From London to Ulaanbaatar: Making the State of Democracy Framework Travel

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Introduction

The United Kingdom in the 1990s provided the setting for the genesis of the democracy assessment framework that was to be developed by the Democratic Audit and International IDEA. Long characterised as the 'mother of all democracies', with the 'mother of all parliaments', the United Kingdom has seemed to many as a strange place to establish an 'audit' of democracy and its development followed somewhat ironically the 'audit culture' that had emerged during the Reagan-Thatcher period of neo-liberalism. Outsiders living in newly established democracies or in non-democracies find it strange that a mature liberal democracy such as the United Kingdom would need an audit of democracy. But the founding premise of the Democratic Audit, which also forms the basis of the State of Democracy framework[1], is that all democracies are incomplete projects in need of scrutiny, vigilance, and improvement, and that it is primarily the citizens of democracy themselves that ought to have the most say in the shaping their own democratic future. This somewhat progressive orientation stands in contrast to market-led impulse for carrying out audits that demonstrated 'value for money' in publicly financed endeavours such as the National Health Service and higher education.

The audit concept is simple. It is an evaluation of an organization, system, process, product, or other unit against a set of agreed and/or accepted standards and practices. For the democratic audit, it has been the current state of democracy in the United

[1] The Democratic Audit has been based at the University of Essex in the Human Rights Centre since its creation; however, in 2005 its domestic wing has begun a shift away from Essex, while its international wing comprising the State of Democracy project has remained at Essex. After an international conference in June 2004, the project was more institutionalised through a memorandum of understanding between International IDEA and the University of Essex. In December 2005, there was a meeting of international experts associated with the State of Democracy project and a new set of handbooks for democracy assessment are being developed.

Kingdom judged against a set of criteria drawn from long debates in normative political theory. There have been three audits carried out on the United Kingdom (Klug, Starmer, and Weir 1996; Weir and Beetham 1999; Beetham, Byrne, Ngan, and Weir 2002), a fourth audit is being planned, and the organisation itself has carried out a large number of research and policy-related activities concerning specific topics related to the quality of British democracy.[2] The main intellectuals behind Democratic Audit – Professors David Beetham and Stuart Weir – decided that the audit concept ought to be able to 'travel' beyond the UK to other mature democracies and, crucially as it turned out, to those countries that had just established democracy. To this end, the framework was developed and eight pilot assessments were conducted in Bangladesh, El Salvador, Italy, Kenya, Malawi, New Zealand, Peru and South Korea. These assessments have been followed by similar projects that stick close to the assessment framework (e.g. in Australia, South Asia, the Philippines, and Ireland) as well as other projects that use the framework in some way (e.g. South Africa, Israel, a UNDP guide to pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators a law course at Georgetown University). In this sense, the State of Democracy framework is a free public good.

Alongside these developments in the State of Democracy framework and burgeoning network of people with experience in carrying out democratic assessments, in January 2005 representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia and the UNDP office in Ulaanbaatar approached International IDEA to assist in developing democratic governance indicators (DGIs) as part of the follow-up activities to the 'Fifth International Conference on New and Restored Democracies' (ICNRD-5). A local research team had been selected and was developing ideas on how to generate

[2] For a full listing of projects and numerous electronic publications, see http://www.democraticaudit.com/index.php.

both ‘core’ and ‘satellite’ indicators on the quality of democracy in Mongolia and it was decided that the State of Democracy Framework would be used as the basis for carrying out this work. As part of this work, I led a team of researchers at the University of Essex to carry out a desk study on the state of democracy in Mongolia as a first step in identifying significant gaps in the public record on Mongolian democracy (see Landman, Larizza, and McEvoy 2005) and to assist the research team in developing measures that were sensitive to the Mongolian political context.

This paper discusses the work that has been carried under the auspices of ICNRD-5 and discusses the degree to which the State of Democracy framework was adaptable to the needs identified by the UNDP and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mongolia. There are a number of features of this experience that make it different from previous assessments. First, the Mongolian assessment was being led by a government ministry along with oversight, financial resources, personnel, and capacity from the UNDP. Second, there was an emphasis on quantitative indicators on the quality of democratic governance, both extant indicators on development, democracy, human rights and good governance, as well as the development of new indicators using a variety of methods including survey instruments, elite interviews, and expert judgments. Third, the work took into account many of the unique features of Mongolia in the development of satellite indicators, such as its low population density, rural-urban migration, the high proportion of a nomadic population, and the mixed outcomes after ten years of privatization and economic liberalization in the relative absence of government regulation.

