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The argument from nonbelief (or the argument from divine hiddenness) is a philosophical argument against the existence of God. The premise of the argument is that if God existed (and wanted humanity to know it), he would have brought about a situation in which every reasonable person believed in him; however, there are reasonable unbelievers, and therefore, this weighs against God's existence. This argument is similar to the classic argument from evil in that it affirms inconsistency between the world that exists and the world that should exist if God had certain desires combined with the power to see them through.

The argument was the subject of J.L. Schellenberg's 1993 book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason and has been addressed by other philosophers, including Theodore Drange.

Introduction to the problem of divine hiddenness[link]

The theme of divine hiddenness, silence or darkness has a long history in Judeo-Christian theology.^[1] The roots of Judeo-Christian contemplation of the ways in which God chooses to remain hidden reach back into the biblical depiction of God, for example the lament of the Psalms, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?....I cry by day, but you do not answer...."^[2] and Isaiah's declaration, "Truly you are a God who hides himself, O God of Israel, the Savior."^[3]

One of the first philosophers to contemplate the problem of hiddenness was Anselm of Canterbury, who in his Proslogion complains:

I have never seen thee, O Lord my God; I do not know thy form. What, O most high Lord, shall this man do, an exile far from thee? What shall thy servant do, anxious in his love of thee, and cast out afar from thy face? He pants to see thee, and thy face is too far from him. He longs to come to thee, and thy dwelling place is inaccessible. He is eager to find thee, and knows not thy place. He desires to seek thee, and does not know thy face. Lord, thou art my God, and thou art my Lord, yet never have I seen thee. It is thou that hast made me, and hast made me anew, and hast bestowed upon me all the blessings I enjoy; and not yet do I know thee. Finally, I was created to see thee and not yet have I done that for which I was made.^[1]

When it comes to the use of divine hiddenness as an objection or evidence against God, Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul Moser in the introduction to a volume of papers dedicated to refutations of Schellenberg's argument, cite Nietzsche's question: "a god who is all-knowing and all-powerful and who does not even make sure his creatures understand his intentions — could that be a god of goodness?"^[1]

Schellenberg's argument from reasonable nonbelief[link]

A formal presentation of the argument is as follows:^[4]

1. If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.
2. If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur.
3. Reasonable nonbelief occurs.
4. No perfectly loving God exists (from 2 and 3).
5. Hence, there is no God (from 1 and 4).

In an article revisiting the argument ten years after it was originally proposed,^[5] Schellenberg writes that criticism has mainly centered around the second premise. He asserts there are relatively few criticisms questioning the existence of reasonable nonbelief, and almost no theist philosopher objects to the idea that God is perfectly loving.

God is perfectly loving[link]

While Schellenberg claims he hasn't seen any serious objections to this premise by theist philosophers, there certainly are other conceptions of God. Daniel Howard-Snyder writes about the possibility of believing in an unsurpassably great personal god that is nevertheless dispassionate towards its creatures. Drawing on to the Stoic concept of Eudaimonia, one can think of a god more akin to a wise sage than the loving parent that Schellenberg envisions.^[6]

Theodore Drange, in his attempt to improve the argument (see below), claims there are many theists who do not view God as perfectly loving, and "some Christians think of him as an angry deity bent on punishing people for their sins."^[7] Drange concludes that the argument should be put forward only in relation to theists who already accept the first premise and believe in a god who is perfectly loving.

Most theists, in fact, do admit that love is a central concept in almost all of the world's religions. God is often directly associated with love, cf agape. Theologians, such as N.T. Wright, suggest that our experience of love is itself a proof of God's existence. However, there are a few others (e.g. Brian Davies in the Thomist tradition) who suggest that the modern interpretation of what it means to say God loves man is incorrect, and so that God is able to be loving in a sense while actually willing disbelief.

