The commission's seal

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, was set up on November 27, 2002, "to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks", including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks.

The commission was also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks.

Chaired by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, the commission consisted of five Democrats and five Republicans. The commission was created by Congressional legislation, with the bill signed into law by President George W. Bush.

The commission's final report was lengthy and based on extensive interviews and testimony. Its primary conclusion was that the failures of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation permitted the terrorist attacks to occur and that had these agencies acted more wisely and more aggressively, the attacks could potentially have been prevented.

After the publication of its final report, the commission closed on August 21, 2004.^[1]

History[link]

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was established on November 27, 2002, by President George W. Bush and the United States Congress, with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger initially appointed to head the commission.^[2] However, Kissinger resigned only weeks after being appointed, because he would have been obliged to disclose the clients of his private consulting business.^[3] Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell was originally appointed as the vice-chairman, but he stepped down on December 10, 2002, not wanting to sever ties to his law firm.^[4] On December 15, 2002, Bush appointed former New Jersey governor Tom Kean to head the commission.^[5]

By the spring of 2003, the commission was off to a slow start, needing additional funding to help it meet its target day for the final report, of May 27, 2004.^[6] In late March, the Bush administration agreed to provide an additional $9 million for the commission, though this was $2 million short of what the commission requested.^[7] The first hearings were held from March 31 to April 1, 2003, in New York City.^[8]

Members[link]

9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean

• Thomas Kean (Chairman) - Republican, former Governor of New Jersey
• Lee H. Hamilton (Vice Chairman) - Democrat, former U.S. Representative from the 9th District of Indiana
• Richard Ben-Veniste - Democrat, attorney, former chief of the Watergate Task Force of the Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office
• Max Cleland - Democrat, former U.S. Senator from Georgia. Resigned December 2003, stating that "the White House has played cover-up"^[9]

• Fred F. Fielding - Republican, attorney and former White House Counsel
• Jamie Gorelick - Democrat, former Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton Administration
• Slade Gorton - Republican, former U.S. Senator from Washington
• Bob Kerrey - Democrat, President of the New School University and former U.S. Senator from Nebraska. Replaced Max Cleland as a Democratic Commissioner, after Cleland's resignation.
• John F. Lehman - Republican, former Secretary of the Navy
• Timothy J. Roemer - Democrat, former U.S. Representative from the 3rd District of Indiana
• James R. Thompson - Republican, former Governor of Illinois

The members of the commission's staff included:

• Philip D. Zelikow, Executive Director/Chair
• Christopher Kojm, Deputy Executive Director
• Daniel Marcus, General Counsel
• John J. Farmer, Senior Counsel
• Janice Kephart, Counsel
• Alvin S. Felzenberg, Spokesman^[10]

Officials called to testify[link]

This unreferenced section requires citations to ensure verifiability.

Then government officials who were called to testify before the commission included:

• George W. Bush - President; testimony not under oath. The session was not officially transcribed because the White House considered it a "private meeting" in which highly classified information would be discussed. Asked to limit the length of testimony to one hour (However, the meeting lasted for three hours and ten minutes). Testimony took place in the Oval Office. Initially, Bush insisted that he testify only to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the commission, but later agreed to testify before the full panel.^[11]
• Dick Cheney - Vice President; testimony not under oath. The session was not officially transcribed because the White House considered it a "private meeting" in which highly classified information would be discussed. Testimony took place in the Oval Office. ^[11]
• George John Tenet - Director of Central Intelligence Agency
• Colin Powell - Secretary of State
• Donald H. Rumsfeld - Secretary of Defense
• Condoleezza Rice - National Security Advisor
• Richard Armitage - Deputy Secretary of State
• Paul Wolfowitz - Deputy Secretary of Defense
• Tom Ridge - Secretary of Homeland Security and former Governor of Pennsylvania
• John Ashcroft - Attorney General

Past government officials who were called to testify before the commission included:

• Bill Clinton - former President; testified in private separately from Al Gore. Testimony was recorded and not limited in time.^[11]
• Al Gore - former Vice President; testified in private separately from Bill Clinton. Testimony was recorded and not limited in time.^[11]
• Madeleine Albright - former Secretary of State
• William Cohen - former Secretary of Defense
• Sandy Berger - former National Security Advisor
• Richard A. Clarke - former chief counter-terrorism adviser on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations
• Janet Reno - former Attorney General
• Sibel Edmonds-former FBI translator ^[12]

President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, former President Bill Clinton, and former Vice President Al Gore all gave private testimony. President Bush and Vice President Cheney insisted on testifying together and not under oath, while Clinton and Gore met with the panel separately. As National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice claimed that she was not required to testify under oath because the position of NSA is an advisory role, independent of authority over a bureaucracy and does not require confirmation by the Senate. Legal scholars disagree on the legitimacy of her claim. Eventually, Condoleezza Rice testified publicly and under oath.^[13]

Report[link]

The cover of the final 9/11 report, which can be purchased in bookstores across the United States and around the world

The commission issued its final report on July 22, 2004. After releasing the report, Commission Chair Thomas Kean declared that both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had been "not well served" by the FBI and CIA.^[14] The commission interviewed over 1,200 people in 10 countries and reviewed over two and a half million pages of documents, including some closely guarded classified national security documents. Before it was released by the commission, the final public report was screened^{[by whom?]} for any potentially classified information and edited as necessary.

Additionally, the commission has released several supplemental reports on the terrorists' financing, travel, and other matters.

Criticism[link]

The commission was criticized for alleged conflicts of interest on the part of commissioners and staff (e.g., Philip D. Zelikow, 9/11 Commission Executive Director/Chair in 1995 co-authored book with Condoleezza Rice^[15]).^[16] Further, the commission's report has been the subject of criticism by both commissioners themselves and by others.^[17][18]

The commission members were appointed by George W. Bush as well as Congress, which led to the criticism^{[by whom?]} that it was not a commission truly independent from the U.S. government whose actions it was supposed to review. The commission stated in its report that "[their] aim has not been to assign individual blame," a judgment which some^[who?] critics believed would obscure the facts of the matter in a nod^[vague] to consensus politics.

