- published: 09 Apr 2013
- author: AllNewsPlace
http://www.youtube.com/AllNewsPlace All News Place يرجى الاشتراك للحصول على آخر المستجدات مكان الأخبار جميع A team of UN experts has gone to Cyprus and is wa...
The 2.5 million Syrians who have recently fled a brutal external and internal civil war, along with the estimated 70,000 who have been killed, is reminiscent of the Assyrian Genocide that occurred during World War One. Starting in 1915 and ending in 1918, Ottoman Turkish soldiers and Kurdish militias systematically subjected hundreds of thousands of Assyrians to a deliberate campaign of massacre, torture, abduction, deportation, impoverishment, and cultural and ethnic destruction. Assyrian Christians were especially targeted, including the unarmed and defenseless. An Ottoman officer, Raphael de Nogales, described the aftermath of one genocidal massacre by writing, "The ghastly slope was crowned by thousands of half-nude and still bleeding corpses, lying in heaps, or interlace in death's final embrace."(1)
The affects of the still fresh preemptive wars instigated by the Bush Administration, which caused tens of thousands of Iraqis to flee into Syria, greatly weakened a struggling economy and political situation, giving rise to high unemployment and an already fragmented society. The Bush Doctrine, driven by the Project For A New American Century, added to Syria's problems by labeling it as part of the "axis of evil" and by accusing Syria of manufacturing nuclear weapons. CIA undercover agents and special forces infiltrated into Syria and armed rebels hoping to overthrow Syria's President Bashar al-Assad who had allied with Iran, arch-enemy of the U.S. Syria continued to request that Israel, America's arch-ally, return the Golan Heights. Meanwhile, the U.S. has also allied itself with terrorist groups (including al-Qaeda) to meet its war aims.
Although the U.S. and other Western Powers continue to sanction and punish Syria for aiding the Palestinians, for their involvement in Lebanon, for imprisoning political prisoners, and for even recognizing an alternative government: the National Coalition; Syrians too have added to their other-inflicted genocide. Syria's Self-inflicted genocide can be observed in how both rebel, such as the Free-Syria Army, and government forces indiscriminately kill their own fellow citizens and execute prisoners. Suicide bombers and roving armed gangs-often trained and supplied by the West-continue to wreak death and destruction across the country too. In order to help prevent this self-inflicted genocide, a form of participatory democracy, where people solve disagreements through negotiations instead of warfare, will have to be sought. Rich heritages, similar cultures, a shared history and national identity should also be emphasized.
During the Assyrian genocide, it is estimated that as many as 65,000 people died from exhaustion, malnourishment, and disease en route to refugee camps. All told, about half of the Assyrian nation died of murder, disease, or exposure as refugees. Still, famine and want were the fate of survivors, whose homes, villages, churches and schools were wiped out. Sadly, and as a remnants of the Assyrian population fled into southeast Anatolia in search of British refugee camps, no relief, let alone resolution, awaited their plight. One civil commissioner of the time acknowledged that their troubles had been "largely or our own creation and a solution has been made more difficult by our own action, or rather inaction."(2) Today, can the same be said of the U.S. and its policies in Syria? As for the Syrians who are fighting, an ancient Syrian proverb says: "Where there are no people, there is Hell."
Dallas Darling (darling@wn.com)
(Dallas Darling is the author of Politics 501: An A-Z Reading on Conscientious Political Thought and Action, Some Nations Above God: 52 Weekly Reflections On Modern-Day Imperialism, Militarism, And Consumerism in the Context of John's Apocalyptic Vision, and The Other Side Of Christianity: Reflections on Faith, Politics, Spirituality, History, and Peace. He is a correspondent for www.worldnews.com. You can read more of Dallas' writings at www.beverlydarling.com and wn.com//dallasdarling.)
(1) Jones, Adam. Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction. New York, New York: Routledge Press, 2006., p. 161.
(2) Ibid., p. 162.
Conflict | Syrian civil war |
---|---|
Partof | the Arab Spring |
Date | – ongoing() |
Place | Mainly Syria, with minor spillovers in neighboring countries |
Result | Ongoing |
Combatant1 | Syrian government
Foreign militants: Hezbollah PFLP–GC Iraqi Shia militias (For other forms of foreign support, see here) |
Combatant2 | Syrian National Coalition
For more on Kurdish involvement, see here |
Commander1 | Bashar al-Assad Maher al-Assad Fahd Jassem al-Freij Ali Abdullah Ayyoub Mohammed Dib Zaitoun Wael Nader al-Halqi Assef Shawkat Dawoud Rajiha Hisham Ikhtiyar Hasan Turkmani |
Commander2 | Moaz al-Khatib
Ghassan Hitto
Salim Idris
Mustafa al-Sheikh
Riad al-Asaad(WIA)
George Sabra
Abdulbaset Sieda
Burhan Ghalioun
---- Abu Mohammad al-Golani ---- Salih Muslim Muhammad |
Strength1 | Syrian Armed Forces: 200,000 (by Nov 2011),
120,000 (by Jan 2013)
110,000 (by Mar 2013)
General Security Directorate: 8,000 Shabiha militiamen: 10,000 fighters 50 000 new localized recruits trained by Iran, Hezbollah, Syria 15,000 soldiers Hezbollah: 1,500–5,000 fighters Iraqi Shi'ite militias: 500 fighters |
Strength2 | 40,000 (by May 2012) 70,000–100,000 (by Sep 2012) Specifics: 30,000 defectors :(by Jul 2012) 6,000–10,000 Al-Nusra Front 1,500–3,000 foreign Mujahideen ---- 4,000–10,000 YPG fighters |
Casualties1 | Syrian government
14,752 soldiers and policemen killed
1,000 government officials killed 1,030+ government forces captured Iran and Hezbollah590 killed PFLP–GC14+ killed |
Casualties2 | 13,792 fighters killed* 979–2,689 protesters killed Syrians killed overall (opposition estimates)** 70,000 Syrians killed overall (February 2013 UN estimate) 534 foreign civilians killed (see here) ---- 14 Iraqi soldiers killed 2 Turkish F4 Phantom pilots killed 2 Lebanese soldiers killed 1 Jordanian soldier killed ---- 1.2 million internally displaced 1,204,707 refugees (March 2013 UNHCR figure) 130,000 missing or detained |
Notes | *Number possibly higher due to the opposition counting rebels that were not defectors as civilians.**Numbers do not include foreign combatants from both sides or Shabiha militiamen who have been killed. }} |
The Syrian civil war, also commonly known as the Syrian uprising, is an ongoing armed conflict in Syria between forces loyal to the Syrian Ba'ath Party government and those seeking to oust it. The conflict began on 15 March 2011, with popular demonstrations that grew nationwide by April 2011. These demonstrations were part of the wider Middle Eastern protest movement known as the Arab Spring. Protesters demanded the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad, whose family has held the presidency in Syria since 1971, as well as the end to over four decades of Ba'ath Party rule
In April 2011, the Syrian Army was deployed to quell the uprising, and soldiers were ordered to open fire on demonstrators. After months of military sieges, the protests evolved into an armed rebellion. Opposition forces, mainly composed of defected soldiers and civilian volunteers, became increasingly armed and organized as they unified into larger groups. However, the rebels remained fractured, without organized leadership. The Syrian government characterizes the insurgency as an uprising of "armed terrorist groups and foreign mercenaries". The conflict has no clear fronts, with clashes taking place in many towns and cities across the country.
