Under a gold standard, paper notes are convertible into pre-set, fixed quantities of gold.

The gold standard is a monetary system in which the standard economic unit of account is a fixed weight of gold. There are distinct kinds of gold standard. First, the gold specie standard is a system in which the monetary unit is associated with circulating gold coins, or with the unit of value defined in terms of one particular circulating gold coin in conjunction with subsidiary coinage made from a lesser valuable metal.

Similarly, the gold exchange standard typically involves the circulation of only coins made of silver or other metals, but where the authorities guarantee a fixed exchange rate with another country that is on the gold standard. This creates a de facto gold standard, in that the value of the silver coins has a fixed external value in terms of gold that is independent of the inherent silver value. Finally, the gold bullion standard is a system in which gold coins do not circulate, but in which the authorities have agreed to sell gold bullion on demand at a fixed price in exchange for the circulating currency.

Gold certificates were used as paper currency in the United States from 1882 to 1933. These certificates were freely convertible into gold coins.

No country currently uses the gold standard as the basis of their monetary system, although several hold substantial gold reserves.

History[link]

Beginnings[link]

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The gold specie standard was not designed, but rather arose out of a general acceptance that gold was useful as a universal currency.^[1] When commodities compete for the role of money, the one that over time loses the least value, takes on the role.^[2] The use of gold as money dates back thousands of years and the first known gold coins were minted in the kingdom of Lydia in Asia Minor around 610 BC. The first coins minted in China are thought to date around 600 BC.^[3]

During the Middle Ages, the Byzantine gold Solidus, commonly known as the Bezant, circulated throughout Europe and the Mediterranean. But as the Byzantine Empire's economic influence declined, the European world tended to see silver, rather than gold, as the currency of choice, leading to the development of a silver standard.

Silver pennies, based on the Roman Denarius, became the staple coin of Britain around the time of King Offa, circa AD 796, and similar coins, including Italian denari, French deniers, and Spanish dineros circulated throughout Europe. Following the Spanish discovery of great silver deposits at Potosí and in Mexico during the 16th century, international trade came to depend on coins such as the Spanish dollar, Maria Theresa thaler, and, in the 1870s, the United States Trade dollar.

In modern times the British West Indies was one of the first regions to adopt a gold specie standard. Following Queen Anne's proclamation of 1704, the British West Indies gold standard was a de facto gold standard based on the Spanish gold doubloon coin. In the year 1717, master of the Royal Mint Sir Isaac Newton established a new mint ratio between silver and gold that had the effect of driving silver out of circulation and putting Britain on a gold standard.

However, only in 1821, following the introduction of the gold sovereign coin by the new Royal Mint at Tower Hill in the year 1816, was the United Kingdom formally put on a gold specie standard, the first of the great industrial powers. Soon to follow was Canada in 1853, Newfoundland in 1865, and the USA and Germany de jure in 1873. The USA used the Eagle as their unit, and Germany introduced the new gold mark, while Canada adopted a dual system based on both the American Gold Eagle and the British Gold Sovereign.

Australia and New Zealand adopted the British gold standard, as did the British West Indies, while Newfoundland was the only British Empire territory to introduce its own gold coin as a standard. Royal Mint branches were established in Sydney, New South Wales, Melbourne, Victoria, and Perth, Western Australia for the purpose of minting gold sovereigns from Australia's rich gold deposits.

The crisis of silver currency and bank notes (1750–1870)[link]

In the late 18th century, wars and trade with China, which sold to Europe but had little use for European goods, drained silver from the economies of Western Europe and the United States. Coins were struck in smaller and smaller numbers, and there was a proliferation of bank and stock notes used as money.

England[link]

In the 1790s, England, suffering a massive shortage of silver coinage, ceased to mint larger silver coins and issued "token" silver coins and overstruck foreign coins. With the end of the Napoleonic Wars, England began a massive recoinage programme that created standard gold sovereigns and circulating crowns and half-crowns, and eventually copper farthings in 1821. The recoinage of silver in England after a long drought produced a burst of coins: England struck nearly 40 million shillings between 1816 and 1820, 17 million half crowns and 1.3 million silver crowns.

The 1819 Act for the Resumption of Cash Payments set 1823 as the date for resumption of convertibility, reached instead by 1821. Throughout the 1820s, small notes were issued by regional banks, which were finally restricted in 1826, while the Bank of England was allowed to set up regional branches. In 1833, however, the Bank of England notes were made legal tender, and redemption by other banks was discouraged. In 1844 the Bank Charter Act established that Bank of England Notes, fully backed by gold, were the legal standard. According to the strict interpretation of the gold standard, this 1844 act marks the establishment of a full gold standard for British money.

US[link]

The US adopted a silver standard based on the Spanish milled dollar in 1785. This was codified in the 1792 Mint and Coinage Act, and by the Federal Government's use of the "Bank of the United States" to hold its reserves, as well as establishing a fixed ratio of gold to the US dollar. This was, in effect, a derivative silver standard, since the bank was not required to keep silver to back all of its currency.

This began a long series of attempts for America to create a bi-metallic standard for the US Dollar, which would continue until the 1920s. Gold and silver coins were legal tender, including the Spanish real, a silver coin struck in the Western Hemisphere. Because of the huge debt taken on by the US Federal Government to finance the Revolutionary War, silver coins struck by the government left circulation, and in 1806 President Jefferson suspended the minting of silver coins.

The US Treasury was put on a strict hard-money standard, doing business only in gold or silver coin as part of the Independent Treasury Act of 1848, which legally separated the accounts of the Federal Government from the banking system. However the fixed rate of gold to silver overvalued silver in relation to the demand for gold to trade or borrow from England. The drain of gold in favor of silver led to the search for gold, including the California Gold Rush of 1849. Following Gresham's law, silver poured into the US, which traded with other silver nations, and gold moved out. In 1853, the US reduced the silver weight of coins, to keep them in circulation, and in 1857 removed legal tender status from foreign coinage.

In 1857 the final crisis of the free banking era of international finance began, as American banks suspended payment in silver, rippling through the very young international financial system of central banks. In 1861 the US government suspended payment in gold and silver, effectively ending the attempts to form a silver standard basis for the dollar.

International[link]

Through the 1860–1871 period, various attempts to resurrect bi-metallic standards were made, including one based on the gold and silver franc; however, with the rapid influx of silver from new deposits, the expectation of scarcity of silver ended.

The interaction between central banking and currency basis formed the primary source of monetary instability during this period. The combination that produced economic stability was a restriction of supply of new notes, a government monopoly on the issuance of notes directly and, indirectly, a central bank and a single unit of value. Attempts to avoid these conditions produced periodic monetary crises.

As notes devalued; or silver ceased to circulate as a store of value; or there was a depression as governments, demanding specie as payment, drained the circulating medium out of the economy. At the same time, there was a dramatically expanded need for credit, and large banks were being chartered in various states, including, by 1872, Japan. The need for a solid basis in monetary affairs would produce a rapid acceptance of the gold standard in the period that followed.

Japan[link]

By way of example, and following Germany's decision after the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) to extract reparations to facilitate a move to the gold standard, Japan gained the needed reserves after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Whether the gold standard provided a government sufficient bona fides when it sought to borrow abroad is debated. For Japan, moving to gold was considered vital to gain access to Western capital markets.^[4]

The gold exchange standard (1870–1914)[link]

This unreferenced section requires citations to ensure verifiability.

