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Political aspects of Islam are derived from the Qur'an, the Sunna (the sayings and living habits of Muhammad), Muslim history, and elements of political movements outside Islam.

Traditional political concepts in Islam include leadership by successors to the Prophet known as Caliphs, (Imamate for Shia); the importance of following Islamic law or Sharia; the duty of rulers to seek Shura or consultation from their subjects; and the importance of rebuking unjust rulers but not encouraging rebellion against them.^[1] A sea change in the Islamic world was the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, which some believed meant an end to the Islamic state both in "symbolic and practice terms".^[2]

In the 19th and 20th century a common theme has been resistance to Western imperialism, particularly the British Empire, and sometimes the perceived racist policies that discriminated against some Muslims. The defeat of Arab armies in the Six Day War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of communism as a viable alternative with the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War has increased the appeal of Islamism and Islamic fundamentalist movements, especially in the context of popular dissatisfaction with ruling regimes in the Muslim world.^{[original research?][citation needed]}

Introduction[link]

Islam is a religion that has existed for over fourteen centuries, in many different countries. As such, diverse political movements in many different contexts have used the banner of Islam to lend legitimacy to their causes. Not surprisingly, many aspects of Islamic politics are subject to much disagreement and contention between different interpretations, particularly between conservative Islamists and liberal movements within Islam. Islam is the second biggest religion in the world.

Islamist or Islamic parties exist in almost every democracy with a Muslim majority. This term has many different meanings which this article will explore, along with links to other political trends.

The controversial term Islamofascism has also been coined by some non-Muslims to describe the political and religious philosophies of some militant Islamic groups. Both terms lump together a large variety of groups with varying histories and contexts. The articles on militant Islamic groups, Islamic parties and modern Islamic philosophy explain some of their actual views in detail.

Muhammad, the Medinan state and Islamic political ideals[link]

Islamists claim that the origins of Islam as a political movement are to be found in the life and times of Islam's prophet, Muhammad and his successors, (depending on the Islamist). In 622 CE, in recognition of his claims to prophethood, Muhammad was invited to rule the city of Medina. At the time the local Arab tribes of Aus and Khazraj dominated the city, and were in constant conflict. Medinans saw in Muhammad an impartial outsider who could resolve the conflict. Muhammad and his followers thus moved to Medina, where Muhammad drafted the Medina Charter. This document made Muhammad the ruler, and recognized him as the Prophet of Allah. The laws Muhammad established during his rule, based on the revelations of the Quran and doing of Muhammad, are considered by Muslims to be Sharia or Islamic law, which Islamic movements seek to replicate in the present day. Muhammad gained a widespread following and an army, and his rule expanded first to the city of Mecca and then spread through the Arabian peninsula through a combination of diplomacy and military conquest.^{[verification needed]}.

Early Caliphate and political ideals[link]

After death of Muhammad, his community needed to appoint a new leader, giving rise to the title Caliph, meaning "successor". Thus the subsequent Islamic empires were known as Caliphates. Alongside the growth of the Umayyad empire, the major political development within Islam in this period was the sectarian split between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims; this had its roots in a dispute over the succession of the Caliphate. Sunni Muslims believed the caliphate was elective, and any member of the Prophet's tribe, Quraysh, might serve as one. Shi'ites, on the other hand, believed the caliphate should be hereditary in the line of the Prophet, and thus all the caliphs, with the exception of Ali, were usurpers.^[3] However, the Sunni sect emerged as triumphant in most of the Muslim world, and thus most modern Islamic political movements (with the exception of Iran) are founded in Sunni thought.

Muhammad's closest companions, the four "rightly guided" Caliphs who succeeded him, continued to expand the state to encompass Jerusalem, Ctesiphon, and Damascus, and sending armies as far as the Sindh.^[4] The Islamic empire stretched from Al-Andalus (Muslim Spain) to Persia under the reign of the Umayyad dynasty. The conquering Arab armies took the system of Sharia laws and courts to their new military camps and cities, and built mosques for Friday jam'at (community prayers) as well as Madrasahs to educate local Muslim youth. These institutions resulted in the development of a class of ulema (classical Islamic scholars) who could serve as qadis (Sharia-court judges), imams of mosques and madrasah teachers. These classical scholars - who lived and earned their livelihoods in the expansionist Islamic empire - gave legal and religious sanction to militarist interpretations of jihad. The political terminology of the Islamic state was all the product of this period. Thus, medieval legal terms such as khalifa, sharia, fiqh, maddhab, jizya, and dhimmi all remain part of modern Islamic vocabulary.

Since the scholarly and legal traditions of the ulema were well-established by the time of the Abbasids, the later Middle Eastern empires and kingdoms (including the Ayyubid, Seljuk, Fatimid, Mamluk and Mongol) had little impact on modern Islamist political ideals.

One Islamic concept concerning the structure of ruling is shura, or consultation, which is the duty of rulers mentioned in two verses in the Quran, 3:153, and 42:36, and contrasted by Muslims with arbitrary personal rule. It is mentioned by Islamic traditionalists, commentators, and contemporary writers but is not commanded by Islamic law only recommended.^[5]

One type of ruler not part of the Islamic ideal was the king, which was disparaged in Quran's mentions of the Pharaoh, "the prototype of the unjust and tyrannical ruler" (18:70, 79) and elsewhere. (28:34)^[6]

Election or appointment[link]

Al-Mawardi, a Muslim jurist of the Shafii school, has written that the caliph should be Qurayshi. Abu Bakr Al-Baqillani, an Ashari Islamic scholar and Maliki lawyer, wrote that the leader of the Muslims simply should be from the majority. Abu Hanifa an-Nu‘man, the founder of the Sunni Hanafi school of fiqh, also wrote that the leader must come from the majority.^[7] Western scholar of Islam, Fred Donner,^[8] argues that the standard Arabian practice during the early Caliphates was for the prominent men of a kinship group, or tribe, to gather after a leader's death and elect a leader from amongst themselves, although there was no specified procedure for this shura, or consultative assembly. Candidates were usually from the same lineage as the deceased leader but they were not necessarily his sons. Capable men who would lead well were preferred over an ineffectual direct heir, as there was no basis in the majority Sunni view that the head of state or governor should be chosen based on lineage alone.

