This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (September 2011)

Ulama (Arabic: علماء‎ ʿUlamāʾ , singular عالِم ʿĀlim, "scholar"), also spelt ulema, refers to the educated class of Muslim legal scholars engaged in the several fields of Islamic studies. They are best known as the arbiters of sharia law. While the ulama are well versed in legal fiqh (jurisprudence) being Islamic lawyers, some of them also go on to specialize in other fields, such as hadith or tafseer.

In a broader sense, the term ulama is used to describe the body of Muslim scholars who have completed several years of training and study of Islamic disciplines, such as a mufti, qadi, faqih, or muhaddith. Some Muslims^[which?] include under this term the village mullahs and imams, who have attained only the lowest rungs on the ladder of Islamic scholarship; other Muslims^{[clarification needed]} would say that clerics must meet higher standards to be considered ulama. This is why it is claimed^[who?] that in Western society there are for the most of the time no ulama present, with the outcome of Muslims in the West searching for qualified knowledge from Islamic countries, to attain some accepted qualification. The Internet gives some streams of ulama speaking on a video record, which is very rare.^[1]

The word ulama in English is plural, and indeclinable.

Teaching[link]

Ulama learned at Islamic religious schools, madrasahs, where they teach students about Islam and other areas of study. It is believed in Islam that a well-rounded education is something every Muslim must acquire in order to understand God’s religion in its entirety. By the end of their education, they acquire an Ijazah, an academic degree in Islamic law and jurisprudence, a practice that dates back to the first several centuries of Islam.^{[citation needed]} Ulama also hold seminars where they give lectures and speeches about the area of Islam in which they specialize.

Afghanistan's Taliban regime was also headed by a mullah, Mullah Omar. However, in most countries, they are merely local power figures.

Judicature[link]

In certain Muslim countries, like Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, where there are sharia courts, Islamic clergy become judges. Therefore, one of the jobs of ulama is the interpretation and maintenance of Islamic law in such countries.

Advisory[link]

In some countries like Saudi Arabia, Islamic clergy fulfill the role of a counsel for the king. There are also jobs for them in various governmental institutions.

Preaching[link]

There are various jobs available for the Islamic clergy at mosques, such as leading public prayers, preaching, and delivering sermons, especially at Friday prayers and some have made missionary activities a lifelong activity.

Ummah[link]

The ulama in most nations consider themselves to represent the ijma "consensus" of the Ummah "community of Muslims" (or to represent at least the scholarly or learned consensus). Many efforts to modernise Islam focus on the reintroduction of ijtihad and empowerment of the ummah to form their own ijma.

Madhhab[link]

Sunni ulama usually work within a tradition (madhhab) that starts with one of five classic jurists.

• Shafi'i (most common in Indonesia, Malaysia, Jordan, Palestine and Egypt)
• Hanafi (most common in Turkey, the Balkans, Central Asia, Indian subcontinent, Egypt)
• Maliki (most common in North Africa, West Africa,)
• Hanbali (most common in Saudi Arabia and several of the Persian Gulf states)
• Zahiri (rare)

Some ulama are not associated with any school. They believe that it is necessary to derive rulings directly from the Qur'an and the Hadith.

History[link]

An Ottoman scholar.

The formative period of Islamic jurisprudence stretches back to the time of the early Muslim communities. In this period, jurists were more concerned with pragmatic issues of authority and teaching than with theory.^[2] Progress in theory happened with the coming of the early Muslim jurist Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafi`i (767–820), who codified the basic principles of Islamic jurisprudence in his book ar-Risālah. The book details the four roots of law (Qur'an, Sunnah, ijma, and qiyas) while specifying that the primary Islamic texts (the Qur'an and the hadith) be understood according to objective rules of interpretation derived from scientific study of the Arabic language.^[3]

The 19th and 20th centuries were marked by a considerable loss of authority and influence of the ulama in most Islamic states. Many secular Arab governments attempted to break the influence of the ulama after their rise to power. Religious institutions were nationalized and the system of waqf "religious donations", which constituted the classical source of income for the ulama, was abolished.

In 1961, Gamal Abdel Nasser put the Al-Azhar University, one of the highest Islamic intellectual authorities, under the direct control of the state. "The Azharis were even put in army uniforms and had to parade under the command of army officers" (G. Keppel, Jihad). In Turkey, the traditional dervish tekkes and Islamic schools were dissolved and replaced by state-controlled religious schools in the 1950s and 1960s. After the independence of Algeria, President Ahmed Ben Bella also deprived the Algerian ulama of their power.

Authors[link]

Many ulama have left behind them only a lifetime of mediating disputes and giving sermons; their respectable contributions did not include authorship. Other ulama have been prolific authors, writing translations of the Quran or Quranic commentaries, studies of hadith, works of philosophy, religious admonition, etc. There are enormous bodies of religious literature that form not only the substance of the courses in Islamic seminaries, but inspirational reading for the ordinary Muslim. Most of this literature has not been translated into English, but remains in its original language (usually Arabic, Urdu, Persian, or Turkish). Some has been printed; some remains in manuscript form.

Ottoman ulama[link]

In order to become one of the ulama in the Ottoman Empire, one had to have studied at a madraseh and be an expert in all the religious sciences, specializing in one or two specifics. In addition, the student had to have been tested and approved by higher ranking ulama. Such assessment by experts gave the ulama legitimacy in the eyes of the public, because it imitated the way the Caliphs after the death of the Prophet Muhammad were appointed. In 14th and 15th century Ottoman Empire, there were not many madrasehs, and so the ulama traveled to countries such as Persia and Egypt to further their education. Upon the conquering of Istanbul however, the sultan converted eight churches into madrasehs and placed eight of the best ulama as the heads.^[4] The ulama in the Ottoman Empire had a large influence over politics because it was believed that secular institutions were all subordinate to religion; the ulama were emblems of religious piety, therefore rendering them powerful over state affairs.^[5] Ulama worked as priest-like authorities who had the role of interpreting and enforcing Islamic shariah law. These jobs were distributed amongst two types of ulama: Muftis, who interpreted Shariah law and the Qadi, who enforced Shariah law. The Ottomans had a strict hierarchy of ulama, with the Sheikh ul-Islam holding the highest rank. A Sheikh ul-Islam was chosen by a royal warrant amongst the qadis of important cities. The Sheikh ul-Islam had the power to confirm new sultans, but once the sultan was affirmed, it was the sultan who retained a higher authority than the Sheik ul-Islam. The Sheikh ul-Islam issued fatwas, which were written interpretations of the Quran that had authority over the community. The Sheikh ul-Islam represented the law of shariah and in the 16th century its importance rose which led to increased power. Sultan Murad appointed a Sufi, Yayha, as his Sheikh ul-Islam during this time which lead to violent disapproval. The objection to this appointment made obvious the amount of power the Sheikh ul-Islam had, since people were afraid he would alter the traditions and norms they were living under by issuing new fatwas.^[6]

See also[link]

• Islam
• Islamic jurisprudence
• List of Islamic studies scholars
• Mullah
• Shi'a clergy

Notes[link]

References[link]

• Zaman, Muhammad Qasim (2002). The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-09680-5. 

