Nicaraguan Contras
Participant in 1980s Nicaraguan Civil War
Nicaraguan Contra militia
Active	1979–1990
Ideology	Various
Leaders	FDN – Commandante Franklin ARDE Frente Sur – Cupula of 6 Regional Commandantes YATAMA – Commandante Blas Misura – Steadman Fagoth
Area of operations	All rural areas of Nicaragua with the exclusion of Pacific Coast, from Rio Coco in the north to Rio San Juan in the south
Strength	23,000
Allies	United States
Opponents	FSLN
Battles/wars	Major operations at La Trinidad, Rama highway, and Siuna and La Bonanza. Numerous government bases overrun throughout Jinotega, Matagalpa, Zelaya Norte, Zelaya Sur, Chontales, and Rio San Juan provinces.

The contras (some references use the capitalized form, "Contras") is a label given to the various rebel groups opposing Nicaragua's FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction government following the July 1979 overthrow of Anastasio Somoza Debayle's dictatorship. Among the separate contra groups, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) emerged as by far the largest. In 1987, virtually all contra organizations were united, at least nominally, into the Nicaraguan Resistance.

From an early stage, the rebels received decisive financial and military support from the United States government, initially supplemented by the Argentine dictatorship of the time. After U.S. support was banned by Congress, the Reagan administration tried to covertly continue contra aid.

The term "contra" comes from the Spanish contra, which means against but in this case is short for la contrarrevolucion, in English "the counter-revolution". Some rebels disliked being called contras, feeling that it defined their cause only in negative terms, or implied a desire to restore the old order. Rebel fighters usually referred to themselves as comandos ("commandos"); peasant sympathizers also called the rebels los primos ("the cousins"). From the mid-1980s, as the Reagan administration and the rebels sought to portray the movement as the "democratic resistance," members started describing themselves as la resistencia.

During the war against the Sandinista government, the contras carried out many violations of human rights, and evidence suggests that these were systematically commited as an element of warfare strategy. Contra supporters in Miami and the White House often tried to downplay these violations, or countered that the Sandinista government carried out much more. In particular, the Reagan administration engaged in a campaign to alter public opinion on the contras which has been denoted as "white propaganda".

History[link]

Origins[link]

The Contras were not a monolithic group, but a combination of three distinct elements of Nicaraguan society:^[1]

• Ex-guardsmen of the Nicaraguan National Guard and other right wing figures who had fought for Nicaragua's ex-dictator Somoza^[2] – these later were especially found in the military wing of the FDN.^[3] After the Guard's disbandment, they formed groups such as the Fifteenth of September Legion, the Anti-Sandinista Guerrilla Special Forces, and the National Army of Liberation.^{[citation needed]} Initially, these groups were small and conducted little active raiding into Nicaragua.^[4]

• Anti-Somozistas who had supported the revolution but felt betrayed by the Sandinista government^[2] – e.g. Edgar Chamorro, prominent member of the political directorate of the FDN,^[5] or Jose Francisco Cardenal, who had briefly served in the Council of State before leaving Nicaragua out of disagreement with the Sandinista government's policies and founding the Nicaraguan Democratic Union (UDN), an opposition group of Nicaraguan exiles in Miami.^[6] Another example are the MILPAS (Milicias Populares Anti-Sandinistas), peasant militias led by disillusioned Sandinista veterans from the northern mountains. Founded by Pedro Joaquín González (known as "Dimas"), the Milpistas were also known as chilotes (green corn). Even after his death, other MILPAS bands sprouted during 1980–1981. The Milpistas were composed largely of the campesino (peasant) highlanders and rural workers who would later form the rank and file of the rebellion.^{[7][8][9][10]}

• Nicaraguans who had avoided direct involvement in the revolution but opposed the Sandinistas' increasingly anti-democratic regime.^[2]

Main groups[link]

The CIA and Argentine intelligence, seeking to unify the anti-Sandinista cause before initiating large-scale aid, persuaded the 15 September Legion, the UDN and several former smaller groups to merge in August 1981 as the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, FDN).^{[citation needed]} Although the FDN had its roots in two groups made up of former National Guardsmen (of the Somoza regime), its joint political directorate was led by businessman and former anti-Somoza activist Adolfo Calero Portocarrero.^[11] Edgar Chamorro later stated that there was strong opposition within the UDN against working with the Guardsmen and that the merging only took place because of insistence by the CIA.^[12]

Based in Honduras, Nicaragua's northern neighbor, under the command of former National Guard Colonel Enrique Bermúdez, the new FDN commenced to draw in other smaller insurgent forces in the north.^{[citation needed]} Largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized by the U.S.,^[13] it emerged as the largest and most active contra group.^[14]

In April 1982, Edén Pastora (Comandante Cero), one of the heroes in the fight against Somoza, organized the Sandinista Revolutionary Front (FRS) – embedded in the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE)^[15] – and declared war on the Sandinista government.^[16] Himself a former Sandinista who had held several high posts in the government, he had resigned apruptly in 1981 and defected,^[16] believing that the newly found power had corrupted the Sandinista's original ideas.^[15] A popular and charismatic leader, Pastora initially saw his group develop quickly.^[16] He confined himself to operate in the southern part of Nicaragua;^[17] after a press conference he was holding on 30 May 1984 was bombed, he "voluntarily withdrew" from the contra struggle.^[15]

A third force, Misurasata, appeared among the Miskito, Sumo and Rama Amerindian peoples of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast, who in December 1981 found themselves in conflict with the authorities following the government's efforts to nationalize Indian land. In the course of this conflict, forced removal of at least 10,000 Indians to relocation centers in the interior of the country and subsequent burning of some villages took place.^[18] The Misurasata movement split in 1983, with the breakaway Misura group of Stedman Fagoth Muller allying itself more closely with the FDN, and the rest accommodating themselves with the Sandinista government.^{[citation needed]} A subsequent autonomy statute in September 1987 largely defused Miskito resistance.

Unity efforts[link]

U.S. officials were active in attempting to unite the Contra groups. In June 1985 most of the groups reorganized as the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), under the leadership of Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo, all originally supporters of the anti-Somoza revolution. After UNO's dissolution early in 1987, the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) was organized along similar lines in May.

U.S. military and financial assistance[link]

In front of the International Court of Justice, Nicaragua claimed that the contras altogether were a creation of the U.S.^[19] This claim was rejected.^[20] The evidence of a very close relationship between the contras and the U.S. was overwhelming and incontrovertible, though.^[21] The U.S. played a very large role in financing, training, arming, and advising the contras over a long period, and the contras only became capable of carrying out significant military operations as a result of this support.^[22]

Prelude to Contra War[link]

As explained by Robert Pastor, President Carter's National Security Advisor on Latin America, there was complete agreement that the U.S.-trained National Guard must be kept intact and it was not until June 29, 1979, shortly before the end of Somoza's rule, that anyone in N.S.C. meetings "suggested the central U.S. objective was something other than preventing a Sandinista victory." By then it was finally realized that means must be sought "to moderate the FSLN," who could not be barred from power, as hoped.^[23] Pastor questioned "whether one could realistically expect to win over the military leaders of the Sandinistas in the last days of their revolution after they had been fighting US imperialism for two decades." He argued that "As long as there was any possibility of placing a buffer between them and exclusive power, should we not reach for it?"^[24]

National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that "we have to demonstrate that we are still the decisive force in determining the political outcomes in Central America."^[25]

In a June 30 cable to Washington on the subject of "National Guard Survival," Ambassedor Pezzullo noted that with "careful orchestration we have a better than even chance of preserving enough of the [National Guard] to maintain order and hold the FSLN in check after Somoza resigns," "even though this successor government would smack somewhat of Somocismo sin Somoza," he added on July 6. "What follows after Somoza's departure is too uncertain as yet," Ambassador Vaky cabled to Pezzullo from Washington a few days later. "Hence Somoza should stay in place until this is determined."^[26]

At the time, the National Guard was carrying out large scale attacks against the population, leaving tens of thousands killed. In a cable to Washington on July 6, Pezzullo recommended that the bombardments be continued: "I believe it ill-advised to go to Somoza and ask for a bombing halt."^[27] He explained, "Air power is the only effective force the GN has to combat the FSLN Force which is capturing more towns daily and clearly has the momentum."^[28]

"The United States has always intervened when we Nicaraguans have tried to define our own future," said a wealthy young businessman. "Now it is willing to see Nicaragua bombed back into the Stone Age in order to maintain its system of domination."^[29]

As the Sandinista forces entered the capital, the Carter administration "began setting the stage for a counter revolution," Peter Kornbluh observes.^[30] On July 19, a U.S. plane disguised with Red Cross markings evacuated the remnants of the National Guard to Miami. The old Guardia was then built into the counter revolutionary force known as the 'Contras' by the C.I.A. and Argentine trainers.^[31]

Political background[link]

Ronald Reagan, who had assumed the American presidency in January 1981, accused the Sandinistas of importing Cuban-style socialism and aiding leftist guerrillas in El Salvador.^{[citation needed]} On 4 January 1982, Reagan signed the top secret National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD-17),^[32] giving the CIA the authority to recruit and support the contras with $19 million in military aid. The effort to support the contras was one component of the Reagan Doctrine, which called for providing military support to movements opposing Soviet-supported, communist governments.

