Portuguese Colonial War
Date 1961–1975 Location Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique Result Portuguese military victory in Angola and Mozambique.[1] Independence of all Portuguese colonial possessions after the Carnation Revolution military coup in Lisbon on 25 April 1974.[2][3] Subsequent withdrawal of all Portuguese troops from Africa under the Lusaka and Alvor agreements.[4]
Belligerents
Portugal Supported by: South Africa  Rhodesia 22x20px Malawi 22x20px NATO[citation needed] (marginally, with great restrictions)	African independence movements (1961-74): MPLA UNITA FNLA FLEC PAIGC FRELIMO MLSTP Supported by:  Soviet Union  Cuba  United States (at times, including JFK era)  People's Republic of China  Zaire[5]  Algeria  Tanzania  Senegal  Tunisia  Guinea Congo-Brazzaville Somalia Burma Warsaw Pact (marginally)
Commanders and leaders
Generally: António de Oliveira Salazar Marcelo Caetano Angola: Francisco da Costa Gomes Portuguese Guinea: António de Spínola Mozambique: António Augusto dos Santos (1964–69), Kaúlza de Arriaga (1969–74)	Angola: Agostinho Neto Lúcio Lara Jonas Savimbi Holden Roberto Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde: Amílcar Cabral Luís Cabral Aristides Pereira Mozambique: Eduardo Mondlane (1962–69) Filipe Samuel Magaia (1964–66) Samora Moïses Machel (1969–75) São Tomé and Príncipe: Manuel Pinto da Costa
Strength
148,000 65,000 in Angola 32,000 in Portuguese Guinea 51,000 in Mozambique	38,000-53,000 + ? Guerrilla 18,000 in Angola 10,000 in Portuguese Guinea 10-15,000 in Mozambique
Casualties and losses
8,289 dead 15,507 with permanent deficiency (physical or psychological)	50,000 in Angola ~6,000 killed ~4,000 wounded in Portuguese Guinea >10,000 killed in Mozambique
Civilian casualties: 50,000 killed in Mozambique [6]

The Portuguese Colonial War (Portuguese: Guerra Colonial), also known in Portugal as the Overseas War (Guerra do Ultramar) or in the former colonies as the War of liberation (Guerra de Libertação), was fought between Portugal's military and the emerging nationalist movements in Portugal's African colonies between 1961 and 1975, after the Portuguese regime was overthrown by a military coup in 1974. It was a decisive ideological struggle and armed conflict of the Cold War in African (Portuguese-Africa and surrounding nations) and European (mainland Portugal) scenarios. Unlike other European nations, the Portuguese Estado Novo regime did not leave its African colonies, or the overseas provinces (províncias ultramarinas) as those overseas territories were officially called since 1951, during the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1960s, various armed independence movements became active in these Portugal-administered territories, namely in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. During the war, several atrocities were committed by all forces involved in the conflict. The decolonization and independence of several African states after the World War II, the Invasion of Goa by Indian Armed Forces and the Santa Maria hijacking, as well as the achievements of the African-American Civil Rights Movement, were also signs of the so called "Winds of change" supporting and giving context to the emergence of independence movements in Portuguese Africa.

Throughout the war period Portugal faced increasing dissent, arms embargoes and other punitive sanctions imposed by most of the international community. For the Portuguese society the war was becoming even more unpopular by 1973 due to its length and financial costs, the worsening of diplomatic relations with other United Nations members, and the role it had always played as a factor of perpetuation of the Estado Novo regime and the non-democratic status quo. The combined guerrilla forces of the MPLA, the UNITA, and the FNLA, in Angola, PAIGC in Portuguese Guinea, and FRELIMO in Mozambique, succeeded in their 13-year-long pro-independence rebellion through guerrilla warfare, when low-ranking elements of the Portuguese Armed Forces staged a military coup at Lisbon in April 1974.^[7][8] The Portuguese Armed Forces' Movimento das Forças Armadas overthrew the Lisbon government in protest of the ongoing war in Portuguese Guinea that seemed to have no military end in sight, as well as in rebellion against the new military laws that were to be presented next year (Decree Law: Decretos-Leis n.os 353, de 13 de Julho de 1973, e 409, de 20 de Agosto) whereby militia officers who completed a brief training program and had served in the overseas territories' defensive campaigns, could be commissioned at the same rank as military academy graduates.^{[9][10][11][12][13]} After the coup, the newly-installed revolutionary Portuguese government removed the overseas military forces and agreed to a quick handover of power for the nationalistic African guerrillas.

The end of the war after the Carnation Revolution military coup of April 1974 in Lisbon resulted in the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Portuguese citizens^[14] plus military personnel of European, African and mixed ethnicity from the newly-independent African territories to Portugal. From May 1974 to the end of the 1970s, over 1 million citizens left these former Portuguese colonies, and would restart their lives predominantly in Portugal, South Africa, North America, the rest of Western Europe and Brazil.^[15][16][17] This migration is regarded as one of the largest peaceful migrations in the world's history.^[18] Devastating civil wars followed in Angola and Mozambique, which lasted several decades and claimed millions of lives and refugees.^[19] The former colonies faced severe problems after independence. Economic and social recession, authoritarianism, lack of democracy and other elemental civil and political rights, corruption, poverty, inequality and failed central planning eroded the initial revolutionary fervour.^[20][21][22] A level of social order and economic development comparable to what had existed under Portuguese rule, including during the period of the Colonial War (1961–1974), became the goal of the independent territories.^[23]

Portugal had been the first European power to establish a colony in Africa when it captured Ceuta in 1415; it became one of the last to leave. The former Portuguese territories in Africa became sovereign states, with Agostinho Neto in Angola, Samora Machel in Mozambique, Luís Cabral in Guinea-Bissau, Manuel Pinto da Costa in São Tomé and Príncipe and Aristides Pereira in Cape Verde as the heads of state.

Political context[link]

Age of Discovery[link]

When the Portuguese began trading on the west coast of Africa, in the 15th century, they concentrated their energies on Guinea and Angola. Hoping at first for gold, they soon found that slaves were the most valuable commodity available in the region for export. The Islamic Empire was already well established in the African slave trade, for centuries linking it to the Arab slave trade. However, the Portuguese who had conquered the Islamic port of Ceuta in 1415 and several other towns in current day Morocco in a Crusade against Islamic neighbours, managed to successfully establish themselves in the area. But the Portuguese never established much more than a foothold in either place. In Guinea, rival Europeans grabbed much of the trade (mainly slaves) while local African rulers confined the Portuguese to the coast. These rulers then sent enslaved Africans to the Portuguese ports and forts in Africa from where they were exported. Thousands of kilometers down the coast, in Angola, the Portuguese found it even harder to consolidate their early advantage against encroachments by Dutch, British and French rivals. Nevertheless the fortified Portuguese towns of Luanda (established in 1587 with 400 Portuguese settlers) and Benguela (a fort from 1587, a town from 1617) remained almost continuously in Portuguese hands. As in Guinea, the slave trade became the basis of the local economy in Angola - with raids carried ever farther inland to procure captives that were sold by African warriors after one of many interethnic skirmishes was resumed. More than a million men, women and children were shipped from here across the Atlantic. In this region, unlike Guinea, the trade remained largely in Portuguese hands. Nearly all the slaves were destined for Brazil. In Mozambique, reached in the 15th century by Portuguese sailors in order to discover a maritime spice trade route, the Portuguese settled along the coast and made their way into the hinterland as sertanejos (backwoodsmen). These sertanejos lived alongside Swahili traders and even took up service among Shona kings as interpreters and political advisors. One such sertanejo managed to travel through almost all the Shona kingdoms, including the Mutapa Empire's (Mwenemutapa) metropolitan district, between 1512 and 1516.^[24] By the 1530s, small groups of Portuguese traders and prospectors penetrated the interior regions seeking gold, where they set up garrisons and trading posts at Sena and Tete on the Zambezi River and tried to gain exclusive control over the gold trade. The Portuguese finally entered into direct relations with the Mwenemutapa in the 1560s.^[25] However, it was also in the coastal strip that the Portuguese traders and explorers settled permanently with more success and would establish strongholds safe from their main rivals in East Africa - the Omani Arabs, including those of Zanzibar.

Scramble for Africa and the World Wars[link]

Portugal's colonial claim to the region was recognized by the other European powers during the 1880s, during the Scramble for Africa, and the final boundaries of Portuguese Africa were agreed by negotiation in Europe in 1891. At the time Portugal was in effective control of little more than the coastal strip of both Angola and Mozambique, but important inroads into the interior had been made since the first half of the 19th century. In Angola, construction of a railway from Luanda to Malanje, in the fertile highlands, is started in 1885. Work begins in 1902 on a commercially more significant line from Benguela all the way inland to the Katanga region, aiming to provide access to the sea for the richest mining district of the Belgian Congo. The line reaches the Congo border in 1928. In 1914, both Angola and Mozambique had Portuguese army garrisons of around 2,000 men, African troops led by European officers. With the outbreak of the World War I in 1914, Portugal sent reinforcements to both colonies, because the fighting in the neighbouring German African colonies would probably spill over the borders into its territories. After Germany declared war on Portugal in March 1916 the Portuguese government sent more reinforcements to Mozambique (the South Africans had captured German South West Africa in 1915). These troops supported British, South African and Belgian military operations against German colonial forces in German East Africa. In December 1917, German colonial forces led by Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck invaded Mozambique from German East Africa. Portuguese, British and Belgian forces spent all of 1918 chasing Lettow-Vorbeck and his men across Mozambique, German East Africa and Northern Rhodesia. Portugal sent a total of 40,000 reinforcements to Angola and Mozambique during the World War I. By this time the regime in Portugal has been through two violent transitions, from monarchy to republic in 1910 and then to a military dictatorship after a coup in 1926. The effect of these changes in Angola is a tightening of Portuguese control. In the early years of the expanded and estabilized colony, there was a continuation of the almost endemic warfare between the Portuguese and the various African rulers of the region, as were endemic warfare between the various African rulers. A systematic campaign of conquest and pacification was undertaken by the Portuguese. One by one the local kingdoms were overwhelmed and abolished. By the middle of the 1920s the whole of Angola is under control. There was no longer slavery in Portuguese Africa, but the plantations were worked on a system of paid but forced African labour composed by the large majority of ethnic Africans who did not have resources to pay their taxes and were considered unemployed by the authorities. After the World War II and the first decolonization events, this system gradually fell into disuse. However, paid forced labour, including labour contracts with forced relocation of people, continued in many regions of Portuguese Africa and only would be abolished in 1961.

Post-World War II[link]

Portuguese territories in Africa by the time of the Colonial War.