The paper is organized into five sections. Section one summarizes the Mongolian case from the perspective of the larger literature on democratization. The second section discusses the types of indicators that were used for the desk study, how they fit into the state of democracy framework, and what were its findings. The third section examines the ways in which the local team developed the tools to assess the quality of democracy that went well beyond and in some cases revised the conclusions reached in the desk study. The fourth section reviews the main democratic governance indicators and how their analysis was used to draw conclusions about democracy in Mongolia. The final section discusses the implications for the future development of the framework.

Background to the Mongolian Desk Study

Since its democratic transition in 1990, Mongolia represents a primary example of a ‘least likely’ (Eckstein 1975; Landman 2003) case of democratisation in relation to other ‘fourth wave’ democracies (Doorenspleet 2000; 2001) and in the Central Asian region itself (Fish 1998, 2001; Sabloff 2002; Fritz 2002). The political system that has been established meets most of the minimal and procedural criteria for democracy outlined by democracy analysts (Diamond 1999; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000), has a competitive and developed political party system and has maintained peaceful and regular transfers of power over five successive parliamentary elections (1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004) and four presidential elections (1993, 1997, 2001, 2005) (see www.idea.int). It is ‘least likely’ since it lacks the standard ‘prerequisites’ for democracy posited by the modernization perspective, it lacks the certain cultural factors seen to be essential for democracy, and it has established democracy among a set of comparable post-communist neighbours that have remained (or become) largely undemocratic.

First, Mongolia does not fit the expectations of either the endogenous or exogenous versions of modernization theory. The *endogenous* version of modernization theory has long argued that high levels of economic development are conducive to democratisation, and countless global statistical analyses have sought to establish this empirical generalization (e.g. Lipset 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Helliwell 1994; Boix 2003; Vanhanen 1997). The *exogenous* version of modernization theory argues that once democracy is established in wealthy countries, it tends not to collapse (Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Landman 2005). In either case, Mongolia has democratised in the absence of high levels of economic development (Fish 1998, 2001; Fritz 2002). Second, Mongolia belies the expectations of certain cultural theories of democratisation, which posit a significant relationship between the establishment of democracy on the one hand and the predominance of Western Christianity and the separation of church and state on the other (Sabloff 2002: 19; Lee 2002: 829). Mongolia is 90 percent Buddhist and the church and state were only separated during the 1911-1921 Revolution, which led to the long period of totalitarian rule modelled after the Soviet system. Third, Mongolia is an exception for its level of democratisation compared to its distance from the possible spatial influences of the West (Kopstein and Reilly 2000: 9-12). Fourth, outside these socio-economic, cultural, and general geographical concerns, Mongolia serves as an exception to broader regional trends. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have had significant difficulties in establishing even basic democratic institutions and procedures, and have had persistent problems with the violation of fundamental human rights (Fish 1998; 2001; Kopstein and Reilly

2000; McFaul 2002), while Mongolia's process of democratisation has not been subject to undue interference from either Russia or China (Fish 1998, 2001; Fritz 2002; Sabloff 2002).

These features of the Mongolia make a fascinating case study not only for carrying out a democracy assessment but also for informing larger debates in the literature on the genesis and survival of democracy.[3] Despite the absence of key factors that are meant to make a county more likely to establish and maintain democracy, the desk study made a number of preliminary conclusion organised according to the State of Democracy framework (see Table 1). The domestic research team then used these findings as topics in need of further research for their in-depth assessment of Mongolian democracy. The publication of the desk study accompanied a two-day conference on democratic governance with the major stakeholders (parliamentarians, the national human rights commissions, civil society groups, members of the foreign and domestic, civil service academics, and the media), and a two-day technical workshop with the research team to discuss the ways in which core and satellite indicators could be developed.