Majlis ash-Shura[link]

Traditional Sunni Islamic lawyers agree that shura, loosely translated as 'consultation of the people', is a function of the caliphate. The Majlis ash-Shura advise the caliph. The importance of this is premised by the following verses of the Quran:

“...those who answer the call of their Lord and establish the prayer, and who conduct their affairs by Shura. [are loved by God]”^[42:38]

“...consult them (the people) in their affairs. Then when you have taken a decision (from them), put your trust in Allah”^[3:159]

The majlis is also the means to elect a new caliph. Al-Mawardi has written that members of the majlis should satisfy three conditions: they must be just, they must have enough knowledge to distinguish a good caliph from a bad one, and must have sufficient wisdom and judgment to select the best caliph. Al-Mawardi also said in emergencies when there is no caliphate and no majlis, the people themselves should create a majlis, select a list of candidates for caliph, then the majlis should select from the list of candidates.^[7] Some modern interpretations of the role of the Majlis ash-Shura include those by Islamist author Sayyid Qutb and by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, the founder of a transnational political movement devoted to the revival of the Caliphate. In an analysis of the shura chapter of the Quran, Qutb argued Islam requires only that the ruler consult with at least some of the ruled (usually the elite), within the general context of God-made laws that the ruler must execute. Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, writes that Shura is important and part of "the ruling structure" of the Islamic caliphate, "but not one of its pillars," and may be neglected without the Caliphate's rule becoming un-Islamic. Non-Muslims may serve in the majlis, though they may not vote or serve as officials.

Rulers, ulama and the traditional Islamic state[link]

One scholar argues that for hundreds of years until the twentieth century, Islamic states followed a system of government based on the coexistence of sultan and ulama following the rules of the sharia law. This system resembled to some extent some Western governments in possessing an unwritten constitution (like the United Kingdom), and possessing separate, countervailing branches of government (like the United States) — which provided Separation of powers in governance. While the United States (and some other systems of government) has three branches of government — executive, legislative and judicial — Islamic states had two — the sultan and ulama. A symbol of the success of this system is the current popularity of the Islamist movement which seeks to restore the Islamist state.^[9]

Separation of religion and state[link]

Some Muslims argue that unlike Christianity, Islam does not separate religion from state, and that for example it is apolitical Islam not political Islam that requires explanation and that is an historical fluke of the "shortlived heyday of secular Arab nationalism between 1945 and 1970."^[10]

In contrast, scholar Olivier Roy argues that "a defacto separation between political power" of sultans and emirs and religious power of the caliph was "created and institutionalized ... as early as the end of the first century of the hegira," what has been lacking in the Muslim world is "political thought regarding the autonomy of this space." No positive law was developed outside of sharia. The sovereign's religious function was to defend the Islamic community against its enemies, institute the sharia, ensure the public good (maslaha). The state was instrument to enable Muslims to live as good Muslims and Muslims were to obey the sultan if he did so. The legitimacy of the ruler was "symbolized by the right to coin money and to have the Friday prayer (Jumu'ah khutba) said in his name."^[11]

Shi'a tradition[link]

In Shia Islam three attitudes towards rulers predominated — political cooperation with the ruler, political activism challenging the ruler, and aloofness from politics — with "writings of Shi'i ulama through the ages" showing "elements of all three of these attitudes."^[12])

Qur'an[link]

According to scholar Moojan Momen, "One of the key statements in the Qur'an around which much of the exegesis" on the issue of what Islamic doctrine says about who is in charge is based on the verse

`O believers! Obey God and obey the Apostle and those who have been given authority [uulaa al-amr] among you`(Qur'an 4:59).

For Sunnis, uulaa al-amr are the rulers (Caliphs and kings) but for Shi'is this expression refers to the Imams."^[13]

According to scholar Bernard Lewis, this Qur'anic verse has been

elaborated in a number of sayings attributed to Muhammad. But there are also sayings that put strict limits on the duty of obedience. Two dicta attributed to the Prophet and universally accepted as authentic are indicative. One says, "there is no obedience in sin"; in other words, if the ruler orders something contrary to the divine law, not only is there no duty of obedience, but there is a duty of disobedience. This is more than the right of revolution that appears in Western political thought. It is a duty of revolution, or at least of disobedience and opposition to authority. The other pronouncement, "do not obey a creature against his creator," again clearly limits the authority of the ruler, whatever form of ruler that may be.^[14]

However, Ibn Taymiyyah -- an important scholar of the Hanbali school —- says in Tafseer for this verse "there is no obedience in sin"; that people should ignore the order of the ruler if it would disobey the divine law and shouldn't use this as excuse for revolution because it will spell Muslims bloods.^{[citation needed]}

Accountability[link]

Sunni Islamic lawyers have commented on when it is permissible to disobey, impeach or remove rulers in the Caliphate. This is usually when the rulers are not meeting public responsibilities obliged upon them under Islam. Al-Mawardi said that if the rulers meet their Islamic responsibilities to the public, the people must obey their laws, but if they become either unjust or severely ineffective then the Caliph or ruler must be impeached via the Majlis ash-Shura. Similarly Al-Baghdadi believed that if the rulers do not uphold justice, the ummah via the majlis should give warning to them, and if unheeded then the Caliph can be impeached. Al-Juwayni argued that Islam is the goal of the ummah, so any ruler that deviates from this goal must be impeached. Al-Ghazali believed that oppression by a caliph is enough for impeachment. Rather than just relying on impeachment, Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani obliged rebellion upon the people if the caliph began to act with no regard for Islamic law. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani said that to ignore such a situation is haraam, and those who cannot revolt inside the caliphate should launch a struggle from outside. Al-Asqalani used two ayahs from the Qur'an to justify this:

“...And they (the sinners on qiyama) will say, 'Our Lord! We obeyed our leaders and our chiefs, and they misled us from the right path. Our Lord! Give them (the leaders) double the punishment you give us and curse them with a very great curse'...”^[33:67–68]

Islamic lawyers commented that when the rulers refuse to step down via successful impeachment through the Majlis, becoming dictators through the support of a corrupt army, if the majority agree they have the option to launch a revolution against them. Many noted that this option is only exercised after factoring in the potential cost of life.^[7]

Rule of law[link]

The following hadith establishes the principle of rule of law in relation to nepotism and accountability^[15]

Narrated ‘Aisha: The people of Quraish worried about the lady from Bani Makhzum who had committed theft. They asked, "Who will intercede for her with Allah's Apostle?" Some said, "No one dare to do so except Usama bin Zaid the beloved one to Allah's Apostle." When Usama spoke about that to Allah's Apostle Allah's Apostle said: "Do you try to intercede for somebody in a case connected with Allah’s Prescribed Punishments?" Then he got up and delivered a sermon saying, "What destroyed the nations preceding you, was that if a noble amongst them stole, they would forgive him, and if a poor person amongst them stole, they would inflict Allah's Legal punishment on him. By Allah, if Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad (my daughter) stole, I would cut off her hand."