Further reading[link]

Look up ulama in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Ulama

• Inalcik, Halil. 1973. "Learning, the Medrese, and the Ulema." In The Ottoman Empire: The Classical AGe 1300–1600. New YOrk: Praeger, pp. 165–178.

• Heyd. Uriel. "Some Aspects of The Ottoman Fetva." School of Oriental and African Studies Bulletin; 32 (1969), p. 35–56.

• Bein, Amit. Ottoman Ulema, Turkish Republic: Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition (2011) Amazon.com

• Hatina, Meir. Ulama, Politics, and the Public Sphere: An Egyptian Perspective (2010). ISBN 978-1-60781-032-2

Guidelines to the Jurisprudence of Ottoman Ulema – Mehmet Ipsirli http://www.muslimheritage.com/topics/default.cfm?ArticleID=416

• Tasar, Murat. "The Ottoman Ulema: their understanding of knowledge and scholarly contribution." The Turks. 3: Ottomans. Editors: Hasan Celâl Güzel, C.Cem Oğuz, Osman Karatay. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002, pp. 841–850.

• Zilfi, Madeline C. 1986. "The Kadizadelis: Discordant Revivalism in Seventeenth Century Istanbul." Journal of Near Eastern Studies 45 (4): 251–269.

Tariq Ramadan

Born	(1962-08-26) August 26, 1962 (age 49) Geneva, Switzerland
Era	21st-century philosophy
Main interests	Islamic studies Theology Philosophy Politics Interfaith dialogue Literature
Website	www.tariqramadan.com

Tariq Ramadan (Arabic: طارق رمضان‎; born 26 August 1962 in Geneva, Switzerland) is a Swiss academic and writer. He is also a Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies in the Faculty of Oriental Studies at Oxford University. He advocates the study and re-interpretation of Islamic texts, and emphasizes the heterogeneous nature of Western Muslims.^[1]

Biography[link]

Tariq Ramadan (at table, right) speaking in Oxford.

Tariq Ramadan is the son of Said Ramadan and Wafa Al-Bana, who was the eldest daughter of Hassan al Banna, who in 1928 founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Gamal al-Banna, the liberal Muslim reformer is his great-uncle. His father was a prominent figure in the Muslim Brotherhood and was exiled by Gamal Abdul Nasser^[2] from Egypt to Switzerland, where Tariq was born.

Tariq Ramadan studied Philosophy and French literature at the Masters level and holds a PhD in Arabic and Islamic studies from the University of Geneva. He also wrote a PhD dissertation on Friedrich Nietzsche, entitled Nietzsche as a Historian of Philosophy.^[3]

He taught at the College de Saussure, a high school in Geneva, Switzerland, and held a lectureship in Religion and Philosophy at the University of Fribourg from 1996 to 2003. In October 2005 he began teaching at St Antony's College at the University of Oxford on a Visiting Fellowship. In 2005 he was a senior research fellow at the Lokahi Foundation.^[4][5] In 2007 he successfully applied for the professorship in Islamic studies at the University of Leiden, but then declined to take up the position, citing professional reasons.^[6][7] He was also a guest professor of Identity and Citizenship at Erasmus University Rotterdam,^[8][9][10] till August 2009 when the City of Rotterdam and Erasmus University dismissed him from his positions as "integration adviser" and professor, stating that the program he chairs on Iran's Press TV, Islam & Life, was "irreconcilable" with his duties in Rotterdam.^[11][12] Ramadan described this move as Islamophobic and politically charged.^[13] Beginning September 2009, Ramadan, was appointed to the His Highness Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani Chair in Contemporary Islamic Studies at Oxford University.^[14]

Ramadan established the Mouvement des Musulmans Suisses (Movement of Swiss Muslims), which engages in various interfaith seminars. He is an advisor to the EU on religious issues and was sought for advice by the EU on a commission on “Islam and Secularism”.In September 2005 he was invited to join a task force by the government of the United Kingdom.^[2] He is also the President of the Euro-Muslim Network, a Brussels-based think-tank.^[15]

He is widely interviewed and has produced about 100 tapes which sell tens of thousands of copies each year.^[16]

As of 2009, Tariq Ramadan was persona non grata in Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,^[17] Libya and Syria because of his "criticism of these undemocratic regimes that deny the most basic human rights".^[18]

U.S. visa revocation and subsequent lifting[link]

In February 2004, Tariq Ramadan accepted the tenured position of Henry R. Luce Professor of Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, at the University of Notre Dame in South Bend, Indiana, United States. He was granted a nonimmigrant visa on May 5, however, on July 28, his H-1B visa was revoked by the State Department.^[19] In August 2004, spokesman for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement cited the "ideological exclusion provision" of the USA PATRIOT Act as the grounds for Ramadan's visa revocation.^[20] In October, the University of Notre Dame filed a H-1B petition on Ramadan's behalf. After hearing no response from the government by December, Ramadan resigned his position from the university.

In September 2005, Ramadan filed an application for a B Visa to allow him to participate at speaking arrangements with various organizations and universities. The government did not issue a decision on Ramadan's visa application, so the American Civil Liberties Union and the New York Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit on January 25, 2006 against the United States government on behalf of the American Academy of Religion, the American Association of University Professors and the PEN American Center – three groups who had planned on meeting with Ramadan in the US – for revoking Ramadan's visa under the "ideological exclusion provision". The ACLU and NYCLU argued that the ideological exclusion provision was in violation of the First Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights of those three groups and that the government's actions violated the Administrative Procedures Act.^[21] After two months had passed without a decision being made, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Pursuant to the injunction, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered the government on June 23, 2006 to issue its decision on Ramadan's pending B Visa application within 90 days.^[22]

On September 19, 2006, the government formally denied Ramadan's visa application. A State Department statement said: "A U.S. consular officer has denied Dr. Tariq Ramadan's visa application. The consular officer concluded that Dr. Ramadan was inadmissible based solely on his actions, which constituted providing material support to a terrorist organization."^[23][24] Between December 1998 and July 2002, Ramadan had given donations totalling $940 to two charity organizations, the Committee for Charity and Support for the Palestinians (CBSP) or Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens and the Association de Secours Palestinien.^[25] The United States Treasury designated both the CBSP and ASP terrorist fundraising organizations for their alleged links to Hamas on August 22, 2003.^[26] The U.S. Embassy told Ramadan that he "reasonably should have known" that the charities provided money to Hamas. In an article in The Washington Post, Ramadan asked: "How should I reasonably have known of their activities before the U.S. government itself knew?"^{[25][27][28][29]}

On February 2, 2007, the ACLU and NYCLU amended their complaint, arguing that the government's explanation for denying Ramadan's visa application was not "facially legitimate and bona fide" and that the ideological exclusion provision of the PATRIOT Act was in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments. They also argued that Ramadan's denial violated the First Amendment rights of those who wanted to hear him speak. In his decision on December 20, 2007, District Judge Paul A. Crotty ruled that the government's justification for denying Ramadan's visa was "facially legitimate and bona fide" and noted that the Court "has no authority to override the Government's consular decision".^[30]

In January 2008, the ACLU appealed Crotty's ruling. Jameel Jaffer, Director of the ACLU National Security Project and lead attorney in the case, stated:

"The government's shifting positions only underscore why meaningful judicial review – the kind of oversight that the district court failed to provide – is so important. In Professor Ramadan’s case and many others, the government is using immigration laws to stigmatize and exclude its critics and to censor and control the ideas that Americans can hear. Censorship of this kind is completely inconsistent with the most basic principles of an open society."