Towards the end of the 19th century, some of the remaining silver standard countries began to peg their silver coin units to the gold standards of the United Kingdom or the USA. In 1898, British India pegged the silver rupee to the pound sterling at a fixed rate of 1s 4d, while in 1906, the Straits Settlements adopted a gold exchange standard against the pound sterling with the silver Straits dollar being fixed at 2s 4d.

At the turn of the century, the Philippines pegged the silver Peso/dollar to the US dollar at 50 cents. A similar pegging at 50 cents occurred at around the same time with the silver Peso of Mexico and the silver Yen of Japan. When Siam adopted a gold exchange standard in 1908, this left only China and Hong Kong on the silver standard.

Adopting the gold standard many European nations changed the name of their currency from Daler (Sweden and Denmark) or Gulden (Austria-Hungary) to Crown, since the former ones were traditionally associated with silver coins and the latter with gold coins.

Impact of World War I (1914–25)[link]

Governments faced with the need to fund high levels of expenditure, but with limited sources of tax revenue, suspended convertibility of currency into gold on a number of occasions in the 19th century. The British government suspended convertibility (that is to say, it went off the gold standard) during the Napoleonic wars and the US government during the US Civil War. In both cases, convertibility was resumed after the war.^{[citation needed]} The real test, however, came in the form of World War I, a test "it failed utterly" according to economist Richard Lipsey.^[1]

In order to finance the costs of war, most belligerent countries went off the gold standard during the war, and suffered significant inflation. Because inflation levels varied between states, when they returned to the standard after the war at price determined by themselves (some, for example, chose to enter at pre-war prices), some countries' goods were undervalued and some overvalued.^[1]

Ultimately, the system as it stood could not deal quickly enough with the large deficits and surpluses created in the balance of payments; this has previously been attributed to increasing rigidity of wages (particularly in terms of wage cuts) brought about by the advent of unionized labor, but is now more likely to be thought of as an inherent fault with the system which came to light under the pressures of war and rapid technological change. In any case, prices had not reached equilibrium by the time of the Great Depression, which served only to kill it off completely.^[1]

For example, Germany had gone off the gold standard in 1914, and could not effectively return to it as Germany had lost much of its remaining gold reserves in reparations. The German central bank issued unbacked marks virtually without limit to buy foreign currency for further reparations and to support workers during the Occupation of the Ruhr finally leading to hyperinflation in the 1920s.

The gold bullion standard and the decline of the gold standard (1925–31)[link]

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William McKinley ran for president on the basis of the gold standard.

The gold specie standard ended in the United Kingdom and the rest of the British Empire at the outbreak of World War I. Treasury notes replaced the circulation of the gold sovereigns and gold half sovereigns. However, legally, the gold specie standard was not repealed. The end of the gold standard was successfully effected by appeals to patriotism when somebody would request the Bank of England to redeem their paper money for gold specie. It was only in 1925, when Britain returned to the gold standard in conjunction with Australia and South Africa, that the gold specie standard was officially ended.

The British Gold Standard Act 1925 both introduced the gold bullion standard and simultaneously repealed the gold specie standard. The new gold bullion standard did not envisage any return to the circulation of gold specie coins. Instead, the law compelled the authorities to sell gold bullion on demand at a fixed price, but only in the form of bars containing approximately four hundred ounces troy of fine gold.^[5] This gold bullion standard lasted until 1931 when speculative attacks on the pound forced Britain off the gold standard.^[6] Loans from American and French Central Banks of £50,000,000, were insufficient and exhausted in a matter of weeks.^[7]

On September 19, 1931, the United Kingdom left the revised gold standard,^[8] forced to suspend the gold bullion standard due to large outflows of gold across the Atlantic Ocean. The British benefited from the departure. They could now use monetary policy to stimulate the economy through the lowering of interest rates. Australia and New Zealand had already been forced off the gold standard by the same pressures connected with the Great Depression, and Canada quickly followed suit with the United Kingdom.

The interwar partially backed gold standard was inherently unstable, because of the conflict between (a) the expansion of sterling and dollar liabilities to foreign central banks, and (b) the resulting deterioration in the reserve ratio of the Bank of England, and U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Banks.^[9] This instability was enhanced by gold flows out of England, with its overvalued pound, to other countries such as France, which was attempting to make Paris a world class financial center, in competition with London and New York.^[10]

It was destabilizing speculation, emanating from lack of confidence in authorities' commitment to currency convertibility that ended the interwar gold standard. In May 1931 there was a run on Austria's largest commercial bank, and the bank failed. The run spread to Germany, where an important bank also collapsed. The countries' central banks lost substantial reserves; international financial assistance was too late; and in July 1931 Germany adopted exchange control, followed by Austria in October. These countries were definitively off the gold standard.

The Austrian and German experiences, as well as British budgetary and political difficulties, were among the factors that destroyed confidence in sterling, which occurred in mid-July 1931. Runs on sterling ensued, and the Bank of England lost much of its reserves. Loans from abroad were insufficient, and in any event taken as a sign of weakness. The gold standard was abandoned in September, and the pound quickly and sharply depreciated on the foreign- exchange market, as overvaluation of the pound would imply.^[11]

Depression and World War II (1932–46)[link]

Prolongation of the Great Depression[link]

Some economic historians, such as American professor Barry Eichengreen, blame the gold standard of the 1920s for prolonging the Great Depression.^[12] Adherence to the gold standard prevented the Federal Reserve from expanding the money supply in order to stimulate the economy, fund insolvent banks and fund government deficits which could "prime the pump" for an expansion. Once the US went off the gold standard, it became free to engage in such money creation. The gold standard limited the flexibility of the central banks' monetary policy by limiting their ability to expand the money supply, and thus their ability to lower interest rates. In the US, the Federal Reserve was required by law to have 40% gold backing of its Federal Reserve demand notes, and thus, could not expand the money supply beyond what was allowed by the gold reserves held in their vaults.^[13] Others including Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman place most or all of the blame for the severity of the Great Depression at the feet of the Federal Reserve, mostly due to the deliberate tightening of monetary policy.^[14] The US economic contraction in 1937, the last gasp of the Great Depression, is blamed on tightening of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve resulting in a higher cost of capital and weaker securities markets, a reduced net government contribution to income, the undistributed profits tax, and higher labor costs.^[15] As a result of the tighter monetary policy, the money supply peaked in March 1937, with a trough in May 1938.^[16]

Higher interest rates intensified the deflationary pressure on the dollar and reduced investment in U.S. banks. Commercial banks also converted Federal Reserve Notes to gold in 1931, reducing the Federal Reserve's gold reserves, and forcing a corresponding reduction in the amount of Federal Reserve Notes in circulation.^[17] This speculative attack on the dollar created a panic in the U.S. banking system. Fearing imminent devaluation of the dollar, many foreign and domestic depositors withdrew funds from U.S. banks to convert them into gold or other assets.^[17] As people pulled money from the banking system due to bank panics, a reverse multiplier effect caused a contraction in the money supply.^[18] Additionally the New York Fed had loaned over $150 million (over 240 tons) to European Central Banks to help them out with their difficulties. This transfer of gold out of the US acted to contract the US money supply. These loans became questionable once England, Germany, Austria and other European countries went off the gold standard in 1931 and weakened confidence in the dollar.^[19]