Reasonable nonbelief: lack of evidence[link]

Since the second premise is the most controversial, we will first discuss the third: that there are instances of reasonable non-belief. When asked what he would say when facing God on judgment day, Bertrand Russell famously replied he would say "Not enough evidence, God! Not enough evidence!" A person may be stubbornly blind to evidence of the divine, but the claim is that some non-believers have tried hard to believe in God. Schellenberg introduced the distinction between culpable and inculpable nonbelief, where the latter is defined as "non-belief that exists through no fault of the non-believer."^[5]

Historically, there is a Calvinist tradition, that places the blame on the non-believers. Calvin's religious epistemology is based on the sensus divinitatis (Sense of Divinity), an assumption that the presence of God is universally perceived by all humans. Paul Helm explains, "Calvin’s use of the term 'sense' signals that the knowledge of God is a common human endowment; mankind is created not only as capable of knowing God, but as actually knowing him."^[8] In this tradition, there is no inculpable or reasonable non-belief. Jonathan Edwards, the 18th century American theologian, claimed that while every human being has been granted the capacity to know God, successful use of these capacities requires an attitude of "true benevolence," a willingness to be open to the truth about God. Thus, the failure of non-believers to see "divine things" is due to "a dreadful stupidity of mind, occasioning a sottish insensibility of their truth and importance."^[9]

In modern times, there are fewer proponents of these views. One reason is that, according to Stephen Maitzen,^[10] anthropology has long established that while religious belief in general is essentially universal, belief in what Calvin would recognize as God is very unevenly distributed among cultures, cf. God in Buddhism. If God exists then why, Maitzen asks, does the prevalence of belief in God vary so dramatically with cultural and national boundaries?

Another reason why philosophers no longer make this claim has to do with respect. In fact, modern critics, such as Howard-Snyder, who praised Schellenberg's book for being "religiously sensitive,"^[11] are similarly sensitive towards the nonbeliever. Howard-Snyder wrote:

Even though some nonbelievers lack true benevolence, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that others possess it since they really do earnestly seek the truth about God, love the Good, assess evidence judiciously, and, if anything, display a prejudice for God, not against Him.^[6]

A perfectly loving god would prevent reasonable nonbelief[link]

The most serious criticism of the argument has been leveled against the claim that if a perfectly loving god exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur. Schellenberg argues in two steps, by first claiming that a loving god would enable humans to partake in a relationship with it, and then, assuming that belief in that god is a necessary condition for such relationships to occur, he infers that a loving god would not permit nonbelief. He states:

There is, first of all, the claim that if there is a personal God who is perfectly loving, creatures capable of explicit and positively meaningful relationship with God, who have not freely shut themselves off from God, are always in a position to participate in such relationship – able to do so just by trying to.^[5]

He justifies this claim by arguing that a conception of divine love can best be formed by extrapolating the best aspects of love in human relations, and draws an analogy with perfect parental love:

The perfectly loving parent, for example, from the time the child can first respond to her at all until death separates them, will, insofar as she can help it, see to it that nothing she does ever puts relationship with herself out of reach for her child.^[5]

He then infers, from the proposition that God is inclined to enable creatures to participate in a relationship with him/her/it (God), the further claim that if there is a perfectly loving god, such creatures will always believe in it. This inference, Schellenberg justifies on the grounds that belief in God's existence is necessary for engaging in a meaningful relationship with God. He further argues that since belief is involuntary, these creatures should always have evidence "causally sufficient" for such belief:

The presence of God will be for them like a light that – however much the degree of its brightness may fluctuate – remains on unless they close their eyes.^[5]

Objections and counterarguments[link]

Unreasonable demands on God[link]

This argument is sometimes seen as demanding God to prove his existence, e.g. by performing miracles. Even in Schellenberg's more refined version, one can argue that the nonbeliever is imposing her own epistemological expectations on the will of God. A detailed treatment of these kinds of demands, and their moral implication, is provided by Paul Moser,^[12] who calls this cognitive idolatry. He defines idolatry as "our not letting the true God be Lord in our lives" and instead commit to something other than God by pursuing a quest for self-realization in our own terms. If this is idolatry in our actions, then idolatry in our knowing, he explains as follows:

Cognitive idolatry relies on a standard for knowledge that excludes the primacy of the morally self-transforming knowledge of God central to knowing God as Lord. It rests on an epistemological standard, whether empiricist, rationalist, or some hybrid, that does not let God be Lord. Such idolatry aims to protect one's lifestyle from serious challenge by the God who calls, convicts, and reconciles. It disallows knowledge of God as personal subject and Lord to whom we are morally and cognitively responsible. It allows at most for knowledge of God as an undemanding object of human knowledge.^[12]

Schellenberg considers this criticism irrelevant to the argument, which in his opinion, does not impose any demands for demonstrations of God's power, but evidence that "need only be such as will be causally sufficient for belief in the absence of resistance... This result might be effected through the much more spiritually appropriate means of religious experience, interpreted in the sensitive manner of a Pascal or a Kierkegaard."^[5] Schellenberg then expresses a certain frustration that theist writers who otherwise extol the value of religious experiences deny non-theists the right to do so.

