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A map of the Arab world. This is based on the standard territorial definition of the Arab world which comprises the states and territories of the Arab League.

This article contains Arabic text, written from right to left in a cursive style with some letters joined. Without proper rendering support, you may see unjoined Arabic letters written left-to-right instead of right-to-left or other symbols instead of Arabic script.

The Arab world (Arabic: الوطن العربي‎ al-watan al-ʿarabī or Arabic: العالم العربي‎ al-ʿālam al-ʿarabī ) refers to Arabic-speaking states, territories and populations in North Africa, Western Asia and elsewhere.^[1]

The standard definition of the Arab world comprises the 22 states and territories of the Arab League stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Arabian Sea in the east, and from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean in the southeast.^[1] It has a combined population of around 340 million people, with over half under 25 years of age.^[2]

The sentiment of Arab nationalism arose in the second half of the 19th century along with other nationalist movements within the Ottoman Empire. The Arab League was formed in 1945 to represent the interests of the Arabs, and especially to pursue the political unification of the Arab countries, a project known as Pan-Arabism.^[3][4] The popular protests throughout the Arab world of late 2010 to early 2011 are directed against the governments and the associated political corruption, paired with the demand for more democratic rights.

The term "Arab world" is usually rejected by those living in the region who do not consider themselves Arabs, like non-Semitic people such as the Berbers and Kurds, as it implies the entire region is Arab in its identity, population, and origin, whereas the original homeland of the Arabs is the Arabian Peninsula. The term is also rejected by some indigenous Semitic minorities such as the Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Syriacs, as they pre-date Arabs in places such as Iraq and Syria. Coptic Egyptians and many other Egyptians also define themselves as Egyptian and not Arab.

Definition[link]

The linguistic and political denotation inherent in the term Arab is generally dominant over genealogical considerations. Thus, individuals with little or no direct ancestry from the Arabian Peninsula could identify themselves or be considered as Arabs, partially by virtue of their home language (see Arab identity). Such an identity however, is disputed by many peoples. Egyptians for example, may or may not identify themselves as Arabs.

Standard territorial definition[link]

Map of the member states of the Arab League. Under the standard territorial definition of the Arab world, the states and territories of the Arab League constitute the Arab world.

Although no globally accepted definition of the Arab world exists,^[1] all countries that are members of the Arab League are generally acknowledged as being part of the Arab world.^[1][5]

The Arab League is a regional organisation that aims (among other things) to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries and sets out the following definition of an Arab:

This standard territorial definition is sometimes seen to be inappropriate^[7] or problematic,^[8] and may be supplemented with certain additional elements (see ancillary linguistic definition below).^[9]

Member states of the Arab League[link]

Ancillary linguistic definition[link]

As an alternative to,^[10] or in combination with,^[1] the standard territorial definition, the Arab world may be defined as consisting of peoples and states united to at least some degree by Arabic language, culture or geographic contiguity,^[11] or those states or territories in which the majority of the population speaks Arabic, and thus may also include populations of the Arab diaspora.^[1]

When an ancillary linguistic definition is used in combination with the standard territorial definition, various parameters may be applied^{[citation needed][clarification needed]} to determine whether a state or territory should be included in this alternative definition of the Arab world. These parameters may be applied^{[clarification needed]} to the states and territories of the Arab League (which constitute the Arab world under the standard definition) and to other states and territories. Typical parameters that may be applied include: whether Arabic is widely spoken; whether Arabic is an official or national language; or whether an Arabic cognate language is widely spoken. These are considered below.

States and territories of the Arab League[link]

Arabic is an official or national language and is widely spoken[link]

Arabic is spoken as both an official and majority language by most Arab League states.

Arabic is an official or national language but is not widely spoken[link]

Several states have declared Arabic to be an official or national language, although Arabic is not widely spoken. As members of the Arab League, however, they are considered part of the Arab world under the standard territorial definition.

Somalia has two official languages, Arabic and Somali, both of which belong to the larger Afro-Asiatic language family. Although Arabic is spoken by many in the north, Somali is the more widely used language and contains many Arabic loan words.^[12]

Similarly, Djibouti has two official languages, Arabic and French. It also has several formally recognised national languages; besides Somali, many people speak Afar, which is also an Afro-Asiatic language. The majority of the population speaks Somali and Afar, although Arabic is also widely used for trade and other activities.^[13]

Comoros has three official languages: Arabic, Comorian and French. Comorian is the most widely spoken language, with Arabic having a religious significance, and French being associated with the educational system.

States and territories outside the Arab League[link]

Arabic is an official or national language but is not widely spoken[link]

Chad, Eritrea and Israel all recognise Arabic as an official language, but none of them is a member-state of the Arab League. Although Eritrea has observer status at the Arab League, and has a large number of Arabic speakers, both Eritrea and Chad are not commonly considered parts of the Arab world.

Israel is a self-professed Jewish state and is not, therefore, part of the Arab world. However, according to some definitions,^[9][14] the population of Arab citizens of Israel may be considered a constituent part of the Arab world.

Arabic cognate languages are spoken but not widely[link]

Iran has about 5 million Arabic speakers. Iranian Arabs are mainly found in Ahwaz, a southwestern region in the Khuzestan Province; others inhabit the Bushehr and Hormozgan provinces as well as the city of Qom. Mali and Senegal recognize Hassaniya, the Arabic dialect of the Moorish ethnic minority, as a national language.^[15] Also Cyprus recognised Cypriot Maronite Arabic under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and Malta has an official language, Maltese, akin to Maghrebi Arabic, but is not part of the Arab world.

Population[link]

Pos	Country	Population	World ranking
1	Egypt	81,650,212[16]	16
2	Algeria	37,100,000	34
3	Morocco	36,064,173	35
4	Sudan	30,894,000	39
5	Iraq	30,747,000	40
6	Saudi Arabia	28,146,658	45
7	Yemen	23,580,000	49
8	Syria	21,593,784	55
9	Tunisia	10,673,800	77
10	Somalia	9,133,000	85
11	United Arab Emirates	8,264,070	93
12	Libya	6,420,000	103
13	Jordan	6,316,000	106
14	Lebanon	4,224,000	125
15	Palestinian territories	4,136,540 (Disputed)	126
16	Kuwait	3,566,000	134
17	Mauritania	3,291,000	138
18	Oman	2,845,000	139
19	Qatar	1,699,435	149
20	Bahrain	1,234,596	155
21	Djibouti	864,000	159
22	Comoros	691,000	163
Total	Arab League	349,870,608

Area[link]