In the late 1950s, the Portuguese Armed Forces saw themselves confronted with the paradox generated by the dictatorial regime of the Estado Novo that had been in power since 1926: on the one hand, the policy of Portuguese neutrality in World War II placed the Portuguese Armed Forces out of the way of a possible East-West conflict; on the other hand, the regime felt the increased responsibility of keeping Portugal's vast overseas territories under control and protect the populations there. Portugal, a neutral country in the war against Germany (1939–1945) before the foundation of NATO, joined that organization as a founding member in 1949, and was integrated within the military commands of NATO. The NATO focus against the threat of a conventional Soviet attack against Western Europe was to the detriment of military preparations against guerrilla uprisings in Portugal's overseas provinces that were considered essential for the survival of the nation. The integration of Portugal in the Atlantic Alliance would form a military élite that would become essential during the planning and implementation of the operations during the Overseas War. This "NATO generation" would ascend quickly to the highest political positions and military command without having to provide evidence of loyalty to the regime. The Colonial War would establish, in this way, a split between the military structure—heavily influenced by the western powers with democratic governments—and the political power of the regime. Some analysts see the "Botelho Moniz coup" (also known as A Abrilada) against the Portuguese government and backed by the U.S. administration,^[26] as the beginning of this rupture, the origin of a lapse on the part of the regime to keep up a unique command center, an armed force prepared for threats of conflict in the colonies. This situation would cause, as would be verified later, a lack of coordination between the three general staffs (Army, Air Force and Navy).

The United States supported the Union of Peoples of Angola (UPA - União dos Povos de Angola), headed by Holden Roberto. With this support, the Congo-Léopoldville-based UPA attacked Portuguese settlers and Africans living in Angola from bases in the Congo.^[27] Many of the African farm workers living in northern Angola worked under labour contracts that required seasonal relocation of workers from the desertified Southwest and Bailundo areas of Angola. Photos of Africans killed by the UPA, which included photos of decapitated civilians, men, women and children of both white and black ethnicity, would later be displayed in the UN by Portuguese diplomats.^[28] The emergence of labor protests, attacks by newly-organized guerrilla movements, and the Santa Maria hijacking by Henrique Galvão began a path to open warfare in Angola.

According to historical researchers like José Freire Antunes, U.S. President John F. Kennedy^[29] sent a message to Salazar advising Portugal to abandon its African colonies shortly after the outbreak of violence in 1961. Instead, after a coup led by pro-U.S. forces failed to depose him, Salazar consolidated power and immediately set to protect the overseas territories by sending reinforcements, setting the stage for continued conflict in Angola. Similar scenarios would play out in other overseas Portuguese territories.

Multiethnic societies, competing ideologies, and armed conflict in Portuguese Africa[link]

Portuguese troops board transport ship destined for battle zone.

By the 1950s, the European mainland Portuguese territory was inhabited by a society that was poorer and had a much higher illiteracy rate than the average Western European societies or those of North America. It was ruled by an authoritarian and conservative right-leaning dictatorship, known as the Estado Novo regime. By this time, the Estado Novo regime ruled both the Portuguese mainland and several centuries-old overseas territories as theoretically co-equal departments. The possessions were Angola, Cape Verde, Macau, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, Portuguese India, Portuguese Timor, São João Baptista de Ajudá and São Tomé and Príncipe. In reality, the relation of mainland Portuguese to their overseas possessions was that of colonial administrator to a subservient colony. Political, legislative, administrative, commercial and other institutional relations between the colonies and Portugal-based individuals and organizations were numerous, though migration to, from, and between Portugal and its overseas departments was limited in size, due principally to the long distance and low annual income of the average Portuguese as well that of the indigenous overseas populations.

An increasing number of African anti-colonial movements called for total independence of the overseas African territories from Portugal. Some, like the U.S.-backed UPA^[30] wanted national self-determination, while others wanted a new form of government based on Marxist principles. Portuguese leaders, including Salazar, attempted to stave off calls for independence by defending a policy of assimilation, multiracialism, and civilising mission, or Lusotropicalism, as a way of integrating Portuguese colonies, and their peoples, more closely with Portugal itself.^[31] For the Portuguese ruling regime, the overseas empire was a matter of national interest, to be preserved at all costs. As far back as 1919, a Portuguese delegate to the International Labour Conference in Geneva declared: "The assimilation of the so-called inferior races, by cross-breeding, by means of the Christian religion, by the mixing of the most widely divergent elements; freedom of access to the highest offices of state, even in Europe - these are the principles which have always guided Portuguese colonisation in Asia, in Africa, in the Pacific, and previously in America."^[32] However, even as late as the 1950s the policy of 'colorblind' access and mixing of races did not extend to all of Portugal's African territories, particularly Mozambique, where in tune with other minority white regimes of the day in southern Africa, the territory was segregated along racial lines. Strict qualification criteria ensured that less than one per cent of black Mozambicans became full Portuguese citizens.^[33]

Numerous subsidies were offered by the Estado Novo regime to those Portuguese who agreed to settle in Angola or Mozambique, including a special premium for each Portuguese man who agreed to marry an African woman.^[34] Salazar himself was fond of restating the old Portuguese policy maxim that any indigenous resident of Portugal's African territories was in theory eligible to become a member of Portuguese government, even its President. In practice, this never took place, though trained black Africans living in Portugal's overseas African possessions were allowed to occupy positions in a variety of areas including the military, the civil service, the clergy, education, and private business - providing they had the requisite education and technical skills. While access to basic, secondary and technical education remained poor until the 1960s, a few Africans were able to attend schools locally or in some cases in Portugal itself. This resulted in the advancement of certain black Portuguese Africans who would become prominent individuals during the war and its aftermath, including Samora Machel, Mário Pinto de Andrade, Marcelino dos Santos, Eduardo Mondlane, Agostinho Neto, Amílcar Cabral, Jonas Savimbi, Joaquim Chissano, and Graça Machel. Two state-run universities were founded in Portuguese Africa in the 1962 by the Minister of the Overseas Adriano Moreira (the Universidade de Luanda in Angola and the Universidade de Lourenço Marques in Mozambique, awarding a range of degrees from engineering to medicine^[35]); however, most of their students came from Portuguese families living in the two territories). Several personalities in Portuguese society, including one of the most idolized sports stars in Portuguese football history, a black football player from Portuguese East Africa named Eusébio, were other examples of efforts towards assimilation and multiracialism in the Post-World War II period.

According to Mozambican historian João Paulo Borges Coelho,^[36] the Portuguese colonial army was largely segregated along terms of race and ethnicity until 1960. There were originally three classes of soldier in Portuguese overseas service: commissioned soldiers (whites), overseas soldiers (African assimilados), and native or indigenous Africans (indigenato). These categories were renamed to 1st, 2nd and 3rd class in 1960 - which effectively corresponded to the same categories. Later, after official discrimination based on skin colour was outlawed, some Portuguese commanders such as General António de Spínola began a process of Africanization of Portuguese forces fighting in Africa. In Portuguese Guinea, this included a large increase in African recruitment along with the establishment of all-black military formations such as the Black Militias (Milícias negras) commanded by Major Carlos Fabião and the African Commando Battalion (Batalhão de Comandos Africanos) commanded by General Almeida Bruno.^[37] While black African soldiers constituted a mere 18% of the total number of troops fighting in Portugal's African territories in 1961, this percentage would rise dramatically over the next thirteen years, with black soldiers constituting over 50% of all government forces fighting in Africa by April 1974. Coelho noted that perceptions of African soldiers varied a good deal among senior Portuguese commanders during the conflict in Angola, Guinea and Mozambique. General Francisco da Costa Gomes, perhaps the most successful counterinsurgency commander, sought good relations with local civilians and employed African units within the framework of an organized counter-insurgency plan.^[38] General António de Spínola, by contrast, appealed for a more political and psycho-social use of African soldiers.^[38] On the other hand, General Kaúlza de Arriaga, the most conservative of the three, appears to have doubted the reliability of African forces outside his strict control, while continuing to view African soldiers as inferior to Portuguese troops.^[38][39]

Native African troops, although widely deployed were initially employed in subordinate roles as enlisted troops or noncommissioned officers. As the war went on, an increasing number of native Angolans rose to positions of command, though of junior rank. In the late 1950s, after 500 years of colonial rule, not only had Portugal failed to produce any native black governor, headmaster, police inspector, or professor, it had also failed to produce a single commander of senior commissioned rank in the overseas Army. Here Portuguese colonial administrators fell victim to the legacy of their own discriminatory and limited polices in education, which largely barred indigenous black Africans from an equal and adequate education until well after the outbreak of the insurgency.^[40] With illiteracy rates approaching 99 per cent and almost no African enrollment in secondary schools,^[40] few African candidates could qualify for Portugal's officer candidate programs; most African officers obtained their commission as the result of individual competence and valour on the battlefield.

Despite these handicaps, while the overwhelming majority of black or native African soldiers served in the enlisted ranks, an increasing percentage were serving as noncommissioned or commissioned officers by the 1970s, including such officers as Captain (later Lt. Colonel) Marcelino da Mata, a black Portuguese citizen born of Guinean parents who rose to command from a first sergeant in a road engineering unit to a commander in the elite all-African Comandos Africanos, where he eventually became one of the most-decorated soldiers in the Portuguese Army.

By the early 1970s, the Portuguese authorities had fully perceived racial discriminatory policies and lack of investment in education as wrong and contrary to their overseas ambitions in Portuguese Africa, and willingly accepted a true color blindness policy with more spending in education and training opportunities, which started to produce a larger number of black high ranked professionals, including military personnel.

After the World War II, as communist and anti-colonial ideologies spread across Africa, many clandestine political movements were established in support of independence using various interpretations of Marxist revolutionary ideology. These new movements seized on anti-Portuguese and anti-colonial sentiment^[41] to advocate the complete overthrow of existing governmental structures in Portuguese Africa. These Marxist movements alleged that Portuguese policies and development plans were primarily designed by the ruling authorities for the benefit of the territories' ethnic Portuguese population at the expense of local tribal control, the development of native communities, and the majority of the indigenous population, who suffered both state-sponsored discrimination and enormous social pressure to comply with government policies largely imposed from Lisbon. Many felt they had received too little opportunity or resources to upgrade their skills and improve their economic and social situation to a degree comparable to that of the Europeans. Statistically, Portuguese Africa's white Portuguese population were indeed wealthier and more educated than the indigenous majority.

After conflict erupted between the UPA and MPLA and Portuguese military forces, U.S. President John F. Kennedy^[29] advised António de Oliveira Salazar (via the US consulate in Portugal) that Portugal should abandon Portugal's African colonies. A failed Portuguese military coup known as the Abrilada, attempted in an effort to overthrow the authoritarian Estado Novo regime of António de Oliveira Salazar, received covert U.S support.^[26] In response, Salazar moved to consolidate his power, ordering an immediate military response to the violence occurring in Angola. As the war progressed, Portugal rapidly increased its mobilized forces. Under the Salazar regime, a military draft required all males to serve three years of obligatory military service; many of those called-up to active military duty were deployed to combat zones in Portugal's African overseas provinces. The national service period was increased to four years in 1967, and virtually all conscripts faced a mandatory two-year tour of service in Africa.^[42] The existence of the draft and likelihood of combat in African counterinsurgency operations would over time result in a sharp increase in emigration by Portuguese men seeking to avoid such service. By the end of the Portuguese colonial war in 1974, black African participation had become crucial due to declining numbers of recruits available from Portugal itself.^[43]

Portuguese-held (green), disputed (yellow) and rebel-held areas (red) in Portuguese-Guinea and other colonies in 1970, before the Portuguese military operations known as Gordian Knot Operation (Mozambique), Operation Green Sea (Guinea) and Frente Leste^[44] (Angola).