The Arab League, United States, European Union, Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and other countries condemned the use of violence against the protesters. The Arab League suspended Syria's membership because of the government's response to the crisis, but granted the Syrian National Coalition Syria's seat on 6 March 2013. The Arab League also sent an observer mission in December 2011, as part of its proposal for peaceful resolution of the crisis. A further attempt to resolve the crisis was made through the appointment of Kofi Annan as a special envoy. On 15 July 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross assessed the Syrian conflict as a "non-international armed conflict" (the ICRC's legal term for civil war), thus applying international humanitarian law under the Geneva Conventions to Syria.
On 2 January 2013, the United Nations stated that the war's death toll had exceeded 60,000; on 12 February, this figure was updated to 70,000. According to various opposition activist groups, between 59,900 and 72,660 people have been killed, of which about half were civilians, but also including 29,435 armed combatants consisting of both the Syrian Army and rebel forces, up to 2,690 opposition protesters and 1,000 government officials. By October 2012, up to 28,000 people had been reported missing, including civilians forcibly abducted by government troops or security forces. According to the UN, about 1.2 million Syrians have been displaced within the country. To escape the violence, as many as 1 million Syrian refugees have fled to neighboring countries. In addition, tens of thousands of protesters have been imprisoned and there were reports of widespread torture and psychological terror in state prisons. International organizations have accused both government and opposition forces of severe human rights violations. However, human rights groups report that the majority of abuses have been committed by the Syrian government's forces, and UN investigations have concluded that the government's abuses are the greatest in both gravity and scale.
In 1982, at the height of a six-year Islamist armed insurgency throughout the country, Hafez al-Assad conducted a scorched earth policy against Islamist-held quarters inside the town of Hama to quell an uprising by the Sunni Islamist community, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists and others. This ruthless crackdown became known as the Hama massacre, which left tens of thousands – both armed insurgents and civilians – dead, although estimates of the death toll still vary.
The issue of President Hafez al-Assad's succession prompted the 1999 Latakia protests, when violent protests and armed clashes erupted following the 1998 Syrian People's Assembly elections. The violent events were an explosion of a long-running feud between Hafez al-Assad and his influential younger brother Rifaat. Two people were killed in fire exchanges between Syrian police and Rifaat's supporters during a police crackdown on Rifaat's port compound in Latakia. According to opposition sources, denied by the government, the protests resulted in hundreds dead and injured. Hafez al-Assad died one year later, from pulmonary fibrosis. He was succeeded by his son Bashar al-Assad, who was appointed after a constitutional amendment lowered the age requirement for President from 40 to his then age of 34.
Bashar al-Assad, who speaks English fluently and whose wife is a British-born and British-educated Sunni Muslim, initially inspired hopes for democratic and state reforms; a "Damascus Spring" of intense social and political debate took place from July 2000 to August 2001. The period was characterized by the emergence of numerous political forums or salons, where groups of like-minded people met in private houses to debate political and social issues. Political activists such as Riad Seif, Haitham al-Maleh, Kamal al-Labwani, Riyad al-Turk and Aref Dalila were important in mobilizing the movement. The most famous of the forums were the Riad Seif Forum and the Jamal al-Atassi Forum. The Damascus Spring ended in August 2001 with the arrest and imprisonment of ten leading activists who had called for democratic elections and for a campaign of civil disobedience. Opposition renewed in October 2005 when Syrian Christian activist Michel Kilo collaborated with other leading opposition figures to deliver the Damascus Declaration, which criticized the Syrian government as "authoritarian, totalitarian and cliquish" and called for democratic reforms.
Rights of free expression, association and assembly were strictly controlled in Syria even before the uprising. The authorities harass and imprison human rights activists and other critics of the government, who are oftentimes indefinitely detained and tortured in poor prison conditions. While al-Assad permitted radio stations to play Western pop music, websites such as Amazon.com, Facebook, Wikipedia and YouTube were blocked until 1 January 2011, when all citizens were permitted to sign up for high speed internet and those sites were allowed. However, a 2007 law requires Internet cafes to record all comments that users post on online chat forums.
Women and ethnic minorities have faced discrimination in the public sector. Thousands of Syrian Kurds were denied citizenship in 1962 and their descendants continued to be labeled as "foreigners" until 2011, when 120,000 out of roughly 200,000 stateless Kurds were granted citizenship on 6 April by a decree of president Bashar al-Assad. Several riots prompted increased tension in Syria's Kurdish areas since 2004. That year, riots broke out against the government in the northeastern Kurdish-Assyrian town of Qamishli. During a chaotic soccer match, some people raised Kurdish flags and the match turned into a political conflict. In a brutal reaction by Syrian police and clashes between Kurdish and Arab groups, at least 30 people were killed, with some claims indicating a casualty count of about 100 people. Occasional clashes between Kurdish protesters and security forces have since continued.
Minor protests calling for government reforms began in January, and continued into March. A "Day of Rage" was called for by activists in Syria to occur on 4 February via social media websites Facebook and Twitter. However, protests failed to materialize within the country itself.
Meanwhile, minor protests occurred elsewhere in the country. Protesters demanded the release of political prisoners, the abolition of Syria's 48-year emergency law, more freedoms, and an end to pervasive government corruption. On 16 March, some 200 people gathered in front of the Interior Ministry in Damascus, calling for the release of political prisoners. The events lead to a "Friday of Dignity" on 18 March, when large-scale protests broke out in several cities, including Banias, Damascus, al-Hasakah, Daraa, Deir az-Zor and Hama. Police responded to the protests with tear gas, water cannons, beatings. At least 6 people were killed and many others injured.
On 25 March, mass protests spread nation-wide, as demonstrators emerged after Friday prayers. Over 100,000 people reportedly marched in Daraa, but at least 20 protesters were reportedly killed. Protests also spread to other Syrian cities, including Homs, Hama, Baniyas, Jasim, Aleppo, Damascus and Latakia. Over 70 protesters in total were reported dead.
The police often responded to the protests violently, not only using water cannons and tear gas, but also beating protesters and firing live ammunition.
As the uprising began, the Syrian government waged a campaign of arrests that had caught tens of thousands of people, according to lawyers and activists in Syria and human rights groups. In response to the uprising, Syrian law had been changed to allow the police and any of the nation's 18 security forces to detain a suspect for eight days without a warrant. Arrests focused on two groups: political activists, and men and boys from the towns that the Syrian Army would start to besiege in April.
Many of those detained experienced various forms of torture and ill-treatment. Many detainees were cramped in tight rooms and were given limited resources, and some were beaten, electrically jolted, or debilitated. At least 27 torture centers, run by Syrian intelligence agencies, were revealed by Human Rights Watch on 3 July 2012.
As the uprising continued, many protesters were arrested, beaten, shot, or killed. President Assad characterizes the opposition as armed terrorist groups with Islamist "takfiri" extremist motives, portraying himself as the last guarantee for a secular government form. Early in the month of April, a large deployment of security forces prevented tent encampments in Latakia. Blockades were set up in several cities, to prevent the movement of protests. Despite the crackdown, widespread protests remained throughout the month in Daraa, Baniyas, Al-Qamishli, Homs, Douma and Harasta.