Commission recommendations[link]

Parenthetic numbers refer to page numbers in the Commission Report

1. The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. (367)
2. United States should support Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own. (369)
3. United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan, in order to give the government a reasonable opportunity to improve the life of the Afghan people. Afghanistan must not again become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism. The United States and the international community should help the Afghan government extend its authority over the country, with a strategy and nation-by-nation commitments to achieve their objectives. (370)
4. The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted, openly. The United States and Saudi Arabia must determine if they can build a relationship that political leaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defend—a relationship about more than oil. It should include a shared commitment to political and economic reform, as Saudis make common cause with the outside world. It should include a shared interest in greater tolerance and cultural respect, translating into a commitment to fight the violent extremists who foment hatred. (374)
5. The U.S. government must define what the message is, what it stands for. We should offer an example of moral leadership in the world, committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to our neighbors. America and Muslim friends can agree on respect for human dignity and opportunity. (376)
6. Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not respect these principles, the United States must stand for a better future. One of the lessons of the long Cold War was that short-term gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal governments were too often outweighed by long-term setbacks for America’s stature and interests. (376)
7. We need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. America does stand up for its values. The United States defended, and still defends, Muslims against tyrants and criminals in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
   • Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It should get them.
   • The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope. Where such assistance is provided, it should be identified as coming from the citizens of the United States. (377)
8. The U.S. government should offer to join with other nations in generously supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds will be spent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly investing their own money in public education. (378)
9. A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terror-ism should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children’s future. (379)
10. The United States should engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terror-ism. (379)
11. The United States should engage its friends to develop a common coalition approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists. (380)
12. Pre-venting the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort—by strengthening counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. (381)
13. Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The government has recognized that information about terrorist money helps us to understand their networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations. Intelligence and law enforcement have targeted the relatively small number of financial facilitators—individuals al Qaeda relied on for their ability to raise and deliver money—at the core of al Qaeda’s revenue stream. (382)
14. The United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility. (385)
15. The U.S. border security system should be integrated into a larger network of screening points that includes our transportation system and access to vital facilities, such as nuclear reactors. The President should direct the Department of Homeland Security to lead the effort to design a comprehensive screening system, addressing common problems and setting common standards with systemwide goals in mind. (387)
16. The Department of Homeland Security, properly supported by the Congress, should complete, as quickly as possible, a biometric entry-exit screening system, including a single system for speeding qualified travelers. It should be integrated with the system that provides benefits to foreigners seeking to stay in the United States. (389)
17. We should do more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies, and raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel and border crossing over the medium and long term through extensive inter-national cooperation. (390)
18. Secure identification should begin in the United States. The federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses. (390)
19. The U.S. government should identify and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for defending them, select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement the effort. The plan should assign roles and missions to the relevant authorities (federal, state, regional, and local) and to private stakeholders. In measuring effectiveness, perfection is unattainable. But terrorists should perceive that potential targets are defended. They may be deterred by a significant chance of failure. (391)
20. Improved use of “no-fly” and “automatic selectee” lists should not be delayed while the argument about a successor to CAPPS continues. (393)
21. The TSA and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. (393)
22. As the President determines the guidelines for information sharing among government agencies and by those agencies with the private sector, he should safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom information is shared. (394)
23. The burden of proof for retaining a particular governmental power should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that there is adequate supervision of the executive’s use of the powers to ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use. (394-5)
24. There should be a board within the executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the commitment the government makes to defend our civil liberties. (395)
25. Homeland security assistance should be based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities. Now, in 2004, Washington, D.C., and New York City are certainly at the top of any such list. We understand the contention that every state and city needs to have some minimum infrastructure for emergency response. But federal homeland security assistance should not remain a program for general revenue sharing. It should supplement state and local resources based on the risks or vulnerabilities that merit additional support. Congress should not use this money as a pork barrel. (396)
26. Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System (ICS). When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a unified command. (397)
27. Congress should support pending legislation which provides for the expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety purposes. (397)
28. We endorse the American National Standards Institute’s recommended standard for private preparedness…. We also encourage the insurance and credit-rating industries to look closely at a company’s compliance with the ANSI standard in assessing its insurability and creditworthiness. We believe that compliance with the standard should define the standard of care owed by a company to its employees and the public for legal purposes. (398)
29. We recommend the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), built on the foundation of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Breaking the older mold of national government organization, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies. (403)
30. The current position of Director of Central Intelligence should be replaced by a National Intelligence Director with two main areas of responsibility: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) to manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it. (411)
31. The CIA Director should emphasize (a) rebuilding the CIA’s analytic capabilities; (b) transforming the clandestine service by building its human intelligence capabilities; (c) developing a stronger language program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives; (d) renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operations officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities;(e) ensuring a seamless relationship between human source collection and signals collection at the operational level; and (f) stressing a better balance between unilateral and liaison operations. (415)
32. Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command. (415)
33. Overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret. Congress should pass a separate appropriations act for intelligence, defending the broad allocation of how these tens of billions of dollars have been assigned among the varieties of intelligence work. (416)
34. Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge. (417)
35. The president should lead the government-wide effort to bring the major national security institutions into the information revolution. (418)
36. Congress should address [the dysfunction system of intelligence oversight].We have considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one. A single committee in each house of Congress. (420)
37. Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this department and its duties. But we believe that Congress does have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent standing committee with a nonpartisan staff. (421)
38. We should minimize as much as possible the disruption of national security policymaking during the change of administrations by accelerating the process for national security appointments. (422)
39. A specialized and integrated national security workforce should be established at the FBI consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security. (425-6)
40. The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should regularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command’s strategies and planning to defend the United States against military threats to the homeland. (428)
41. The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly assess the types of threats the country faces to determine (a) the adequacy of the government’s plans—and the progress against those plans—to protect America’s critical infrastructure and (b) the readiness of the government to respond to the threats that the United States might face. (428)

Work of commissioners after the commission ceased its functions[link]

Months after the commission had officially issued its report and ceased its functions, Chairman Kean and other commissioners toured the country to draw attention to the recommendations of the commission for reducing the terror risk, claiming that some of their recommendations were being ignored. Co-chairs Kean and Hamilton wrote a book about the constraints they faced as commissioners titled Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission.