</Table 1 about here/>

The Framework and Indicators

The desk study utilised a larger selection of quantitative indicators than had been used in previous desk studies or national assessments to date. This set of indicators proved

[3] For the modernization perspective alone, there are a number of countries other than Mongolia that could be considered 'least likely', including Bostwana, Costa Rica, Malawi, and India. These countries have been able to establish and maintain democracy despite being relatively poor. It does not appear that economic development is responsible for the genesis of democracy (see Boix 2003) and none of these countries reaches the threshold of per capita GDP where the probability of democratic collapse is meant to approach 0 (see Przeworski, Alavarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000).

quite useful in mapping the main developments within each pillar of the State of Democracy framework and were at least sensitive enough to capture the profound transformations Mongolia has undergone since its transition in 1990. Many times, these indicators are not useful for countries that have had stable democracy for many years and have typically been employed for large-N comparisons using multivariate statistical analysis. Table 2 lists the main quantitative indicators that were used in the study arranged according to the main pillars of the State of Democracy Framework. As is clear from the table, there are major gaps in readily available indicators that can be used for a democracy assessment, but those that were used did provide a window into major historical patterns and along with its more qualitative analysis identified areas where the national team could explore further.

</Table 2 about here/>

The extant quantitative indicators on the protection of civil and political rights provided a general picture of the main trends, while the qualitative reporting helped substantiate the observed decline in the trends for civil rights protection, particularly in the areas of conditions of detention and the use of torture. But it was clear that more information was needed pre-trial detentions, access to legal assistance, conditions of detention for juvenile detainees, the use of the death penalty the degree to which corruption undermined the rule of law and differentiated access to justice. There was limited availability of socio-economic indicators a need to find more evidence *de facto* discrimination in health, education, and welfare, as well as the linkages between denial of social and economic rights on the one hand and the undermining of civil and political on the other. It was clear form the study that political participation is high and civil society has become well developed and organised. Bur more evidence was needed on government responsiveness to the demands of citizens, the constituency work of MPs, why popular trust in the political parties is relatively low even though political participation remains high, and more evidence on local government and the concerns of the different provinces, and whether these concerns are being probably channelled through to central government. Finally, more analysis was needed of state reporting to the various UN Human Rights Treaty bodies and whether domestic NGOs have been preparing shadow reports, and/or how engaged Mongolian NGOs are working with the UN Human Rights Commission (now Council) and INGOs operating in significant international fora concerned with human rights, democracy, and good governance.

The Local Team and Democracy Assessment

The Mongolian research team took many of these recommendations on board in formulating their research strategy and programme of activities, particularly the need to use core indicators and develop satellite indicators. Core indicators are those indicators that would apply to all democracies, while satellite indicators are those that reflect the specific social and political context of Mongolia. For the team this context presents significant challenges for strengthening and deepening democracy and comprises the following nine main elements:

1. Mongolia is a new democracy that is undergoing a dual transition from authoritarianism to democracy and from a command economy to a market economy;

2. Constitutionally, Mongolia has a parliamentary regime, but throughout the political transition, it has retained many elements of a semi-presidentialism;

3. Mongolia is economically underdeveloped with a large territory, small and unevenly dispersed population, and a small and highly dependent economy;

4. Dues to harsh living conditions in the rural sector and the pull of the market in the urban sector, there has been increasing migration to urban areas;

5. There is a popular belief in the state as provider and a certain attachment to the authoritarian past;

6. The public consciousness is heavily imbued with centuries of the nomadic lifestyle and philosophy, while the Marxist ideological understanding of politics remains strong and knowledge of democratic values remains general, weak, and superficial;

7. The abrupt nature of the dual transition triggered a collapse of the economy, accompanied by a rapid social segregation in society, which has increased unemployment, poverty and led to new forms of corruption;

8. There is an inversely proportional gender distribution in education, employment and appointment to positions that stands in stark contrast to most developed and societies;

9. The small size of population is a key factor that explains the importance of networks of strong relationships, such as acquaintances, friends, compatriots, former colleagues, former classmates as well as traditions and customs that tend to be more dominant than the rule of law.[4]

Against the background of this baseline assessment, the team used a variety of methods for developing 80 core indicators organised into 14 clusters and 8 satellite indicators. The team began by presenting the entire set of state of democracy search questions to a group of national experts who assigned an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 5, where a higher score denotes stronger support for the search question and generally the institutionalisation of democratic values.[5] Overall, the mean value for the group of experts is 3.02 and the team concluded from this initial probe that certain features of democracy had been consolidated, while remaining problems mean that Mongolian democratic stability overall remains precarious.

[4] Adapted from the Draft Country Information Note 2006: 14.
[5] The different points on the scale are as follows: (1) situation characterized as most undemocratic with far-reaching alienation from democracy, close to anti-democratic condition; (2) Non-democratic characteristics prevail, alienation from democracy is evident but opportunity to reinstate democracy is not lost; (3) democratic and non-democratic characteristics are fairly proportional and situation could turn either way; (4) Democratic characteristics prevail but not fully guaranteed; (5) democratic characteristics are apparent and democracy fully guaranteed (Draft Country Information Note 2006: 7).