While Portuguese forces had all but won the guerrilla war in Angola, and had stalemated FRELIMO in Mozambique, colonial forces were forced on the defensive in Guinea, where PAIGC forces had carved out a large area of the rural countryside under effective insurgent control, using Soviet-supplied AA cannon and ground-to-air missiles to protect their encampments from attack by Portuguese air assets.^[45][46] Overall, the increasing success of Portuguese counterinsurgency operations and the inability or unwillingness of guerrilla forces to destroy the economy of Portugal's African territories was seen as a victory for the Portuguese government policies.

The Soviet Union,^[47] realising that military success by insurgents in Angola and Mozambique was becoming increasingly remote, shifted much of its military support to the PAIGC in Guinea, while increasing diplomatic efforts to isolate Portugal from the world community.^[48] The success of the socialist bloc in isolating Portugal diplomatically extended inside Portugal itself into the armed forces, where younger officers disenchanted with the Estado Novo regime and promotional opportunities began to identify ideologically with those calling for overthrow of the government and the establishment of a state based on Marxist principles.^[49]

By early 1974, guerrilla operations in Angola and Mozambique had been reduced to sporadic ambush operations against the Portuguese in the rural countryside areas, far from the main centers of population.^[43] The only exception was Portuguese Guinea, where PAIGC guerrilla operations, strongly supported by neighbouring allies like Guinea and Senegal, were largely successful in liberating and securing large areas of Portuguese Guinea. According some historians, Portugal recognized its inability to win the conflict in Guinea at the outset, but was forced to fight on to prevent an independent Guinea from serving as a inspirational model for insurgents in Angola and Mozambique.^[50]

Despite continuing attacks by insurgent forces against targets throughout the Portuguese African territories, the economies of both Portuguese Angola and Mozambique had actually improved each year of the conflict, as well as the economy of Portugal proper.^[51] Angola enjoyed an unprecedented economic boom during the 1960s, and the Portuguese government built new transportation networks to link the well-developed and highly urbanized coastal strip with the remote inland regions of the territory.^[42] The number of ethnic European Portuguese migrants from mainland Portugal (the metrópole) continued to increase as well, though always constituting a small minority of each territory's total population.^[52] Nevertheless, the costs of continuing the wars in Africa imposed a heavy burden on Portugal's resources; by the 1970s, the country was spending 40 per cent of its annual budget on the war effort.^[42]

The dismissal of General Spínola by Dr. Marcelo Caetano, the last prime minister of Portugal under the Estado Novo regime, over the general's publicly-announced desire to open negotiations with the PAIGC over Portuguese Guinea caused considerable public indignation in Portugal, and created favorable conditions for a military overthrow of the existing regime, which had lost all public support. On 25 April 1974 a military coup organized by left-wing Portuguese military officers - the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), overthrew the Estado Novo regime in what came to be known as the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon, Portugal.^[49] The coup resulted in a period of economic collapse and political instability, but received general support from the public in its aim of ending the Portuguese war effort in Africa. Officers suspected of sympathizing with the prior regime, even black officers such as Captain Marcelino da Mata, were imprisoned and tortured, while African soldiers who had served in native Portuguese Army units were forced to petition for Portuguese citizenship or else face deportation to face their former enemies in Angola, Guinea, or Mozambique.

According to Tetteh Hormeku (Programme Officer with Third World Network's Africa Secretariat in Accra; 2008 North-South Institute's Visiting Helleiner Research Fellow), the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974 came as a shock to the United States and other Western powers, as most analysts and the Nixon administration had concluded that Portuguese military success on the battlefield would resolve any political divisions within Portugal concerning the conduct of the war in Portuguese Africa, providing the conditions for US investment there.^[53] Most concerned was the apartheid government of South Africa, which launched a deep border incursion operation into Angola to attack guerrilla-controlled areas of the country following the coup.

The combatants[link]

Angola[link]

Overseas Province of Angola's coat of arms until 1975.

Portuguese soldiers in Angola.

On 3 January 1961 Angolan peasants in the region of Baixa de Cassanje, Malanje, boycotted the Cotonang Company's cotton fields where they worked, demanding better working conditions and higher wages. Cotonang, a company owned by Portuguese, British and German investors used native Africans to produce an annual cotton crop for export abroad. The uprising, later to become known as the Baixa de Cassanje revolt, was led by two previously unknown Angolans, António Mariano and Kulu-Xingu.^[54] During the protests, African workers burned their identification cards and attacked Portuguese traders. The Portuguese Air Force responded to the rebellion by bombing twenty villages in the area, allegedly using napalm in an attack that resulted in some 400 indigenous Angolan deaths.^[55][56]

In the Portuguese Overseas Province of Angola, the call for revolution was initially taken up by two insurgent groups, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), and the União das Populações de Angola (UPA), which changed its name to the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) in 1962. The MPLA commenced activities in an area of Angola known as the Zona Sublevada do Norte (ZSN or the Rebel Zone of the North), consisting of the provinces of Zaire, Uíge and Cuanza Norte. On February 4, 1961, using arms largely captured from Portuguese soldiers and police^[57] 250 MPLA guerrillas attacked the São Paulo fortress prison and police headquarters in Luanda in an attempt to free what it termed 'political prisoners'. The attack was unsuccessful, and no prisoners were released, but seven Portuguese policemen and forty Angolans were killed, mostly MPLA insurgents.^[57] Portuguese authorities responded with a sweeping counterinsurgency response in which over 5,000 Angolans were arrested, and a Portuguese mob raided the musseques (shanty towns) of Luanda, killing several dozen Angolans in the process.^[58]

On March 15, 1961, the UPA led by Holden Roberto launched an incursion into the Bakongo region of northern Angola with 4,000-5,000 insurgents. The insurgents called for local Bantu farmworkers and villagers to join them, unleashing an orgy of violence and destruction. The insurgents attacked farms, government outposts, and trading centers, killing everyone they encountered. At least 1,000 Portuguese settlers and an unknown number of indigenous Angolans were killed.^[59] The violence of the uprising received worldwide press attention and engendered sympathy for the Portuguese, while adversely affecting the international reputation of Roberto and the UPA.^[60]

Portuguese military parade in Luanda, Angola.

In response, Portuguese Armed Forces instituted a harsh policy of reciprocity by torturing and massacring rebels and protesters. Some Portuguese soldiers decapitated rebels and impaled their heads on stakes, pursuing a policy of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". Much of the initial offensive operations against Angolan UPA and MPLA insurgents was undertaken by four companies of Caçadores Especiais (Special Hunter) troops skilled in light infantry and antiguerrilla tactics, and who were already stationed in Angola at the outbreak of fighting.^[61] Individual Portuguese counterinsurgency commanders such as Second Lieutenant Fernando Robles of the 6ª Companhia de Caçadores Especiais became well-known throughout the country for their ruthlessness in hunting down insurgents.^[62]

The Portuguese Army steadily pushed the UPA back across the border into Congo-Kinshasa in a brutal counteroffensive that also displaced some 150,000 Bakongo refugees, taking control of Pedra Verde, the UPA's last base in northern Angola, on 20 September 1961.^[60] Within the next few weeks Portuguese military forces pushed the MPLA out of Luanda northeast into the Dembos region, where the MPLA established the "1st Military Region". For the moment, the Angolan insurgency had been defeated, but new guerrilla attacks would later break out in other regions of Angola such as Cabinda province, the central plateaus, and eastern and southeastern Angola.

By most accounts, Portugal's counterinsurgency campaign in Angola was the most successful of all its campaigns in the Colonial War.^[43] Angola is a large territory, and the long distances from safe havens in neighboring countries supporting the rebel forces made it difficult for the latter to escape detection. The distance from the major Angolan urban centres to the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia were so large that the eastern part of Angola's territory was known by the Portuguese as Terras do Fim do Mundo (the lands of the far side of the world). Another factor was internecine struggles between three competing revolutionary movements - (FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA) - and their guerrilla armies. For most of the conflict, the three rebel groups spent as much time fighting each other as they did fighting the Portuguese. For example, during the 1961 Ferreira Incident, a UPA patrol captured 21 MPLA insurgents as prisoners, then summarily executed them on 9 October, sparking open confrontation between the two insurgent groups. Strategy also played a role, as a successful hearts and minds campaign led by General Costa Gomes helped blunt the influence of the various revolutionary movements. Finally, unlike other overseas possessions, Portuguese Angola was able to receive support from a local ally, in this case South Africa. South African military operations proved to be of significant assistance to Portuguese military forces in Angola, who sometimes referred to their South African counter-insurgent counterparts as primos (cousins).

The campaign in Angola saw the development and initial deployment of several unique counter-insurgency forces:

• Batalhões de Caçadores Pára-quedistas (Paratrooper Hunter Battalions): employed throughout the conflicts in Africa, were the first forces to arrive in Angola when the war began
• Comandos (Commandos): born out of the war in Angola, and later used in Guinea and Mozambique
• Caçadores Especiais (Special Hunters): were in Angola from the start of the conflict in 1961
• Fiéis (Faithfuls): a force composed by Katanga exiles, black soldiers that opposed the rule of Mobutu
• Leais (Loyals): a force composed by exiles from Zambia, black soldiers that were against Kenneth Kaunda
• Grupos Especiais (Special Groups): units of volunteer black soldiers that had commando training; also used in Mozambique
• Tropas Especiais (Special Troops): the name of Special Forces Groups in Cabinda
• Flechas (Arrows): a successful indigenous formation of scouts, controlled by the PIDE/DGS, and composed by Bushmen that specialized in tracking, reconnaissance and pseudo-terrorist operations. Also employed in Mozambique, the Flechas inspired the formation of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts.
• Grupo de Cavalaria Nº1 (1st Cavalry Group): a mounted cavalry unit, armed with the 7.62 mm Espingarda m/961 rifle and the m/961 Walther P-38 pistol, tasked with reconnaissance and patrolling. The 1st was also known as the "Angolan Dragoons" (Dragões de Angola). The Rhodesians would also later develop a similar concept of horse-mounted counter-insurgency forces, forming the Grey's Scouts.
• Batalhão de Cavalaria 1927 (1927 Cavalry Battalion): a tank unit equipped with the M5A1 tank. The battalion was used for supporting infantry forces and as a rapid reaction force. Again the Rhodesians would copy this concept forming the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment.

Portuguese Guinea[link]

Overseas Province of Guinea's coat of arms until 1974.

A PAIGC checkpoint in 1974

In Portuguese Guinea (also simply referred to as Guinea at that time), the Marxist African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) started fighting in January 1963. Its guerrilla fighters attacked the Portuguese headquarters in Tite, located to the south of Bissau, the capital, near the Corubal river. Similar actions quickly spread across the entire colony, requiring a strong response from the Portuguese forces.

The war in Guinea has been termed "Portugal's Vietnam". The PAIGC was well-trained, well-led, and equipped and received substantial support from safe havens in neighbouring countries like Senegal and Guinea-Conakry. The jungles of Guinea and the proximity of the PAIGC's allies near the border proved to be of significant advantage in providing tactical superiority during cross-border attacks and resupply missions for the guerrillas. The conflict in Portuguese Guinea involving the PAIGC guerrillas and the Portuguese Army would prove the most intense and damaging of all conflicts in the Portuguese Colonial War, blocking Portuguese attempts to pacify the disputed territory via new economic and socioeconomic policies that had been applied with some success in Portuguese Angola and Portuguese Mozambique. In 1965 the war spread to the eastern part of Guinea; that same year, the PAIGC carried out attacks in the north of the territory where at the time only the Front for the Liberation and Independence of Guinea (FLING), a minor insurgent group, was active. By this time, the PAIGC had begun to openly receive military support from the Socialist Bloc, mainly from Cuba, and the Soviet Union.