The forced contraction of the money supply caused by people removing funds from the banking system during the bank panics resulted in deflation; and even as nominal interest rates dropped, inflation-adjusted real interest rates remained high, rewarding those that held onto money instead of spending it, causing a further slowdown in the economy.^[20] Recovery in the United States was slower than in Britain, in part due to Congressional reluctance to abandon the gold standard and float the U.S. currency as Britain had done.^[21]

In the early 1930s, the Federal Reserve defended the fixed price of dollars in respect to the gold standard by raising interest rates, trying to increase the demand for dollars. Its commitment and adherence to the gold standard explain why the U.S. did not engage in expansionary monetary policy. To compete in the international economy, the U.S. maintained high interest rates. This helped attract international investors who bought foreign assets with gold.^[17]

Congress passed the Gold Reserve Act on 30 January 1934; the measure nationalized all gold by ordering the Federal Reserve banks to turn over their supply to the U.S. Treasury. In return the banks received gold certificates to be used as reserves against deposits and Federal Reserve notes. The act also authorized the president to devalue the gold dollar so that it would have no more than 60 percent of its existing weight. Under this authority the president, on 31 January 1934, changed the value of the dollar from $20.67 to the troy ounce to $35 to the troy ounce, a devaluation of over 40%.

Other factors in the prolongation of the Great Depression include trade wars and the reduction in international trade caused by trade barriers such as Smoot-Hawley Tarriff in the US and the Imperial Preference policies of Great Britain,^[22] the failure of central banks to act responsibly,^[23] government policies designed to prevent wages from falling, such as the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, during the deflationary period resulting in production costs dropping slower then sales prices and thereby injuring business profitability ^[24] and increases in taxes to reduce budget deficits and to support new programs such as Social Security. The US top marginal income tax rate went from 25% to 63% in 1932 and to 79% in 1936^[25] while the bottom rate increased over 10 fold from .375% in 1929 to 4% in 1932^[26] Successful attacks on partially backed currencies which forced many countries off the gold standard and reduced confidence in the financial system, and a financial system, further damaged by the bank panics of the 1930s were also factors, as was inclement weather such as the drought resulting in the US Dust Bowl.

Milton Friedman stated that "the severity of each of the major contractions — 1920-1, 1929-33 and 1937-8 is directly attributable to acts of commission and omission by the Reserve authorities"^[27] He further believes that the US got out of the Great Depression because of the "natural resiliency of the economy and WW2, and not due to any acts of government, which in general were "very destructive" and extended the Great Depression.^[28]

Barry Eichengreen believes that the Austrian School view that the Great Depression was the result of a credit bust has much to recommend it.^[29] Alan Greenspan wrote that the bank failures of the 1930s were sparked by Great Britain dropping the gold standard in 1931. This act "tore asunder" any remaining confidence in the banking system.^[30] Financial historian Niall Ferguson writes that what made the Great Depression truly 'great' was the European banking crisis of 1931.^[31]

British hesitate to return to gold standard[link]

During the 1939–1942 period, the UK depleted much of its gold stock in purchases of munitions and weaponry on a "cash-and-carry" basis from the U.S. and other nations.^{[citation needed]} This depletion of the UK's reserve convinced Winston Churchill of the impracticality of returning to a pre-war style gold standard.

John Maynard Keynes, who had argued against such a gold standard, proposed to put the power to print money in the hands of the privately owned Bank of England. Keynes, in warning about the menaces of inflation, said, "By a continuous process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens. By this method, they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some".^[32]

Quite possibly because of this, the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement established the International Monetary Fund and an international monetary system based on convertibility of the various national currencies into a U.S. dollar that was in turn convertible into gold.

Post-war international gold-dollar standard (1946–1971)[link]

After the Second World War, a system similar to a Gold Standard and sometimes described as a "gold exchange standard" was established by the Bretton Woods Agreements. Under this system, many countries fixed their exchange rates relative to the U.S. dollar. The U.S. promised to fix the price of gold at approximately $35 per ounce. Implicitly, then, all currencies pegged to the dollar also had a fixed value in terms of gold.^[1]

Starting under the administration of the French President Charles de Gaulle and continuing until 1970, France reduced its dollar reserves, trading them for gold from the U.S. government, thereby reducing U.S. economic influence abroad. This, along with the fiscal strain of federal expenditures for the Vietnam War and persistent balance of payments deficits, led President Richard Nixon to end the direct convertibility of the dollar to gold on August 15, 1971, resulting in the system's breakdown (the "Nixon Shock").

Theory[link]

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Commodity money is inconvenient to store and transport. Further, it does not allow a government to manipulate or restrict the flow of commerce within its dominion with the same ease that a fiat currency does. As such, commodity money gave way to representative money, and gold and other specie were retained as its backing.

Gold was a common form of money due to its rarity, durability, divisibility, fungibility, and ease of identification,^[4] often in conjunction with silver. Silver was typically the main circulating medium, with gold as the metal of monetary reserve.

The gold standard variously specified how the gold backing would be implemented, including the amount of specie per currency unit. The currency itself is just paper and so has no intrinsic value, but is accepted by traders because it can be redeemed any time for the equivalent specie. A U.S. silver certificate, for example, could be redeemed for an actual piece of silver.

Representative money and the gold standard protect citizens from hyperinflation and other abuses of monetary policy, as were seen in some countries during the Great Depression. However, they were not without their problems and critics, and so were partially abandoned via the international adoption of the Bretton Woods System. That system eventually collapsed in 1971, at which time nearly all nations had switched to full fiat money.

According to Keynesian analysis, the earliness with which a country left the gold standard reliably predicted its economic recovery from the great depression. For example, Great Britain and Scandinavia, which left the gold standard in 1931, recovered much earlier than France and Belgium, which remained on gold much longer. Countries such as China, which had a silver standard, almost avoided the depression entirely. The connection between leaving the gold standard as a strong predictor of that country's severity of its depression and the length of time of its recovery has been shown to be consistent for dozens of countries, including developing countries. This may explain why the experience and length of the depression differed between national economies.^[33]

Differing definitions[link]

A 100%-reserve gold standard, or a full gold standard, exists when a monetary authority holds sufficient gold to convert all of the representative money it has issued into gold at the promised exchange rate. It is sometimes referred to as the gold specie standard to more easily identify it from other forms of the gold standard that have existed at various times. Opponents of a 100%-reserve standard consider a 100%-reserve standard difficult to implement, saying that the quantity of gold in the world is too small to sustain current worldwide economic activity at current gold prices; implementation would entail a many-fold increase in the price of gold.^{[citation needed]} However, proponents of the gold standard have said that any amount of gold can serve as the reserve: "Once a money is established, any stock of money becomes compatible with any amount of employment and real income."^[34] According to them the prices of goods and services will adjust to the supply of gold.^[35]

In an international gold-standard system (which is necessarily based on an internal gold standard in the countries concerned),^[36] gold or a currency that is convertible into gold at a fixed price is used as a means of making international payments. Under such a system, when exchange rates rise above or fall below the fixed mint rate by more than the cost of shipping gold from one country to another, large inflows or outflows occur until the rates return to the official level. International gold standards often limit which entities have the right to redeem currency for gold. Under the Bretton Woods system, these were called "SDRs" for special drawing rights.^{[citation needed]}