Various Islamic lawyers do however place multiple conditions, and stipulations e.g. the poor cannot be penalised for stealing out of poverty, before executing such a law, making it very difficult to reach such a stage. It is well known during a time of drought in the Rashidun caliphate period, capital punishments were suspended until the effects of the drought passed.

Islamic jurists later formulated the concept of the rule of law, the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land, where no person is above the law and where officials and private citizens are under a duty to obey the same law. A Qadi (Islamic judge) was also not allowed to discriminate on the grounds of religion, race, colour, kinship or prejudice. There were also a number of cases where Caliphs had to appear before judges as they prepared to take their verdict.^[16]

According to Noah Feldman, a law professor at Harvard University, the legal scholars and jurists who once upheld the rule of law were replaced by a law governed by the state due to the codification of Sharia by the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century:^[17]

How the scholars lost their exalted status as keepers of the law is a complex story, but it can be summed up in the adage that partial reforms are sometimes worse than none at all. In the early 19th century, the Ottoman empire responded to military setbacks with an internal reform movement. The most important reform was the attempt to codify Shariah. This Westernizing process, foreign to the Islamic legal tradition, sought to transform Shariah from a body of doctrines and principles to be discovered by the human efforts of the scholars into a set of rules that could be looked up in a book.

Once the law existed in codified form, however, the law itself was able to replace the scholars as the source of authority. Codification took from the scholars their all-important claim to have the final say over the content of the law and transferred that power to the state.

Reaction to European colonialism[link]

In the 19th century European encroachment on the Muslim world came with the retreat of the Ottoman Empire, the arrival of the French in Algeria (1830), the disappearance of the Moghul Empire in India (1857), the Russian incursions into the Caucasus (1857) and Central Asia.

The first Muslim reaction to European encroachment was of "peasant and religious", not urban origin. "Charismatic leaders", generally members of the ulama or leaders of religious orders, launched the call for jihad and formed tribal coalitions. Sharia in defiance of local common law was imposed to unify tribes. Examples include Abd al-Qadir in Algeria, the Mahdi in Sudan, Shamil in the Caucasus, the Senussi in Libya and in Chad, Mullah-i Lang in Afghanistan, the Akhund of Swat in India, and later, Abd al-Karim in Morocco. All these movements eventually failed "despite spectacular victories such as the destruction of the British army in Afghanistan in 1842 and the taking of Kharoum in 1885."^[18]

The second Muslim reaction to European encroachment later in the century and early 20th century was not violent resistance but the adoption of some Western political, social, cultural and technological ways. Members of the urban elite, particularly in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey advocated and practiced "Westernization".

The failure of the attempts at political westernization, according to some, was exemplified by the Tanzimat reorganization of the Ottoman rulers. Sharia was codified into law (which was called the Mecelle) and an elected legislature was established to make law. These steps took away the Ulama's role of "discovering" the law and the formerly powerful scholar class weakened and withered into religious functionaries, while the legislature was suspended less than a year after its inauguration and never recovered to replaced the Ulama as a separate "branch" of government providing Separation of powers.^[19] The "paradigm of the executive as a force unchecked by either the sharia of the scholars or the popular authority of an elected legislature became the dominant paradigm in most of the Sunni Muslim world in the twentieth century."^[20]

Modern political ideal of the Islamic state[link]

In addition to the legitimacy given by medieval scholarly opinion, nostalgia for the days of successful Islamic empire simmered under later Western colonialism. This nostalgia played a major role in the Islamist political ideal of Islamic state, a state in which Islamic law is preeminent.^[21] The Islamist political program is generally to be accomplished by re-shaping the governments of existing Muslim nation-states; but the means of doing this varies greatly across movements and circumstances. Many Islamist movements, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh, have found that they can use the democratic process to their advantage, and so focus on votes and coalition-building with other political parties. Other more radical movements such as Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh embrace militant Islamic ideology.

In the face of the tremendous poverty, corruption and disillusionment with conventional politics, the political ideal of the Islamic state has been criticized by many espousing liberal movements within Islam and for example by Ziauddin Sardar, as being utopian and not offering real solutions.

20th century[link]

Following World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and the subsequent dissolution of the Caliphate by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (founder of Turkey), many Muslims perceived that the political power of their religion was in retreat. There was also concern that Western ideas and influence were spreading throughout Muslim societies. This led to considerable resentment of the influence of the European powers. The Baath Party was created in Syria and in Iraq as a movement to resist and harry the British.

During the 1960s, the predominant ideology within the Arab world was pan-Arabism which deemphasized religion and emphasized the creation of socialist, secular states based on Arab nationalism rather than Islam. However, governments based on Arab nationalism have found themselves facing economic stagnation and disorder. Increasingly, the borders of these states were seen as artificial colonial creations - which they were, having literally been drawn on a map by European colonial powers.

Now from Cairo to Tehran, the crowds that in the 1950s demonstrated under the red or national flag now march beneath the green banner. The targets are the same: foreign banks, nightclubs, local governments accused of complacency toward the West. The continuity is apparent not only in these targets but also the participants: the same individuals who followed Nasser or Marx in the 1960s are Islamists today.^[22]

Contemporary movements[link]

Some common political currents in Islam include

• Traditionalism, which accepts traditional commentaries on the Quran and Sunna and "takes as its basic principle imitation (taqlid), that is, refusal to innovate", and follows one of the four legal schools or Madh'hab (Shaf'i, Maliki, Hanafi, Hanbali) and, may include Sufism. An example of Sufi traditionalism is the Deobandi school in India.^[23]
• Reformist fundamentalism, which "criticizes the tradition, the commentaries, popular religious practices (maraboutism, the cult of saints)", deviations, and superstitions; it aims to return to the founding texts. This reformism generally developed in response to an external threat (the influence of Hinduism on Islam, for example. 18th-century examples are Shah Wali Allah in India and Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (who founded Wahhabism) in the Arabian Peninsula.^[24] A modern example may be Salafism (Salafiyya).
• Islamism or political Islam, both follows and departs from reformist fundamentalism, embracing a return to the sharia, but adopting Western terminology such as revolution and ideology and taking a more liberal attitude towards women's rights.^[25] Contemporary examples include the Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Masyumi party .
• Liberal movements within Islam generally define themselves in opposition to Islamic political movements, but often embrace many of its anti-imperialist elements.

Sunni and Shia differences[link]

According to scholar Vali Nasr, political tendencies of Sunni and Shia Islamic revival differ, with Sunni fundamentalism "in Pakistan and much of the Arab world" being "far from politically revolutionary", while Shia fundamentalism is strongly influenced by Ruhollah Khomeini and his talk of the oppression of the poor and class war. Sunni fundamentalism "was rooted in conservative religious impulses and the bazaars, mixing mercantile interests with religious values." ... Khomeini's version of fundamentalism engaged the poor and spoke of class war.