The soul-making theodicy[link]

John Hick used the term "soul-making" in his theodicy Evil and the God of Love to describe the kind of spiritual development that he believes justifies the existence of evil. This defense is employed by Michael Murray,^[13] who explains why divine hiddeness is an essential to soul-making. While based on the accounts of religious individuals, it isn't hard to imagine a world where God is known, and yet believers act freely with ample opportunities for spiritual development, Murray gives a deep and careful analysis of the argument, concluding that if God's existence were revealed in such a way as to remove reasonable non-belief, then "any desire that we might have to believe or act in ways contrary to that which has been revealed would be overwhelmed."

One must note here that e.g. in Christianity (and even more in Judaism, where he talks to Job and explains why he is just), God has already exposed himself very distinctly: e.g. to the Apostles who saw his resurrection. One explanation might be that he knows some people wouldn't believe anyway but if he knows everything a priori, there is a problem about God's liability for what he created. This however contradicts the existence of Satan, a fallen angel who is obviously aware of God and yet freely chose to rebel against him ^[14] because it implies that he acted in ways contrary even with knowledge.

The unknown purpose defense[link]

Alvin Plantinga writes that the statement "We can see no good reason for God to do X" only implies "There is no good reason for God to do X" on the assumption that "If there were a good reason for God to do X, we would be able to see it," which he suggests is absurd.^[15]

Drange's argument from nonbelief[link]

This section relies on references to primary sources or sources affiliated with the subject, rather than references from independent authors and third-party publications. Please add citations from reliable sources. (January 2012)

Theodore Drange proposed a version of the nonbelief argument in 1996. He considers the distinction between culpable and inculpable nonbelief to be completely irrelevant, and tries to argue that the mere existence of nonbelief is evidence against the existence of God. A semi-formal presentation of the argument is as follows:^[16]

1. If God exists, God:
   1. wants all humans to believe God exists before they die;
   2. can bring about a situation in which all humans believe God exists before they die;
   3. does not want anything that would conflict with and be at least as important as its desire for all humans to believe God exists before they die; and
   4. always acts in accordance with what it most wants.
2. If God exists, all humans would believe so before they die (from 1).
3. But not all humans believe God exists before they die.
4. Therefore, God does not exist (from 2 and 3).

References[link]

External links[link]

• "The Argument from (Reasonable) Nonbelief" at Infidels.org: contains a large number of papers mainly focusing on Theodore Drange's formulation.
• "The Argument from Unbelief" at Philosophy of Religion .Info: Offers a simple overview and rebuttal.
• Responses to the problem of Divine Hiddenness from the website of the Christian Colligation of Apologetics Debate Research & Evangelism.
• Daniel Howard-Snyder. Academic papers and books by one the most respected critics of Schellenberg's argument. Many papers are relevant to the current article and all are available for download. Highly recommended as a starting point, since Schellenberg seems to have no web presence.
• Paul Moser's "Idolaters anonymous". Moser expressed the idea that arguing from nonbelief is engaging in cognitive idolatry.
• Jonathan Kvanvig. One paper critical of the argument, but all papers are available for download and may be of interest.
• Stephen Maitzen. Has two papers in support of the argument, but many more on the philosophy of religion available for download here.

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In logic and rhetoric, a fallacy is usually an improper argumentation in reasoning often resulting in a misconception or presumption. Literally, a fallacy is "an error in reasoning that renders an argument logically invalid".^[1] By accident or design, fallacies may exploit emotional triggers in the listener or participant (appeal to emotion), or take advantage of social relationships between people (e.g. argument from authority). Fallacious arguments are often structured using rhetorical patterns that obscure any logical argument.

Though an argument is not "logically valid", it is not necessarily the case that the conclusion is incorrect. It simply means that the conclusion cannot logically be arrived at using that argument.