Rank	Country	Area (km2)[Note 1]	Area (sq mi)	% of Total	Notes
1	Algeria	2,381,741	919,595	18.1%	Largest country in Africa and in the Arab world.
2	Saudi Arabia	2,149,690	830,000	16.4%	Largest country in the Middle East.
3	Sudan	1,861,484	718,723	14.2%	Formerly the largest country in Africa.
4	Libya	1,759,540	679,360	11.4%
5	Mauritania	1,025,520	395,960	7.8%
6	Egypt	1,002,000	387,000	7.6%	Excluding the Hala'ib Triangle (20,580 km2/7,950 sq mi).
7	Somalia	637,657	246,201	4.9%
8	Yemen	527,968	203,850	4.0%
9	Morocco	446,550	172,410	3.4%	Does not include Western Sahara (266,000 km2/103,000 sq mi).
10	Iraq	435,244	168,049	3.3%
11	Oman	309,500	119,500	2.4%
12	Syria	185,180	71,500	1.4%	Including the part of the Golan Heights (1,200 km2/460 sq mi) currently administered by Israel.
13	Tunisia	163,610	63,170	1.2%
14	Jordan	89,342	34,495	0.7%
15	United Arab Emirates	83,600	32,300	0.6%
16	Djibouti	23,200	9,000	0.1%
17	Kuwait	17,818	6,880	0.1%
18	Qatar	11,586	4,473	0.08%
19	Lebanon	10,452	4,036	0.08%
20	Palestine	6,020	2,320	0.05%
21	Comoros	2,235	863	0.01%
22	Bahrain	758	293	0.005%

Population density[link]

Rank	Country	Density (/km2)	Density (/mi2)	Area (km2)	Area (mi2)	Population	Notes
1	Bahrain	1,646	4,263	750	290	1,234,596	[4]
2	Palestinian territories	687	1,779	6,020	2,320	4,136,540	[17]
3	Lebanon	404	1,046	10,452	4,036	4,224,000
4	Comoros	309	800	2,235	863	691,000
5	Kuwait	200	518	17,818	6,880	3,566,437
6	Qatar	154	399	11,000	4,200	1,699,435
7	Syria	117	303	185,180	71,500	21,593,784
8	United Arab Emirates	99	256	83,600	32,300	8,264,070	[18]
9	Egypt	90	233	1,001,449	386,662	81,650,212	[19]
10	Morocco	75	194	446,550	172,410	32,487,860	[20]
11	Jordan	71	184	89,342	34,495	6,316,000
12	Iraq	70	181	438,317	169,235	30,747,000
13	Tunisia	65	168	163,610	63,170	10,673,800	[21]
14	Yemen	45	117	527,968	203,850	23,580,000
15	Djibouti	37	96	23,200	9,000	864,000
16	Sudan	16	41	1,886,068	728,215	30,894,000	[22]
17	Algeria	16	41	2,381,741	919,595	37,100,000
18	Somalia	14	36	637,657	246,201	9,133,000
19	Saudi Arabia	13.1	34	2,149,690	830,000	28,146,658
20	Oman	9.2	24	309,500	119,500	2,845,000
21	Libya	3.6	9.3	1,759,540	679,360	6,420,000
22	Mauritania	3.2	8.3	1,025,520	395,960	3,291,000

Demographics[link]

The Arabic language forms the unifying feature of the Arab world. Though different areas use local varieties of Arabic, all share in the use of the modern standardized language, derived from Classical Arabic (symptomatic of Arabic diglossia). This contrasts with the situation in the wider Islamic world, where in contiguous Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Arabic maintains its use in a similar script and retains its cultural prestige primarily as the language of religion and theological scholarship, but where Arabic is not spoken as a vernacular.

The majority of people in the Arab World adhere to Islam and the religion has official status in most countries. Shariah law exists partially in the legal system in some countries, especially in the Arabian peninsula, while others are secular. The majority of the Arab countries adhere to Sunni Islam. Iraq and Bahrain, however, are Shia majority countries, while Lebanon, Yemen, and Kuwait have large Shia minorities. In Saudi Arabia, the eastern province Al-Hasa region has Shia minority and the southern province city Najran has an Ismalia Shiite minority also. Ibadi Islam is practised in Oman and Ibadis make up 75% population of the country.

There are sizable numbers of Christians, living primarily in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Territories, and Sudan. Formerly, there were significant minorities of Jews throughout the Arab World. However, the Partition of Palestine, and establishment of Israel prompted their subsequent mass emigration and expulsion within a few decades. Today small Jewish communities remain, ranging anywhere from ten in Bahrain, to more than 1,000 in Tunisia and 7,000 in Morocco. Overall, Arabs make up about one quarter of the world's 1.5 billion Muslims, a group sometimes referred to as the Islamic world.

According to UNESCO, the average rate of adult literacy (ages 15 and older) in this region is 76.9%. In Mauritania and Yemen, the rate is lower than the average, at barely over 50%. On the other hand, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and Jordan record a high adult literacy rate of over 90%. The average rate of adult literacy shows steady improvement, and the absolute number of adult illiterates fell from 64 million to around 58 million between 1990 and 2000-2004. Overall, the gender disparity in adult literacy is high in this region, and of the illiteracy rate, women account for two-thirds, with only 69 literate women for every 100 literate men. The average GPI (Gender Parity Index) for adult literacy is 0.72, and gender disparity can be observed in Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen. Above all, the GPI of Yemen is only 0.46 in a 53% adult literacy rate.^[23] According to a UN survey, in the Arab world, the average person reads four pages a year and one new title is published each year for every 12,000 people.^[24] The Arab Thought Foundation reports that just above 8% of people in Arab countries aspire to get an education.^[24]

Literacy rate is higher among the youth than adults. Youth literacy rate (ages 15–24) in the Arab region increased from 63.9 to 76.3% from 1990 to 2002. The average rate of GCC States Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) was 94%, followed by the Maghreb at 83.2% and the Mashriq at 73.6%. However, more than one third of youth remain illiterate in the Arab least developed countries (Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen).^[25] In 2004, the regional average of youth literacy is 89.9% for male and 80.1% for female.^[26]

The average population growth rate in Arab countries is 2.3%.^{[citation needed]}

The United Nations published an Arab human development report in 2002, 2003 and 2004. These reports, written by researchers from the Arab world, address some sensitive issues in the development of Arab countries: women empowerment, availability of education and information among others.

Women in the Arab world are still denied equality of opportunity, although their disempowerment is a critical factor crippling the Arab nations' quest to return to the first rank of global leaders in commerce, learning and culture, according to a new United Nations-sponsored report in 2008.^[27]

Within the most common definition of the Arab World, there are substantial populations who are not Arab either by ethnic or linguistic affiliation, and who often or generally do not consider themselves Arab as such. Nevertheless, most are as indigenous to their areas and many, if not most, actually resided in the area before the arrival of true Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula during which the spread of Islam took place. Certain populations have expressed resentment towards the term "Arab World," and believe that their national and political rights have been unjustly brushed aside by modern governments' focus on Pan-Arabism and promoting an Arab identity.

History[link]

Early history[link]

The Great Mosque of Kairouan (also called the Mosque of Uqba), was founded in 670 by the Arab general and conqueror Uqba ibn Nafi.^[28] The Great Mosque of Kairouan is located in the historic city of Kairouan in Tunisia.