The book was released on August 15, 2006 and chronicles the work of Kean (Commission Chairman) and Hamilton (Commission Vice-Chairman) of the 9/11 Commission. In the book, Kean and Hamilton charge that the 9/11 Commission was "set up to fail," and write that the commission was so frustrated with repeated misstatements by officials from The Pentagon and the Federal Aviation Administration during the investigation that it considered a separate investigation into possible obstruction of justice by Pentagon and FAA officials.^[19]

Government deception[link]

Tenet testified before a public hearing of the Sept. 11 Commission investigating 9/11, that he did not meet with Bush in August 2001, the month before the September 11 attacks. The same evening after the hearings, a CIA spokesman corrected Tenet’s testimony, stating that Tenet did indeed meet with Bush twice in August.^[20] Tenet in his memoir writes of his memorable visit to Bush at Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas, August 2001.^[21]

John Farmer, Jr., senior counsel to the Commission stated that the Commission "discovered that...what government and military officials had told Congress, the Commission, the media, and the public about who knew what when — was almost entirely, and inexplicably, untrue." Farmer continues: "At some level of the government, at some point in time … there was a decision not to tell the truth about what happened...The (NORAD) tapes told a radically different story from what had been told to us and the public."^[22] Thomas Kean, the head of the 9/11 Commission, concurred: "We to this day don’t know why NORAD told us what they told us, it was just so far from the truth."^[23]

See also[link]

• 9/11 Commission Report
• September 11, 2001 radio communications
• War games in progress on September 11, 2001

References[link]

Further reading[link]

• Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission, by Thomas H Kean and Lee H. Hamilton (Random House, August 2006) ISBN 0-307-26377-0
• The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation, by Philip Shenon (the Twelve - Jan. 2008), ISBN 978-0-446-58075-5
• The Next Ten Years of Post-9/11 Security Efforts, Q&A with 9/11 Commissioner Slade Gorton (July 2011)

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: 9/11 Commission

• Official website
• The Complete 9/11 Commission Report (7 MB PDF)
• Kindle-formatted version of the Complete 9/11 Commission Report
• 9/11 Commission staff biographies
• 9/11 Public Discourse Project (Set up by Commission members following completion of report)
• The 9-11 Commission: An Audio Chronicle - NPR
• Congressional Research Service, 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status, Dec. 2006
• Stonewalled by the C.I.A. Op-Ed piece written by Thomas Kean and Lee H. Hamilton in the January 2, 2008 edition of the New York Times
• 9/11 Chair: Attack Was Preventable - from CBS
• The Shea Memorandum to the 9-11 Commission
• Photos of 9/11 Commission Public Hearings 7 to 12

v t e Members of the 9/11 Commission Kean (Chair) Hamilton (Vice chair) Ben-Veniste Fielding Gorelick Gorton Kerrey Lehman Roemer Thompson

Look up commission or commissioning in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

Commission may refer to:

• Commission (remuneration), a form of payment to an agent for services rendered
• Commission (document), a document given to commissioned officers.
• Commissioning, a process or service provided to validate the completeness and accuracy of a project or venture
  • Project commissioning, the process of assuring that all systems and components of a building or industrial plant are designed, installed, tested, operated, and maintained according to the operational requirements of the owner or final client
  • Building commissioning, a quality assurance process during and following building construction
• Ship commissioning, placing a warship in active military duty
• Commissioned officer, who derives authority directly from a sovereign power
  • Contrast with Non-commissioned officers
• Statutory commission, a government authority created by statutes of the legislature such as:
  • Statutory authority
  • Independent agencies of the United States government
  • Regulatory agency
  • Public benefit corporation
• Constitutional Commission, a body reviewing or writing a constitution
• European Commission, the executive body of the European Union
• Presidential Commission (United States), a high level research group
• Royal Commission, a public inquiry
• Irish Land Commission, a body designed to fix rents in Ireland
• U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, a US body enforcing and regulating the securities industry
• Great Commission, a tenet of Christian theology given by Jesus to spread his teachings
• The Commission (mafia), the governing body of the mafia in the United States
• Commission (art), the purchase of the creation of a piece of art most often on behalf of another
• Commissioned (gospel group)

Commission may also be used for:

• Letters patent, an open letter issued by a government granting an office or other status to someone or some entity
• A type of government agency that operates under the authority of a board of commissioners, though the term may also be applied to non-governmental groups such as the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics
• A type of contract for performance or creation of a specific work

See also[link]

• Commissioner

This disambiguation page lists articles associated with the same title. If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article.

George Tenet
18th Director of Central Intelligence
In office July 11, 1997 – July 11, 2004
President	Bill Clinton George W. Bush
Preceded by	John M. Deutch
Succeeded by	Porter J. Goss
Personal details
Born	George John Tenet (1953-01-05) January 5, 1953 (age 59) New York City, New York, United States
Political party	Democratic[1]
Religion	Greek Orthodox

George John Tenet (born January 5, 1953) was the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for the United States Central Intelligence Agency, and is Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at Georgetown University.

Tenet held the position as the DCI from July 1997 to July 2004, making him the second-longest-serving director in the agency's history–behind Allen Welsh Dulles–as well as one of the few DCIs to serve under two U.S. presidents of opposing political parties. In February 2008, he became a managing director at the merchant bank Allen & Company.

Background[link]

Tenet was born in Flushing, Queens, New York, the son of Evangelia and John Tenet.^[2][3] His father was born in Albania. His mother was from Epirus.^[4][5] His father worked in a coal-mine in France before arriving in the United States.^[6] Tenet was raised in Little Neck, Queens where he and his brother Bill worked as busboys in their family's diner (later renamed Scobee Diner). He attended Public School 94, Louis Pasteur Junior High School 67, and Benjamin N. Cardozo High School (he was a classmate of Ron Jeremy and actor Reginald VelJohnson).^[7] Tenet graduated from Georgetown University in 1976 with a Bachelor of Science degree in foreign service and received a Master of International Affairs degree from Columbia University in 1978.

Tenet is married to Stephanie Glakas-Tenet. They have one son.^[8]

Early career[link]

Tenet became research director of the American Hellenic Institute from 1978 to 1979.^[9] He then began working for the Senate, first as a legislative assistant and later as Legislative Director to former Senator H. John Heinz III of Pennsylvania (1982–1985). He was a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) from 1985–1988, then Staff Director of the SSCI from 1988–1993. Later, Tenet joined President-elect Bill Clinton's national security transition team. Clinton appointed Tenet Senior Director for Intelligence Programs at the National Security Council (1993–1995).^[10][11]

CIA career[link]

Tenet was appointed Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in July 1995. After John Deutch's abrupt resignation in December 1996, Tenet served as acting director. This was followed by the withdrawal of Anthony Lake, whose nomination had been blocked by Republicans in Congress. Tenet was then officially appointed Director on July 11, 1997, after a unanimous confirmation vote in the Senate. While the Director of Central Intelligence has typically been replaced by an incoming administration ever since Jimmy Carter replaced DCI George H. W. Bush, Tenet served through the end of the Clinton administration and well into the term of George W. Bush.