Ramadan himself remarked:

"The U.S. government's actions in my case seem, at least to me, to have been arbitrary and myopic. But I am encouraged by the unwavering support I have received from ordinary Americans, civic groups and particularly from scholars, academic organizations, and the ACLU. I am heartened by the emerging debate in the U.S. about what has been happening to our countries and ideals in the past six years. And I am hopeful that eventually I will be allowed to enter the country so that I may contribute to the debate and be enriched by dialogue."^[31]

On July 17, 2009, the US federal appeals court reversed the ruling of the lower district court. The three-judge panel on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit – composed of Judges Jon O. Newman, Wilfred Feinberg and Reena Raggi – ruled that the Court had "jurisdiction to consider the claim, despite the doctrine of consular nonreviewability". They stated that government was required by law to "confront Ramadan with the allegation against him and afford him the subsequent opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and reasonably should not have known, that the recipient of his contributions was a terrorist organization." Under the limited review permitted by the 1972 Supreme Court ruling in Kleindienst v. Mandel, the panel concluded that the "record does not establish that the consular officer who denied the visa confronted Ramadan with the allegation that he had knowingly rendered material support to a terrorist organization, thereby precluding an adequate opportunity for Ramadan to attempt to satisfy the provision that exempts a visa applicant from exclusion under the 'material support' subsection if he 'can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [he] did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization.'" Additionally, the panel agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that their First Amendment rights had been violated. The panel remanded the case to a lower court to determine if the consular officer had confronted Ramadan with the "allegation that he knew that ASP provided funds to Hamas and then providing him with a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that he did not know, and should not have reasonably known, of that fact."^[32]

Following the ruling, Ramadan stated, "I am very gratified with the court's decision. I am eager to engage once again with Americans in the kinds of face-to-face discussions that are central to academic exchange and crucial to bridging cultural divides." Melissa Goodman, staff attorney with the ACLU National Security Project, issued a statement saying, "Given today's decision, we hope that the Obama administration will immediately end Professor Ramadan's exclusion. We also encourage the new administration to reconsider the exclusion of other foreign scholars, writers and artists who were barred from the country by the Bush administration on ideological grounds."^[33]

On January 20, 2010, after more than five years of waiting, the American State Department has decided, in a document signed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to lift the ban that prohibited Ramadan (as well as Professor Adam Habib from South Africa) from entering the United States. On the lifting of this ban, Ramadan has stated:

Coming after nearly six years of inquiry and investigation, Secretary Clinton’s order confirms what I have affirmed and reaffirmed from day one: the first accusations of terrorist connections (subsequently dropped), then donations to Palestinian solidarity groups, were nothing more than a pretense to prohibit me from speaking critically about American government policy on American soil. The decision brings to an end a dark period in American politics that saw security considerations invoked to block critical debate through a policy of exclusion and baseless allegation.

On April 8, 2010, Ramadan spoke as part of a panel discussion at the Great Hall of Cooper Union in New York City, his first public appearance since the State Department lifted the ban.^[34] The group debated the lengths to which Western nations should go to accommodate their Muslim populations.

Views[link]

Ramadan works primarily on Islamic theology and the position of Muslims in the West and within Muslim majority countries. In general, he believes it necessary to interpret the Qur'an, not simply to read the Arabic text, in order to understand its meaning and to practice Islamic philosophy.^[35] He also emphasizes the difference between religion and culture, which he believes are too often confused, arguing that citizenship and religion are separate concepts which should not be mixed. He claims that there is no conflict between being both a Muslim and a European; a Muslim must accept the laws of his country. But he is opposed to some politicians or people who try to circumvent or to give a new sense of their own laws.

He believes that Western Muslims must create a "Western Islam" just as there is a separate "Asian Islam" and an "African Islam", which take into account cultural differences.^[36] By this he means that European Muslims must re-examine the fundamental texts of Islam (primarily the Qur'an) and interpret them in light of their own cultural background, influenced by European society.

He rejects a binary division of the world into dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (the abode of war), on the grounds that such a division is not mentioned in the Qur'an. He has been also known to cite favourably the Dar al-Da'wa (Abode of Information Dissemination).^[37] However, Ramadan has articulated both the "ideological geography" of the West and the duty of da'wa in an original fashion and one that is starkly more pro-integration than the more conservative "loyal resident alienage" articulated by such jurists as al-Qaradawi. For Ramadan, the West is neither the Abode of War nor the Abode of da'wa but "dar al-shahada," the "Abode of Testimony" [to the Islamic Message]. He argues that Muslims are "witnesses before mankind"; they must continue to review the fundamental principles of Islam and take responsibility for their faith.

Importantly, for him the "Islamic message" to which Muslims are expected to bear witness is not primarily the particularist, socially conservative code of traditionalist jurists, but a commitment to universalism and the welfare of non-Muslims; it is also an injunction not merely to make demands on un-Islamic societies but to express solidarity with them.^[38][39]

"... the European environment is a space of responsibility for Muslims. This is exactly the meaning of the notion of "space of testimony" [dar al-shahada] that we propose here, a notion that totally reverses perspectives: whereas Muslims have, for years, been wondering whether and how they would be accepted, the in-depth study and evaluation of the Western environment entrusts them, in light of their Islamic frame of reference, with a most important mission... Muslims now attain, in the space of testimony, the meaning of an essential duty and of an exacting responsibility: to contribute, wherever they are, to promoting good and equity within and through human brotherhood. Muslims' outlook must now change from the reality of "protection" alone to that of an authentic "contribution."

He emphasizes a Muslim's responsibility to his community, whether it be Islamic or not. He criticizes the 'us vs. them' mentality that some Muslims advocate against the West. He also advocates having Muslim scholars in the West who are versed in Western mores, and not relying on religious studies that come only from the Islamic world. He wants more Islamic philosophy written in European languages. He thinks that European Muslims' reliance on an "external" Islam, leaves them feeling inadequate and impure, which is one of the main causes of alienation from European culture.