The Arabs historically originate as a Central Semitic group in the Arabian peninsula. Their expansion beyond Arabia and the Syrian desert is due to the Muslim conquests of the 7th and 8th centuries. Egypt was conquered in AD 639, and gradually Arabized during the medieval period. A distinctively Egyptian Arabic language emerged by the 16th century. The Maghreb was also conquered in the 7th century, and gradually Arabized under the Fatimids. Islam was brought to Sudan from Egypt during the 8th to 11th centuries.

The culture of Sudan today depends on the tribe, some have a pure Nubian, Beja, or Arabic culture and some have a mixture of Arab and Nubian elements.^{[citation needed]}

Islam became predominant in the Kanem Empire in Chad and the Adal Sultanate in Somalia by the late medieval period, but no Arabic-speaking majority developed, even though Arabic came to be used as a lingua franca.

Ottoman and colonial period[link]

The Arab Abbasid Caliphate fell to the Mongol invasions in the 13th century. Egypt came under Turkic rule. The Turkish Ottoman Empire by 1570 controlled most of the Arab world, although Morocco remained under the rule of Berber dynasties, succeeded by the Saadi dynasty in the 16th to 17th centuries.

The sentiment of Arab nationalism arose in the second half of the 19th century along with other nationalisms within the failing Ottoman Empire.

When the Ottoman Empire collapsed as a result of World War I, much of the Arab world came to be controlled by the European colonial empires: British Mandate for Palestine, British Mandate of Mesopotamia, British protectorate of Egypt, French protectorate of Morocco, Italian Libya, French Tunisia, French Algeria, French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon and the so-called Trucial States, a British protectorate formed by the sheikhdoms on the former "Pirate Coast".

These Arab states only gained their independence during or after World War II, the Republic of Lebanon in 1943, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946, Libya in 1951, the Republic of Egypt in 1952, the Kingdom of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, the Republic of Iraq in 1958, Algeria in 1962 and the United Arab Emirates in 1971. By contrast, Saudi Arabia had fragmented with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and was unified under Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia by 1932. The Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen also seceded directly from the Ottoman Empire in 1918. Oman apart from brief intermittent Persian and Portuguese rule has been self-governing since the 8th century.

Cold War period (1945-1989)[link]

Pan-Arabism[link]

The Arab League was formed in 1945 to represent the interests of the Arabs, and especially to pursue the political unification of the Arab worlds, a project known as Pan-Arabism.^[3][4] There were some short-lived attempts at such unification in the mid-20th century, notably the United Arab Republic of 1958 to 1961. The Arab League's main goal is to unify politically the Arab populations so defined. Its permanent headquarters are located in Cairo. However, it was moved temporarily to Tunis during the 1980s, after Egypt was expelled for signing the Camp David Accords (1978).

Pan-Arabism has mostly been abandoned as an ideology since the 1980s, and was replaced by Pan-Islamism on one hand, and individual nationalisms on the other.

Military conflicts[link]

Arab-Israeli conflict[link]

The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 has given rise to the Arab–Israeli conflict, one of the major unresolved geopolitical conflicts.

The Arab states in changing alliances were involved in a number of wars with Israel and its western allies between 1948 and 1973, including the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, the 1956 Suez Crisis, the Six-Day War of 1967, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. An Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 1979.

Iran-Iraq war[link]

Civil war in Lebanon[link]

Civil war in Yemen[link]

Somalia[link]

Civil War[link]

Somali-Ethiopian War[link]

Somali-Kenyan War[link]

Petroleum[link]

While the Arab world had been of limited interest to the European colonial powers, the British Empire being mostly interested in the Suez Canal as a route to British India, the economic and geopolitical situation changed dramatically after the discovery of large petroleum deposits in the 1930s, coupled with the vastly increased demand for petroleum in the west as a result of the Second Industrial Revolution.

The Persian Gulf is particularly well-endowed with this strategic raw material: four Persian Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar, are among the top ten oil or gas exporters worldwide. In addition, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia, and Sudan all have smaller but significant reserves. Where present, these have had significant effects on regional politics, often enabling rentier states, leading to economic disparities between oil-rich and oil-poor countries, and, particularly in the more sparsely populated states of the Persian Gulf and Libya, triggering extensive labor immigration.

Islamism and Pan-Islamism were on the rise during the 1980s. The Hezbollah, a militant Islamic party in Lebanon, was founded in 1982. Islamic terrorism became a problem in the Arab world in the 1970s to 1980s. While the Muslim Brotherhood had been active in Egypt since 1928, their militant actions were limited to assassination attempts on political leaders.

Recent history (1990 to present)[link]

Today, Arab states are characterized by their autocratic rulers and lack of democratic control. The 2010 Democracy Index classifies Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories as "hybrid regimes", and all other Arab states as "authoritarian regimes". Similarly, the 2011 Freedom House report classifies Comoros and Mauritania as "electoral democracies",^[29] Lebanon and Kuwait as "partly free", and all other Arab states as "not free".

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq forces, led to the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War. Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia joined a multinational coalition that opposed Iraq. Displays of support for Iraq by Jordan and the Palestinians resulted in strained relations between many of the Arab states. After the war, a so-called "Damascus Declaration" formalized an alliance for future joint Arab defensive actions between Egypt, Syria, and the GCC states.^[30]

A chain of events leading to the destabilization of the authoritarian regimes established during the 1950s throughout the Arab world became apparent during the early years of the 21st century. The 2003 invasion of Iraq led to the collapse of the Baathist regime and ultimate execution of Saddam Hussein. A growing class of young, educated, secular citizens with access to modern media such as Al Jazeera (since 1996) and communicating via the internet began to form a third force besides the classical dichotomy of Pan-Arabism vs. Pan-Islamism that had dominated the second half of the 20th century. In 2003, the Egyptian Movement for Change, popularly known as Kefaya, was launched to oppose the Mubarak regime and to establish democratic reforms and greater civil liberties in Egypt. In Syria, the Damascus Spring of 2000 to 2001 heralded the possibility of democratic change, but the Baathist regime managed to suppress the movement.

Arab spring[link]

The popular protests throughout the Arab world of late 2010 to early 2011 are directed against these authoritarian and the associated political corruption, paired with the demand for more democratic rights.

Syrian revolution[link]

States and territories[link]

For the states and territories constituting the Arab world, see Arab world#Definition above.

Forms of government[link]

Different forms of government are represented in the Arab World: Some of the countries are monarchies: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The other Arab countries are all republics. With the exception of the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and recently Mauritania, democratic elections throughout the Arab World are generally viewed as compromised, due to outright vote rigging, intimidation of opposition parties, and severe restraints on civil liberties and political dissent.

After World War II, Pan-Arabism sought to unite all Arabic-speaking countries into one political entity. Only Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Libya and North Yemen considered the short-lived unification of the United Arab Republic. Historical divisions, competing local nationalisms, and geographical sprawl were major reasons for the failure of Pan-Arabism. Arab Nationalism was another strong force in the region which peaked during the mid-20th century and was professed by many leaders in Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. Arab Nationalist leaders of this period included Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, Michel Aflaq, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, Zaki al-Arsuzi, Constantin Zureiq and Shukri al-Kuwatli of Syria, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr of Iraq, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Mehdi Ben Barka of Morocco, and Shakib Arslan of Lebanon.