This

Cleavage between fundamentalism as revivalism and fundamentalism as revolution was deep and for a long while coincided closely with the sectarian divide between the Sunnis - the Muslim world's traditional `haves`, concerned more with conservative religiosity - and the Shia - the longtime outsiders,` more drawn to radical dreaming and scheming."^[26]

Graham Fuller has also noted that he found "no mainstream Islamist organization (with the exception of [shia] Iran) with radical social views or a revolutionary approach to the social order apart from the imposition of legal justice."^[27]

Modern debates[link]

Once the common opposition to colonialism, corruption and racism was established as a focus, debates on political Islam became generally focused on several core questions through the 1970s:^{[citation needed]}

• The status of women and integration of priorities of feminism into a renewed fiqh^{[citation needed]}
• Islamic economics and the role of debt in oppression and stagnation of Muslim states^{[citation needed]}
• Zionism and the response to the formation of the Jewish state of Israel and the question of statehood^{[citation needed]}
• Self governance in Muslims nations or in nations with significant Muslim minorities
• Control of oil revenues in the Middle East^{[citation needed]}

United Nations cooperation was pivotal in this view - as was cooperation with secular forces and allies. The agenda of secular and Islamist movements during this period was all but indistinguishable. However, some rural movements were finding progress made here to be symbolic and unsatisfactory. In 1979 the political situation drastically changed, with Egypt making peace with Israel, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - all three events had wide-ranging effects on how Islam was perceived as a political phenomenon.^{[citation needed]}

To understand this, consider the variety of attitudes Muslims with a fervent belief in Islam as a universal solution to political problems, took to the events of the 1980s and the 1990s:

Perception of persecution[link]

Some Muslims place the blame for all flaws in Muslim societies on the influx of "foreign" ideas including debt-based capitalism, communism, and even feminism; a return to the principles of Islam is seen as the natural cure. This is however interpreted in very many ways: socialism and Marxism as a guide to adapting Islam to the modern world was in decline by the 1980s as the USSR invaded Afghanistan and polarized attitudes against Communism and other secular variants of socialism. Capitalism was often discredited by plain corruption.^{[citation needed]}

One persistent theme that both proponents and opponents of Islam as a political movement note is that Muslims are actively persecuted by the West and other foreigners. This view is of course not distinguishable from a critique of imperialism including oil imperialism, since many Muslim nations are sitting on relatively vast oil reserves. Colonialism is often identified as the force which is 'against Islam', and seems to neatly encompass British Empire experiences as well as those of modern times.

Reactive Islam[link]

It was largely through reactive measures that the movement that is labeled Islamist came to be visible to the West, where it was labeled as being a distinct movement from Islam, pan-Arabism and resistance to colonization. The legitimacy of this kind of distinction is very much in doubt. Olivier Roy holds that the primary motive of all of this activity is resistance to colonialism and control of the Islamic World by outsiders. In this view, the movement called Islamist is wholly reactive and incidental, just a convenient rationale used to justify what is in fact resistance of a cultural and economic sort.^{[citation needed]}

However, there are many overt similarities. Those militants who follow a version of sharia based on the classical fiqh ("jurisprudence") as interpreted by local ulema ("jurists"), were the most prominent of several competing trends in modern Islamic philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s. It was at this time that they became visible - and a concern - to the West, as they challenged the modernist dictators that the West had generally put trust in.^{[citation needed]}

See militant Islam for a detailed review of some modern movements that are often labeled Islamist by their opponents. This article is only about the reactive definition of the West, leading to the label. Trends which led to this are summarized by Ziauddin Sardar.^{[citation needed]}

Cold War exploitation[link]

Such cross-cultural exchanges, polite activism and moderate views were very often suppressed by the funders of more militant strains who sought to exploit them against the Soviet Union. The United States, for instance, in the 1980s supplied university-authored textbooks to the mujahedeen of Afghanistan that encouraged militant attitudes and even taught arithmetic using examples involving hand grenades and "dead infidels".^{[citation needed]}

There was also pressure against secular socialism in the Islamic World, and especially in Iraq, Syria and Iran, until the Iranian Revolution of 1979 proved it could well be counter-productive and lead to a backlash that put regimes in place that would be hostile to the Western, secular, world.^{[citation needed]}

Role in terrorism[link]

Some militant Islamist forces have been implicated in terrorism and have become targets in a series of military initiatives justified by the US rhetoric of "War on Terrorism", which has been adopted by Russia, Israel and other countries. This has led Muslims and the opponents of these initiatives (in the peace movement) to characterize it sometimes as actually a War on Islam.^{[citation needed]}

As part of this war, they claim, literally every political interpretation of Islam, from classical fiqh to Marxist to such moderate views as those of Dr. Shakir, are all being classified as part of one "enemy" movement?^{[citation needed]}

Movements described as 'Islamist'[link]

What these groups have in common tends to be opposition to the United States and Israel. They vary widely in terms of the form of Islamic Law they prefer.

Globalization[link]

Along with many other cultural phenomena, Islamic political thought has undergone its own globalization as adherents of many different strains have come together. Even in such strictly controlled, secretive groups as Al-Qaida, there were believing Muslims of drastically varying backgrounds coming together, some of whom accepted the tactics and priorities of the group, and some not. While violent fanatics deployed by cynical leaders make highly visible attacks on Western interests and even on 'homelands', this is thought by many to be no more than backlash for an entire 20th century full of cynical attempts by German, British, and American Empires to deploy Islamic idealists as a mere tactic.^{[citation needed]}

When Russia joined the Council of the Islamic Conference in 2003, it emphasized that it had a long history of successful co-existence with Muslims, and a large integrated population of Muslims (few of which are in any sense Islamist). President Vladimir Putin, despite a long and bloody confrontation with rebels in Chechnya, offered to act as a bridge or neutral broker in dealings between Muslims and NATO, the EU and USA. This was a quite different rhetoric, a more pragmatic one likely reflecting the reality that the ex-Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan had substantial Islamic political movements - similar to those in Turkey and Pakistan, relatively modern in tone and willing to participate in the US War on Terrorism to some degree, although not as direct combatants.^{[citation needed]}

Some analysts believe that the old Cold War battlelines have been redrawn, with Russia choosing new allies - those with a record of success in forcing US withdrawals from strategic territories (Beirut, Somalia and - depending on interpretation - Afghanistan and Iraq) with Muslim populations. In this view, the old Marxist alliance against colonialism is the dominant rhetoric.^{[citation needed]}