Tenet embarked on a mission to regenerate the CIA, which had fallen on hard times since the end of the Cold War. The number of agents recruited each year had fallen to an all-time low, a 25-percent decline from the Cold War peak. Tenet appealed to the original mission of the agency, which had been to "prevent another Pearl Harbor." The trick was to see where danger might come from in the post-Cold War world. Tenet focused on potential problems such as "the transformation of Russia and China," "rogue states" like North Korea, Iran and Iraq, and terrorism.^[12]

1999 Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade[link]

On May 7, 1999, during the Kosovo War, U.S. bombers struck the Chinese embassy in Belgrade with five JDAM precision guided bombs, killing three Chinese reporters and injuring 20 others. The USA claimed the attack was accidental. In testimony before a congressional committee, Tenet later admitted the strike was the only one in the campaign organized and directed by his agency,^[13][14] though he still claimed it was not deliberate. Later analysis has suggested that a 100-yard error in a military targeting database maintained by the Pentagon was not corrected or updated in a timely manner and that other systems intended to prevent such incidents failed to perform as expected. As a result of this and other incidents, systematic changes to were made to pre-strike Rules of Engagement (ROE) for U.S. pilots, including checklists verifying target information and coordinates. China has never accepted the U.S. version of events, although Tenet in a published work noted in a bit of black humor that in the prelude to the bombing of Iraq China had, through unofficial channels, provided the Agency with the exact GPS coordinates of their Embassy in Baghdad so as to ensure the CIA knew the precise location.^[15]

Al-Qaeda and the War on Terror[link]

By 1999 al-Qaeda had emerged as a significant terrorist threat. The 1998 bombings of two US African embassies were the latest in a string of attacks on American interests in the west Indian-Ocean region. And in 2000 the USS Cole was bombed in Aden in an attempt to sink her, killing 17 naval personnel.

Bin Laden Plan[link]

In 1999 Tenet put forward a grand "Plan" for dealing with al-Qaeda. In preparation, he selected new leadership for the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC). He placed Cofer Black in charge of the CTC, and Richard Blee (a "top-flight executive" from Tenet's own suite) in charge of the CTC's Bin Laden unit. Tenet assigned the CTC to develop the Plan. The proposals, brought out in September, sought to penetrate Qaeda's "Afghan sanctuary" with US and Afghan agents, in order to obtain information on and mount operations against Bin Laden's network. In October, officers from the Bin Laden unit visited northern Afghanistan. Once the Plan was finalized, the Agency created a "Qaeda cell" (whose functions overlapped those of the CTC's Bin Laden unit) to give operational leadership to the effort.

The CIA concentrated its inadequate financial resources on the Plan, so that at least some of its more modest aspirations were realized. Intelligence collection efforts on bin Laden and al-Qaeda increased significantly from 1999. "By 9/11", said Tenet, "a map would show that these collection programs and human [reporting] networks were in place in such numbers as to nearly cover Afghanistan". (But this excluded Bin Laden's inner circle itself.)^[16]

Predator drone[link]

The CIA also experimented with a small remote-controlled reconnaissance aircraft, the Predator, to try to spot Bin Laden in Afghanistan. A series of flights in autumn 2000, overseen by CTC officials and flown by USAF drone pilots from a control room at the CIA's Langley headquarters, produced probable sightings of the al-Qaeda leader.^[17]

Black and others became advocates of arming the Predator with adapted Hellfire anti-tank missiles to try to kill Bin Laden and other Qaeda leaders in targeted killings. But there were both legal and technical issues. Tenet in particular was concerned about the CIA moving back into the business. And a series of live-fire tests in the Nevada Desert in summer 2001 produced mixed results.

Tenet advised cautiously on the matter at a meeting of the Cabinet-level Principals Committee on September 4, 2001. If the Cabinet wanted to empower the CIA to field a lethal drone, Tenet said, "they should do so with their eyes wide open, fully aware of the potential fallout if there were a controversial or mistaken strike". National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice concluded that the armed Predator was required, but evidently not ready. It was agreed to recommend to the CIA to resume reconnaissance flights. The "previously reluctant" Tenet then ordered the Agency to do so. The CIA was authorized to "deploy the system with weapons-capable aircraft".^[18]

Strategic assessments branch[link]

In late 2000 Tenet, recognizing the deficiency of "big-picture" analysis of al-Qaeda, appointed a senior manager in the Counterterrorist Center to investigate "creating a strategic assessment capability". In spring 2001 the CTC got back to him, requesting the hiring of "a small group of contractors not involved in day-to-day crises to digest vast quantities of information and develop targeting strategies".

The CTC's Strategic Assessments Branch was formally set up in July. But it struggled to find personnel. The head of the branch finally took up his post on September 10, 2001.^[19]

September 11 attacks[link]

After the September 11 attacks, many observers criticized the Intelligence Community for numerous "intelligence failures" as one of the major reasons why the attacks were not prevented.^[20]

Tenet testified before a public hearing of the Sept. 11 Commission investigating 9/11, that he did not meet with Bush in August 2001, the month before the September 11 attacks. The same evening after the hearings, a CIA spokesman corrected Tenet’s testimony, stating that Tenet did indeed meet with Bush twice in August.^[21] Tenet in his memoir writes of his memorable visit to Bush at Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas, August 2001.^[22]

In August 2007, a secret report written by the CIA inspector general was made public (originally written in 2005 but kept secret). The 19-page summary states that Tenet knew the dangers of Al Qaeda well before September 2001, but that the leadership of the CIA did not do enough to prevent any attacks. Tenet reacted to the publication of this report by calling it "flat wrong", citing in particular the planning efforts of the past two years.^[23]

Tenet immediately increased the size and capability of the CIA's special operations component housed in the Special Operations Group of the Special Activities Division. This force had been allowed to diminish under the early Clinton administration. These Paramilitary Operations Officers were the first to enter both Afghanistan and Iraq. Once in these countries these officers organized and led the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Kurds against Ansar Al-Islam and Saddam's forces in Iraq. The rebuilding of this capability and the successful employment of these elite commandos is considered one of Tenets greatest achievements in the Global War on Terror.^[24][25][26]

Worldwide Attack Matrix[link]

Tenet considered that his Al-Qaeda plan had placed the CIA in a better position to respond after the September 11 attacks. As he put it,

How could [an intelligence] community without a strategic plan tell the president of the United States just four days after 9/11 how to attack the Afghan sanctuary and operate against al-Qa'ida in ninety-two countries around the world?^[27]

Tenet (left, in pink tie) briefs President George W. Bush in the Oval Office along White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and Vice President Dick Cheney (face not seen).