He believes that most Muslims in the West are quietly and successfully integrating into society. The main problems for the community come from those who are ignorant of Western society.

He also worries about Western perceptions of Islam. He says the Muslim community has been bad at representing itself, and that this has allowed westerners to confuse Islam with cultural traits, as well as political problems. For example, he believes that many notionally Islamic countries have governments which betray the principles of Islam.

He believes that the Muslim leadership in Europe is partially responsible for the sometimes shaky relations between Muslims and the rest of society. He believes that they have been overly defensive, and have not properly explained the philosophy of Islam, nor have they engaged sufficiently with non-Muslim society.

He stresses that a Muslim's freedom of religion is very extensive in the West, and that permission for "un-Islamic" activities, such as drinking, or pre-marital sex, does not compel Muslims to do anything. Only a few situations warrant the invocation of the "clause of conscience" which allows a Muslim to make it clear that certain actions or behaviours are in contradiction of their faith. These are, participating in a war whose sole desire is for power or control; fighting or killing a fellow Muslim, unless their attitude is unjust or wrong; participating in an unlawful transaction (such as purchasing insurance, burial, incorrect slaughter). He stresses that in such cases the situation should be carefully analysed, and the degree of compulsion considered. Only non-violence and negotiation are acceptable in these cases.^[40]

Ramadan has voiced his opposition to all forms of capital punishment but believes the Muslim world should remove such laws from within, without any Western pressure, as such would only further alienate Muslims, and instead bolster the position of those who support hudud punishments.

He has said "Muslim populations are convincing themselves of the Islamic character of these practices through a rejection of the west, on the basis of a simplistic reasoning that stipulates that 'the less western, the more Islamic'."^[41]

Politically, Ramadan was opposed to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He believes that jihad against the United States military in Iraq was justified as an act of resistance to oppression.

He has condemned suicide bombing and violence as a tactic.^[42] Perhaps more importantly, he believes that terrorism is never justifiable, even though it is sometimes understandable.^[43]

He was opposed to the French law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools.

Ramadan wrote that the Muslim response to Pope Benedict XVI's speech on Islam was disproportionate, and was encouraged by reactionary Islamic regimes in order to distract their populations, and that it did not improve the position of Islam in the world.^[44]

Ramadan wrote an article entitled, Les (nouveaux) intellectuels communautaires, which French newspapers Le Monde and Le Figaro refused to publish. Oumma.com did eventually publish it. In the article he criticizes a number of French Jewish intellectuals and figures such as Alexandre Adler, Alain Finkielkraut, Bernard-Henri Lévy, André Glucksmann and Bernard Kouchner, for allegedly abandoning universal human rights, and giving special status to the defence of Israel. Ramadan was accused, in return, of having used inflammatory language.^[45][46]

Debate[link]

In a French television debate in 2003 with Nicolas Sarkozy, Sarkozy accused Ramadan of defending the stoning of adulterers, a punishment stipulated in the section of the Islamic penal code known as hudud, roots being in Mosaic law as mentioned in the Old Testament of the Bible and not having been abrogated by later revelations, consequently Sura 6 verse 89 of the Quran is interpreted in orthodox Islam as sanctioning the death penalty for certain crimes. Ramadan replied that Sarkozy was wrong. He said that he opposed stoning and that he favored “a moratorium” on such practices to have time to discuss the law outright. Many people, including Sarkozy, were outraged. Ramadan later defended his position arguing that, because it involved religious texts, the law would have to be properly understood and contextualised. Ramadan argued that in Muslim countries, the simple act to "condemn" won't change anything, but with a "moratorium", it could open the way for further debate. He thinks that such a debate can only lead to an abolishment of these rules.^[47] He further engaged in similar debates on the issue, notably at the Cambridge Union with Sir Bernard Crick, among others, in 2008.

Critical reception[link]

Some academics have greeted his works with enthusiasm, detecting liberalising and rationalising tendencies.^[48]

Praise[link]

Paul Donnelly^{[disambiguation needed ]} at the liberal^[49] online magazine Salon.com asked rhetorically: "Tariq Ramadan: The Muslim Martin Luther?".^[50] Similarly, an article at the self-described liberal^[51] The American Prospect praised Ramadan and his work in particular as an "entire corpus consists of a steady and unyielding assault on Muslim insularity, self-righteousness, and self-pity."^[52]

Criticism[link]

In a book published by Encounter Books, Caroline Fourest analysed Tariq Ramadan's 15 books, 1,500 pages of interviews, and approximately 100 recordings,^[53][54] and concludes "Ramadan is a war leader," and the "political heir of his grandfather," Hassan al-Banna, stating that his discourse is, "often just a repetition of the discourse that Banna had at the beginning of the 20th century in Egypt," and that he "presents [al-Banna] as a model to be followed."^[16][55] She argues that "Tariq Ramadan is slippery. He says one thing to his faithful Muslim followers and something else entirely to his Western audience. His choice of words, the formulations he uses – even his tone of voice – vary, chameleon-like, according to his audience."^[53] Tariq Ramadan responded that Caroline Fourest's book was filled with inaccuracies and untruths, a few of which she later acknowledged on her blog^[56].

Olivier Guitta, writing in The Weekly Standard, welcomed the U.S. decision to refuse Ramadan a visa, based on Ramadan's supposed links to terrorist organizations and claiming that his father was the likely author of "'The Project'... a roadmap for installing Islamic regimes in the West by propaganda, preaching, and if necessary war." He further claimed that the former head of the French antiracism organization SOS Racisme, "Malek Boutih told Ramadan after talking with him at length: ‘Mr. Ramadan, you are a fascist.’"^[16] In an interview with Europe 1 Boutih likened him to "a small Le Pen^{[disambiguation needed ]}";^[57] in another interview he accused him of having crossed the line of racism and anti-Semitism, thus not genuinely belonging to the alter-globalization movement. Similarly, self-described conservative^[58] Daniel Pipes concurred with the revocation of Ramadan's visa on grounds of Ramadan's alleged ties with Islamic extremism.^[59] After the lifting of the visa revocation, an article in the National Review criticized the double standard of lifting the visa restriction on Ramadan, but not for Issam Abu Issa who was banned by the Bush Administration for being a whistleblower against the Palestinian Authority's corruption.^[60]

Bertrand Delanoë, Socialist mayor of Paris, declared Ramadan unfit to participate at the European Social Forum, as not even "a slight suspicion of anti-Semitism" would be tolerable. Talking to the Paris weekly Marianne, Fadela Amara, president of Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Submissive, a French feminist movement), Aurélie Filippetti, municipal counsellor for The Greens in Paris, Patrick Klugman, leading member of the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions juives de France and Dominique Sopo, head of SOS-Racisme accuse Ramadan of having misused the alter-globalization movement's ingenuousness to advance his "radicalism and anti-Semitism."^[61] Similarly, an article in the online publication of Alliance for Workers' Liberty published 40 reasons why Ramadan was a reactionary, criticizing views on Islamic extremism, women's rights and anti-Semitism.^[62] Egyptian intellectual Tarek Heggy has also charged Ramadan with saying different things to different audiences.^[63] Other criticisms have included claims that that an essay attacking French intellectuals was anti-semitic ^[64] and that he has shown excessive generosity in his rationalization of the motives behind acts of terrorism, such as in the case of [Mohammed Merah].^[65]

