The Xinhua News Agency (simplified Chinese: 新华通讯社; traditional Chinese: 新華通訊社; pinyin: Xīnhuá tōngxùnshè, IPA: [ɕínxwǎ]; /ˈʃiːnhwɑː/;^[1] literally "New China News Agency") is the official press agency of the People's Republic of China and the biggest center for collecting information and press conferences in China. It is the largest news agency in China, ahead of the China News Service. Xinhua is subordinate to the State Council and reports to the Communist Party of China's Publicity and Public Information Departments. Xinhua's headquarters complex, the "pencil building", is at No. 57 Xuanwumenxi Street, Beijing. Its website Xinhua.org or Xinhuanet.com is headquartered on the twentieth floor of the Dacheng Plaza (大成大厦 Dàchéng Dàshà) in Xicheng District, Beijing.^[2]

Xinhua employs more than 10,000 people, operates 107 foreign bureaus worldwide, and maintains 31 bureaus in China—one for each province, plus a military bureau. As most of the newspapers in China cannot afford to station correspondents abroad, or even in every Chinese province, they rely on Xinhua feeds to fill their pages. People's Daily, for example, uses Xinhua material for approximately 25 percent of its stories. Xinhua is a publisher as well as a news agency—it owns more than 20 newspapers and a dozen magazines, and it prints in eight languages: Chinese, English, Spanish, French, Russian, Portuguese, Arabic and Japanese.

History[link]

The Xinhua press agency was started in November 1931 as the Red China News Agency and changed to its current name in 1937.^[3] During the Pacific War the agency developed overseas broadcasting capabilities and established its first overseas branches.^[3] It began broadcasting to foreign countries in English from 1944. When the communists took power in China, the agency represented the Chinese Communist Party in countries and territories with which it had no diplomatic representation, such as Hong Kong.^[3]

The agency was described as the "eyes and tongue" of the Party, observing what is important for the masses and passing on the information.^[4] A former Xinhua director, Zheng Tao, noted that the agency was a bridge between the Party, the government and the people, communicating both the demands of the people and the policies of the Party.^[5]

Like many other media organizations, Xinhua struggled to find the "right line" to use in covering the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Although more cautious than People's Daily in its treatment of sensitive topics during that period – such as how to commemorate reformist Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang's April 1989 death, the then ongoing demonstrations in Beijing and elsewhere, and basic questions of press freedom and individual rights – Xinhua gave some favorable coverage to demonstrators and intellectuals who were questioning top party leaders. Even so, many Xinhua reporters were angry with top editors for not going far enough and for suppressing stories about the Tiananmen Square crackdown. For several days after the violence on June 4, almost no-one at Xinhua did any work, and journalists demonstrated inside the Agency's Beijing compound. Government control of the media increased after the protests – top editors at the agency's bureaux in Hong Kong and Macau were replaced with appointees who were "loyal to the mainland" rather than those with ties to either Hong Kong or Macau.^[6]

Finance[link]

In the past, Xinhua was able to attract the top young journalists emerging from the universities or otherwise newly entering the field, but it can no longer do so easily because of the appeal and resources of other newspapers and periodicals and the greater glamour of television and radio jobs.^{[citation needed]} For example, mid-level reporters for the Xinmin Evening News in Shanghai are often given an apartment, whereas at Xinhua and People's Daily this benefit is reserved for the most senior journalists.

Beijing has been cutting funding to the news agency by an average of seven percent per year over the past three years, and state funds currently cover only about 40 percent of Xinhua's costs. As a result, the agency is raising revenues through involvement in public relations, construction, and information-servicing businesses.

Reach[link]

Today, Xinhua News Agency delivers its news across the world in six languages: Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish, and Arabic, as well as news pictures and other kinds of news. It has made contracts to exchange news and news pictures with more than eighty foreign news agencies or political news departments. Xinhua is also responsible for handling, and in some cases, censoring reports from foreign media destined to release in China.^[7]

The agency recently began to converge its news and electronic media coverage and has increased its English coverage through its wire service and chinaview.cn web site. Xinhua recently acquired commercial real estate on New York's Times Square and is developing a staff of top-tier English-language reporters. Xinhua has also started an English-language satellite news network.^[8]

Internal media[link]

The Chinese media's internal publication system, in which certain journals are published exclusively for government and party officials, provides information and analysis which are not generally available to the public. The State values these internal reports because they contain much of China's most sensitive, controversial, and high-quality investigative journalism.

Xinhua and many other Chinese media organizations produce reports for the "internal" journals. Informed observers note that journalists generally like to write for the internal publications—typically, only the most senior or most capable print and broadcast reporters are given such opportunities – because they can write less polemical and more comprehensive stories without having to omit unwelcome details commonly done in the print media directed to the general public. The internal reports, written from a large number of countries, typically consist of in depth analyses of international situations and domestic attitudes towards regional issues and a certain country's perception of China.^[9]

The Chinese government's internal media publication system follows a strict hierarchical pattern designed to facilitate party control. A publication called Reference News—which includes translated articles from abroad as well as news and commentary by senior Xinhua reporters—is delivered by Xinhua personnel, rather than by the national mail system, to officials at the working level and above. A three-to-ten-page report called Internal Reference (Neibu Cankao) is distributed to officials at the ministerial level and higher. One example was the first reports on the SARS outbreak by Xinhua which only government officials were allowed to see.^[10] The most highly classified Xinhua internal reports, known as "redhead reference" (Hong Tou Cankao) reports, are issued occasionally to the top dozen or so party and government officials.

There are signs that the internal publication system is breaking down as more information becomes widely available in China. A Hong Kong-based political journal circulated on the Chinese mainland has questioned the need for such a system in light of China's modern telecommunications and expanding contacts with the outside world. Internal publications are becoming less exclusive; some are now being sold illegally on the street and are increasingly available to anyone with money.

Headquarters and regional sectors[link]

The Xinhua headquarters is located in Beijing. The Xinhua News Agency established its first overseas affiliate in 1947 in London, with Samuel Chinque as publisher. Now it distributes its news in Asia, Middle East, Latin America, Africa where run the superior offices; in Hong Kong, Macau and many foreign countries and districts. There are more than one hundred Xinhua affiliates.

Xinhua in Hong Kong[link]

Xinhua's branch in Hong Kong was not just a press office. It was named a news agency under the special historic conditions before the territory's sovereignty was transferred from Britain to the PRC, because the PRC did not recognise British sovereignty over the colony, and an embassy or consulate cannot be set up within what it considered its soil. Until 1997, it served as the de facto diplomatic mission of the PRC in the territory. It was authorized by the special administrative region government to continue to represent the central government after 1997, and it was renamed The Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong SAR on January 18, 2000. The State Council appointed Gao Siren (高祀仁) as the director in August 2002. After renaming as liaison office, a Xinhua Agency which is a true press office was set up.