Later and current Arab Nationalist leaders include Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya, Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad of Syria and Saddam Hussein of Iraq. The diverse Arab states generally maintained close ties but distinct national identities developed and strengthened with the social, historical and political realities of the past 60 years. This has made the idea of a pan-Arab nation-state increasingly less feasible and likely. Additionally, an upsurge in political Islam has since led to a greater emphasis on pan-Islamic rather than pan-Arab identity amongst some Arab Muslims. Arab nationalists who once opposed Islamic movements as a threat to their power, now deal with them differently for reasons of political reality.^[31]

Modern boundaries[link]

Many of the modern borders of the Arab World were drawn by European imperial powers during the 19th and early 20th century. However, some of the larger states (in particular Egypt and Syria) have historically maintained geographically definable boundaries, on which some of the modern states are roughly based. The 14th century Egyptian historian Al-Maqrizi, for instance, defines Egypt's boundaries as extending from the Mediterranean in the north to lower Nubia in the south; and between the Red Sea in the east and the oases of the Western/Libyan desert. The modern borders of Egypt, therefore, are not a creation of European powers, and are at least in part based on historically definable entities which are in turn based on certain cultural and ethnic identifications.

At other times, kings, emirs or sheikhs were placed as semi-autonomous rulers over the newly created nation states, usually chosen by the same imperial powers that for some drew the new borders, for services rendered to European powers like the British Empire, e.g. Sherif Hussein ibn Ali. Many African states did not attain independence until the 1960s from France after bloody insurgencies for their freedom. These struggles were settled by the imperial powers approving the form of independence given, so as a consequence almost all of these borders have remained. Some of these borders were agreed upon without consultation of those individuals that had served the colonial interests of Britain or France. One such agreement solely between Britain and France (to the exclusion of Sherif Hussein ibn Ali), signed in total secrecy until Lenin released the full text, was the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Another influential document written without the consensus of the local population was the Balfour Declaration.

As former director of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, Efraim Halevy, now a director at the Hebrew University said,

He went on to give an example,

Historian Jim Crow, of Newcastle University, has said:

Modern economies[link]

As of 2006, the Arab World accounts for two-fifths of the gross domestic product and three-fifths of the trade of the wider Muslim World^{[citation needed]}.

The Arab states are mostly, although not exclusively, developing economies and derive their export revenues from oil and gas, or the sale of other raw materials. Recent years have seen significant economic growth in the Arab World, due largely to an increase in oil and gas prices, which tripled between 2001 and 2006, but also due to efforts by some states to diversify their economic base. Industrial production has risen, for example the amount of steel produced between 2004 and 2005 rose from 8.4 to 19 million tonnes. (Source: Opening speech of Mahmoud Khoudri, Algeria's Industry Minister, at the 37th General Assembly of the Iron & Steel Arab Union, Algiers, May 2006). However even 19 million tons pa still only represents 1.7% of global steel production, and remains inferior to the production of countries like Brazil.^[33]

The main economic organisations in the Arab World are the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprising the states in the Persian Gulf, and the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA), made up of North African States. The GCC has achieved some success in financial and monetary terms, including plans to establish a common currency in the Persian Gulf region. Since its foundation in 1989, the UMA's most significant accomplishment has been the establishment of a 7000 km highway crossing North Africa from Mauritania to Libya's border with Egypt. The central stretch of the highway, expected to be completed in 2010, will cross Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. In recent years a new term has been coined to define a greater economic region: the MENA region (standing for Middle East and North Africa) is becoming increasingly popular, especially with support from the current US administration.

As of August 2009 it was reported that Saudi Arabia is the strongest Arab economy according to World Bank.^[34]

Saudi Arabia remains the top Arab economy in terms of total GDP. It is Asia's eleventh largest economy, followed by Egypt and Algeria, which were also the second and third largest economies in Africa (after South Africa), in 2006. In terms of GDP per capita, Qatar is the richest developing country in the world.^[35]

The total GDP of all Arab countries in 1999 was US$531.2 billion. By contrast, the GDP of Spain that year was US$595.5 billion.^[36]

Geography[link]

The Arab World stretches across more than 13,000,000 square kilometres (5,000,000 sq mi) of North Africa and the part of North-East Africa and South-West Asia. The Asian part of the Arab world is called the Mashriq. The North African part of the Arab World to the west of Egypt and Sudan is known as the Maghreb. The status of Egypt itself, geographically in the center of the Arab world, is disputed; although on the African continent, it has stronger cultural connections to the Mashriq.

The term "Arab" often connotes the Middle East, but the larger (and more populous) part of the Arab World is North Africa. Its eight million square kilometers include two of the largest countries of the African continent, Algeria (2.4 million km²) in the center of the region and Sudan (1.9 million km²) in the southeast. Algeria is about three-quarters the size of India, or about one-and-a-half times the size of Alaska, the largest state in the United States. The largest country in the Arab Middle East is Saudi Arabia (2 million km²).

At the other extreme, the smallest autonomous mainland Arab country in North Africa and the Middle East is Lebanon (10,452 km²), and the smallest island Arab country is Bahrain (665 km²).

Notably, every Arab country borders a sea or ocean, with the exception of the Arab region of northern Chad, which is completely landlocked. Iraq is actually nearly landlocked, as it has only a very narrow access to the Persian Gulf.

Historical boundaries[link]

The political borders of the Arab world have wandered, leaving Arab minorities in non-Arab countries of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa as well as in the Middle Eastern countries of Cyprus, Turkey and Iran, and also leaving non-Arab minorities in Arab countries. However, the basic geography of sea, desert, and mountain provide the enduring natural boundaries for this region.

Abbasid caliphate (750 - 1258 CE)

The Arab world straddles two continents, Africa and Asia, and is oriented mainly along an east-west axis, dividing it into African and Asian areas.

Arab Africa[link]

Arab Africa—or more commonly Arab North Africa, though this is redundant—is roughly a long trapezoid, narrower at the top, that comprises the entire northern third of the continent. It is surrounded by water on three sides (west, north, and east) and desert or desert scrubland on the fourth (south).

In the west, it is bounded by the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. From northeast to southwest, Morocco, Western Sahara (annexed and occupied by Morocco), and Mauritania make up the roughly 2,000 kilometers of Arab Atlantic coastline. The southwestern sweep of the coast is gentle but substantial, such that Mauritania's capital, Nouakchott (18°N, 16°W), is far enough west to share longitude with Iceland (13–22°W). Nouakchott is the westernmost capital of the Arab World and the third-westernmost in Africa, and sits on the Atlantic fringe of the southwestern Sahara. Next south along the coast from Mauritania is Senegal, whose abrupt border belies the gradient in culture from Arab to Negroid African that historically characterizes this part of West Africa.

