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British involvement in Mali and the wider region is deepening, and it is clearly in everyone’s interests that we do not allow legitimate Governments to fail, particularly when faced with extremists. It is no secret that I opposed our recent interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, because I fear that one can be drawn into ever-deepening conflicts. Afghanistan illustrated the dangers of being sucked into larger deployments. That mission morphed into something much larger: it changed from a mission to defeat al-Qaeda or deny it the use of Afghanistan to one of nation-building.

Drawing on our lessons in Afghanistan—and, perhaps, on other interventions—will the Government clarify the following points? We need greater clarity on the role of British troops. The Government have said they will not be placed in a combat role, but there are a host of grey areas between combat roles and support roles. What exactly will these advisers do? Will they be involved in logistics or training, or will they advise on strategy? Equally importantly, how will they be protected? Are we deploying troops on the ground to protect these advisers, or are we relying on our French colleagues to provide that protection?

May I also ask the Secretary of State what exactly is the exit strategy? It is very easy to get drawn into these situations, but it is not always clear what the endgame and exit strategy are, and even what the endgame looks like. What are the contingency plans if military progress does not go to plan? Is there talk on the table that we should perhaps be deploying or committing, or be prepared to commit, more troops if the fighting goes badly? At the moment, that is all going well, but the situation can change very quickly.

Finally, what lessons should we learn from United Nations Security Council resolution 2085, which was passed last year and called on local African nations to lead the combat role in defeating these extremists in northern Mali? There was tremendous delay in the implementation of that resolution. What lessons have we learned from that, because we seem to be playing catch-up? On a related but slightly separate issue, what is the international community’s broader strategy on encouraging local forces to play a more proactive role, not only in Mali, but in the wider region, in combating these extremists? These are legitimate questions and the British public and we as a House need to ask them, because there is a real danger of getting drawn into a much larger deployment, particularly if things do not go to plan on the ground.

Mr Hammond: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his questions. First, the UK has a clear interest in the stability of Mali and in ensuring that its territory does not become an ungoverned space available to al-Qaeda and its associates to organise for attacks on the west. Secondly, we have established military co-operation with France, which is an important part of Britain’s strategy for the future, and this situation, along with the Libya campaign, is an opportunity for us to demonstrate the validity of that working relationship with France. The role of British troops, as I set out in my response to the urgent question, is clearly not a combat role, and it will also not extend, as we envisage it at the moment, to a force protection role. We are looking for force protection arrangements to be put in place, probably by the French, but certainly by the European Union in relation to the EU training mission.