In Guinea, the success of PAIGC guerrilla operations forced Portuguese armed forces on the defensive, and the latter were forced to limit their response to defending territories and cities already held. Unlike Portugal's other African territories, successful small-unit Portuguese counterinsurgency tactics were slow to evolve in Guinea. Defensive operations, where soldiers were dispersed in small numbers to guard critical buildings, farms, or infrastructure were particularly devastating to the regular Portuguese infantry, who became vulnerable to guerrilla attacks outside of populated areas by the forces of the PAIGC. They were also demoralized by the steady growth of PAIGC liberation sympathizers and recruits among the rural population. In a relatively short time, the PAIGC had succeeded in reducing Portuguese military and administrative control of the territory to a relatively small area of Guinea. The scale of this success can be seen in the fact that native Guineans in the 'liberated territories' ceased payment of debts to Portuguese landowners as well as payment of taxes to the colonial administration.^[63] The branch stores of the Companhia União Fabril (CUF), Mario Lima Whanon, and Manuel Pinto Brandão companies were seized and inventoried by the PAIGC in the areas they controlled, while the use of Portuguese currency in the areas under guerrilla control was banned.^[63] In order to maintain the economy in the liberated territories, the PAIGC was impelled an early stage to establish its own administrative and governmental bureaucracy, which organized agricultural production, educated PAIGC farmworkers on how to protect crops from destruction from aerial attack by the Portuguese Air Force, and opened armazens do povo (people's stores) to supply urgently needed tools and supplies in exchange for agricultural produce.^[63]

In 1968, General António de Spínola, the Portuguese general responsible for the Portuguese military operations in Guinea, was appointed as governor. General Spínola began a series of civil and military reforms designed to weaken PAIGC control of the Guinea and rollback insurgent gains. This included a 'hearts and minds' propaganda campaign designed to win the trust of the indigenous population, an effort to eliminate some of the discriminatory practices against native Guineans, a massive construction campaign for public works including new schools, hospital, an improved telecommuncations and road network, and a large increase in recruitment of native Guineans into the Portuguese armed forces serving in Guinea as part of an Africanization strategy.

Until 1960, Portuguese military forces serving in Guinea were composed of units led by white officers, with commissioned soldiers (whites), overseas soldiers (African assimilados), and native or indigenous Africans (indigenato) serving in the enlisted ranks. These discriminatory colour bars to service were eliminated as part of an Africanization policy of General António de Spínola, which called for the integration of indigneous Guinea Africans into Portuguese military forces in Africa. Two special indigenous African counterinsurgency detachments were formed by the Portuguese Armed Forces. The first of these was the African Commandos (Comandos Africanos), consisting of a battalion of commandos composed entirely of black soldiers (including the officers). The second was the African Special Marines (Fuzileiros Especiais Africanos), Marine units entirely composed of black soldiers. The African Special Marines supplemented other Portuguese elite units conducting amphibious operations in the riverine areas of Guinea in an attempt to interdict and destroy guerrilla forces and supplies. General Spinola's Africanization policy also fostered a large increase in indigenous recruitment into the armed forces, culminating the establishment of all-black military formations such as the Black Militias (Milícias negras) commanded by Major Carlos Fabião.^[37] By the early 1970s, an increasing percentage of Guineans were serving as noncommissioned or commissioned officers in Portuguese military forces in Africa, including such higher-ranking officers as Captain (later Lt. Colonel) Marcelino da Mata, a black Portuguese citizen born of Guinean parents who rose from a first sergeant in a road engineering unit to a commander in the Comandos Africanos.

During the latter part of the 1960s, military tactical reforms instituted by Gen. Spínola began to improve Portuguese counterinsurgency operations in Guinea. Naval amphibious operations were instituted to overcome some of the mobility problems inherent in the underdeveloped and marshy areas of the territory, utilizing Destacamentos de Fuzileiros Especiais (DFE) (special marine assault detachments) as strike forces. The Fuzileiros Especiais were lightly equipped with folding-stock m/961 (G3) rifles, 37mm rocket launchers, and light machine guns such as the Heckler & Koch HK21 to enhance their mobility in the difficult, swampy terrain.

Portugal commenced Operação Mar Verde or Operation Green Sea on 22 November 1970 in an attempt to overthrow Ahmed Sékou Touré, the leader of the Republic of Guinea and staunch PAIGC ally, to capture the leader of the PAIGC, Amilcar Cabral, and to cut off supply lines to PAIGC insurgents. The operation involved a daring raid on Conakry, a PAIGC safe haven, in which 400 Portuguese Fuzileiros (amphibious assault troops) attacked the city. The attempted coup d'état failed, though the Portuguese managed to destroy several PAIGC ships and free hundreds of Portuguese POWs at several large POW camps. One immediate result of Operation Green Sea was an escalation in the conflict, with countries such as Algeria and Nigeria now offering support to the PAIGC as well as the Soviet Union, which sent warships to the region (known by NATO as the West Africa Patrol) in a show of force calculated to deter future Portuguese amphibious attacks on the territory of the Republic of Guinea.

Between 1968 and 1972, the Portuguese forces increased their offensive posture, in the form of raids into PAIGC-controlled territory. At this time Portuguese forces also adopted unorthodox means of countering the insurgents, including attacks on the political structure of the nationalist movement. This strategy culminated in the assassination of Amílcar Cabral in January 1973. Nonetheless, the PAIGC continued to increase its strength, and began to heavily press Portuguese defense forces. This became even more apparent after the PAIGC received heavy radar-guided anti-aircraft cannon and other AA munitions provided by the Soviets, including SA-7 shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles, all of which seriously impeded Portuguese air operations.^[46][64]

After the Carnation Revolution military coup in Lisbon on 25 April 1974, the new revolutionary leaders of Portugal and the PAIGC signed an accord in Algiers, Algeria in which Portugal agreed to remove all troops by the end of October and to officially recognize the Republic of Guinea-Bissau government controlled by the PAIGC, on 26 August 1974 and after a series of diplomatic meetings.^[65] Demobilized by the Portuguese authorities and abandoned to their fate, a total of 7,447 black African soldiers who had served in Portuguese native commando forces and militia were summarily executed by the PAIGC after Portuguese forces ceased hostilities.^[65][66][67]

Mozambique[link]

Overseas Province of Mozambique's coat of arms until 1975.

The Portuguese Overseas Province of Mozambique was the last territory to start the war of liberation. Its nationalist movement was led by the Marxist-Leninist Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which carried out the first attack against Portuguese targets on September 24, 1964, in Chai, Cabo Delgado Province. The fighting later spread to Niassa, Tete in central Mozambique. A report from Battalion No. 558 of the Portuguese army makes references to violent actions, also in Cabo Delgado, on August 21, 1964.

On November 16 of the same year, the Portuguese troops suffered their first losses fighting in the north of the territory, in the region of Xilama. By this time, the size of the guerrilla movement had substantially increased; this, along with the low numbers of Portuguese troops and colonists, allowed a steady increase in FRELIMO's strength. It quickly started moving south in the direction of Meponda and Mandimba, linking to Tete with the aid of Malawi.

Until 1967 the FRELIMO showed less interest in Tete region, putting its efforts on the two northernmost districts of Mozambique where the use of landmines became very common. In the region of Niassa, FRELIMO's intention was to create a free corridor to Zambézia. Until April 1970, the military activity of FRELIMO increased steadily, mainly due to the strategic work of Samora Machel in the region of Cabo Delgado. The war in Mozambique saw a great involvement of Rhodesia, supporting the Portuguese troops in operations and even conducting operations independently. By 1973, the territory was mostly under Portuguese control.^[68] The Operation "Nó Górdio" (Gordian Knot Operation) - conducted in 1970 and commanded by Portuguese Brigadier General Kaúlza de Arriaga - a conventional-style operation to destroy the guerrilla bases in the north of Mozambique, was the major military operation of the Portuguese Colonial War. A hotly disputed issue, the Gordian Knot Operation was considered by several historians and military strategists as a failure that even worsened the situation for the Portuguese, but according to others, including its main architect,^[69] troops, and officials who had participated on both sides of the operation, including high ranked elements from the FRELIMO guerrilla, it was also globally described as a tremendous success of the Portuguese Armed Forces.^[70] Arriaga, however, was removed from his powerful military post in Mozambique by Marcelo Caetano shortly before the events in Lisbon that would trigger the end of the war and the independence of the Portuguese territories in Africa. The reason for Arriaga's abrupt fate was an alleged incident with indigenous civilian populations, as well as Portuguese government's suspicion that Arriaga was planning a military coup against Marcelo's administration in order to avoid the rise of leftist influences in Portugal and the loss of the African overseas provinces.

The construction of the Cahora Bassa Dam tied up large numbers of Portuguese troops (near 50% of all the troops in Mozambique) and brought the FRELIMO to the Tete Province, closer to some cities and more populated areas in the south. Still, although the FRELIMO tried to halt and stop the construction of the dam, it was never able to do so. In 1974, the FRELIMO launched mortar attacks against Vila Pery (now Chimoio) an important city and the first (and only) heavy populated area to be hit by the FRELIMO.

In Mozambique special units were also used by the Portuguese Armed Forces:

• Grupos Especiais (Special Groups): locally-raised counter-insurgency troops similar to those used in Angola
• Grupos Especiais Pára-Quedistas (Paratrooper Special Groups): units of volunteer black soldiers that were given airborne training
• Grupos Especiais de Pisteiros de Combate (Combat Tracking Special Groups): special units trained in tracking and locating guerrillas forces
• Flechas (Arrows), a formation of indigenous scouts and trackers, similar to the one employed in Angola

Major counter-insurgency operations[link]

• 1970 - Gordian Knot Operation (Operação Nó Górdio)
• 1970 - Operation Green Sea (Operação Mar Verde)
• 1971 - Frente Leste

Role of the Organisation of African Unity[link]

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded May 1963. Its basic principles were co-operation between African nations and solidarity between African peoples. Another important objective of the OAU was an end to all forms of colonialism in Africa. This became the major objective of the organization in its first years and soon OAU pressure led to the situation in the Portuguese colonies being brought up at the UN Security Council.

The OAU established a committee based in Dar es Salaam, with representatives from Ethiopia, Algeria, Uganda, Egypt, Tanzania, Zaire, Guinea, Senegal and Nigeria, to support African liberation movements. The support provided by the committee included military training and weapon supplies.

The OAU also took action in order to promote the international acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), composed by the FNLA. This support was transferred to the MPLA and to its leader, Agostinho Neto in 1967. In November 1972, both movements were recognized by the OAU in order to promote their merger. After 1964, the OAU recognized PAIGC as the legitimate representatives of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and in 1965 recognised FRELIMO for Mozambique.