Response to some of the criticism[link]

Ramadan vehemently denies contacts with terrorists or other Islamic fundamentalists and the charges of anti-Semitism and double talk, attributing the charges to misinterpretation and an unfamiliarity with his writings.^[66] He stated: "I have often been accused of this 'double discourse', and to those who say it, I say – bring the evidence. I am quite clear in what I say. The problem is that many people don't want to hear it, particularly in the media. Most of the stories about me are completely untrue: journalists simply repeat black propaganda from the internet without any corroboration, and it just confirms what they want to believe. Words are used out of context. There is double-talk, yes, but there is also double-hearing. That is what I want to challenge."^[42] In answer to criticism of his response to September 11th, Ramadan replied that two days after the attacks he had published an open letter, exhorting Muslims to condemn the attacks and the attackers, and not to "hide behind conspiracy theories."^[67] and that less than two weeks after the attacks he had stated that “The probability [of bin Laden's guilt] is large, but some questions remain unanswered ... But whoever they are, Bin Laden or others, it is necessary to find them and that they be judged,” and that the interview had been conducted before any evidence was publicly available.^[68]

Public reception[link]

One of the world's top 100 innovators of the 21st Century (one of the world's top 7th religious leaders) by Time Magazine in 2000

One of the world's top 100 most influential intellectuals in the world by Time Magazine in 2004

An online poll provided by the American Foreign Policy magazine in 2009 and in 2010 placed Ramadan on the 49th spot in a list of the world’s top 100 contemporary intellectuals.^[69]

In 2008, an open online poll, Tariq Ramadan was voted the 8th top most intellectual person in the world on the list of Top 100 Public Intellectuals by Prospect Magazine (UK).

Selected works[link]

• The quest for meaning: developing a philosophy of pluralism, 2010, ISBN 978-0-14-191957-7
• What I Believe, 2009. ISBN 978-0-19-538785-8
• Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation, 2009. ISBN 978-0-19-533171-4
• In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons from the Life of Muhammad, 2007. ISBN 978-0-19-530880-8
• Western Muslims and the future of Islam, 2004. ISBN 0-19-517111-X
• Islam, the West, and the Challenge of Modernity, 2001. ISBN 0-86037-311-8
• To Be a European Muslim, 1999. ISBN 0-86037-300-2

References[link]

Further reading[link]

• "Tariq Ramadan and the Oxford Haskalah Attempt (February 18, 2011).
• Berman, Paul, 'Who's Afraid of Tariq Ramadan?', in The New Republic, June 2007.
  • Wie is er bang voor Tariq Ramadan?, Paul Berman, 2007, ISBN 978-90-290-8063-7 Translation from Dutch:'Who is Afraid of Tariq Ramadan?' This is presumably a version of the long essay by Paul Berman in The New Republic of June 2007, which may still be under copyright protection.
• Berman, Paul, The Flight of the Intellectuals; ISBN 978-1-933633-51-0
• Lionel Favrot : Tariq Ramadan dévoilé – hors série de Lyon Mag'.
• Nicholas Tampio, "Constructing the Space of Testimony: Tariq Ramadan’s Copernican Revolution" "Political Theory", Vol 39.5 (2011).
• Irfan Khawaja, Review of Paul Berman's "The Flight of the Intellectuals" and Tariq Ramadan's "What I Believe" [1], "Reason Papers: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Normative Studies," vol. 33 (Fall 2011), pp. 165-89.
• Frère Tariq: Discours, stratégie et méthode de Tariq Ramadan, Caroline Fourest; ISBN 2-246-66791-7
  • Frère Tariq, Extraits exclusifs, Un livre de Caroline Fourest, L'Express, October 18, 2004
  • Translated into English as Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan. New York: Encounter Books. 2008. pp. 262 pages. ISBN 978-1-59403-215-8. 
• Tariq Ramadan und die Islamisierung Europas, Ralph Ghadban; ISBN 3-89930-150-1
• Le sabre et le coran, Tariq Ramadan et les frères musulmans à la conquéte de l'Europe, Paul Landau, 2005, ISBN 2-268-05317-2
• Jonathan Laurence, "The Prophet of Moderation: Tariq Ramadan's Quest to Reclaim Islam" 'Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2007).
• Jack-Alain Léger, Tartuffe fait Ramadan, Denoël, 2003,
• À contre Coran, livre de Jack-Alain Léger, mars 2004, collection « Hors de moi », éditions HC
• Andrew F. March, "Reading Tariq Ramadan: Political Liberalism, Islam and 'Overlapping Consensus'," Ethics and International Affairs, Volume 21.4 (Winter 2007).
  • "Law as a Vanishing Mediator in the Theological Ethics of Tariq Ramadan," European Journal of Political Theory, (Vol. 10, No. 2, April 2011, pp. 177-201.).
  • "The Post-Legal Ethics of Tariq Ramadan: Persuasion and Performance in 'Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation' (A Review Essay)," Middle East Law and Governance, (2010).
• Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan ?, Aziz Zemouri; ISBN 2-84187-647-0
• Tariq Ramadan on the Arab Spring: A Revolution in Suspense

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Tariq Ramadan

• Official website
• Tariq Ramadan audio and video lectures from Halal Tube
• Tariq Ramadan argues for a new understanding of what it means to be a “moderate” Muslim
• Tariq Ramadan Debates Moustafa Bayoumi on Proposed Islamic Center Near Ground Zero – video by Democracy Now!

Ghazali (Arabic: غزالي‎‎) is an Arabic surname, it may refer to:

• Abu Hamed Mohammad ibn Mohammad Ghazali, Persian philosopher
• Ahmad Ghazali, Persian mystic
• Mohammed Ghazali, Pakistani cricketer
• Mohammed al-Ghazali, Islamic cleric
• Nazem Al-Ghazali, Iraqi singer
• Rustum Ghazali, Syrian politician
• Youcef Ghazali, Algerian footballer
• Zainab al Ghazali, Egyptian activist

This page or section lists people with the surname Ghazali. If an internal link intending to refer to a specific person led you to this page, you may wish to change that link by adding the person's given name(s) to the link.