This was at a meeting of the restricted National Security Council – or "war council" – at Camp David on September 15, 2001. Tenet presented the Worldwide Attack Matrix, a blueprint for what became known as the War On Terror.^[20] He proposed firstly to send CIA teams into Afghanistan to collect intelligence on, and mount covert operations against, al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The teams would act jointly with military Special Operations units. "President Bush later praised this proposal, saying it had been a turning point in his thinking."^[28]

Use of Water Boarding and Willingness to Use Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EIT's)[link]

The CIA was authorized by President Bush to use water boarding (a method of torture) and other forms of enhanced interrogation techniques (EIT's) during interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, all suspected Al Qaida members, during Tenet's directorship.^[29][30]

Tenet and Iraq WMD controversy[link]

According to a report by veteran investigative journalist Bob Woodward in his book Plan of Attack, Tenet privately lent his personal authority to the intelligence reports about weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq.^[31] At a meeting on December 12, 2002, he assured Bush that the evidence that Iraq had WMDs amounted to a "slam dunk case." After several months of refusing to confirm this statement, Tenet stated that it was taken out of context. He indicated that it was made pursuant to a discussion about how to convince the American people to support invading Iraq.^[32] The search following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by U.S., British and international forces yielded no significant WMDs.

Resignation[link]

Citing "personal reasons," Tenet submitted his resignation to President Bush on June 3, 2004. James Pavitt, his Deputy Director for Operations at the CIA, announced his resignation the following day, leading to speculation that the exit of both senior intelligence officials was related to the controversy over alleged Iraqi WMDs and the decision to go to war. Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA under President Jimmy Carter, said, "I think the president feels he's in enough trouble that he's got to begin to cast some of the blame for the morass that we are in Iraq on to somebody else and this was one subtle way to do it." (Boston Herald, June 4, 2004) However, Bush voiced support for Tenet's efforts, stating, "George Tenet did a superb job for America. It was a high honor to work with him, and I'm sorry he left." (Reuters, June 5, 2004)

Awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom[link]

President Bush awarding the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Tenet on 14 December 2004.

Tenet's seven-year term as Director of Central Intelligence was the second-longest in U.S. history. On December 14, 2004, President Bush awarded Tenet the Presidential Medal of Freedom. This was controversial, both because George Tenet had been wrong in his assertion that there were nuclear weapons in Iraq and because many critics felt that it was given more for political reasons than merit^[33].

Recent activities[link]

QinetiQ[link]

In October 2006 Tenet joined QinetiQ as an independent non-executive director.^[34] Tenet then stepped down from the board in February 2008 to become the managing director of the secretive investment bank Allen & Company.^[35] Tenet also sits on the boards of directors of L-1 Identity Solutions, a major supplier of biometric identification software, and Guidance Software, which makes forensic software used to search computer hard drives for evidence.^[36] Along with a number of other notable Greek Americans, he is a member of the advisory board of The Next Generation Initiative, a leadership program aimed at getting students involved in public affairs.

Memoir[link]

In April 2007 Tenet released his memoir titled At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. He appeared on 60 Minutes on April 29, 2007, offering much criticism of the Bush administration. The book was the top-selling book in sales in the first week after publication.

The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of its Enemies since 9/11 (2006) by Ron Suskind was apparently written with Tenet's cooperation.^[37] The book claims that Abu Zubaydah, once said to be al-Qaida chief of operations, was a low level functionary and mentally ill.^[38] Even after determining this, Tenet continued to have Zubaybah waterboarded so he could produce fanciful stories of terrorist plots, the book claims.^[38]

In his memoirs, Tenet responded as follows:

Critics pointed out a factual error in Tenet's book. On the book's first page, Tenet tells of a conversation with then-Pentagon advisor Richard Perle on September 12, 2001 in which Tenet claims Perle told him in person that "Iraq had to pay for the attack." But the conversation could not have occurred on that day, because Perle was stranded in Paris, France on September 12 and didn't return to Washington until three days later. Perle later stated that the two men indeed crossed each other one morning, as claimed by Tenet, but only later in the same week and not on September 12. But Perle insisted that he and Tenet exchanged no words in that encounter.^[40][41]

See also[link]

• Bin Laden Issue Station: The CIA's Osama bin Laden-tracking unit, 1996–2003.

References[link]

External links[link]

Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: George Tenet

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: George Tenet

• Frontline: The Dark Side
• SourceWatch entry for George Tenet
• George Tenet profile
• CNN: Tenet told Bush WMD case a 'slam dunk'
• Official excerpt of George Tenet's 60 Minutes interview at YouTube
• Peter Krogh discusses spying, terrorism and the theft of intellectual property with George Tenet On Great Decisions,1996

v t e Directors of Central Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Sidney Souers Hoyt Vandenberg Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter W. Bedell Smith Allen W. Dulles John A. McCone William Raborn Richard Helms James R. Schlesinger William Colby George H. W. Bush Stansfield Turner William J. Casey William H. Webster Robert Gates R. James Woolsey, Jr. John M. Deutch George Tenet Central Intelligence Agency Porter J. Goss Michael Hayden Leon Panetta David Petraeus

v t e Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Kingman Douglass Edwin Kennedy Wright William Harding Jackson Allen W. Dulles Charles P. Cabell Marshall Carter Richard Helms Rufus Taylor Robert E. Cushman, Jr. Vernon A. Walters Enno Knoche John F. Blake Frank Carlucci Bobby Ray Inman John N. McMahon Robert Gates Richard James Kerr Bill Studeman George Tenet John A. Gordon John E. McLaughlin Central Intelligence Agency Albert Calland Stephen Kappes Michael Morell