Armament and tactics[link]

Portugal[link]

In 1961 the Portuguese had 79,000 in arms - 58,000 in the Army, 8,500 in the Navy and 12,500 in the Air force (Cann, 1997). These numbers grew quickly. By the end of the conflict in 1974 due to the Carnation Revolution (a military coup in Lisbon), the total in the Portuguese Armed Forces had risen to 217,000.

Prior to their own Colonial War the Portuguese military had studied French and British efforts in Indo-China, Algeria and Malaya (Cann, 1997). Based on their analysis of operations in those theatres and considering their own situation in Africa, the Portuguese military took the unusual decision to restructure their entire armed forces, from top to bottom, for counterinsurgency. This transformation did, however, take seven years to complete and only saw its final form in 1968. By 1974 the counterinsurgency efforts were successful in the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, but in Portuguese Guinea the local guerrilla was making progresses. As the conflict escalated, the Portuguese authorities developed progressively tougher responses, these included the Gordian Knot Operation and the Operation Green Sea.

When conflict erupted in 1961, Portuguese forces were badly equipped to cope with the demands of a counter-insurgency conflict. It was standard procedure, up to that point, to send the oldest and most obsolete material to the colonies. Thus, initial military operations were conducted using World War II radios, the old m/937 7.92 mm Mauser rifle, and the equally elderly German m/938 7.92 mm (MG-13) Dreyse and Italian 8 mm x 59RB m/938 (Breda M37) machine guns.^[71] Much of Portugal's older small arms derived from Germany in various deliveries made mostly before World War II. Later, Portugal would purchase arms and military equipment from France, West Germany, South Africa, and to a lesser extent, from Belgium, Israel and the USA.

A Portuguese version of Heckler & Koch G3A3 was used as the standard infantry weapon for most of Portugal's forces. It would be produced in large quantities in the Fábrica do Braço de Prata small arms plant.

Within a short time, the Portuguese Army saw the need for a modern selective-fire combat rifle, and in 1961 adopted the 7.62 x 51 mm (7.62mm NATO) caliber Espingarda m/961 (Heckler & Koch G3) as the standard infantry weapon for most of its forces, that would be produced in large quantities in the Fábrica do Braço de Prata, a Portuguese small arms producer.^[72] However, quantities of the 7.62 mm NATO FN and German G1 FAL rifle, known as the m/962, were also issued; the FAL was a favored weapon of members serving in elite commando units such as the Caçadores Especiais.^[72] At the beginning of the war, the elite airborne units (Caçadores Pára-quedistas) rarely used the m/961, having adopted the ultra-modern 7.62 mm NATO ArmaLite AR-10 (produced by the Netherlands-based arms manufacturer Artillerie Inrichtingen) in 1960.^[73][74] In the days before attached grenade launchers became standard, Portuguese paratroopers frequently resorted to the use of ENERGA anti-tank rifle grenades fired from their AR-10 rifles. Some Portuguese-model AR-10s were fitted with A.I.-modified upper receivers in order to mount 3x or 3.6x telescopic sights.^[75] These rifles were used by marksmen accompanying small patrols to eliminate individual enemy at extended ranges in open country.^[76] After Holland embargoed further sales of the AR-10, the paratroop battalions were issued a collapsible-stock version of the regular m/961 (G3) rifle, also in 7.62 mm NATO caliber.^[77]

The powerful recoil and heavy weight of the 7.62mm x 51 NATO cartridge used in Portuguese rifle-caliber arms such as the m/961 limited the amount of ammunition that could be carried as well as accuracy in automatic fire, generally precluding the use of the latter except in emergencies. Instead, most infantryman used their rifles to fire individual shots. While the heavy m/961 and its relatively lengthy barrel were well-suited to patrol operations in open savannah, it tended to put Portuguese infantry at a disadvantage when clearing the low-ceilinged interiors of native buildings or huts, or when moving through thick bush, where ambush by a concealed insurgent with an automatic weapon was always a possibility. In these situations the hand grenade often became a more useful weapon than the rifle.

For the light machine-gun role, the German MG42 in 7.92 mm and later 7.62 mm NATO caliber was used until 1968, when the 7.62 mm m/968 Metralhadora Ligeira became available. Some 9 mm x 19 mm submachine guns, including the Austrian Steyr MP34 m/942, the Portuguese FBP m/948, and the Uzi were also used, mainly by officers, horse-mounted cavalry, reserve and paramilitary units, and security forces.^[71]

A Portuguese Air Force Alouette III helicopter deploying paratroopers armed with 7.62mm ArmaLite AR-10 rifles during an assault operation in Angola.

To destroy enemy emplacements, other weapons were employed, including the 37 mm (1.46 in), 60 mm (2.5 in), and 89 mm (3.5 in.) Lança-granadas-foguete (Bazooka), along with several types of recoilless rifles.^[77][78] Because of the mobile nature of counterinsurgency operations, heavy support weapons were less frequently used. However, the m/951 12.7 mm (.50 caliber) U.S. M2 Browning heavy machine gun saw service in both ground and vehicle mounts, as well as 60 mm, 81 mm, and later, 120 mm mortars.^[78] Artillery and mobile howitzers were used in a few operations.

Mobile ground operations consisted of patrol sweeps by armored car and reconnaissance vehicles. Supply convoys used both armored and unarmored vehicles. Typically, armored vehicles would be placed at the front, center, and tail of a motorized convoy. Several armored cars were used, including the Panhard AML, Panhard EBR, Fox and (in the 1970s) the Chaimite.

A Portuguese F-84 being loaded with ordnance in the 1960s, at Luanda Air Base.

The Portuguese Airforce employed Fiat G91 aircraft like this in the Portuguese Colonial War.

Unlike the Vietnam War, Portugal's limited national resources did not allow for widespread use of the helicopter. Only those troops involved in raids (also called golpe de mão (hand blow) in Portuguese) - mainly Commandos and Paratroopers - would deploy by helicopter. Most deployments were either on foot or in vehicles (Berliet and Unimog trucks). The helicopters were reserved for support (in a gunship role) or MEDEVAC. The Alouette III was the most widely-used helicopter, although the Puma was also used with great success. Other aircraft were employed: for air support the T6, the F-86 Sabre and the Fiat G.91 were used; for reconnaissance the Dornier Do 27 was employed. In the transport role, the Portuguese Air Force originally used the Junkers Ju 52, followed by the Nord Noratlas, the C-54 Skymaster, and the C-47 (all of these aircraft were also used for Paratroop drop operations). From 1965, Portugal began to purchase the Fiat G.91 to deploy to its African overseas territories of Mozambique, Guinea and Angola in the close-support role.^[79] The first 40 G.91 were purchased second-hand from the Luftwaffe, out of the aircraft that had originally been produced for Greece and which differed from the rest of the Luftwaffe G.91s sufficiently to create maintenance problems. The aircraft replaced the Portuguese F-86 Sabre.

The Portuguese Navy (particularly the Marines, known as Fuzileiros) made extensive use of patrol boats, landing craft, and Zodiac inflatable boats. They were employed especially in Guinea, but also in the Congo River (and other smaller rivers) in Angola and in the Zambezi (and other rivers) in Mozambique. Equipped with standard or collapsible-stock m/961 rifles, grenades, and other gear, they utilized small boats or patrol craft to infiltrate guerrilla positions. In an effort to intercept infiltrators, the Fuzileiros even manned small patrol craft on Lake Malawi. The Navy also used Portuguese civilian cruisers as troop transports, and drafted Portuguese Merchant Navy personnel to man ships carrying troops and material and into the Marines.

There were also many Portuguese irregular forces in the Overseas War; these included the Flechas and the Fiéis (Faithfuls).

Native black warriors were employed in Africa by the Portuguese colonial rulers since the 16th century. Portugal had employed regular native troops (companhias indigenas) in its colonial army since the early 19th century. After 1961, with the beginning of the colonial wars in its overseas territories, Portugal began to incorporate black Portuguese Africans into integrated units as part of the war effort in Angola, Portuguese Guinea, and Mozambique, based on concepts of multi-racialism and preservation of the empire. African participation on the Portuguese side of the conflict varied from marginal roles as laborers and informers to participation in highly-trained operational combat units like the Flechas. As the war progressed, use of African counterinsurgency troops increased; on the eve of the military coup of 25 April 1974, black ethnic Africans accounted for more than 50 percent of Portuguese forces fighting the war.

From 1961 to the end of the Colonial War, the paratrooper nurses nicknamed Marias, were women who served the Portuguese armed forces being deployed in Portuguese Africa's dangerous guerrilla-infiltrated combat zones to perform rescue operations.^[80][81]

Throughout the war period Portugal had to deal with increasing dissent, arms embargoes and other punitive sanctions imposed by most of the international community. The later included UN-sponsored sanctions, Non-Aligned Movement-led defamation, and myriad boycotts and protests performed by both foreign and domestic political organizations, like the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). Near the end of the conflict, a report by the controversial priest Adrian Hastings, alleging atrocities and war crimes of the Portuguese military, was printed a week before the Portuguese prime minister Marcelo Caetano was due to visit Britain to celebrate the 600th anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance in 1973. Portugal's growing isolation following Hastings's claims has often been cited as a factor that helped to bring about the "carnation revolution" coup in Lisbon which deposed the Caetano regime in 1974, ending the Portuguese African counter-insurgency campaigns and triggering the rapid collapse of the Portuguese Empire.^[82]

Guerrilla movements[link]

AK-47 automatic rifles were widely used by the African guerrilla movements.

The armament of the nationalist groups came mainly from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and (especially in Mozambique) China. However, they also used small arms of U.S. manufacture (such as the .45 M1 Thompson submachine gun), along with British, French, and German weapons derived from neighboring countries sympathetic to the rebellion. Later in the war, most guerrillas would use roughly the same Soviet-origin infantry rifles: the Mosin-Nagant bolt-action rifle, the SKS carbine, and most importantly, the AK-47 series of 7.62 mm x 39 mm automatic rifles. Rebel forces also made extensive use of machine guns for ambush and positional defense. The 7.62 mm Degtyarev light machine gun (LMG) was the most widely used LMG, together with the DShK and the SG-43 Goryunov heavy machine guns. Support weapons included mortars, recoilless rifles, and in particular, Soviet-made rocket-propelled grenade launchers, the RPG-2 and RPG-7. Anti-aircraft weapons were also employed, especially by the PAIGC and the FRELIMO. The ZPU-4 AA cannon was the most widely used, but by far the most effective was the Strela 2 missile, first introduced to guerrilla forces in Guinea in 1973 and in Mozambique the following year by Soviet technicians.

The guerrillas' AK-47 and AKM rifles were highly thought of by many Portuguese soldiers, as they were shorter, slightly lighter, and more mobile than the m/961 (G3), while permitting the user to deliver a heavy volume of controlled automatic fire at the close ranges typically encountered in bush warfare.^[83] The AK-47's ammunition load was also lighter.^[83] The average Angolan or Mozambiquan rebel could easily transport 150 7.62 mm x 39 cartridges (five 30-round magazines) on his person during bush operations, compared to 100 7.62 mm x 51 rounds (five 20-round magazines) typically carried by a Portuguese infantryman on patrol.^[83] Though a common misconception holds that Portuguese soldiers used captured AK-47 type weapons, this was only true of a few elite units for special missions. Like U.S. forces in Vietnam, ammunition resupply difficulties and the obvious danger of being mistaken for a guerrilla when firing an enemy weapon generally precluded their use.