Mohammad Mosaddegh
60th and 62nd Prime Minister of Iran
In office 28 April 1951 – 16 July 1952
Monarch	Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
Deputy	Hossein Fatemi
Preceded by	Hossein Ala'
Succeeded by	Ahmad Qavam
In office 21 July 1952 – 19 August 1953
Monarch	Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
Deputy	Ahmad Zirakzadeh
Preceded by	Ahmad Qavam
Succeeded by	Fazlollah Zahedi
Leader of National Front
In office 1 January 1949 – 5 March 1967
Deputy	Karim Sanjabi
Preceded by	Party created
Succeeded by	Karim Sanjabi
Member of Parliament of Iran
In office 1 May 1920 – 1 May 1948
Constituency	Tehran
Personal details
Born	(1882-06-16)16 June 1882 Tehran, Iran
Died	5 March 1967(1967-03-05) (aged 84) Ahmadabad-e Mosaddeq, Iran
Political party	National Front
Spouse(s)	Zia od-Saltane (1901-1965)
Children	5
Religion	Shi'a Islam
Signature

Mohammad Mosaddegh or Mosaddeq (Persian: محمد مصدق‎, IPA: [mohæmˈmæd(-e) mosædˈdeɣ] ( listen)*), also spelled Mossadegh, Mossadeq, Mosadeck, or Musaddiq (16 June 1882 – 5 March 1967), was the Prime Minister of Iran from 1951 until being overthrown in a coup d'état in 1953.

His administration introduced a wide range of social and political reforms but is most notable for its nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, which had been under British control since 1913 through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC/AIOC) (later British Petroleum or BP).^[1]

Mosaddegh was removed from power in a coup on 19 August 1953, organised and carried out by the United States CIA at the request of the British MI6 which chose Iranian General Fazlollah Zahedi to succeed Mosaddegh.^[2]

The coup is sometimes known as the TPAJAX Project^[3] after its CIA cryptonym, however, in Iran it is referred to as the 28 Mordad 1332 coup, after its date on the Iranian calendar.^[4], which is incorrect as the Operation's proper name was TPAjax (TP standing for Tudeh Party of Iran the Russian backed communist party of Iran} Mosaddegh was imprisoned for three years, then put under house arrest until his death.

Early life[link]

Mossadegh was born to a prominent family in Tehran in 1882; his father, Mirza Hideyatu'llah Khan, a Bakhtiari tribesman, was a financial administrator in Khorasan province under the Qajar dynasty and his mother, Shahzadi Malika Taj Khanum, was the granddaughter of the reformist Qajar prince Abbas Mirza, and a great granddaughter of Fat′h-Ali Shah Qajar.^[5][6][7] When Mosaddegh's father died in 1892, his uncle was appointed the tax collector of the Khorasan province and was bestowed with the title of Mosaddegh-os-Saltaneh by Nasser al-Din Shah.^[8] Mosaddegh himself later bore the same title, by which he was still known to some long after titles were abolished.^[9]

In 1901, Mosaddegh married Zahra Khanum (1879–1965), a granddaughter of Nasser al-Din Shah through her mother. The couple had five children, two sons (Ahmad and Ghulam Hussein) and three daughters (Mansura, Zia Ashraf and Khadija).

Education[link]

A young Mosaddegh

Mosaddegh received his Licence en Droit as well as his Doctor of law from the University of Neuchâtel in Switzerland.

Mosaddegh also taught at the University of Tehran at the start of World War I before beginning his long political career.^[10]

Early political career[link]

Mosaddegh started his political career with the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905/07. At the age of 24, he was elected from Isfahan to the newly inaugurated Persian Parliament, the Majlis of Iran. During this period he also served as deputy leader of the Humanitarian Society, Jameeyate Ensaniat, under Mostowfi ol-Mamalek.^[11] In protest of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, he relocated to Switzerland, from where he returned the following year after being invited by the new Iranian Prime Minister, Hassan Pirnia (Moshir-ed-Dowleh), to become his Minister of Justice. While en-route to Tehran, he was asked by the people of Shiraz to become the Governor of the Fars Province. He was later appointed Finance Minister, in the government of Ahmad Qavam (Qavam os-Saltaneh) in 1921, and then Foreign Minister in the government of Moshir-ed-Dowleh in June 1923. He then became Governor of the Azerbaijan Province. In 1923, he was re-elected to the Majlis.

In 1925, the supporters of Reza Khan in the Majlis, proposed legislation to dissolve the Qajar dynasty and appoint Reza Khan the new Shah. Mossadegh voted against such a move, arguing that such an act was a subversion of the 1906 Iranian constitution. He gave a speech in the Majlis, praising Reza Khan's achievements as a statesman, while encouraging him to respect the constitution and become the Prime Minister, not the Shah. On December 12, 1925, the Majlis deposed the young Shah Ahmad Shah Qajar, and declared Reza Shah the new monarch of the Imperial State of Persia, and the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty.^[12]

In 1941 Reza Shah Pahlavi was forced to abdicate in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi by the British. In 1944, Mosaddegh was once again elected to parliament. This time he took the lead of Jebhe Melli (National Front of Iran), an organisation he had founded with nineteen others such as Hossein Fatemi, Ahmad Zirakzadeh, Ali Shayegan and Karim Sanjabi, aiming to establish democracy and end the foreign presence in Iranian politics, especially by nationalising the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's (AIOC) operations in Iran.

Prime minister[link]

Support for oil nationalization[link]

Most of Iran's oil reserves were in the Persian Gulf area and had been developed by the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) for export to Britain. For a number of reasons — a growing consciousness of how little Iran was getting from the AIOC for its oil; refusal of the AIOC to offer of a ‘50–50% profit sharing deal' to Iran as Aramco had to Saudi Arabia; anger over Iran's defeat and occupation by the Allied powers — nationalization of oil was an important and popular issue with "a broad cross-section of the Iranian people."^[13]

General Haj-Ali Razmara, the Shah's choice, was approved as prime minister June 1950. On 3 March 1951 he appeared before the Majlis (parliament) in an attempt to persuade the deputies against "full nationalization on the grounds that Iran could not override its international obligations and lacked the capacity to run the oil industry on its own." He was assassinated four days later while praying in the mosque by Khalil Tahmasebi, a member of the militant fundamentalist group Fadayan-e Islam.^[14] This order of events, while appearing in many mainstream historical accounts, confronts countervailing evidence. Firstly, "[US]embassy staffers early on speculated that Razmara might either be assassinated or become involved in a power struggle with the Shah."^[15] These two concerns appear to converge according to Stephen Kinzer, who notes that:

“[e]vidence emerged to suggest that the fatal shot had been fired not by Tahmasibi but by a soldier acting on behalf of the Shah or members of his inner circle, and that Asadollah Alam had knowingly driven him to his fatal rendezvous. Years later a retired Iranian colonel wrote in his memoir that the fatal shot had come from a Colt revolver, available only to soldiers. “An army sergeant, in civilian clothes, was chosen for the deed”, he asserted. “He had been told to shoot and kill Razmara with a Colt, the moment Tahmasibi began to shoot… Those who had examined the wounds in Razmara’s body were in no doubt that he had been killed by a Colt bullet, not by the bullet of a weak gun.”^[16][17]

While this account is corroborated by several other studies,^[18] it remains a point of contention among historians. After negotiations for higher oil royalties failed, on 15 March and 20 March 1951, the Iranian Majlis and Senate voted to nationalize the British-owned and operated AIOC, taking control of Iran's oil industry.