By December 1981, however, the U.S. had already begun to support armed opponents of the Sandinista regime.^[33] From the beginning, the CIA was in charge.^[34] To arm, clothe, feed, and supervise the contras^[35] would become the most ambitious paramilitary and political action operation mounted by the agency in nearly a decade.^[36]

In the fiscal year 1984, the U.S. congress approved $24 million in contra aid.^[37] However, since the contras failed to win widespread popular support or military victories within Nicaragua,^[38] since opinion polls indicated that a majority of the U.S. public was not supportive of the contras,^[39] and since the Reagan administration lost much of its support regarding its contra policy within Congress after disclosure of CIA mining of Nicaraguan ports,^[40] Congress cut off all funds for the contras in 1985 by the third Boland Amendment.^[37] The Boland Amendment had first been passed by Congress in December 1982. At this time, it only outlawed U.S. assistance to the contras for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government, while allowing assistance for other purposes.^[41] In October 1984, it was amended to forbid action by not only the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency but all U.S. government agencies.

The case for support of the contras, however, continued to be made in Washington, D.C. by both the Reagan administration and the Heritage Foundation, which argued that support for the contras would counter Soviet influence in Nicaragua.^[42]

U.S. Pretexts for War[link]

It was revealed that Washington's intention was to provoke an internal and external violent response from the Sandinistas to create a pretext for continuing the terrorist war. David MacMichael, former CIA analyst on Nicaragua, testified at the World Court hearings: "The principal actions to be undertaken were paramilitary which hopefully would provoke cross-border attacks by Nicaraguan forces and thus serve to demonstrate Nicaragua's aggressive nature and possibly call into play the Organization of American States' provisions (regarding collective self-defense). It was hoped that the Nicaraguan Government would clamp down on civil liberties within Nicaragua itself, arresting its opposition, so demonstrating its allegedly inherent totalitarian nature and thus increase domestic dissent within the country, and further that there would be reaction against United States citizens, particularly against United States diplomatic personnel within Nicaragua and thus to demonstrate the hostility of Nicaragua towards the United States."^[43]

A joint State Department-Defense Department document that was distributed to those who attended the White House ceremony on December 10, 1986 marking International Human Rights Day, states that: "In the American continent, there is no regime more barbaric and bloody, no regime that violates human rights in a manner more constant and permanent, than the Sandinista regime."

Human Rights Watch rebutted the administration's assertions, stating that:

"Whatever the sins of the Sandinistas -- and they are real -- this is nonsense. Between 40,000 and 50,000 Salvadoran civilians were murdered by government forces and death squads...during the 1980s. A similar number died during Somoza's last year or so in Nicaragua, mostly in indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population by the National Guard. The number of civilian noncombatants killed by the armed forces in Guatemala during the 1980s cannot be known, but it is probably the highest in the hemisphere. As to Nicaragua, taking into account all of the civilian noncombatant deaths attributable to government forces in the more than seven years since the Sandinistas consolidated power, it is difficult to count a total of more than 300 of which the largest number of victims were Miskito Indians on the Atlantic Coast in 1981 and 1982. [Furthermore], Americas Watch knows of two cases of [Nicaraguan] political prisoners in the sense in which that term is used in the United States. [one of these] had been arrested for evading the military draft. He was subsequently released without charges and is not presently serving in the military. Also at this time, Amnesty International has no currently adopted "prisoner of conscience" in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas."^[44]

The World Court dismissed the administration's allegations that the Nicaraguan government was supplying arms to the Salvadoran rebels fighting the U.S. backed Himmler-style regime, concluding that: "The evidence is insufficient to satisfy the Court that, since the early months of 1981, assistance has continued to reach the Salvadorian armed opposition from the territory of Nicaragua on any significant scale, or that the Government of Nicaragua was responsible for any flow of arms at either period."^[45]

The Sandinistas were often described as "Marxist-Leninist" by the Reagan administration and much of the major media although their policies did not match the definition. The Ortega administration was allied with Fidel Castro's Cuba but unlike Cuba, Nicaragua under the FSLN had a "mixed economy", multiple opposition parties, a freely elected government, and a vocal opposition press, including La Prensa, a National Endowment for Democracy (NED) sponsored newspaper that was openly supportive of the Contras and regularly called for the overthrow of the government.

In spite of the 1984 Sandinista electoral victory being declared "free, fair, and hotly contested" the United States continued its terrorist war against the nation.^[46][47] The Reagan administration criticized the elections as a "sham" based on the charge that Arturo Cruz, the candidate nominated by the Coordinadora Democrática Nicaragüense, comprising three rightwing political parties, did not participate in the elections. However, the administration privately argued against Cruz's participation for fear his involvement would legitimize the elections. U.S. officials admitted to the New York Times that "The Administration never contemplated letting Cruz stay in the race because then the Sandinistas could justifiably claim that the elections were legitimate, making it much harder for the United States to oppose the Nicaraguan Government."^[48]

While observing the electoral process in 1984, the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) described Nicaragua's new political and economic system: "Nicaragua's poor majority would have access to, and be the primary beneficiaries of, public programs. In the economic arena it implies redistribution of access to wealth and public services. In the political arena, mass organizations created during the struggle against Somoza and afterward involve very large numbers of people in the decisions that affect their lives. Economic elites can survive in the new system, and even make private profits, if they recognize the interests of the majority population and collaborate with the state in meeting the majority's needs; but they will no longer be allowed to rule."^[49]

On June 26, 1986, the Sandinista government suspended the publication of La Prensa citing an oped in the Washington Post by La Prensa editor Jaime Chamorro which sought to rebut the arguments of members of Congress who were opposed to the $100 milion in Contra aid. Chamorro also asserted that there were 10,000 political prisoners in Nicaragua. Vice President Ramirez informed Human Rights Watch that the decision to suspend La Prensa's publication could be reversed under the condition that the paper clearly dissociate itself from the United States policy supporting the Contras.^[50]

The populist nature of the Sandinista government distressed many in the Reagan administration, who then claimed the country was a key Cold War battleground and a Soviet proxy state.

In contrast to the administration's warnings of a 'Soviet beachhead' in Nicaragua, the June 1984 Bureau of Intelligence and Research report commissioned by the State Department, "Soviet Attitudes Towards, Aid to, and Contacts with Central American Revolutionaries," reported that "Soviet military aid to Nicaragua is unobtrusive and sometimes ephemeral." The author of the report, Dr. Carl Jacobsen found that "the limited amounts of truly modern equipment acquired by the Sandinistas . . . came from Western Europe not the Eastern bloc." The report concluded that "all too many US claims proved hollow" and that "the scope and nature of the Kremlin's intrusion are far short of justifying the President's exaggerated alarms."^[51][52] Furthermore, one classified CIA assessment written after the Hind helicopters were delivered in November 1984 reported that "The overall military buildup is primarily defensive-oriented, and much of the recent effort has been devoted to improving counter-insurgency capabilities."^[53]

On May 1, 1985 President Reagan announced that his administration perceived Nicaragua to be "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States," and declared a "national emergency" and a trade embargo against Nicaragua to "deal with that threat."^[54] After the U.S. enforced the embargo, Nicaragua was isolated from the West, forcing the Sandinistas to rely more on Eastern bloc military and economic assistance but Moscow declined to offer the quantity of aid it provided to close communist allies.^[55]

U.S. allied right wing Latin Envoys opposed the embargo, arguing that it made Nicaragua move closer to the Soviet Union. The Mexican official commented, "This move just cuts off more options for the Sandinistas. By closing doors to the Sandinistas, you only make them more desperate. What they need are more doors, political, economic--everything." One of the South American diplomats observed, "I think Ortega is a desperate man and when a country is desperate it looks for the first table from which it can eat. It does not matter then if the table is in Moscow or Havana or Prague."^[56]

U.S. Imperialism[link]

Robert Pastor, President Carter's National Security Advisor on Latin America explained why the administration had to back Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza until he could no longer be sustained to then move to bar the FSLN from power through the "preservation of existing institutions, especially the National Guard,"^[57] even though it had been massacring the population "with a brutality a nation usually reserves for its enemy.": "The United States did not want to control Nicaragua or the other nations in the region, but it also did not want to allow developments to get out of control. It wanted Nicaraguans to act independently, except when doing so would affect U.S. interests adversely."^[58]