Advantages[link]

• Long-term price stability has been described as the great virtue of the gold standard.^[37] The gold standard limits the power of governments to inflate prices through excessive issuance of paper currency.^[38] Under the gold standard, high levels of inflation are rare, and hyperinflation is nearly impossible as the money supply can only grow at the rate that the gold supply increases.^[38] Economy-wide price increases caused by ever-increasing amounts of currency chasing a constant supply of goods are rare,^[38] as gold supply for monetary use is limited by the available gold that can be minted into coin.^[38] High levels of inflation under a gold standard are usually seen only when warfare destroys a large part of the economy, reducing the production of goods, or when a major new source of gold becomes available.^[38] In the U.S. one of those periods of warfare was the Civil War, which destroyed the economy of the South,^[39] while the California Gold Rush made large amounts of gold available for minting.^[40]
• Proponents of the gold standard claim that its stability fosters economic prosperity.^[41][42]
• The gold standard provides fixed international exchange rates between those countries that have adopted it, and thus reduces uncertainty in international trade.^[38] Historically, imbalances between price levels in different countries would be partly or wholly offset by an automatic balance-of-payment adjustment mechanism called the "price specie flow mechanism."^[38] Gold used to pay for imports reduces the money supply of importing nations, causing deflation and a reduction in the general price level for goods and services, making them more competitive, while the importation of gold by net exporters serves to increase the money supply, causes inflation and an increase in the general price level, making them less competitive.^[43]
• The gold standard acts as a check on government deficit spending as it limits the amount of debt that can be issued. It also prevents governments from inflating away the real value of their already existing debt through currency devaluation.^[44] A central bank cannot be an unlimited buyer of last resort of government debt. A central bank could not create unlimited quantities of money at will, as there is a limited supply of gold.^[38]
• A gold standard cannot be used for what some economists call, financial repression.^[45] Newly printed money can be used to purchase goods and services, and to discharge debts, at no cost to the printer. This acts as a mechanism to transfer the wealth of society to those that can print money, from everyone else. Financial repression is most successful in liquidating debts when accompanied by a steady dose of inflation, and it can be considered a form of taxation.^[46][47] In 1966 Alan Greenspan wrote "Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious process. It stands as a protector of property rights. If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in understanding the statists' antagonism toward the gold standard."^[48] Per John Maynard Keynes "By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens".^[49] Financial repression negatively affects economic growth.^[50]
• The gold standard benefits savers by preventing their savings from being devalued or destroyed through inflation, and by rewarding them with higher real (inflation adjusted) interest rates. In the US and United Kingdom, from 1945 to 1980 negative real interest rates have cost lenders an estimated 3-4% of GDP per year on average.^[51]
• The gold standard tends to limit credit booms and the resulting boom bust cycle because of the inelastic supply of money.^[52]

Disadvantages[link]

Gold prices (US$ per ounce) from 1968 to 2010, in nominal US$ and inflation adjusted US$.

• The unequal distribution of gold as a natural resource makes the gold standard much more advantageous in terms of cost and international economic empowerment for those countries that produce gold.^[53] In 2010 the largest producers of gold, in order, are China, followed by Australia, the US, South Africa and Russia.^[54] The country with the largest reserves is Australia.^[55]
• The gold standard acts as a limit on economic growth.^[56] “As an economy’s productive capacity grows, then so should its money supply. Because a gold standard requires that money be backed in the metal, then the scarcity of the metal constrains the ability of the economy to produce more capital and grow.”^[56]
• Mainstream economists believe that economic recessions can be largely mitigated by increasing money supply during economic downturns.^[57] Following a gold standard would mean that the amount of money would be determined by the supply of gold, and hence monetary policy could no longer be used to stabilize the economy in times of economic recession.^[58] Such reason is often employed to partially blame the gold standard for the Great Depression, citing that the Federal Reserve couldn't expand credit enough to offset the deflationary forces at work in the market.^[59]
• Although the gold standard has brought long-run price stability, it has also historically been associated with high short-run price volatility.^[60][61] It has been argued by, among others, Anna Schwartz, that this kind of instability in short-term price levels can lead to financial instability as lenders and borrowers become uncertain about the value of debt.^[62]
• The total amount of gold that has ever been mined has been estimated at around 142,000 metric tons^[63] and arguments have been made that this amount is too small to serve as a monetary base. The value of this amount of gold is over 6 trillion dollars while the monetary base of the US, with a roughly 20% share of the world economy, stands at $2.7 trillion at the end of 2011.^[64] Murray Rothbard argues that the amount of gold available is not a bar to a gold standard since the free market will determine the purchasing power of gold money based on its supply.^[65]
• Deflation punishes debtors.^[66][67] Real debt burdens therefore rise, causing borrowers to cut spending to service their debts or to default. Lenders become wealthier, but may choose to save some of their additional wealth rather than spending it all.^[68] The overall amount of expenditure is therefore likely to fall.^[68]
• Monetary policy would essentially be determined by the rate of gold production.^[69] Fluctuations in the amount of gold that is mined could cause inflation if there is an increase, or deflation if there is a decrease.^[60][69] Some hold the view that this contributed to the severity and length of the Great Depression as the gold standard forced the central banks to keep monetary policy too tight, creating deflation.^[70][71]
• James Hamilton contended that the gold standard may be susceptible to speculative attacks when a government's financial position appears weak, although others contend that this very threat discourages governments' engaging in risky policy (see Moral Hazard).^[71] For example, some believe that the United States was forced to contract the money supply and raise interest rates in September 1931 to defend the dollar after speculators forced Great Britain off the gold standard^[71][72][73]
• If a country wanted to devalue its currency, a gold standard would generally produce sharper changes than the smooth declines seen in fiat currencies, depending on the method of devaluation.^[74]
• Most economists favor a low, positive rate of inflation. Partly this reflects fear of deflationary shocks, but primarily because they believe that central banks still have some role to play in dampening fluctuations in output and unemployment. Central banks can more safely play that role when a positive rate of inflation gives them room to tighten money growth without inducing price declines.^[75]
• It is difficult to manipulate a gold standard to tailor to an economy’s demand for money, providing practical constraints against the measures that central banks might otherwise use to respond to economic crises.^[76] The demand for money always equals the supply of money. Creation of new money reduces interest rates and thereby increases demand for new lower cost debt, raising the demand for money.^[77]

Advocates of a renewed gold standard[link]

The return to the gold standard is supported by many followers of the Austrian School of Economics, Objectivists, free-market libertarians^[78] and, in the United States, by strict constitutionalists largely because they object to the role of the government in issuing fiat currency through central banks. A significant number of gold-standard advocates also call for a mandated end to fractional-reserve banking.^{[citation needed]}

Few politicians^[79] today advocate a return to the gold standard, other than adherents of the Austrian school and some supply-siders. However, some prominent economists have expressed sympathy with a hard-currency basis, and have argued against politically-controlled fiat money, including former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (himself a former Objectivist), and macro-economist Robert Barro.^[80] Greenspan famously argued the case for returning to a 'pure' gold standard in his 1966 paper "Gold and Economic Freedom", in which he described supporters of fiat currencies as "welfare statists" intending to use monetary policies to finance deficit spending.^[81]

Barro argues in favor of adopting some form of "monetary constitution" that will provide stability to monetary policy rather than allowing decisions about monetary policy to be made on the basis of politics, but suggests that what form this constitution takes—for example, a gold standard, some other commodity-based standard, or a fiat currency with fixed rules for determining the quantity of money—is considerably less important.^[80] U.S. Congressman Ron Paul has continually argued for the reinstatement of the gold standard, but is no longer a strict advocate, instead supporting a basket of commodities that emerges on the free markets.^[82]

For the time being, the global monetary system continues to rely on the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency by which major transactions, such as the price of gold itself, are measured.^[83] A host of alternatives has been suggested, including energy-based currencies, and market baskets of currencies or commodities, gold being one of the alternatives.

