The Basij (Persian: بسيج‎) (officially Basij-e Mostaz'afin, literally "Mobilization of the Oppressed")^[1][2] is a paramilitary volunteer militia established in 1979 by order of the Islamic Revolution's leader Ayatollah Khomeini. The original organization comprised the civilian volunteers whom the Ayatollah Khomeini urged to fight in the Iran-Iraq war.^[3] The force consists of young Iranians who have volunteered, often in exchange for official benefits. Currently Basij serve as an auxiliary force engaged in activities such as internal security as well as law enforcement auxiliary, the providing of social service, organizing of public religious ceremonies, and, more notoriously, policing of morals and the suppression of dissident gatherings.^[4][5] Basij is the name of the force; a basiji is an individual member.^[6]

The Basij are set up as ^[7] subordinate to, receiving their orders from, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei to whom they are known for their loyalty.^[8] They have also been described as "a loosely allied group of organizations" including "many groups controlled by local clerics."^[7] They have a local organization in almost every city in Iran.^[9]

As of October 2009 Mohammad Reza Naqdi was the commander of the Basij.^[10][11] The force has often been present and reacting against the widespread protests which occurred immediately after the 2009 Iranian presidential election and in the months following.^[12]

History[link]

Origins[link]

During the Iranian revolution, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a decree founding the Basij as "a large people's militia", in November 1979. He is reported to have stated that "a country with 20 million youths must have 20 million riflemen or a military with 20 million soldiers; such a country will never be destroyed." ^[1] This "people's militia" was established on April 30, 1980.^[6] The Basij was open to those above the age of 18 and below the age of 45, and all women in that age category.^{[citation needed]} According to author Baqer Moin, the group "which was formed as a civil defence force, but in practice became a grass-roots intelligence organisation, was largely made up of young boys aged between ten and sixteen and, during the war, unemployed old men, some in their eighties."^[13]

During the Iran-Iraq War hundreds of thousands volunteered for the Basij, including children as young as 12 and unemployed old men, some in their eighties. These volunteers were swept up in Shi'i love of martyrdom and the atmosphere of patriotism of the war mobilization. They were encouraged through visits to the schools and an intensive media campaign. The Basij may best be known for their employment human wave attacks which cleared minefields or draw the enemy's fire.^[13] It is estimated that tens of thousands were killed in the process. Some reports have the Basiji marching into battle marking their expected entry to heaven by wearing plastic "keys to paradise" around their necks.

The typical human wave tactic was for Basijis (often very lightly armed and unsupported by artillery or air power) to march forward in straight rows. While casualties were high, the tactic often worked. “They come toward our positions in huge hordes with their fists swinging,” an Iraqi officer complained in the summer of 1982. “You can shoot down the first wave and then the second. But at some point the corpses are piling up in front of you, and all you want to do is scream and throw away your weapon. Those are human beings, after all.”^[14]

According to Dilip Hiro, by the spring of 1983 the Basij had trained 2.4 million Iranians in the use of arms and sent 450,000 to the front.^[15] Tehran Bureau estimates the basij peak number at the front at 100,000 by December 1986.^[6] By the end of the war between 700,000-800,000 Basij volunteers were sent to the front.^[16] In 1985 the IRNA put the number of basij at 3 million.^[17]

Duties after the war[link]

By the end of the war, most of the Basijis left the service and were reintegrated back into their lives, often after years of being in the front. After the war, the Basij was reorganized and gradually developed into one of the Islamic regime's "primary guarantors of domestic security."^[16] By 1988 the number of Basij checkpoints dramatically decreased, but the Basij were still active in monitoring the activities of citizens.^[18] They enforce hijab, arresting women for violating the dress code, arrest youths for attending mixed gender parties or being in public with unrelated members of the opposite sex,^[19] seized 'indecent' material and satellite dish antennae.^[1]

In 1988 college Basiji organizations were established on college campuses to fight "Westoxification" and potential student agitation against the government.^[19] Basij members played "a central role" in breaking up the student riots in Tehran in 1999. They were also instrumental in quelling several outbreaks of ethnic unrest in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, which is home to the majority of Iran's ethnic-Arab population.^[16]

Basij also act as an emergency management service, being mobilized in case of earthquakes or other natural or human-made disasters. It may supplement law enforcement by setting up street inspection posts in urban areas to intercept drug smuggling and potential insurgency.^{[citation needed]}

The Ashura Brigades are reported to have been created in 1993 after anti-government riots erupted in various Iranian cities. These Islamic brigades were made up of both Revolutionary Guards and the Basij and by 1998 numbered 17,000.^[1]

Revival[link]

According to the New York Times, after the spontaneous celebrations following Iran winning of a spot in the World Cup soccer championship in 1998, and the student protests in July 1999, the Islamic government felt that it had lost control of the streets, and "reinvented" the Basij to correct this problem.^[7] Giving a slightly different timeline, GlobalSecurity.org reports that it was under the administration of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad (elected in 2005) that the Basij appeared "to be undergoing something of a revival."^[18]

In late September 2005, the Basij staged a series of urban defense exercises across the country. Its first deputy commander announced the creation of 2,000 "Ashura battalions" within the Basij that will have "riot-control responsibilities." Some speculated the "revival" of the Basij was connected "with preparations for possible civil unrest." ^[1]

The Iranian Government has drawn up a number of different plans to keep the Basij alive. Among these plans is the emphasis on ideas such as Development Basij (Basij-e-Sazandegi). Fars News Agency reported. "Among the most important tasks of the Basij are boosting everlasting security, strengthening development infrastructures, equipping resistance bases, [and] increasing employment," Hejazi added. He described the prohibition of vice and the promotion of virtue in society as the "divine policy" of the Basij.^[18]

Along with the Iranian riot police and the Ansar-e-Hezbollah, the Basij have been active in recent years in suppressing student demonstrations in Iran. The Basij are sometimes differentiated from the Ansar in being more "disciplined" and not beating, or at least not being as quick to beat demonstrators.^[20] Other sources describe the Ansar-e-Hezbollah as part of the "loosely allied group of organizations" that make up the Basij.^[7]

Some believe the change in focus of the Basij from its original mission of fighting to defend Iran in the Iran-Iraq War to its current internal security concerns has led to a loss in its prestige and morale. According to an unnamed "seasoned analyst" quoted by csmonitor.com, "You define yourself by your enemies, and those were the superpowers back then. ... But now they are fighting young people who put gel in their hair. That's the enemy. So it's demeaning, and not at all elevating for their self-image."^[21]

The Basij came "under the formal authority of the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) commander in 2007 and were incorporated into IRGC ground forces in 2008."^[6]

2009 election protests[link]

