Portrait of "The Ratification of the Treaty of Münster", one of the treaties leading to the Peace of Westphalia, where the concept of nation state was born

The nation state is a state that self-identifies as deriving its political legitimacy from serving as a sovereign entity for a nation as a sovereign territorial unit.^[1] The state is a political and geopolitical entity; the nation is a cultural and/or ethnic entity. The term "nation state" implies that the two geographically coincide. Nation state formation took place at different times in different parts of the earth but has become the dominant form of state organization.

The concept and actuality of the nation state can be compared and contrasted with that of the city state,^[2][3][4] empire, confederation, and other state forms with which it may overlap. The key distinction from the other forms is the identification of a people with a polity.

History and origins[link]

The origins and early history of nation states are disputed. A major theoretical issue is: "Which came first, the nation or the nation state?" For nationalists, the answer is that the nation existed first, nationalist movements arose to present its legitimate demand for sovereignty, and the nation state met that demand. Some "modernization theories" of nationalism see the national identity largely as a product of government policy to unify and modernize an already existing state. Most theories see the nation state as a 19th-century European phenomenon, facilitated by developments such as mass literacy and the early mass media. However, historians also note the early emergence of a relatively unified state, and a sense of common identity, in Portugal and the Dutch Republic.

In France, Eric Hobsbawm argues the French state preceded the formation of the French people. Hobsbawm considers that the state made the French nation, not French nationalism, which emerged at the end of the 19th century, the time of the Dreyfus Affair. At the time of the 1789 French Revolution, only half of the French people spoke some French, and 12-13% spoke it "fairly", according to Hobsbawm.

During the Italian unification, the number of people speaking the Italian language was even lower. The French state promoted the unification of various dialects and languages into the French language. The introduction of conscription and the Third Republic's 1880s laws on public instruction, facilitated the creation of a national identity, under this theory.

The theorist Benedict Anderson argues that nations are "imagined communities" (the members cannot possibly know each other), and that the main causes of nationalism and the creation of an imagined community are the reduction of privileged access to particular script languages (such as Latin), the movement to abolish the ideas of divine rule and monarchy, as well as the emergence of the printing press under a system of capitalism (or, as Anderson calls it, print-capitalism). The "state-driven" theories of the origin of nation states tend to emphasize a few specific states, such as England and its rival France. These states expanded from core regions, and developed a national consciousness and sense of national identity ("Englishness" and "Frenchness").

Both assimilated peripheral nations (Wales, Cornubia, Brittany, Occitania); these areas experienced a revival of interest in the national culture in the 19th century, leading to the creation of autonomist movements in the 20th century.^[5]

Some nation states, such as Germany or Italy, came into existence at least partly as a result of political campaigns by nationalists, during the 19th century. In both cases, the territory was previously divided among other states, some of them very small. The sense of common identity was at first a cultural movement, such as in the Völkisch movement in German-speaking states, which rapidly acquired a political significance. In these cases, the nationalist sentiment and the nationalist movement clearly precede the unification of the German and Italian nation states.

Historians Hans Kohn, Liah Greenfeld, Philip White and others have classified nations such as Germany or Italy, where cultural unification preceded state unification, as ethnic nations or ethnic nationalities. Whereas 'state-driven' national unification's, such as in France, England or China, are more likely to flourish in multiethnic societies, producing a traditional national heritage of civic nations, or territory-based nationalities.^[6][7][8]

The idea of a nation state is associated with the rise of the modern system of states, often called the "Westphalian system" in reference to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The balance of power, which characterizes that system, depends for its effectiveness upon clearly defined, centrally controlled, independent entities, whether empires or nation states, which recognize each others sovereignty and territory. The Westphalian system did not create the nation state, but the nation state meets the criteria for its component states (by assuming that there is no disputed territory).

The nation state received a philosophical underpinning in the era of Romanticism, at first as the 'natural' expression of the individual peoples (romantic nationalism: see Johann Gottlieb Fichte's conception of the Volk, which would be later opposed by Ernest Renan). The increasing emphasis during the 19th century on the ethnic and racial origins of the nation, led to a redefinition of the nation state in these terms.^[8] Racism, which in Boulainvilliers's theories was inherently antipatriotic and antinationalist, joined itself with colonialist imperialism and "continental imperialism", most notably in pan-Germanic and pan-Slavic movements.^[9]

The relation between racism and ethnic nationalism reached its height in the 20th century fascism and Nazism. The specific combination of 'nation' ('people') and 'state' expressed in such terms as the Völkische Staat and implemented in laws such as the 1935 Nuremberg laws made fascist states such as early Nazi Germany qualitatively different from non-fascist nation states. Obviously, minorities, who are not part of the Volk, have no authentic or legitimate role in such a state. In Germany, neither Jews nor the Roma were considered part of the Volk, and were specifically targeted for persecution. However German nationality law defined 'German' on the basis of German ancestry, excluding all non-Germans from the 'Volk'.

In recent years, the nation state's claim to absolute sovereignty within its borders has been much criticized.^[8] A global political system based on international agreements and supra-national blocs characterized the post-war era. Non-state actors, such as international corporations and non-governmental organizations, are widely seen as eroding the economic and political power of nation states, potentially leading to their eventual disappearance.

Before nation states[link]

Dissolution of the multiethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire (1918)

In Europe, in the 18th century, the classic non-national states were the multiethnic empires, (the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire) and smaller states at what would now be called sub-national level. The multi-ethnic empire was a monarchy ruled by a king, emperor or sultan. The population belonged to many ethnic groups, and they spoke many languages. The empire was dominated by one ethnic group, and their language was usually the language of public administration. The ruling dynasty was usually, but not always, from that group.

This type of state is not specifically European: such empires existed on all continents, excepting Australia and Antarctica. Some of the smaller European states were not so ethnically diverse, but were also dynastic states, ruled by a royal house. Their territory could expand by royal intermarriage or merge with another state when the dynasty merged. In some parts of Europe, notably Germany, very small territorial units existed. They were recognised by their neighbours as independent, and had their own government and laws. Some were ruled by princes or other hereditary rulers, some were governed by bishops or abbots. Because they were so small, however, they had no separate language or culture: the inhabitants shared the language of the surrounding region.