Beyond the expert judgments, the team carried out an elite survey of member of the Mongolian *Hural*, a public opinion survey using a random sample of the population, an adapted version of UN Habitat's Urban Governance Index[6], and an adapted version of the CIVICUS civil society index.[7] The two survey instruments (elite and mass) have a battery of questions ranging from the meaning of democracy to perceptions and explanations for patterns of discrimination to trust in particular institutions, as well as specific questions on rights issues and the use of the death penalty. The Urban Governance index provides an overall assessment of the quality of urban governance in Ulaanbaatar across the dimensions of effectiveness, accountability, participation and equity and was produced through a one-day workshop with major stakeholders, the results of which were then complemented with data from the City Government statistical office. The CIVICUS civil society index provides combined score for the four dimensions of structure, values, environment, and impact with respect to civil society.

The survey analysis of MPs showed that for the meaning of democracy, most respondents chose freedom and/or freedom of expression (45.5%), followed by rule of the people and law (45.5%), justice (18.2%), and transparency (18.2%).[8] There were general levels of the development and functioning of democracy, and that the main obstacles to continued democratisation were corruption, inequality, and lack of access to information. The elite survey also highlighted problems with inefficiency, absence of judicial independence, while corruption was seen as main reason for the precariousness of rights protections. There is even support for the parliament,

[6]See http://www.unhabitat.org/campaigns/governance/activities_6.asp
[7] See http://www.civicus.org
[8] Multiple responses were possible so the totals are greater than 100%.

president, and human rights commission at 36.4% support for each, with less support for the government, courts, and ministries. There is greater party identification for the opposition Democratic Party, or DP (36.4%) than for the Mongolian People's Party, or MPRP (27.3%), while the remaining MPs in the sample identify with neither party. While 72% of the sample declared that they were members of an NGO, only 27% thought that NGOs had any influence on national or local decision-making.

The analysis of the mass survey results showed that the general population was more ambivalent about the development and functioning of democracy than the MPs. Between 45% and 52% of the sample were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with the development and functioning of democracy, while 49.4% of the sample felt that democracy has had both and positive and negative impact on their personal situation. The mass respondents agreed with MPs that the judiciary lacks real independence and that the combination of nepotism and corruption undermine the judiciary's capacity to protect human rights. There is more support for the MPRP (29.9%) than the DP (22.3%). In contrast to the MPs there is much less support in the general population for government institutions, including the human rights commission, while they agree with the MPs that NGOs do not have a tremendous influence on decision-making.

The urban governance index shows that for Ulaanbaatar had the highest scores for the indicators across effectiveness, followed by participation, accountability, and equity. These different scores reflect good revenue and expenditure ratios, which may have been overestimated due to underreporting on the size of Ulaanbaatar's population. Participation is relatively high due to the direct elections of the City Councillors (although the Mayor is not directly elected), a large number of civic associations (although they are not particularly active), high voter turnout, and numerous public forums. The city is reasonably strong on mechanisms for accountability but it does not have an independent organisation for fighting corruption and no law requiring elected officials to declare their income. Finally, the city does not fare well for questions relating to equity, since there is not a citizen's charter for basic services and measures on water and the informal sector that may benefit the poor. Moreover, over 30% of the city's population lives below the poverty line, while there is an under-representation of women in local government; women who often bear the 'double burden' of head of household and income earner.

The civil society index and the large process of consultation that was used to generate the index, produced conclusions about civil society that stand in stark contrast to those reached in the desk study. To outside observers and commentators, civil society in Mongolia appeared lively and vibrant (partly because it has not suffered the kind of overt repression that civil societies in other post-authoritarian countries have); however, to the internal observers and participants responsible for compiling the civil society index, civil society in Mongolia remains weak. It continues to have 'strong traces of the socialist period', which are 'manifested through the continued influence of inherited mass organizations,' the public sphere itself is not free from government interference, and direct and indirect forms of control (International Civil Society Forum for Democracy 2005: 1). The index shows that Mongolian civil society only achieved very low scores on structure (limited scope and depth of participation), environment (disabling political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural context), impact (inability to transform efforts and values into real impact), while the score for values was slightly higher due to evidence of a high degree of 'commitment to and awareness of democratic principles and humanitarian values' (International Civil Society Forum for Democracy 2005: 1). It is interesting to note that these findings from this process for compiling a civil society index are consistent with those of the elite and mass survey with respect to the limited capacity of civil society to affect decision-making at the local and national level in Mongolia.