The government, dominated by the Alawite sect, made some concessions to the majority Sunni and some minority populations. Authorities reversed a ban that restricted teachers from wearing the niqab, and closed the country's only casino. The government also granted citizenship to thousands of Syrian Kurds previously labeled "foreigners".
A popular demand from protestors was an end of the nation’s state of emergency, which had been in effect for nearly 50 years. The emergency law had been used to justify arbitrary arrests and detention, and to ban political opposition. After weeks of debate, Assad signed the decree on 21 April, lifting Syria’s state of emergency. However, anti-government protests continued into April, with activists unsatisfied with what they considered vague promises of reform from Assad.
The government disabled mobile phones, landlines, electricity, and the Internet in several places. Authorities had extracted passwords of social media sites from journalists through beatings and torture. The pro-government online group the Syrian Electronic Army had frequently hacked websites to post pro-regime material, and the government has been implicated in malware attacks targeted at those reporting on the crisis. The government also targeted and tortured political cartoonist Ali Farzat, who had been critical of the crackdown.
Syrian public school instructors teach students that the ongoing conflict is a foreign conspiracy – something which many people regard as propaganda. There have been several occurrences of videos of violence circulated by social media on both sides that have turned out to be footage from conflicts in other countries.
During the crackdown in Daraa, the Syrian Army also besieged and blockaded several towns around Damascus. Throughout May, situations similar to those that occurred in Daraa were reported in other besieged towns and cities, such as Baniyas, Homs, Talkalakh, Latakia, and several other towns. After the end of each siege, violent suppression of sporadic protests continued throughout the following months. By 24 May, more than 1,000 people have been killed in the uprising according to the National Organization for Human Rights in Syria.
The first instance of armed insurrection occurred on 4 June in Jisr ash-Shugur, a city near the Turkish border in Idlib province. Angry protestors set fire to a building where security forces had fired on a funeral demonstration. Eight security officers died in the fire as demonstrators took control of a police station, seizing weapons. Clashes between protestors and security forces continued in the following days. Some security officers defected after secret police and intelligence agents executed soldiers who refused to shoot civilians. On 6 June, Sunni militiamen and army defectors ambushed a group of security forces heading to the city. More security officers were killed when the city's security headquarters was overrun; 120 security forces were reportedly killed on that day. In response, the government sent troops supported by 200 military vehicles and helicopter gunships to the city. Fearing a massacre, insurgents and defectors, along with 10,000 residents, fled across the Turkish border.
In June and July, protests continued as government forces expanded operations, repeatedly firing at protesters, employing tanks against demonstrations, and conducting arrests. The towns of Rastan and Talbiseh, and Maarat al-Numaan were besieged in early June. On 30 June, large protests erupted against the Assad government in Aleppo, Syria's largest city. On 3 July, Syrian tanks were deployed to Hama, two days after the city witnessed the largest demonstration against Bashar al-Assad. On 31 July, a nationwide crackdown nicknamed the "Ramadan Massacre" resulted in the death of at least 142 people and hundreds of injuries. Some besieged cities and towns were described as having famine-like conditions.
On 29 July, a group of defected officers announced the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which would become the main opposition army. Composed of defected Syrian Armed Forces personnel and civilian volunteers, the rebel army seeks to remove Bashar al-Assad and his government from power. This began a new phase in the conflict, with more armed resistance against the government crackdown. The FSA would grow in size, to about 20,000 by December, and to an estimated 40,000 by June 2012.
On 23 August, a coalition of anti-government groups was formed, the Syrian National Council. The group, based in Turkey, attempted to organize the opposition. However, the opposition, including the FSA, remained a fractious collection of political groups, longtime exiles, grass-roots organizers and armed militants, divided along ideological, ethnic or sectarian lines.
Throughout August, Syrian forces stormed major urban centers and outlying regions, and continued to attack protests. On 14 August, the Siege of Latakia continued as the Syrian Navy became involved in the military crackdown for the first time. Gunboats fired heavy machine guns at waterfront districts in Latakia, as ground troops and security agents backed by armor stormed several neighborhoods, causing up to 28 deaths. Throughout the next few days the siege dragged on, with government forces and shabiha militia continuing to fire on civilians in the city, as well as throughout the country. The Eid ul-Fitr celebrations, started in near the end of August, were muted after security forces fired on large demonstrations in Homs, Daraa, and the suburbs of Damascus.
During the first six months of the uprising, the inhabitants of Syria's two largest cities, Damascus and Aleppo, remained largely uninvolved in the anti-government protests. The two cities' central squares have seen organized rallies of hundreds of thousands in support of president Assad and his government.
As military defections increased, sporadic clashes began to occur between the defectors and security forces. On 8 September, the Syrian Army raided the home of the brother of army defector Colonel Hussein Harmouche, one of the first defecting officers. The operation in Idlib province resulted in the death of three defectors and six Syrian Army soldiers. Around this time, defectors in the province and elsewhere began to group together and target Syrian Army patrols. Protests still continued, but they were often dispersed with gunfire by security forces and pro-government militias.
A major confrontation between the FSA and the Syrian armed forces occurred in Rastan. From 27 September to 1 October, Syrian government forces, backed by tanks and helicopters, led a major offensive on the town of Al-Rastan in Homs province, which had been under opposition control for a couple weeks. There were reports of large numbers of defections in the city, and the FSA reported it had destroyed 17 armoured vehicles during clashes in Rastan, using RPGs and booby traps. One rebel brigade reported that it killed 80 loyalist soldiers in fighting. A defected officer in the Syrian opposition claimed that over a hundred officers had defected as well as thousands of conscripts, although many had gone into hiding or home to their families, rather than fighting the loyalist forces. The 2011 Battle of Rastan between the government forces and the FSA was the longest and most intense action up until that time. After a week of fighting, the FSA was forced to retreat from Rastan. To avoid government forces, the leader of the FSA, Col. Riad Asaad, retreated to the Turkish side of Syrian-Turkish border.
By October, the FSA began start to receive military support from Turkey, who allowed the rebel army to operate its command and headquarters from the country's southern Hatay province close to the Syrian border, and its field command from inside Syria. The FSA would often launch attacks into Syria’s northern towns and cities, while using the Turkish side of the border as a safe zone and supply route. A year after its formation, the FSA would gain control over many towns close to the Turkish border.
In October, clashes between loyalist and defected army units were being reported fairly regularly. During the first week of the month, sustained clashes were reported in Jabal al-Zawiya in the mountainous regions of Idlib province. Syrian rebels captured most of Idlib city as well. In mid-October, other clashes in Idlib province include the city of Binnish and the town of Hass in the province near the mountain range of Jabal al-Zawiya. In late October, other clashes occurred in the northwestern town of Maarrat al-Nu'man in the province between government forces and defected soldiers at a roadblock on the edge of the town, and near the Turkish border, where 10 security agents and a deserter were killed in a bus ambush. It was not clear if the defectors linked to these incidents were connected to the FSA.
Throughout October Syrian forces continued to suppress protests, with hundreds of killings and arrests reportedly having taken place. The crackdown continued into the first three days of November. On 3 November, the government accepted an Arab League plan that aims to restore the peace in the country. According to members of the opposition, however, government forces continued their suppression of protests.
The Arab Parliament recommended the suspension of Arab League member state Syria on 20 September 2011, over persistent reports of disproportionate violence against regime opponents and activists during the uprising. A vote on 12 November agreed to formally suspend Syria four days after the vote. Syria remained suspended as the Arab League sent in December a commission "monitoring" Syria's violence on protesters. By the end of January the Arab League suspended its monitoring mission in the country due to worsening conditions and rising violence across the country.