v t e Cabinet of President Bill Clinton (1993–2001)   Cabinet Secretary of State Warren Christopher (1993 – 1997) Madeleine Albright (1997 – 2001) Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen (1993 – 1994) Robert Rubin (1995 – 1999) Lawrence Summers (1999 – 2001) Secretary of Defense Les Aspin (1993 – 1994) William Perry (1994 – 1997) William Cohen (1997 – 2001) Attorney General Janet Reno (1993 – 2001) Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt (1993 – 2001) Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy (1993 – 1994) Dan Glickman (1995 – 2001) Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown (1993 – 1996) Mickey Kantor (1996 – 1997) William Daley (1997 – 2000) Norman Mineta (2000 – 2001) Secretary of Labor Robert Reich (1993 – 1997) Alexis Herman (1997 – 2001) Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala (1993 – 2001) Secretary of Education Richard Riley (1993 – 2001) Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Henry Cisneros (1993 – 1997) Andrew Cuomo (1997 – 2001) Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña (1993 – 1997) Rodney Slater (1997 – 2001) Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary (1993 – 1997) Federico Peña (1997 – 1998) Bill Richardson (1998 – 2001) Secretary of Veterans Affairs Jesse Brown (1993 – 1997) Togo West (1998 – 2000) Hershel Gober* (2000 – 2001) acting secretary.   Cabinet-level Vice President Al Gore (1993 – 2001) White House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty (1993 – 1994) Leon Panetta (1994 – 1997) Erskine Bowles (1997 – 1998) John Podesta (1998 – 2001) Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency Carol Browner (1993 – 2001) Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Korbel Albright (1993 – 1997) Bill Richardson (1997 – 1998) Richard Holbrooke (1999 – 2001) Director of the Office of Management and Budget Leon Panetta (1993 – 1994) Alice Rivlin (1994 – 1996) Franklin Raines (1996 – 1998) Jacob Lew (1998 – 2001) Director of National Drug Control Policy Lee Brown (1993 – 1995) Barry McCaffrey (1996 – 2001) Trade Representative Mickey Kantor (1993 – 1997) Charlene Barshefsky (1997 – 2001) Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency James Lee Witt (1993 – 2001)* Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch (1995 – 1996) George Tenet (1997–2001) Administrator of the Small Business Administration Erskine Bowles (1993 - 1994) Philip Lader (1994 – 1997) Aída Álvarez (1997–2001) took office in 1993, raised to cabinet-rank in 1996

David Ray Griffin

Born	August 8, 1939
Era	20th-century philosophy
Region	Western Philosophy
School	Process Theology
Influenced by Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne

David Ray Griffin (born 1939) is a retired American professor of philosophy of religion and theology. Along with John B. Cobb, Jr., he founded the Center for Process Studies in 1973, a research center of Claremont School of Theology which seeks to promote the common good by means of the relational approach found in process thought.^[1] Griffin has published a number of books on the subject of the September 11 attacks, suggesting that there was a conspiracy involving some elements of the United States government.^[2]

Life and professional career[link]

David Ray Griffin is a longtime resident of Santa Barbara, California, was a full-time academic from 1973 until April 2004. He is currently a co-director of the Center for Process Studies, and one of the foremost contemporary exponents of process theology, founded on the process philosophies of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.

Griffin grew up in a small town in Oregon, where he was an active participant in his Disciples of Christ church. After deciding to become a minister, Griffin entered Northwest Christian College, but became disenchanted with the conservative-fundamentalist theology that was taught there. While getting his master’s degree in counseling from the University of Oregon, Griffin attended a lecture series delivered by Paul Tillich at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California. At this time, Griffin made his decision to focus on philosophical theology. He eventually attended the Claremont Graduate University, where Griffin received his Ph.D. in 1970.^[3]

As a student in Claremont, Griffin was initially interested in Eastern religions, particularly Vedanta. However, he started to become a process theologian while attending John B. Cobb’s seminar on Whitehead’s philosophy. According to Griffin, process theology, as presented by Cobb, “provided a way between the old supernaturalism, according to which God miraculously interrupted the normal causal processes now and then, and a view according to which God is something like a cosmic hydraulic jack, exerting the same pressure always and everywhere (which described rather aptly the position to which I had come)", (Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology). Griffin applied Whitehead’s thought to the traditional theological subjects of christology and theodicy and argued that process theology also provided a sound basis for addressing contemporary social and ecological issues.^[4]

After teaching theology and Eastern religions at the University of Dayton, Griffin came to appreciate the distinctively postmodern aspects of Whitehead’s thought. In particular, Griffin found Whitehead’s nonsensationist epistemology and panexperientialist ontology immensely helpful in addressing the major problems of modern philosophy, including the problems of mind-body interaction, the interaction between free and determined things, the emergence of experience from nonexperiencing matter, and the emergence of time in the evolutionary process. In 1973, Griffin returned to Claremont to establish, with Cobb, the Center for Process Studies at the Claremont School of Theology.^[5]

While on research leave in 1980–81 at Cambridge University and Berkeley, the contrast between modernity and postmodernity became central to his work. Many of Griffin’s writings are devoted to developing postmodern proposals for overcoming the conflicts between religion and modern science. Griffin came to believe that much of the tension between religion and science was not only the result of reactionary supernaturalism, but also the mechanistic worldview associated with the rise of modern science in the seventeenth century. In 1983, Griffin started the Center for a Postmodern World in Santa Barbara, and became editor of the SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Philosophy between 1987 and 2004.^[6]

Statements and publications on the September 11 attacks[link]

Following the September 11 attacks, David Ray Griffin moved his focus from questions of philosophy and religion to ones of politics and history, specifically American expansionism and imperialism. He intended to write a book on the subject, presenting 9/11 in terms of "blowback" for aggressive United States foreign policies of the 20th century:

"Until the spring of 2003, I had not looked at any of the evidence. I was vaguely aware there were people, at least on the internet, who were offering evidence against the official account of 9/11... I knew the US government had 'fabricated' evidence to go to war several times before. Nevertheless... I did not take this possibility seriously... I was so confident that they must be wrong." ^[7]

After reading the work of Paul Thompson and Nafeez Ahmed, he became convinced that there was a prima facie case for the contention that there must have been complicity from individuals within the United States, and joined the 9/11 Truth Movement in calling for an extensive investigation from the United States media, Congress and the 9/11 Commission. At this time, he set about writing his first book on the subject, which he called The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11 (2004).^[8]

Part One of the book looks at the events of 9/11, discussing each flight in turn and also the behaviour of President George W. Bush and his Secret Service protection. Part Two examines 9/11 in a wider context, in the form of four "disturbing questions". David Ray Griffin discussed this book and the claims within it in an interview with Nick Welsh, reported under the headline Thinking Unthinkable Thoughts: Theologian Charges White House Complicity in 9/11 Attack.^[9]

Critics of Griffin's thesis, such as Chip Berlet, say that many of the claims in the book are refutable.^[10] Griffin has rejected these criticisms ^[11] and debated Berlet.^[12]

Griffin's second book on the subject was a direct critique of the 9/11 Commission Report, called The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions And Distortions (2005).^[13] Griffin's article The 9/11 Commission Report: A 571-page Lie summarises this book, presenting 115 instances of either omissions or distortions of evidence he claims are in the report, stating that "the entire Report is constructed in support of one big lie: that the official story about 9/11 is true."^[14]