Mir Hussein Moussavi, opposition presidential candidate in 2009, has "decried the violence carried out by the Basij" during protests following the disputed presidential election, complaining that the basij attack the demonstrations "with hoses, clubs, iron bars, truncheons and sometimes firearms," `just before the police show up.` ^[7] The tactics used by the Basij against election demonstrators have been described as involving choosing "targets at the edges of the crowds, going for the vulnerable and unwary stragglers," attacking "surreptitiously ... jumping demonstrators as they return home on darkened streets at night,"^[22] and also wielding "tiny knives or razor blades to use against protestors from behind their backs."^[23] There have also been reports of poor performance by basij after the 2009 election, with some basij failed to suppress demonstrations, "deserted their assignments", and being unwilling "to beat up neighbors who protested against the election result by chanting `God is great` from their homes."^[6] According to Tehran Bureau, "from June 22 onward, the Basij constituted only a minority of the forces cracking down on protesters," after having had "trouble maintaining order in major urban centers" particularly Tehran. This was thought to be a reason for the replacement of commander Hossein Taeb and the Basij's formal integration into the Revolutionary Guards ground forces in October 2009.^[6]

Following the protests, Hojjatoleslam Hossein Taeb, commander of the Basij, "cautioned" Iranians that the US was "hiring agents and mercenaries in an effort to continue its plots for a soft overthrow of the Islamic Republic," according to the Iranian Fars news agency.^[24] Taeb has also stated that the anti-government riots "killed eight members of the Basij and wounded 300 others."^[25][26]

Calls for international terrorism[link]

In 2012, Basij commander Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi called for the burning of the White House.^[27]

Organization and membership[link]

Organization[link]

A policeman (L) and a Basiji (R) arresting a young man for carrying a knife in front of the Iranian parliament, 24 June 2009

Subgroupings of the Basij include the Pupil Basij [Basij-e Danesh-Amouzi], the Student Basij [Basij-e Daneshjouyi], the University Basij, the Public Service Basij [Basij-e Edarii], and the Tribal Basij,^[16] (aka Basij-e Ashayer or the former tribal levies incorporated into the Basij). In the Student Basij, middle-school-aged members are called "Seekers" (Puyandegan), and high-school members are called the "Vanguard" (Pishgaman).^[18] Tehran Bureau also lists a "Basij of the Guilds" [Basij-e Asnaf], and a "Labor Basij" [Basij-e Karegaran].^[6]

Basij has been called "a quasi-decentralised network". Its organizational structure and training "varies from one province to another, according to the nature and severity of the potential threats identified by the IRGC and Basij commanders in different regions."^[16] The Basij have "branches in almost every Iranian mosque",^[28] with rooms marked Paygah-e-Basij or Basij base, "which serves as a kind of Islamic club where students study the Koran, organize sports teams and plan field trips."^[7] According to the Tehran Bureau, the Basij "statute distinguishes between three types of members":

• Regular members, "who are mobilized in wartime and engage in developmental activities in peacetime. Regular members are volunteers and are unpaid, unless they engage in war-time duty."
• Active Members, "who have had extensive ideological and political indoctrination, and who also receive payment for peacetime work." and
• Special Members, "who are paid dual members of the Basij and the IRGC and serve as the IRGC ground forces."^[6]

Basij form the fifth branch of the Army of the Revolutionary Guard, and the "three main armed wings" of the Basij are the Ashoura and Al-Zahra Brigades, the Imam Hossein Brigades (composed of Basij war veterans who cooperate closely with the IRGC ground forces) and the Imam Ali Brigades (which deal with security threats).^[6] According to Radio Free Europe, the "backbone" of the Basij comprises 2,500 Al-Zahra battalions (all women) and Ashura battalions (male), numbering 300–350 personnel each. The IRGC aims to arm 30 percent of these battalions with semi-heavy and heavy weapons. However, all members of the battalions are trained to use light arms and rifles.^[16] They are trained "in riot-control tactics and how to deal with domestic uprisings,"^[16] and officially tasked with "defending the neighborhoods in case of emergencies."^[6]

In addition, since 2007 the Basij have established "30,000 new combat cells, each of them 15-20 members strong, named Karbala and Zolfaqar". The cells "cooperate closely" or in emergency situations are "controlled by" the Revolutionary Guard.^[16][29]

Commanders[link]

The current commander of the Basij is Mohammad Reza Naqdi, who replaced Hossein Taeb in October 2009.^[16] Hossein Taeb was appointed commander of the Basij on July 14, 2008.^[10][11]

The first deputy commander General Mirahmadi was formally installed on 4 September 2005. The Tehran commander is Seyyed Mohammad Haj Aqamir. The deputy Basij commander for Tehran, General Ahmad Zolqadr, was formally installed on 5 September 2005; the new Basij commander in Tabrizi, Brigadier General Mohammad Yusef Shakeri, on 29 September 2005.^[18]

Size[link]

Estimates of the number of Basij vary, with its leadership giving higher figures than outside commentators. According to RFERL,

According to a former commander of the Basij, Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi, the strength of the force in 2004 was 10.3 million. By 2007, its strength stood at 12.6 million. The current commander of the Basij, Hasan Taeb, told the semi-official Fars news agency on November 25 that the force now numbers 13.6 million, which is about 20 percent of the total population of Iran. Of this number, about 5 million are women and 4.7 million are schoolchildren. ... In fact the Basij may be able to mobilize no more than 1.5 million men and women of military age.^[30]

An earlier study in 2005 by a Washington think-tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, put "the number of full-time, uniformed, and active members at 90,000, with another 300,000 reservists and some 1 million that could be mobilized when necessary."^[6]

Duties and activities[link]

In their capacity of maintaining law and order, Basiji act as "morality police" in towns and cities by "enforcing the wearing of the hijab; arresting women for violating the dress code; prohibiting male-female fraternization; monitoring citizens' activities; confiscating satellite dishes and `obscene` material; intelligence gathering; and even harassing government critics and intellectuals. Basij volunteers also act as bailiffs for local courts."^[30]

Duties may vary by province, with Basij deployed against drug traffickers in the eaastern border regions, banned goods smugglers in Hormuzgan and Bushehr, and "carrying out border-guard duties" on the border with Iraq.^[30]

As of 2008, "government construction and economic projects can be contracted to the Basij",^[30] and in 2010, "thousands" of basiji "were educated in blogging and filtering of dissident websites" on the internet.^[6]

Benefits and profile of members[link]

According to a 2006 report from Globalsecurity.org Basij membership is thought to comprise "mainly boys, old men, and those who recently finished their military service," ^[1] while in 2009 the New York Times describes them as "ranging in age from high school to about 30 years old."^[7]

Benefits for members of the Basij reportedly include exemption from the 21 months of military service required for Iranian men, reserved spots in universities, and a small stipend.^[7] Members of Basij are more likely than non-members to obtain government positions, especially security related positions within government controlled institutions. Many Iranians reportedly join Basij only to take advantage of the benefits membership and to get admission to university or as a tool to get promotion in government jobs.^[31]

In past elections militia members have voted for both hardliners and reformists. President Ahmadinejad enjoys significant support from militia members, many of whom have benefited from his policies.^[32]

As the Basij is a volunteer paramilitary organisation, most Basiji are not permitted to carry a firearm except for special requirements. This means that only about 25% of Basij carry firearms, usually an AK-47. However there is no rule saying that they cannot use any other weaponry, an issue which has brought major controversy.