Mines were one of the principal weapons used by the insurgents against Portuguese mechanized forces, who typically patrolled the mostly unpaved roads of their territories using motor vehicles and armored scout cars.^[84] To counter the mine threat, Portuguese engineers commenced the herculean task of tarring the rural road network.^[85] Mine detection was accomplished not only by electronic mine detectors, but also by employing trained soldiers (picadors) walking abreast with long probes to detect nonmetallic road mines. Guerrillas in all the various revolutionary movements used a variety of mines, often combining anti-tank with anti-personnel mines to ambush Portuguese formations with devastating results. A common tactic was to plant large anti-vehicle mines in a roadway bordered by obvious cover, such as an irrigation ditch, then seed the ditch with anti-personnel mines. Detonation of the vehicle mine would cause Portuguese troops to deploy and seek cover in the ditch, where the anti-personnel mines would cause further casualties. If the insurgents planned to confront the Portuguese openly, one or two heavy machine guns would be sited to sweep the ditch and other likely areas of cover. Other mines used included the PMN (Black Widow), TM-46, and POMZ. Even amphibious mines were used such as the PDM, along with numerous home-made antipersonnel wood box mines and other nonmetallic explosive devices. The impact of mining operations, in addition to causing casualties, undermined the mobility of Portuguese forces, while diverting troops and equipment from security and offensive operations to convoy protection and mine clearance missions.

In general, the PAIGC in Guinea was the best armed, trained, and led of all the guerrilla movements. By 1970 it even had candidates training in the Soviet Union, learning to fly MIGs and to operate Soviet-supplied amphibious assault crafts and APCs.

Opposition in Portugal[link]

The government presented as a general consensus that the colonies were a part of the national unity, closer to overseas provinces than to true colonies. The communists were the first party to oppose the official view, since they saw the Portuguese presence in the colonies as an act against the colonies' right to self determination. During its 5th Congress, in 1957, the illegal Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português - PCP) was the first political organization to demand the immediate and total independence of the colonies. However, being the only truly organized opposition movement, the PCP had to play two roles. One role was that of a communist party with an anti-colonialist position; the other role was to be a cohesive force drawing together a broad spectrum of opposing parties. Therefore it had to accede to views that didn't reflect its true anticolonial position.

Several opposition figures outside the PCP also had anticolonial opinions, such as the candidates to the fraudulent presidential elections, like Norton de Matos (in 1949), Quintão Meireles (in 1951) and Humberto Delgado (in 1958). The communist candidates had, obviously, the same positions. Among them were Rui Luís Gomes and Arlindo Vicente, the first would not be allowed to participate in the election and the second would support Delgado in 1958.

After the electoral fraud of 1958, Humberto Delgado formed the Independent National Movement (Movimento Nacional Independente - MNI) that, in October 1960, agreed that there was a need to prepare the people in the colonies, before giving them the right of self-determination. Despite this, no detailed policies for achieving this goal were set out.^{[citation needed]}

In 1961, the nº8 of the Military Tribune had as its title "Let's end the war of Angola". The authors were linked to the Patriotic Action Councils (Juntas de Acção Patriótica - JAP), supporters of Humberto Delgado, and responsible for the attack on the barracks of Beja. The Portuguese Front of National Liberation (Frente Portuguesa de Libertação Nacional - FPLN), founded in December 1962, attacked the conciliatory positions. The official feeling of the Portuguese state, despite all this, was the same: Portugal had inalienable and legitimate rights over the colonies and this was what was transmitted through the media and through the state propaganda.

In April 1964, the Directory of Democratic-Social Action (Acção Democrato-Social - ADS) presented a political solution rather than a military one. In agreement with this initiative in 1966, Mário Soares suggested there should be a referendum on the overseas policy Portugal should follow, and that the referendum should be preceded by a national discussion to take place in the six months prior to the referendum.^{[citation needed]}

The end of Salazar's rule in 1968, due to illness, did not prompt any change in the political panorama.^{[citation needed]} The radicalization of the opposition movements started with the younger people who also felt victimized by the continuation of the war.^{[citation needed]}

The universities played a key role in the spread of this position. Several magazines and newspapers were created, such as Cadernos Circunstância, Cadernos Necessários, Tempo e Modo, and Polémica that supported this view. It was in this environment that the Armed Revolutionary Action (Acção Revolucionária Armada - ARA), the armed branch of the Portuguese Communist party created in the late 1960s, and the Revolutionary Brigades (Brigadas Revolucionárias - BR), a left-wing organization, became an important^{[citation needed]} force of resistance against the war, carrying out multiple acts of sabotage and bombing against military targets. The ARA began its military actions in October 1970, keeping them up until August 1972. The major actions were the attack on the Tancos air base that destroyed several helicopters on March 8, 1971, and the attack on the NATO headquarters at Oeiras in October of the same year. The BR, on its side, began armed actions on 7 November 1971, with the sabotage of the NATO base at Pinhal de Armeiro, the last action being carried out 9 April 1974, against the Niassa ship which was preparing to leave Lisboa with troops to be deployed in Guinea. The BR acted even in the colonies, placing a bomb in the Military Command of Bissau on 22 February 1974.

By the early 1970s, the Portuguese Colonial War continued to rage on, consuming fully 40% of Portugal's annual budget.^[42] The Portuguese military was overstretched and there was no political solution or end in sight. While the human losses were relatively small, the war as whole had already entered its second decade. The Portuguese ruling regime of Estado Novo faced criticism from the international community and was becoming increasingly isolated. It had a profound impact on Portugal - thousands of young men avoided conscription by emigrating illegally, mainly to France and the US. The war in the Portuguese overseas territories of Africa was increasingly unpopular in Portugal itself as the people got weary of war and balked at its ever-rising expense. Many ethnic Portuguese of the African overseas territories were also increasingly willing to accept independence if their economic status could be preserved. In addition, younger Portuguese military academy graduates resented a program introduced by Marcello Caetano whereby militia officers who completed a brief training program and had served in the overseas territories' defensive campaigns, could be commissioned at the same rank as military academy graduates. Caetano's Portuguese Government had begun the program (which included several other reforms) in order to increase the number of officials employed against the African insurgencies, and at the same time cut down military costs to alleviate an already overburdened government budget. Thus, the group of revolutionary military insurgents started as a military professional class^[86] protest of Portuguese Armed Forces captains against a decree law: the Dec. Lei nº 353/73 of 1973, organizing themselves in a loosely-allied group known as the MFA.^[11][87]

Faced with government inflexibility over proposed reforms, some Portuguese junior military officers, many from underprivileged backgrounds and increasingly attracted to the Marxist philosophy of their African insurgent opponents,^[49] began to move the MFA to the political left.^[88] On April 25, 1974, Portuguese military officers of the MFA staged a bloodless military coup that toppled António de Oliveira Salazar's successor Marcelo Caetano, and successfully overthrew the Portuguese regime of Estado Novo. The revolt would later become known as the Carnation Revolution. General Spínola was invited to assume the office of President, but resigned a few weeks later after it became clear that his desire to set up a system of federalized home rule for the African territories was not shared by the rest of the MFA, who wanted an immediate end to the war (achievable only by granting independence to the provinces of Portuguese Africa).^[88] The 25 April coup led to a series of temporary governments, marked by a nationalisation of many important areas of the economy.

Aftermath[link]

After the coup on April 25, 1974, while the power struggle for control of Portugal's government was occurring in Lisbon, many Portuguese Army units serving in Africa simply ceased field operations, in some cases ignoring orders to continue fighting and withdrawing into barracks, in others negotiating local ceasefire agreements with insurgents.^[88]

On 26 August 1974, after a series of diplomatic meetings, Portugal and the PAIGC signed an accord in Algiers, Algeria in which Portugal agreed to remove all troops by the end of October and to officially recognize the Republic of Guinea-Bissau government controlled by the PAIGC.^[65]

In June 1975, after a period of eight months under which Mozambique had been administered by a provisional government, representatives of the Portuguese government and FRELIMO signed an agreement to grant independence to Mozambique, with the president of FRELIMO to assume the presidency of the newly independent nation. This was followed the next month by the announcement of the independence of Cape Verde, and the establishment of a new nation, the Republic of Cape Verde. In Angola, the Alvor Agreement was signed on January 15, 1975, granting Angola independence from Portugal on 11 November 1975. The Alvor Agreement formally ended the war for independence. The agreement, while signed by the MPLA, the FNLA, UNITA, and the Portuguese government, was never signed by the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda or the Eastern Revolt as the other parties had excluded them from the peace negotiations. The coalition government established by the Alvor Agreement soon fell apart as the various nationalist parties each attempted to seize power. Unable to broker a new compromise, in November 1975 Portugal's last African High Commissioner Rosa Coutinho simply hauled down his nation's flag and departed Angola for good.^[88]

For a brief time after the coup of 25 April Coup, (May 1974 - November 1975) the country was on the brink of civil war^[89] between left-wing hardliners (Vasco Gonçalves, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and others) and the moderate forces (Francisco da Costa Gomes, António Ramalho Eanes and others). Moderate elements of the new military government eventually won, preventing Portugal from becoming a communist state.^[90]

By 1975, Portugal had converted to a democratic government.^[43] The effects of having integrating hundreds of thousands of returning Portuguese from the former African provinces (collectively known as retornados), and political and economic turmoil resulting from the military coup and successive governments would cripple the Portuguese economy for decades to come.^[91]

Monument in Lisbon to Portuguese soldiers who died in the Oversaeas War (1961–1975).

Portugal had been the first European power to establish a colony in Africa when it captured Ceuta in 1415 and now it was one of the last to leave. The departure of the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique increased the isolation of Rhodesia, where white minority rule ended in 1980 when the territory gained international recognition as the Republic of Zimbabwe with Robert Mugabe as the head of government. The former Portuguese territories in Africa became sovereign states with Agostinho Neto (followed in 1979 by José Eduardo dos Santos) in Angola, Samora Machel (followed in 1986 by Joaquim Chissano) in Mozambique and Luís Cabral (followed in 1980 by Nino Vieira) in Guinea-Bissau, as heads of state.

In contrast to some other European colonial possessions, many of the Portuguese living in Portuguese Africa had strong ties to their adopted land, as their ancestors had lived in Africa for generations.^[92][93] For these individuals, the prospect of Portugal's imminent departure from its African territories was nearly impossible to comprehend. Nevertheless, most accepted the inevitable, and while an abortive right-wing settler revolt broke out in Mozambique, it quickly died out as Portuguese coup leaders made it clear that the decision to grant independence was irrevocable.^[88] Fear of reprisals and impending changes in political and economic status by the Marxist governments of the new African states resulted in the peaceful exodus of over one million Portuguese citizens of European, African and mixed ethnicity from the newly-independent African territories to Portugal, South Africa, and other countries.