In some cases these states were simply overthrown by nationalist uprisings in the 19th century. Liberal ideas of free trade played a role in German unification, which was preceded by a customs union, the Zollverein. However, the Austro-Prussian War, and the German alliances in the Franco-Prussian War, were decisive in the unification. The Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire broke up after the First World War and the Russian Empire became the Soviet Union, after the Russian Civil War.

A few of the smaller states survived: the independent principalities of Liechtenstein, Andorra, Monaco, and the republic of San Marino. (Vatican City is different. Although there was a larger Papal State, it was created in its present form by the 1929 Lateran treaties between Italy and the Roman Catholic Church.)

Characteristics of the nation state[link]

Nation states have their own characteristics, differing from those of the pre-national states. For a start, they have a different attitude to their territory, compared to the dynastic monarchies: it is semisacred, and nontransferable. No nation would swap territory with other states simply, for example, because the king's daughter got married. They have a different type of border, in principle defined only by the area of settlement of the national group, although many nation states also sought natural borders (rivers, mountain ranges).

The most noticeable characteristic is the degree to which nation states use the state as an instrument of national unity, in economic, social and cultural life.

The nation state promoted economic unity, by abolishing internal customs and tolls. In Germany, that process, the creation of the Zollverein, preceded formal national unity. Nation states typically have a policy to create and maintain a national transportation infrastructure, facilitating trade and travel. In 19th-century Europe, the expansion of the rail transport networks was at first largely a matter for private railway companies, but gradually came under control of the national governments. The French rail network, with its main lines radiating from Paris to all corners of France, is often seen as a reflection of the centralised French nation state, which directed its construction. Nation states continue to build, for instance, specifically national motorway networks. Specifically, transnational infrastructure programmes, such as the Trans-European Networks, are a recent innovation.

The nation states typically had a more centralised and uniform public administration than its imperial predecessors: they were smaller, and the population less diverse. (The internal diversity of the Ottoman Empire, for instance, was very great.) After the 19th-century triumph of the nation state in Europe, regional identity was subordinate to national identity, in regions such as Alsace-Lorraine, Catalonia, Brittany, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. In many cases, the regional administration was also subordinated to central (national) government. This process was partially reversed from the 1970s onward, with the introduction of various forms of regional autonomy, in formerly centralised states such as France.

The most obvious impact of the nation state, as compared to its non-national predecessors, is the creation of a uniform national culture, through state policy. The model of the nation state implies that its population constitutes a nation, united by a common descent, a common language and many forms of shared culture. When the implied unity was absent, the nation state often tried to create it. It promoted a uniform national language, through language policy. The creation of national systems of compulsory primary education and a relatively uniform curriculum in secondary schools, was the most effective instrument in the spread of the national languages. The schools also taught the national history, often in a propagandistic and mythologised version, and (especially during conflicts) some nation states still teach this kind of history.^[10]

Language and cultural policy was sometimes negative, aimed at the suppression of non-national elements. Language prohibitions were sometimes used to accelerate the adoption of national languages and the decline of minority languages (see Germanisation).

In some cases, these policies triggered bitter conflicts and further ethnic separatism. But where it worked, the cultural uniformity and homogeneity of the population increased. Conversely, the cultural divergence at the border became sharper: in theory, a uniform French identity extends from the Atlantic coast to the Rhine, and on the other bank of the Rhine, a uniform German identity begins. To enforce that model, both sides have divergent language policy and educational systems, although the linguistic boundary is in fact well inside France, and the Alsace region changed hands four times between 1870 and 1945.

Examples[link]

The nation state in practice[link]

The largest ethnic group as the percentage of total population.
* Dark yellow: 85% and above.
* Yellow: 65-84%.
* Light yellow: 64% and below;
* Blue: Traditional ethnic definitions do not apply. Ethnicity is replaced by color of skin.
(Source: WFB. Data as of 2000-2008).

In some cases, the geographic boundaries of an ethnic population and a political state largely coincide. In these cases, there is little immigration or emigration, few members of ethnic minorities, and few members of the "home" ethnicity living in other countries.

Clear examples of nation states (where ethnic groups make up more than 95% of the population are shown) include the following: (For further detail, please see the respective ethnic groups of the nation states mentioned as examples.)

• Albania: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Albanian at about 98.6% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
• Armenia: The vast majority of Armenia's population consists of ethnic Armenians at about 98% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
• Bangladesh: The vast majority ethnic group of Bangladesh are the Bengali people, comprising 98% of the population, with the remainder consisting of mostly Bihari migrants and indigenous tribal groups. Therefore, Bangladeshi society is to a great extent linguistically and culturally homogeneous, with very small populations of foreign expatriates and workers, although there is a substantial number of Bengali workers living abroad.
• Egypt: The vast majority of Egypt's population consists of ethnic Egyptians at about 99% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities, as well as refugees or asylum seekers. Modern Egyptian identity is closely tied to the geography of Egypt and its long history, its development over the centuries saw overlapping or conflicting ideologies. Though today an Arabic-speaking people, that aspect constitutes for Egyptians a cultural dimension of their identity, not a necessary attribute of or prop for their national political being. Today most Egyptians see themselves, their history, culture and language (the Egyptian variant of Arabic) as specifically Egyptian and at the same time as a part of "Arabs."
• Estonia: Defined as a nation state in its 1922 constitution; up until the period of Soviet colonialisation Estonia was historically a very homogenous state with 88.1% of residents being Estonians and 8.2% Russians according to the 1934 census.^[11] As a result of Soviet policies the demographic situation changed dramatically with the arrival of Russian speaking settlers. Today Estonians is 74.0% and Russians is 25.5% (2010)^[12]. A significant proportion (84.1%) is citizens of Estonia, around 7.3% are citizens of Russia and 7.0% as yet undefined citizenship (2010).^[12][11]
• Hungary: The Hungarians or the Magyar people consist of about 95% of the population, with a small Roma and German minority: see Demographics of Hungary.
• Iceland: Although the inhabitants are ethnically related to other Scandinavian groups, the national culture and language are found only in Iceland. There are no cross-border minorities, the nearest land is too far away: see Demographics of Iceland

Ainu, an ethnic minority people from Japan (between 1863 and early 1870s).