Shortly before Somoza fled to Miami, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski declared that "we have to demonstrate that we are still the decisive force in determining the political outcomes in Central America."^[59]

BBC News put the war "in context": "The Sandinistas had begun redistributing property and made notable progress in the sphere of education. But the US regarded them with suspicion, fearing their policies were hostile to American interests. Former Secretary of State George Schultz is reported to have warned, in March 1986, that if the Sandinistas "succeed in consolidating their power," then "all the countries in Latin America, who all face serious internal economic problems, will see radical forces emboldened to exploit these problems".^[60]

In "Nicaragua: The Threat of a Good Example?", Oxfam, the British charitable relief and development organization observes:

"Oxfam's long-term development work is most likely to succeed where governments are genuinely committed to the needs of the poor majority. Rarely is this the case. Nicaragua stands out because of the positive climate for development based on people's active participation, which Oxfam has encountered over the past five years [i.e. since 1979 under the Sandinista government]. Since 1979 the scope for development has been enormous, with remarkable progress achieved in health, literacy and a more equitable distribution of resources...The new Government of National Reconstruction stressed its desire to develop a mixed economy and political pluralism in a country that had no tradition of democracy or free elections. Great importance was also attached to achieving a high degree of national self-sufficiency and an independent, non-aligned foreign policy. This radically new focus of social policy in Nicaragua towards the needs of the poor presented enormous scope for Oxfam's work. In addition to locally-based projects, Oxfam was now able to support nationwide initiatives to tackle problems rooted in poverty. The concept of actively involving people in development through community organisations is neither new nor radical, but widely recognised to be a precondition for successful development. However, as the World Bank points out: "Governments..vary greatly in the commitment of their political leadership to improving the condition of the people and encouraging their active participation in the development process." From Oxfam's experience of working in seventy-six developing countries, Nicaragua was to prove exceptional in the strength of that Government commitment."^[61]

One of the primary goals of the United States was to undermine Nicaragua's successful independent development and democratic reforms, fearing that the "threat of a good example" would become an "exporter of revolution", by demonstration.

This fear was expressed by Secretary of State George Shultz in March 1986, when he warned that if the Sandinistas "succeed in consolidating their power," then "all the countries in Latin America, who all face serious internal economic problems, will see radical forces emboldened to exploit these problems."^[60] "Nicaragua is the cancer, and we must cut it out," Shultz said in a speech at Kansas State University.^[62]

General John Galvin, commander of U.S. forces in Latin America explained why enlarging armies in neighboring client states and stationing more U.S. troops in the region would not counter the "threat of a good example" in Nicaragua: 'The Sandinistas would attack with ideological "subversion" rather than conventional warfare, and "You cannot contain that by putting military forces on their border."^[63]

Across the establishment it was agreed that the US must "contain Nicaragua." The New York Times reported that U.S. military maneuvers near Nicaragua were "intended to deter the Sandinista Government in Managua from exporting its leftist ideology."^[64]

U.S. allies in Honduras were particularly concerned. "We don't have a wall to stop Sandinista ideology or subversives," complains William Hall Rivera, the Honduran president's chief of staff. "It won't be a fight over land, but over minds." He adds: "We'll need a Marshall Plan."

The Wall Street Journal reporter, Clifford Krauss, describes such fears throughout the region. But "things could be worse. Left wing movements in Central America have lost strength over the past few years, and revolution doesnt seem to be brewing in the region."^[65] - Referring to the success of U.S.-run state terror in El Salvador and Guatemala which decapitated the trade unions and "popular organizations".^[66]

A Department of Defense official informed the press of part of their "containment" strategy for preventing the spread of the Nicaraguan "cancer": "Those 2,000 hard-core guys could keep some pressure on the Nicaraguan government, force them to use their economic resources for the military and prevent them from solving their economic problems--and that's a plus. Anything that puts pressure on the Sandinista regime, calls attention to the lack of democracy and prevents the Sandinistas from solving their economic problems is a plus."

Administration officials told the Los Angeles Times that they were content to see the contras debilitate the Sandinistas by forcing them to divert scarce resources toward the war and away from social programs.^[67]

Furthermore, the C.I.A. instructed the Contras to destroy and sabotage economic and social targets such as lumber yards, coffee processing plants, electrical generating stations, farms, cooperatives, food storage facilities, health centers, including a particular effort to dusrupt the coffee harvests through attacks on coffee cooperatives and on vehicles carrying volunteer coffee harvesters. They also attacked and intimidated civilians deemed to be contributors to the country's economy such as telephone workers, coffee pickers, teachers, and technicians as well as civilians who participated or cooperated in government or community programs such as distribution of subsidized food products, rural cooperatives, and education.^{[68][69][70][71]}

Thomas Carothers, who describes his stand as 'Neo-Reaganite', is one of the leading international experts on democracy promotion initiatives and U.S. foreign policy. He's currently the vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where he is the founder and director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Program. He writes from the perspective of an insider as well as a scholar. While serving in the State Department, he worked with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) on "democracy enhancement" programs in Latin America from 1985-1988.

In conclusion, Carothers writes:

"The underlying U.S. goal is maintaining the basic societal orders of particular Latin American countries approximately as they are ensuring that the economics are not drastically rearranged and that the power relations of the various social sectors are not turned upside down..The underlying objective is to maintain the basic order of what, historically at least, are quite undemocratic societies. The deep fear in the United States government of populist-based change in Latin America with all its implications for upsetting established economic and political orders and heading off in a leftist direction leads to an emphasis on incremental change from the top down.^[72] The Reagan administration came to adopt pro-democracy policies as a means of relieving pressure for more radical change, but inevitably sought only limited, top-down forms of democratic change that did not risk upsetting the traditional structures of power with which the United States has long been allied."^[73]

Illegal covert operations[link]

With Congress blocking further contra aid, the Reagan administration sought to arrange funding and military supplies by means of third countries and private sources.^[74] Between 1984 and 1986, $34 million from third countries and $2.7 million from private sources were raised this way.^[74] The secret contra assistance was run by the National Security Council, with officer Lt. Col. Oliver North in charge.^[75] With the third-party funds, North created an organization called "The Enterprise" which served as the secret arm of the NSC staff and had its own airplanes, pilots, airfield, ship, operatives and secret Swiss bank accounts.^[74] It also received assistance from personnel from other government agencies, especially from CIA personnel in Central America.^[74] This operation functioned, however, without any of the accountability required of U.S. government activities.^[74] The Enterprise's efforts culminated in the Iran-Contra Affair of 1986–1987, which facilitated contra funding through the proceeds of arms sales to Iran.

According to the National Security Archive, Oliver North had been in contact with Manuel Noriega, the military leader of Panama later convicted on drug charges, whom he personally met. The issue of drug money and its importance in funding the Nicaraguan conflict was the subject of various reports and publications. The contras were funded by drug trafficking, of which the USA was aware.^[76] Senator John Kerry's 1988 Committee on Foreign Relations report on Contra drug links concluded that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems."^[77]

The Reagan administration's support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s. In August 1996, San Jose Mercury News reporter Gary Webb published a series titled Dark Alliance, alleging that the contras contributed to the rise of crack cocaine in California. [1] [2]

Propaganda[link]

During the time congress blocked funding for the contras, the Reagan government engaged in a campaign to alter public opinion and change the vote in congress on contra aid.^[78] For this purpose, the NSC established an interagency working group which in turn coordinated the the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean (S/LPD), which conducted the campaign.^[79]
The S/LPD produced and widely disseminated a variety of pro-contra publications, arranged speeches and press conferences.^[80] It also disseminated "white propaganda" – pro-contra newspaper articles by paid consultants who did not disclose their connection to the Reagan administration.^[81]
On top of that, Oliver North helped Carl Channell's tax-exempt organization, the "National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty", to raise $10 million, by arranging numerous briefings for groups of potential contributors at the premises of the White House and by facilitating private visits and photo sessions with president Reagan for major contributors.^[82] Channell, in turn, used part of that money to run a series of television advertisements directed at home districts of congressmen considered to be swing votes on contra aid.^[82] Out of the $10 million raised, more than $1 million was spent on pro-contra publicity.^[83]

"If you look at it as a whole," a senior S/LPD official said, "the Office of Public Diplomacy was carrying out a huge psychological operation of the kind the military conducts to influence a population in denied or enemy territory."^[84][85][86]

International Court of Justice ruling[link]

In 1984, the Sandinista government filed a suit in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States (Nicaragua v. United States), which resulted in a 1986 judgment against the United States. The ICJ held that the U.S. had violated international law by supporting the contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and by mining Nicaragua's harbors. Regarding the alleged human rights violations by the contras, however, the ICJ took the view that the U.S. could only be held accountable for them if it would have been proven that the U.S. had effective control of the contra operations resulting in these alleged violations.^[87] Nevertheless, the ICJ found that the U.S. encouraged acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law by producing the manual Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare (Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas) and disseminating it to the contras.^[88] The manual, amongst other things, advised on how to rationalize killings of civilians^[89] and recommended to hire professional killers for specific selective tasks.^[90]