Xinhua in Cairo[link]

Xinhua opened its Middle East Regional Bureau in Cairo, Egypt in 1985. In November 2005, Xinhua News Agency opened a new office building alongside the Nile River in Cairo's Maadi district.^[11]

Xinhua in Vientiane[link]

Xinhua opened a Bureau in Vientiane, the capital of Laos, in 2010. It is the only foreign news bureau permitted to operate in the country.

Xinhua online[link]

The Xinhua News Agency runs the prominent news website Xinhuanet.com, which provides news in six different languages. The domain xinhuanet.com attracted 430,000 unique visitors between February 2008 and February 2009 according to a Compete.com survey.

Partnerships[link]

In 2001, Hong Kong-listed media company Sing Tao News Corporation Limited invested in joint ventures with Xinhua News Agency to set up a market information Web site and offer audio and visual services planning and consulting.

Tantao News[link]

In its drive to globalize its content and reach new audiences, Xinhua has entered into a partnership with CNEWSCO, LLC, an apolitical American company. A key element of the relationship is the editorial freedom CNEWSCO enjoys to select and publish Xinhua multimedia content under a new brand Tantao. The Tantao Global News Network focuses on providing global news coverage on a variety of topics and perspectives originating mainly from Chinese news and media sources. Content is aggregated, published and syndicated from major Chinese news organizations including the Xinhua News Agency, Shanghai Media Group, China Central Television America, and others sources.

Credibility[link]

Bloomberg Businessweek commented on the opening of Xinhua Finance, saying that it would have to overcome the "Xinhua stigma" of being associated with "official propaganda", and suspicions by outsiders of its credibility.^[12] In an interview with Indian media in 2007, the head of Xinhua, Tian Congmin, affirmed the problem of "historical setbacks and popular perceptions".^[13] Newsweek criticized Xinhua as "being best known for its blind spots" regarding controversial news in China, and mentioned that its "coverage of the United States is hardly fair and balanced". Even so, "Xinhua's spin diminishes when the news doesn't involve China".^[14]

During the 2003 SARS outbreak, Xinhua was slow to release reports of the incident to the public. However, its reporting in the aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake was seen in as more transparent and credible as Xinhua journalists operated more freely.^[15][16] After the Beijing Television Cultural Center fire, cognizant of Xinhua's "tardy" reporting in contrast to bloggers, China announced the investment of 20 billion yuan to Xinhua. The vice president of the China International Publishing Group commented on this, saying that quantity of media exposure would not necessarily help perceptions of China. Rather, he said, media should focus on emphasizing Chinese culture and the Chinese way of life "to convey the message that China is a friend, not an enemy".^[17]

Xinhua for its own part has criticized the perception of Western media objectivity, citing an incident during the 2008 Tibetan unrest when Western media outlets used a picture of Nepalese police beating Tibetan protesters, misleadingly labeling the pictures as of Chinese police,^[18] with commentary from CNN calling Chinese leaders "goons and thugs". CNN later apologized for the comments,^[19] but Richard Spencer of The Sunday Telegraph defended what he conceded was "biased" Western media coverage of the riots, blaming China for not allowing foreign media access to Tibet during the conflict.^[20]

See also[link]

	People's Republic of China portal
	Journalism portal

• China Xinhua News Network Corporation
• China Securities Journal
• Media of the People's Republic of China

References[link]

External links[link]

• Xinhua News in English
• Xinhua News (Chinese)
• Archive Repository for Selective Xinhua Arabic News Feeds

Coordinates: 39°53′55.55″N 116°21′54.83″E / 39.8987639°N 116.3652306°E / 39.8987639; 116.3652306

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Kim Taek-Soo
Kim Taek-Soo Kim Taek-Soo
Personal information
Full name	KIM Taek Soo
Nationality	South Korea
Medal record Men's table tennis Competitor for  South Korea World Championships Bronze 2004 Doha Team Bronze 2003 Paris Doubles Bronze 2001 Osaka Doubles Bronze 2001 Osaka Team Bronze 1999 Eindhoven Doubles Bronze 1997 Manchester Team Bronze 1995 Tianjin Team Bronze 1993 Gothenburg Doubles Bronze 1991 Chiba City Singles World Cup Silver 2000 Yangzhou Singles Silver 1998 Shantou Singles Silver 1992 Ho Chi Minh City Singles Gold 1992 Las Vegas Doubles Gold 1990 Seoul Doubles Gold 1995 Atlanta Team Asian Championships Silver 2000 Doha Singles Silver 2000 Doha Mixed Doubles Bronze 1998 Osaka Doubles Silver 1998 Osaka Team Bronze 1996 Kallang Singles Silver 1996 Kallang Doubles Bronze 1996 Kallang Mixed Doubles Gold 1996 Kallang Team Bronze 1990 Kuala Lumpur Singles Silver 1990 Kuala Lumpur Mixed Doubles

Kim Taek-Soo (Hangul: 김택수, Hanja: 金擇洙) (born May 25, 1970) is a male former table tennis player from South Korea. He is best known for his powerful forehand, amazingly quick footwork and perhaps the best traditional penhold backhand in the history of table tennis. Taek Soo played the penhold style and used a single side of the racket as opposed to the newer style of reverse backhand looping that has become a big part of the Chinese penhold arena.

As of 2010 Kim Taek-Soo has been announced as the new national coach of the Korean National Team for table tennis. It is unknown when he will take over from the current head-coach Yoo Nam-Kyu.

External links[link]

• profile

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This biographical article relating to a South Korean table tennis figure is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it. v t e

Chen Xinhua
Full name	CHEN Xinhua
Nationality	China  England
Medal record Men's table tennis Competitor for  China World Championships Bronze 1987 New Delhi Singles Gold 1987 New Delhi Men's Team Bronze 1985 Gothenburg Mixed Doubles Gold 1985 Gothenburg Men's Team Silver 1983 Tokyo Mixed Doubles Silver 1981 Novi Sad Mixed Doubles World Cup Gold 1985 Foshan Singles Asian Championships Bronze 1978 Kuala Lumpur Singles Gold 1978 Kuala Lumpur Men's Team Competitor for  England World Cup Bronze 1990 Chiba City Men's Team European Championships Silver 1992 Stuttgart Men's Team

Chen Xinhua is a male former table tennis player. He is from China, but obtained the English citizenship in 1990. From 1978 to 1992 he won several medals in singles, doubles, and team events in the World Table Tennis Championships. He is also the winner of Table Tennis World Cup in 1985.^[1]

References[link]

This biographical article relating to a People's Republic of China table tennis figure is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it. v t e

Bo Xilai 薄熙来
CPC Chongqing Committee Secretary
In office November 2007 – March 2012
Deputy (Mayor)	Wang Hongju (2007–2009) Huang Qifan (2009–)
Preceded by	Wang Yang
Succeeded by	Zhang Dejiang
Minister of Commerce of the PRC
In office February 2004 – December 2007
Premier	Wen Jiabao
Preceded by	Lü Fuyuan
Succeeded by	Chen Deming
Personal details
Born	(1949-07-03) 3 July 1949 (age 62) Beijing, Republic Of China
Political party	Communist Party of China
Spouse(s)	Li Danyu (divorced) Gu Kailai
Relations	Bo Yibo (father)
Children	Li Wangzhi Bo Guagua
Alma mater	Peking University Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Bo Xilai (born 3 July 1949) is a Chinese politician. He came to prominence through his tenures as the mayor of the coastal economic hub of Dalian and then governor of Liaoning province. From 2004 to November 2007, he served as Minister of Commerce. Between 2007 and 2012 he served as a member of the Politburo and head of the Communist Party's Chongqing branch.