• Japan: Japan is also traditionally seen as an example of a nation state and also the largest of the nation states, with population in excess of 120 million. It should be noted that Japan has a small number of minorities such as Ryūkyū peoples, Koreans and Chinese, and on the northern island of Hokkaidō, the indigenous Ainu minority. However, they are either numerically insignificant (Ainu), their difference is not as pronounced (though Ryukyuan culture is closely related to Japanese culture, it is nonetheless distinctive in that it historically received much more influence from China and has separate political and nonpolitical and religious traditions) or well assimilated (Zainichi^{[disambiguation needed ]} population is collapsing due to assimilation/naturalisation).
• Lebanon: The Arabic-speaking Lebanese consist at about 95% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities, as well as refugees or asylum seekers. Modern Lebanese identity is closely tied to the geography of Lebanon and its history. Although they are now an Arabic-speaking people and ethnically homogeneous, its identity oversees overlapping or conflicting ideologies between its Phoenician heritage and Arab heritage. While many Lebanese regard themselves as Arab, other Lebanese regard themselves, their history, and their culture as Phoenician and not Arab, while still other Lebanese regard themselves as both.
• Lesotho: Lesotho's ethno-linguistic structure consists almost entirely of the Basotho (singular Mosotho), a Bantu-speaking people; about 99.7% of the population are Basotho.
• Maldives: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Dhivehi at about 98% of the population, with the remainder consisting of foreign workers; there are no indigenous ethnic minorities.
• Malta: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Maltese at about 95.3% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
• Mongolia: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Mongol at about 95.0% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few ethnic minorities included in Kazakhs.
• North and South Korea, are one of the most ethnically and linguistically homogeneous in the world. Particularly in reclusive North Korea, there are very few ethnic minority groups and expatriate foreigners.
• Poland: After World War II, with the extermination of the Jews by the invading German Nazis during the Holocaust, the Expulsion of Germans after World War II and the loss of eastern territories (Kresy), 96.7% of the people of Poland claim Polish nationality, and 97.8% declare that they speak Polish at home (Census 2002).
• Several Polynesian countries such as Tonga, Samoa, Tuvalu, etc.^{[citation needed]}
• Portugal: Although surrounded by other lands and people, the Portuguese nation has occupied the same territory since the romanization or latinization of the native population during the Roman era. The modern Portuguese nation is a very old amalgam of formerly distinct historical populations that passed through and settled in the territory of modern Portugal: native Iberian peoples, Celts, ancient Mediterraneans (Greeks, Phoenicians, Romans, Jews), invading Germanic peoples like the Suebi and the Visigoths, and Muslim Arabs and Berbers. Most Berber/Arab people and the Jews were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula during the Reconquista and the repopulation by Christians.
• San Marino: The Sammarinese make up about 97% of the population and all speak Italian and are ethnically and linguisticially identical to Italians. San Marino is a landlocked enclave, completely surrounded by Italy. The state has a population of approximately 30,000, including 1,000 foreigners, most of whom are Italians.
• Swaziland: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Swazi at about 98.6% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.

The notion of a unifying "national identity" also extends to countries that host multiple ethnic or language groups, such as India and China. For example, Switzerland is constitutionally a confederation of cantons, and has four official languages, but it has also a 'Swiss' national identity, a national history and a classic national hero, Wilhelm Tell.^[13]

Innumerable conflicts have arisen where political boundaries did not correspond with ethnic or cultural boundaries. For one example, the Hatay Province was transferred to Turkey from Syria after the majority-Turkish population complained of mistreatment. The traditional homeland of the Kurdish people extends between northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey, and western Iran. Some of its inhabitants call for the creation of an independent Kurdistan, citing mistreatment by the Turkish and Iraqi governments. An armed conflict between the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party and the Turkish government over this issue has been ongoing since 1984.

After WWII in the Tito era, nationalism was appealed to for uniting South Slav peoples. Later in the 20th century, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, leaders appealed to ancient ethnic feuds or tensions that ignited conflict between the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as well Bosnians, Montenegrins and Macedonians, eventually breaking up the long collaboration of peoples and ethnic cleansing was carried out in the Balkans, resulting in the destruction of the formerly communist republic and produced the civil wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992–95, resulted in mass population displacements and segregation that radically altered what was once a highly diverse and intermixed ethnic makeup of the region. These conflicts were largely about creating a new political framework of states, each of which would be ethnically and politically homogeneous. Serbians, Croatians and Bosnians insisted they were ethnically distinct although many communities had a long history of intermarriage. All could speak the common Serbo-Croatian Language. Presently Slovenia (89% Slovene), Croatia (88% Croat) and Serbia (83% Serb) could be classified as nation states per se, whereas Macedonia (66% Macedonian), Montenegro (42% Montenegrin) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (47% Bosniak) are multinational states.

Ethnolinguistic map of mainland China and Taiwan

Belgium is a classic example of an artificial state that is not a nation state. The state was formed by secession from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830, whose neutrality and integrity was protected by the Treaty of London 1839; thus it served as a buffer state between the European powers France, Prussia (After 1871 the German Empire), the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands until World War I. Belgium is divided between the Flemings in the north and the French-speaking or the German-speaking population in the south. The Flemish population in the north speaks Dutch, the Walloon population in the south speaks French and/or German. The Brussels population speaks French and/or Flemish.

The Flemish identity is also ethnic and cultural, and there is a strong separatist movement espoused by the political parties, Vlaams Belang and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie. The Francophone Walloon identity of Belgium is linguistically distinct and regionalist. There is also is unitary Belgian nationalism, several versions of a Greater Netherlands ideal, and a German-speaking community of Belgium annexed from Prussia in 1920, and re-annexed by Germany in 1940–1944. However these ideologies are all very marginal and politically insignificant during elections.

China covers a large geographic area and uses the concept of "Zhonghua minzu" or Chinese nationality, in the sense of ethnic groups, but it also officially recognizes the majority Han ethnic group which accounts for over 90% of the population, and no fewer than 55 ethnic national minorities.

The United Kingdom[link]

Map of the United Kingdom showing its four "constituent countries".

The United Kingdom is a complex example of a nation state, due to its "countries within a country" status. The UK is a unitary state formed initially by the merger of two independent kingdoms, the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of Scotland, but the Treaty of Union (1707) that set out the agreed terms has ensured the continuation of distinct features of each state, including separate legal systems and separate national churches.

In 2003, the British Government described the United Kingdom as "countries within a country".^[14] While the Office for National Statistics and others describe the United Kingdom as a "nation state",^[15][16] others, including a then Prime Minister, describe it as a "multinational state",^[17][18][19] and the term Home Nations is used to describe the four national teams that represent the four nations of the United Kingdom (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales).^[20]

Israel[link]

Israel's definition of a nation state differs from other countries as its concept of a nation state is based on the Ethnoreligious group (Judaism) rather than solely on ethnicity, while the ancient mother language of the Jews, Hebrew, was revived as a unifying bond between them as a national and official language.