In early November, clashes between the FSA and security forces in Homs escalated as the siege continued. After six days of bombardment, the Syrian Army stormed the city on 8 November, leading to heavy street fighting in several neighborhoods. Resistance in Homs was significantly greater than that seen in other towns and cities, and some in opposition have referred to the city as the "Capital of the Revolution". Unlike events in Deraa and Hama, operations in Homs have thus far failed to quell the unrest.
November and December saw increasing rebel attacks, as opposition forces grew in number. In the two months, the FSA launched deadly attacks on an air force intelligence complex in the Damascus suburb of Harasta, the Ba'ath party youth headquarters in Idlib province, Ba'ath Party offices in Damascus, an airbase in Homs province, and an intelligence building in Idlib. On 15 December, opposition fighters ambushed checkpoints and military bases around Daraa, killing 27 soldiers, in one of the largest attacks yet on security forces. The opposition suffered a major setback on 19 December, when a failed defection in Idlib province lead to 72 defectors killed.
By early 2012 daily protests had dwindled, eclipsed by the spread of armed conflict: January saw intensified clashes around the suburbs of Damascus, with the Syrian Army use of tanks and artillery becoming common. Fighting in Zabadani began on 7 January when the Syrian Army stormed the town in an attempt to rout out FSA presence. After the first phase of the battle ended with a ceasefire on 18 January, leaving the FSA in control of the town, the FSA launched an offensive into nearby Douma. Fighting in the town lasted from 21 to 30 January, before the rebels were forced to retreat as result of a government counteroffensive. Although, the Syrian Army managed to retake most of the suburbs, sporadic fighting continued.
Fighting erupted in Rastan again on 29 January, when dozens of soldiers manning the town's checkpoints defected and began opening fire on troops loyal to the government. After days of battle, opposition forces gained complete control of the town and surrounding suburbs on 5 February. In a bombing attack on buildings used by Syrian military intelligence in Aleppo, at least 28 people died and 235 were injured on 10 February 2012. It was unclear who the perpetrator of the attack was due to conflicting claims.
By February, intense fighting continued in Homs, as rebels claimed to have gained control over two-thirds of the city. However, starting in 3 February, the Syrian army launched a major offensive to retake rebel-held neighborhoods. In early March, after weeks of artillery bombardments and heavy street fighting, the Syrian army eventually captured the district of Baba Amr, a major rebel stronghold. The Syrian Army also captured the district of Karm al-Zeitoun by 9 March, where activists claimed that government forces killed 47 women and children. By the end of March, the Syrian army retook control of half a dozen districts, leaving them in control of 70 percent of the city. By early April, the estimated death toll of the conflict, according to activists, has reached 10,000.
On 5 June, fighting broke out in Haffa and nearby villages in the coastal province of Latakia. Rebels fought with government forces backed by helicopter gunships in the heaviest clashes in the province since the revolt began. Syrian forces seized the territory from rebels following eight days of fighting and shelling. On 6 June, 78 civilians were killed in the Al-Qubeir massacre. According to activist sources, government forces started by shelling the village before the Shabiha militia moved in. The UN observers headed to Al-Qubeir in the hope of investigating the alleged massacre, but they were met with a roadblock and small arms fire before reaching the village and were forced to retreat.
At the same time, the conflict began moving into the two largest cities, Damascus and Aleppo, which the government claimed were dominated by a pro-Assad silent majority. In both cities, peaceful protests – including a general strike by Damascus shopkeepers a small strike in Aleppo were interpreted by some as indicating that the historical alliance between the government and the business establishment in the large cities had become weak.
On 22 June, a Turkish F-4 fighter jet was shot down by Syrian government forces, killing both pilots. Tensions between Syria and Turkey dramatically escalated following this incident, as both sides disputed whether the jet had been flying in Syrian or international airspace when it was shot down. Despite Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's vows to retaliate harshly against Assad's government, no such intervention materialised. Bashar al-Assad publicly apologised for the incident, and relations between the two countries cooled.
On 18 July, Syrian Defense Minister Dawoud Rajiha, former defense minister Hasan Turkmani, and the president's brother-in-law General Assef Shawkat were killed by a bomb attack in Damascus. The Syrian intelligence chief Hisham Ikhtiyar, who was injured in the same explosion, later succumbed to his wounds. Both the FSA and Liwa al-Islam claimed responsibility for the assassination. The fate of the interior minister Mohammad al-Shaar was initially the subject of conflicting reports, variously reporting him as injured but alive, and dead. There were also rumors that President Assad may also have been injured in the attack due to his lack of recent public appearances, but new images of Assad surfaced days later. The assassinations were the first of such high-ranking members of Assad's elite since the uprising began. In an interview later that month, General Mohammad Al-Zobi of the rebel forces stated that the explosion had been carried out using 15 kilograms of explosives, which had been smuggled into the building and then detonated remotely.
On 19 July, Russia and China vetoed a United Nations resolution that would impose sanctions against the Syrian government, showing again the divide in international opinion towards the conflict. Russia and China, who are major trade allies with Syria, stated that they sought a more balanced resolution calling equally on both sides to halt violence. On the same day, Iraqi officials reported that the FSA had gained control of all four border checkpoints between Syria and Iraq, increasing concerns for the safety of Iraqis trying to escape the violence in Syria.
In late July, government forces managed to break the rebel offensive on Damascus by pushing out most of the opposition fighters, although fighting still continued in the outskirts. After this, the focus shifted to the battle for control of Aleppo. On 25 July, multiple sources reported that the Assad government was using fighter jets to attack rebel positions in Aleppo and Damascus, and on 1 August, UN observers in Syria witnessed government fighter jets firing on rebels in Aleppo. In early August, the FSA offensive to capture Aleppo was repelled, and the Syrian Army recaptured Salaheddin district, an important rebel stronghold in Aleppo.
On 19 September, rebel forces seized a border crossing between Syria and Turkey in Ar-Raqqah province. It was speculated that this crossing, along with several other border crossings into Turkey and one into Iraq, could provide opposition forces with strategic and logistical advantages, allowing them greater ease in transporting supplies into the country. In late September, the FSA moved its command headquarters from southern Turkey into rebel-controlled areas of northern Syria.
On 3 October 2012, a Syrian–Turkish border clash ensued when a mortar shell fired from Syria hit a residential neighborhood of the Turkish border town of Akçakale. Five Turkish citizens were killed, and the Turkish military responded with artillery strikes against targets inside Syria. This was the most serious cross-border escalation to date.
On 9 October, rebel forces seized control of Maarat al-Numan, a strategic town in Idlib province on the highway linking Damascus with Aleppo. By 18 October, the FSA had captured most of Douma, the biggest suburb of Damascus, although fighting continued in the area.
On 22 October, a Jordanian soldier died in a gunfight between Jordanian troops and Islamic militants attempting to cross the border into Syria. Sameeh Maaytah, the Information Minister of Jordan, said the soldier was the first member of the Jordanian military to be killed in clashes connected to the civil war in Syria.
Lakhdar Brahimi arranged for a ceasefire during Eid al-Adha in late October, but it quickly collapsed as both rebels and the Syrian Army resumed large-scale operations.