In 2001, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad proposed a new currency that would be used initially for international trade among Muslim nations. The currency he proposed was called the Islamic gold dinar and it was defined as 4.25 grams of pure (24-carat) gold. Mahathir Mohamad promoted the concept on the basis of its economic merits as a stable unit of account and also as a political symbol to create greater unity between Islamic nations. The purported purpose of this move would be to reduce dependence on the United States dollar as a reserve currency, and to establish a non-debt-backed currency in accord with Islamic law against the charging of interest.^[84] However, to date, Mahathir's proposed gold-dinar currency has failed to take hold.

In 2011, the legislature of the state of Utah passed a bill to accept federally-issued gold and silver coins as legal tender to pay taxes.^[85][86] Similar legislation is under consideration in a number of other US states.

Gold as a reserve today[link]

The Swiss Franc was based on a 40% legal gold-reserve requirement from 1936, when it ended gold convertibility,^[87] until 2000. Gold reserves are held in significant quantity by many nations as a means of defending their currency, and hedging against the U.S. Dollar, which forms the bulk of liquid currency reserves.^{[citation needed]} Both gold coins and gold bars are traded in liquid markets and serve as a private store of wealth.

See also[link]

Numismatics portal

• A Program for Monetary Reform (1939) – The Gold Standard
• Bimetallism/Free Silver
• Coinage Act of 1792
• Coinage Act of 1873
• Federal Reserve System
• Full-reserve banking
• Gold as an investment
• Gold bug
• Gold Points
• Gold Reserve Act
• Metal as money
• Metallism
• Monetary reform
• Representative money
• Silver standard
• Store of value
• The Great Deflation
• Latin Monetary Union

International institutions

• Bank for International Settlements
• International Monetary Fund
• United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference
• World Bank

References[link]

Further reading[link]

• Gold Keeps Shining, 40 Years After Nixon Ended Gold Standard, an April 2011 radio and Internet feature story by the Special English service of the Voice of America.
• Bensel, Richard Franklin (2000). The political economy of American industrialization, 1877–1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-77604-X. OCLC 43552761. 
• Eichengreen, Barry J.; Marc Flandreau (1997). The gold standard in theory and history. New York City: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-15061-2. OCLC 37743323. 
• Bordo, Michael D. (1999). Gold standard and related regimes: collected essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-55006-8. OCLC 59422152. 
• Bordo, Michael D; Anna Jacobson Schwartz and National Bureau of Economic Research (1984). A Retrospective on the classical gold standard, 1821–1931. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-06590-1. OCLC 10559587. 
• Officer, Lawrence H. (2007). Between the Dollar-Sterling Gold Points: Exchange Rates, Parity and Market Behavior. Chicago: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-03821-9. OCLC 124025586. 
• Eichengreen, Barry J. (1995). Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939. New York City: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-510113-8. OCLC 34383450. 
• Einaudi, Luca (2001). Money and politics: European monetary unification and the international gold standard (1865–1873). Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-924366-2. OCLC 45556225. 
• Roberts, Mark A (March 1995). "Keynes, the Liquidity Trap and the Gold Standard: A Possible Application of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis". The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies (Blackwell Publishing) 61 (1): 82–92. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9957.1995.tb00270.x. 
• Thompson, Earl A.; Charles Robert Hickson (2001). Ideology and the evolution of vital institutions: guilds, the gold standard, and modern international cooperation. Boston: Kluwer Acad. Publ.. ISBN 0-7923-7390-1. OCLC 46836861. 
• Pollard, Sidney (1970). The gold standard and employment policies between the Wars. London: Methuen. ISBN 0-416-14250-8. OCLC 137456. 
• Hanna, Hugh Henry; Charles Arthur Conant, Jeremiah Jenks (1903). Stability of international exchange: Report on the introduction of the gold-exchange standard into China and other silver-using countries. OCLC 6671835. 
• Elks, Ken. "The complete history of British Coinage in 12 parts". Predecimal.com. Chris Perkins. http://www.predecimal.com/p1celtic.php. Retrieved 2008-11-13. 
• Banking in modern Japan. Tokyo: Fuji Bank. 1967. ISBN 0-333-71139-4. OCLC 254964565. 
• Officer, Lawrence H. (2008). "The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics". In Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 488. DOI:10.1057/9780230226203.0136. ISBN 0-333-78676-9. OCLC 181424188. http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_B000137&goto=bimetalism&result_number=140. Retrieved 2008-11-13. 
• Drummond, Ian M.; The Economic History Society (1987). The gold standard and the international monetary system 1900–1939. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Education. ISBN 0-333-37208-5. OCLC 18324084. 
• Hawtrey, Ralph George (1927). The Gold Standard in theory and practice. London: Longman. ISBN 0-313-22104-9. OCLC 250855462. 
• Flandreau, Marc (2004). The glitter of gold: France, bimetallism, and the emergence of the international gold standard, 1848–1873. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-925786-8. OCLC 54826941. 
• Lalor, John (2003) [1881]. Cyclopedia of Political Science, Political Economy and the Political History of the United States. London: Thoemmes Continuum. ISBN 1-84371-093-5. OCLC 52565505. 
• Bernanke, Ben; Harold James (October 1990). The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the Great Depression: An International Comparison. Working Paper Series. 3488. Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research. OCLC 22840844. http://www.nber.org/papers/w3488. Retrieved 2008-11-13.  Also published as: Bernanke, Ben; Harold James (1991). "The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the Great Depression: An International Comparison". In R. Glenn Hubbard. Financial markets and financial crises. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 33–68. ISBN 0-226-35588-8. OCLC 231281602. http://books.google.com/books?id=MEfUi2H4cqwC&printsec=frontcover&cad=0#PRA1-PA33,M1. Retrieved 2008-11-13. 
• Rothbard, Murray Newton (2006). "The World Currency Crisis". Making Economic Sense. Burlingame, California: Ludwig von Mises Institute. pp. 295–299. ISBN 0-945466-46-3. OCLC 78624652. http://books.google.com/books?id=elPzEDHG9ysC&printsec=frontcover&cad=0#PRA2-PA295,M1. 
• Cassel, Gustav (1936). The downfall of the gold standard. Oxford: Clarendon Press. OCLC 237252. 
• Braga de Macedo, Jorge; Barry J. Eichengreen and Jaime Reis (1996). Currency convertibility: the gold standard and beyond. New York City: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-14057-9. OCLC 33132906. 
• Russell, William H. (1982). The Deceit of the Gold Standard and of Gold Monetization. American Classical College Press. ISBN 0-89266-324-3. 
• Mitchell, Wesley C. (1908). Gold, prices, and wages under the greenback standard. Berkeley, California: The University Press. OCLC 1088693. 
• Mouré, Kenneth (2002). The gold standard illusion: France, the Bank of France, and the International Gold Standard, 1914–1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-924904-0. OCLC 48544538. 
• Bayoumi, Tamim A.; Barry J. Eichengreen and Mark P. Taylor (1996). Modern perspectives on the gold standard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-57169-3. OCLC 34245103. 
• Keynes, John Maynard (1925). The economic consequences of Mr. Churchill. London: Hogarth Press. OCLC 243857880. 
• Keynes, John Maynard (1930). A treatise on money in two volumes. London: MacMillan. OCLC 152413612. 
• Ferderer, J. Peter (1994). Credibility of the interwar gold standard, uncertainty, and the Great Depression. Annandale-on-Hudson, New York: Jerome Levy Economics Institute. OCLC 31141890. 
• Aceña, Pablo Martín; Jaime Reis (2000). Monetary standards in the periphery: paper, silver and gold, 1854–1933. London: Macmillan Press. ISBN 0-333-67020-5. OCLC 247963508. 
• Gallarotti, Giulio M. (1995). The anatomy of an international monetary regime: the classical gold standard, 1880–1914. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-508990-1. OCLC 30511110. 
• Dick, Trevor J. O.; John E. Floyd (2004). Canada and the Gold Standard: Balance of Payments Adjustment Under Fixed Exchange Rates, 1871–1913. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-61706-5. OCLC 59135525. 
• Kenwood, A.G.; A. L. Lougheed (1992). The growth of the international economy 1820–1990. London: Routledge. ISBN 91-44-00079-0. 
• Hofstadter, Richard (1996). "Free Silver and the Mind of "Coin" Harvey". The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays. Harvard: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-65461-7. OCLC 34772674. 
• Lewis, Nathan K. (2006). Gold: The Once and Future Money. New York: Wiley. ISBN 0-470-04766-6. OCLC 87151964. 
• Withers, Hartley (1919). War-Time Financial Problems. London: J. Murray. OCLC 2458983. http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/13045. Retrieved 2008-11-14. 
• Metzler, Mark (2006). Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan.. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. p. [5]. ISBN 0-520-24420-6. </ref>
• Pietrusza, David (2011). 'It Shines for All': The Gold Standard Editorials of The New York Sun. New York City, New York: New York Sun Books. ISBN 1-4611-5612-2. 