Israel was founded as a Jewish state in 1948, and the country's Basic Laws describe it as both a Jewish and a democratic state. According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 75.7% of Israel's population is Jewish.^[21] Large numbers of Jews continue to emigrate to Israel. Arabs, who make up 20.4% of the population, are the largest ethnic minority in Israel. Israel also has very small communities of Armenians, Circassians, Assyrians, Samaritans, and persons of some Jewish heritage. There are also some non-Jewish spouses of Israeli Jews. However, these communities are very small, and usually number only in the hundreds or thousands.

Pakistan[link]

Pakistan, even being an ethnically diverse country, is regarded as a nation state^[22] due to its ideology on basis of which it got independence from British India as a separate nation rather than as a unified India.^[23][24][25] Pakistanis are strongly bonded by their Muslim identity, culture, heritage, a single national language (Urdu) and values in the subcontinent.^[22][26]

Minorities[link]

Romani arrivals at the Belzec death camp await instructions.

The most obvious deviation from the ideal of 'one nation, one state', is the presence of minorities, especially ethnic minorities, which are clearly not members of the majority nation. An ethnic nationalist definition of a nation is necessarily exclusive: ethnic nations typically do not have open membership. In most cases, there is a clear idea that surrounding nations are different, and that includes members of those nations who live on the 'wrong side' of the border. Historical examples of groups, who have been specifically singled out as outsiders, are the Roma and Jews in Europe.

Negative responses to minorities within the nation state have ranged from cultural assimilation enforced by the state, to expulsion, persecution, violence, and extermination. The assimilation policies are usually enforced by the state, but violence against minorities is not always state initiated: it can occur in the form of mob violence such as lynching or pogroms. Nation states are responsible for some of the worst historical examples of violence against minorities: minorities not considered part of the nation.

However, many nation states accept specific minorities as being part of the nation, and the term national minority is often used in this sense. The Sorbs in Germany are an example: for centuries they have lived in German-speaking states, surrounded by a much larger ethnic German population, and they have no other historical territory. They are now generally considered to be part of the German nation and are accepted as such by the Federal Republic of Germany, which constitutionally guarantees their cultural rights. Of the thousands of ethnic and cultural minorities in nation states across the world, only a few have this level of acceptance and protection.

Multiculturalism is an official policy in many states, establishing the ideal of peaceful existence among multiple ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups. Many nations have laws protecting minority rights.

When national boundaries that do not match ethnic boundaries are drawn, such as in the Balkans and Central Asia, ethnic tension, massacres and even genocide, sometimes has occurred historically (see Bosnian genocide and 2010 South Kyrgyzstan riots).

Irredentism[link]

The Greater German Empire under Nazi Germany in 1943

Ideally, the border of a nation state extends far enough to include all the members of the nation, and all of the national homeland. Again, in practice some of them always live on the 'wrong side' of the border. Part of the national homeland may be there too, and it may be governed by the 'wrong' nation. The response to the non-inclusion of territory and population may take the form of irredentism: demands to annex unredeemed territory and incorporate it into the nation state.

Irredentist claims are usually based on the fact that an identifiable part of the national group lives across the border. However, they can include claims to territory where no members of that nation live at present, because they lived there in the past, the national language is spoken in that region, the national culture has influenced it, geographical unity with the existing territory, or a wide variety of other reasons. Past grievances are usually involved and can cause revanchism.

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish irredentism from pan-nationalism, since both claim that all members of an ethnic and cultural nation belong in one specific state. Pan-nationalism is less likely to specify the nation ethnically. For instance, variants of Pan-Germanism have different ideas about what constituted Greater Germany, including the confusing term Grossdeutschland, which, in fact, implied the inclusion of huge Slavic minorities from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Typically, irredentist demands are at first made by members of non-state nationalist movements. When they are adopted by a state, they typically result in tensions, and actual attempts at annexation are always considered a casus belli, a cause for war. In many cases, such claims result in long-term hostile relations between neighbouring states. Irredentist movements, typically circulate maps of the claimed national territory, the greater nation state. That territory, which is often much larger than the existing state, plays a central role in their propaganda.

Irredentism should not be confused with claims to overseas colonies, which are not generally considered part of the national homeland. Some French overseas colonies would be an exception: French rule in Algeria unsuccessfully treated the colony as a département of France.

Future[link]

It has been speculated by both proponents of globalization and various science fiction writers that the concept of a nation state may disappear with the ever-increasingly interconnected nature of the world.^[8][27][28] Such ideas are sometimes expressed around concepts of a world government. Another possibility is a societal collapse and move into communal anarchy or zero world government, in which nation states no longer exist and government is done on the local level based on a global ethic of human rights.^{[original research?]}

This falls into line with the concept of internationalism, which states that sovereignty is an outdated concept and a barrier to achieving peace and harmony in the world, thus also stating that nation states are also a similar outdated concept.

If the nation state begins to disappear, it may well be the direct or indirect result of globalization and internationalism. The two concepts state that sovereignty is an outdated concept and, as the concept and existence of a nation state depends on 'untouchable' sovereignty, it is therefore reasonable to assume that.^{[original research?]}

Globalization especially has helped to bring about the discussion about the disappearance of nation states, as global trade and the rise of the concepts of a 'global citizen' and a common identity have helped to reduce differences and 'distances' between individual nation states, especially with regards to the internet.^[29]

Clash of civilizations[link]

In direct contrast to cosmopolitan theories about an ever more connected world that no longer requires nation states, is the Clash of Civilizations theory. The proposal by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington is that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post–Cold War world.

The theory was originally formulated in a 1992 lecture^[30] at the American Enterprise Institute, which was then developed in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled "The Clash of Civilizations?",^[31] in response to Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man. Huntington later expanded his thesis in a 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature of global politics in the post–Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that human rights, liberal democracy and capitalist free market economics had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post–Cold War world. Specifically, Francis Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the 'end of history' in a Hegelian sense.

Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had reverted only to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the future will be along cultural and religious lines.

As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict.