The new governments of Angola and Mozambique, faced a severe set of challenges as devastating civil wars broke out in both countries. Lasting several decades, these ongoing conflicts would eventually claim over two million lives and an even greater number of refugees, while destroying much of the infrastructure in both nations.^[19][94][95] Resentments over economic difficulties caused by failed government policies, the general disenfranchisement of political opponents, and widespread corruption at the highest levels of government eroded the initial optimism present at independence. These problems were exacerbated by a tendency to consolidate power by directing public anger against ethnic Portuguese and mixed-race Africans,^[23] as well as those who had supported the former colonial regime. Many of the local black soldiers that served in the Portuguese Army and who had fought against the insurgents were demobilised by Portuguese authorities and simply left behind in Africa. The most famous infamous reprisal occurred in Guinea-Bissau. Demobilized by the Portuguese authorities and abandoned to their fate, a total of 7,447 black African soldiers who had served in Portuguese native commando forces and militia were summarily executed by the PAIGC after Portuguese forces ceased hostilities.^[65] In a statement in the party newspaper Nô Pintcha (In the Vanguard), a spokesman for the PAIGC revealed that many of the ex-Portuguese indigenous African soldiers that were executed after cessation of hostilities were buried in unmarked collective graves in the woods of Cumerá, Portogole, and Mansabá.^[67][96]

Because the political regimes involved in wars or counterinsurgency tend to minimize unfavorable news stories about their military actions, many Portuguese remained unaware of the atrocities committed by the colonial regimes and the army. In 2007, a Radiotelevisao Portuguesa (RTP) documentary by Joaquim Furtado, made public both these government-supported atrocities and the organized massacres and terror campaign policies of some pro-independence guerrilla movements or their supporters; it was watched by over a million people, a tenth of the population at the time.^[97]

With the fall of the Estado Novo regime, most Portuguese citizens, tired of the long war and their isolation from the world community under the Caetano regime, supported the decision to recognize the independence of Portuguese Africa immediately, while accepting the inevitable loss of their former overseas territories. However, controversies over the MFA coup of 25 April 1974 and the decisions made by coup leaders remain to this day. In 2011, one of the chief organizers of the 1974 Carnation Revolution, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, stated that he would never have participated in the coup if he had known what the country would become after it.^[98]

Economic consequences of the war[link]

Evolution of the expenditure of the Portuguese state with the military during the war

In Portugal, government budgets increased significantly during the war years. The country's expenditure on the armed forces ballooned since the beginning of the war in 1961. The expenses were divided into ordinary and extraordinary ones; the latter were the main factor in the huge increase in the military budget. The succession of Marcelo Caetano, after Salazar's incapacitation, resulted in steady increases in military spending on the African wars through 1972.^[99]

In mainland Portugal, the growth rate of the economy during the war years ranged from 6%-11%, and in post war years 2-3%.^[100] This is substantially higher than the vast majority of other European nations. Other indicators like GDP as percentage of Western Europe would indicate that Portugal was rapidly catching up to its European neighbours. In 1960, at the initiation of Salazar's more outward-looking economic policy, Portugal's per capita GDP was only 38 percent of the EC-12 average; by the end of the Salazar period, in 1968, it had risen to 48 percent; and in 1973, on the eve of the revolution, Portugal's per capita GDP had reached 56.4 percent of the EC-12 average. In 1975, the year of maximum revolutionary turmoil, Portugal's per capita GDP declined to 52.3 percent of the EC-12 average. Convergence of real GDP growth toward the EC average occurred as a result of Portugal's economic resurgence since 1985. In 1991 Portugal's GDP per capita climbed to 54.9 percent of the EC average, exceeding by a fraction the level attained just during the worst revolutionary period.^[101]

For many decades to come after independence, the economies of the three former Portuguese African territories involved in the war continued to remain problematic due to continuing internecine political conflicts and power struggles as well as inadequate agricultural production caused by disruptive government policies resulting in high birth mortality rates, widespread malnutrition, and disease. By the 21st century, the Human Development Index of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, were among the lowest in the World, while corruption and social inequality soared. After 1974, the deterioration in central planning effectiveness, economic development and growth, security, education and health system efficiency, was rampant. None of the newly-independent ex-Portuguese African states made any significant economic progress in the following decades, and political progress in terms of democratic processes and protection of individual human rights was either minimal or nonexistent. With few exceptions, the new regimes ranked at the bottom of human development and GDP per capita world tables. By 2002, however, the end of the Angolan Civil War, combined with exploitation of the country's highly valuable natural resources, resulted in that country becoming economically successful for the first time in decades.

Films about the War[link]

• Os Demonios de Alcacer-Quibir (Portugal 1975, director: Jose Fonseca da Costa).
• La Vita è Bella (Portugal/Italy/USSR 1979), director: Grigori Naumowitsch Tschuchrai).
• Sorte que tal Morte (Portugal 1981, director: Joao Matos Silva).
• Acto dos Feitos da Guine (Portugal 1980, director: Fernando Matos Silva).
• Gestos & Fragmentos - Ensaio sobre os Militares e o Poder (Portugal 1982, director: Alberto Seixas Santos).
• Um Adeus Português (Portugal 1985, director: Joao Botelho).
• Era Uma Vez Um Alferes (Portugal 1987, director: Luis Filipe Rocha).
• Matar Saudades (Portugal 1987, director: Fernando Lopes Vasconcelos)
• A Idade Maior (Portugal 1990, director: Teresa Villaverde Cabral).
• "Non", ou A Vã Glória de Mandar (Portugal/France/Spain 1990, director: Manoel de Oliveira).
• Ao Sul (Portugal 1993, director: Fernando Matos Silva).
• Capitães de Abril (Captains of April, Portugal 2000, director: Maria de Medeiros).
• Assalto ao Santa Maria (Assault on the Santa Maria, Portugal 2009, director: Francisco Manso).

Documentaries about the War[link]

• A Guerra - Colonial - do Ultramar - da Libertação, 1st Season (Portugal 2007, director: Joaquim Furtado, RTP)
• A Guerra - Colonial - do Ultramar - da Libertação, 2nd Season (Portugal 2009, director: Joaquim Furtado, RTP)

See also[link]

• Angolan War of Independence
• Guinea-Bissau War of Independence
• Mozambican War of Independence
• Operation Gordian Knot
• Rhodesian Bush War
• South African Border War
• Carnation Revolution
• Portuguese Army Commandos
• Special Operations Troops Centre
• Parachute Troops School
• Portuguese Marine Corps
• Portuguese irregular forces in the Overseas War
• Portuguese Armed Forces
• Military history of Africa
• Portuguese invasion of Guinea (1970)
• Operation Vijay (1961) (Portuguese India)
• Angolan Civil War
• Mozambican Civil War
• Lusophobia

v t e Portuguese Overseas Empire North Africa 15th century 1415–1640  Ceuta 1458–1550  Alcácer Ceguer (El Qsar es Seghir) 1471–1550  Arzila (Asilah) 1471–1662  Tangier 1485–1550  Mazagan (El Jadida) 1487– middle 16th century  Ouadane 1488–1541  Safim (Safi) 1489  Graciosa 16th century 1505–1769  Santa Cruz do Cabo  de Gué (Agadir) 1506–1525  Mogador (Essaouira) 1506–1525  Aguz (Souira Guedima) 1506–1769  Mazagan (El Jadida) 1513–1541  Azamor (Azemmour) 1515  São João da Mamora (Mehdya) 1577–1589  Arzila (Asilah) Sub-Saharan Africa 15th century 1455–1633  Anguim 1462–1975  Cape Verde 1470–1975  São Tomé1 1474–1778  Annobón 1478–1778  Fernando Poo (Bioko) 1482–1637  Elmina (São Jorge  da Mina) 1482–1642  Portuguese Gold Coast 1508–1547 (1600)  Madagascar2 1498–1540  Mascarene Islands 16th century 1500–1630  Malindi 1500–1975  Príncipe1 1501–1975  Portuguese E. Africa  (Mozambique) 1502–1659  Saint Helena 1503–1698  Zanzibar 1505–1512  Quíloa (Kilwa) 1506–1511  Socotra 1557–1578  Accra 1575–1975  Portuguese W. Africa  (Angola) 1588–1974  Cacheu3 1593–1698  Mombassa (Mombasa) 17th century 1645–1888  Ziguinchor 1680–1961  São João Baptista de Ajudá 1687–1974  Bissau3 18th century 1728–1729  Mombassa (Mombasa) 1753–1975  São Tomé and Príncipe 19th century 1879–1974  Portuguese Guinea 1885–1975  Portuguese Congo   1 Part of São Tomé and Príncipe from 1753.   2 A Factory (Anosy region) and small temporary coastal bases.   3 Part of Portuguese Guinea from 1879. Southwest Asia 16th century 1506–1615  Gamru (Bandar-Abbas) 1507–1643  Sohar 1515–1622  Hormuz (Ormus) 1515–1648  Quriyat 1515–?   Qalhat 1515–1650  Muscat 1515?–?   Barka 1515–1633? Julfar (Ras al-Khaimah) 1521–1602  Bahrain (Muharraq and Manama) 1521–1529?  Qatif 1521?–1551? Tarut Island 1550–1551  Qatif 1588–1648  Matrah 17th century 1620–?   Khor Fakkan 1621?–?   As Sib 1621–1622  Qeshm 1623–?   Khasab 1623–?   Libedia 1624–?   Kalba 1624–?   Madha 1624–1648  Dibba Al-Hisn 1624?–?   Bandar-e Kong Indian subcontinent 15th century 1498–1545  Laccadive Islands       (Lakshadweep) 16th century Portuguese India · 1500–1663  Cochim (Kochi) · 1501–1663  Cannanore (Kannur) · 1502–1658, 1659-1661  Quilon (Coulão/Kollam) · 1502–1661  Pallipuram (Cochin de Cima) · 1507–1657  Negapatam (Nagapatnam) · 1510–1962  Goa · 1512–1525, 1750  Calicut (Kozhikode) · 1518–1619  Portuguese Paliacate trading outpost (Pulicat) · 1521–1740  Chaul · 1523–1662  Mylapore · 1528–1666  Chittagong · 1531–1571  Chaul · 1531–1571  Chalé · 1534–1601  Salsette Island · 1534–1661  Bombay (Mumbai) · 1535  Ponnani · 1535–1739  Baçaím (Vasai-Virar) · 1536–1662  Cranganore (Kodungallur) · 1540–1612  Surat · 1548–1658  Tuticorin (Thoothukudi) 16th century (continued) Portuguese India (continued) · 1559–1962  Daman and Diu · 1568–1659  Mangalore · 1579–1632  Hugli · 1598–1610  Masulipatnam (Machilipatnam) 1518–1521  Maldives 1518–1658  Portuguese Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 1558–1573  Maldives 17th century Portuguese India · 1687–1749  Mylapore 18th century Portuguese India · 1779–1954  Dadra and Nagar Haveli East Asia and Oceania 16th century 1511–1641  Portuguese Malacca 1512–1621  Maluku · 1522–1575  Ternate · 1576–1605  Ambon · 1578–1650  Tidore 1512–1665  Makassar 1553–1999  Macau 1571–1639  Decima (Dejima, Nagasaki) 17th century 1642–1975  Portuguese Timor (East Timor)1 19th century Macau · 1864–1999  Coloane · 1849–1999  Portas do Cerco · 1851–1999  Taipa · 1890–1999  Ilha Verde 20th century Macau · 1938–1941  Lapa and Montanha (Hengqin) 1  1975 is the year of East Timor's Declaration of Independence and subsequent invasion by Indonesia. In 2002, East Timor's independence was recognized by Portugal & the world. North America and the North Atlantic Ocean 15th century 1420 Madeira 1432 Azores 16th century 1500–1579?  Terra Nova (Newfoundland) 1500–1579?  Labrador 1516–1579?  Nova Scotia Central and South America 16th century 1500–1822  Brazil 1536–1620  Barbados 17th century 1680–1777  Nova Colónia do Sacramento 19th century 1808–1822  Cisplatina (Uruguay) 1809–1817  Portuguese Guiana 1822  Upper Peru (Bolivia) Portuguese colonization of the Americas - Theory of Portuguese discovery of Australia - Portuguese colonialism in Indonesia