Arab Africa's boundary to the north is again a continental boundary, the Mediterranean Sea. This boundary begins in the west with the narrow Strait of Gibraltar, the thirteen kilometer wide channel that connects the Mediterranean with the Atlantic to the west, and separates Morocco from Spain to the north. East along the coast from Morocco are Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, followed by Egypt, which forms the region's (and the continent's) northeastern corner. The coast turns briefly but sharply south at Tunisia, slopes more gently southeastward through the Libyan capital of Tripoli, and bumps north through Libya's second city, Benghazi, before turning straight east again through Egypt's second city, Alexandria, at the mouth of the Nile. Along with the spine of Italy to its north, Tunisia thus marks the junction of western and eastern Mediterranean, and a cultural transition as well: west of Egypt begins the region of the Arab World known as the Maghreb include (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania).

Historically the 4,000-kilometer Mediterranean boundary has fluttered. Population centers north of it in Europe have invited contact and Arab exploration—mostly friendly, though sometimes not. Islands and peninsulas near the Arab coast have changed hands. The islands of Sicily and Malta lie just a hundred kilometers east of the Tunisian city of Carthage, which has been a point of contact with Europe since its founding in the first millennium BCE; both Sicily and Malta at times have been part of the Arab World. Just across the Strait of Gibraltar from Morocco, regions of the Iberian peninsula were part of the Arab World throughout the Middle Ages, extending the northern boundary at times to the foothills of the Pyrenees and leaving a substantial mark on local and wider European and Western culture.

The northern boundary of the African Arab world has also fluttered briefly in the other direction, first through the Crusades and later through the imperial involvement of France, Britain, Spain, and Italy. Another visitor from northern shores, Turkey, controlled the east of the region for centuries, though not as a colonizer. Spain still maintains two small enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla (called "Morocco Espanol"), along the otherwise Moroccan coast. Overall this wave has ebbed, though like the Arab expansion north it has left its mark. The proximity of North Africa to Europe has always encouraged interaction, and this continues with Arab immigration to Europe and European interest in the Arab countries today. However, population centers and the physical fact of the sea keeps this boundary of the Arab World settled on the Mediterranean coastline.

To the east, the Red Sea defines the boundary between Africa and Asia, and thus also between Arab Africa and the Arab Middle East. This sea is a long and narrow waterway with a northwest tilt, stretching 2,300 kilometers from Egypt's Sinai peninsula southeast to the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between Djibouti in Africa and Yemen in Arabia but on average just 150 kilometers wide. Though the sea is navigable along its length, historically much contact between Arab Africa and the Arab Middle East has been either overland across the Sinai or by sea across the Mediterranean or the narrow Bab al Mendeb strait. From northwest to southeast, Egypt, Sudan, and Eritrea form the African coastline, with Djibouti marking Bab al Mendeb's African shore.

Southeast along the coast from Djibouti is Somalia, but the Somali coast soon makes a 90-degree turn and heads northeast, mirroring a bend in the coast of Yemen across the water to the north and defining the south coast of the Gulf of Aden. The Somali coast then takes a hairpin turn back southwest to complete the horn of Africa. For six months of the year the monsoon winds blow from up equatorial Somalia, past Arabia and over the small Yemeni archipelago of Socotra, to rain on India; they then switch directions and blow back. Hence the east- and especially southeast-coast boundary of Arab Africa has historically been a gateway for maritime trade and cultural exchange with both East Africa and the subcontinent. The trade winds also help explain the presence of the Comoros islands, an Arab-African country, off the coast of Mozambique, near Madagascar in the Indian Ocean, the southernmost part of the Arab World.

The southern boundary of Arab North Africa is the strip of scrubland known as the Sahel that crosses the continent south of the Sahara, dipping further south in Sudan in the east.

Arab Western Asia[link]

The West Asian Arab region comprises the Arabian Peninsula, Bilad al-Sham (the Arab name for what was Ottoman Syria which included Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Territories, most of Jordan and parts of Iraq, and Iran, more broadly or narrowly defined. The peninsula is roughly a tilted rectangle that leans back against the slope of northeast Africa, the long axis pointing toward Turkey and Europe.

See also[link]

Middle East portal

Notes[link]

References[link]

• Baumann, Andrea (2006). Influences of culture on the styles of business behaviour between Western and Arab managers. Norderstedt, Germany: GRIN. ISBN 978-3-638-86642-2. http://books.google.com/books?id=S33VxDyW0bAC&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
• Deng, Francis Mading (1995). War of visions: Conflict of identities in the Sudan. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. ISBN 0-8157-1794-6. http://books.google.com/books?id=iAPLHidx8MkC&. 
• Frishkopf, Michael (2010). "Introduction: Music and media in the Arab world and Music and media in the Arab world as music and media in the Arab world: A metadiscourse". In Frishkopf, Michael. Music and media in the Arab world. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. ISBN 978-977-416-293-0. http://books.google.com/books?id=KANOAYzkhA8C&. 
• Hourani, Albert Habib (1991). A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge, Mass.: Warner Books. ISBN 978-0-674-39565-7.
• Kronholm, Tryggve (1993). "Arab culture: Reality or fiction?". In Palva, Heikki; Vikør, Knut S.. The Middle East: Unity and diversity: Papers from the second Nordic conference on Middle Eastern studies. Nordic proceedings in Asian studies. 5. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. ISBN 87-87062-24-0. http://books.google.com/books?id=aluD22J9SG8C&. 
• Reader, John (1997). Africa: A Biography of the Continent. New York: Vintage. ISBN 978-0-679-40979-3.
• Rejwan, Nissim (1974). Nasserist ideology: its exponents and critics. New York: Halsted Press. ISBN 0-470-71628-2. http://books.google.com/books?id=AkQDAxVwaOEC&. 
• Rinnawi, Khalil (2006). Instant nationalism: McArabism, al-Jazeera and transnational media in the Arab world. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. ISBN 978-0-7618-3439-7. http://books.google.com/books?id=xJYLNUBgSeUC&. 
• Sullivan, Earl L.; Ismael, Jacqueline S., eds. (1991). "Preface". The contemporary study of the Arab world. Edmonton, Alberta: The University of Alberta Press. ISBN 0-88864-211-3. http://books.google.com/books?id=YTkHGis-yYEC&. 
• Saint-Prot, Charles (2003). French Policy toward the Arab World. AbuDhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. ISBN 978-9948-00-336-6.

Further reading[link]

• Ayalon, Amy (1987). Language and change in the Arab Middle East: the evolution of modern political discourse Studies in Middle Eastern history. Oxford University Press US. ISBN 978-0-19-504140-8.