In the 1993 Foreign Affairs article, Huntington writes:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.^[31]

Scholar Sandra Joireman suggests that Huntington may be characterised as a neo-primordialist since while he sees people as having strong ties to their ethnicity, he does not believe that these ties have always existed.^[32]

See also[link]

• Bioregionalism – as an alternative to Nation States.
• City-state
• Multinational state
• National personification
• Primordialism
• Titular nation

References[link]

Further reading[link]

• Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities. ISBN 0-86091-329-5 .
• Luca Bellocchio, Fine dello stato o stato senza fine?, Democrazia e Diritto, No. 4, 2005, 197-206
• Colomer, Josep M.. 2007. Great Empires, Small Nations. The Uncertain Future of the Sovereign State. ISBN 0-415-43775-X .
• Gellner, Ernest (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-1662-0 .
• Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1992). Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-43961-2.
• Khan, Ali (1992). The Extinction of Nation states
• Renan, Ernest. 1882. "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" ("What is a Nation?")
• Malesevic, Sinisa (2006). Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism New York: Palgrave.
• Smith, Anthony D. (1986). The Ethnic Origins of Nations London: Basil Blackwell. pp 6–18. ISBN 0-631-15205-9.
• White, Philip L. (2006). "Globalization and the Mythology of the Nation State," In A.G.Hopkins, ed. Global History: Interactions Between the Universal and the Local Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 257–284. [2]

External links[link]

• From Paris to Cairo: Resistance of the Unacculturated (Identity and the Nation state)

A nation may refer to a community of people who share a common language, culture, ethnicity, descent, or history.^[1] In this definition, a nation has no physical borders. However, it can also refer to people who share a common territory and government (for example the inhabitants of a sovereign state) irrespective of their ethnic make-up.^[2][3] In international relations, nation can refer to a country or sovereign state.^[1] The word nation can more specifically refer to people of North American Indians, such as the Cherokee Nation that prefer this term over the contested term tribe.^[1]

According to Joseph Stalin writing in 1913 in Marxism and the National Question: "a nation is not a racial or tribal, but a historically constituted community of people;" "a nation is not a casual or ephemeral conglomeration, but a stable community of people;" "a common language is one of the characteristic features of a nation;" "a nation is formed only as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of people living together generation after generation;" "a common territory is one of the characteristic features of a nation;" "a common economic life, economic cohesion, is one of the characteristic features of a nation;" "a common psychological make-up, which manifests itself in a common culture, is one of the characteristic features of a nation;" "A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture." According to Stalin, this would exclude Jews as they have no common territory.^[4]

An alternative view, expressed by Otto Bauer, author of Social Democracy and the Nationalities Question (1907), that "A nation is an aggregate of people bound into a community of character by a common destiny." would include Jews. R. Springer, author of The National Problem (1909), also cited by Stalin in his discussion of this matter, held similar views.^[4]

Etymology[link]

The word nation came to English from the Old French word nacion, which in turn originates from the Latin word natio (nātĭō) literally meaning "that which has been born".^[5]

As an example of how the word natio was employed in classical Latin, the following quote from Cicero's Philippics Against Mark Antony in 44 BC contrasts the external, inferior nationes ("races of people") with the Roman civitas ("community"):

"Omnes nationes servitutem ferre possunt: nostra civitas non potest."
("All races are able to bear enslavement, but our community cannot.")

— Cicero, Orationes: Pro Milone, Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, Pro rege Deiotaro, Philippicae I-XIV^[6]

An early example of the use of the word "nation" (in conjunction with language and territory) was provided in 968 by Liutprand (the bishop of Cremona) who, while confronting the Byzantine emperor, Nicephorus II, on behalf of his patron Otto I, Holy Roman Emperor, declared:

"The land...which you say belongs to your empire belongs, as the nationality and language of the people proves, to the kingdom of Italy.'"

— Liutprand, Relatio de legatione Constantinopolitana ad Nicephorum Phocam ^[7]

[edit] Medieval nationes

A significant early use of the term nation, as natio, occurred at mediaeval universities^[8] to describe the colleagues in a college or students, above all at the University of Paris, who were all born within a pays, spoke the same language and expected to be ruled by their own familiar law. In 1383 and 1384, while studying theology at Paris, Jean Gerson was elected twice as a procurator for the French natio. The University of Prague adopted the division of students into nationes: from its opening in 1349 the studium generale which consisted of Bohemian, Bavarian, Saxon and Polish nations.

In a similar way, the nationes were segregated by the Knights Hospitaller of Jerusalem, who maintained at Rhodes the hostels from which they took their name "where foreigners eat and have their places of meeting, each nation apart from the others, and a Knight has charge of each one of these hostels, and provides for the necessities of the inmates according to their religion", as the Spanish traveller Pedro Tafur noted in 1436.^[9]

See also[link]

References[link]

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Jacob Zuma GCB
President of South Africa
Incumbent
Assumed office 9 May 2009
Deputy	Kgalema Motlanthe
Preceded by	Kgalema Motlanthe
President of the African National Congress
Incumbent
Assumed office 18 December 2007
Deputy	Kgalema Motlanthe
Preceded by	Thabo Mbeki
Deputy President of South Africa
In office 14 June 1999 – 14 June 2005
President	Thabo Mbeki
Preceded by	Thabo Mbeki
Succeeded by	Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka
Member of Parliament
In office 1999–2005
Personal details
Born	Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma (1942-04-12) 12 April 1942 (age 70) Inkandla, South Africa
Nationality	South African
Political party	African National Congress (1959–present)
Spouse(s)	Gertrude Sizakele Khumalo (1973–present) Kate Zuma (1976–2000)[1] Nkosazana Dlamini (1982–1998) Nompumelelo Ntuli (2008–present) Thobeka Mabhija (2010–present)[2] Gloria Bongekile Ngema (2012-present)[3]
Children	20
Religion	Protestantism (Full Gospel Church of Southern Africa)[4]

Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma (born 12 April 1942) is the President of South Africa,^[5] elected by parliament following his party's victory in the 2009 general election.

Zuma is the President of the African National Congress (ANC), the governing political party, and was Deputy President of South Africa from 1999 to 2005.^[6] Zuma is also referred to by his initials JZ^[7] and his clan name Msholozi.^[8][9] Zuma became the President of the ANC on 18 December 2007 after defeating incumbent Thabo Mbeki at the ANC conference in Polokwane. Zuma was also a member of the South African Communist Party (SACP),^[10] briefly serving on the party's Politburo until he left the party in 1990.^[11] On 20 September 2008, Thabo Mbeki announced his resignation after being recalled by the African National Congress's National Executive Committee,^[12] following a conclusion by Judge Nicholson of improper interference in the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), including the prosecution of Jacob Zuma for corruption.