Human rights and political activism[link]

Human rights controversies[link]

• According to allegations received by the UNHCR "tens of thousands of Basijis had been ordered to prowl about every factory, office and school to ensure that everyone adhered to the Islamic code. [...] After the summer 1999 riots Basij units were revived, rearmed and sent out into the streets to help enforce Islamic law. The Basijis are reportedly under the control of local mosques. It was further said that the Basijis set up checkpoints around the cities and stopped cars to sniff their occupant's breath for alcohol and check for women wearing make-up or travelling with a man not their close relative or husband. It was reported that the Law of Judicial Support for the Basijis, published in the Official Gazette No. 13946 of 8.10.1371 (December 1992), provided no redress against arbitrary detention by the Basijis." Iran's permanent representative to the U.N. denied these charges.^[33]
• Amnesty International claims that "investigations by Parliament and the National Security Council indicated that actions by Revolutionary Guard officials and Basij (Mobilization) forces, among others, precipitated the unrest and injuries following the July 1999 students demonstrations".^[34]
• Human Rights Watch has reported that the Basij belong to the "Parallel institutions" (nahad-e movazi), "the quasi-official organs of repression that have become increasingly open in crushing student protests, detaining activists, writers, and journalists in secret prisons, and threatening pro-democracy speakers and audiences at public events." Under the control of the Office of the Supreme Leader these groups set up arbitrary checkpoints around Tehran, uniformed police often refraining from directly confronting these plainclothes agents. "Illegal prisons, which are outside of the oversight of the National Prisons Office, are sites where political prisoners are abused, intimidated, and tortured with impunity." ^[35]
• On 13 November 2006, Tohid Ghaffarzadeh, a student at Islamic Azad University of Sabzevar was reportedly killed by a Basij member at the University while Ghaffarzadeh was talking to his girlfriend. The killer reportedly approached Ghaffarzadeh and stabbed him with a knife explaining that what he did was according to his religious beliefs.^[36]
• On 15 June 2009, reports linked the Basij militia to murder of civilians in Azadi Square, Tehran, during the 2009 Iranian election protests.^[37][38] News agencies reported 7 dead and over 50 wounded.^[39]
• On 27 June 2009, Human Rights Watch said the Basij were raiding homes at night, destroying property, beating people, and confiscating satellite dishes. They said the raids were to stop anti-government chanting and to prevent people from watching foreign news broadcasts.^[40]
• During this same period, several Basij members have been filmed breaking into houses and shooting into crowds.^{[41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48]}
• During the 2009 election protests, the IRG and the Basij also attacked Universities and students' dorms at night,^[49] and destroyed property.^[50][51]

Politics[link]

In theory the Basij are banned from involvement in politics by the Iranian constitution, but its leadership is considered active, particularly during and after the 2005 election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.^[6] According to RFERL, "Basij support contributed to Ahmadinejad's victory in the 2005 presidential election". In the March 2008 parliamentary elections, the Basij and IRGC commanders

"openly backed Ahmadinejad's principalists (osulgarayan)". In February 2008, Major General Jafari was quoted as saying that "the principlists are in control of the executive and legislative branches and, God willing, the judiciary will soon follow suit." Hasan Taeb, then deputy commander of the Basij, similarly stressed that Basij members should have a "maximum presence" in the elections.^[30]

Supreme Leader Khamenei, to whom the Basij have been described as very loyal to, described Basij as "the greatest hope of the Iranian nation" and "an immaculate tree".^[8]

See also[link]

• Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution
• Hezbollah of Iran

Notes[link]

External links[link]

• Video Archive of Basij
• Letters from Iran - The Basij in the Universities
• Basij Students Organization official website (from Internet Archive)
• Heavy Weapons for Baseej Volunteer Militia from Rooz Online (from Internet Archive)
• Iran Primer: The Basij Resistance Force by ALI ALFONEH, 21 Oct 2010

Ali Khamenei سید علی حسینی خامنه‌ای Əli Xameneyi
2nd Supreme Leader of Iran
Incumbent
Assumed office 4 June 1989
President	Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani Mohammad Khatami Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
Prime Minister	Mir-Hossein Mousavi
Preceded by	Ruhollah Khomeini
3rd President of Iran
In office 13 October 1981 – 3 August 1989
Prime Minister	Mahdavi Kani (Acting) Mir-Hossein Mousavi
Preceded by	Mohammad-Ali Rajai
Succeeded by	Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
Leader of the Islamic Republican Party
In office 15 July 1981 – 15 May 1987
Deputy	Mir-Hossein Mousavi
Preceded by	Mohammad-Javad Bahonar
Succeeded by	Party dissolved
Personal details
Born	Seyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei (1939-07-17) 17 July 1939 (age 72) Mashhad, Iran
Political party	Combatant Clergy Association (1977–present)
Other political affiliations	Islamic Republican Party (1979–1987)
Spouse(s)	Khojaste Khamenei (1964–present)[1]
Children	Mojtaba Mostafa Masoud Meysam Hoda Boshra
Religion	Usuli Twelver Shia Islam

Grand Ayatollah^[2] Sayyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei (Persian: سید علی حسینی خامنه ای‎, Azerbaijani: سید علی حسینی خامنه‌ای – Seyyid Əli Xameneyi, pronounced [ʔæˈliː hoseiˈniː xɒːmeneˈʔiː] ( listen); born 17 July 1939)^[3] is the Supreme Leader of Iran,^[4] and a Twelver Shi'a marja.^[4][5] He had also served as the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran from 1981 to 1989. In 2010, Forbes selected him 26th in the list of 'World's Most Powerful People'.^[6]

Holding absolute power in his country, he has been described as one of only three people having "important influence" during the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran ^[7][8][9]. Khamenei was the victim of an attempted assassination in June 1981 that paralyzed his right arm^[10][11], although so far the biggest challenge to his leadership has been the mass protests following the June 2009 presidential elections^[12] during which he strongly supported president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.^[13] They have had a falling out since.^[14]

Early life[link]

Khamenei holds the title of Sayyed, which means that he claims direct patrilineal descent from Ali ibn Abi Talib. Some^[which?] of Khamenei's ancestors are from Tafresh in today's Markazi province, and had migrated from their original home in Tafresh to Tabriz.^[15][16] Born in Mashhad,^[3][17] he is second eldest of eight children, and two of his brothers are also clerics. His younger brother, Hadi Khamenei, is a renowned newspaper editor and cleric.^[18] Khamenei is Iranian Azeri on his father's side^{[19][20][21][22]} and his mother is a Yazd-native Persian.^[23]

He attended religious studies classes at the rudimentary and advanced levels in the hawza of Mashhad, under his mentors such as Haj Sheikh Hashem Qazvini, and Ayatollah Milani, and then went to Najaf in 1957.^[24] After a short stay he left Najaf to Mashhad, and in 1958 he settled in Qom. Khamenei attended the classes of Ayatollahs Husain Borujerdi and Ruhollah Khomeini. Later, he was involved in the Islamic activities of 1963 which led to his arrest in the city of Birjand, in Southern Khorasan Province. Shortly thereafter, he was released and resumed teaching in Mashhad's religious schools and mosques, teaching the Nahj al-Balagheh.^[24] According to his official biography, Khamenei spent a “clandestine life” in Tehran in the year 1966–1967 after which he was arrested by the police and imprisoned.