In early November 2012, rebels made significant gains in northern Syria. The rebel capture of Saraqib in Idlib province, which lies on the strategic M5 highway, further isolated Aleppo from government-controlled areas of the country. Due to insufficient anti-aircraft weapons, rebel units attempted to nullify the government's air power by destroying landed helicopters and aircraft on air bases. On 3 November, rebels launched an attack on the Taftanaz air base, a core base for the Syrian military's helicopter and bombing operations.
On 18 November, rebels took control of Base 46 in the Aleppo Governorate, one of the Syrian Army's largest bases in northern Syria, after weeks of intense fighting with government forces. Defected General Mohammed Ahmed al-Faj, who commanded the assault, hailed the capture of Base 46 as "one of our biggest victories since the start of the revolution", claiming nearly 300 Syrian troops had been killed and 60 had been captured, with rebels seizing large amounts of heavy weapons, including tanks.
On 22 November, rebels captured the Mayadeen military base in the country's eastern Deir ez Zor province. Activists said this gave the rebels control of a large amount of territory east of the base, stretching to the Iraqi border. On 29 November, at approximately 10:26 UTC, the Syrian Internet and phone service was shut off for a two-day period. There was much speculation that the Syrian government was responsible for the outage; however, state sources denied responsibility and blamed the blackout on fiber optic lines near Damascus becoming exposed and damaged.
In mid-December 2012, American officials said that the Syrian military had resorted to firing Scud ballistic missiles at rebel fighters inside Syria. Reportedly, six Scud missiles were fired at the Sheikh Suleiman base north of Aleppo, which rebel forces had occupied. It is unclear whether the Scuds hit the intended target. The government denied this claim. Later that month, a further Scud attack took place near Marea, a town in a rebel-held area north of Aleppo near the Turkish border. The missile appeared to have missed its target. That same month, the British Daily Telegraph reported that the FSA had now penetrated into Latakia province's Mediterranean coast through Turkey, and that the Syrian government's forces were unable to repel the FSA invasion thus far.
In late December, rebel forces pushed further into Damascus, taking control of the adjoining Yarmouk and Palestine refugee camps, pushing out fighters from the pro-government Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command with the help of other factions. Rebel forces launched an offensive against army positions in Hama province, later claiming to have forced army regulars to evacuate several towns and bases, and stating that "three-quarters of western rural Hama is under our control." Rebels also captured the northern town of Harem near the Turkish border in Idlib province, after weeks of heavy fighting.
Assad delivered a speech to the nation on 6 January 2013, standing before supporters at the Opera House in Damascus. In the speech, he "outlined terms for a political solution to the country's bitter conflict," indicating his support for an "international reconciliation conference" to end the conflict, leading to a "national referendum and fair election," stating that this is the "only way" the political landscape can be changed, and possible only if "[certain] western and regional" countries stop arming the rebel groups, which he characterized as terrorists. Assad said Syria will listen to advice, but will not be "dictated to" other countries.
On 11 January, Islamist groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra, took full control of the strategic Taftanaz air base in the northern Idlib province, after weeks of fighting. The air base, one of the largest in northern Syria, was often used by the military to carry out helicopter raids and deliver supplies. The rebels claimed to have seized helicopters, tanks and multiple rocket launchers, and other military equipment, before being forced to withdraw by a government counter-attack. The leader of the Al-Nusra brigade said the amount of weapons they took was a "game changer".
On 17 January, clashes broke out between Islamist rebels and Kurdish militiamen near the town of Ras al-Ain. According to the Kurdish National Council (KNC), the Islamist rebels came across the border from Turkey and began shelling the town indiscriminately. The KNC appealed to the Free Syrian Army and the main opposition National Coalition to halt the siege. Activists stated that they feared Turkey sought to use jihadists in its conflict with the Kurds.
On 11 February, Islamist rebels captured the town of Al-Thawrah in Raqqa province and the nearby Tabqa Dam, Syria's largest dam and a key source of hydroelectricity. The next day, rebel forces took control of Jarrah air base, located east of Aleppo. The base had been used to launch bombing raids in Aleppo province, and had served as an important supply line for the Assad regime. On 14 February, fighters from Jabhat al-Nusra took control of Shadadeh, a town located in Hasakah province near the Iraqi border.
On 20 February, a car bomb exploded in the Mazraa neighborhood of Damascus near the Ba'ath Party headquarters, killing at least 53 people and injuring more than 235. None of the organized groups on either side in the conflict claimed responsibility, but the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces denounced the bombing, and held the Assad regime responsible for the deaths caused by it. The Assad regime blamed Jabhat al-Nusra. The bombing coincided with high-level meetings in Cairo where terms for ending the civil war were to be discussed among various opposition groups, particularly the proposals of Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib to negotiate directly with the Assad regime.
On 21 February, the FSA in Quasar began shelling Hezbollah positions in Lebanon. Prior to this, Hezbollah militants had been shelling villages near Quasar from within Lebanon. A 48-hour ultimatum was issued by a FSA commander on 20 February, warning the militant group to stop the attacks or face retaliation.
On 2 March, intense clashes between rebels and the Syrian Army erupted in the north-central city of Raqqa, with many reportedly killed on both sides. On the same day, Syrian troops regained several villages along the highway near Aleppo. By 3 March, rebels had overrun Raqqa's central prison, allowing them to free hundreds of prisoners, according to the SOHR. The SOHR also claimed that rebel fighters were now in control of most of an Aleppo police academy in Khan al-Asal, and that over 200 rebels and government troops had been killed fighting for control of it.
On 4 March, rebel forces launched an offensive to capture Raqqa outright. By 6 March, the rebels had captured the entire city, effectively making Raqqa the first provincial capital to be lost by the Assad regime. Residents of Raqqa celebrated by reportedly tearing down a huge poster of Assad, and toppling a bronze statue of his late father Hafez Assad in the centre of the city. The rebels also seized two top government officials.
On 18 March, the Syrian Air Force attacked rebel positions in Lebanon for the first time. The attack occurred at the Wadi al-Khayl Valley area, near the border town of Arsal.
On 21 March, a suspected suicide bombing in the Iman Mosque in Mazraa district killed as much as 41 people, including the high profile Pro Assad Sunni cleric, Sheikh Mohammed al-Buti.
On 23 March, several rebel groups seized the 38th division air defense base in southern Daraa province near a strategic highway linking Damascus to Jordan. On the next day, rebels captured a 25 km strip of land near the Jordanian border, which included the towns of Muzrib, Abdin, and the Al-Rai military checkpoint.
On 25 March, rebels launched one of their heaviest bombardments of Central Damascus since the revolt began, with mortars reportedly hitting Ummayad Square, where Baath Party headquarters, Air Force Intelligence and state television are also located. The attack was launched when rebel forces advanced into the Kafr Souseh district of Damascus.
On March 26, Free Syrian Army leader Riad al-Asaad was seriously injured by a car bomb.
The Shabiha are unofficial pro-government militias drawn largely from Assad's Alawite minority group. Since the uprising, the Syrian government has frequently used shabiha to break up protests and enforce laws in restive neighborhoods. As the protests escalated into an armed conflict, the opposition started using the term shabiha to describe any civilian Assad supporter taking part in the government's crackdown on the uprising. The opposition blames the shabiha for the many violent excesses committed against anti-government protesters and opposition sympathizers, as well as looting and destruction. In December 2012, the shabiha were designated a terrorist organization by the United States.