Zuma has faced significant legal challenges. He was charged with rape in 2005, but was acquitted. In addition, he fought a long legal battle over allegations of racketeering and corruption, resulting from his financial advisor Schabir Shaik's conviction for corruption and fraud. On 6 April 2009, the National Prosecuting Authority decided to drop the charges, citing political interference.

Life and career[link]

Early years[link]

Zuma was born in Nkandla, Zululand (now part of KwaZulu-Natal).^[13] His father was a policeman who died when Zuma was still a young boy, and his mother a domestic worker.^[14] He received no formal schooling.^[15] As a child, he was constantly moving between Zululand and the suburbs of Durban in the area of Umkhumbane (near Chesterville).^[16] He has two brothers, Michael and Joseph.^[17]

Imprisonment and ban[link]

Zuma engaged in politics at an early age and joined the African National Congress in 1959. He became an active member of Umkhonto we Sizwe in 1962, following the banning of the ANC in 1961. He joined the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1963.^[10] In 1963, he was arrested with a group of 45 recruits near Zeerust in the western Transvaal, currently part of the North West Province. Convicted of conspiring to overthrow the Apartheid government which was led by white minorities, he was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, which he served on Robben Island with Nelson Mandela and other notable ANC leaders who were also imprisoned there. Whilst imprisoned Zuma served as a referee for prisoners' association football games, organised by the prisoners' own governing body, Makana F.A.^[18]

After his release, he was instrumental in the re-establishment of ANC underground structures in the Natal province.^[6]

He first left South Africa in 1975 and met Thabo Mbeki in Swaziland, and proceeded to Mozambique, where he dealt with the arrival of thousands of exiles in the wake of the Soweto uprising.

He became a member of the ANC National Executive Committee in 1977. He also served as Deputy Chief Representative of the ANC in Mozambique, a post he occupied until the signing of the Nkomati Accord between the Mozambican and South African governments in 1984. After signing the Accord, he was appointed as Chief Representative of the ANC.

He served on the ANC's political and military council when it was formed in the mid-1980s, and was elected to the politburo of the SACP on April 1989.^[19]

In January 1987, Zuma was again forced to leave a country, this time by the government of Mozambique. He moved to the ANC Head Office in Lusaka, Zambia, where he was appointed Head of Underground Structures and shortly thereafter Chief of the Intelligence Department. His tenure there remains the subject of considerable controversy.^[10]

Return from exile[link]

Following the end of the ban on the ANC in February 1990, he was one of the first ANC leaders to return to South Africa to begin the process of negotiations.^[6]

In 1990, he was elected Chairperson of the ANC for the Southern Natal region, and took a leading role in fighting political violence in the region between members of the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). He was elected the Deputy Secretary General of the ANC the next year, and in January 1994, he was nominated as the ANC candidate for the Premiership of KwaZulu Natal.

The IFP, led by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, put particular emphasis on Zulu pride and political power during this period. In this context, Zuma's Zulu heritage made his role especially important in the ANC's efforts to end the violence, to emphasise the political (rather than tribal) roots of the violence, and to win the support of Zulu people in the region.

Rise to national leadership[link]

Zuma had experience in national leadership, as he started serving in the National Executive committee of the ANC in 1977 when the party was still a liberation movement. By the time he became its president he had served the ANC for thirty years. After the 1994 general election, with the ANC becoming a governing party but having lost KwaZulu-Natal province to the IFP, he was appointed as Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) of Economic Affairs and Tourism for the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government, after stepping aside to allow Thabo Mbeki to run unopposed for deputy presidency. In December 1994, he was elected National Chairperson of the ANC and chairperson of the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, and was re-elected to the latter position in 1996. He was elected Deputy President of the ANC at the National Conference held at Mafikeng in December 1997 and consequently appointed executive Deputy President of South Africa in June 1999.

During this time, he also worked in Kampala, Uganda, as facilitator of the Burundi peace process, along with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. Museveni chairs the Great Lakes Regional Initiative, a grouping of regional presidents overseeing the peace process in Burundi, where several armed Hutu groups took up arms in 1993 against a government and army dominated by the Tutsi minority that they claimed had assassinated the first president elected from the Hutu majority.^[20]

On 14 June 2005 Zuma was expelled from his post as Deputy President due to corruption and fraud related to the $5-billion weapons acquisition deal by the South African government in 1999. Zuma's successor as Deputy President of South Africa was Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, the wife of Bulelani Ngcuka. Mlambo-Ngcuka had been Minister of Minerals and Energy since 1999. While her appointment was widely welcomed by the business community, she was booed publicly at many ANC rallies by Zuma supporters between the time corruption charges had been filed but before rape charges were made with the first booing taking place in Utrecht.^[21]

Election as ANC President[link]

Zuma with Barack Obama and Michelle Obama in New York, 2009

In terms of party tradition, as the deputy president of the ANC, Zuma was already in line to succeed Mbeki. The party structures held their nominations conferences in October and November 2007, where Zuma appeared favourite for the post of ANC President, and, by implication, the President of South Africa in 2009.^[22][23][24] Zuma was elected President of the ANC on 18 December 2007 with 2329 votes, beating the second-term ANC and South African president Thabo Mbeki's 1505 votes. On 28 December 2007, the National Prosecuting Authority served Zuma an indictment to stand trial in the High Court on various counts of racketeering, money laundering, corruption and fraud.^[25]

President of South Africa[link]

Argentinean President Cristina Fernández and South African President Zuma speaking together.

In September 2008, the ANC ruled Thabo Mbeki unfit to rule a country, thus ending his parliamentary support and forcing his resignation from the country's presidency. It was announced that the party's deputy president, Kgalema Motlanthe, would become president until 2009 general elections, after which Zuma would become president.^[26][27] He won the election on 6 May and was sworn in as president of South Africa on 9 May 2009.

Political-economic orientation[link]

Zuma is an economic leftist, who described himself as a socialist.^[28] He has received support from trade unions and from the South African Communist Party. He also received support from women's and youth leagues of the African National Congress.^[28] According to The Guardian and The New York Times, he supports redistribution of wealth, and has allied himself with socialists and communists that seek to redistribute wealth.^[28][29] But The Guardian (UK) also reported that Zuma has tried "to reassure foreign investors their interests will be protected."