The son of Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Elders of the Communist Party of China, Bo Xilai is identified as one of the "princelings" of Chinese politics. He cultivated a casual and charismatic image in the media that marked a departure from the normally staid nature of Chinese politics.

In Chongqing, Bo became known for heavy-handed populism. He initiated a campaign against organized crime, increased spending on welfare programs, maintained consistent double-digit percentage GDP growth, and campaigned to revive Cultural Revolution-era "red culture." Bo's promotion of egalitarian values and the achievements of his "Chongqing model" made him the champion of the Chinese New Left, composed of both Maoists and social democrats disillusioned with the country's market-based economic reforms and increasing economic inequality.^[1] However, the perceived lawlessness of Bo's anti-corruption campaigns, coupled with concerns about his outsized personality, made him a controversial figure.

Bo was considered a likely candidate for promotion to the elite Politburo Standing Committee in CPC 18th National Congress in 2012. His political fortunes came to an abrupt end following the Wang Lijun incident, in which his top lieutenant and police chief sought asylum at the American consulate in Chengdu and revealed details of Bo's alleged involvement in a homicide plot. In the fallout, Bo was removed as Chongqing party chief in March 2012 and suspended from the politburo the following month. Bo's dismissal was notable for exposing disunity within Communist Party ranks shortly before a leadership transition.

Early life[link]

Bo Xilai was the fourth child of prominent Communist Party leader Bo Yibo, who served as Minister of Finance in the early years of the People's Republic of China but who fell from favor in 1965 for supporting more open trade relations with the West^{[citation needed]}. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Bo Yibo was labeled a "rightist" and a "counterrevolutionary" and purged from his posts.^[2] He spent the ensuing twelve years in prison, where he was reportedly tortured. His wife, Hu Ming, was abducted by Red Guard in Guangzhou, and was either beaten to death or committed suicide.^[3]

Bo Xilai was 17 years old when the Cultural Revolution began, and at the time attended the prestigious No. 4 High School in Beijing — one of the best in the country.^[3][4] In the early years of the Cultural Revolution, Bo is reported to have been an active member of the liandong Red Guard organization^[4][5] and may have at one point denounced his father.^[6]

As the political winds of the Cultural Revolution shifted, Bo and his siblings were either imprisoned or sent to the countryside, and Bo Xilai was locked up for five years.^[7] After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the members of the Gang of Four were officially blamed for the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and Bo's family was released. Bo Yibo was politically rehabilitated, and in 1979 became vice premier.^[2]

After his release, Bo Xilai worked at the Hardware Repair Factory for the Beijing Second Light Industry Bureau.^[8] He was admitted to the Peking University by public examination in 1977. Unlike many of his contemporaries in the Chinese leadership who studied engineering, Bo majored in world history.^[9] In his sophomore year, Bo enlisted in a Master's program in international journalism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,^[4] graduating with a Master's degree in 1982.^[10] He joined the Communist Party in October 1980.^[10]

Early political career[link]

During the 1980s, the Bo family regained its political influence. Bo Yibo served successively as vice premier and vice-chairman of the Central Advisory Commission. The elder Bo came to be known as one of the “eight elders” (sometimes referred to as the “eight immortals”) of the Communist Party and was instrumental in the implementation of market reforms in the 1980s. Although he favored more liberal economic policies, the elder Bo was politically conservative, and endorsed the use of military force against demonstrators during the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests.^[2] After the 1989 crackdown, Bo Yibo helped ensure the ascent of Jiang Zemin to succeed Deng Xiaoping as the leader of the Party and helped Jiang consolidate power in the 1990s.^[9] Bo Yibo remained a prominent figure in the party until his death in 2007^[2] and was influential in shaping his son's career.^[11]

After graduating from university, Bo was assigned to Zhongnanhai^[9] – the headquarters of the Communist Party – where he worked with the research office of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat and CPC Central Committee General Office.^[4] He soon requested a transfer to the provinces, and in 1984 was appointed deputy party secretary of Jin County, near Dalian in the northeastern province of Liaoning.^[9][10] In an interview with People’s Daily, Bo said that his family name created career obstacles. "For quite a long time people had reservations about me," he said.^[11] Bo subsequently became deputy secretary and then secretary of the party committee of the Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone and secretary of the Jinzhou party committee.^[10]

Rising again in rank within the party, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Dalian Municipal CPC Committee, the city's top decision-making body, and became the Vice-mayor of Dalian in 1990.^[10] In 1993, Bo became deputy Party secretary and mayor of Dalian.^[9]

Liaoning[link]

Mayor of Dalian[link]

Dalian saw significant development under Bo's leadership.

Bo became acting mayor of Dalian in 1992 and formally assumed the post in 1993. He remained mayor until 2000. Bo served as Dalian's deputy party secretary from 1995.^[10] Bo was promoted to party chief in 1999 and served in that position until 2000.