Though often used unintentionally, fallacies can be used purposefully to win arguments regardless of the merits. Among such devices, discussed in more detail below, are: "ignoring the question" to divert argument to unrelated issues using a red herring, making the argument personal (argumentum ad hominem) and discrediting the opposition's character, "begging the question" (petitio principi), the use of the non-sequitur, false cause and effect (post hoc ergo propter hoc), bandwagoning (everyone says so), the "false dilemma" or "either-or fallacy" in which the situation is oversimplified, "card-stacking" or selective use of facts, and "false analogy". Another common device is the "false generalization", an abstraction of the argument that shifts discussion to platitudes where the facts of the matter are lost. There are many, many more tricks to divert attention from careful exploration of a subject.^[2]

Fallacies can generally be classified as informal (premises fail to support the proposed conclusion, but the argument is structured properly) or formal (logical structure is flawed).

Material fallacies[link]

The taxonomy of material fallacies is based on that of Aristotle's body structure Organon (Sophistici elenchi). This taxonomy is as follows:

[edit] Fallacy of accident or sweeping generalization

• Fallacy of accident or sweeping generalization: a generalization that disregards exceptions.
  • Example

    Argument: Cutting people is a crime. Surgeons cut people, therefore, surgeons are criminals.

    Problem: Cutting people is not a crime in certain situations.

    Argument: It is illegal for a stranger to enter someone's home uninvited. Firefighters enter people's homes uninvited, therefore firefighters are breaking the law.

    Problem: The exception does not break nor define the rule; a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid (where an accountable exception is ignored).^{[clarification needed]}

[edit] Converse fallacy of accident or hasty generalization

• Converse fallacy of accident or hasty generalization: argues from a special case to a general rule.
  • Example

    Argument: Every person I've met has ten fingers, therefore, all people have ten fingers.

    Problem: Those who have been met are not a representative subset of the entire set.

  • Also called reverse accident, destroying the exception, a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter

[edit] Irrelevant conclusion

• Irrelevant conclusion: diverts attention away from a fact in dispute rather than addressing it directly.
  • Example

    Argument: Billy believes that pigs can fly, therefore pigs can fly.

    Problem: Billy can be wrong. (In particular this is an appeal to authority.)

  • Special cases:
    • purely personal considerations (argumentum ad hominem),
    • popular sentiment (argumentum ad populum—appeal to the majority; appeal to loyalty.),
    • fear (argumentum ad baculum),
    • conventional propriety (argumentum ad verecundiam—appeal to authority)
    • to arouse pity for getting one's conclusion accepted (argumentum ad misericordiam)
    • forwarding the proposition under dispute without any certain proof (argumentum ad ignorantiam)
    • assuming a perceived defect in the origin of a claim discredits the claim itself (genetic fallacy)
  • Also called Ignoratio Elenchi, a "red herring"

[edit] Affirming the consequent/Denying the antecedent

• Affirming the consequent and Denying the antecedent: draws a conclusion from premises that do not support that conclusion by confusing necessary and sufficient conditions.
  • Affirming the consequent Example:

    Argument: If people have the flu, they cough. Torres is coughing. Therefore, Torres has the flu.

    Problem: Other things, such as asthma, can cause someone to cough. The argument treats having the flu as a necessary condition of coughing; in fact, having the flu is a sufficient condition of coughing, but it is not necessary to have the flu for one to cough.

    Argument: If it rains, the ground gets wet. The ground is wet, therefore it rained.

    Problem: There are other ways by which the ground could get wet (e.g. someone spilled water).

• Denying the antecedent Example

  • Argument: If it is raining outside, it must be cloudy. It is not raining outside. Therefore, it is not cloudy.

    Problem: Rain is a sufficient condition of cloudiness, but cloudy conditions do not necessarily produce rain.

[edit] Begging the question

• Begging the question: demonstrates a conclusion by means of premises that assume that conclusion.
  • Example

    Argument: Aspirin users are at risk of becoming dependent on the drug, because aspirin is an addictive substance.

    Problem: The premise and the conclusion have the same meaning. If one has already accepted the premise, there is no need to reason to the conclusion. Obviously the premise is not logically irrelevant to the conclusion, for if the premise is true the conclusion must also be true. It is, however, logically irrelevant in proving the conclusion.

  • Also called Petitio Principii, or assuming the answer. Begging the question does not preclude the possibility that the statement is incorrect, and it is not sufficient proof in and of itself.
  • A related fallacy is Circulus in Probando, arguing in a circle, or circular reasoning. This is when two (or more) conclusions are used as premises to support each other, but unless one accepts one of them as true at the outset, there is no reason to accept the conclusions.