Corruption charges[link]

Zuma became embroiled in a corruption related controversy after his financial advisor, Schabir Shaik, was charged with corruption and fraud. Bulelani Ngcuka, the national director of Public Prosecutions at the time, investigated both Zuma and the Chief Whip of the ANC, Tony Yengeni, after allegations of abuse of power were levelled against them. This concerned improper influence in the controversial arms deal, and the question of financial benefit as a result of such influence. While Yengeni was found guilty, the case was dropped against Zuma, with Ngcuka stating, "...that there was prima facie evidence of corruption, but insufficient to win the case in court".^[30] Ngcuka moved to private practice after criticism from the ANC over this incident.

In 2004, Zuma became a key figure mentioned in the Schabir Shaik trial. Schabir Shaik, a Durban businessman and his financial advisor, was questioned over bribery in the course of the purchase of Valour class frigates for the South African Navy, a proposed waterfront development in Durban, and lavish spending on Zuma's residence in Nkandla. In the trial Shaik was shown to have solicited a bribe of R500 000 per annum for Zuma in return for Zuma's support for the defence contractor Thomson CSF, documented in the infamous "encrypted fax".^[31][32] On 2 June 2005, Shaik was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years in prison.^[33]

Judge Hilary Squires elaborates in detail on the numerous transactions that transpired between Zuma and Shaik, summarising with "all the accused companies were used at one time or another to pay sums of money to Jacob Zuma". The media mis-quoted Squires with the phrase "A generally corrupt relationship" (existed between Zuma and Shaik), whereas these exact words do not appear in the court transcripts.^[34] To the defence of the originators of this phrase, the full transcript^[35][36] of the judgment against Shaik actually does mention Zuma 471 times, uses word "corrupt" or "corruption" 54 times, and contains 12 sentences with both the word "corrupt" and the name "Zuma". Media sources later switched to the phrase "mutually beneficial symbiosis", from the judgment's paragraph 235: "It would be flying in the face of commonsense and ordinary human nature to think that he did not realise the advantages to him of continuing to enjoy Zuma's goodwill to an even greater extent than before 1997; and even if nothing was ever said between them to establish the mutually beneficial symbiosis that the evidence shows existed, the circumstances of the commencement and the sustained continuation thereafter of these payments, can only have generated a sense of obligation in the recipient."

After twelve days of intense media speculation about his future, President Thabo Mbeki relieved Zuma of his duties as deputy president on 14 June 2005. Mbeki told a joint sitting of parliament that "in the interest of the honourable Deputy President, the government, our young democratic system and our country, it would be best to release the honourable Jacob Zuma from his responsibilities as Deputy President of the republic and member of the cabinet." Zuma then resigned as a Member of Parliament.

In the aftermath of the Shaik trial, Zuma was formally charged with corruption by the National Prosecuting Authority. The case was struck from the roll of the Pietermaritzburg High Court after the prosecution's application for a postponement (petitioned in order to allow the NPA to secure admissible forms of documentation required as evidence) was dismissed. In dismissing the application for postponement the Court rendered moot the defence's application for a permanent stay of proceedings which would prevent Zuma from being criminally prosecuted.^[37]

Zuma's legal team continued to delay proceedings and in spite of Zuma's claim that he desired the matter to appear in court, succeeded in making critical evidence unavailable to the court resulting in the prosecution making an application for postponement on the set date. As the prosecution was not ready the case was struck from the roll after the prosecution's application for a postponement was dismissed,^[37] however Zuma's legal team was unsuccessful in its attempts to have the courts grant a permanent stay of proceedings (which would have rendered Zuma immune to prosecution on the charges). This left Zuma open to being recharged with corruption as soon as the NPA completed preparing its case.

On 8 November 2007 the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the National Prosecuting Authority with respect to appeals relating to various search and seizure exercises performed by the and rejected four appeals made by Zuma's defence team. This ruling pertained to the National Prosecuting Authority obtaining the personal diary of senior member of a French arms company, which may have provided information relating to Zuma's possible corrupt practices during the awarding of an arms deal.

On 28 December 2007, the Scorpions served Zuma an indictment to stand trial in the High Court on various counts of racketeering, money laundering, corruption and fraud. A conviction and sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year would have rendered Zuma ineligible for election to the South African Parliament and consequently he would not have been eligible to serve as President of South Africa.

Charges declared unlawful[link]

Zuma appeared in court on 4 August 2008. On 12 September 2008, Pietermaritzburg Judge Chris Nicholson held that Zuma's corruption charges were unlawful on procedural grounds in that the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions ("NDPP") did not give Zuma a chance to make representations before deciding to charge him (this is a requirement of the South Africa Constitution), and directed the state to pay legal costs.^[38][39][40] Nicholson also added, however that he believed political interference played a role in the decision to recharge Zuma, although he did not say this was the reason why he held that the charges brought against Zuma were unlawful. Nicholson also stressed that his ruling did not relate to Zuma's guilt or innocence, but was merely on a procedural point. Various media reports had incorrectly reported that the charges against Zuma had been dismissed.^[41][42] This was not the case. It remained competent for the NDPP to recharge Zuma, however, only once he had been given an opportunity to make representations to the NDPP in respect of the NDPP's decision to do so. In paragraph 47 of the Judgment, Judge Nicholson wrote,

The obligation to hear representations forms part of the audi alteram partem principle. What is required is that a person who may be adversely affected by a decision be given an opportunity to make representations with a view to procuring a favourable result. The affected person should usually be informed of the gist or the substance of the case, which he is to answer.

The Court held that the NDPP's failure to follow the procedure outlined in Section 179(5)(d) of the Constitution rendered the decision by the NDPP to recharge Zuma unlawful. Judge Nicholson found that there were various inferences to be drawn from the timing of the charges levelled against Zuma (such as the fact that he was charged soon after he was elected president of the ANC) which would warrant a conclusion that there had been a degree of political interference by the Executive arm of government. Judge Nicholson writes in paragraph 210 of his judgement,

The timing of the indictment [of Zuma] by Mr Mpshe on 28 December 2007, after the President suffered a political defeat at Polokwane was most unfortunate. This factor, together with the suspension of Mr Pikoli, who was supposed to be independent and immune from executive interference, persuade me that the most plausible inference is that the baleful political influence was continuing.