Bo's tenure in Dalian was marked by the city's phenomenal transformation from a drab port city to a modern metropolis, a 'showcase' of China's rapid economic growth.^[12] In the early 1990s, Bo took some credit for the construction of the Shenyang-Dalian Expressway, China's first controlled-access freeway, winning accolades for the rapid expansion of infrastructure and for environmental work.^[13] Since Bo's time in office, Dalian became known as one of the cleanest cities in China, having won the UN Habitat Scroll of Honour Award in 1999. In addition, Bo was an advocate for free enterprise and small businesses, and successfully courted foreign investment from South Korea, Japan, and Western countries.^[12] In contrast to his colleagues, he held press conferences at Chinese New Year, and developed a reputation among foreign investors for 'getting things done'.^[13]

Bo spent seventeen years in the city of Dalian, a lengthy term in comparison to colleagues of the same rank, who are often transferred to different locales throughout their careers. Despite the accompanying economic growth and rise in living standards, Bo's tenure in Dalian has sometimes been criticized as having been too focused on aesthetic development projects such as expansive boulevards, monuments, and large public parks.^[13] To make way for his large-scale projects, Bo's administration moved large numbers of local residents from downtown areas into new homes in the city's outskirts. Dalian's greenery was dubbed "Xilai Grass".^[14] He also reputedly had a remote control in the Mayor's office for the fountains on the city's main square.^[15] In addition, he spearheaded the construction of a huabiao in the city.^[16] In 2000, Bo was frontrunner for the post of Mayor of Shenzhen, based on his success in making Dalian the "Hong Kong of the North". However it was suggested that Bo was too independent and outspoken for the post. The post went to Yu Youjun instead.^[17]

15th Party Congress[link]

During the 15th Party Congress in 1997, Bo Xilai’s family launched an unsuccessful campaign to secure his promotion to become a member of the Central Committee of the CCP. Although nepotism was generally frowned upon in China, Bo Yibo’s ambitions for his son were well-known.^[14] Bo Yibo advanced the idea that revolutionary elders should 'nominate' their children to become high officials, and Bo Xilai was selected as his family’s 'representative' over his older brother Bo Xicheng,^[14] ostensibly because of Xilai’s superior academic credentials, which included attendance at the elite Peking University and a master’s degree.

In order to secure Bo Xilai’s selection for promotion during the 15th Party Congress, the family launched a nationwide campaign to publicize his son’s "achievements" as mayor of Dalian.^[14] They commissioned author Chen Zufeng to pen a report portraying Bo as a man who is "as statesman-like as Henry Kissinger, as environmentally conscious as Al Gore, and almost as beloved by the public as Princess Diana."^[14] Despite the publicity campaign, Bo Xilai failed even to gain a seat in the Liaoning provincial delegation to the Party Congress. Ultimately, Bo Yibo helped him gain a seat with the Shanxi delegation, but the younger Bo was unable to secure a promotion.^[14]

In addition, Bo placed second-last in the confirmation vote for membership in the 15th Central Committee. As he placed in the bottom 5% of candidates, Bo was denied entry into the elite council, suffering a major political embarrassment.^[4] Bo's failure to get elected was attributed to a general opposition to nepotism within the Party.^[14] Moreover, during his tenure in Dalian, Bo caused resentment for the amount of 'special favours' that he procured for the coastal city at the expense of the rest of the province.^[14] His perceived partisan interests locked Bo's kin in a factional struggle against Li Tieying, one of China's central leadership figures, who may have created obstacles to his promotion.^[14]

Provincial Governor[link]

In 2001, a corruption scandal involving former Liaoning governor Zhang Guoguang provided an opportunity for Bo's advancement.^[13] Prior to the 15th Party Congress, Bo Yibo and Bo Xilai assisted then-President Jiang Zemin in preparing to force political rival Qiao Shi into retirement. The Bo family also supported Jiang's lacklustre "Three Stresses" (San Jiang) campaign in 1997.^[9] Such unwavering support for Jiang was said to have worked in Bo Xilai's favour when the vacancy for Governor of Liaoning opened. Bo became acting Governor in 2001 after the dismissal and arrest of Zhang Guoguang,^[9] and was officially confirmed as Governor in 2003.^[10] In his position as governor, which he held until 2004, Bo gained membership to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.^[4]

During his tenure in Liaoning, Bo played a critical role in the promotion of the Northeast Area Revitalization Plan. Adopted in 2003 by party authorities, the policy aimed to strengthen economic development in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. Bo Xilai was particularly enthusiastic about the policy, stating his desire to see the northeast become "China's fourth economic engine" (the others being the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and the Bohai Economic Region).^[4]

The northeast region was at one time known as the "cradle of industrialization" of China. In 1980, industrial output for Liaoning province alone was twice that of the southern Guangdong province. However, the northeast was left behind amidst market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, while regions like Guangdong prospered. Its economy—still largely tied to state-owned enterprises—stagnated relative to other regions, with high unemployment rates.^[4] The revitalisation plan aimed to address this by reviving the region’s traditional industries, strengthening trade ties with and encouraging investment from South Korea and Japan, and experimenting with free trade zones in select cities.^[18] In 2004, official media reported that foreign direct investment in Liaoning had nearly doubled since the launch in 2003 of the northeastern rejuvenation strategy.^[19]

Although Bo established a reputation as a comparatively clean politician during his tenures in Dalian and as governor of Liaoning,^[20] he was not immune to corruption allegations. In particular, Bo was the subject of critical investigative reports by Liaoning journalist Jiang Weiping,^[21] the whistleblower in the Mu and Ma corruption case in Liaoning – a scandal that Bo benefited from politically. While Bo was not directly involved in the scandal, Jiang accused Bo of providing political cover for his friends and relatives.^[21] Jiang was initially sentenced to eight years in prison on trumped-up charges, for which Bo was criticized, but was released after five years under international pressure.^[13][22] Yang Rong, the former chief executive of Brilliance China Automotive who fled to the United States after getting embroiled in a dispute against state property authorities, accused Bo of interfering in his judicial proceedings in Beijing.^[13] In addition, Bo openly clashed with Wen Shizhen, then-party secretary in Liaoning who was technically Bo's superior.^[4][13] Wen reportedly criticized Bo for "developing China's cities like Europe and its countryside like Africa," and even held a party to celebrate Bo's departure from Liaoning in 2004.^[23]

Falun Gong practitioners and their supporters have accused Bo of leading an especially severe crackdown on the group during his tenure in Liaoning.^[24][25] They have filed lawsuits against Bo in over ten countries, alleging torture and crimes against humanity.^[26][27] In 2007 Bo was found liable for the torture of a Falun Gong practitioner in an uncontested civil suit in Australia.^[28]

16th Party Congress[link]

At the 16th Party Congress in 2002, Bo's age, regional tenures, and patronage links fit the profile for a potential candidate to be groomed for the "5th generation of leaders" that would assume power in 2012. His chief competitors were seen as Xi Jinping, then party chief in the coastal province of Zhejiang, and Li Keqiang, a populist Tuanpai candidate who was the Governor of the central province of Henan.^[9] As with the 15th Party Congress five years earlier, the elder Bo lobbied for his son's promotion.^[9] The Bo family enjoyed the patronage of Jiang Zemin. However, Bo Xilai's unequivocal support for Jiang strengthened the reluctance of his political opponents to support his nomination. Ultimately, although Bo remained a top contender for higher promotion, Xi and Li remained the main candidates to succeed Hu Jintao as Paramount leader.^[9]

Minister of Commerce[link]

Commerce Minister Bo meets his American counterpart, Carlos Gutierrez, during a visit to the United States in 2007

When Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as General Secretary in late 2002, Bo's career as a local official ended with his appointment to Minister of Commerce in Wen Jiabao's cabinet to replace Lü Fuyuan, who retired for health reasons. Bo concurrently served as a member of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Bo's stint as Minister of Commerce significantly raised his international profile and generated media attention both in China and abroad. Described as good-looking, articulate and open-minded in his approach to problems,^[29] Bo's rise from a municipal official to the central government generated great media fanfare and elevated his status to something of a 'political star.' Bo's political persona was considered a departure from the generally serious and conservative leadership in Beijing. With his youthful vigour, populism, and purported popularity with female reporters, Bo's political rise had been compared to that of John F. Kennedy.^[30]

Bo presided over a continued rise in foreign investment in China as Minister of Commerce. His daily schedule was dominated by receiving foreign guests and dignitaries. By the time that he became Minister, he spoke relatively fluent and colloquial English. During a meeting with American officials, Bo reputedly told a struggling interpreter to stop translating because the Chinese officials could understand English and it was wasting time. In May 2004 Bo was one of the few ministers hand-picked to accompany Premier Wen Jiabao on a five-country trip to Europe.^[30] The trade policy of the United States toward China also sparked significant controversy. Bo maintained a conciliatory but assertive attitude as he attended talks in Washington.^[30] On his trips to the United States, he conducted substantive discussions with his American counterparts and signed agreements on intellectual property, the services sector, agricultural products, food safety, and consumer protection.^[30]

Bo also oversaw the restructuring of the Ministry, formed from the amalgamation of the National Economics and Commerce Bureau and the Department of International Trade. Bo sought to balance the amount of attention given to foreign investors and domestic commercial institutions. He began tackling the imbalance from the retail sector, whose success up to that point was largely dependent on foreign companies.^[30] He drew up plans to protect Chinese industries' competitive position within a domestic market that was quickly being crowded out by foreign competition.^[31]

17th Party Congress[link]

At the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, Bo gained a seat on the 25-member Politburo, effectively China's ruling council. He was then tipped to leave the Ministry of Commerce and take over as party chief in the southwestern megalopolis of Chongqing. Bo’s predecessor, political rival Wang Yang, was reassigned as party chief of Guangdong province.

At the time, Chongqing was reeling from problems such as air and water pollution, unemployment, poor public health, and complications from the Three Gorges Dam.^[6] According to analysts, Hu wanted to transfer his ally Wang Yang out of Chongqing before these problems intensified.^[6] Bo was initially reluctant to go to Chongqing and was reportedly unhappy with his new assignment. He had hoped to become vice-premier instead,^[32] but Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice-premier Wu Yi argued against Bo's promotion to vice-premiership. In particular, Wu was critical of Bo’s penchant for self-promotion,^[23] and Wen cited international lawsuits against Bo by Falun Gong adherents as a barrier to his holding higher office.^[6]

Bo took up the Chongqing post on 30 November, a month following the conclusion of the Congress, even though Wang Yang had vacated the position on 13 November.^[32] Whilst some saw this transfer as a 'banishment' from the central government to the hinterlands to keep Bo's perceived arrogance and high-profile antics out of Beijing's view,^[6] others considered it a promotion since being the party chief in one of the four direct-controlled municipalities came with an ex officio seat on the Politburo.^[32][33]

Chongqing[link]

The Chongqing model[link]

Although Bo was initially unhappy about his re-assignment in Chongqing, he soon resolved to use his new position as a staging ground for a return to higher national office.^[34] Bo made no secret of his desire to enter the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) during the 18th Party Congress in autumn 2012,^[35] all but two of the PSC members—including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao—were expected to retire.^[29] The transition would be an opportunity for Bo to join the highest echelon of national leadership, likely as a replacement for ally Zhou Yongkang, secretary of the Central Political and Legislative Committee, serving as the head of the party's security apparatus.^[35][36]

In Chongqing, Bo pioneered a new style of governance dubbed the "Chongqing Model” — a set of social and economic policies intended to address diverse challenges facing modern China following economic reforms.^[37][38]

The Chonqging model was characterized in part by increased state control and the promotion of a neo-leftist ideology. Along with his police chief Wang Lijun, Bo launched a sweeping campaign against organized crime, and increased the security and police presence in the city. Critics noted these policies were accompanied by the erosion of the rule of law, and allegations surfaced of political and personal rivals being victimized amidst Bo’s anti-corruption drive. As a means of addressing declining public morality, Bo launched a “red culture” movement to promote Maoist-era socialist ethics. On the economic front, he actively courted foreign investment—much as he had done in Liaoning province. The Chongqing model was also characterized by massive public works programs, subsidized housing for the poor, and social policies intended to make it easier for rural citizens to move to the city, thus reaping the benefits of urban status.^[37] Some have compared Bo's governing style to Russian president Vladimir Putin.^[39]

The Chongqing model provided an 'alternate' comprehensive roadmap for development that diverged from the policies favored by the reformist faction dominated by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.^[37] Bo’s leadership in Chongqing dramatically raised his profile, both nationally and internationally. In 2010, he was named as one of the 'World's 100 Most Influential People in 2010' by Time.^[40] Observers noted that, in China's non-electoral political system, Bo's high-profile presence and bold political maneuvers effectively amounted to a public campaign for the top leadership.^[41] However, he drew the ire of some of the country’s leaders; President Hu and Premier Wen were reluctant to acknowledge Bo publicly, ostensibly due to a discomfort over his leadership style.^[41]

Organized crime[link]

Bo's tenure in Chongqing was dominated by a protracted war against organized crime and corruption known as dahei ("striking black"). Between 2009 and 2011, an estimated 5,700 people were arrested in the sweeping campaign that ensnared not only criminals, but also businessmen, members of the police force, judges, government officials, and political adversaries.^[42][43] The campaign was overseen by Wang Lijun, whom Bo had worked with previously in Liaoning province.^[29]

Wen Qiang, one of the most prominent figures implicated in the trials, had been a prominent municipal official since the days of party chiefs He Guoqiang and Wang Yang. China observer Willy Lam suggested that the such a large-scale crackdown was given 'go-ahead' from central authorities and general secretary, president Hu Jintao, and Bo was careful to not look as though Chongqing was trying to 'set an example' for the rest of the country so he could benefit from the success politically.^[44]

The dahei campaign earned Bo national recognition and widespread popularity in Chongqing—all the more because of the city’s historical reputation as a center for criminal activity.^[35] In contrast to often colorless and orthodox politicians, Bo gained the reputation as a party boss that "got things done."^[45] The apparent success of the campaign gave Bo a 'rock star status', and resulted in calls for a nation-wide campaign modeled on Chongqing. Through the campaign, Bo gained the support of a number of powerful members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping and Zhou Yongkang, all of whom visited Chongqing or praised Bo's achievements sometime between 2010 and 2011.^[38]