Others accept the Russian pledge as sincere, and believe that Islamist movements of all stripes will eventually come to accommodation with domestic secular forces, and Islam as a global anti-corruption, anti-colonialism, and anti-racism movement, less focused on Zionism and Palestine. George W. Bush for instance has noted the real need as economic development in Muslim countries, to break the cycle of poverty that tends to feed into extremist movements. In Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq, the Bush administration has worked closely with nominally Islamic forces and ruling political parties in government. It denies intensely that it is involved in a War on Islam. However, polls of Muslim nations indicate these denials are not trusted. Any accommodation will not be quick in coming.^{[citation needed]}

Internationalism[link]

Political Islam in a strictly non-evangelical sense cannot be described as Islamist. In a strictly political sense, born out of the struggles against colonialism and the war on terror, Islamic resistance movements can be seen to be analogous to other resistance movements, such as Latin American struggles against US "imperialism". In this sense political Islam falls within the scope of internationalism, which has many other branches - Maoist, Marxist and of course Latin American. The Latin American struggles have been reported for example in the magazine New Internationalist and likewise the struggles in the Islamic world have been reported in the magazine Islamic Internationalist.

See also[link]

• Islamic Peace
• Islamism
• Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam
• Jamaat-e-Islami
• Hizb ut-Tahrir Islamic political party
• Tanzeem-e-Islami Islamic revolutionary party working for establishing khilafah.
• Ayatollah Mohamed Hossein Kazemini Borujerdi Islamic activist for separation of politics from Islam

References[link]

Sources[link]

The following sources generally prescribe to the theory that there is a distinct 20th century movement called Islamism:

• "Children of Abraham: An Introduction to Islam for Jews" Khalid Duran with Abdelwahab Hechiche, The American Jewish Committee and Ktav, 2001
• "The Islamism Debate" Martin Kramer, 1997, which includes the chapter The Mismeasure of Political Islam
• "Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook" Charles Kurzman, Oxford University Press, 1998
• "The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder" Bassam Tibi, Univ. of California Press, 1998

However, the following sources challenge that argument:

• Edward Said, Orientalism
• Merryl Wyn Davies, Beyond Frontiers: Islam and Contemporary Needs
• G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, 1980
• Hamid Enyat, Modern Islamic Political Thought

These authors in general locate the issues of Islamic political intolerance and fanaticism not in Islam, but in the generally low level of awareness of Islam's own mechanisms for dealing with these, among modern believers, in part a result of Islam being suppressed prior to modern times.

Further reading[link]

Democracy in the Middle East, the role of Islamist political parties, and the war on terrorism:

• Ayoob, Mohammed. The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World. University of Michigan Press, 2007.
• Marina Ottoway, et al., Democratic Mirage in the Middle East^{[dead link]}, Carnegie Endowment for Ethics and International Peace, Policy Brief 20, (October 20, 2002).
• Marina Ottoway and Thomas Carothers, Think Again: Middle East Democracy, Foreign Policy (Nov./Dec. 2004).
• Steven Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security: The Foundations of the War on Terror, Ithaca Press, 2007 ISBN 978-0-86372-321-6
• Chris Zambelis, The Strategic Implications of Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Middle East, Parameters, (Autumn 2005).
• Adnan M. Hayajneh, The U.S. Strategy: Democracy and Internal Stability in the Arab World, Alternatives (Volume 3, No. 2 & 3, Summer/Fall 2004).
• Gary Gambill, Jumpstarting Arab Reform: The Bush Administration's Greater Middle East Initiative, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (Vol. 6, No. 6-7, June/July 2004).
• Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East, 6 November 2003.
• Robert Blecher, Free People Will Set the Course of History: Intellectuals, Democracy and American Empire, Middle East Report (March 2003).
• Robert Fisk, What Does Democracy Really Mean In The Middle East? Whatever The West Decides, The Independent, 8 August 2005.
• Fawaz Gergez, Is Democracy in the Middle East a Pipedream?^{[dead link]}, Yale Global Online, April 25, 2005.
• Masood Ashraf Raja. "Muslim Modernity: Poetics, Politics, and Metaphysics.” Muslim Societies and the Challenge of Secularization: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Gabriele Marranci. Ed. Aberdeen: Springer, 2010: 99-112.

External links[link]

• Islam and Politics from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
• Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: The Search for Common Ground
• The Ideology of Terrorism and Violence in Saudi Arabia: Origins, Reasons and Solution
• Evaluating the Islamist movement - written by Greg Noakes, an American Muslim who works at the Washington Report
• Muslim scholars face down fanaticism - written by Aicha Lemsine, an Algerian journalist and author.
• Peter Krogh discuses Islam and politics with John L. Esposito and Mary Jane Deeb On Great Decisions,1994

Imran Khan Niazi عمران خان نیازی
Personal details
Born	(1952-11-25) 25 November 1952 (age 59) Lahore, West Punjab, Dominion of Pakistan
Political party	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
Spouse(s)	Jemima Khan (1995–2004)
Children	Sulaiman Qasim Khan
Residence	Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan
Alma mater	Keble College, Oxford
Occupation	Politician Philanthropist Cricketer
Religion	Islam
Website	PTI

Imran Khan Niazi (Urdu: عمران خان نیازی; born 25 November 1952) is a Pakistani politician and former cricketer, playing international cricket for two decades in the late twentieth century. After retiring, he entered politics. Currently, besides his political activism, Khan is also a philanthropist, cricket commentator, Chancellor of the University of Bradford and Founder and Chairman Board of Governors of Shaukat Khanum Memorial Cancer Hospital & Research Centre.

Arguably Pakistan's most successful cricket captain, Khan played for the Pakistani cricket team from 1971 to 1992 and served as its captain intermittently throughout 1982–1992.^[1] After retiring from cricket at the end of the 1987 World Cup, he was called back to join the team in 1988. At 39, Khan led his teammates to Pakistan's first and only World Cup victory in 1992. He has a record of 3807 runs and 362 wickets in Test cricket, making him one of eight world cricketers to have achieved an 'All-rounder's Triple' in Test matches.^[2] On 14 July 2010, Khan was inducted into the ICC Cricket Hall of Fame.^[3]

In April 1996, Khan founded and became the chairman of a political party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Movement for Justice).^[4] He represented Mianwali as a member of the National Assembly from November 2002 to October 2007.^[5] Foreign Policy magazine has described him as "Pakistan's Ron Paul".^[6]

Through worldwide fundraising, he has also helped establish the Shaukat Khanum Memorial Cancer Hospital & Research Centre in 1996 and Mianwali's Namal College in 2008.