In paragraph 220 of the Judgement Judge Nicholson went on to write,

There is a distressing pattern in the behaviour which I have set out above indicative of political interference, pressure or influence. It commences with the "political leadership" given by Minister Maduna to Mr Ngcuka, when he declined to prosecute the applicant, to his communications and meetings with Thint representatives and the other matters to which I have alluded. Given the rules of evidence the court is forced to accept the inference which is the least favourable to the party's cause who had peculiar knowledge of the true facts. It is certainly more egregious than the "hint or suggestion" of political interference referred to in the Yengeni matter. It is a matter of grave concern that this process has taken place in the new South Africa given the ravages it caused under the Apartheid order."^[43]

Prior to the hearing there had been a spate of criticism of the South African Judiciary by Zuma supporters,^[44] amongst whom were some prominent legal minds, such as Paul Ngobeni^[45] In that context, the irony was that this was the third time the South African Judiciary had found in his favour, including Zuma's acquittal of the rape charge brought against him. The NDPP soon announced its intention to appeal the decision.

Charges reinstated on appeal[link]

Thabo Mbeki filed an affidavit and applied to the Constitutional Court to appeal Pietermaritzburg High Court Judge Chris Nicholson's ruling:

It was improper for the court to make such far-reaching "vexatious, scandalous and prejudicial" findings concerning me, to be judged and condemned on the basis of the findings in the Zuma matter. The interests of justice, in my respectful submission would demand that the matter be rectified. These adverse findings have led to my being recalled by my political party, the ANC – a request I have acceded to as a committed and loyal member of the ANC for the past 52 years. I fear that if not rectified, I might suffer further prejudice.^[46]

Tlali Tlali, National Prosecuting Authority spokesman, stated by phone from Pretoria, on 23 September, "We have received the papers. It's under consideration."^[47]

The judgement for the appeal was handed down on 12 January 2009 at the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bloemfontein. Deputy Judge President Louis Harmse had to rule on two aspects of the appeal. The first aspect was whether or not Zuma had the right to be invited to make representations to the NPA before they decided to reinstate charges of bribery and corruption against him. The second aspect was whether Judge Nicholson was correct in implying political meddling by the then President Thabo Mbeki with regards to the NPA's decision to charge Zuma.

On the question of the NPA's obligation to invite representations when reviewing decisions Harmse DP found that Nicholson's interpretation of section 179 of the Constitution was incorrect in that the NPA did not have such an obligation and thus was free to have charged Zuma as it did. On the question of Nicholson's inferences of political meddling by Mbeki, Harmse DP found that the lower court "overstepped the limits of its authority".

Charges dropped[link]

On 6 April 2009, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) dropped all charges against Zuma, as well as co-accused French arms company Thint, in light of new revelations about serious flaws in the prosecution.^[48] The revelations were in the form of intercepted phone calls showing that the head of the Scorpions, Leonard McCarthy, and the former National Director of Public Prosecutions, Bulelani Ngcuka, had conspired over the timing of the charges laid against Zuma, presumably to the political advantage of Zuma's political rival, President Thabo Mbeki. The announcement of the withdrawal of charges was made by the acting head of the NPA, Mokothedi Mpshe, who however stressed that the withdrawal was due to abuse which left the legal process "tainted", and did not amount to an acquittal.^[49]

Just before the NPA's announcement, however, at least two political parties intimated that they would consider legal action of their own should the charges be dropped.^[50] The Democratic Alliance subsequently filed for a judicial review of the NPA's decision, with party leader Helen Zille stating that Mpshe had "not taken a decision based in law, but [instead had] buckled to political pressure".^[51] The case was set to be heard on 9 June 2009.^[52] Whilst Zuma filed his responses timeously, Mpshe delayed the hearing of the matter, requesting two extensions to file the NPA's response. NPA spokesperson Mthunzi Mhaga said he could not file papers because there were "outstanding matters" to be resolved. Zille, the Democratic Alliance's party head contended that Zuma's response was fundamentally wrong and "devoid of any constitutional basis".^[53] Whilst the legal challenges continued, a survey showed that, as at June 2009, more than half of South Africans believed President Jacob Zuma was doing a good job. The poll, conducted by TNS Research Studies in the last half of June 2009, revealed that Zuma's approval ratings had steadily improved. Around 57% of the people polled said they thought Zuma was a capable leader – this was up 3% from April 2009 when the president was inaugurated. In November 2008, just months after former president Thabo Mbeki was recalled and when Zuma was facing graft charges, only 36% of South Africans were positive about him.^[54]

Rape charges[link]

In December 2005, Zuma was charged with raping a 31 year old woman at his home in Forest Town, Gauteng. The alleged victim was from a prominent ANC family, the daughter of a deceased struggle comrade of Zuma, and also an AIDS activist who was known to be HIV positive. Zuma denied the charges and claimed that the sex was consensual.

A crowd of supporters and the curious outside the Johannesburg High Court.

Even before charges were filed, as rumours about rape accusations surfaced later in November, Zuma's political prospects began to appear to take a turn for the worse. Most of his higher-level political supporters could not respond to these new charges the way they had the corruption charges. In a hearing prior to the rape trial, a group of thousands of his supporters gathered near the courthouse, as a smaller gathering of anti-rape groups demonstrated on behalf of the alleged rape victim.^[55] As he did throughout the trial, Zuma sang Lethu Mshini Wami (Bring me my machine gun) with the crowd, and ANC Youth League and Communist Party Youth League spokesmen spoke in support of Zuma.^[56]

As the rape trial proceeded, reports surfaced that the South African Communist Party was severely divided over how to address the issue of Zuma and the SACP's relationship to him. Many members of the party's youth wing supported Zuma while others in the SACP were sceptical about the value of rallying behind a particular person as opposed to emphasising principles of governance.^[57][58][59]

Despite the defection of some former supporters, many Zuma supporters continued to rally outside the courthouse, arousing criticism by anti-rape groups for regular attacks on the integrity and moral standing of Zuma's accuser, insults yelled at a close friend of the accuser, and even stones thrown at a woman that members of the crowd mistook for the accuser.^[60] Zuma's defence team introduced evidence relating to the woman's sexual past, and asserted that the sex that took place was consensual. The prosecution asserted that her lack of resistance was due to a state of shock, and that the relationship between the two was like that of a 'father-daughter' pair.^[61][62]