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“Emerald Czar” Document Spurs Controversy, Investigation

January 7, 2013

Follow the Colombia Documentation Project on Twitter @Colombiadocs

Former "Emerald Czar" lawyer (and current Supreme Court justice) Fernando Castro Caballero.

Former “Emerald Czar” lawyer (and current Supreme Court justice) Fernando Castro Caballero.

Colombian prosecutors will investigate allegations in a recently published State Department cable that billionaire Víctor Carranza was “responsible for the October 1997 Miraflores massacre.” Reports of the new probe came via RCN and W Radio in Colombia, who joined a number of other media outlets in covering our declassified dossier on Colombia’s “Emerald Czar.” (En Español @ VerdadAbierta.com)

Pivoting off of our document release, Semana magazine columnist Daniel Coronell points out that Carranza’s former attorney, Fernando Castro Caballero, who just took a seat on Colombia’s Supreme Judicial Court, will have the final word on another important human rights case allegedly tied to Carranza: the 1997 Mapiripán massacre.

Coronell says that a recent investigation has found that Castro had far stronger links to Carranza than he has previously said:

[A]n investigation by Equipo Nizkor found documents that show that the link was much closer than the magistrate wants to admit. The truth is that doctor Castro Caballero served as Víctor Carranza’s legal advocate in the formation and financing of paramilitary groups.

Coronell’s concerns about Carranza’s ability to manipulate the Colombian justice system are echoed in a declassified U.S. State Department cable published as part of our “Emerald Czar” collection.

A cable from the U.S. Embassy in 1996 cites a source who explains that there had been two processes open against Víctor Carranza. In the first, none of the witnesses came forward. In the second, all of the witnesses had died.

Coronell cites another cable from the collection in which a paramilitary leader using Carranza’s reported alias “freely admitted” that “he and men under his command” were “responsible for the October 1997 Miraflores massacre” and that the Colombian Army “had facilitated the operation ‘from beginning to end.’”

“If Víctor Carranza is identified as the paramilitary chief of Meta and allied with the Castaño family,” asks Coronell, “should his former lawyer pronounce the final word of justice in the case of the Mapiripán massacre?”

After previous attempts to prosecute Carranza failed to produce a conviction, the Human Rights Unit of the Colombian Prosecutor General’s Office (Fiscalía) opened a new investigation of Carranza’s paramilitary connections in February 2012 based largely on the testimony of former paramilitary chiefs linking Carranza to the financing and operations of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). But this is apparently the first time that the billionaire emerald magnate has been officially investigated in relation to Miraflores.

Television coverage of Carranza’s alleged links to Miraflores is available here and below, courtesy of Canal Capital Bogotá.

Follow the Colombia Documentation Project on Twitter @Colombiadocs

Document Friday: CENTCOM’s Powerpoint about “Green on Blue” Attacks.

January 4, 2013
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Afghan Police in Helmund Province.  From the Brithish Foreign Commonwealth Office.  

This was also posted on ForeignPolicy.com

According to the Pentagon’s December 2012 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, “green on blue” attacks — incidents in which members of the Afghan security forces attack NATO coalition soldiers — “increased sharply” last year. At least 52 coalition soldiers died as a result of at least 37 green-on-blue attacks in 2012. A recently declassified set of slides produced by U.S. Central Command, published below and made public here for the first time, illustrates some of the steps that the U.S. military has taken to defeat “insider threats” — and why “green on blues” are so difficult to prevent.

The Centcom slides identify four types of threats: “Infiltration,” when insurgents join the ANSF with the intent to attack, spy, or create mistrust; “Co-opting,” when insurgents use “intimidation, blackmail, or connections” to persuade an existing ANSF member to conduct an attack; “Mimicking,” when insurgents use stolen uniforms or forged ID cards to attack ISAF soldiers; and “Destabilizers,” ANSF soldiers who (often due to “stress, mental instability, or… drug use”) attack ISAF soldiers without having been influenced by insurgents.

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See this for more on “Destabilizers.”

Centcom’s ANSF Screening and Monitoring Timeline shows a robust — if belated — effort to quantitatively monitor each soldier in the Afghan army. Screening was hampered because a NATO intelligence-sharing agreement with the Afghan government wasn’t reached until March 2008, and the ANSF biometrics program was not officially established until September 2009. In response to insider attacks, the Afghan Ministry of Defense began extensively ramping up its counterintelligence program in late 2010.

Troublingly, some other basic steps were not undertaken until late in the war effort. The document reports that in May 2011, “10,000 ANSF uniforms [were] removed from bazaars,” but it does not elaborate on how and why they were there; or how many uniforms remain available for purchase by non-soldiers who might attempt “Mimicking” attacks.

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How many uniforms are still in the bazaars?