Family, education, and personal life[link]

Imran Khan was born in Lahore, the only son of Ikramullah Khan Niazi, a civil engineer, and his wife Shaukat Khanum.^[7] Although long settled in Mianwali in Punjab, the family were of Pashtun ethnicity and belonged to the Niazi Shermankhel tribe.^[8] A quiet and shy boy in his youth, Khan grew up with his four sisters in relatively affluent (upper middle-class) circumstances^[9] and received a privileged education. He was educated the Cathedral School in Lahore, the Royal Grammar School Worcester in England, where he excelled at cricket, and at Aitchison College, Lahore. In 1972, he enrolled to study Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Keble College, Oxford, where he graduated with a second-class degree in Politics and a third in Economics.^[10] Khan's mother hailed from the Burki family which had produced several successful hockey players,^[7] as also cricketers such as Javed Burki and Majid Khan.^[8] Early in life, Khan developed an interest in cricket, which is an extremely popular sport in Pakistan.

Marriage to Jemima Marcelle Goldsmith[link]

On 16 May 1995, Khan married Jemima Goldsmith, in an Islamic ceremony in Paris. A month later, on 21 June, they were married again in a civil ceremony at the Richmond register office in England, followed by a reception at the Goldsmiths' house in Surrey.^[11] . The marriage, described as "tough" by Khan,^[8] produced two sons, Sulaiman Isa (born 18 November 1996) and Kasim (born 10 April 1999).^[12] As an agreement of his marriage, Khan spent four months a year in England. On 22 June 2004, it was announced that the Khans had divorced because it was "difficult for Jemima to adapt to life in Pakistan".^[13] The marriage ended amicably. Imran has regular access to his children and his relationship with his ex-wife is friendly. Khan now resides in Bani Gala, Islamabad, where he built a farmhouse with the money he gained from selling his London flat. He grows fruit trees, wheat, and keeps cows, while also maintaining a cricket ground for his two sons, who visit during their holidays.^[8]

Cricket career[link]

Pride of Performance Award Recipient
Imran Khan was recipient of the Pride of Performance Award 1983
Presented by	Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Date	1983
Country	Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Khan made a lacklustre first-class cricket debut at the age of sixteen in Lahore. By the start of the 1970s, he was playing for his home teams of Lahore A (1969–70), Lahore B (1969–70), Lahore Greens (1970–71) and, eventually, Lahore (1970–71).^[14] Khan was part of Oxford University's Blues Cricket team during the 1973–75 seasons.^[10] At Worcestershire, where he played county cricket from 1971 to 1976, he was regarded as only an average medium pace bowler. During this decade, other teams represented by Khan include Dawood Industries (1975–76) and Pakistan International Airlines (1975–76 to 1980–81). From 1983 to 1988, he played for Sussex.^[2]

In 1971, Khan made his Test cricket debut against England at Birmingham. Three years later, he debuted in the One Day International (ODI) match, once again playing against England at Nottingham for the Prudential Trophy. After graduating from Oxford and finishing his tenure at Worcestershire, he returned to Pakistan in 1976 and secured a permanent place on his native national team starting from the 1976–77 season, during which they faced New Zealand and Australia.^[14] Following the Australian series, he toured the West Indies, where he met Tony Greig, who signed him up for Kerry Packer's World Series Cricket.^[2] His credentials as one of the fastest bowlers of the world started to establish when he finished third at 139.7 km/h in a fast bowling contest at Perth in 1978, behind Jeff Thomson and Michael Holding, but ahead of Dennis Lillee, Garth Le Roux and Andy Roberts.^[2]

As a fast bowler, Khan reached the peak of his powers in 1982. In 9 Tests, he got 62 wickets at 13.29 each, the lowest average of any bowler in Test history with at least 50 wickets in a calendar year.^[15] In January 1983, playing against India, he attained a Test bowling rating of 922 points. Although calculated retrospectively (ICC player ratings did not exist at the time), Khan's form and performance during this period ranks third in the ICC's All-Time Test Bowling Rankings.^[16]

Khan achieved the all-rounder's triple (securing 3000 runs and 300 wickets) in 75 Tests, the second fastest record behind Ian Botham's 72. He is also established as having the second highest all-time batting average of 61.86 for a Test batsman playing at position 6 of the batting order.^[17] He played his last Test match for Pakistan in January 1992, against Sri Lanka at Faisalabad. Khan retired permanently from cricket six months after his last ODI, the historic 1992 World Cup final against England at Melbourne, Australia.^[18] He ended his career with 88 Test matches, 126 innings and scored 3807 runs at an average of 37.69, including six centuries and 18 fifties. His highest score was 136 runs. As a bowler, he took 362 wickets in Test cricket, which made him the first Pakistani and world's fourth bowler to do so.^[2] In ODIs, he played 175 matches and scored 3709 runs at an average of 33.41. His highest score remains 102 not out. His best ODI bowling is documented at 6 wickets for 14 runs.

Captaincy[link]

At the height of his career, in 1982, the thirty-year-old Khan took over the captaincy of the Pakistan cricket team from Javed Miandad. Recalling his initial discomfort with this new role, he later said, "When I became the cricket captain, I couldn’t speak to the team directly I was so shy. I had to tell the manager, I said listen can you talk to them, this is what I want to convey to the team. I mean early team meetings I use to be so shy and embarrassed I couldn’t talk to the team."^[19] As a captain, Khan played 48 Test matches, out of which 14 were won by Pakistan, 8 lost and the rest of 26 were drawn. He also played 139 ODIs, winning 77, losing 57 and ending one in a tie.^[2]

In the team's second match under his leadership, Khan led them to their first Test win on English soil for 28 years at Lord's.^[20] Khan's first year as captain was the peak of his legacy as a fast bowler as well as an all-rounder. He recorded the best Test bowling of his career while taking 8 wickets for 58 runs against Sri Lanka at Lahore in 1981–82.^[2] He also topped both the bowling and batting averages against England in three Test series in 1982, taking 21 wickets and averaging 56 with the bat. Later the same year, he put up a highly acknowledged performance in a home series against the formidable Indian team by taking 40 wickets in six Tests at an average of 13.95. By the end of this series in 1982–83, Khan had taken 88 wickets in 13 Test matches over a period of one year as captain.^[14]

Imran Khan's test career bowling statistics

This same Test series against India, however, also resulted in a stress fracture in his shin that kept him out of cricket for more than two years. An experimental treatment funded by the Pakistani government helped him recover by the end of 1984 and he made a successful comeback to international cricket in the latter part of the 1984–85 season.^[2]