The general categories of analysis and search questions within the State of Democracy framework provided excellent guidance for the national team, and like assessments in other countries (particularly Australia), the framework was expanded in some degree to capture the unique features and circumstances of the Mongolian dual transition from a Communist authoritarian regime to a liberal capitalist democracy. Table 3 lists the additional indicators and/or new search questions that were added to the framework to take into account problems with patterns of discrimination, inequality, poverty, migration, party discipline, horizontal accountability, and independence of the media. This collection of core and satellite indicators has been used for an overall assessment of the state of democracy in Mongolia, which is complemented as part of Mongolia's mandate as chair of the ICNRD-5 with a plan of action and programme of activities that seeks to institutionalise the monitoring of democracy and to share the lessons with other new and restored democracies.

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Conclusions

The main conclusion from this exercise has been that the analytical categories from the state of democracy framework have been able to travel beyond the confines of a developed democracy such as the United Kingdom to a country with a number of extraordinarily unique features. The past democracy assessments have shown the versatility and flexibility of the framework as it has been applied to other developed and developing democracies. And now, Mongolia can be added to the growing list of counties for which this framework has proved useful and beneficial. Drawing on the preliminary findings of the desk study, the national research team developed a new set of core quantitative indicators based on the framework that have gone well beyond anything compiled before, and it has also developed the useful idea of satellite indicators that capture some of the unique features of the country. It is clear that a similar research strategy should be developed for countries that adopt the framework in the future. It was also refreshing that the more in-depth research conducted by the local team produced results that challenged the findings of the desk study and that appeared internally consistent across the different research methods that were adopted.

As part of its desire to share its experiences in democracy assessment, the Mongolian government, with the assistance of the UNDP also commissioned a comparative study of Mongolia along with the five post-Soviet republics in Central Asia (Landman, Larizza, McEvoy and Carvalho 2006). Some of these countries (e.g. Turkmenistan) did not meet the minimum criteria of democracy, while others in practice (e.g. Uzbekistan) have undermined the democratic principles upon which they were initially founded after independence in the early 1990s. Again, the framework proved an adept tool for organising quantitative and qualitative information on all the countries, and the study itself was framed within the large idea of a ‘most similar systems deisgn’, where different outcomes are compared across similar countries. In similar fashion to the South Asia project, the Central Asian study compared and contrasted experiences with democracy across the countries and drew attention to both the broad conclusions that could be drawn about the countries, as well as the significant gaps in knowledge remaining about them. In many of the countries, it simply will not yet be possible for a national team to carry out a democracy assessment, but the Mongolian experience and its leadership of the ICNRD-5 offers a valuable lesson for all democracies in the world.

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Table 1. Findings from the State of Democracy Desk Study on Mongolia

1. Mongolia has consolidated democracy over the last 15 years. By both narrow and quite broad criteria ranging from regular elections to popular attitudes towards democracy, Mongolia appears to have consolidated democracy and it is unlikely that democratic governance itself is under serious threat, but its long-term prospects remain precarious.

2. Mongolia has established a multi-party competitive political system where there has been significant alternation in power between civilian leaders without any interruption to democratic practices.

3. Mongolia has a large number of political parties that serve to represent a broad range of political views and interests, and which have established firm roots in society.

4. Mongolia has a vibrant and lively civil society with strong and large non-governmental organisations, particularly among journalists and women.

5. Mongolian citizens express strong support for the democratic transition and the democratic system even during times of economic adversity, while express less support for the democratic process itself and mixed support for political institutions.

6. Despite the process of democratic consolidation there remain significant areas of concern about the fullness of Mongolian democracy, particularly in areas such as the right to health, problems with corruption, poverty and unemployment, and other social and economic rights limitations that impinge on the full exercise of civil and political rights.

7. There are problems with access to and administration of justice, where patterns of corruption have undermined due process, and unreasonable conditions of pre-trial detention and the use of the death penalty in secret limit the notion of a full protection of civil rights.

8. The semi-presidential institutional design has provided the opportunity for power sharing and political accommodation, but elections have been dominated by the success of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), which has tended to control the parliament and the presidency, while constitutional amendments have undermined horizontal accountability by allowing MPs to serve simultaneously as cabinet members.