The final declassified slide details the eight-step screening process Afghan recruits must complete to enter basic training. These steps include: providing a valid tazkera (identification card), two letters from elders, biometric collection (currently the database stores 430,000 records), a criminal records check, fitness check (officers only), and medical and drug screenings. Failing a THC (marijuana) screening does not disqualify a recruit from serving in the ANSF — despite the document’s earlier claim that drug use can factor into “Destabilizer” (non-insurgent) insider attacks.

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“THC is not a disqualifier.”

Centcom claims that this screening process — which is undergoing “ongoing improvements” — gives “the ANSF a better chance to identify ‘insider threats’ before they enter the service.” Since the creation of this May 2011 document, these “ongoing improvements” have included a process forreceiving anonymous tips, suspending the training of the Afghan Local Police and some joint “mentoring” operations, installing NATO service members dubbed “guardian angels” to observe all gatherings of NATO and Afghan troops, meetings between Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and senior Afghan commanders and officials, as well as discussion of this problem between Presidents Obama and Karzai.

Despite these efforts and improvements, green-on-blue attacks continue to escalate, making Centcom’s assessment that “continued shortfalls… will allow some insider attacks to continue to occur” all the more ominous.

Miraflores: Top Colombian Officials Dismissed “Apocryphal” Warning of 1997 Massacre

December 27, 2012

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Colombian Defense Minister Gilberto Echeverri Mejía said Miraflores warnings were "apocryphal."

Colombian Defense Minister Gilberto Echeverri Mejía said Miraflores warnings were “apocryphal.”

Top Colombian civilian and military officials dismissed specific warnings of the October 1997 paramilitary assault in Miraflores, according to a declassified State Department cable recently published by the National Security Archive.

Last week we told you about a declassified document that seems to connect Colombian “Emerald Czar” Víctor Carranza (and the Colombian Army) to the October 1997 Miraflores massacre. According to the cable from the U.S. Embassy in Colombia, a paramilitary leader using Carranza’s reported alias “freely admitted” that “he and men under his command” were “responsible for the October 1997 Miraflores massacre” and that the Colombian Army “had facilitated the operation ‘from beginning to end.’”

The same cable reveals that just days before the killings Colombia’s top-ranking civilian and military officials downplayed warnings that AUC paramilitaries would strike in Miraflores. An unknown source told the Embassy on October 10, 1997—a little more than a week before the massacre—“that Miraflores was on the short list for AUC expansion into the area, and that, as in the case of Mapiripan, the paramilitaries would fly in because ‘it was safer that way.’”

Defense Minister Gilberto Echeverri Mejía told U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette that the warning “was apocryphal and produced to deceive the American Embassy.” Armed Forces commander Gen. José Manuel Bonett also minimized the likelihood that paramilitaries would strike in Miraflores, since they would need to fly in supplies and reinforcements, something that Bonett said “the ‘armed forces would not [repeat] would not permit.’”

Nevertheless, that is precisely what happened. As the Embassy observed:

Only five days later, however, on October 18, the paramilitaries did arrive in Miraflores, by air. And, after killing at least six people, they subsequently flew out.

You can read the entire cable, titled “Mapiripan and Miraflores: Increased Signs of Army Facilitation of Paramilitaries,” here.

Follow the Colombia Documentation Project on Twitter @Colombiadocs

Lifting the Veil on Colombia’s “Emerald Czar”

December 22, 2012

Follow the Colombia Documentation Project on Twitter @Colombiadocs

Declassified documents characterize Carranza as a "big-time narco" and one of the "best known" paramilitary leaders in Colombia.

Declassified documents characterize Carranza as a “big-time narco” and one of the “best known” paramilitary leaders in Colombia.

If you’re not too busy prepping for the holiday break, take a few minutes to read our latest Electronic Briefing Book about the billionaire who stands at the intersection of the emerald business, narcotrafficking, and paramilitary death squads in Colombia: “Emerald Czar” Víctor Carranza Niño.

Earlier this year, Colombian prosecutors announced a new probe into Carranza’s paramilitary ties following the testimony of more than half a dozen former members of the the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Top AUC capos have accused Carranza of sponsoring and organizing paramilitary death squads responsible for countless assassinations and massacres.

Their statements are corroborated by the declassified observations of U.S. diplomats and intelligence officials, who have characterized him as both a “big-time narco” and one of the “best known” paramilitary leaders in Colombia.

Now, the testimony of one former AUC chief may just be the key to unlocking the secrets of a recently declassified U.S. diplomatic cable and the massacre at Miraflores.

Follow this link to read the full posting: Lifting the Veil on Colombia’s “Emerald Czar”

Follow the Colombia Documentation Project on Twitter @Colombiadocs

“FOIAsourcing”: Sudan Beyond the Brink

December 12, 2012
Minni Minnawi, leader of the Sudanese Liberation Movement, shakes hands with George W. Bush on July 25, 2006 in the Oval Office.

Minni Minnawi, leader of the Sudanese Liberation Movement, shakes hands with George W. Bush on July 25, 2006, in the Oval Office.