In 1987, Khan led Pakistan to its first ever Test series win in India, which was followed by Pakistan's first series victory in England the same year.^[20] During the 1980s, his team also recorded three creditable draws against the West Indies. India and Pakistan co-hosted the 1987 World Cup, but neither ventured beyond the semi-finals. Khan retired from international cricket at the end of the World Cup. In 1988, he was asked to return to the captaincy by the President Of Pakistan, General Zia-Ul-Haq, and on 18 January, he announced his decision to rejoin the team.^[2] Soon after returning to the captaincy, Khan led Pakistan to another winning tour in the West Indies, which he has recounted as "the last time I really bowled well".^[8] He was declared Man of the Series against West Indies in 1988 when he took 23 wickets in 3 tests.^[2]

Khan's career-high as a captain and cricketer came when he led Pakistan to victory in the 1992 Cricket World Cup. Playing with a brittle batting line-up, Khan promoted himself as a batsman to play in the top order along with Javed Miandad, but his contribution as a bowler was minimal. At the age of 39, Khan scored the highest runs of all the Pakistani batsmen and took the winning last wicket himself.^[14]

Post-retirement[link]

In 1994, Khan had admitted that, during Test matches, he "occasionally scratched the side of the ball and lifted the seam." He had also added, "Only once did I use an object. When Sussex were playing Hampshire in 1981 the ball was not deviating at all. I got the 12th man to bring out a bottle top and it started to move around a lot."^[21] In 1996, Khan successfully defended himself in a libel action brought forth by former English captain and all-rounder Ian Botham and batsman Allan Lamb over comments they alleged were made by Khan in two articles about the above-mentioned ball-tampering and another article published in an Indian magazine, India Today. They claimed that, in the latter publication, Khan had called the two cricketers "racist, ill-educated and lacking in class." Khan protested that he had been misquoted, saying that he was defending himself after having admitted that he tampered with a ball in a county match 18 years ago.^[22] Khan won the libel case, which the judge labelled a "complete exercise in futility", with a 10–2 majority decision by the jury.^[22]

Since retiring, Khan has written opinion pieces on cricket for various British and Asian newspapers, especially regarding the Pakistani national team. His contributions have been published in India's Outlook magazine,^[23] the Guardian,^[24] the Independent, and the Telegraph. Khan also sometimes appears as a cricket commentator on Asian and British sports networks, including BBC Urdu^[25] and the Star TV network.^[26] In 2004, when the Indian cricket team toured Pakistan after 14 years, he was a commentator on TEN Sports' special live show, Straight Drive,^[27] while he was also a columnist for sify.com for the 2005 India-Pakistan Test series.^[28] He has provided analysis for every cricket World Cup since 1992, which includes providing match summaries for BBC during the 1999 World Cup.^[28]

In November 2009 Khan underwent emergency surgery at Lahore's Shaukat Khanum Cancer Hospital to remove an obstruction in his small intestine.^[29]

Social work[link]

For more than four years after retiring from cricket in 1992, Khan focused his efforts solely on social work. By 1991, he had founded the Shaukat Khanum Memorial Trust, a charity organisation bearing the name of his mother, Mrs. Shaukat Khanum. As the Trust's maiden endeavour, Khan established Pakistan's first and only cancer hospital, constructed using donations and funds exceeding $25 million, raised by Khan from all over the world.^[4] Inspired by the memory of his mother, who died of cancer, the Shaukat Khanum Memorial Cancer Hospital & Research Centre, a charitable cancer hospital with 75 percent free care, opened in Lahore on 29 December 1994.^[8] Khan currently serves as the chairman of the hospital and continues to raise funds through charity and public donations.^[30]

During the 1990s, Khan also served as UNICEF's Special Representative for Sports^[31] and promoted health and immunisation programmes in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Thailand.^[32]

On 27 April 2008, Khan's brainchild, a technical college in the Mianwali District called Namal College, was inaugurated. Namal College was built by the Mianwali Development Trust (MDT), as chaired by Khan, and was made an associate college of the University of Bradford (of which Khan is Chancellor) in December 2005.^[33] Currently, Khan is building another cancer hospital in Karachi, using his successful Lahore institution as a model. While in London, he also works with the Lord’s Taverners, a cricket charity.^[4]

Political work[link]

Imran Khan, Chairman, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf in World Economic Forum

In 1996, Khan founded a political party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which emphasized on anti-corruption policies.^[8][34] The newly formed party was unable to win a seat during the 1997 Pakistani general election.^[35] Khan supported General Pervez Musharraf's military coup in 1999,^[36] believing Musharraf would "end corruption, clear out the political mafias".^[37] According to Khan, he was Musharraf's choice of prime minister in 2002 but turned down the offer.^[38] The 2002 Pakistani general election were held in October across 272 constituencies. Khan anticipated doing well in the elections and was prepared to form a coalition if his party did not get a majority of the vote.^[39] He was elected from the NA-71 constituency of Mianwali and being the only party member to have secured a seat, PTI won only 0.8% of the popular vote. Khan, who was sworn in as an MP on 16 November,^[40] remained part of the Standing Committees on Kashmir and Public Accounts, and expressed legislative interest in Foreign Affairs, Education and Justice.^[41]

On 6 May 2005, Khan became one of the first Muslim figures to criticise a 300-word Newsweek story about the alleged desecration of the Qur'an in a U.S. military prison at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. Khan held a press conference to denounce the article and demanded that Gen. Pervez Musharraf secure an apology from the American president George W. Bush for the incident.^[42]. In June 2007, the federal Parliamentary Affairs Minister Dr. Sher Afghan Khan Niazi and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) party filed separate ineligibility references against Khan, asking for his disqualification as member of the National Assembly on grounds of immorality. Both references, filed on the basis of articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan, were rejected on 5 September.^[43]

On 2 October 2007, as part of the All Parties Democratic Movement, Khan joined 85 other MPs to resign from Parliament in protest of the Presidential election scheduled for 6 October, which General Musharraf was contesting without resigning as army chief.^[5] On 3 November 2007, Khan was put under house arrest at his father's home hours after President Musharraf declared a state of emergency in Pakistan. Khan had demanded the death penalty for Musharraf after the imposition of emergency rule, which he equated to "committing treason". The next day, on 4 November, Khan escaped and went into peripatetic hiding.^[44] He eventually came out of hiding on 14 November to join a student protest at the University of the Punjab.^[45] At the rally, Khan was captured by students from the Jamaat-i-Islami political party, who claimed that Khan was an uninvited nuisance at the rally, and they handed him over to the police, who charged him under the Anti-terrorism act for allegedly inciting people to pick up arms, calling for civil disobedience, and for spreading hatred.^[46].