References[link]

Bibliography[link]

• Kaúlza de Arriaga - Published works of the General Kaúlza de Arriaga
• Becket, Ian et all., A Guerra no Mundo, Guerras e Guerrilhas desde 1945, Lisboa, Verbo, 1983
• Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, História de Portugal, 6ª ed., Lisboa, Palas Editora, Vol. III, 1981
• Mattoso, José, História Contemporânea de Portugal, Lisboa, Amigos do Livro, 1985, «Estado Novo», Vol. II e «25 de Abril», vol. único
• Mattoso, José, História de Portugal, Lisboa, Ediclube, 1993, vols. XIII e XIV
• Pakenham, Thomas, The Scramble for Africa, Abacus, 1991 ISBN 0-349-10449-2
• Reis, António, Portugal Contemporâneo, Lisboa, Alfa, Vol. V, 1989;
• Rosas, Fernando e Brito, J. M. Brandão, Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Venda Nova, Bertrand Editora, 2 vols. 1996
• Vários autores, Guerra Colonial, edição do Diário de Notícias
• Jornal do Exército, Lisboa, Estado-Maior do Exército
• Cann, John P, Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974, Hailer Publishing, 2005

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Guerra do Ultramar

• (Portuguese) Guerra Colonial: 1961–1974 (guerracolonial.org)

The "Battle of Isandhlwana" by Charles Edwin Fripp. Fought between the Zulu of South Africa and the British Empire.

Colonial war is a blanket term relating to the various conflicts that arose as the result of overseas territories being settled by foreign powers creating a colony. The term usually refers to wars fought during the nineteenth century between European armies in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean.

The wars may be split into several categories.

A revolt of the indigenous population against rule by the Imperial power. In the 19th century these were rarely successful due to the technological and organisational superiority of the Imperial forces. One notable success was the Haitian slave revolt against French rule. In the 20th century these types of conflict were often termed "Wars of National Liberation" and due to better armaments and a heavily politicised leadership strategy achieved much better results by wearing down the will of the Imperial power to continue with an expensive and politically unpopular struggle rather than militarily defeating them, although the Vietnamese also managed the latter against the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 leading to their expulsion from Indo-China.

A second category was the war of self-determination by settlers and descendants of settlers against rule by the "mother" country. This did not necessarily involve what was left of any indigenous population but often took the form of a civil war between supporters of the status quo and revolutionaries. The prime example of this was the American War of Independence against British rule followed by the various South American Wars of Liberation against the Spanish Empire. Success was often dependent on external factors and alliances, the American colonists were helped by the French winning naval superiority at a crucial time and the Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman empire was aided by the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino by a combined Anglo/French/Russian fleet.

A third category was the conflict with neighbours of the colony as part of Imperial policy, either expansionism such as the Anglo-Zulu and Anglo-Boer wars of the late nineteenth century and the Italian attack on Abyssinia or as part of a wider conflict such as the World War I campaigns between British/Belgian/French colonial forces and their German neighbours in Africa and Asia.

Victory against colonial powers[link]

Although colonial wars usually resulted in victory for the European forces in the long term, there were several defeats for their forces especially in the early stages of a conflict when the Imperial power had not brought its full force to bear. These include the Battle of Isandhlwana and the Battle of Adowa where over-confident European forces were defeated by native African soldiery. In both of these battles, the African armies greatly outnumbered the European armies, suffered heavy casualties but overwhelmed their enemy.

Italian Troops firing on the Turks in Tripoli. 1911

Examples[link]

Examples of colonial wars include the Java War, the Indian Rebellion, and various conflicts waged during the Scramble for Africa, such as the Anglo-Zulu War and the Mahdist War. The Anglo-Ashanti Wars of the late 1800s were a typical example of colonial warfare, in which small British armies, equipped with modern artillery and machine guns, repeatedly defeated much larger forces of local warriors. During the 19th century and early 20th century colonial period there was endemic warfare on the frontiers of many colonies in tribal areas, notably for the British Empire on the North West frontier of India, for the French and Spanish in their North African colonies and for the United States in North America.

See also[link]

• Colonialism
• Insurgency and counter-insurgency
• Spice trade
• Dutch-Portuguese War
• Le Fanion de la Légion
• Zulu (film)
• Battle of Isandhlwana
• Malayan Emergency
• Philippine Revolution
• Portuguese Colonial War
• Italo-Turkish War
• First Italo–Ethiopian War
• Second Italo-Abyssinian War
• East African Campaign (World War I)
• East African Campaign (World War II)
• Battle of Adowa
• Society of Colonial Wars

Other uses[link]

• Colony Wars was a 1997 video game.

References[link]

This article does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (December 2009)

Portuguese Empire Império Português
Motto: Vis Unita Maior Nunc et Semper
Anthem:  O Hino da Carta (1834–1911) A Portuguesa (1911–2002)
The Portuguese Empire and overseas interests.
Capital		Lisbon[1]
Official language(s)		Portuguese
Government		Monarchy (1415–1910) Republic (1910–2002)
-	First King	John I
-	Last King	Manuel II
-	First President	Manuel de Arriaga
-	Last President	Jorge Sampaio
Formation		1415
-	Sea route to India	1498
-	Discovery of Brazil	1500
-	Transfer of the Portuguese Court to Brazil	1807
-	Brazil’s elevation to a Kingdom	1815
-	Brazilian Independence	1822
-	Republic	1910
-	Loss of the Indian colonies	1961
-	Independence of the African colonies	1974/1975
-	Last colony (de facto)	1999
-	Last colony (de jure) [2]	2002
1. ^ The capital was located at Rio de Janeiro from 1808 to 1821. 2. ^ Macau is usually considered the last colony as the Indonesian Invasion of East Timor and the resulting occupation were not officially recognized by other nations despite the Portuguese decolonizing process for East Timor in 1975. The independence of East Timor in 2002 from Indonesia ended the observed Portuguese sovereignty.

The Portuguese Empire (Portuguese: Império Português), also known as the Portuguese Overseas Empire (Ultramar Português) or the Portuguese Colonial Empire (Império Colonial Português), was the first global empire in history.^[1][2][3] In addition, it was the longest-lived of the modern European colonial empires, spanning almost six centuries, from the capture of Ceuta in 1415 to the handover of Macau in 1999 or the grant of sovereignty to East Timor in 2002. The empire spread throughout a vast number of territories that are now part of 53 different sovereign states.

Portuguese sailors began exploring the coast of Africa in 1419, using recent developments in navigation, cartography and maritime technology such as the caravel, in order that they might find a sea route to the source of the lucrative spice trade. In 1488, Bartolomeu Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and in 1498, Vasco da Gama reached India. In 1500, either by an accidental landfall or by the crown's secret design, Pedro Álvares Cabral discovered Brazil on the South American coast. Over the following decades, Portuguese sailors continued to explore the coasts and islands of East Asia, establishing forts and factories as they went. By 1571, a string of outposts connected Lisbon to Nagasaki along the coasts of Africa, the Middle East, India, and Asia. This commercial network brought great wealth to Portugal.

Between 1580 and 1640 Portugal became a partner, with Spain, in a personal union of the two countries' crowns. Though the empires continued to be administered separately, Portuguese colonies became the subject of attacks by three rival European powers hostile to Spain and envious of Iberian successes overseas: the Netherlands, Britain and France. With its smaller population, Portugal was unable to effectively defend its overstretched network of trading posts, and the empire began a long and gradual decline.^[4]

Significant losses to the Dutch in Portuguese India and Southeast Asia during the 17th century brought an end to the Portuguese trade monopoly in the Indian Ocean. Brazil became Portugal's most valuable colony until, as part of the wave of independence movements that swept the Americas during the early 19th century, it broke away in 1822. Portugal's Empire was reduced to its colonies on the African coastline (which were expanded inland during the Scramble for Africa in the late 19th century), East Timor, and enclaves in India and Macau.

After World War II, Portugal's leader, António Salazar, attempted to keep what remained of the pluricontinental Empire intact at a time when other European countries were beginning to withdraw from their colonies. In 1961 the handful of Portuguese troops garrisoned in Goa were unable to prevent the numerically superior Indian troops marching into the colony. Salazar began a long and bloody war to quell anti-colonialist forces in the African colonies. The unpopular war lasted until the overthrow of the regime in 1974. The new government immediately changed policy and recognised the independence of all its colonies, except for Macau, which by agreement with the Chinese government was returned to China in 1999, thereby marking the end of the Portuguese Empire. Currently, the Azores and Madeira archipelagos are the only territories overseas that remain politically linked to Portugal.

The Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) is the cultural successor of the Empire.

Origins (1139–1415)[link]

Portugal in 1415.

The origins of the Portuguese Empire, and of Portugal itself, lay in the reconquista: the gradual Christian reconquest of the Iberian peninsula from the Moors.^{[citation needed]} After establishing itself as a separate kingdom in 1139, Portugal completed its reconquest of Moorish territory by reaching Algarve in 1249, but its independence continued to be threatened by neighbouring Castile until the signing of the Treaty of Ayllón in 1411.^{[citation needed]}

Free from threats to its existence and unchallenged by the wars fought by other European states, Portuguese attention turned overseas and towards a military expedition to the Muslim lands of North Africa.^[5] There were several probable motives for their first attack, on the Marinid Sultanate (in present-day Morocco): it offered the opportunity to continue the Christian crusade against Islam; to the military class, it promised glory on the battlefield and the spoils of war;^[6] and finally, it was also a chance to expand Portuguese trade and to address Portugal's economic decline.^[5]

Kingdom of Portugal
Topics
Portuguese Monarchs Portuguese Cortes Portuguese Nobility Portuguese Empire Portuguese Discoveries Demise of the Monarchy Succession to the Throne

In 1415 an attack was made on Ceuta, a strategically located North African Muslim enclave along the Mediterranean Sea, and one of the terminal ports of the trans-Saharan gold and slave trades. The conquest was a military success, and marked one of the first steps in Portuguese expansion beyond the Iberian Peninsula,^[7] but it proved costly to defend against the Muslim forces that soon besieged it. The Portuguese were unable to use it as a base for further expansion into the hinterland,^[8] and the trans-Saharan caravans merely shifted their routes to bypass Ceuta and/or used alternative Muslim ports.^[9]

Age of Discovery (1415–1542)[link]

Infante Dom Henry the Navigator, generally credited as the driving force behind Portuguese maritime exploration. Painting by Nuno Gonçalves, 15th century.