External links[link]

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• 1933 Audio of FDR's Explanation of the Banking Crisis & Gold Confiscation
• Is the Gold Standard Still the Gold Standard among Monetary Systems? by Lawrence H. White Ph.D. Professor of Economic History
• The Case for a 100 Percent Gold Dollar by Murray N. Rothbard Ph.D. Professor Emeritus of Economics
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Milton Friedman

Chicago School of Economics
Born	(1912-07-31)July 31, 1912 Brooklyn, New York
Died	November 16, 2006(2006-11-16) (aged 94) San Francisco, California
Nationality	American
Institution	Hoover Institution (1977–2006) University of Chicago (1946–77) Columbia University (1937–41, 1943–45, 1964–65) NBER (1937–40)
Field	Economics
Alma mater	Columbia University (Ph.D.), 1946, University of Chicago (M.A.), 1933 Rutgers University (B.A.), (1932)
Opposed	John Maynard Keynes, John Kenneth Galbraith, Murray Rothbard
Influences	Adam Smith, Irving Fisher, Frank Knight, Murray Rothbard, Jacob Viner, Harold Hotelling, Arthur Burns, Friedrich Hayek, Homer Jones, Ludwig von Mises, Henry Simons, George Stigler
Influenced	Margaret Thatcher, Alan Greenspan, David D. Friedman, Anna J. Schwartz, Ben Bernanke, Gary Becker, Thomas Sowell, Harry Markowitz, Chicago Boys, William F. Buckley, Jr., Cato Institute
Contributions	Price theory, Monetarism, applied macroeconomics, floating exchange rates, volunteer military, Permanent income hypothesis, Friedman test
Awards	John Bates Clark Medal (1951) Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (1976) Presidential Medal of Freedom (1988) National Medal of Science (1988)
Signature

Milton Friedman (July 31, 1912 – November 16, 2006) was an American economist, statistician, and author who taught at the University of Chicago for more than three decades. He was a recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, and is known for his research on consumption analysis, monetary history and theory, and the complexity of stabilization policy.^[1] As a leader of the Chicago school of economics, he influenced the research agenda of the economics profession. A survey of economists ranked Friedman as the second most popular economist of the twentieth century behind John Maynard Keynes,^[2] and The Economist described him as "the most influential economist of the second half of the 20th century…possibly of all of it."^[3]

Friedman's challenges to what he later called "naive Keynesian" (as opposed to New Keynesian) theory^[4] began with his 1950s reinterpretation of the consumption function, and he became the main advocate opposing activist Keynesian government policies.^[5] In the late 1960s he described his own approach (along with all of mainstream economics) as using "Keynesian language and apparatus" yet rejecting its "initial" conclusions.^[6] During the 1960s he promoted an alternative macroeconomic policy known as "monetarism". He theorized there existed a "natural" rate of unemployment, and argued that governments could increase employment above this rate (e.g., by increasing aggregate demand) only at the risk of causing inflation to accelerate.^[7] He argued that the Phillips curve was not stable and predicted what would come to be known as stagflation.^[8] Friedman argued that, given the existence of the Federal Reserve, a constant small expansion of the money supply was the only wise policy.^[9]

Friedman was an economic adviser to conservative President Ronald Reagan. His political philosophy extolled the virtues of a free market economic system with minimal intervention. He once stated that his role in eliminating U.S. conscription was his proudest accomplishment, and his support for school choice led him to found The Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice. In his 1962 book Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman advocated policies such as a volunteer military, freely floating exchange rates, abolition of medical licenses, a negative income tax, and education vouchers.^[10] His ideas concerning monetary policy, taxation, privatization and deregulation influenced government policies, especially during the 1980s. His monetary theory influenced the Federal Reserve's response to the global financial crisis.^[11]

Milton Friedman's works include many monographs, books, scholarly articles, papers, magazine columns, television programs, videos, and lectures, and cover a broad range of topics of microeconomics, macroeconomics, economic history, and public policy issues. His books and essays were widely read, and have had an international influence, including in Communist countries.^{[12][13][14][15]}

Early life[link]

Friedman was born in Brooklyn, New York, to recent Jewish immigrants Jenő Friedman and Sára Landau from Beregszász in Austria-Hungary (now Berehove in Ukraine), both of whom worked as dry goods merchants. Shortly after Milton's birth, the family relocated to Rahway, New Jersey. A talented student, Friedman graduated from Rahway High School in 1928, just before his 16th birthday.^[16][17]