Literary scholarship[link]

Khamenei is fluent in both Persian and Arabic.^[25] He has translated several books into Persian from Arabic, including the works of the famous Egyptian Islamist theoretician Sayyid Qutb. He is a less fluent speaker of the Azerbaijani language, his father's native language^[26] and has some understanding of English.^[27]

In his analysis of the Persian poetry of Allameh Muhammad Iqbal, he states that "Iqbal was not acquainted with Persian idiom, as he spoke Urdu at home and talked to his friends in Urdu or English. He did not know the rules of Persian prose writing."^[28] Nevertheless, he admires Iqbal.^{[citation needed]}

Like many other politically active clerics at the time, Khamenei was far more involved with politics than religious scholarship.^[29]

Political life and presidency[link]

Mohammad-Ali Rajai visiting Khamenei in hospital after an assassination attempt by the MKO on 27 June 1981

Khamenei was a key figure in the Islamic revolution in Iran and a close confidant of Ayatollah Khomeini.^{[citation needed]}

Khomeini appointed Khamenei to the post of Tehran's Friday prayers in 1979, after forced resignation of Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri from the post, when he criticised Khomeini for torture of prisoners. He served briefly as the Deputy Minister for Defence and as a supervisor of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. He also went to the battlefield as a representative of the defense commission of the parliament. In June 1981, Khamenei narrowly escaped an assassination attempt when a bomb, concealed in a tape recorder at a press conference, exploded beside him. He was permanently injured, losing the use of his right arm.^[30]

In 1981, after the assassination of Mohammad-Ali Rajai, Khamenei was elected President of Iran by a landslide vote in the Iranian presidential election, October 1981 and became the first cleric to serve in the office. Ayatollah Khomeini had originally wanted to keep clerics out of the presidency but later changed his views.^{[citation needed]}

Khamenei and Hussein-Ali Montazeri

In his presidential inaugural address Seyd Ali Khamenei vowed to eliminate "deviation, liberalism, and American-influenced leftists".^[31] Vigorous opposition to the regime, including nonviolent and violent protest, assassinations, guerrilla activity and insurrections, was answered by state repression and terror in the early 1980s, both before and during Khamenei's presidency. Thousands of rank-and-file members of insurgent groups were killed, often by revolutionary courts. By 1982, the government announced that the courts would be reined in, although various political groups continued to be repressed by the government in the first half of the 1980s.^[32]

Khamenei during Iran-Iraq War

Khamenei helped guide the country during the Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s, and developed close ties with the now-powerful Revolutionary Guards. As president, he had a reputation of being deeply interested in the military, budget and administrative details.^[30] After the Iraqi army was expelled from Iran in 1982, Khamenei became one of the main opponents of Khomeini's decision to counter-invade into Iraq, an opinion Khamenei shared with Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, with whom he would later conflict during the 2009 Iranian election protests.^[33]

He was re-elected to a second term in 1985, capturing 85.66% of total votes.^[34]

Supreme Leader (Vali-e faqih)[link]

Seyed Ali Khamenei succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution, after Khomeini's death, being elected as the new Supreme Leader by the Assembly of Experts on 4 June 1989. Initially, a council of three members, Ali Meshkini, Mousavi Ardabili and Khamenei, was proposed for Leadership. After the assembly rejected the idea of a Leadership Council, and Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Golpaygani failed to get enough votes, Khamenei was elected the Leader by two thirds of the votes.^[35][36]

The concept that the ruler of the land should be an Islamic jurist serving as "guardian" (Vali faqih ولی فقیه in Persian), was developed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in a lecture series made book. In this kind of theocratic "guardianship" leadership (Velayat-e Faqih, ولایت فقیه ), no political decision is lawful until it is approved by the guardian jurist who is called Leader (رهبر Rahbar in Persian) by the Iranian constitution. Even the taking of office by the democratically elected president is subject to the approval of the Leader.^{[citation needed]}

Khamenei's approach to leadership[link]

Khamenei's era as leader has differed from that of his predecessor Khomeini. He has continued Khomeini's policy of "balancing one group against another, making sure that no single side gains too much power."^[30][37] But lacking Khomeini's charisma and clerical standing, he has developed networks, first inside the armed forces, and then among the clerics administering the major religious foundations (or bonyads), and seminaries of Qom and Mashhad.^[37] According to Vali Nasr, he has brought many of the powers of the presidency with him into the office, turning it into an "omnipotent overseer of Iran's political scene". Officials under Khamenei influence the country's various powerful, and sometimes bickering, institutions, including "the parliament, the presidency, the judiciary, the Revolutionary Guards, the military, the intelligence services, the police agencies, the clerical elite, the Friday prayer leaders and much of the media", as well as various "nongovernmental foundations, organizations, councils, seminaries and business groups".^[30] Under him, the government is said to resemble "a clerical oligarchy more than an autocracy."^[37]

To maintain "the image of the Leader as 'guide', rather than executive", Khamenei stays aloof from day-to-day politics. He gives no press conferences or interviews, and, as noted in Hooman Majd's book:

[He] speaks only at special gatherings, such as an occasional Friday prayer or commemoration ceremonies of one sort or another. The Leader meets with foreign dignitaries (almost exclusively Muslim) but limits any televised and public words to generalities, such as Iran's support for the country (or entity like Hamas or Hezbollah) whose emissary he is meeting, Iran's peaceful and Islamic nature, and Iran's eagerness to expand trade and contacts with the friendly country in question. He pointedly does not meet with representatives of Western powers. The Leader does not travel overseas; if anyone wishes to see him, that person must travel to Iran.^[38]

Apart from his time in Najaf as a student, Khamenei travelled to Libya during his time as President.^[39][40]

Despite this policy, as leader, Khamenei reserves the right to "inject himself into the process and 'correct' a flawed policy or decision."^[41]

In his speeches Khamenei regularly mentions many familiar themes of the 1979 revolution: justice, independence, self-sufficiency, fundamentalist Islamic government and resolute opposition to Israel and United States, while rarely mentioning other revolutionary ideals such as democracy and greater government transparency.^[31] Dealing with the presidents who have served during his reign, Khamenei has successfully scuttled President Rafsanjani's attempts to find a modus vivendi with the United States, President Khatami's aspirations for a more democratic Islamic state, and President Ahmadinejad's desire for confrontation.^[31]

Election as Leader & title of "Grand Ayatollah"[link]

At the time of Khomeini's death Khamenei was not a marja or an ayatollah, and the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran required the Leader to be a marja. However, Ayatollah Khomeini had not been satisfied with the field of candidates to replace him and in April 1989, three months before his death, assigned a team to revise the constitution so that the Leader of Iran need only be an expert on Islamic jurisprudence and possess the "appropriate political and managerial skills".^[31][42] This new amendment to the constitution had not been put to a referendum yet, so after voting for Khamenei, the Assembly of Experts internally titled him a temporary office holder until the new constitution became effective. The choice of Khamenei is said to be a political one,^[43] but the "political elite" of the Islamic Republic "rallied behind Khamenei" and his status was "elevated overnight" from Hojjat ol-Islam to Ayatollah.^{[citation needed]}