By September 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell termed the ongoing violence in Darfur, which had killed at least 50,000 Sudanese and left a million more homeless, genocide. Two years later, the Sudanese government and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) signed the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement in an attempt to end the exponential increase in casualties. While the SLM, the largest Sudanese rebel group, signed the Agreement, many smaller militant groups remained outside the bounds of the treaty, and extensive violence continued.

Despite the ongoing bloodshed, in August 2006 Sudan rejected a UN resolution calling for UN peacekeeping forces in Darfur, saying their presence would compromise Sudanese sovereignty. Shortly thereafter, the top UN official in the country, Jan Pronk, was expelled, and the situation on the ground deteriorated even further.

For our second installment of FOIAsourcing, we are providing five documents recording the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, visit to Sudan during that precarious period in late August 2006. These documents are newly-released through the Freedom of Information Act by the Department of State, and have yet to be analyzed; it is a perfect opportunity for you to tell us – and everyone else – what is significant about the documents. For example, did the U.S. miss an opportunity to compel the Sudanese to accept UN peacekeeping troops?

If you need any help deciphering the Department of State cables, look here.

Document 1

Document 2

Document 3

Document 4

Document 5

For more background, read the Archive’s complete Darfur collection, and explore the documents that provide “blistering assessments” of the policy failures that allowed for the humanitarian tragedy.

Remembering Dos Erres 30 Years Later

December 6, 2012

Thirty years ago, in the early morning hours of December 6, 1982, the Kaibiles, the Guatemalan elite special forces unit, stormed into the sleepy village of Dos Erres. Later that day, more than 200 men, women, and many children, had been brutally tortured, murdered, and thrown into the village well. Thirty years have passed, and many questions still remain unanswered, but progress toward justice is being made.

Jorge Vinicio Sosa Orantes as a young soldier. (Sebastian Rotella)

Jorge Vinicio Sosa Orantes as a young soldier. (Sebastian Rotella)

In September of 2012, former commanding officer of the Guatemalan special forces, the Kaibiles, Jorge Vinicio Sosa Orantes was extradited to the United States to face charges of immigration fraud.  ProPublica reported that Sosa “is the highest-ranking officer to have been arrested on charges alleging direct involvement in the massacre by a 20-man unit of elite commandos in the northern Guatemalan farming hamlet of Dos Erres.” Sosa’s trial date is set for April 30th 2013 in California.

The story of this harrowing massacre was brought to light more recently in the United States when the Public Radio International program, “This American Life,” devoted an entire show to it this past May. Read more about Dos Erres, declassified U.S. documents, and story of one of the only survivors of the massacre, Oscar Ramirez, here: “Document Friday: What Happened at Dos Erres?”

Old Regs May Not Necessarily Be Bad Regs, But Can Be A Red Flag

December 6, 2012
ecfr

The Electronic Code of Federal Regulations

Earlier this week, the National Security Archive published its latest FOIA audit. The audit determined which federal agencies have updated their FOIA regulations in the electronic Code of Federal Regulations to reflect the most current FOIA legislation, the 2007 OPEN Government Act, and which have yet to do so. So far, we have received positive and constructive responses from several agencies regarding the posting, including a letter* from the Chief FOIA Officer at the Merit Systems Protection Board. His letter reminded us that six agencies (not our previously reported three) participate in FOIAonline, the government portal that provides a one stop shop for requesting, tracking, and posting digital versions of documents. We have since updated our audit to reflect the correction.

The MSPB’s letter also informed us that despite last being updated in 2000, that the Board does “follow all the other ‘best practices’ listed in [our] post.” We very much appreciate the prompt agency feedback, and applaud the MSPB for embracing best practice FOIA regulations. Hopefully the next step the MSPB, and other agencies in similar positions, will take is to formally update their regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations. This will ensure that best practices are continued, even if there are shifts in agency personnel as administrations reshuffle and change. While outdated FOIA regulations do not necessarily mean regulations are bad, regulations that do not reflect the most current legislation can be a red flag to FOIA requesters, and agencies whose regulations are grossly out of date give the impression that these agencies do not prioritize FOIA. FOIA requesters, regardless of their level of sophistication or knowledge of the FOIA, expect, reasonably and rightfully so, that when they can find an agency’s FOIA regulations, that those regulations reflect good law.

* Full text of the  MSPB letter:

As the Chief FOIA Officer for the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), I’d like to correct a possible inaccuracy in your post on this subject and provide an additional comment.  The MSPB is a charter member of FOIAonline; your first example of “best practice” regulations indicates only three agencies currently participate in FOIAonline.  You may be referring only to the Department of Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Archives and Records Administration.

In addition, we actually follow all the other “best practices” listed in your post.  You may review our Annual FOIA Reports and Chief FOIA Officer Reports at http://www.mspb.gov/FOIA/foiareports.htm for more information.

I’d appreciate it if you would clarify which agencies participate in FOIAonline, and post these comments where appropriate.  Thanks very much for your coverage of these important issues.

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