However, Bo's campaign was criticized for running roughshod over judicial due process and eroding the rule of law.^[42] Individuals targeted in the campaign were arbitrarily detained by the authorities, with an estimated 1,000 being sent to forced labor.^[46] Lawyers for the accused were intimidated and harassed, and in at least one case, sentenced to 18 months in prison.^[45] Allegations also surfaced over the use of torture to extract confessions.^[45] Moreover, assets seized during the campaign were allegedly redirected to help pay for Bo’s popular social housing programs.^[47] The Wall Street Journal reported that the $11 billion went into government coffers through the campaign.^[42] Li Jun, a fugitive businessman, asserted that he became a target of Bo anti-corruption drive as a result of a land dispute with the government. When he refused government demands to give up the land, he claims that he was abducted and tortured, and that the $700 million worth of assets in his business were seized.^[48][49]

Red culture movement[link]

During his time in Chongqing, Bo initiated a series of Maoist-style campaigns to revive 'red culture' and improve public morale. The initiative included the promotion of Maoist quotes, 'red' songs, revolutionary television programing and operas, and initiatives to encourage students to work in the countryside, akin to the way students were required to do during the Down to the Countryside Movement of the Cultural Revolution.^[50] As part of the movement, Bo and the city's Media Department initiated a "Red Songs campaign" that demanded every district, government department, commercial enterprise, educational institution, state radio and TV station begin singing 'red songs' praising the achievements of the Communist Party of China. Bo pledged to reinvigorate the city with the Marxist ideals reminiscent of the Mao era.^{[51][52][53][54]}

Prior to the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China celebrations, for instance, Bo sent out 'red text messages' to the city's 13 million cellphone users.^[55] According to Xinhua, Bo's text messages are usually quotes from Mao's Little Red Book, and include phrases such as "I like how Chairman Mao puts it: The world is ours, we will all have to work together,"^[56] and "responsibility and seriousness can conquer the world, and the Chinese Communist Party members represent these qualities."^[35] Bo and his team of municipal administrators also raised new Mao statues in Chongqing, while providing 'social security apartments' to the city's less well-off.^[57] Some scholars have characterized this as an example of the revival of Maoism in the Chinese Communist ethos.^[57]

Reactions to the red culture movement were divided. Bo’s revival of Mao-era culture and accompanying social welfare programs were popular within much of the middle to lower income strata of Chongqing society, and made Bo a star with both conventional Marxists and neo-leftists. Bo won praise for returning the city to what some called China's 'true socialist heritage' by de-emphasizing material wealth, and evoked nostalgia to the social equality that existed during Mao's time.^[58] Some retirees said they wanted to pass on "revolutionary spirit" to their children, while others participated as a means to praise the Communist Party for the country’s economic progress.^[59]

The campaign also had many detractors. Some intellectuals and reformers criticized the campaign for being regressive, akin to "being drowned in a red sea", and bringing back painful memories from the Cultural Revolution.^[58][60] Several mid-level officials in the city committed suicide due to overwhelming pressure to organize events for the red songs campaign.^[60] Bo’s critics derisively referred to him as "little Mao".^[61]

Social policies[link]

A cornerstone of Bo’s Chongqing model involved a series of egalitarian social policies aimed to lessen the gap between rich and poor, and ease the rural-urban divide. Bo promoted the notion of pursuing “red GDP”—an economic model embodying communist egalitarianism—and suggested that, if economic development were analogous to 'baking a cake', then the primary task should be to divide the cake fairly rather than building a larger cake.^[62]

To that end, the city reportedly spent $15.8 billion on public apartment complexes for use by recent college graduates, migrant workers and low-income residents.^[38] In 2007, the cities of Chongqing and Chengdu were selected to run pilot projects intended to mitigate the rural-urban divide and ease integration of rural residents into the cities. Under China’s hukou registration system, citizens are classified as either rural or urban—a distinction that determines nor only where they may live, but also affects educational opportunities, taxation, property rights, and so on. Of Chongqing’s 32 million residents, only 27% held urban hukous as of 2007.^[63] The 2007 project made it easier for rural residents to obtain urban status, a policy intended not only to help balance inequality, but also to enable the government to develop underused rural land. Under Bo’s leadership, Chongqing established “land exchanges” where rural villages could earn credits for maximizing farmland.^[64]

Bo's approach to social policy was demonstrated during the November 2008 taxi strikes, which saw over 8,000 taxi drivers take to the streets for two days in protests over high fees, unregulated competition and rising fuel charges. Similar protests in China are frequently suppressed—sometimes forcefully—with official media sometimes blaming labor unrest on criminal instigation.^[65] Bo's government instead held a televised roundtable dialogues with the protesters and citizens, and agreed to allow the formation of a trade union. His handling of situation earned him praise as a comparatively restrained and progressive leader.^[66][67]

Economic policies[link]

Another major component of Bo’s Chongqing model concerned the city’s economic policies. Just as he had done in Liaoning province, Bo ambitiously pursued foreign investment in the city, lowering corporate income tax rates (15% compared to the 25% national average), and sought to stimulate rapid urbanization and industrialization.^[63] He also carried on with policies initiated by his predecessors which focused on domestic consumption, rather than export-led growth.

During his tenure, Chongqing reported annual GDP growth far exceeding the national average. In 2008, for instance, nationwide GDP growth was reported at 8%, while Chongqing reported 14.3%; the same year, foreign trade rose by 28%, and bank loans were up 29%.^[63]

Bo model of economic growth won national and international praise for seamlessly combining foreign investment and state-led growth. However, Bo's critics called the model of “red GDP” – subsidized infrastructure, housing and public works projects – unsustainable and a drain on the city's budget. Some civil servants complained that they were not getting salaries on time.^[60] Chongqing received a disproportionately high share (some $34 billion) of stimulus money from the Beijing in 2008. Political rivals such as Bo’s predecessor Wang Yang also suggested that economic figures in Chongqing were “rigged”—artificially inflated through unnecessary construction and public works projects.^[68]

Leadership style[link]

Although many of Bo’s campaigns earned popular support, especially from the city’s poor, his leadership style has been described as “propagandistic,” “ruthless,” and “arrogant” by subordinates and city officials, academics, journalists, and other professionals.^[23][60] Michael Wines of the New York Times wrote that although Bo was possessed of “prodigious charisma and deep intelligence,” these qualities were offset by a “studied indifference to the wrecked lives that littered his path to power…Mr. Bo’s ruthlessness stood out, even in a system where the absence of formal rules ensures that only the strongest advance.”^[23] Bo placed onerous demands on government officials in the city, requiring them to be available to work all day and all night, seven days a week.^[60] He reportedly called subordinates to late-night meetings, publicly criticized and humiliated those with whom he disagreed, and even hit underlings who failed to meet his demands.^[23] According to a psychologist quoted in the Daily Telegraph, since Bo Xilai assumed power, "depression, burn out and suicides have all risen among officials…Officials now make up the largest share of patients in counselling in the city.”^[60]