Friedman graduated from Rutgers University in New Jersey, where he specialized in mathematics and initially intended to become an actuary. During his time at Rutgers, Friedman became influenced by two economics professors, Arthur F. Burns and Homer Jones, who convinced him that modern economics could help end the Great Depression. After graduating from Rutgers in 1932, Friedman was offered two scholarships to do graduate work; one being Mathematics at Brown University and the other being Economics at the University of Chicago.^[18]Friedman chose the latter, thus earning an M.A. in 1933. He was strongly influenced by Jacob Viner, Frank Knight, and Henry Simons. It was at Chicago that Friedman met his future wife, economist Rose Director. During 1933–34 he had a fellowship at Columbia University, where he studied statistics with renowned statistician and economist Harold Hotelling. He was back in Chicago for 1934–35, spending the year working as a research assistant for Henry Schultz, who was then working on Theory and Measurement of Demand. That year, Friedman formed what would prove to be lifelong friendships with George Stigler and W. Allen Wallis.^[19]

Public service[link]

Friedman was initially unable to find academic employment, so during 1935, he followed his friend W. Allen Wallis to Washington, where Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal was "a lifesaver" for many young economists.^[20] At this stage, Friedman said that he and his wife "regarded the job-creation programs such as the WPA, CCC, and PWA appropriate responses to the critical situation," but not "the price- and wage-fixing measures of the National Recovery Administration and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration."^[21] Foreshadowing his later ideas, he believed price controls interfered with an essential signaling mechanism to help resources be used where they were most valued. Indeed, Friedman later concluded that all government intervention associated with the New Deal was "the wrong cure for the wrong disease," arguing that the money supply should simply have been expanded, instead of contracted.^[22] In the publication Monetary History of the United States by Friedman and Anna Schwartz, they argue that the Great Depression was caused by monetary contraction, which was the consequence of poor policymaking by the Federal reserve and the continuous crises of the banking system.^[23]

During 1935, he began work for the National Resources Committee, which was then working on a large consumer budget survey. Ideas from this project later became a part of his Theory of the Consumption Function. Friedman began employment with the National Bureau of Economic Research during autumn 1937 to assist Simon Kuznets in his work on professional income. This work resulted in their jointly authored publication Incomes from Independent Professional Practice, which introduced the concepts of permanent and transitory income, a major component of the Permanent Income Hypothesis that Friedman worked out in greater detail in the 1950s. The book hypothesizes that professional licensing artificially restricts the supply of services and raises prices.

During 1940, Friedman was appointed an assistant professor teaching Economics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, but encountered antisemitism in the Economics department and decided to return to government service.^[24][25] Friedman spent 1941–43 working on wartime tax policy for the Federal Government, as an advisor to senior officials of the United States Department of the Treasury. As a Treasury spokesman during 1942 he advocated a Keynesian policy of taxation. He helped to invent the payroll withholding tax system, since the federal government badly needed money in order to fight the war.^[26] He later said, "I have no apologies for it, but I really wish we hadn't found it necessary and I wish there were some way of abolishing withholding now."^[27]

Academic career[link]

Early years[link]

In 1943, Friedman joined the Division of War Research at Columbia University (headed by W. Allen Wallis and Harold Hotelling), where he spent the rest of World War II working as a mathematical statistician, focusing on problems of weapons design.^[28]

During 1945, Friedman submitted Incomes from Independent Professional Practice (co-authored with Kuznets and completed during 1940) to Columbia as his doctoral dissertation. The university awarded him a Ph.D. during 1946. Friedman spent the 1945–46 academic year teaching at the University of Minnesota (where his friend George Stigler was employed). On February 12, 1945, his son, David D. Friedman was born.

University of Chicago[link]

University of Chicago

During 1946, Friedman accepted an offer to teach economic theory at the University of Chicago (a position opened by departure of his former professor Jacob Viner to Princeton University). Friedman would work for the University of Chicago for the next 30 years. There he helped build an intellectual community that produced a number of Nobel Prize winners, known collectively as the Chicago School of Economics.

At that time, Arthur Burns, who was then the head of the National Bureau of Economic Research, asked Friedman to rejoin the Bureau's staff. He accepted the invitation, and assumed responsibility for the Bureau's inquiry into the role of money in the business cycle. As a result, he initiated the "Workshop in Money and Banking" (the "Chicago Workshop"), which promoted a revival of monetary studies. During the latter half of the 1940s, Friedman began a collaboration with Anna Schwartz, an economic historian at the Bureau, that would ultimately result in the 1963 publication of a book co-authored by Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960.

Friedman spent the 1954–55 academic year as a Fulbright Visiting Fellow at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. At the time, the Cambridge economics faculty was divided into a Keynesian majority (including Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn) and an anti-Keynesian minority (headed by Dennis Robertson). Friedman speculates that he was invited to the fellowship because his views were unacceptable to both of the Cambridge factions. Later his weekly columns for Newsweek magazine (1966–84) were well read and increasingly influential among political and business people.^[29] From 1968 to 1978, he and Paul Samuelson participated in the Economics Cassette Series, a biweekly subscription series where the economist would discuss the days' issues for about a half hour at a time.^[30]

Friedman was an economic adviser to Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater during 1964.

Nobel memorial prize and retirement[link]

In 1976 Friedman won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics "for his achievements in the fields of consumption analysis, monetary history and theory and for his demonstration of the complexity of stabilization policy."^[1] During the banquet speech he made a reference to “the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel”. In that he was the first recipient to do so, and it wasn’t until 2006 that a recipient of the prize called it by its proper name.^[31] During 1977, at age 65, Friedman retired from the University of Chicago after teaching there for 30 years. He and his wife moved to San Francisco where he became a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. From 1977 on, he was affiliated with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. During the same year, Friedman was approached by the Free To Choose Network and asked to create a television program presenting his economic and social philosophy. The Friedmans worked on this project for the next three years, and during 1980, the ten-part series, titled Free to Choose, was broadcast by the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). The companion book to the series (co-authored by Milton and his wife, Rose Friedman), also titled Free To Choose, was the bestselling nonfiction book of 1980 and has since been translated into 14 foreign languages.

Friedman served as an unofficial adviser to Ronald Reagan during his 1980 presidential campaign, and then served on the President's Economic Policy Advisory Board for the rest of the Reagan Administration. During 1988, he received the National Medal of Science and Reagan honored him with the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Milton Friedman is known now as one of the most influential economists of the 20th century.^[32][33] Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Friedman continued to write editorials and appear on television. He made several visits to Eastern Europe and to China, where he also advised governments. He was also for many years a Trustee of the Philadelphia Society.^[34][35][36]

Scholarly contributions[link]

Economics[link]

Friedman was best known for reviving interest in the money supply as a determinant of the nominal value of output, that is, the quantity theory of money. Monetarism is the set of views associated with modern quantity theory. Its origins can be traced back to the 16th-century School of Salamanca or even further; however, Friedman's contribution is largely responsible for its modern popularization. He co-authored, with Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States (1963), which was an examination of the role of the money supply and economic activity in U.S. history. A striking conclusion of their research was one regarding the role of money supply fluctuations as contributing to economic fluctuations. Several regression studies with David Meiselman during the 1960s suggested the primacy of the money supply over investment and government spending in determining consumption and output. These challenged a prevailing but largely untested view on their relative importance. Friedman's empirical research and some theory supported the conclusion that the short-run effect of a change of the money supply was primarily on output but that the longer-run effect was primarily on the price level.

Friedman was the main proponent of the monetarist school of economics. He maintained that there is a close and stable association between price inflation and the money supply, mainly that price inflation should be regulated with monetary deflation and price deflation with monetary inflation. He famously quipped that price deflation can be fought by "dropping money out of a helicopter."^[37]

Friedman's arguments were designed to counter popular claims that price inflation at the time was the result of increases in the price of oil, or increases in wages: as he wrote,

Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.