[edit] Fallacy of false cause

• Fallacy of false cause or non sequitur: incorrectly assumes one thing is the cause of another. Non Sequitur is Latin for "It does not follow."
  • Example

    Argument: I hear the rain falling outside my window; therefore, the sun is not shining.

    Problem: The conclusion is false because the sun can shine while it is raining.

  • Special cases
    • post hoc ergo propter hoc: believing that temporal succession implies a causal relation.
      • Example

        Argument: It rained just before the car broke down. The rain caused the car to break down.

        Problem: There may be no connection between the two events. Two events co-occurring is not an indication of causation.

    • cum hoc ergo propter hoc: believing that correlation implies a causal relation.
      • Example

        Argument: More cows die in the summer months. More ice cream is consumed in summer months. Therefore, the consumption of ice cream in the summer months is killing cows.

        Problem: No premise suggests the ice cream consumption is causing the deaths. The deaths and consumption could be unrelated, or something else could be causing both, such as summer heat.

        Also called causation versus correlation.

[edit] Fallacy of many questions

• Fallacy of many questions or loaded question: groups more than one question in the form of a single question.
  • Example

    Argument: Have you stopped beating your wife?

    Problem: A yes or no answer will still be an admission of guilt to beating your wife at some point. (See also Mu.)

  • Also called Plurium Interrogationum and other terms

[edit] Straw man

• Straw man: A straw man argument is an informal fallacy based on misrepresenting an opponent's position so as to more easily refute it.^[3]
  • Example

    Person A: Sunny days are good.

    Person B: If all days were sunny, we'd never have rain, and without rain, we'd have famine and death. Therefore, you are wrong.

    Problem: B has misrepresented A's claim by falsely suggesting that A claimed that only sunny days are good, and then B refuted the misrepresented version of the claim, rather than refuting A's original assertion.

Verbal fallacies[link]

Verbal fallacies are those in which a conclusion is obtained by improper or ambiguous use of words. They are generally classified as follows.

Magisterial fallacy (Engineer's Resolve)[link]

• "Wherein we think and speak as if our outsider status and lengthy education have given us the authority of a high-court judge to decide what is true." (p. 320)^[4]

[edit] Equivocation

• Equivocation consists in employing the same word in two or more senses, e.g. in a syllogism, the middle term being used in one sense in the major and another in the minor premise, so that in fact there are four not three terms. Often this happens when the two meanings are similar despite being distinctly different.

Example Argument: All heavy things have a great mass; Jim has a "heavy heart"; therefore Jim's heart has a great mass.

Problem: Heavy describes more than just weight. (Jim is sad.)

Connotation fallacies[link]

• Connotation fallacies occur when a dysphemistic word is substituted for the speaker's actual quote and used to discredit the argument. It is a form of attribution fallacy.

[edit] Apophasis and argument by innuendo

• Argument by innuendo involves implicitly suggesting a conclusion without stating it outright. For example, a job reference that says a former employee "was never caught taking money from the cash box" In this example the overly specific nature of the innuendo implies that the employee was a thief, even though it does not make (or justify) a direct statement of accusation.^[5]

[edit] Amphiboly

• Amphiboly is the result of ambiguity of grammatical structure.

Example: The position of the adverb "only" in a sentence starting with "He only said that" results in a sentence in which it is uncertain as to which of the other three words the speaker is intending to modify with the adverb.

[edit] Fallacy of composition

• Fallacy of composition "From each to all". Arguing from some property of constituent parts, to the conclusion that the composite item has that property. This can be acceptable (i.e., not a fallacy) with certain arguments such as spatial arguments (e.g. "all the parts of the car are in the garage, therefore the car is in the garage").

Example Argument: All the musicians in a band (constituent parts) are highly skilled, therefore the band itself (composite item) is highly skilled.

Problem: The band members may be skilled musicians but may lack the ability to function properly as a group.

[edit] Division

• Division, the converse of the preceding, arguing from a property of the whole, to each constituent part.

Example Argument: "The university (the whole) is 700 years old, therefore, all the staff (each part) are 700 years old".

Problem: Each and every person currently on staff is younger than 700 years. The university continues to exist even when, one by one, each and every person on the original staff leaves and is replaced by a younger person. See Theseus' Ship paradox.

Example Argument: "This liquid is part of a nutritious breakfast therefore the liquid is nutritious."