In his next book, Christian Faith and the Truth Behind 9/11: A Call to Reflection and Action (2006), he summarizes some of what he believes is evidence for government complicity and reflects on its implications for Christians. The Presbyterian Publishing Corporation, publishers of the book, noted that Griffin is a distinguished theologian, and praised the book’s religious content, but said, "The board believes the conspiracy theory is spurious and based on questionable research."^[15][16]

In 2006, Griffin, along with Peter Dale Scott, edited 9/11 and the American Empire: Intellectuals Speak Out, a collection of essays including Steven Jones' paper Why Indeed Did The World Trade Center Towers Collapse?.^[17] Debunking 9/11 Debunking (2007) looks at the way mainstream media such as Popular Mechanics have sought to debunk the alternative 9/11 theories and the tactics he claims they employ to persuade the reader that they have done so.^[18] In 9/11 Contradictions: An Open Letter to Congress and the Press (2008) he presents chapters on 25 alleged contradictions involving elements of the "accepted story" of 9/11, and calls for Congress and the press to investigate and resolve them.^[19]

David Ray Griffin has delivered several lectures that are popular within the 9/11 Truth Movement, and has given interviews on alternative media shows such as The Alex Jones Show.^[20] A lecture entitled 9/11 and American Empire: How should religious people respond?, delivered on April 18, 2005 at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, was aired by C-SPAN.^[21] At the end of one of his lectures, 9/11: The Myth and the Reality, Griffin was asked why a theologian would take such an interest in 9/11, to which he replied: "If 9/11 is not a religious issue, then I don't know what is."^[22]

In a review published in the magazine The Nation, former Central Intelligence Agency agent Robert Baer dismissed the gist of Griffin's writings as one in a long line of conspiracy theories about national tragedies, but stated that the Bush administration had created a climate of secrecy and mistrust that helped generate such explanations.^[23] He later said:

"Until we get a complete, honest, transparent investigation—not one based on 'confession' extracted by torture—we will never know what happened on 9/11. David Griffin will never let this go until we get the truth."^[24]

Affiliations[link]

• Center for Process Studies
• Scholars for 9/11 Truth and Justice

References[link]

1. ^ "About the Center". The Center for Process Studies. http://www.ctr4process.org/about/general.shtml. Retrieved December 14, 2009. 
2. ^ Powell, Michael (September 8, 2006). "The Disbelievers – 9/11 Conspiracy Theorists Are Building Their Case Against the Government From Ground Zero". Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/07/AR2006090701669.html. Retrieved May 1, 2010. 
3. ^ Directory of history departments and organizations in the United States and Canada. American Historical Association. 1991. p. 101. 
4. ^ David R. Griffin (2007). Whitehead's radically different postmodern philosophy: an argument for its contemporary relevance. State University of New York. 
5. ^ Leslie A. Muray (2008). Liberal Protestantism and science. Greenwood Press. p. 97. 
6. ^ Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ed. (2003). The Cambridge companion to postmodern theology. Cambridge Univ. Press. p. 94. 
7. ^ Griffin, David Ray; Richard Falk (2004). The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11. p. 13. ISBN 1-56656-552-9. http://bogusstory.com/TheNewPearlHarbor.html/. Retrieved July 26, 2007. 
8. ^ Griffin, David Ray; Richard Falk. The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11. ISBN 1-56656-552-9. http://bogusstory.com/TheNewPearlHarbor.html/. Retrieved July 26, 2007. 
9. ^ Native Forest Council: News
10. ^ PublicEye.org – Post 9/11 Conspiracism
11. ^ PublicEye.org – Response to Chip Berlet's Review of "The New Pearl Harbor"
12. ^ Democracy Now! | The New Pearl Harbor: A Debate On A New Book That Alleges The Bush Administration Was Behind The 9/11 Attacks
13. ^ Griffin, David (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions. Olive Branch Press. ISBN 1-56656-584-7. 
14. ^ "David Ray Griffin's "The 9/11 Commission Report: A 571-page Lie"". http://www.911truth.org/article.php?story=20050523112738404. 
15. ^ Smith, Peter (2006). "Presbyterian publishing board criticizes own book". courier-journal.com. The Courier-Journal. http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20061116/NEWS01/61116033/1008/NEWS01. Retrieved November 28, 2006. ^{[dead link]}
16. ^ Kane, Jason (2006). "PPC backs away from 9/11 conspiracy book". Presbyterian News Service. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). http://www.pcusa.org/pcnews/2006/06596.htm. Retrieved November 28, 2006. 
17. ^ Griffin, David Ray (2006). 9/11 and American Empire: Intellectuals Speak Out, Vol. 1. Olive Branch Press. ISBN 1-56656-659-2. 
18. ^ Griffin, David Ray (2007). Debunking 9/11 Debunking: An Answer to Popular Mechanics and Other Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory.. Olive Branch Press. ISBN 978-1-56656-686-5. 
19. ^ Thomsson, Lena (May 2, 2009). "25 frågor hela världen vill ha svar på". Gefle Dagblad. http://gd.se/kultur/boken/1.1008102. Retrieved May 26, 2009. 
20. ^ Alex Jones Interviews David Ray Griffin
21. ^ 911truth.org ::::: 9/11 and American Empire: How should religious people respond?
22. ^ "9/11: The Myth and the Reality" Lecture
23. ^ "Dangerous Liaisons," September 27, 2004)
24. ^ Amazon.com: Debunking 9/11 Debunking: An Answer to Popular Mechanics and Other Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory: Books: David Ray Griffin

Books[link]

About Philosophy, Theology, Religion and Nature Science[link]

• A process Christology, Westminster Press, 1973, ISBN 0-664-20978-5

• Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition, with John B. Cobb, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976, ISBN 0-664-24743-1

• John Cobb's Theology in Process, Westminster John Knox Press, 1977, ISBN 0-664-21292-1

• Process and Reality, Free Press; 2nd edition, 1979, ISBN 0-02-934570-7

• Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time: Bohm, Prigogine and Process Philosophy, State University of New York Press, 1986, ISBN 0-88706-115-X

• The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals (Suny Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought), State Univ of New York Press, 1988, ISBN 0-88706-784-0

• Spirituality and Society: Postmodern Visions (Suny Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought), State University of New York Press, 1988, ISBN 0-88706-853-7

• Varieties of Postmodern Theology (Suny Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought), State University of New York Press, 1989, ISBN 0-7914-0050-6