On 30 October, 2011, Imran Khan changed the political picture of the country by addressing more than 100,000 supporters, challenging the policies of the current government, calling this new change a "tsunami" against the ruling parties,^[47] followed by another successful public gathering in Karachi on 25 December, 2011.^[48] Since then Imran Khan has become a real threat for the current ruling parties and future political prospect in Pakistan. According to International Republican Institute (IRI)'s survey, Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) tops the list of popular parties in Pakistan both at the national as well as provincial level, leaving Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Peopleís Party (PPP) behind.^[49]

Ideology[link]

Khan's proclaimed political platform and declarations include: Islamic values, to which he rededicated himself in the 1990s; liberal economics, with the promise of deregulating the economy and creating a welfare state; decreased bureaucracy and the implementation of anti-corruption laws, to create and ensure a clean government; the establishment of an independent judiciary; overhaul of the country's police system; and an anti-militant vision for a democratic Pakistan.^[18][26][50]

Khan told Britain's Daily Telegraph, "I want Pakistan to be a welfare state and a genuine democracy with a rule of law and an independent judiciary."^[18] Other ideas he has presented include a requirement of all students to spend a year after graduation teaching in the countryside and cutting down the over-staffed bureaucracy in order to send them to teach too.^[51] "We need decentralisation, empowering people at the grass roots," he has said.^[52]

Criticism[link]

Khan had a child out of wedlock with Ana-Luisa White (Sita White).^[53] This was confirmed by a judgement of paternity rendered by a Superior Court of the State of California for the county of Los Angeles in favour of White^[54] wherein it was held that Khan was the father of a female child born on June 15, 1992.^{[55][56][not in citation given]} Khan did not challenge that judgement and in 2004 accepted the child as his daughter. He and his wife Jemima became the girls guardians.^{[57][58] [59] [60] [61]}

During the 1970s and 1980s, Khan became known as a socialite due to his "non-stop partying" at London nightclubs such as Annabel's and Tramp, though he claims to have hated English pubs and to never drink alcohol.^{[4][8][26][42]} He gained notoriety in London gossip columns for romancing young debutantes such as Susannah Constantine, Lady Liza Campbell and the artist Emma Sergeant.^[8]

Khan is often dismissed as a political lightweight^[45] and a celebrity outsider in Pakistan,^[19] where national newspapers also refer to him as a "spoiler politician".^[62] The Muttahida Qaumi Movement, has asserted that Khan is "a sick person who has been a total failure in politics and is alive just because of the media coverage".^[63] Political observers say the crowds he draws are attracted by his cricketing celebrity, and the public has been reported to view him as a figure of entertainment rather than a serious political authority.^[51]

Declan Walsh in The Guardian newspaper in England in 2005 described Khan as a "miserable politician," observing that, "Khan's ideas and affiliations since entering politics in 1996 have swerved and skidded like a rickshaw in a rainshower... He preaches democracy one day but gives a vote to reactionary mullahs the next."^[64] The charge constantly raised against Khan is that of hypocrisy and opportunism, including what has been called his life's "playboy to puritan U-turn."^[19] Political commentator Najam Sethi, stated that, "A lot of the Imran Khan story is about backtracking on a lot of things he said earlier, which is why this doesn’t inspire people."^[19]. He is also criticized for being a puppet of Pakistan's 'establishment'.^[65]

Awards and honours[link]

Khan in Germany

• Khan is featured in the University of Oxford's Hall of Fame and has been an honorary fellow of Oxford's Keble College.^[31]
• In 1976 as well as 1980, Khan was awarded The Cricket Society Wetherall Award for being the leading all-rounder in English first-class cricket.
• In 1983, he was also named Wisden Cricketer of the Year
• In 1983, he had received the President’s Pride of Performance Award
• In 1985, Sussex Cricket Society Player of the Year
• In 1990, Indian Cricket Cricketer of the Year^[14]
• In 1992, Khan was given Pakistan's civil award, the Hilal-i-Imtiaz
• On 8 July 2004, Khan was awarded the Lifetime Achievement Award at the 2004 Asian Jewel Awards in London, for "acting as a figurehead for many international charities and working passionately and extensively in fund-raising activities.^[66]
• On 7 December 2005, Khan was appointed the fifth Chancellor of the University of Bradford, where he is also a patron of the Born in Bradford research project.
• On 13 December 2007, Khan received the Humanitarian Award at the Asian Sports Awards in Kuala Lumpur for his efforts in setting up the first cancer hospital in Pakistan.^[67]
• On 5 July 2008, he was one of several veteran Asian cricketers presented special silver jubilee awards at the inaugural Asian cricket Council (ACC) award ceremony in Karachi.^[68]
• In 2009, at International Cricket Council's centennial year celebration, Khan was one of fifty-five cricketers inducted into the ICC Hall of Fame.^[69]
• In 2011 he was given Jinnah award.

Writings by Khan[link]

Khan has published six works of non-fiction, including an autobiography co-written with Patrick Murphy. He periodically writes editorials on cricket and Pakistani politics in several leading Pakistani and British newspapers. It was revealed in 2008 that Khan's second book, Indus Journey: A Personal View of Pakistan, had required heavy editing from the publisher. The publisher Jeremy Lewis revealed in a memoir that when he asked Khan to show his writing for publication, "he handed me a leatherbound notebook or diary containing a few jottings and autobiographical snippets. It took me, at most, five minutes to read them; and that, it soon became apparent, was all we had to go on."^[70]

Books

• Khan, Imran (1989). Imran Khan's cricket skills. London : Golden Press in association with Hamlyn. ISBN 0-600-56349-9. 
• Khan, Imran & Murphy, Patrick (1983). Imran: The autobiography of Imran Khan. Pelham Books. ISBN 0-7207-1489-3. 
• Khan, Imran (1991). Indus Journey: A Personal View of Pakistan. Chatto & Windus. ISBN 0-7011-3527-1. 
• Khan, Imran (1992). All Round View. Mandarin. ISBN 0-7493-1499-0. 
• Khan, Imran (1993). Warrior Race: A Journey Through the Land of the Tribal Pathans. Chatto Windus. ISBN 0-7011-3890-4. 
• Khan, Imran (2011). Pakistan: A Personal History. Bantam Press. ISBN 0-593-06774-6. 

Articles

• Guardian comments, political and cricket commentary by Khan
• Telegraph columns, sports articles penned by Khan from 2000 to present
• We must address the root causes of this terror, Khan's editorial in the Independent following the 11 September attacks
• Benazir Bhutto has only herself to blame, Khan's 2007 editorial on Bhutto's return to Pakistan

In popular culture[link]

After the permission from him, Kaptaan is a biographical film about him.

References[link]