In late 2009, a popular investigative television show on China Central Television aired a critical story on Bo’s anti-crime drive, expressing concern over the apparent disregard for the legal process. In response, Bo utilized his connections to have the show’s host temporarily banned from the airwaves, and its producer moved to another program.^[23] Others who opposed Bo’s initiatives were also met with retribution. Li Zhuang, a defense lawyer from Beijing, was sentenced to two and a half years in prison (lated reduced to 18 months) in 2009 for attempting to defend one of the high-profile targets of Bo’s crackdown.^[23][69] Cheng Li, a scholar at the Brookings Institution, remarked that “Nobody really trusts [Bo]: a lot of people are scared of him, including several princelings who are supposed to be his power base.”^[23]

Alleged eavesdropping operations[link]

As part of Bo’s efforts to fight crime and maintain social and political stability in Chongqing, he initiated a major electronic surveillance operation. Wang Lijun, Bo’s police chief, served as the architect of the state-funded project, which was described in official media as a “comprehensive package bugging system covering telecommunications to the Internet.”^[70] The system involved wiretaps, eavesdropping, and monitoring of internet communications, and was designed with the help of cybersecurity expert Fang Binxing, known for his pivotal role in the construction of China’s Great Firewall.^[70]

According the New York Times, the eavesdropping operations did not only target local criminals, but also the communications of top Chinese leaders, including general secretary, president Hu Jintao.^[71] One source connected to the Chinese leadership said that Bo tried to monitor nearly all central leaders who had visited Chongqing.^[70] In August 2011, a phone call between President Hu Jintao and anti-corruption official Ma Wen was found to be wiretapped under Bo’s orders. The revelation about the eavesdropping operation resulted in intense scrutiny from Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and contributed in Bo’s downfall in 2012.^[70]

Death of Neil Heywood[link]

On 14 November 2011, British citizen Neil Heywood was found dead in his Chongqing hotel room. At the time, local authorities declared he had died from alcohol over-consumption, though his family noted that he was not a heavy drinker. The official cause of death was not scrutinized until several months later, when revelations emerged that Heywood’s death was a homicide, and Bo Xilai was implicated.

Heywood served as an intermediary linking western companies to powerful Chinese politicians.^[72] He was a long-time associate of the Bo family: he reportedly shared a close personal relationship with Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, and had helped the couple’s son earn admission to the Harrow School in England.^[73] Heywood also allegedly served as a middleman for the family, helping them clandestinely move large sums of money overseas.^[74]

In October 2011, Heywood reportedly had a business dispute with Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, when he demanded a higher commission for his services. The dispute escalated, with Heywood ultimately threatening to reveal the family’s business dealings and overseas assets, estimated to total in excess of $136 million.^[75][76] Heywood was then allegedly poisoned by Gu and an assistant.^[77]

Downfall[link]

Wang Lijun incident[link]

In early 2012, the party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection bolstered its presence within Chongqing as the city's leaders came under investigation. Much of the attention focused on Bo's police chief, Wang Lijun, who may have been under investigation for his role in a corruption case in Liaoning province. Growing scrutiny over the city's wiretapping operation against senior leaders also likely fell mainly on Wang.^[70] Although details are scarce, several sources have suggested that Wang's resentment against Bo grew amidst the investigations—resentment that was compounded when Wang realized that he and his wife had also been targets of wiretapping under Bo's orders.^[70]

Moreover, Wang was privy to details of Neil Heywood's death, and had reportedly attempted to voice his concerns to Bo about alleged poisoning. Around 16 January, Wang is believed to have confronted Bo over evidence that implicated Bo's wife in the murder. Although Bo initially agreed to allow an inquiry, he then changed course and sought to obstruct investigations.^[78] Wang was abruptly demoted on 2 February to the far less prestigious position of Vice-mayor overseeing education, science, and environmental affairs.^[79] Bo placed Wang under surveillance, and several of his close associates were reportedly taken into custody. Some reports allege that Bo may have been plotting to have Wang assassinated.^[80]

On 6 February 2012, apparently fearing for his life, Wang traveled to the U.S. consulate in the nearby city of Chengdu, bringing evidence implicating Bo and his family in the Neil Heywood murder. According to reports, Wang sought and was denied asylum in the United States.^[81] He remained in the consulate for approximately 24 hours before leaving "of his own volition" and being taken into the custody of state security officials dispatched from Beijing.^[82][83][84] Local media in Chongqing announced that he was on a mental health-related sick leave.^[85]

A day after Wang's leave, several overseas Chinese-language news websites posted an open letter allegedly penned by Wang, which sharply criticized Bo as a "hypocrite" and "the greatest gangster in China" and accused Bo of corruption.^[86] Without knowing what incriminating material Wang may have held against Bo, even Bo's supporters in China's top leadership were reluctant to vouch for him.^[87] Bo responded in an unusually open press conference during the 2012 National People's Congress, acknowledging "negligent supervision" of his subordinates, saying he may have "relied upon the wrong person".^[88]

Removal from posts[link]

On 15 March, Bo was dismissed as Chongqing party chief and its related municipal posts, while temporarily retaining a seat on the Politburo. Due to the potentially destructive effects Bo's dismissal would have on party unity, party elders were consulted on the matter.^[89] The decision was reportedly made at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on 7 March, during which security tsar Zhou Yongkang cast a lone dissenting vote.^[89] On 14 March, Bo was reprimanded by Premier Wen Jiabao during the Premier's annual press conference.^[90][91] Wen called the achievements of Chongqing "significant," but the result of "multiple administrations," i.e., not just Bo himself. Wen also made numerous allusions to the damage wrought by the Cultural Revolution, an indirect rebuke of Bo's efforts to revive "red culture".^[32][91] Addressing high-level political changes by a Premier to an open public forum was unprecedented. Political observers believe that Wen's remarks and Bo's downfall represented a consensus within the central leadership that Bo not only needed to shoulder the responsibility for the Wang Lijun scandal, but also marked a significant victory for liberal reformers.^[92][93]

On 10 April, Bo was suspended from the party's Central Committee and its Politburo, pending investigation for "serious disciplinary violations." Bo's wife, Gu Kailai, was now a prime suspect in the inquiry into the death of British businessman Neil Heywood.^[94] The announcements, carrying criminal implications, likely marked the end of Bo's political career.^[95][96]

Aftermath[link]