External links[link]

• ArabLand.com—Directories of all Arab World countries
• Araboo.com—Arab World Directory
• Arab Countries information
• WinArab—Arab Articles
• US4Arabs.com—Arab American Community Website
• Carboun Information and resources relating to energy, environment, and sustainability in the Arab World

Tariq Ramadan

Born	(1962-08-26) August 26, 1962 (age 49) Geneva, Switzerland
Era	21st-century philosophy
Main interests	Islamic studies Theology Philosophy Politics Interfaith dialogue Literature
Website	www.tariqramadan.com

Tariq Ramadan (Arabic: طارق رمضان‎; born 26 August 1962 in Geneva, Switzerland) is a Swiss academic and writer. He is also a Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies in the Faculty of Oriental Studies at Oxford University. He advocates the study and re-interpretation of Islamic texts, and emphasizes the heterogeneous nature of Western Muslims.^[1]

Biography[link]

Tariq Ramadan (at table, right) speaking in Oxford.

Tariq Ramadan is the son of Said Ramadan and Wafa Al-Bana, who was the eldest daughter of Hassan al Banna, who in 1928 founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Gamal al-Banna, the liberal Muslim reformer is his great-uncle. His father was a prominent figure in the Muslim Brotherhood and was exiled by Gamal Abdul Nasser^[2] from Egypt to Switzerland, where Tariq was born.

Tariq Ramadan studied Philosophy and French literature at the Masters level and holds a PhD in Arabic and Islamic studies from the University of Geneva. He also wrote a PhD dissertation on Friedrich Nietzsche, entitled Nietzsche as a Historian of Philosophy.^[3]

He taught at the College de Saussure, a high school in Geneva, Switzerland, and held a lectureship in Religion and Philosophy at the University of Fribourg from 1996 to 2003. In October 2005 he began teaching at St Antony's College at the University of Oxford on a Visiting Fellowship. In 2005 he was a senior research fellow at the Lokahi Foundation.^[4][5] In 2007 he successfully applied for the professorship in Islamic studies at the University of Leiden, but then declined to take up the position, citing professional reasons.^[6][7] He was also a guest professor of Identity and Citizenship at Erasmus University Rotterdam,^[8][9][10] till August 2009 when the City of Rotterdam and Erasmus University dismissed him from his positions as "integration adviser" and professor, stating that the program he chairs on Iran's Press TV, Islam & Life, was "irreconcilable" with his duties in Rotterdam.^[11][12] Ramadan described this move as Islamophobic and politically charged.^[13] Beginning September 2009, Ramadan, was appointed to the His Highness Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani Chair in Contemporary Islamic Studies at Oxford University.^[14]

Ramadan established the Mouvement des Musulmans Suisses (Movement of Swiss Muslims), which engages in various interfaith seminars. He is an advisor to the EU on religious issues and was sought for advice by the EU on a commission on “Islam and Secularism”.In September 2005 he was invited to join a task force by the government of the United Kingdom.^[2] He is also the President of the Euro-Muslim Network, a Brussels-based think-tank.^[15]

He is widely interviewed and has produced about 100 tapes which sell tens of thousands of copies each year.^[16]

As of 2009, Tariq Ramadan was persona non grata in Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,^[17] Libya and Syria because of his "criticism of these undemocratic regimes that deny the most basic human rights".^[18]

U.S. visa revocation and subsequent lifting[link]

In February 2004, Tariq Ramadan accepted the tenured position of Henry R. Luce Professor of Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, at the University of Notre Dame in South Bend, Indiana, United States. He was granted a nonimmigrant visa on May 5, however, on July 28, his H-1B visa was revoked by the State Department.^[19] In August 2004, spokesman for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement cited the "ideological exclusion provision" of the USA PATRIOT Act as the grounds for Ramadan's visa revocation.^[20] In October, the University of Notre Dame filed a H-1B petition on Ramadan's behalf. After hearing no response from the government by December, Ramadan resigned his position from the university.

In September 2005, Ramadan filed an application for a B Visa to allow him to participate at speaking arrangements with various organizations and universities. The government did not issue a decision on Ramadan's visa application, so the American Civil Liberties Union and the New York Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit on January 25, 2006 against the United States government on behalf of the American Academy of Religion, the American Association of University Professors and the PEN American Center – three groups who had planned on meeting with Ramadan in the US – for revoking Ramadan's visa under the "ideological exclusion provision". The ACLU and NYCLU argued that the ideological exclusion provision was in violation of the First Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights of those three groups and that the government's actions violated the Administrative Procedures Act.^[21] After two months had passed without a decision being made, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Pursuant to the injunction, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered the government on June 23, 2006 to issue its decision on Ramadan's pending B Visa application within 90 days.^[22]

On September 19, 2006, the government formally denied Ramadan's visa application. A State Department statement said: "A U.S. consular officer has denied Dr. Tariq Ramadan's visa application. The consular officer concluded that Dr. Ramadan was inadmissible based solely on his actions, which constituted providing material support to a terrorist organization."^[23][24] Between December 1998 and July 2002, Ramadan had given donations totalling $940 to two charity organizations, the Committee for Charity and Support for the Palestinians (CBSP) or Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens and the Association de Secours Palestinien.^[25] The United States Treasury designated both the CBSP and ASP terrorist fundraising organizations for their alleged links to Hamas on August 22, 2003.^[26] The U.S. Embassy told Ramadan that he "reasonably should have known" that the charities provided money to Hamas. In an article in The Washington Post, Ramadan asked: "How should I reasonably have known of their activities before the U.S. government itself knew?"^{[25][27][28][29]}

On February 2, 2007, the ACLU and NYCLU amended their complaint, arguing that the government's explanation for denying Ramadan's visa application was not "facially legitimate and bona fide" and that the ideological exclusion provision of the PATRIOT Act was in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments. They also argued that Ramadan's denial violated the First Amendment rights of those who wanted to hear him speak. In his decision on December 20, 2007, District Judge Paul A. Crotty ruled that the government's justification for denying Ramadan's visa was "facially legitimate and bona fide" and noted that the Court "has no authority to override the Government's consular decision".^[30]

In January 2008, the ACLU appealed Crotty's ruling. Jameel Jaffer, Director of the ACLU National Security Project and lead attorney in the case, stated:

"The government's shifting positions only underscore why meaningful judicial review – the kind of oversight that the district court failed to provide – is so important. In Professor Ramadan’s case and many others, the government is using immigration laws to stigmatize and exclude its critics and to censor and control the ideas that Americans can hear. Censorship of this kind is completely inconsistent with the most basic principles of an open society."