Bassel al-Assad is reported to have created the shabiha in the 1980s for the government use in times of crisis. Shabiha have been described as "a notorious Alawite paramilitary, who are accused of acting as unofficial enforcers for Assad's regime"; "gunmen loyal to Assad", and "semi-criminal gangs thugs close to the regime". Despite the group's image as an Alawite militia, some shabiha operating in Aleppo have been reported to be Sunnis.
In 2012, the Assad regime created a more organized official militia known as the Jaysh al-Sha'bi, allegedly with help from Iran and Hezbollah. As with the shabiha, the vast majority of Jaysh al-Sha'bi members are Alawite and Shi'ite volunteers.
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is the main armed opposition in Syria. Its formation was announced in late July 2011 by a group of defecting Syrian Army officers. In a video, the men called upon Syrian soldiers and officers to defect to their ranks, and said the purpose of the Free Syrian Army was to defend civilian protesters from violence by the state. Many Syrian soldiers subsequently deserted to join the FSA. The actual number of soldiers who defected to the FSA is uncertain, with estimates ranging from 1,000 to over 25,000 by December 2011. The FSA functions more as an umbrella organization than a traditional military chain of command, and is "headquartered" in Turkey. As such, it cannot issue direct orders to its various bands of fighters, but many of the most effective armed groups are fighting under the FSA's banner.
As deserting soldiers abandoned their armored vehicles and brought only light weaponry and munitions, FSA adopted guerilla-style tactics against regime security forces in urban areas. Its primary target has been the Shabiha militias; most FSA attacks are directed against trucks and buses that are believed to carry security reinforcements. Sometimes, the occupants of government vehicles are taken as hostages, while in other cases the vehicles are attacked either with roadside bombs or with hit-and-run attacks. The FSA has also targeted power lines and water mains in "retaliation against Hezbollah's provocations". To encourage defection, the FSA began attacking army patrols, shooting the commanders and trying to convince the soldiers to switch sides. FSA units have also acted as defense forces by guarding neighborhoods with strong opposition presences, patrolling streets while protests take place, and attacking Shabiha members. However, the FSA also engaged in street battles with security forces in Deir ez-Zor, Al-Rastan, and Abu Kamal. Fighting in these cities raged for days, with no clear victor. In Hama, Homs, Al-Rastan, Deir ez-Zor and Daraa in late 2011, the Syrian military used airstrikes against them, leading to calls from the FSA for the imposition of a no-fly zone by Western powers.
More than 3,000 members of the Syrian security forces had been killed by May 2011, which the Syrian government stated was due to "armed gangs" among the protesters. However, the opposition blamed the deaths on the government. Syrians have been crossing the border to Lebanon to buy weapons on the black market since the beginning of the protests. Clan leaders in Syria claim that the armed uprising is of a tribal, revenge-based nature, not Islamist. On 6 June, the government said more than 120 security personnel were killed by "armed gangs"; 20 in an ambush, and 82 in an attack on a security post. The main centers of unrest have been described as being predominately Sunni Muslim towns and cities close to the country's borders where smuggling has been common for generations, and thus have more access to smuggled weapons.
Daniel Byman believes the political and military opposition are each worryingly divided and disconnected from each other, and thus uniting, training and pushing the armed opposition to avoid religious sectarianism is crucial. The latter is important, for otherwise the Alawites and other minorities will fight all the harder, and make post-Assad Syria more difficult to govern. Others would say that part of Byman's analysis represents a failure to understand that the leadership within Syria is decentralised out of necessity, that this is a good thing, and that decentralisation is not the same thing as fragmentation, and certainly does not represent an absence of strong leadership. Whichever view one accepts, there are undeniably rivalries between different strands and disagreement between those advocating peaceful protests and those backing armed struggle.
In November 2012, the council agreed to unify with several other opposition groups to form the Syrian National Coalition. The SNC has 22 out of 60 seats of the Syrian National Coalition.
The main aims of the National Coalition are replacing the Bashar al-Assad government and "its symbols and pillars of support", "dismantling the security services", unifying and supporting the Free Syrian Army, refusing dialogue and negotiation with the al-Assad government, and "holding accountable those responsible for killing Syrians, destroying [Syria], and displacing [Syrians]".
The National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC) is a Syrian bloc consisting of 13 left-wing political parties, among which is the Kurdish PYD. The NCC is a bloc taking position in between SNC and pro-government movements, and has a left-leaning political profile.
The NCC differs from the Syrian National Coalition on two main points of strategy:
:1) The NCC refuses to accept foreign military intervention, although it does accept various forms of support for the opposition and supports Arab League involvement in the conflict. :2) It tries to maintain a pacifist stance in relationship to the Syrian government, opposing the sectarianism of which both the FSA and pro-government militias have been accused.
Despite having recently endorsed the Free Syrian Army on 23 September 2012, the FSA has dismissed the NCC as an extension of the government, stating that "this opposition is just the other face of the same coin". The Coordination Committee, unlike the Syrian National Council, believed that the solution was to keep the current Syrian government, and hoped to resolve the current crisis through dialogue, in order to achieve "a safe and peaceful transition from a state of despotism to democracy". Despite since changing its stance of the continuation of the Assad government in some kind of transitional capacity, the NCC has held onto its policy of opposing all foreign intervention, but has previously suggested the group would find the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria acceptable.
The government has also been widely accused of fomenting sectarian hatred against the opposition. In a March 2012 TIME report, an anti-Assad activist claimed that the Syrian government had paid government workers to write anti-Alawite graffiti and chant sectarian slogans at opposition rallies. Alawites who have taken refugee at the coast and in the Alawite mountains as well as in Lebanon have also told journalists that they were offered money by the Syrian government to spread sectarianism through chants and graffiti.
At the uprising's outset, some protesters reportedly chanted sectarian threats such as "Christians to Beirut; Alawites to the coffin". Some prominent opposition groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) have a religious basis which has been seen as threatening to Syria's Alawite and Christian minorities. Smaller opposition forces, such as the jihadist Al-Nusra Front, take explicitly sectarian positions. There are reports of incidents in which rebel forces engaged in sectarian violence, such as burning Shi'ite mosques.
In mid-2012, the fear of rising sectarian anger against the Alawite community led to speculation of a re-creation of the 1920s-era Alawite State as a safe haven for Assad and the leadership should Damascus finally fall. Latakia and Tartus provinces both have Alawite-majority populations, and historically constituted the territory of the Alawite State between 1920 and 1936. Around the same time, Christians living in Aleppo started to arm themselves, many with the help of the Syrian government. Christian groups expressed fears that Islamist rebels would persecute them, as had happened to Christians in Iraq during the Iraq War.
In December 2012, UN human rights investigators stated that there had been "a clear shift" in the nature of the conflict since the beginning of the year, with more fighters and civilians on both sides describing the civil war in ethnic or religious terms. The investigators claimed that, sectarian divides have deepened, as "ethnic and religious minority groups have increasingly aligned themselves with parties to the conflict", raising the possibility of reprisal killings and prolonged violence that could last for years after the government falls.
In 2012, several cities with large Kurdish populations, such as Qamishli and Al-Hasakah, began witnessing large-scale protests against the Syrian government. The government responded by sending in tanks and firing upon the protesters. However, the head of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), Salih Muslim, stated in July 2012 that he did not support either the government or the opposition. Kurdish fighters have since clashed with both government and rebel forces.