His status as marja is controversial. In 1994, after the death of Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Araki, the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom declared Khamenei a new marja. However, four of Iran's dissident grand ayatollahs declined to recognize Khamenei as a marja.^[44] Nevertheless, according to narjes.org a cleric only needs acceptance of a few grand ayatollahs to be recognized as marja.^[45] Khamenei refused the offer of marja'iyat for Iran, as he explained, due to other heavy responsibilities, but agreed to be the marja for the Shi'as outside of Iran. His acceptance of marja'iyat for Shi'as outside Iran does not have traditional precedence in Shi'ism. Marja'iyat can be, and in modern times it increasingly is, transitional.^[43] This title has been widely criticised by Muslim scholars who do not recognise Khamenei as an Ayatollah-Ozma or Marja-e-Taqlid.^[46]

Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Shirazi, who was under house-arrest at the time for his opposition to Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, did not accept Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as a marja. According to "Human Rights in Iran" (2001) by Pace University's Reza Afshari, Shirazi was "indignant" over recognition of Khamenei as the Leader and a marja. Shirazi (who died in late 2001) apparently favored a committee of Grand Ayatollahs to lead the country.^{[citation needed]} Other marjas who questioned the legitimacy of Khamenei's marja'yat were dissident clerics: Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, Grand Ayatollah Hassan Tabatabai-Qomi and Grand Ayatollah Yasubedin Rastegar Jooybari.^[44] In 1997 the more senior Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, "questioned the powers of the Leader" and was punished with the closure of his religious school, an attack on his office in Qom" and a period of house arrest.^[5]

Fatwas[link]

As a Grand Ayatollah (disputed or not), Khamenei has issued thousands of fatwas in answer to questions from Shi'a petitioners, "on everything from Islamic law to betting on basketball, student loans to children in day care with non-Muslims, women on motorcycles to staying in hotels used by Buddhists". He has ruled against the wearing of neckties and the listening to music and news from foreign sources, but not nose piercing (as long as adornments are covered).^[47]

Fatwa regarding companions of Muhammad[link]

In 2010, Imam Khamenei issued a fatwa which bans any insult to the Sahabah (companions of Muhammad) as well as Muhammad's wives. This fatwa has been argued by some that the fatwa was issued in a grand effort to make reconcile legal, social, and political disagreements between the two largest sects in Islam: Sunni and Shia.^{[citation needed]}

Amman Message[link]

Khamenei is one of the Ulama signatories of the Amman Message, which gives a broad foundation for defining Muslim orthodoxy.^[48]

Fatwa against nuclear weapons[link]

Khamenei with Major General Mansour Sattary (1948–1995) former Commander of Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued a fatwa saying the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons was forbidden under Islam.^[49] The fatwa was cited in an official statement by the Iranian government at an August 2005 meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.^[50], However a group of former Iranian diplomats said that Khamenei had told a group of Iranian security and intelligence officials that his fatwa would not restrict Muslims in Iran from pursuing and building a nuclear weapon.^[51] The impact and applicability of the fatwa has also been put into question for various other reasons, including the possibility that the fatwa may have been pronounced under the Shia doctrine of taqiyya (a form of permitted lying in the interest of defending the faith), or that it may be changed and even reversed by Khamenei in the future- much as then Supreme Leader Khomeini, during the Iran-Iraq war, reluctantly reversed his previous doctrinal ban on indiscriminate weaponry and ordered the resumption of research into its development, including nuclear bombs.^[52]

Iran's nuclear program has been a subject of international debate for decades. The Iranian government claims the purpose of its nuclear development is to produce electricity, while some western countries accuse it of trying to create nuclear weapons.^[53]

Relationship with the press[link]

In 2000 he was listed by the Committee to Protect Journalists as "one of the top ten enemies of the press and freedom of expression",^[54] and was named to the Time 100 in 2007.^[55] Opposition journalists Ahmad Zeidabadi, Mohsen Sazegara, Mohammad Nourizad and Akbar Ganji were arrested and investigated^{[56][57][58][59]} for spreading critical articles containing unproven charges against Khamenei's policies as the leader and some organizations.^[60][61] According to the Iran's Press Law "spreading rumors and lies and distorts the words of others" is not allowed.^[62] Also, according to the law, "spreading libel against officials, institutions, organizations and individuals in the country or insulting legal or real persons who are lawfully respected, even by means of pictures or caricatures" is not allowed.^[62]

Among his controversial actions were his rejection of a bill presented by the Iranian parliament in 2000 that aimed to reform the country's press law, and the disqualification of thousands of parliamentary candidates for the 2004 Iranian legislative election by the Guardian Council he appointed.^[5]

Political power following reform era[link]

According to Karim Sadjadpour of the American Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, several factors have strengthened Khamenei in recent years:

(1) A vast network of commissars stationed in strategic posts throughout government bureaucracies, dedicated to enforcing his authority; (2) the weak, conservative-dominated parliament, headed by Khamenei loyalist Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel (whose daughter is married to the Leader's son); (3) the rapidly rising political and economic influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, whose top leaders are directly appointed by Khamenei and have always been publicly deferential to him; (4) the political disengagement of Iran's young population ....; and (5) most significant[ly], the 2005 presidential election, which saw hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad trounce Khamenei's chief rival ... Hashemi Rafsanjani ...^[31]

Challenges following 2009 election protest[link]

In mid August 2009 a group of unnamed former reformist lawmakers appealed to the Assembly of Experts — the constitutional body charged with electing and (in theory) supervising and removing the Leader – to investigate Leader Ali Khamenei's qualification to rule.^[63] A week later another anonymous letter was issued "calling Iran’s leader a dictator and demanding his removal," this one by a group of Iranian clerics.^[64] The letters were called a blow to Khamenei's "status as a neutral arbiter and Islamic figurehead"^[64] and an "unprecedented challenge to the country's most powerful man"^[63] though not a blow to his actual power as leader. The New York Times reports "the phrase `death to Khamenei` has begun appearing in graffiti on Tehran walls, a phrase that would have been almost unimaginable not long ago."^[64]

The letter was addressed to the head of the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a "powerful former president" who also questions the election results. According to the Associate Press it is unlikely the letter's demands would be met as "two-thirds of the 86-member assembly are considered strong loyalists of Khamenei and would oppose" any investigation of him.^[63]

According to The New York Times an 11-page anonymous letter by a group of Iranian clerics was issued 15 August "calling Iran’s leader a dictator and demanding his removal."^[65][66]

According to the New York Times, a "prominent Iranian cleric and a former lawmaker said on Sunday that they had spoken to some of the authors and had no doubt the letter was genuine." According to this cleric the letter's signatories number "several dozen, and are mostly midranking figures from Qum, Isfahan and Mashhad," and that a “the pressure on clerics in Qum is much worse than the pressure on activists because the establishment is afraid that if they say anything they can turn the more traditional sectors of society against the regime,” "^[64]

Dispute with President Ahmadinejad[link]