9. At the international level, Mongolia has served as a beacon of democracy in a fairly non-democratic part of the world and has shown leadership in the international community of democracies, as well as adopting a ninth Millennium Development Goal specifically on democracy and human rights.

10. Mongolia has ratified most of the international human rights treaties with few reservations, but has had persistent difficulty in implementing their provisions fully.

11. Mongolia remains highly donor-dependent, which has had an impact on its economic policies (particularly privatisation), but it has resisted undue influence from Russia and China.

Source: Landman, Larizza, and McEvoy (2005): 3-4.

Table 2. Main quantitative indicators used in the Mongolia state of democracy desk study

Pillar	Category	Indicator	Description	Location
Citizenship, Law and Rights	Nationhood and citizenship	None		
	The Rule of law and access to justice	None		
	Civil and political rights	Freedom House Civil and Political Liberties	Ordinal scale with low scores denoting great freedom	www.freedomhouse.org
		Political Terror Scale	Ordinal scale for personal integrity rights with low scores denoting greater protection	http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/images/Colloquium/faculty-staff/gibney.html
		Torture Scale	Ordinal scale with low scores denoting less use of torture	O. Hathaway (2002)
		Physical integrity rights	Ordinal scale with low scores denoting greater protection	www.humanrightsdata.com
	Economic and social rights	Economic development	Per capita GDP Agricultural employment Industrial employment Unemployment Imports and exports Net foreign direct investment Total foreign aid per capita Government expenditure on health, education and military Central government debt	www.worldbank.org

		Economic freedom	Ordinal scale with low scores denoting more freedom	www.heritage.org
Representative and accountable government	Free and fair elections	Electoral statistics	Party seat and vote share	Fish 1998; 2001 Severinghaus 2001 Tuya 2005
	Democratic role of political parties	None		
	Government effectiveness and accountability	Political stability Voice and accountability Government effectiveness Regulatory quality Rule of law	Computed score from data reduction of multiple governance indicators	www.worldbank.org
		Public opinion data on support for institutions	Percentage support for democratic transition, market economy, political system, president, parliament, judiciary, state organisations, and political parties	Sant Maral Foundation (www.forum.mn)
		Public opinion data on support for democracy	Percentage support for democracy	East Asia Barometer as cited in Shin and Wells (2005)
	Civilian control of military and police	Military expenditure	Percent of central government expenditure	www.worldbank.org

	Minimizing corruption	Perception of corruption	Percent response on scale measuring the degree of corruption, which institutions are corrupt, and what are the corrupt practices within the professions	Zorig Foundation
Civil society and popular participation	The media in a democratic society	Press freedom	Ordinal scale on press freedom with low scores denoting more freedom	www.freedomhouse.org
	Political participation	Voter turnout	Percent turnout in parliamentary and presidential elections	www.idea.int
	Government responsiveness	None		
	Decentralisation	None		
Democracy beyond the state	International dimensions of democracy			
	External dependence	US economic assistance	Millions of dollars for food, USAID, and other economic assistance	USAID overseas loans and grants (greenbook) www.qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/
	International human rights treaty obligations	Ratification of main international treaties		http://www.bayefsky.com/./html/mongolia_t1_ratifications.php

Table 3. Mongolia 'satellite' indicators and new search questions

Pillar of the State of Democracy framework	Satellite indicators/new search questions
Citizenship, Law and Rights	To what extent is equality in civil and socio-economic rights secured for migrants?
	To what extent do effects of social traditions and personal interests support the process of ensuring the equality of rights?
Representative and Accountable Government	To what extent does the composition of the election authority have an effect on its independence? To what extent do citizens have the opportunity to monitor election process?
	How is discipline of parliamentary parties legally regulated? How far is internal democracy within parties open to the public?
	To what extent does the capacity of the real economy serve as a resource for resolving problems accumulated in society?
	How stable is the public service after elections? To what extent are public servants protected from politics?
	Are there mechanisms established for reciprocated oversight of activities between the Parliament and Cabinet, local government self-governing bodies and local administration?
Civil Society and Popular Participation	How far are media instruments, journalists protected from falling under hidden influences?
	Relationship of the government and citizens, and how far do government, public officials and NGOs provide meaningful support to popular participation?
	Are there appropriate relations established between the government, local self-government bodies and local administrations? What is its role in decentralization?
Democracy beyond the State	None developed.

Source: Draft Country Information Note 2006: 15-16.