The United States, which did not participate in the merits phase of the proceedings, maintained that the ICJ's power did not supersede the Constitution of the United States and argued that the court did not seriously consider the Nicaraguan role in El Salvador, while it accused Nicaragua of actively supporting armed groups there, specifically in the form of supply of arms.^[91] The ICJ had found that evidence of a responsibility of the Nicaraguan government in this matter was insufficient.^[92] The U.S. argument was affirmed, however, by the dissenting opinion of ICJ member U.S. Judge Schwebel,^[93] who concluded that in supporting the contras, the U.S. acted lawfully in collective self-defence in El Salvador's support.^[94] The U.S. blocked enforcement of the ICJ judgment by the United Nations Security Council and thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any actual compensation.^[95] The Nicaraguan government finally withdrew the complaint from the court in September 1992 (under the later, post-FSLN, government of Violeta Chamorro), following a repeal of the law requiring the country to seek compensation.^[96]

Human rights violations[link]

Edgar Chamorro, a former Contra and member of the FDN's political directorate who later became a critic of the Contras, stated that during his time with the Contras, he frequently received reports about atrocities committed by Contra troops against civilians and against Sandinista prisoners: "As time went on, I became more and more troubled by the frequent reports I received of atrocities committed by our troops against civilians and against Sandinista prisoners. The atrocities I had heard about were not isolated incidents, but reflected a consistent pattern of behaviour by our troops. There were unit commanders who openly bragged about their murders, mutilations, etc."^[97]

A Sandinista militiaman interviewed by The Guardian stated that Contra rebels committed these atrocities against Sandinista prisoners after a battle at a Sandinista rural outpost: "Rosa had her breasts cut off. Then they cut into her chest and took out her heart. The men had their arms broken, their testicles cut off. They were killed by slitting their throats and pulling the tongue out through the slit."^[98]

Americas Watch – which subsequently became part of Human Rights Watch – accused the Contras of^[99]:

• targeting health care clinics and health care workers for assassination^[100]
• kidnapping civilians^[101]
• torturing civilians^[102]
• executing civilians, including children, who were captured in combat^[103]
• raping women^[100]
• indiscriminately attacking civilians and civilian houses^[101]
• seizing civilian property^[100]
• burning civilian houses in captured towns.^[100]

Human Rights Watch released a report on the situation in 1989, which stated: "[The] contras were major and systematic violators of the most basic standards of the laws of armed conflict, including by launching indiscriminate attacks on civilians, selectively murdering non-combatants, and mistreating prisoners."^[104]

Similarly, the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR, now known as "Progressio"), a human rights organization which identifies itself with liberation theology, had summarized Contra operating procedures in their 1987 human rights report: "The record of the contras in the field, as opposed to their official professions of democratic faith, is one of consistent and bloody abuse of human rights, of murder, torture, mutilation, rape, arson, destruction and kidnapping."^[105] Earlier, in December 1984, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs had issued a report condemning the Contras and the United States government as being among the worst human rights violators in Latin America: "The CIA directed forces are among the worst human rights violators in Latin America, responsible for systematic brutality against a civilian population. For it's critical role in facilitating the Contra violence, the [United States] Administration must share responsibility as a hemispheric violator of human rights. The Contras have killed, tortured, raped, mutilated and abducted hundreds of civilians they suspect of sympathizing with the Sandinistas. Victims have included peasants, teachers, doctors and agricultural workers."^[106]

Human rights violations as a strategy[link]

A fact finding mission of 1985 – sponsored by the International Human Rights Law Group and the Washington Office on Latin America, and carried out independently of any Nicaraguan government interference or direction - found that the contras with some frequency deliberately targeted Nicaraguan citizens in acts of terroristic violence.^[107]

An influential report on Contra atrocities was issued by lawyer Reed Brody shortly before the 1985 U.S. Congressional vote on Contra aid. It disclosed a "distinct pattern" of abuses by the contras, including: "attacks on purely civilian targets resulting in the killing of unarmed men, woman, children and the elderly; – premeditated acts of brutality including rapes, beatings, mutilations and torture; – and individual and mass kidnappings of civilians for the purpose of forced recruitment into the Contra forces and the creation of a hostage refugee population in Honduras; – assaults on economic and social targets such as farms, cooperatives and on vehicles carrying volunteer coffee harvesters; – intimidation of civilians who participate or cooperate in government or community programs such as distribution of subsidized food products, education and local self-defense militias; – and kidnapping, intimidation, and even murder of religious leaders who support the government, including priests and clergy- trained lay pastors."^[108]

Similarly, Human Rights Watch pointed out that "the Contras systematically engage in violent abuses... so prevalent that these may be said to be their principal means of waging war" in a 1989 report.^[109]

In his affidavit to the World Court, former contra Edgar Chamorro testified that "The CIA did not discourage such tactics. To the contrary, the Agency severely criticized me when I admitted to the press that the FDN had regularly kidnapped and executed agrarian reform workers and civilians. We were told that the only way to defeat the Sandinistas was to...kill, kidnap, rob and torture..."^[110]

These deliberate acts of violence against civilians were acknowledged by the CIA as early as late 1983, when Duane Clarridge, Latin America division chief of the CIA’s Directorate for Operations, reported in a secret briefing to the Senate subcommittee that the contras had murdered "civilians and Sandinista officials in the provinces, as well as heads of cooperatives, nurses, doctors and judges." However, he maintained that "these events don’t constitute assassinations because as far as we are concerned assassinations are only those of heads of state. I leave definitions to the politicians. After all, this is a war — a paramilitary operation."^[111]

In 1987, "Gen. John Galvin, leader of the U.S. Southern Command, told a House subcommittee...that the contra rebels fighting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government have a better chance of winning than they did just a few months ago and attributed his growing optimism to the contras' new strategy of attacking civilian targets instead of soldiers. Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Western Hemisphere subcommittee, Galvin said, "The contras have a fighting chance if we sustain them" with continued military aid. "It's getting better. In the past few months, I'm more hopeful than I was before." Asked after the hearing what the contras have achieved the past few months, Galvin replied, "Lots of victories. They're going after soft targets. They're not trying to duke it out with the Sandinistas directly."^[112] Likewise, a U.S. military analyst was quoted by the Washington Post in 1987 in acknowledging that the contras were "still going after small, soft targets like farmers' cooperatives."^[113]

State Department spokesman Charles Redman, at a July 1, 1986 press briefing, defended SOUTHCOM's strategy, asserting that "These cooperatives, this was what was attacked in Nicaragua, often have a dual military-economic purpose.."

Responding to Redman's statement, Americas Watch observed: "The State Department statement would do credit to George Orwell's Ministry of Truth. It would be interesting to know, however, whether it considers how its theory that a cooperative has a "dual military-economic purpose" and, therefore, is a legitimate target for attack, might be applied, for example, to an unfortified Israeli kibbutz where attackers kill and injure children, burn houses and kidnap civilians. Is it now U.S. policy that such an attack would be legitimate?"^[114]

New Republic Editor Michael Kinsley, regarded as the spokesperson of the left in mainstreem discussion, argued that critics should not simply dismiss State Department justifications for death squad terror against "soft targets": "The State Department has defended bloody contra attacks on government-sponsored farm cooperatives, saying that these civilian facilities have military aspects. And, of course, that's true. In a Marxist society geared up for war, there are no clear lines separating officials, soldiers and civilians. A guerrilla struggle can't be won by attacking only card-carrying Sandinistas. The goal is to undermine morale and confidence in the government: a perfectly legitimate goal if you believe in the cause, but impossible to achieve without vast civilian suffering. Any sensible policy must meet the test of cost-benefit analysis. The amount of blood and misery that will be poured in, and the likelihood that democracy will emerge at the other end."^[115]

[edit] Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare

The CIA manual, "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare" (Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas), had been written in 1983 to be used by the contras.^[116] The manual talks about killing civilians who try to leave an occupied town and to rationalize their killing^[117], hiring professional assassins^[118], blackmailing citizens into working for the contras, and inciting violence during demonstrations.^[119]

The International Court of Justice ruled on 27 June 1986 that by disseminating the manual to the contras, the United States of America had "encouraged ... acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law."^[120] Americas Watch had come to a similar conclusion in 1985.^[121]

Controversy[link]

US news media published several articles accusing Americas Watch and other bodies of ideological bias and unreliable reporting. It alleged that Americas Watch gave too much credence to alleged Contra abuses and systematically tried to discredit Nicaraguan human rights groups such as the Permanent Commission on Human Rights, which blamed the major human rights abuses on the Sandinistas.^[122]

In 1985, the Wall Street Journal reported:

Three weeks ago, Americas Watch issued a report on human rights abuses in Nicaragua. One member of the Permanent Commission for Human Rights commented on the Americas Watch report and its chief investigator Juan Mendez: "The Sandinistas are laying the groundwork for a totalitarian society here and yet all Mendez wanted to hear about were abuses by the contras. How can we get people in the U.S. to see what's happening here when so many of the groups who come down are pro-Sandinista?"^[123]

Human Rights Watch, the umbrella organization of Americas Watch, replied to these allegations: "Almost invariably, U.S. pronouncements on human rights exaggerated and distorted the real human rights violations of the Sandinista regime, and exculpated those of the U.S.-supported insurgents, known as the contras.... The Bush administration is responsible for these abuses, not only because the contras are, for all practical purposes, a U.S. force, but also because the Bush administration has continued to minimize and deny these violations, and has refused to investigate them seriously."^[124]

Military successes and election of Violeta Chamorro[link]

By 1986, the contras were besieged by charges of corruption, human-rights abuses and military ineptitude.^[125] A much-vaunted early 1986 offensive never materialized, and Contra forces were largely reduced to isolated acts of terrorism.^[126] In October 1987, however, the contras staged a successful attack in southern Nicaragua.^[127] Then on 21 December 1987, the FDN launched attacks at La Bonanza, La Siuna, and La Rosita in Zelaya province, resulting in heavy fighting.^[128] ARDE Frente Sur attacked at El Almendro and along the Rama road.^{[128][129][130]} These large scale raids mainly became possible as the contras were able to use US-provided Redeye missiles against Sandinista Mi-24 helicopter gunships, which had been supplied by the Soviets.^[131][132] Nevertheless, the Contras remained tenuously encamped within Honduras and weren't able to hold Nicaraguan territory.^[133][134]

There were isolated protests among the population against the draft implemented by the Sandinista government, which even resulted in full-blown street clashes in Masaya in 1988.^[135] However, polls showed the Sandinista government still enjoyed strong support from Nicaraguans.^[136] Political opposition groups were splintered and the Contras began to experience defections, although United States aid maintained them as a viable military force.^[137][138]

After a cutoff in US military support and with both sides facing international pressure to bring an end to the conflict, the Contras agreed to negotiations with the FSLN. Despite opposition from then-US President Bush five Central American Presidents, including Ortega, agreed to cooperate to disband the Contras beginning in December 1989 with the assumption of free and fair elections in Nicaragua in February 1990. This peace allowed the Nicaraguan elections of February 1990 in which Violeta Chamorro and her party the UNO won an upset victory 55% to 41% over Daniel Ortega with Chamorro winning nearly 68% of the rural vote. This in spite of the fact that the estimated 500,000 refugees created by the war living outside Nicaragua were not allowed to cast absentee ballots.^[139] Although polls leading up to the election indicated an FSLN victory the UNO scored an upset due to popular discontent with the draft and the perception that voting in the UNO would lead to a permanent peace.^[140]

The upset can be explained in that during the run-up to the elections, the Bush administration continued the strategy of trying to terrorize the population into voting the government out. The C.I.A. manual, "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare", instructs the Contras that "If the government police cannot put an end to the guerrilla activities, the population will lose confidence in the government, which has the inherent mission of guaranteeing the safety of citizens."^[141] "The United States wanted the contras kept intact in their Honduran bases to ensure Nicaraguan compliance with commitments to democratic and electoral change", the Washington Post reported.^[142] Boston Globe editor Randolph Ryan observed, Washington is sending "an implicit message..to the Nicaraguan electorate: If you want a secure peace, vote for the opposition."^[143]

The Canadian Observer Mission's four-week investigation of the electoral process in Nicaragua reported that the U.S. "is doing everything it can to disrupt the elections set for next year": "American intervention is the main obstacle to the attainment of free and fair elections in Nicaragua". It added further that the Contras are "waging a campaign of intimidation with the clear message,`if you support the (Sandinista government), we will be back to kill you'." The observer mission estimates that the contras killed 42 people in "election violence" in October.^[144]

In its review of 1989, Human Rights Watch observed that "The policy of keeping the contras alive, through so-called "humanitarian" or non-lethal aid, sustains a force that has shown itself incapable of operating without consistently committing gross abuses in violation of the laws of war. The policy also has placed in jeopardy the holding of elections by encouraging contra attacks on the electoral process. Thus, while the Bush administration proclaims its support for human rights and free and fair elections in Nicaragua, it persists in sabotaging both."^[145]

On November 8, 1989, the White House announced that the embargo against Nicaragua would continue unless Violeta Chamorro won.^[146] The Bush administration also financed Chamorro's campaign with a $9 million election aid package through the National Endowment for Democracy. Edgar Chamorro, a former Contra leader who later became a critic of the CIA-Contra war, said 'For Nicaraguans, the choice was simple: continued war, poverty and inflation or opposition candidate Violeta Barrios de Chamorro'.."They were not electing a president, they were electing a way out." President elect Chamorro surmised that ensuing problems such as 16,000% inflation "eroded the credibility of the government" and led people to realize that "if the Sandinistas won, the pain would continue."^[147]

Thomas Walker, a specialist on Central America, writes: "The voters chose a candidate of Washington's choice with a 'gun held to their heads', as was clear to many impartial observers."^[148]

After informing it's readers that the winners were "the Nicaraguans, of course," the New Republic turns to its Managua correspondent Tom Gjelten, who writes: "UNO victory rallies were small, mostly private affairs, and there was no mass outpouring into the streets. Most people stayed home."^[149] Almost a month after the elections, the Associated Press reported that "UNO supporters still have not held a public celebration."^[150]

Shortly thereafter the contras were allowed the re-enter the country into security zones and were assimilated back into Nicaraguan society.^{[citation needed]}

U.S. Media Reaction[link]

Time Magazine acknowledged that U.S. policy was to: "wreck the economy and prosecute a long and deadly proxy war until the exhausted natives overthrow the unwanted government themselves. Since 1985 Washington has strangled Nicaraguan trade with an embargo. It has cut off Nicaragua's credit at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The contra war cost Managua tens of millions and left the country with wrecked bridges, sabotaged power stations and ruined farms. The impoverishment of the people of Nicaragua was a harrowing way to give the National Opposition Union (U.N.O.) a winning issue. Nicaragua had been devastated by a 40% drop in G.N.P., an inflation rate running at 1,700% a year and constant shortages of food and basic necessities. At least 30,000 people had been killed in the war, and 500,000 more had fled."^[151]

Nevertheless, Time states that, with the victory of U.N.O.: "democracy burst forth where everyone least expected it. Given the chance to vote in an honest and secret election, Nicaraguans decisively repudiated the Sandinista government, which the U.S. had been struggling to overthrow for a decade."^[152]

The New York Times headline reads: "Americans United In Joy, But Divided over Policy." The policy division turns out to be over who deserves credit for the joyous outcome.

David Shipler's headline in the New York Times reads: "Nicaragua, Victory U.S. Fair Play," observing that: "It is true that partly because of the confrontation with the U.S., Nicaragua's economy suffered terribly, setting the stage for the widespread public discontent with the Sandinistas reflected in Sunday's balloting. But few governments become moderate during a war; the contra war strengthened Sandinista hard-liners and probably contributed to their oppressive policies. The way to resolution opened only when Congress suspended the war, in effect, to give the Sandinistas a chance to proceed democratically...Thus, Nicaragua's election has vindicated Washington's fledgling program of providing public, above-board funding to help democratic procedures take root in countries with authoritarian regimes."^[153]

In "Rallying to Chamorro," the Editors of the Boston Globe declared: "Having supported the election of Chamorro, the U.S. must, to shore up the Chamorro regime, match the millions it spent trying to overthrow Ortega. Ortega's defenders in the U.S., if they love Nicaraguans and not just Sandinistas, must now rally to Chamorro...The Sandinista revolution, still potent as an opposition force, is now, like so many Marxist-Leninist phenomena, consigned to the dustbin of history. Another blessing of democracy is that outside theories mean little. At long last, Nicaragua itself has spoken."^[154]

For examples of the "liberal" reaction to the 1990 Nicaraguan elections, Anthony Lewis, columnist for the New York Times noted that the U.S. policies produced "misery, death and shame," and that "the economic distress that no doubt moved some Nicaraguans to vote for Mrs. Chamorro was caused in part, after all, by U.S. sanctions" - then stated that the result of Washington's "experiment in peace and democracy" gave "fresh testimony to the power of Jefferson's idea: government with the consent of the governed...To say so seems romantic, but then we live in a romantic age."^[155]