Another force for nationalization was the Tudeh or Communist party. In early April 1951 the party organised nationwide strikes and riots in protest against delays in nationalization of the oil industry along with low wages and bad housing in the oil industry. This display of strength, along with public celebration at the assassination of General Razmara made an impact on the deputies of the Majlis.^[19]

Election as prime minister[link]

On 28 April 1951, the Majlis (Parliament of Iran) named Mosaddegh as new prime minister by a vote of 79–12. Aware of Mosaddegh's rising popularity and political power, the young Shah appointed Mosaddegh to the Premiership.

The new administration introduced a wide range of social reforms: Unemployment compensation was introduced, factory owners were ordered to pay benefits to sick and injured workers, and peasants were freed from forced labor in their landlords' estates. Twenty percent of the money landlords received in rent was placed in a fund to pay for development projects such as public baths, rural housing, and pest control.^[20]

On 1 May, Mosaddegh nationalized the AIOC, cancelling its oil concession due to expire in 1993 and expropriating its assets. The next month a committee of five majlis deputies was sent to Khuzistan to enforce the nationalization.^[21][22] Mosaddegh explained his nationalisation policy in a 21 June 1951 speech:

The confrontation between Iran and Britain escalated as Mosaddegh's government refused to allow the British any involvement in Iran's oil industry, and Britain made sure Iran could sell no oil. In July, Mosaddegh broke off negotiations with AIOC after it threatened "to pull out its employees", and told owners of oil tanker ships that "receipts from the Iranian government would not be accepted on the world market." Two months later the AIOC evacuated its technicians and closed down the oil installations. Under nationalized management many refineries lacked the trained technicians that were needed to continue production. The British government announced a de facto blockade, reinforced its naval force in the Persian Gulf and lodged complaints against Iran before the United Nations Security Council.^[21]

Mosaddegh shaking hands with Mohammad-Reza Shah in their first meeting after Mossadegh's election as Prime Minister

The British government also threatened legal action against purchasers of oil produced in the formerly British-controlled refineries and obtained an agreement with its sister international oil companies not to fill in where the AIOC was boycotting Iran. The entire Iranian oil industry came to a virtual standstill, oil production dropping from 241,400,000 barrels (38,380,000 m³) in 1950 to 10,600,000 barrels (1,690,000 m³) in 1952. This Abadan Crisis reduced Iran's oil income to almost nil, putting a severe strain on the implementation of Mosaddegh's promised domestic reforms. At the same time BP and Aramco doubled their production in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq, to make up for lost production in Iran so that no hardship was felt in Britain.

Still enormously popular in late 1951, Mosaddegh called elections. His base of support was in urban areas and not in the provinces.^[24] This fact was reflected in the rejection of Mosaddegh's bill for electoral reform (which no longer disqualified illiterates from electoral participation) by the conservative bloc, on the grounds that it would "unjustly discriminate patriots who had been voting for the last forty years".^[25]

According to Ervand Abrahamian: "Realizing that the opposition would take the vast majority of the provincial seats, Mosaddegh stopped the voting as soon as 79 deputies – just enough to form a parliamentary quorum — had been elected."^[26] An alternative account is offered by Stephen Kinzer. Beginning in the early 1950s under the guidance of C.M. Woodhouse, chief of the British intelligence station in Tehran, Britain's covert operations network had funneled roughly £10,000 per month to the Rashidian brothers (two of Iran's most influential royalists) in the hope of buying off, according to CIA estimates, "the armed forces, the Majlis (Iranian parliament), religious leaders, the press, street gangs, politicians and other influential figures".^[27] Thus, in his statement asserting electoral manipulation by "foreign agents", Mosaddegh suspended the elections. His National Front party had made up 30 of the 79 deputies elected. Yet none of those present vetoed the statement, and the elections were postponed indefinitely. The 17th Majlis convened on February 1952.

Tension soon began to escalate in the Majlis. Conservative opponents refused to grant Mosaddegh special powers to deal with the economic crisis caused by the sharp drop in revenue and voiced regional grievances against the capital Tehran, while the National Front waged "a propaganda war against the landed upper class".^[24]

Resignation and uprising[link]

On 16 July 1952, during the royal approval of his new cabinet, Mosaddegh insisted on the constitutional prerogative of the prime minister to name a Minister of War and the Chief of Staff, something the Shah had done hitherto. The Shah refused, and Mosaddegh announced his resignation appealing directly to the public for support, pronouncing that "in the present situation, the struggle started by the Iranian people cannot be brought to a victorious conclusion".^[28]

Veteran politician Ahmad Qavam (also known as Ghavam os-Saltaneh) was appointed as Iran's new prime minister. On the day of his appointment, he announced his intention to resume negotiations with the British to end the oil dispute, a reversal of Mosaddegh's policy. The National Front — along with various Nationalist, Islamist, and socialist parties and groups^[29] — including Tudeh — responded by calling for protests, strikes and mass demonstrations in favor of Mosaddegh. Major strikes broke out in all of Iran's major towns, with the Bazaar closing down in Tehran. Over 250 demonstrators in Tehran, Hamadan, Ahvaz, Isfahan, and Kermanshah were killed or suffered serious injuries.^[30]

After five days of mass demonstrations on Siyeh-i Tir (the 30th of Tir on the Iranian calendar), military commanders ordered their troops back to barracks, fearful of overstraining the enlisted men's loyalty and left Tehran in the hands of the protesters.^[31] Frightened by the unrest, Shah dismissed Qavam and re-appointed Mosaddegh, granting him the full control of the military he had previously demanded.

Reinstatement and emergency powers[link]

More popular than ever, a greatly strengthened Mosaddegh convinced parliament to grant him emergency powers for six months "to decree any law he felt necessary for obtaining not only financial solvency, but also electoral, judicial, and educational reforms".^[32] Mosaddegh appointed Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani as house speaker. Kashani's Islamic scholars, as well as the Tudeh Party, proved to be two of Mosaddegh's key political allies, although relations with both were often strained.

With his emergency powers, Mosaddegh tried to strengthen the democratic political institutions by limiting the monarchy's unconstitutional powers,^[33] cutting Shah's personal budget, forbidding him to communicate directly with foreign diplomats, transferring royal lands back to the state and expelling his politically active sister Ashraf Pahlavi.^[31]

In January 1953 Mosaddegh successfully pressed Parliament to extend "emergency powers for another 12 months". With these powers, he decreed a land reform law that established village councils and increased the peasants' share of production.^[32] This weakened the landed aristocracy, abolishing Iran's centuries-old feudal agriculture sector, replacing it with a system of collective farming and government land ownership. Mosaddegh saw these reforms as a means of checking the power of the Tudeh Party, which had been agitating for general land reform among the peasants.