Ramadan himself remarked:

"The U.S. government's actions in my case seem, at least to me, to have been arbitrary and myopic. But I am encouraged by the unwavering support I have received from ordinary Americans, civic groups and particularly from scholars, academic organizations, and the ACLU. I am heartened by the emerging debate in the U.S. about what has been happening to our countries and ideals in the past six years. And I am hopeful that eventually I will be allowed to enter the country so that I may contribute to the debate and be enriched by dialogue."^[31]

On July 17, 2009, the US federal appeals court reversed the ruling of the lower district court. The three-judge panel on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit – composed of Judges Jon O. Newman, Wilfred Feinberg and Reena Raggi – ruled that the Court had "jurisdiction to consider the claim, despite the doctrine of consular nonreviewability". They stated that government was required by law to "confront Ramadan with the allegation against him and afford him the subsequent opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and reasonably should not have known, that the recipient of his contributions was a terrorist organization." Under the limited review permitted by the 1972 Supreme Court ruling in Kleindienst v. Mandel, the panel concluded that the "record does not establish that the consular officer who denied the visa confronted Ramadan with the allegation that he had knowingly rendered material support to a terrorist organization, thereby precluding an adequate opportunity for Ramadan to attempt to satisfy the provision that exempts a visa applicant from exclusion under the 'material support' subsection if he 'can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [he] did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization.'" Additionally, the panel agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that their First Amendment rights had been violated. The panel remanded the case to a lower court to determine if the consular officer had confronted Ramadan with the "allegation that he knew that ASP provided funds to Hamas and then providing him with a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that he did not know, and should not have reasonably known, of that fact."^[32]

Following the ruling, Ramadan stated, "I am very gratified with the court's decision. I am eager to engage once again with Americans in the kinds of face-to-face discussions that are central to academic exchange and crucial to bridging cultural divides." Melissa Goodman, staff attorney with the ACLU National Security Project, issued a statement saying, "Given today's decision, we hope that the Obama administration will immediately end Professor Ramadan's exclusion. We also encourage the new administration to reconsider the exclusion of other foreign scholars, writers and artists who were barred from the country by the Bush administration on ideological grounds."^[33]

On January 20, 2010, after more than five years of waiting, the American State Department has decided, in a document signed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to lift the ban that prohibited Ramadan (as well as Professor Adam Habib from South Africa) from entering the United States. On the lifting of this ban, Ramadan has stated:

Coming after nearly six years of inquiry and investigation, Secretary Clinton’s order confirms what I have affirmed and reaffirmed from day one: the first accusations of terrorist connections (subsequently dropped), then donations to Palestinian solidarity groups, were nothing more than a pretense to prohibit me from speaking critically about American government policy on American soil. The decision brings to an end a dark period in American politics that saw security considerations invoked to block critical debate through a policy of exclusion and baseless allegation.

On April 8, 2010, Ramadan spoke as part of a panel discussion at the Great Hall of Cooper Union in New York City, his first public appearance since the State Department lifted the ban.^[34] The group debated the lengths to which Western nations should go to accommodate their Muslim populations.

Views[link]

Ramadan works primarily on Islamic theology and the position of Muslims in the West and within Muslim majority countries. In general, he believes it necessary to interpret the Qur'an, not simply to read the Arabic text, in order to understand its meaning and to practice Islamic philosophy.^[35] He also emphasizes the difference between religion and culture, which he believes are too often confused, arguing that citizenship and religion are separate concepts which should not be mixed. He claims that there is no conflict between being both a Muslim and a European; a Muslim must accept the laws of his country. But he is opposed to some politicians or people who try to circumvent or to give a new sense of their own laws.

He believes that Western Muslims must create a "Western Islam" just as there is a separate "Asian Islam" and an "African Islam", which take into account cultural differences.^[36] By this he means that European Muslims must re-examine the fundamental texts of Islam (primarily the Qur'an) and interpret them in light of their own cultural background, influenced by European society.

He rejects a binary division of the world into dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (the abode of war), on the grounds that such a division is not mentioned in the Qur'an. He has been also known to cite favourably the Dar al-Da'wa (Abode of Information Dissemination).^[37] However, Ramadan has articulated both the "ideological geography" of the West and the duty of da'wa in an original fashion and one that is starkly more pro-integration than the more conservative "loyal resident alienage" articulated by such jurists as al-Qaradawi. For Ramadan, the West is neither the Abode of War nor the Abode of da'wa but "dar al-shahada," the "Abode of Testimony" [to the Islamic Message]. He argues that Muslims are "witnesses before mankind"; they must continue to review the fundamental principles of Islam and take responsibility for their faith.

Importantly, for him the "Islamic message" to which Muslims are expected to bear witness is not primarily the particularist, socially conservative code of traditionalist jurists, but a commitment to universalism and the welfare of non-Muslims; it is also an injunction not merely to make demands on un-Islamic societies but to express solidarity with them.^[38][39]

"... the European environment is a space of responsibility for Muslims. This is exactly the meaning of the notion of "space of testimony" [dar al-shahada] that we propose here, a notion that totally reverses perspectives: whereas Muslims have, for years, been wondering whether and how they would be accepted, the in-depth study and evaluation of the Western environment entrusts them, in light of their Islamic frame of reference, with a most important mission... Muslims now attain, in the space of testimony, the meaning of an essential duty and of an exacting responsibility: to contribute, wherever they are, to promoting good and equity within and through human brotherhood. Muslims' outlook must now change from the reality of "protection" alone to that of an authentic "contribution."

He emphasizes a Muslim's responsibility to his community, whether it be Islamic or not. He criticizes the 'us vs. them' mentality that some Muslims advocate against the West. He also advocates having Muslim scholars in the West who are versed in Western mores, and not relying on religious studies that come only from the Islamic world. He wants more Islamic philosophy written in European languages. He thinks that European Muslims' reliance on an "external" Islam, leaves them feeling inadequate and impure, which is one of the main causes of alienation from European culture.

He believes that most Muslims in the West are quietly and successfully integrating into society. The main problems for the community come from those who are ignorant of Western society.

He also worries about Western perceptions of Islam. He says the Muslim community has been bad at representing itself, and that this has allowed westerners to confuse Islam with cultural traits, as well as political problems. For example, he believes that many notionally Islamic countries have governments which betray the principles of Islam.

He believes that the Muslim leadership in Europe is partially responsible for the sometimes shaky relations between Muslims and the rest of society. He believes that they have been overly defensive, and have not properly explained the philosophy of Islam, nor have they engaged sufficiently with non-Muslim society.

He stresses that a Muslim's freedom of religion is very extensive in the West, and that permission for "un-Islamic" activities, such as drinking, or pre-marital sex, does not compel Muslims to do anything. Only a few situations warrant the invocation of the "clause of conscience" which allows a Muslim to make it clear that certain actions or behaviours are in contradiction of their faith. These are, participating in a war whose sole desire is for power or control; fighting or killing a fellow Muslim, unless their attitude is unjust or wrong; participating in an unlawful transaction (such as purchasing insurance, burial, incorrect slaughter). He stresses that in such cases the situation should be carefully analysed, and the degree of compulsion considered. Only non-violence and negotiation are acceptable in these cases.^[40]

Ramadan has voiced his opposition to all forms of capital punishment but believes the Muslim world should remove such laws from within, without any Western pressure, as such would only further alienate Muslims, and instead bolster the position of those who support hudud punishments.

He has said "Muslim populations are convincing themselves of the Islamic character of these practices through a rejection of the west, on the basis of a simplistic reasoning that stipulates that 'the less western, the more Islamic'."^[41]

Politically, Ramadan was opposed to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He believes that jihad against the United States military in Iraq was justified as an act of resistance to oppression.