In "Taking Responsibility: Effect of 80's U.S. Nicaragua Policy on Chamorro Victory," New Republic Editor, Michael Kinsley, observes that: "Impoverishing the people of Nicaragua was precisely the point of the contra war and the parallel policy of economic boycott and veto of international development loans..The contra war managed to kill more than 30,000 Nicaraguans..The economic disaster was probably the victorious opposition's best election issue..What followed-ceasefire, free election, victory for the opposition, voluntary surrender of political power by the Sandinistas-turned out to be pleasanter than anyone would have dared to predict. Those who supported aid to the contras..., as did this magazine, can find considerable vindication in the outcome. Gratifying as the election results are democracy is not yet quite safe in Nicaragua and having served as an inspiration for the triumph of democracy in our time, the United States now has an opportunity to see to it that democracy prevails."^[156]

Tom Wicker, columnist for the New York Times, noted that the Sandinistas lost the election "because the Nicaraguan people were tired of war and sick of economic deprivation" - but nonetheless calling the elections "free and fair."^[157]

Alexander Cockburn's headline in the Wall Street Journal reads: "U.S.-Backed Terrorism Won in Nicaragua, Not Democracy."^[158]

"In Nicaragua, a win but not a victory," Boston Globe Editor, Randolph Ryan observes: "It is hard to say which is sadder: What happened to Nicaragua and its people (and its revolution) on the way to the stunning defeat of the Sandinistas in the election on Sunday. Or the fact that so many Americans in public life -- the politicians and journalists who establish the terms of discourse for everyone else -- describe the election victory of the American-backed candidate as a victory for peace and democracy. This was undeniably a victory for former President Reagan and President Bush, and for Elliott Abrams and Oliver North. It was a victory for violence pays. For money talks. For cynicism. For terrorism, fading into mere cruelty. And for cowardice among the liberal opposition."^[159]

In Guatemala, the independent Central America Report observed that "Although the concessions granted by the Sandinistas were the result of the regional peace accords the elections themselves were mandated in the Nicaragua constitution, adopted in January 1987, before the Arias Plan." With regard to the elections, "Most analysts agree that the UNO victory marks the consummation of the US government's military, economic and political efforts to overthrow the Sandinistas." Under the heading "The Winners", the journal added:

"US President George Bush emerged as a clear victor in the Nicaraguan elections. The decade-long Reagan/Bush war against Nicaragua employed a myriad of methods -- both covert and open -- aimed at overthrowing the Sandinistas. Bush's continuation of the two-pronged Reagan policy of economic strangulation and military aggression finally reaped tangible results. Following the elections, Ortega said that the outcome was not in retrospect surprising since the voters went to the polls "with a pistol pointed at their heads."

"The consensus attributes the population's defection...to the critical economic crisis in Nicaragua," the report continues, citing an editorial in the Guatemala City press that "pointed out that more than ten years of economic and military aggressions waged by a government with unlimited resources created the setting for an election determined by economic exhaustion." "It was a vote in search of peace by a people that, inevitably, were fed up with violence," the Guatemala City editorial concluded: "It is a vote from a hungry people that, more than any idea, need to eat."

The analysis ends with this comment:

"While many observers today are remarking that never before has a leftist revolutionary regime handed over power in elections, the opposite is also true. Never has a popularly elected leftist government in Latin America been allowed to undertake its reforms without being cut short by a coup, an invasion or an assassination."^[160]

See also[link]

• Anti-communism
• Carla's Song
• CIA and Contras cocaine trafficking in the US
• Operation Charly
• Reagan Doctrine
• Role of women in Nicaraguan Revolution

Notes[link]

References[link]

External links[link]

• Confessions of a Contra: How the CIA Masterminds the Nicaraguan Insurgency by The New Republic, 5 August 1985
• "The Contras' Valley Forge: How I View the Nicaragua Crisis", by Enrique Bermúdez (with Michael Johns), Policy Review magazine, Summer 1988.
• The Contras and U.S. Funding from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
• U.S. Policy Towards the Contras from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
• "Nicaragua Goes For Reagan", National Review, 19 March 1990.
• "Nicaragua 1981–1990: Destabilization in slow motion, by William Blum.
• "Dark Alliance", by Gary Webb, San Jose Mercury News, August 1996.
• "The World Stopped Watching", a documentary film directed by Peter Raymont. White Pine Pictures, 2003.
• "The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations" – National Security Archive.
• US administration disregarding the UN verdict Video provided by BBC.
• When the AK-47s Fall Silent, by Timothy Brown
• CIA Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare. Tactical Manual for the Revolutionary.

Look up Contra, contra, or contra- in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

Contra is a Latin preposition meaning "against". It is very frequently abbreviated to con, which is a separate preposition. It may refer to:

• Contras, Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries opposed to the Sandinistas
  • Iran–Contra affair, the Reagan administration selling weapons to Iran to fund the Contras
• Contra (citation signal), a term used in legal citations
• Contra payment (financial accounting), made in cases where a customer is also a supplier and a payment owed is offset against a payment due

Media[link]

• Contra (Swedish magazine), an anti-socialist magazine in Sweden

Music[link]

• Contra dance, several folk dance styles in which couples dance in two facing lines of indefinite length
• Contra (album), the second album by Vampire Weekend
• Contrabassoon, or double bassoon, a larger version of the bassoon sounding an octave lower
• Contra-alto and Contrabass clarinets
• Contrabass and Subcontrabass saxophones
• Contrabass bugle, the lowest-pitched instrument in the drum and bugle corps hornline

Video games[link]

• Contra (series), a line of run and gun video games created by Konami
  • Contra (video game), the original game, released in 1987
• Contra, a Command & Conquer: Generals – Zero Hour modification

People[link]

• Cosmin Contra (born 1975), Romanian football player

Places[link]

• Tenero-Contra, a municipality in the district of Locarno in the canton of Ticino in Switzerland
• Contra, Virginia
• Contra Costa Canal

This disambiguation page lists articles associated with the same title. If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article.

Nicaraguan Contra militia, 1987

Guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular warfare and refers to conflicts in which a small group of combatants including, but not limited to, armed civilians (or "irregulars") use military tactics, such as ambushes, sabotage, raids, the element of surprise, and extraordinary mobility to harass a larger and less-mobile traditional army, or strike a vulnerable target, and withdraw almost immediately.

Etymology[link]

The term means "little war" in Spanish, and the word, guerrilla, has been used to describe the concept since the 18th century, and perhaps earlier. A person who is a member of a guerrilla is a guerrillero.

The term 'guerrilla' was used within the English language as early as 1809. The word was used to describe the fighters, and their tactics (e.g."the town was taken by the guerrillas"). However, in most languages guerrilla still denotes the specific style of warfare. The use of the diminutive evokes the differences in number, scale, and scope between the guerrilla army and the formal, professional army of the state.

Strategy, tactics and organization[link]

The Spanish resistance to the French invasion, June 1808

The strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare tend to focus around the use of a small, mobile force competing against a larger, more unwieldy one.^[1] The guerrilla focuses on organizing in small units, depending on the support of the local population, as well as taking advantage of terrain more accommodating of small units.

Tactically, the guerrilla army would avoid any confrontation with large units of enemy troops, but seek and eliminate small groups of soldiers to minimize losses and exhaust the opposing force. Not limiting their targets to personnel, enemy resources are also preferred targets. All of that is to weaken the enemy's strength, to cause the enemy eventually to be unable to prosecute the war any longer, and to force the enemy to withdraw.

It is often misunderstood that guerrilla warfare must involve disguising as civilians to cause enemy troops to fail in telling friend from foe. However, this is a not a primary feature of a guerrilla war. This type of war can be practiced anywhere there are places for combatants to cover themselves and where such advantage cannot be made use of by a larger and more conventional force.

Communist leaders like Mao Zedong and North Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh both implemented guerrilla warfare giving it a theoretical frame which served as a model for similar strategies elsewhere, such as the Cuban "foco" theory and the anti-Soviet Mujahadeen in Afghanistan.^[2]

Mao Zedong summarized basic guerrilla tactics at the beginning of the Chinese "Second Revolutionary Civil War" as: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."^[3]

While the tactics of modern guerrilla warfare originate in the 20th century, irregular warfare, using elements later characteristic of modern guerrilla warfare, has existed throughout the battles of many ancient civilizations but in a smaller scale. This recent growth was inspired in part by theoretical works on guerrilla warfare, starting with the Manual de Guerra de Guerrillas by Matías Ramón Mella written in the 19th century and, more recently, Mao Zedong's On Guerrilla Warfare, Che Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare and Lenin's text of the same name, all written after the successful revolutions carried by them in China, Cuba and Russia respectively. Those texts characterized the tactic of guerrilla warfare as, according to Che Guevara's text, being "used by the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression".

History[link]

The Third of May 1808 by Francisco Goya, showing Spanish resisters being executed by Napoleon's troops.

Boer guerrillas during the Second Boer War in South Africa.