Early in his presidency, Pres. Ahmadinejad was sometimes described as "enjoy[ing] the full backing" of the Supreme Leader^[67], and even as being his "protege."^[68] In Ahmadinejad's 2005 inauguration the supreme leader allowed Ahmadinejad to kiss his hand and cheeks in what was called "a sign of closeness and loyalty,"^[69] and after the 2009 election fully endorsed Ahmadinejad against protesters.^[70] However as early as January 2008 signs of disagreement between the two men developed over domestic policies,^[67] and by November 2010 several sources detected a "growing rift" between the two.^[71] The disagreement has been described as centering on Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, a top adviser and close confidant of Ahmadinejad^[72] and opponent of "greater involvement of clerics in politics",^[73] who was First Vice President of Iran until being ordered to resign from the cabinet by the supreme leader. In 2009 Ahmadinejad dismissed an opponent of Mashaei, Intelligence Minister Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i, and two years later another Intelligence minister, Heydar Moslehi, resigned after being asked to by Ahmadinejad, but was reinstated by the supreme leader^[68] within hours.^[74] Ahmadinejad responded with an "11-day walkout" of cabinet meetings, religious ceremonies, and other official functions^[71][74] which was denounced by clerics, parliamentarians and military commanders, who accused him of ignoring orders from the supreme leader.^[72] Several people "said to be close" to the president and Mashaei (such as Abbas Amirifar and Mohammed Sharif Malekzadeh) were arrested on charges of being "magicians" and invoking djinns.^[71] On 6 May 2011 it was reported that Ahmadinejad had been given an ultimatum to accept the leader's intervention or resign^[75], and on 8 May he welcoming Moslehi back to a cabinet meeting.^[72] The events have been said to have "humiliated and weakened" Ahmadinejad, though the president has denied that there was any rift between the two,^[72][73] and in a 3 June 2011 speech, Khamenei called for unity among the ruling conservatives, stating that the administration of Ahmadinejad "has been able to accomplish many great tasks."^[76]

Domestic policy[link]

Khamenei standing beside the tomb of General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, Chief of the Armed Forces of Iran during the Iran-Iraq war

Khamenei is regarded by some as the figurehead of the country's conservative establishment.^[5] He is the commander in chief of all armed forces and appoints the head of judiciary system and national radio and television.^{[citation needed]}

Khamenei supported Mesbah Yazdi describing him as one of Iran's most credible ideologues prior to the 2005 election, but has reportedly "recently been concerned about Mesbah's political ambitions."^[77] Mesbah is a critic of reform movement in Iran and is seen as President Ahmadinejad's spiritual guide.^{[citation needed]}

In 2007, Khamenei requested that government officials speed up Iran's move towards economic privatization. Its last move towards such a goal was in 2004, when Article 44 of the constitution was overturned. Article 44 had decreed that Iran's core infrastructure should remain state-run. Khamenei also suggested that ownership rights should be protected in courts set up by the Justice Ministry; the hope was that this new protection would give a measure of security to and encourage private investment.^[78][79]

Additionally, Khamenei has stated that he believes in the importance of nuclear technology for civilian purposes because "oil and gas reserves cannot last forever."^[80][81]

On 30 April 2008, Ali Khamenei backed President Ahmadinejad’s economic policy and said the West was struggling with more economic difficulties than Iran, with a "crisis" spreading from the United States to Europe, and inflation was a widespread problem. The Iranian leader said that the ongoing economic crisis which has crippled the world has been unprecedented in the past 60 years. “This crisis has forced the UN to declare state of emergency for food shortages around the globe but foreign radios have focused on Iran to imply that the current price hikes and inflation in the country are the results of carelessness on the part of Iranian officials which of course is not true”, he said. Khamenei emphasized that no one has the right to blame the Iranian government for Iran’s economic problems. He also advised people and the government to be content and avoid waste in order to solve economic problems. “I advise you to keep in your mind that this great nation is never afraid of economic sanctions”, he added.^{[82][83][84][85]}

Islamization of universities[link]

In a speech given in 2002 Khamenei stressed that he was not satisfied with the performance of then minister of science and higher education Mostafa Moeen, since he had allowed students to pursue activities deemed against Islam in his point of view, such as practicing and studying music, arts, traveling abroad to the land of non-believers, and conducting field trips that were not religious in nature. In the speech Khamenei asks for stricter control on these issues urging the universities to enforce Islamic values.^[86]

Science and technology[link]

Ali Khamenei has been supportive of scientific progress in Iran. He was among the first Islamic clerics to allow stem cell research and therapeutic cloning.^[87][88] In 2004, Khamenei said that the country's progress is dependent on investment in the field of science and technology. He also said that attaching a high status to scholars and scientists in society would help talents to flourish and science and technology to become domesticated, thus ensuring the country's progress and development.^[89]

Minorities[link]

Khamenei’s regime has been characterized by a number of measures that evidenced lack of tolerance towards other minority groups. A memorandum from 1991 signed by Ali Khamenei, states that the Bahá’í community, Iran’s largest religious minority, should be dealt with in such a way “that their progress and development are blocked”, and stipulates that Bahá’ís be denied livelihoods and university education.^[90] A number of persecutions, such as the barring Bahá’ís from higher education and the arrest of the country’s Bahá’í leaders, caused international outcry and condemnatory rhetoric from several high-ranking individuals and organizations.

His attitude towards the Sunni has also caused dissension. Khamenei is reported to oppose the building of a Sunni mosque in Iran's capital, Tehran. According to a Tehran resident quoted by the Asia Times newspaper, reformist former president Mohammad Khatami stated that Khamenei's opposition was the reason he had not followed through on his campaign promise to allow the building of a Sunni mosque in Tehran.^[91] Khamenei kept quiet after Caspian Airlines Flight 7908 incident that led to 168 deaths. No national mourning was announced and that generated anger among Iranian Christian/Armenian community and other Iranians.^[92] This is in contrast to incidents like the death of Iraqi cleric Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim, where Khamenei sent a message and a three day national mourning was announced.^[93]

National Radio and Television[link]

Khamenei at grave of martyrs killed during Iran-Iraq War

Khamenei directly appoints the head of IRIB and the organization works under his responsibility. The state controls most radio and television news outlets, and it is often these pro-government voices that disseminate the official hard-line rhetoric. Many people complain of propaganda in state-controlled media.^[94]

Interpretation of Islamic law[link]

As "Vali faqih", or Leader, Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa ruling stating that the decisions of the Vali faqih "in all the matters that concerns Muslims and Islam," are "the will and decision of the whole nation."^[95]

In 2000, Ali Khamenei sent a letter to the Iranian parliament forbidding the legislature from debating a revision of the Iranian press law. He wrote: "The present press law has succeeded to a point in preventing this big plague. The draft bill is not legitimate and in the interests of the system and the revolution."^[96] His use of "extra-legislative power" has been criticized widely by reformists and opposition groups. In reaction to the letter, some Parliament members voiced outrage and threatened to resign.^[97] Kayhan and Jomhuri-ye Eslami are two newspapers published under the management of Khamenei.