He has condemned suicide bombing and violence as a tactic.^[42] Perhaps more importantly, he believes that terrorism is never justifiable, even though it is sometimes understandable.^[43]

He was opposed to the French law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools.

Ramadan wrote that the Muslim response to Pope Benedict XVI's speech on Islam was disproportionate, and was encouraged by reactionary Islamic regimes in order to distract their populations, and that it did not improve the position of Islam in the world.^[44]

Ramadan wrote an article entitled, Les (nouveaux) intellectuels communautaires, which French newspapers Le Monde and Le Figaro refused to publish. Oumma.com did eventually publish it. In the article he criticizes a number of French Jewish intellectuals and figures such as Alexandre Adler, Alain Finkielkraut, Bernard-Henri Lévy, André Glucksmann and Bernard Kouchner, for allegedly abandoning universal human rights, and giving special status to the defence of Israel. Ramadan was accused, in return, of having used inflammatory language.^[45][46]

Debate[link]

In a French television debate in 2003 with Nicolas Sarkozy, Sarkozy accused Ramadan of defending the stoning of adulterers, a punishment stipulated in the section of the Islamic penal code known as hudud, roots being in Mosaic law as mentioned in the Old Testament of the Bible and not having been abrogated by later revelations, consequently Sura 6 verse 89 of the Quran is interpreted in orthodox Islam as sanctioning the death penalty for certain crimes. Ramadan replied that Sarkozy was wrong. He said that he opposed stoning and that he favored “a moratorium” on such practices to have time to discuss the law outright. Many people, including Sarkozy, were outraged. Ramadan later defended his position arguing that, because it involved religious texts, the law would have to be properly understood and contextualised. Ramadan argued that in Muslim countries, the simple act to "condemn" won't change anything, but with a "moratorium", it could open the way for further debate. He thinks that such a debate can only lead to an abolishment of these rules.^[47] He further engaged in similar debates on the issue, notably at the Cambridge Union with Sir Bernard Crick, among others, in 2008.

Critical reception[link]

Some academics have greeted his works with enthusiasm, detecting liberalising and rationalising tendencies.^[48]

Praise[link]

Paul Donnelly^{[disambiguation needed ]} at the liberal^[49] online magazine Salon.com asked rhetorically: "Tariq Ramadan: The Muslim Martin Luther?".^[50] Similarly, an article at the self-described liberal^[51] The American Prospect praised Ramadan and his work in particular as an "entire corpus consists of a steady and unyielding assault on Muslim insularity, self-righteousness, and self-pity."^[52]

Criticism[link]

In a book published by Encounter Books, Caroline Fourest analysed Tariq Ramadan's 15 books, 1,500 pages of interviews, and approximately 100 recordings,^[53][54] and concludes "Ramadan is a war leader," and the "political heir of his grandfather," Hassan al-Banna, stating that his discourse is, "often just a repetition of the discourse that Banna had at the beginning of the 20th century in Egypt," and that he "presents [al-Banna] as a model to be followed."^[16][55] She argues that "Tariq Ramadan is slippery. He says one thing to his faithful Muslim followers and something else entirely to his Western audience. His choice of words, the formulations he uses – even his tone of voice – vary, chameleon-like, according to his audience."^[53] Tariq Ramadan responded that Caroline Fourest's book was filled with inaccuracies and untruths, a few of which she later acknowledged on her blog^[56].

Olivier Guitta, writing in The Weekly Standard, welcomed the U.S. decision to refuse Ramadan a visa, based on Ramadan's supposed links to terrorist organizations and claiming that his father was the likely author of "'The Project'... a roadmap for installing Islamic regimes in the West by propaganda, preaching, and if necessary war." He further claimed that the former head of the French antiracism organization SOS Racisme, "Malek Boutih told Ramadan after talking with him at length: ‘Mr. Ramadan, you are a fascist.’"^[16] In an interview with Europe 1 Boutih likened him to "a small Le Pen^{[disambiguation needed ]}";^[57] in another interview he accused him of having crossed the line of racism and anti-Semitism, thus not genuinely belonging to the alter-globalization movement. Similarly, self-described conservative^[58] Daniel Pipes concurred with the revocation of Ramadan's visa on grounds of Ramadan's alleged ties with Islamic extremism.^[59] After the lifting of the visa revocation, an article in the National Review criticized the double standard of lifting the visa restriction on Ramadan, but not for Issam Abu Issa who was banned by the Bush Administration for being a whistleblower against the Palestinian Authority's corruption.^[60]

Bertrand Delanoë, Socialist mayor of Paris, declared Ramadan unfit to participate at the European Social Forum, as not even "a slight suspicion of anti-Semitism" would be tolerable. Talking to the Paris weekly Marianne, Fadela Amara, president of Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Submissive, a French feminist movement), Aurélie Filippetti, municipal counsellor for The Greens in Paris, Patrick Klugman, leading member of the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions juives de France and Dominique Sopo, head of SOS-Racisme accuse Ramadan of having misused the alter-globalization movement's ingenuousness to advance his "radicalism and anti-Semitism."^[61] Similarly, an article in the online publication of Alliance for Workers' Liberty published 40 reasons why Ramadan was a reactionary, criticizing views on Islamic extremism, women's rights and anti-Semitism.^[62] Egyptian intellectual Tarek Heggy has also charged Ramadan with saying different things to different audiences.^[63] Other criticisms have included claims that that an essay attacking French intellectuals was anti-semitic ^[64] and that he has shown excessive generosity in his rationalization of the motives behind acts of terrorism, such as in the case of [Mohammed Merah].^[65]

Response to some of the criticism[link]

Ramadan vehemently denies contacts with terrorists or other Islamic fundamentalists and the charges of anti-Semitism and double talk, attributing the charges to misinterpretation and an unfamiliarity with his writings.^[66] He stated: "I have often been accused of this 'double discourse', and to those who say it, I say – bring the evidence. I am quite clear in what I say. The problem is that many people don't want to hear it, particularly in the media. Most of the stories about me are completely untrue: journalists simply repeat black propaganda from the internet without any corroboration, and it just confirms what they want to believe. Words are used out of context. There is double-talk, yes, but there is also double-hearing. That is what I want to challenge."^[42] In answer to criticism of his response to September 11th, Ramadan replied that two days after the attacks he had published an open letter, exhorting Muslims to condemn the attacks and the attackers, and not to "hide behind conspiracy theories."^[67] and that less than two weeks after the attacks he had stated that “The probability [of bin Laden's guilt] is large, but some questions remain unanswered ... But whoever they are, Bin Laden or others, it is necessary to find them and that they be judged,” and that the interview had been conducted before any evidence was publicly available.^[68]

Public reception[link]

One of the world's top 100 innovators of the 21st Century (one of the world's top 7th religious leaders) by Time Magazine in 2000

One of the world's top 100 most influential intellectuals in the world by Time Magazine in 2004

An online poll provided by the American Foreign Policy magazine in 2009 and in 2010 placed Ramadan on the 49th spot in a list of the world’s top 100 contemporary intellectuals.^[69]