—Milton Friedman, 1963.^[38]

Friedman rejected the use of fiscal policy as a tool of demand management; and he held that the government's role in the guidance of the economy should be restricted severely. Friedman wrote extensively on the Great Depression, which he termed the Great Contraction, arguing that it had been caused by an ordinary financial shock whose duration and seriousness were greatly increased by the subsequent contraction of the money supply caused by the misguided policies of the directors of the Federal Reserve.

The Fed was largely responsible for converting what might have been a garden-variety recession, although perhaps a fairly severe one, into a major catastrophe. Instead of using its powers to offset the depression, it presided over a decline in the quantity of money by one-third from 1929 to 1933 ... Far from the depression being a failure of the free-enterprise system, it was a tragic failure of government.

—Milton Friedman, Two Lucky People, 233

Friedman also argued for the cessation of government intervention in currency markets, thereby spawning an enormous literature on the subject, as well as promoting the practice of freely floating exchange rates. His close friend George Stigler explained, "As is customary in science, he did not win a full victory, in part because research was directed along different lines by the theory of rational expectations, a newer approach developed by Robert Lucas, also at the University of Chicago."^[39]

Friedman was also known for his work on the consumption function, the permanent income hypothesis (1957), which Friedman himself referred to as his best scientific work.^[40] This work contended that rational consumers would spend a proportional amount of what they perceived to be their permanent income. Windfall gains would mostly be saved. Tax reductions likewise, as rational consumers would predict that taxes would have to increase later to balance public finances. Other important contributions include his critique of the Phillips curve and the concept of the natural rate of unemployment (1968). This critique associated his name, together with that of Edmund Phelps, with the insight that a government that brings about greater inflation cannot permanently reduce unemployment by doing so. Unemployment may be temporarily lower, if the inflation is a surprise, but in the long run unemployment will be determined by the frictions and imperfections of the labor market.

Friedman's essay "The Methodology of Positive Economics" (1953) provided the epistemological pattern for his own subsequent research and to a degree that of the Chicago School. There he argued that economics as science should be free of value judgments for it to be objective. Moreover, a useful economic theory should be judged not by its descriptive realism but by its simplicity and fruitfulness as an engine of prediction. That is, students should measure the accuracy of its predictions, rather than the "soundness of its assumptions. His argument was part of an ongoing debate among such statisticians as Jerzy Neyman, Leonard Savage, and Ronald Fisher.^[41]

Statistics[link]

One of his most famous contributions to statistics is sequential sampling. "Friedman did statistical work at the Division of War Research at Columbia. He and his colleagues came up with a sampling technique, known as sequential sampling, which became, in the words of The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 'the standard analysis of quality control inspection.' The dictionary adds: 'Like many of Friedman’s contributions, in retrospect it seems remarkably simple and obvious to apply basic economic ideas to quality control; that however is a measure of his genius.'"^[42]

Public policy positions[link]

Federal reserve[link]

Friedman believed that if the money supply was to be centrally controlled (as by the Federal Reserve) that the preferable way to do it would be with a mechanical system that would keep the quantity of money increasing at a steady rate. However, instead of government involvement at all, he was open to a "real," non-government, gold standard where money is produced by the private market: "A real gold standard is thoroughly consistent with [classical] liberal principles and I, for one, am entirely in favor of measures promoting its development." He did however add this caveat, "Let me emphasize that this note is not a plea for a return to a gold standard.... I regard a return to a gold standard as neither desirable nor feasible—with the one exception that it might become feasible if the doomsday predictions of hyperinflation under our present system should prove correct."^[43] He said the reason that it was not feasible was because "there is essentially no government in the world that is willing to surrender control over its domestic monetary policy." However, it could be done if "you could re-establish a world in which government's budget accounted for 10 percent of the national income, in which laissez-faire reigned, in which governments did not interfere with economic activities and in which full employment policies had been relegated to the dustbin..."^[43]

He was critical of the Federal Reserve's influence on the economics profession. In a 1993 letter to University of Texas economics professor and former House Banking Committee investigator Robert Auerbach, Friedman wrote:

I cannot disagree with you that having something like 500 economists is extremely unhealthy. As you say, it is not conducive to independent, objective research. You and I know there has been censorship of the material published. Equally important, the location of the economists in the Federal Reserve has had a significant influence on the kind of research they do, biasing that research toward noncontroversial technical papers on method as opposed to substantive papers on policy and results.^[44]

School choice[link]

In his 1955 article "The Role of Government in Education" Friedman proposed supplementing publicly operated schools with privately run but publicly funded schools through a system of school vouchers.^[45] Reforms similar to those proposed in the article were implemented in, for example, Chile in 1981 and Sweden in 1992.^[46] In 1996 Friedman, together with his wife, founded the The Foundation for Educational Choice to advocate school choice and vouchers.

Conscription[link]

Milton Friedman was a major proponent of a volunteer military, stating that the draft was "inconsistent with a free society."^[47][48] In Capitalism and Freedom, he argued that conscription is inequitable and arbitrary, preventing young men from shaping their lives as they see fit.^[49] During the Nixon administration he headed the committee to research a conversion to paid/volunteer armed force. He would later state that his role in eliminating the conscription in the United States was his proudest accomplishment.^[9] Friedman did, however, believe a nation could compel military training as a reserve in case of war time.^[49]

Libertarianism and the Republican party[link]

He served as a member of President Reagan's Economic Policy Advisory Board during 1981. During 1988, he received the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the National Medal of Science. He said that he was a libertarian philosophically, but a member of the U.S. Republican Party for the sake of "expediency" ("I am a libertarian with a small 'l' and a Republican with a capital 'R.' And I am a Republican with a capital 'R' on grounds of expediency, not on principle.") But, he said, "I think the term classical liberal is also equally applicable. I don't really care very much what I'm called. I'm much more interested in having people thinking about the ideas, rather than the person."^[50]

Public goods and monopoly[link]

Friedman was supportive of the state provision of some public goods that private businesses are not considered as being able to provide. However, he argued that many of the services performed by government could be performed better by the private sector. Above all, if some public goods are provided by the state, he believed that they should not be a legal monopoly where private competition is prohibited; for example, he wrote:

There is no way to justify our present public monopoly of the post office. It may be argued that the carrying of mail is a technical monopoly and that a government monopoly is the least of evils. Along these lines, one could perhaps justify a government post office, but not the present law, which makes it illegal for anybody else to carry the mail. If the delivery of mail is a technical monopoly, no one else will be able to succeed in competition with the government. If it is not, there is no reason why the government should be engaged in it. The only way to find out is to leave other people free to enter.

—Milton Friedman, Friedman, Milton & Rose D. Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press, 1982, 29

Welfare[link]

Friedman made newspaper headlines by proposing a negative income tax to replace the existing welfare system, and then opposing a bill to implement it because the bill proposed to supplement the existing system rather than replace it.

Drugs[link]

Friedman also supported libertarian policies such as legalization of drugs and prostitution. During 2005, Friedman and more than 500 other economists advocated discussions regarding the economic benefits of the legalization of marijuana.^[51]

Economic freedom[link]