Guerrilla warfare can be traced back to Sun Tzu, in his The Art of War (6th century BCE).^[2] Some authors argue that his example directly inspired the development of modern guerrilla warfare.^[2][4]

An early example during the American Revolution was when British General John Burgoyne referred to the American Patriots using this type of warfare during the Saratoga campaign. He noted that, in proceeding through dense woodland:

The enemy is infinitely inferior to the King’s Troop in open space, and hardy combat, is well fitted by disposition and practice, for the stratagems of enterprises of Little War...upon the same principle must be a constant rule, in or near woods to place advanced sentries, where they may have a tree or some other defense to prevent their being taken off by a single marksman.

So conscious of hidden marksmen was Burgoyne that he asked his men, ‘When the Lieutenant General visits an outpost, the men are not to stand to their Arms or pay him any compliment,‘ clearly aware he would be singled out.^[5]

Nonetheless, the Peninsular War, nicknamed the Spanish Ulcer and regarded by some historians, including Karl Marx,^[6] as one of the first national wars,^[7] is also significant for the emergence of large-scale guerrilla warfare. It is from this conflict that the English language borrowed the word.^[8] This war saw British and Portuguese forces using Portugal as a secure position to launch campaigns against the French army, while Spanish guerrilleros bled the occupiers. Gates notes that much of the French army "was rendered unavailable for operations against Wellington because innumerable Spanish contingents kept materialising all over the country. In 1810, for example, when Massena invaded Portugal, the Imperial forces in the Peninsula totaled a massive 325,000 men, but only about one quarter of these could be spared for the offensive—the rest were required to contain the Spanish insurgents and regulars. This was the greatest single contribution that the Spaniards were to make and, without it, Wellington could not have maintained himself on the continent for long—let alone emerge victorious from the conflict".^[9] Combined, the regular and irregular allied forces prevented Napoleon's Marshals from subduing the rebellious Spanish provinces.^[10]

Marx and Engels wrote about other examples of guerrilla warfare during the American Civil War, by Tyrolians and Prussians against Napoleon, by Poland and the Caucasus against Imperial Russia, Pegu (Burma) against the British Empire, but it has been said that "when Lenin wrote his classic paper, Guerrilla Warfare,^[11] in 1906, he did not quote Marx and Engels because they had not written in depth on the topic... Lenin begins from the premise that guerrilla warfare must be linked to struggle of the masses of the working class, or else it is against the interests of revolution: 'the acts of individuals isolated from the masses, which demoralise the workers, repel wide strata of the population, disorganize the movement and injure the revolution'".^[12] Lenin also argued about the inevitability of guerrilla warfare in some conflicts by saying that "guerrilla warfare is an inevitable form of struggle at a time when the mass movement has actually reached the point of an uprising and when fairly large intervals occur between the 'big engagements' in the civil war." It must be noted that Marx and Engels interchanged numerous letters on war and military science and Engels wrote about several military topics.

Counter-guerrilla warfare[link]

Principles[link]

The guerrilla can be difficult to beat, but certain principles of counter-insurgency warfare are well known since the 1950s and 1960s and have been successfully applied.

Classic guidelines[link]

Sixteen blindfolded Partisan youth await execution by German forces in Serbia, 20 August 1941

A Viet Cong base camp being burned, My Tho, South Vietnam, 1968

The widely distributed and influential work of Sir Robert Thompson, counter-insurgency expert of the Malayan Emergency, offers several such guidelines. Thompson's underlying assumption is that of a country minimally committed to the rule of law and better governance.

Some governments, however, give such considerations short shrift, and their counter-insurgency operations have involved mass murder, genocide, starvation and the massive spread of terror, torture and execution. The totalitarian regimes of Adolf Hitler are classic examples, as are more modern conflicts in places like Afghanistan.

Timothy Snyder wrote, "In the guise of anti-partisan actions, the Germans killed perhaps three quarters of a million people, about 350,000 in Belarus alone, and lower but comparable numbers in Poland and Yugoslavia. The Germans killed more than a hundred thousand Poles when suppressing the Warsaw Uprising of 1944."^[13]

In the Vietnam War, Americans countered the Soviet–backed Viet Cong with a policy of wastage, carrying out widespread destruction of villages, crops, and forests (see Operation Ranch Hand).^[14] In the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the Soviets countered the U.S.–backed Mujahideen with a policy of wastage,^{[citation needed]} driving over one third of the Afghan population into exile (over 5 million people), and carrying out widespread destruction of villages, granaries, crops, herds and irrigation systems, including the deadly and widespread mining of fields and pastures.

Many modern countries employ manhunting doctrine to seek out and eliminate individual guerrillas.^{[citation needed]} Elements of Thompson's moderate approach are adapted here:^[15]

1. The people are the key base to be secured and defended rather than territory won or enemy bodies counted. Contrary to the focus of conventional warfare, territory gained, or casualty counts are not of overriding importance in counter-guerrilla warfare. The support of the population is the key variable. Since many insurgents rely on the population for recruits, food, shelter, financing, and other materials, the counter-insurgent force must focus its efforts on providing physical and economic security for that population and defending it against insurgent attacks and propaganda.
2. There must be a clear political counter-vision that can overshadow, match or neutralize the guerrilla vision. This can range from granting political autonomy, to economic development measures in the affected region. The vision must be an integrated approach, involving political, social and economic and media influence measures. A nationalist narrative for example, might be used in one situation, an ethnic autonomy approach in another. An aggressive media campaign must also be mounted in support of the competing vision or the counter-insurgent regime will appear weak or incompetent.
3. Practical action must be taken at the lower levels to match the competitive political vision. It may be tempting for the counter-insurgent side to simply declare guerrillas "terrorists" and pursue a harsh liquidation strategy. Brute force however, may not be successful in the long run. Action does not mean capitulation, but sincere steps such as removing corrupt or arbitrary officials, cleaning up fraud, building more infrastructure, collecting taxes honestly, or addressing other legitimate grievances can do much to undermine the guerrillas' appeal.
4. Economy of force. The counter-insurgent regime must not overreact to guerrilla provocations, since this may indeed be what they seek to create a crisis in civilian morale. Indiscriminate use of firepower may only serve to alienate the key focus of counterinsurgency- the base of the people. Police level actions should guide the effort and take place in a clear framework of legality, even if under a State of Emergency. Civil liberties and other customs of peacetime may have to be suspended, but again, the counter-insurgent regime must exercise restraint, and cleave to orderly procedures. In the counter-insurgency context, "boots on the ground" are even more important than technological prowess and massive firepower, although anti-guerrilla forces should take full advantage of modern air, artillery and electronic warfare assets.^[16]
5. Big unit action may sometimes be necessary. If police action is not sufficient to stop the guerrilla fighters, military sweeps may be necessary. Such "big battalion" operations may be needed to break up significant guerrilla concentrations and split them into small groups where combined civic-police action can control them.
   

   

   Soviet partisans hanged by German forces in January 1943
6. Aggressive mobility. Mobility and aggressive small unit action is extremely important for the counter-insurgent regime. Heavy formations must be lightened to aggressively locate, pursue and fix insurgent units. Huddling in static strongpoints simply concedes the field to the insurgents. They must be kept on the run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches, etc.
7. Ground level embedding and integration. In tandem with mobility is the embedding of hardcore counter-insurgent units or troops with local security forces and civilian elements. The US Marines in Vietnam also saw some success with this method, under its CAP (Combined Action Program) where Marines were teamed as both trainers and "stiffeners" of local elements on the ground. US Special Forces in Vietnam like the Green Berets, also caused significant local problems for their opponents by their leadership and integration with mobile tribal and irregular forces.^[17] The CIA's Special Activities Division created successful guerrilla forces from the Hmong tribe during the war in Vietnam in the 1960s,^[18] from the Northern Alliance against the Taliban during the war in Afghanistan in 2001,^[19] and from the Kurdish Peshmerga against Ansar al-Islam and the forces of Saddam Hussein during the war in Iraq in 2003.^[20][21] In Iraq, the 2007 US "surge" strategy saw the embedding of regular and special forces troops among Iraqi army units. These hardcore groups were also incorporated into local neighborhood outposts in a bid to facilitate intelligence gathering, and to strengthen ground level support among the masses.^[16]
8. Cultural sensitivity. Counter-insurgent forces require familiarity with the local culture, mores and language or they will experience numerous difficulties. Americans experienced this in Vietnam and during the US invasion of Iraqi and occupation, where shortages of Arabic speaking interpreters and translators hindered both civil and military operations.^[22]
9. Systematic intelligence effort. Every effort must be made to gather and organize useful intelligence. A systematic process must be set up to do so, from casual questioning of civilians to structured interrogations of prisoners. Creative measures must also be used, including the use of double agents, or even bogus "liberation" or sympathizer groups that help reveal insurgent personnel or operations.
10. Methodical clear and hold. An "ink spot" clear and hold strategy must be used by the counter-insurgent regime, dividing the conflict area into sectors, and assigning priorities between them. Control must expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions elsewhere, while priority areas are cleared and held.
11. Careful deployment of mass popular forces and special units. Mass forces include village self-defense groups and citizen militias organized for community defense and can be useful in providing civic mobilization and local security. Specialist units can be used profitably, including commando squads, long range reconnaissance and "hunter-killer" patrols, defectors who can track or persuade their former colleagues like the Kit Carson units in Vietnam, and paramilitary style groups.
12. The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully used. Such aid should be limited either by time, or as to material and technical, and personnel support, or both. While outside aid or even troops can be helpful, lack of clear limits, in terms of either a realistic plan for victory or exit strategy, may find the foreign helper "taking over" the local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities as the stream of dead foreigners mounts. Such a scenario occurred with the US in Vietnam, with the American effort creating dependence in South Vietnam, and war weariness and protests back home. Heavy-handed foreign interference may also fail to operate effectively within the local cultural context, setting up conditions for failure.
    