Bo's downfall elicited strong reactions among the Chinese public and with commentators across the political spectrum.^[97] Leftist websites such as Utopia, Red China, and Maoflag were full of angry commentary over Bo's dismissal. These websites were shut down for a period of "maintenance" shortly after.^[97][98] Leftist commentators voiced support for Bo: Kong Qingdong called Bo's dismissal 'a plot by enemies of the state'; Sima Nan said associating Bo with the Cultural Revolution was a 'smear campaign';^[99] Sima's pro-Bo microblogs were censored.^[98] Large numbers of sympathetic posts for Bo appeared in microblogs from Chongqing, and Dalian, where Bo was once mayor.^[97][100] The Global Times also wrote a sympathetic editorial. Liberal media reacted positively, criticizing Bo's style of 'personality-based rule' as dangerous and regressive.^[101] Right-leaning commentators said Bo's downfall signified a 'correct orientation' to China's future development.^[101] Southern Media Group editor Yan Lieshan remarked that Bo correctly identified China's problems but prescribed the wrong solution.^[101] Businesspeople whose assets were seized by Bo's administration in Chongqing also reacted positively.^[97]

Bo's dismissal caused political shockwaves unseen since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989,^[95][102] and exposing internal conflicts within Communist Party. In the weeks following 15 March, party authorities deliberated on Bo's case.^[103] In the absence of official reports of the proceedings, microblogs churned out a flood of speculation, including rumours of a coup.^[104] In response, the authorities instructed newspapers and websites to strictly report only official releases, and arrested six people accused of 'rumourmongering'.^[103]

Aware of its potentially divisive impact, authorities carefully controlled media coverage of Bo's removal from office. State media reported 'pledges of loyalty' to the party's decision to disgrace Bo, including statements from the new Chongqing party authorities, Beijing municipal organs, and grassroots party members rallying to the party line. The party's mouthpiece People's Daily issued a front-page editorial calling for unity behind the "correct decision".^[103][96] The military held 'political education' sessions on short notice, stressing unity and loyalty to the Party under the leadership of Hu Jintao.^[105] Bo's downfall also affected his ally Zhou Yongkang, who had reportedly relinquished his operational control over Chinese security institutions and lost the right to influence who would succeed him at the 18th Party Congress.^[106]

Political alignment and affiliations[link]

In the course of his career, Bo Xilai was the beneficiary of considerable patronage from former Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin.^[107] He is thus associated with Jiang’s faction,^[68] sometimes referred to as the “elitists,” that is generally known to favor a model that emphasizes free trade, economic development in the coastal regions, and export-led growth. It is a coalition composed largely of “princelings” (the children of high-ranking former party leaders), business people, leaders of coastal cities, and members of the erstwhile "Shanghai clique."^[108] By contrast, the “populist” coalition of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao advocates more balanced economic development and improvements to China’s social safety net.^[68] The populist faction is generally associated with the "left," and comprised rural leaders, socialist intellectuals, and several leaders who rose to prominence through their connections with the Communist Youth League.^[108]

Although Bo is identified with the elitist bloc for his time in Liaoning and as Minister of Commerce, during his tenure in the interior city of Chongqing, he adopted a number of populist policies more typically associated with the left. Namely, he implemented social housing programs, gave residency status (and therefore the associated social welfare benefits) to rural migrant workers, and emphasized a need for a more balanced distribution of wealth.^[109] Although Bo relentlessly pursued technology, capital, and business opportunities, he also spearheaded a large number of government programs to help the working class and disadvantaged groups.^[38] Bo’s campaigns against corruption also allegedly seized the assets of private entrepreneurs, in turn funneling these funds into state projects and welfare programs, effectively re-asserting state control over wealth.^[47] He also sought to promote “red culture,” and mandated the revival of Mao-era slogans and songs, evoking a time of an egalitarian society.

Bo's policies in Chongqing ultimately made him a prominent figure among neo-Maoists and leftists,^[47] and a representative of the conservative wing of the Communist Party. Although Bo did not favor the discontinuation of market economics or a return to Mao-era policies, he was seen to advocate a strong role for the state in peoples' lives.^[110] Bo’s anti-corruption campaign, in particular, earned him a reputation for heavy-handedness and authoritarian methods in crime and punishment.^[111][112] Bo’s policies put him in opposition to the more liberal and reform-oriented faction, particularly Premier Wen Jiabao and Guangdong party chief Wang Yang, who favored the strengthening of rule of law and a continuation of political reform.^[47][110] To observers, Bo and Wang's verbal warfare over the future direction of development marked an increasing polarization of Chinese politics into leftist and reformer camps.^[113]

Family[link]

Bo's first wife was Li Danyu, the daughter of former Beijing Party First Secretary Li Xuefeng. Their son, Li Wangzhi, graduated from Columbia University in 2001.^[114][115] Li Danyu insisted that her son change his surname to Li following her divorce from Bo Xilai.^[114] Li Wangzhi is reportedly low-key and modest, and has a master's degree in media studies. He worked at Citibank and a law firm in Beijing.^[114]

Bo married his second wife, Gu Kailai, in 1986. Gu was a prominent lawyer and founder of the Kailai lawfirm in Beijing.^[116] Gu’s father, Gu Jingsheng, was a Communist revolutionary. Her mother, Fan Chengxiu, is a descendant of the renowned Song Dynasty Prime Minister and Poet Fan Zhongyan.^[116]

Bo Xilai drew criticism from others in the party for his high-profile courting of media attention and using his family pedigree to further the interests of his wife and her law firm.^[9] Bo denied that his wife had profited from his position, saying that his wife had retired her legal practice while the couple lived in Dalian in the 1990s. Bo said that Gu "now basically just stays at home, doing some housework for me."^[117] Jiang Weiping claimed that Gu served as Bo's "gatekeeper" when Bo was the mayor of Dalian, regularly accepting gifts and bribes from property developers seeking access to him, and from Party officials seeking government appointments.^[118] There was speculation that Bo Xilai may have attempted to interfere with a corruption investigation into his wife.^[119] Following his dismissal, his wife was reported to have been implicated in the death of British businessman and family friend Neil Heywood.^[120]

Bo and Gu have one son, Guagua. He attended Harrow School, and was later admitted to Balliol College, Oxford, where in 2006 he started studying for a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Guagua then went on to study at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.^[121][122] Bo Guagua's high-profile and privileged lifestyle has provided tabloid fodder for Chinese-language media.^[117][121] Asked how he could afford his son's tuition fees on his estimated annual salary of $22,000,^[121] Bo replied that his son received "full scholarships" from the respective institutions.^[117] Maclean's reported that Bo's family associate, Neil Haywood, pulled strings to have Guagua accepted into Harrow shortly after becoming involved with Bo.^[118]

Bo Xiyong, Bo Xilai's eldest brother, is a vice-chairman and executive director of Hong Kong-listed China Everbright International, but does so under a pseudonym. Although the name used, according to company filings, is 'Li Xueming', the company declined to confirm if they are one and the same.^[123]

See also[link]

• Politics of Liaoning
• Politics of Chongqing

References[link]