Operation Menu

Operation Menu was the codename of a covert United States Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombing campaign conducted in eastern Cambodia and Laos from 18 March 1969 until 26 May 1970, during the Vietnam War. The supposed targets of these attacks were sanctuaries and Base Areas of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and forces of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF or derogatively, Viet Cong), which utilized them for resupply, training, and resting between campaigns across the border in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

The campaign failed in its objective of preventing North Vietnamese offensives, which continued during Operation Menu. In the aftermath of the operation, details surrounding it became known by the United States Congress and the US public, leading to dire consequences for the Nixon administration.

An official United States Air Force record of some US bombing activity over Indochina from 1964 to 1973 was declassified by US president Bill Clinton in 2000. The data reveals the true extent of the bombing of Cambodia, as well as Laos and Vietnam. According to the data, the Air Force began bombing the rural regions of Cambodia along its South Vietnam border in 1965 under the Johnson administration. This was four years earlier than previously believed. A report by historian Ben Kiernan and Taylor Owen states 2,756,941 tons of ordnance were dropped in 230,516 sorties on 113,716 sites. Just over 10 percent of this bombing was indiscriminate, with 3,580 of the sites listed as having “unknown” targets and another 8,238 sites having no target listed at all. The Menu bombings were an escalation of these air attacks. Nixon authorized the use of long-range B-52 bombers to carpet bomb the region. Historians now classify the campaign as a mere fourteen month phase in an extensive series of secretive bombing raids that spanned a period of eleven years.

Background

In 1966, Sihanouk made an agreement with Zhou En-lai of the People's Republic of China that would allow PAVN and NLF forces to establish Base Areas in Cambodia and to use the port of Sihanoukville for the delivery of military materiel. The US, heavily involved in South Vietnam, was not eager to openly violate the asserted neutrality of Cambodia, which had been guaranteed by the Geneva Accord of 1954.

Cambodian claims of neutrality, however, did not prevent President Lyndon B. Johnson from authorizing covert reconnaissance operations by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group beginning in 1967. The mission of the highly-classified unit was to obtain military intelligence on the Base Areas (Project Vesuvius) that would be presented to Sihanouk in hopes of changing his position. : Mao Zedong (l), Prince Sihanouk (c), and North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho (r)]]

By late 1968, Sihanouk, under pressure from the political right at home and from the US, agreed to more normalized relations with the Americans. In July 1968, he had agreed to reopen diplomatic relations and, in August, formed a Government of National Salvation under the pro-US General Lon Nol. Newly-inaugurated President Richard M. Nixon, seeking any means by which to withdraw from Southeast Asia and obtain "peace with honor", saw an opening with which to give time a safety for the US withdrawal, and time to implement the new policy of Vietnamization. Before the diplomatic amenities with Sihanouk were even concluded, Nixon had decided to deal with the situation of PAVN troops and supply bases in Cambodia. He had already considered a naval blockade of the Cambodian coast, but was talked out of it by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who believed that Sihanouk could still be convinced to agree to ground attacks against the Base Areas.

On 30 January 1969, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Earl G. Wheeler had suggested to the president that he authorize the bombing of the Cambodian sanctuaries. He was seconded on 9 February by the US commander in Vietnam, General Creighton W. Abrams, who also submitted his proposal to bomb the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), the elusive headquarters of PAVN/NLF southern operations, located somewhere in the Fishhook region of eastern Cambodia. On 22 February, during the period just following the Tết holidays, PAVN/NLF forces launched an offensive. Nixon became even more angered when the communists launched rocket and artillery attacks against Saigon, which he considered a violation of the "agreement" he believed had been made when the US halted the bombing of North Vietnam in November 1968. The Vietnamese asserted no such agreement had been made.

Nixon, who was enroute to Brussels for a meeting with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders, ordered his National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to prepare for airstrikes against PAVN/NLF Base Areas in Cambodia as a reprisal. The bombings were to serve three purposes: it would show Nixon's tenacity; it would disable PAVN's offensive capability to disrupt the US withdrawal and Vietnamization; and it would demonstrate the US' determination, "that might pay dividends at the negotiating table in Paris." He then cabled Colonel Alexander Haig, a National Security Council staff aide, to meet him in Brussels along with Colonel Raymond B. Sitton, a former Strategic Air Command officer on the JCS staff, to formulate a plan of action.

By seeking advice from high administration officials, Nixon had delayed any quick response that could be explicitly linked to the provocation. He decided to respond to the next provocation and didn't have to wait long. On 14 March, communist forces once again attacked South Vietnam's urban areas and Nixon was ready.

Breakfast

In his diary in March 1969, Nixon’s chief of staff, HR Haldemann, noted that the final decision to carpet bomb Cambodia ‘was made at a meeting in the Oval Office Sunday afternoon, after the church service’.

In his diary on March 17, 1969, Haldemann wrote:

Historic day. K[issinger]’s “Operation Breakfast” finally came off at 2:00 PM our time. K really excited, as is P[resident].

And the next day:

K’s “Operation Breakfast” a great success. He came beaming in with the report, very productive. A lot more secondaries than had been expected. Confirmed early intelligence. Probably no reaction for a few days, if ever.

The bombing began on the night of 18 March with a raid by 60 B-52 Stratofortress bombers, based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The target was Base Area 353, the supposed location of COSVN in the Fishhook. Although the aircrews were briefed that their mission was to take place in South Vietnam, 48 of the bombers were diverted across the Cambodian border and dropped 2,400 tons of bombs. The mission was designated Breakfast, after the morning Pentagon planning session at which it was devised.

Breakfast was so successful (in US terms) that General Abrams provided a list of 15 more known Base Areas for targeting. During the next 14 months the operation continued. The five remaining missions that made up the operation and their targets were: Lunch (Base Area 609), Snack (Base Area 351), Dinner (Base Area 352), Supper (Base Area 740), and Dessert (Base Area 350). SAC flew 3,800 B-52 sorties against these targets, and dropped 108,823 tons of ordnance during the missions. Due to the continued reference to gastronomic situations in the codenames, the entire series of missions was referred to as Operation Menu. Assessment of bomb damage to the targets was difficult to obtain, due to the covert nature of the operation. Instead of utilizing Air Force aircraft for the missions, SOG forward air controllers were tasked with obtaining intelligence on target damage.