In late 1996, following a fatwa by Khamenei stating that music education corrupts the minds of young children, many music schools were closed and music instruction to children under the age of 16 was banned by public establishments (although private instruction continued).^[98] Khamenei stated, "The promotion of music [both traditional and Western] in schools is contrary to the goals and teachings of Islam, regardless of age and level of study."^[99]

In 1999, Khamenei issued a fatwa stating that it was permitted to use a third-party (donor sperm, ova or surrogacy) in fertility treatments. This was in clear opposition to the fatwa on ART by Gad El-Hak Ali Gad El-Hak of Egypt's Al-Azhar University in the late 1980s which permitted ART (IVF and similar technologies) as long there is no third-party donation (of sperm, eggs, embryos, or uteruses).^[100] This led to an upswing of fertility tourism in Iran.^[101]

In 2002, he ruled that human stem cell research was permissible under Islam, with the condition that it be used to create only parts as opposed to a whole human.^[102]

In 2002 Khamenei intervened against the death sentence given to Hashem Aghajari for arguing that Muslims should re-interpret Islam rather than blindly follow leaders. Khamenei ordered a review of the sentence against Aghajari and it was later commuted to a prison sentence.^[5]

In July 2007, Khamenei criticized Iranian women's rights activists and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): "In our country ... some activist women, and some men, have been trying to play with Islamic rules in order to match international conventions related to women," Khamenei said. "This is wrong." Khamenei made these comments two days after Iranian women's rights activist Delaram Ali was sentenced to 34 months of jail and 10 lashes by Iran's judiciary.^[103] Iran's judiciary works under the auspices of the supreme leader and is independent from the government.

With regard to women's dress, Khamenei believes in the need for compulsory hijab.^[104]

Khamenei claims that "Today, homosexuality is a major problem in the western world. They [western nations] however ignore it. But the reality is that homosexuality has become a serious challenge, pain and unsolvable problem for the intellectuals in the west."^[105]

In 2007, Iranian police under the direction of Khamenei launched a "Public Security Plan", arresting dozens of "thugs" to increase public security. The arrested "thugs" are sometimes beaten on camera in front of neighborhood inhabitants, or forced to wear hanging watering cans used for lavatory ablutions around their necks.^[106] During the first three months of the campaign, 62,785 women were stopped by police in Tehran for not strictly adhering to Islamic dress code. Of these, 1,837 were arrested.

Elections[link]

As Supreme Leader, Khamenei has influence over elections in his appointment of half of the members of the Council of Guardians, who approve or disqualify candidates for office. In February 2004 the Council of Guardians, disqualified thousands of candidates, including 80 incumbents (including the deputy speaker), many of the reformist members of the parliament, and all the candidates of the Islamic Iran Participation Front party from running in the 2004 parliamentary elections. It did not allow to run in the election. The conservatives won about 70% of the seats. The parliamentary election held on 20 February 2004 in Iran was a key turning point in that country's political evolution. The election marked the conclusive end of the campaign for political and social reform initiated by Mohammad Khatami after he was elected president in a landslide vote in May 1997.^[107]

During the 2005 presidential election, Khamenei's comments about importance of fighting corruption, being faithful to the ideals of the Islamic revolution, as well as on the superior intelligence and dynamism of those who studied engineering, were interpreted by some as a subtle endorsement of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (who had a PhD in traffic engineering).^[31] After the election, and until recently Khamenei, was outspoken in his support for Ahmadinejad, and "defended him publicly in ways which he never" had reformist president Khatami. Khamenei would later certify the results of the 2009 Iranian Presidential election.^[31]

Khamenei has taken a firm stand against what has been described as "greatest domestic challenge in 30 years" to the leadership of the Islamic Republic – the 2009 Iranian election protests. He has stated that he will neither reconsider vote results nor bow to public pressure over the disputed reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.^[108] "By Allah's favor, the presidential election was accurately held, and the current matters should be pursued legally."^[109] In a public appearance on 19 June he expresses his support for the declared winner Ahmadinejad and accused foreign powers – including Britain, Israel and the United States – of helping foment protest against the election results.^[110] In particular, he singled out Britain, perceiving the country as the "most evil" of its enemies.^[111] He said that the Iranian people will respond with an "iron fist" if Western powers meddle in Iran's internal affairs.^[112]

Human rights[link]

Khamenei with former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva

Khamenei has called human rights a fundamental principle underlying Islamic teachings, that precedes western concern for human rights by many centuries. Human Rights in Islam include the rights to live, to be free, and to benefit from justice and welfare. He has attacked Western powers who have criticized the rights record of the Islamic Republic for hypocrisy by economically oppressing people in Third World countries and supporting despots and dictators.^[113]

However under Khamenei's interpretation this does not extend to religious rights for Bahá'ís. Khamenei supported persecution of Bahá'ís and signed documents recommending several organized methods of oppression and ways of decreasing the influence of Bahá'ís in Iran and abroad.^[114] According to a letter from the Chairman of the Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces in Iran addressed to the Ministry of Information, the Revolutionary Guard and the Police Force, Khamenei has also ordered the Command Headquarters to identify people who adhere to the Bahá'í Faith and to monitor their activities and gather any and all information about the members of the Bahá'í Faith.^[115][116]

In response to Western complaints of human rights abuses in Iran he has stated that the American administration has committed many crimes and is therefore not fit to judge the Islamic Republic.^[117]

In a visit with hardline cleric Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, Khamenei praised Mesbah’s books and thoughts as being original, very useful, solid and correct. He also stated that the Islamic world needs these ideas today more than any time in the past.^[118] Mesbah Yazdi advocates a return to the values of the 1979 Iranian revolution and is a prominent opponent of the Reformist movement in Iran.

When on 17 September 1992, 3 Iranian-Kurdish opposition leaders and their interpreter were assassinated in the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin, Berlin's highest criminal court issued an international arrest warrant for the Iranian intelligence minister for ordering the assassination and implied Khamenei was one of the masterminds behind the attack.^[119]

Ali Khamenei appoints the commander of the para-military Basij forces that the opposition claim killed dozens of Iranian protesters after the presidential election of June 2009.^{[120][121][122]} There is a petition to the International Court of Justice in Hague, to investigate, prosecute and arrest Ali Khamenei for his role in repeated human rights abuses in Iran.

People charged for criticizing Ali Khamenei[link]

Insulting the Leader is a crime in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Those believed to have insulted Khamenei may be arrested or may be punished on a less formal basis such as by being beaten by vigilantes. Even Khamenei's family members have not been immune to this, as his younger brother, the reformist cleric Hadi Khamenei, was "brutally beaten ... after a sermon in which he criticized the powers of the Supreme Leader," by Basij militia loyal to him.^[31] Some writers, journalists and politicians who have been charged with "insulting Ali Khamenei" include:

• Ahmad Zeidabadi^[123]
• Abdollah Nouri^[124]
• Mohammad Nourizad
• Issa Saharkhiz
• Mohsen Sazegara
• Akbar Ganji

However, many clerics are known to criticize the leader, like the case when a letter was addressed to the head of the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a "powerful former president" who also "questioned" the election results after the 2009 elections.