During the civil war, numerous Kurdish political parties organised themselves into the Kurdish National Council. Until October 2011, most of these parties were members of the NCC. After October 2011, only the PYD remained in the NCC, holding a more moderate stance regarding the Assad regime.
On 19 July 2012, Kurdish militias from the PYD and Kurdish National Council forced out government forces from several areas, including the town of Ayn al-Arab (known as Kobanê in Kurdish). Kurdish militias then denied access to the FSA, whose fighters approached upon hearing of the Kurdish victory, arguing that Kurds could take care of Kurdish areas alone. Nuri Brimo, a spokesperson for the PYD, announced that the liberation of Kobane was the beginning of a battle for the whole of Syrian Kurdistan and its autonomy.
Some in the opposition claimed that the PKK, a Kurdish separatist group in Turkey, is helping the Syrian government in the conflict. However, Murat Karayilan, the leader of the PKK, denied such claims, stating that the Kurds in Syria do not support either side and desire both neutrality and autonomy. In February 2013, Arab rebels and Kurdish fighters in northern Syria agreed to a peace deal, ending months of hostilities.
Iraqi and Syrian Kurds established control over their own regions with the help of the Turkish-based Kurdistan Workers' Party and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Irbil, under President Massoud Barzani. The Syrian Kurdish enclave has been fighting westward to secure an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, between the northern part of the Alawi region and the Syrian border with Turkey.
While major Palestinian factions such as Hamas have turned against the Syrian government, other groups, particularly the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC), have remained supportive. The PFLP-GC has been accused by pro-rebel Palestinians of actively participating in the conflict as secret police in the refugee camps. In late October 2012, pro-rebel Palestinians formed the so-called Storm Brigade with the task of wresting control of the Yarmouk Camp in Damascus from pro-government groups.
The US and its NATO allies have pressed for al-Assad's departure, but Russia and China have consistently blocked any United Nations resolution that would impose sanctions on Syria. Russian officials stated that plans for Syria's political future should not be forced on it from outside and claimed that "terrorists" are present within the opposition's ranks. In December 2012, the Russian deputy foreign minister, Mikhail Bogdanov, claimed Syria's government was "progressively losing control" and that "the victory of the Syrian opposition cannot be excluded", although the Russian Foreign Ministry insisted soon after that the country had not changed its position on Syria and "never will". Iran, a longtime ally of Syria, has consistently expressed support for Assad.
Since 2012, the United States, United Kingdom and France have provided opposition forces with non-lethal military aid, including communications equipment, body armor, medical supplies and non-combat armored vehicles. The U.K. was also reported to have provided intelligence support from its Cyprus bases, revealing Syrian military movements to Turkish officials, who then pass on the information to the FSA. The CIA was reported to be involved in covert operations along the Turkish-Syrian border, where agents investigated rebel groups, recommending arms providers which groups to give aid to. CIA agents also helped opposition forces to develop supply routes, and provided them with communications training. The majority of the weapons provided to rebel forces by Saudi Arabia and Qatar have ended up in the hands of hardline Islamic jihadists, who it is feared will create problems elsewhere once the Syrian conflict comes to a close.
In spring 2012, Saudi Arabia and Qatar announced they would begin arming and bankrolling the opposition. Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Centre in Beirut, and Emile Hokayem of the International Institute of Strategic Studies argued that such support would be unlikely to immediately make a decisive impact. A ship carrying weapons from Libya believed destined for Syria's rebels was intercepted by Lebanon in April 2012. In December 2012, Qatar was reported to be shipping arms to Sunni Islamists in Syria as a means of cementing alliances in the Middle East.
In December 2012, a new wave of weapons from foreign supporters were transferred to rebel forces via the Jordanian border in the country's south. The arms included M79 Osa anti-tank weapons and M-60 recoilless rifles purchased by Saudi Arabia from Croatia. Previously, most of the weapons were delivered via the Turkish border in the north. However, much of the arms unintentionally ended up in the hands of Islamist rebels. The goal for the change in routes was to strengthen moderate rebels and to bring the war closer to Damascus.
On 6 March 2013, the Arab League gave its members the "green light" to arm the Syrian rebels. In early March 2013, a Jordanian security source revealed that the United States, Britain, and France were training non-Islamist rebels in Jordan.
Western diplomats have frequently criticized Russia's behavior, but Russia denied its actions have violated any international law. Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that Russia does not support either side. However, a Syrian jetliner returning from Moscow in October 2012 was forced to land in Ankara, the Turkish capital, and the government of Turkey announced hours later that Russian munitions and military equipment had been discovered aboard the aircraft and confiscated. The Russian Foreign Ministry denied that the cargo of the plane was sold to the Syrian military by the Russian government and claimed that its shipping did not violate international sanctions, contrary to the Turkish assertion. Later in October, the Russian military demanded an inquiry into the source of the Syrian rebels' U.S.-made Stinger surface-to-air missiles. By January 2013, Russia showed "little sign of easing support for the Assad regime" and was "carrying out the largest naval exercises since the Soviet era off the coast of Syria", though some analysts speculated that this was merely cover to use its warships for large-scale evacuations of its citizens.
Iran, which sees Syria as a key regional ally, has not only provided the Assad regime with arms and technical support, but has also sent combat troops, specifically the Revolutionary Guards, to support Syrian military operations. Technical support has reportedly included unmanned aerial vehicles to guide Syrian military planes and gunners in their bombarding of rebel positions. It has been reported that Iran also trained personnel from Hezbollah, a militant group based in Lebanon which has deployed pro-Assad fighters to Syria. In January 2013, during a prisoner swap between the Syrian rebels and the Assad regime, 48 Iranians were reportedly released by the rebels in exchange for nearly 2,130 prisoners held by the Syrian government. Rebels claimed the captives were linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. United States State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland described the Iranians as "members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard", describing their presence as "just another example of how Iran continues to provide guidance, expertise, personnel, technical capabilities to the Syrian regime." In March 2013, Israeli sources alleged that Iran and Hezbollah had built a 50,000-strong joint militia to support Assad. Iraq, located between Syria and Iran, has been criticized by the U.S. for allowing Iran to ship military supplies to Syria over Iraqi airspace. According to the New York Times, Iranian arms transfers are changing the balance of power in the region, and the civil war has "become a regional contest for primacy in Syria between Sunni Arabs and the Iran-backed Assad government and Hezbollah of Lebanon." Iran is reportedly using Maharaj Airlines to ship weapons to the Syrian government.
Some analysts have interpreted the Syrian conflict as part of a regional proxy war between pro-opposition Sunni states, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and Iran and Shi'ites in Iraq, who support the Alawite-led Syrian government. Russian, Eastern European and Iranian civilians have been viewed as legitimate targets by some resistance leaders and forces, a position rejected by the Syrian opposition coalition. At the outbreak of the civil war, there were an estimated 30,000 Russian civilians in Syria, and an additional 30,000 from former Soviet republics such as the Ukraine. Some – such as Anhar Kochneva, a journalist and blogger who was taken prisoner by Syrian rebels, and confessed under pressure that she worked for Russian intelligence – have played a role in support of the Assad regime, but many are civilian workers uninvolved in espionage or military operations. In late 2012, reports emerged that the Russian government was sending a naval evacuation fleet to Syria.