Problem: Simply because the breakfast taken as a whole is nutritious does not necessarily mean that each part of that breakfast is nutritious (unless the definition of a nutritious breakfast requires all parts to be nutritious).

[edit] Proof by verbosity

• Proof by verbosity, sometimes colloquially referred to as argumentum verbosum - a rhetorical technique that tries to persuade by overwhelming those considering an argument with such a volume of material that the argument sounds plausible, superficially appears to be well-researched, and it is so laborious to untangle and check supporting facts that the argument might be allowed to slide by unchallenged.

Accent[link]

• Accent, which occurs only in speaking and consists of emphasizing the wrong word in a sentence. e.g., "He is a fairly good pianist", according to the emphasis on the words, may imply praise of a beginner's progress or insult of an expert pianist.

• "He is a fairly good pianist." This argument places emphasis on the fact that "He", as opposed to anyone else, is a fairly good pianist.
• "He is a fairly good pianist." This is an assertion that he "is" a good pianist, as opposed to a poor one.
• "He is a fairly good pianist." The emphasis on "a" makes this an assertion that while he is a good pianist, there are other good pianists as well.
• "He is a fairly good pianist." This is an assertion that his ability as a pianist is fair, perhaps in need of improvement.
• "He is a fairly good pianist." This is an assertion that he is most certainly a good pianist, perhaps even impressively so.
• "He is a fairly good pianist." This is isolating his ability as only being good in the field of musical instruments, namely, the piano, and possibly excludes the idea that he is good at anything else.
• "I killed my wife?" in response to a police officer asking if he killed his wife. In court, the police officer states his reply to his question was "I killed my wife." This use of accent is demonstrated in the courtroom comedy My Cousin Vinnie.

Figure of Speech[link]

• Figure of Speech, the confusion between the metaphorical or figurative use of a word or phrase and the ordinary or literal use of a word or phrase.

Example: The sailor was at home on the sea.

Problem: The expression 'to be at home' does not literally mean that one's domicile is in that location.

This can happen in conjunction with Equivocation, whereby word or phrase is used literally in one part of an argument but figuratively in another part of the argument.

Example: John lives on a house-boat on the sea. He feels at home on his house-boat. Therefore he is like a sailor because he is at home on the sea.

[edit] Fallacy of misplaced concreteness

• Fallacy of misplaced concreteness, identified by Whitehead in his discussion of metaphysics, this refers to the reification of concepts which exist only in discussion.

Example 1[link]

Timmy argues:

1. Billy is a good tennis player.
2. Therefore, Billy is 'good', that is to say a morally good person.

Here the problem is that the word good has different meanings, which is to say that it is an ambiguous word. In the premise, Timmy says that Billy is good at some particular activity, in this case tennis. In the conclusion, Timmy states that Billy is a morally good person. These are clearly two different senses of the word "good". The premise might be true but the conclusion can still be false: Billy might be the best tennis player in the world but a rotten person morally. However, it is not legitimate to infer he is a bad person on the ground there has been a fallacious argument on the part of Timmy. Nothing concerning Billy's moral qualities is to be inferred from the premise. Appropriately, since it plays on an ambiguity, this sort of fallacy is called the fallacy of equivocation, that is, equating two incompatible terms or claims.

Example 2[link]

One posits the argument:

1. Nothing is better than eternal happiness.
2. Eating a sandwich is better than nothing.
3. Therefore, eating a sandwich is better than eternal happiness.

This argument has the appearance of an inference that applies transitivity of the two-placed relation is better than, which in this critique we grant is a valid property. The argument is an example of syntactic ambiguity. In fact, the first premise semantically does not predicate an attribute of the subject, as would for instance the assertion

Nothing is better than eternal happiness.

In fact it is semantically equivalent to the following universal quantification:

Everything fails to be better than eternal happiness.

So instantiating this fact with eating a sandwich, it logically follows that

Eating a sandwich fails to be better than eternal happiness.

Note that the premise A sandwich is better than nothing does not provide anything to this argument. This fact really means something such as

Eating a sandwich is better than eating nothing at all.

Thus this is a fallacy of equivocation.

Deductive fallacy[link]

In philosophy, the term logical fallacy properly refers to a formal fallacy: a flaw in the structure of a deductive argument which renders the argument invalid.