• God and Religion in the Postmodern World: Essays in Postmodern Theology (Constructive Postmodern Thought), State University of New York Press, 1989, ISBN 0-88706-929-0

• Archetypal Process: Self and Divine in Whitehead, Jung, and Hillman, Northwestern University Press, 1990, ISBN 0-8101-0815-1

• Sacred Interconnections: Postmodern Spirituality, Political Economy and Art (SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought), State University of New York Press, 1990, ISBN 0-7914-0231-2

• Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology (Suny Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought), State University of New York Press, 1990, ISBN 0-7914-0198-7

• God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy, University Press of America, 1991, ISBN 0-8191-7687-7

• Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations, State University of New York Press, 1991, ISBN 0-7914-0612-1

• Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: Peirce, James, Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne (SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought), State University of New York Press, 1993, ISBN 0-7914-1333-0

• Postmodern Politics for a Planet in Crisis: Policy, Process, and Presidential Vision (SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought), State University of New York Press, 1993, ISBN 0-7914-1485-X

• Jewish Theology and Process Thought (Suny Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought), State University of New York Press, 1996, ISBN 0-7914-2810-9

• Parapsychology, Philosophy, and Spirituality: A Postmodern Exploration (SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought), State University of New York Press, 1997, ISBN 0-7914-3315-3

• Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion (Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion),Cornell University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-8014-3778-4

• Religion and Scientific Naturalism: Overcoming the Conflicts (SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought),State University of New York Press, 2000, ISBN 0-7914-4563-1

• Process Theology and the Christian Good News: A Response to Classical Free Will Theism in 'Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue between Process and Free Will Theists', Cobb and Pinnock (editors), Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2000, ISBN 0-8028-4739-0

• Two Great Truths: A New Synthesis of Scientific Naturalism and Christian Faith, Westminster John Knox Press, 2004, ISBN 0-664-22773-2

• Deep Religious Pluralism, Westminster John Knox Press, 2005, ISBN 0-664-22914-X

• Whitehead's Radically Different Postmodern Philosophy: An Argument for Its Contemporary Relevance (SUNY Series in Philosophy), State University of New York Press, 2007, ISBN 0-7914-7049-0

About the September 11 attacks[link]

• The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9-11, Olive Branch Press, 2004, ISBN 1-56656-552-9

• The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions, Olive Branch Press, 2004, ISBN 1-56656-584-7

• Christian Faith and the Truth Behind 9/11: A Call to Reflection and Action, Westminster John Knox Press, 2006, ISBN 0-664-23117-9

• The American Empire and the Commonwealth of God: A Political, Economic, Religious Statement, with John B. Cobb, Richard A. Falk and Catherine Keller, Westminster John Knox Press, 2006, ISBN 0-664-23009-1

• 9/11 and American Empire: Intellectuals Speak Out, Vol. 1, editor, with Peter Dale Scott, Olive Branch Press, 2006, ISBN 1-56656-659-2

• Debunking 9/11 Debunking: An Answer to Popular Mechanics and Other Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory (Revised & Updated Edition), Olive Branch Press, Paperback: 392 pages, March 2007, ISBN 1-56656-686-X

• 9/11 Contradictions: An Open Letter to Congress and the Press, Interlink Publishing Group, March 2008, ISBN 1-56656-716-5

• New Pearl Harbor Revisited: 9/11, the Cover-up and the Exposé, Olive Branch Press, September 2008, ISBN 1-56656-729-7

• Osama Bin Laden: Dead or Alive?, Olive Branch Press, May 2009, ISBN 1-56656-783-1

• Osama Bin Laden: Dead or Alive?, Arris Books UK, July 2009, ISBN 1-84437-081-X

• The Mysterious Collapse of World Trade Center 7: Why the Final Official Report About 9/11 Is Unscientific and False, Interlink Publishing, September 2009, ISBN 1-56656-786-6

• The Mysterious Collapse of World Trade Center 7: Why the Final Official Report About 9/11 Is Unscientific and False, Interlink Publishing, Arris Books UK, September 2009, ISBN 1-84437-083-6

• Cognitive Infiltration: An Obama Appointee's Plan to Undermine the 9/11 Conspiracy Theory, Olive Branch Press, September 2010

• 9/11 Ten Years Later: When State Crimes Against Democracy Succeed , Olive Branch Press, September 6, 2011, ISBN 978-1-56656-868-5

External links[link]

• DVD - David Ray Griffin "9/11: Why Do Bill Moyers and Robert Parry Accept Miracles?" A talk given in Seattle, May, 2011
• Official website
• Articles by David Ray Griffin
• VIDEO: David Ray Griffin on new 9/11 evidence June 4, 2008
• Center for process studies
• Presbyterian Church publishes 9/11 conspiracy theory
• David Ray Griffin Curriculum Vitae
• Bibliography of Published Articles
• OUT LOUD: AN INSIDE JOB?
• Unquestioned Answers
• Independent.com – 'Thinking Unthinkable Thoughts: Theologian Charges White House Complicity in 9/11 Attack', Nick Welsh (April 1, 2005)
• SeptemberEleventh.org – 'The 9/11 Commission Report: A 571-Page Lie, David Ray Griffin, 9/11 Visibility Project (May 22, 2005)
• The Destruction of the World Trade Center: Why the Official Account Cannot Be True
• Getting Agnostic About 9/11 – A society of nonbelievers questions the official version LATimes, Friday, August 26, 2005.
• Review of The New Pearl Harbor, by Chip Berlet.
• Response to Chip Berlet's Review of The New Pearl Harbor, David Ray Griffin, May 1, 2004.
• Claremont School of Theology retired faculty.
• Bio at coast to coast am
• David Ray Griffin's testimony at the Congressional Black Caucus, Annual Legislative Conference 2005 (September 21–24, Washington Convention)
• Is American Democracy Too Feeble To Deal With 9/11?
• 9/11 The Myth and the Reality: Dr. David Ray Griffin – Two speeches given by philosopher and theologian Dr. David Ray Griffin at The Commonwealth Club in San Francisco (4/3/06) and at The Grand Lake Theater in Oakland (3/30/06).
• The Muslim-Jewish-Christian Alliance for 9/11 Truth – Articles by Dr David Ray Griffin
• Ryan Mackey (2007-08-31). On Debunking 9/11 Debunking: Examining Dr. David Ray Griffin’s Latest Criticism of the NIST World Trade Center Investigation. Jet Propulsion Laboratory. http://jod911.com/drg_nist_review_2_1.pdf.