The most significant group is Al-Nusra Front, headed by Abu Muhammad al-Julani, which probably accounts for up to a quarter of opposition fighters in Syria. It includes some of the rebellion's most battle-hardened and effective fighters, coming from Libya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Palestine, Lebanon, Australia, Chechnya, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Azerbaijan, France, Iraq, Spain, Denmark and Tajikistan. Jabhat al-Nusra has claimed responsibility for multiple suicide bombings, including several deadly explosions in Damascus in 2011 and 2012. The United States has formally designated the Al Nusra Front a "foreign terrorist" organization, with Robert Ford, the U.S. ambassador to Syria, stating that "Extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra are a problem, an obstacle to finding the political solution that Syria's going to need".
In October 2012, various Iraqi religious sects join the conflict in Syria on both sides. Radical Sunnis from Iraq, have traveled to Syria to fight against President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government. Also, Shiites from Iraq, in Babil Province and Diyala Province, have traveled to Damascus from Tehran, or from the Shiite Islamic holy city of Najaf, Iraq to protect Sayyida Zeinab, an important mosque and shrine of Shia Islam in Damascus.
The relationship between the Mujahideen and the indigenous Syrian opposition is tense, even though Jabhat al-Nusra has fought alongside the FSA in several battles. The Mujahideen's strict religious views and willingness to impose sharia law disturbed many Syrians. Some rebel commanders have accused foreign jihadists of "stealing the revolution", robbing Syrian factories and displaying religious intolerance.
On 15 January 2013, The Cable claimed that the Syrian military had likely used chemical weapons in Homs during late December 2012. It cited experts saying that victims in Homs exhibited symptoms which matched the effects of Agent 15, a CX-level incapacitating agent. However, the White House subsequently stated, "The reporting we have seen from media sources regarding alleged chemical weapons incidents in Syria has not been consistent with what we believe to be true about the Syrian chemical weapons program".
On 19 March 2013, the Syrian government and Syrian rebels accused one another of deploying chemical weapons in an attack in the province of Aleppo. Syrian state television and the government of Russia both blame the rebels for the chemical weapon attack. Reports indicated between 15 and 40 deaths. An unnamed Reuters photographer described the gas as having a "chlorine like smell" and said that he saw victims suffocating. Rebels allege that a SCUD missile was used to deliver the agent, while the Syrian Information Minister blamed the rebels for the attack; neither side presented clear evidence for its claims. According to a spokesman for the Free Syrian Army, the attack occurred in rebel territory, though Reuters photographs showed images of Syrian government soldiers injured in the attack.Senior American officials said that the Syrian rebels do not have the capability to launch chemical weapons, and were skeptical that weapons had been used.
Estimates of deaths in the conflict vary widely, with figures, per opposition activist groups, ranging from 59,900 to 72,660. On 2 January 2013, the United Nations stated that 60,000 had been killed since the civil war began, with U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay saying "The number of casualties is much higher than we expected, and is truly shocking." The following month, the U.N. updated its death toll estimate to 70,000. Some areas of the country have been affected disproportionately by the war; by some estimates, as many as a third of all deaths have occurred in the city of Homs.
One problem has been determining the number of "armed combatants" who have died, due to some sources counting rebel fighters who were not regime defectors as civilians. At least half of those killed have been estimated to be combatants from both sides, including more than 7,200 government soldiers. In addition, UNICEF reported that over 500 children had been killed by early February 2012. Another 400 children have been reportedly arrested and tortured in Syrian prisons. Both claims have been contested by the Syrian government. Additionally, over 600 detainees and political prisoners are known to have died under torture. In mid-October 2012, the opposition activist group SOHR reported the number of children killed in the conflict had risen to 2,300, and in March 2013, opposition sources stated that over 5,000 children had been killed.
The violence in Syria has caused hundreds of thousands to flee their homes. In August 2012, the United Nations said more than one million people were internally displaced. Many have sought safety in nearby countries. Jordan has seen the largest influx of refugees since the conflict began, followed by Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq. On 9 October 2012, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the number of Syrian refugees stood at between 355,000 to 500,000. In March 2013, the UNHCR stated that the number of Syrian refugees had exceeded 1 million.
With regard to armed opposition groups, the UN accused them of offences including unlawful killing, torture and ill-treatment, kidnapping and hostage taking, and the use of children in dangerous non-combat roles. Human Rights Watch also reports evidence of rebels kidnapping civilians for ransom, as well as summary executions of army soldiers and numerous cases of physical torture.
On 14 January 2013, the International Rescue Committee released a report stating many refugees flee Syria due to a widespread fear of rape. The report also spoke of the systematic targeting of health care workers, and the shooting of engineers seeking to maintain the sanitation and water infrastructure of Aleppo.
By July 2012, the human rights group Women Under Siege had documented over 100 cases of rape and sexual assault during the conflict, with many of these crimes believed to be perpetrated by the Shabiha and other pro-government militias. Victims included men, women, and children, with about 80% of the known victims being women and girls.
Criminal networks have been used by both the government and the opposition during the conflict. Facing international sanctions, the Syrian government relied on criminal organizations to smuggle goods and money in and out of the country. The economic downturn caused by the conflict and sanctions also led to lower wages for Shabiha members. In response, some Shabiha members began stealing civilian properties, and engaging in kidnappings.
Rebel forces sometimes relied on criminal networks to obtain weapons and supplies. Black market weapon prices in Syria’s neighboring countries have significantly increased since the start of the conflict. To generate funds to purchase arms, some rebel groups have turned towards extortion, stealing, and kidnapping.
The Syrian civil war is spilling into Lebanon, leading to incidents of sectarian violence in northern Lebanon between supporters and opponents of the Syrian government, and armed clashes between Sunnis and Alawites in Tripoli.
On 17 September 2012, Syrian ground-attack aircraft fired three missiles over the border into Lebanese territory near Arsal. It was suggested that the jets were chasing rebels in the vicinity. The attack prompted Lebanese President Michel Sleiman to launch an investigation, whilst not publicly blaming Syria for the incident.
On 22 September, a group of armed members of the Free Syrian Army attacked a border post near Arsal. The group were chased off into the hills by the Lebanese Army, who detained and later released some rebels due to pressure from locals. President Sleiman praised the actions taken by the military as maintaining Lebanon's position being "neutral from the conflicts of others". He called on border residents to "stand beside their army and assist its members." Syria has repeatedly called for an intensified crackdown on rebels that it says are hiding in Lebanese border towns.
On 11 October, four shells fired by the Syrian military hit Qaa, where previous shelling incidents had caused fatalities.
On 19 October, a car bomb exploded in central Beirut, killing a top Lebanese security official, Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan. At least 7 others were killed and perhaps 80 were injured in the blast. Al-Hassan was known for his opposition to the Syrian government. He was suspected of involvement in arms smuggling for the opposition, and had also been involved in uncovering former Minister of Information Michel Samaha's involvement in orchestrating destabilising bombings in Lebanon with Syrian-supplied explosives. Samaha was arrested in August 2012. Following an investigation that implicated individuals linked to the Syrian government in the blast, Lebanese officials issued an arrest warrant on 4 February 2013 for Syrian intelligence chief Ali Mamlouk for helping to plan the attack on al-Hassan.
Refugee children from Syria have been displaced into the border towns, threatening to overwhelm the Beqaa educational system.
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