Foreign policy[link]

Khamenei and Vladimir Putin

Khamenei has "direct responsibility" for foreign policy, which "cannot be conducted without his direct involvement and approval". He has a foreign policy team independent of the president's "which includes two former foreign ministers" and "can at any time of his choosing inject himself into the process and `correct` a flawed policy or decision."^[125] His foreign policy is said to steer a course that avoids either confrontation or accommodation with the West.^[31]

Opposition to the United States[link]

Khamenei has been described as consistent in his opposition to the United States and the Western World in general, reportedly including this theme into his speeches no matter whether the topic is foreign policy, agriculture or education. He has declared that it is "clear that conflict and confrontation between" Islamic Republic of Iran and the U.S. "is something natural and unavoidable" since the United States "is trying to establish a global dictatorship and further its own interests by dominating other nations and trampling on their rights." However, while "cutting ties with America is among our basic policies," and "any relations would provide the possibility to the Americans to infiltrate Iran and would pave the way for their intelligence and spy agents," Khamenei holds the door open to relations with the U.S. at some future date, saying "we have never said that the relations will remain severed forever. Undoubtedly, the day the relations with America prove beneficial for the Iranian nation I will be the first one to approve of that."^[31] However, in a speech to Iranian students on 29 October 2008, which was quoted on Iranian TV (as translated by MEMRI), Khamenei stated that "the Iranian people's hatred for America is profound. The reason for this [hatred] is the various plots that the U.S. government has concocted against Iran and the Iranian people in the past 50 years. The Americans have not only refused to apologize for their actions, but have continued with their arrogant actions."^[126]

On 4 June 2006, Khamenei said that Iran would disrupt energy shipments from the Persian Gulf region (about 20% of the world's daily supply of oil passes from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz very close to Iran's coast^[127]) should the country come under attack from the US, insisting that Tehran will not give up its right to produce nuclear fuel.

On 14 September 2007, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (on 1st Friday prayer of Ramadan) predicted that George Bush and American officials will one day be tried in an international criminal court to be held "accountable" for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.^[128] He has also blamed the United States for "blind terrorism" after its invasion of Iraq.^[129] He asserts that the United States is the main cause of insecurity in Iraq.

On 21 March 2009, a day after US President Barack Obama unprecedentedly offered Iran a "new beginning" of diplomatic engagement between the two old foes, Khamenei said a change of US "words" was not enough and added: "We will watch and we will judge (the new US administration) ... You change, our behavior will change."^[130]

In June 2011, Khamenei accuses the United States government of terrorism and rejected the American definition of terrorism; he was quoted as saying, "The U.S. and the European governments that follow it describe Palestinian combatant groups who fight for the liberation of their land as terrorists."^[131]

Condemnation of 11 September 2001 attacks[link]

After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Khamenei condemned the act and the attackers and called for a condemnation of terrorist activities all over the world, but warned strongly against a military intervention in Afghanistan.^[132] He is quoted as saying, "Mass killings of human beings are catastrophic acts which are condemned wherever they may happen and whoever the perpetrators and the victims may be".^[132]

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict[link]

Khamenei remains a steadfast opponent of the State of Israel and Zionism. In 2001 Khamenei famously remarked that "this cancerous tumor of a state [Israel] should be removed from the region" and that "no one will allow a bunch of thugs, lechers and outcasts from London, Washington and Moscow to rule over the Palestinians." On the same occasion he proposed that "Palestinian refugees should return and Muslims, Christians and Jews could choose a government for themselves, excluding immigrant Jews."^[133]

According to anti-regime change activist Abbas Edalat, in 2005 Khamenei responded to President Ahmadinejad's remark that Zionism should be "wiped off the map" by saying that "the Islamic Republic has never threatened and will never threaten any country."^[134] Moreover Khamenei's main advisor in foreign policy, Ali Akbar Velayati, refused to take part in a Holocaust conference. In contrast to Ahmadinejad's remarks, Velayati said that the Holocaust was a genocide and a historical reality.^[135]

In a sermon for Friday prayers in Tehran on 19 September 2008, Khamenei stated that "it is incorrect, irrational, pointless and nonsense to say that we are friends of Israeli people," and that he had raised the issue "to spell an end to any debates".^[136] The remarks were made in reference to earlier comments by Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, a vice president in charge of tourism, and president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had both insisted that Iran was the enemy of the Zionist state but not of the Israeli people.^{[citation needed]}

In a September 2009 sermon, Khamenei was quoted as saying, "the Zionist cancer is gnawing into the lives of Islamic nations."^[137]

Personal life and health[link]

Khamenei in military

Khamenei has six children.^[138] Khamenei says that he sometimes reads American magazines such as Time and Newsweek.^[139]

Although not nearly as elderly as some other senior clerics, Khamenei's health has been called into question. In January 2007, after he had not been seen in public for some weeks, and hadn't appeared (as he traditionally does) at celebrations for Eid al-Adha, rumours spread of his illness or death. Khamenei issued a statement declaring that "enemies of the Islamic system fabricated various rumors about death and health to demoralize the Iranian nation," but according to author Hooman Majd he appeared to be "visibly weak" in photos released with the statement.^[140]

An unidentified ally of former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani stated in autumn 2009 that Khamenei had terminal leukemia and was expected to die within months, and Rafsanjani's unwillingness to act after the disputed Presidential election in 2009 was coming from his wish to succeed Khamenei and annul Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election afterwards.^[141] Three years later, Khamenei is still alive, as shown in the intense political stand-off with former protégé Ahmadinejad in 2011.

Government posts[link]

Since the founding of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has held many government posts^[3]

• 1979 – Founded the Islamic Republic Party, along with like-minded clerics such as Mohammad Beheshti, Mohammad Javad Bahonar, Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardebili, and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
• 1980 – Secretary of Defense.
• 1980 – Supervisor of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards.
• 1980 – Leader of the Friday Congregational Prayer.
• 1980 – The Tehran Representative in the Consultative Assembly.
• 1981 – Ayatollah Khomeini's Representative in the High Security Council.
• 1981 – Elected President of the Islamic Republic of Iran after assassination of Muahmmad Ali Raja’i, and was re-elected to a second term in 1985.
• 1982 – chairman of the High Council of Revolution Culture Affairs.
• 1988 – President of the Expediency Council.
• 1989 – Chairman of the Constitution Revisal Committee.
• 1989 – Khamenei became the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran by choice of the Council of Experts, after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini.

See also[link]

	Iran portal
	Biography portal

• History of fundamentalist Islam in Iran
• List of national leaders
• List of Grand Ayatollahs

Bibliography[link]

• Discourse on Patience^[142] (translation by Sayyid Hussein Alamdar available online)
• Iqbal: Manifestation of the Islamic Spirit, Two Contemporary Muslim Views^[143] ISBN 1-871031-20-6
  • Iqbal, the Poet-Philosopher of Islamic Resurgence is one of the "Two Contemporary Muslim Views," the other one is Ali Shariati's.
• Replies to Inquiries about the Practical Laws of Islam^[144] ISBN 964-472-000-8 (PDF version)
• Lessons from the Nahjul-Balaghah^[145][146]
• Human Rights In Islam'
• The Charter Of Freedom^{[147][148][149]}
• Essence of Tawhid: Denial of Servitude but to God

References[link]