However, it is often used more generally in informal discourse to mean an argument which is problematic for any reason, and thus encompasses informal fallacies as well as formal fallacies.

The presence of a formal fallacy in a deductive argument does not imply anything about the argument's premises or its conclusion (see fallacy fallacy). Both may actually be true, or even more probable as a result of the argument (e.g., appeal to authority), but the deductive argument is still invalid because the conclusion does not follow from the premises in the manner described. By extension, an argument can contain a formal fallacy even if the argument is not a deductive one; for instance an inductive argument that incorrectly applies principles of probability or causality can be said to commit a formal fallacy.

Formalisms and frameworks used to understand fallacies[link]

A different approach to understanding and classifying fallacies is provided by argumentation theory; see for instance the van Eemeren, Grootendorst.^[6] In this approach, an argument is regarded as an interactive protocol between individuals which attempts to resolve a disagreement. The protocol is regulated by certain rules of interaction, and violations of these rules are fallacies. Many of the fallacies in the list above are best understood as being fallacies in this sense.

Other systems of classification[link]

Of other classifications of fallacies in general the most famous are those of Francis Bacon and J. S. Mill. Bacon (Novum Organum, Aph. 33, 38 sqq.) divided fallacies into four Idola (Idols, i.e. False Appearances), which summarize the various kinds of mistakes to which the human intellect is prone. With these should be compared the Offendicula of Roger Bacon, contained in the Opus maius, pt. i. J. S. Mill discussed the subject in book v. of his Logic, and Jeremy Bentham's Book of Fallacies (1824) contains valuable remarks. See Rd. Whateley's Logic, bk. v.; A. de Morgan, Formal Logic (1847) ; A. Sidgwick, Fallacies (1883) and other textbooks.

See also[link]

Attacking Faulty Reasoning Cognitive distortion Evidence List of cognitive biases Mathematical fallacy

List of fallacies List of paradoxes Sophistry Straight and Crooked Thinking Truth

Logic portal Thinking portal Psychology portal

References[link]

Further reading[link]

• C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies, Methuen London, 1970. reprinted by Vale Press in 1998 as ISBN 0-916475-24-7.
• Douglas N. Walton, Informal logic: A handbook for critical argumentation. Cambridge University Press, 1989.
• Hans V. Hansen; Robert C. Pinto (1995). Fallacies: classical and contemporary readings. Penn State Press. ISBN 978-0-271-01417-3. 
• John Woods (2004). The death of argument: fallacies in agent based reasoning. Springer. ISBN 978-1-4020-2663-8. 
• Frans van Eemeren; Bart Garssen; Bert Meuffels (2009). Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness: Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion. Springer. ISBN 978-90-481-2613-2. 

Historical texts

• Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, De Sophistici Elenchi. library.adelaide.edu.au
• William of Ockham, Summa of Logic (ca. 1323) Part III.4.
• John Buridan, Summulae de dialectica Book VII.
• Francis Bacon, the doctrine of the idols in Novum Organum Scientiarum, Aphorisms concerning The Interpretation of Nature and the Kingdom of Man, XXIIIff. fly.hiwaay.net
• Arthur Schopenhauer, The Art of Controversy | Die Kunst, Recht zu behalten - The Art Of Controversy (bilingual), (also known as "Schopenhauers 38 stratagems"). gutenberg.net
• John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic - Raciocinative and Inductive. Book 5, Chapter 7, Fallacies of Confusion. la.utexas.edu

External links[link]

Look up fallacy in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

• Infographic poster of enumeration of logical fallacies
• SEP entry on informal logic has a section on fallacy theory
• Appeal to Authority Appeal to Authority Logical Fallacy
• FallacyFiles.org contains categorization of fallacies with examples.
• 42 informal logical fallacies explained by Dr. Michael C. Labossiere (including examples), nizkor.org
• Humbug! The skeptic’s field guide to spotting fallacies in thinking – textbook on fallacies. scribd.com
• List of fallacies with clear examples, infidels.org
• Interactive Syllogistic Machine A web based syllogistic machine for exploring fallacies, figures, and modes of syllogisms.
• Logical Fallacies and the Art of Debate, csun.edu
• LogicalFallacies.Info
• An Informal Fallacy Primer, acontrario.org
• Stephen Downes Guide to the Logical Fallacies, onegoodmove.org
• "Love is a Fallacy", a short story written by Max Shulman. WebCitation archive.