    

    A Tuareg rebel fighter in northern Niger, 2008
13. Time. A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict that wears down the will of the opposing counter-insurgent forces. Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time. The counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done. Impatient demands for victory centered around short-term electoral cycles play into the hands of the guerrillas, though it is equally important to recognize when a cause is lost and the guerrillas have won.

Variants[link]

Some writers on counter-insurgency warfare emphasize the more turbulent nature of today's guerrilla warfare environment, where the clear political goals, parties and structures of such places as Vietnam, Malaysia, or El Salvador are not as prevalent. These writers point to numerous guerrilla conflicts that center around religious, ethnic or even criminal enterprise themes, and that do not lend themselves to the classic "national liberation" template.

The wide availability of the Internet has also cause changes in the tempo and mode of guerrilla operations in such areas as coordination of strikes, leveraging of financing, recruitment, and media manipulation. While the classic guidelines still apply, today's anti-guerrilla forces need to accept a more disruptive, disorderly and ambiguous mode of operation.

Insurgents may not be seeking to overthrow the state, may have no coherent strategy or may pursue a faith-based approach difficult to counter with traditional methods. There may be numerous competing insurgencies in one theater, meaning that the counterinsurgent must control the overall environment rather than defeat a specific enemy. The actions of individuals and the propaganda effect of a subjective “single narrative” may far outweigh practical progress, rendering counterinsurgency even more non-linear and unpredictable than before. The counterinsurgent, not the insurgent, may initiate the conflict and represent the forces of revolutionary change. The economic relationship between insurgent and population may be diametrically opposed to classical theory. And insurgent tactics, based on exploiting the propaganda effects of urban bombing, may invalidate some classical tactics and render others, like patrolling, counterproductive under some circumstances. Thus, field evidence suggests, classical theory is necessary but not sufficient for success against contemporary insurgencies...^[23]

Foco theory[link]

Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery.

— Che Guevara ^[24]

In the 1960s the Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara developed the foco (Spanish: foquismo) theory of revolution in his book Guerrilla Warfare, based on his experiences during the 1959 Cuban Revolution. This theory was later formalized as "focalism" by Régis Debray. Its central principle is that vanguardism by cadres of small, fast-moving paramilitary groups can provide a focus for popular discontent against a sitting regime, and thereby lead a general insurrection. Although the original approach was to mobilize and launch attacks from rural areas, many foco ideas were adapted into urban guerrilla warfare movements.

Twentieth and twenty-first century guerrilla conflicts[link]

[[File:Kovpak partisanki.jpg|right|thumb|Female Soviet partisans operating under [[Sydir Kovpak] in Nazi-occupied Ukraine.]]

A Kurdish PKK guerrilla in Iraqi Kurdistan as part of the Kurdish–Turkish conflict.

The tactics of guerrilla warfare were used successfully in the 20th century by—among others— the Soviet partisans and the Polish Home Army in World War II,^[13] Mao Zedong and the People's Liberation Army in the Second Sino-Japanese War and Chinese Civil War. Fidel Castro, Che Guevara and the 26th of July Movement in the Cuban Revolution. Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Viet Cong and select members of the Green Berets in the Vietnam War (and the First Indochina War before that). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the Sri Lankan Civil War, the Afghan Mujahideen in the Soviet war in Afghanistan, George Grivas and Nikos Sampson's Greek guerrilla group EOKA in Cyprus, Aris Velouchiotis and Stefanos Sarafis and the EAM against the Axis occupation of Greece during World War II, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the German Schutztruppe in World War I, Josip Broz Tito and the Yugoslav Partisans in World War II, and the antifrancoist guerrilla in Spain during the Franco dictatorship,^[25] the Kosovo Liberation Army in the Kosovo War, and the Irish Republican Army led by Michael Collins during the Irish War of Independence.^[26] Most factions of the Taliban, Iraqi insurgency, Colombia's FARC, and the Communist Party of India (Maoist) are said to be engaged in some form of guerrilla warfare—as was, until recently, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). In India, Marathas under leadership of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj used it to overthrow of the Mughals. It was also effectively used by Tatya Tope and Rani Laxmibai in the Indian Rebellion of 1857, as well as by Pazhassi Raja of Kerala to fight the British. Other examples of recent guerrilla wars include:

Africa

• Angolan Civil War
• Darfur Conflict
• Ivorian Civil War
• Rhodesian Bush War
• Sudan
• Tuareg Rebellion (2007–2009)
• Western Sahara War

Asia:

• Soviet war in Afghanistan
• Sri Lankan Civil War

Europe

• Kosovo War
• The Troubles

Latin America:

• Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), El Salvador - became a political party and have current presidency
• Nicaraguan Revolution

Afghan guerrillas that were chosen to receive medical treatment in the United States, Norton Air Force Base, California, 1986.

Present ongoing guerrilla wars include:

Africa

• South Sudan
• Uganda - Lord's Resistance Army

Asia

• Arab–Israeli conflict
• Balochistan conflict
• India - Communist insurgency
• Iran–Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan conflict
• Iraq War
• Islamic insurgency in the Philippines
• South Thailand insurgency in Southern Thailand along the Malaysia-Thailand border
• Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan
• Kurdish–Turkish conflict

Latin America:

• Colombian armed conflict (1964–present)
• Internal conflict in Peru
• Shining Path
• Zapatista Army of National Liberation, Mexico - has been relatively non-violent since 1994

Russia

• Second Chechen War

Popular culture[link]

• For Whom the Bell Tolls, an Ernest Hemingway novel which tells the story of Robert Jordan, an American volunteer attached to a guerrilla unit during the Spanish Civil War.
• Chetniks! The Fighting Guerrillas (1943), a 20th Century Fox movie on the guerrilla resistance movement of General Draza Mihailovich in German-occupied Yugoslavia during World War II.
• Undercover (1943), a British film produced by Ealing Studios, released in the US by Columbia pictures as Underground Guerrillas.
• The 1965 novel Dune features such warfare as conducted against House Harkonnen by the nomadic Fremen tribe, led by Paul Atreides.
• Season 3 of Battlestar Galactica which focuses on the guerrilla war against the Cylons by the former citizens of the Twelve Colonies on New Caprica.
• The Tomorrow series by John Marsden about guerrilla warfare after a fictional invasion and occupation of Australia.
• Che, Steven Soderbergh's two-part 2008 biopic about Che Guevara starring Benicio del Toro as Che.
• Red Faction: Guerrilla, a game in which the player is a guerrilla fighting an entrenched enemy.
• "Guerrilla Radio", a 1999 rock song by Rage Against the Machine.
• "Red Dawn", a 1984 American war film about a group of high school students become engaged in guerrilla warfare after their country is invaded by Cubans and Russians.
• "Defiance", a 2000's movie about guerrilla fighters in 1940's Belarus against the Nazis.

See also[link]

Footnotes[link]

Further reading[link]

• Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History
• Fitzroy Maclean, Disputed Barricade: The Life and Times of Josip Broz Tito
• Peter MacDonald, Giap: The Victor in Vietnam
• Keats J. 1990. They Fought Alone. Time Life. ISBN 0-8094-8555-9
• Schmidt LS. 1982. "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance on Mindanao During the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945". M.S. Thesis. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 274 pp.

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Guerrilla warfare

Look up guerrilla in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

• Spanish Anthem of the traditional Guerrilleros unit
• Tribute to Mexican Women Guerrilleras. On the Freedom Country
• abcNEWS: The Secret War - Pakistani militants conduct raids in Iran
• abcNEWS Exclusive: The Secret War - Deadly guerrilla raids in Iran
• Insurgency Research Group - Multi-expert blog dedicated to the study of insurgency and the development of counter-insurgency policy.
• Guerrilla warfare on Spartacus Schoolnet
• Encyclopaedia Britannica, Guerrilla warfare
• Mao on Guerrilla warfare
• Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare
• Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS)India