However, during this time Iranians were "becoming poorer and unhappier by the day" thanks to the British boycott. Mosaddegh's political coalition began to fray, his enemies increased in number.^[34]

Partly through the efforts of Iranians working as British agents, several former members of Mosaddegh's coalition turned against him. They included Mozzafar Baghai, head of the worker-based Toilers party; Hussein Makki, who had helped lead the takeover of the Abadan refinery and was at one point considered Mosadegh's heir apparent; and most outspokenly Ayatollah Kashani, who damned Mosaddegh with the "vitriol he had once reserved for the British".^[35]

Overthrow of Mosaddegh[link]

Plot to depose Mosaddegh[link]

Soldiers surround the Parliament building in Tehran on 19 August 1953.

The British government had grown increasingly distressed over Mosaddegh's policies and were especially bitter over the loss of their control of the Iranian oil industry. Repeated attempts to reach a settlement had failed and in October 1952, Mosaddegh declared Britain an enemy, and cut all diplomatic relations.^[36]

Engulfed in a whole range of problems following World War II, Britain was unable to resolve the issue single-handedly and looked towards the United States to settle the issue. Initially America had opposed British policies. After U.S. mediation had failed several times to bring about a settlement, American Secretary of State Dean Acheson concluded that the British were "destructive and determined on a rule or ruin policy in Iran."^[37]

The American position shifted in late 1952, when Dwight D. Eisenhower had been elected U.S. President. In November and December, British intelligence officials suggested to American intelligence that the prime minister should be ousted. British prime minister Winston Churchill suggested to the incoming Eisenhower administration that Mossadegh, despite his open disgust with socialism, was, or would become, dependent on the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party,^[38] resulting in Iran "increasingly turning towards communism" and towards the Soviet sphere at a time of high Cold War fears.^{[39][40][41][42]} After the Eisenhower administration had entered office in early 1953, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to work together toward Mosaddegh's removal and began to publicly denounce Mosaddegh's policies for Iran as harmful to the country. In the meantime the already precarious alliance between Mosaddegh and Kashani was severed in January 1953, when Kashani opposed Mosaddegh's demand that his increased powers be extended for a period of one year.

Operation Ajax[link]

Mosaddegh at the Tomb of the Unknowns in Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia.

In March 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles directed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was headed by his younger brother Allen Dulles, to draft plans to overthrow Mosaddegh.^[43] On 4 April 1953, Allen Dulles approved US$1 million to be used "in any way that would bring about the fall of Mosaddegh". Soon the CIA's Tehran station started to launch a propaganda campaign against Mosaddegh. Finally, according to The New York Times, in early June, American and British intelligence officials met again, this time in Beirut, and put the finishing touches on the strategy. Soon afterward, according to his later published accounts, the chief of the CIA's Near East and Africa division, Kermit Roosevelt, Jr. the grandson of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, arrived in Tehran to direct it.^[44] In 2000, The New York Times made partial publication of a leaked CIA document titled, Clandestine Service History – Overthrow of Premier Mosaddegh of Iran – November 1952-August 1953. This document describes the point-by-point planning of the coup by agent Donald Wilbur, and execution conducted by the American and British governments. The New York Times published this critical document with the names omitted. The New York Times also limited its publication to scanned image (bitmap) format, rather than machine-readable text. This document was eventually published properly – in text form, and fully unexpurgated. The complete CIA document is now web published. The word ‘blowback' appeared for the very first time in this document.

The plot, known as Operation Ajax, centered on convincing Iran's monarch to issue a decree to dismiss Mosaddegh from office, as he had attempted some months earlier. But the Shah was terrified to attempt such a dangerously unpopular move, and it would take much persuasion and many U.S. funded meetings, which included bribing his sister Ashraf to successfully change his mind.^[45]

Mosaddegh became aware of the plots against him and grew increasingly wary of conspirators acting within his government.^[46] According to Dr. Donald N. Wilber, who was involved in the plot to remove Mossadegh from power, in early August, Iranian CIA operatives pretending to be socialists and nationalists threatened Muslim leaders with "savage punishment if they opposed Mossadegh," thereby giving the impression that Mossadegh was cracking down on dissent, and stirring anti-Mossadegh sentiments within the religious community. A referendum to dissolve parliament and give the prime minister power to make law was submitted to voters, and it passed with 99 percent approval, 2,043,300 votes to 1300 votes against.^[47] According to Mark J. Gasiorowski, "There were separate polling stations for yes and no votes, producing sharp criticism of Mosaddeq" and that the "controversial referendum...gave the CIA's precoup propaganda campaign an easy target". On or around Aug. 16, Parliament was suspended indefinitely, and Mosaddeq's emergency powers were extended.

Overthrow[link]

In August 1953, the Shah finally agreed to Mossadegh's overthrow, after Roosevelt told that the U.S. would proceed with him or without him^[48] and formally dismissed the Prime Minister in a written decree, an act explicitly permitted under the constitution.^[49] As a precautionary measure, he flew to Baghdad and from there hid safely in Rome. He actually signed two decrees, one dismissing Mosaddegh and the other nominating the CIA's choice, General Fazlollah Zahedi, as Prime Minister. These decrees, called Farmāns, were specifically written as dictated by Donald Wilbur the CIA architect of the plan, which were designed as a major part of Wilbur's strategy to give the impression of legitimacy to the secret coup, as can be read in the declassified plan itself which bears his name. Wilbur was later given a letter of commendation by Alan Dulles, CIA head, for his work. It too is now declassified, and appears in Wilbur's autobiography.^{[citation needed]}

Tehran strongman Shaban Jafari played a major role in Mossadegh's overthrow.

Soon, massive protests, engineered by Roosevelt's team, took place across the city and elsewhere with tribesmen paid to be at the ready to assist the coup. Anti- and pro-monarchy protesters, both paid by Roosevelt,^[48] violently clashed in the streets, looting and burning mosques and newspapers, leaving almost 300 dead. The pro-monarchy leadership, chosen, hidden and finally unleashed at the right moment by the CIA team, led by retired army General and former Minister of Interior in Mosaddegh's cabinet, Fazlollah Zahedi joined with underground figures such as the Rashidian brothers and local strongman Shaban Jafari,^[50] to gain the upper hand on 19 August 1953 (28 Mordad). The military joined on cue: pro-Shah tank regiments stormed the capital and bombarded the prime minister's official residence, on Roosevelt's cue, according to his book. Mosaddegh managed to flee from the mob that set in to ransack his house, and, the following day, surrendered to General Zahedi, who was meanwhile set up by the CIA with makeshift headquarters at the Officers' Club. Mosaddegh was arrested at the Officers' Club and transferred to a military jail shortly after.^[51] On 22 August, the Shah returned from exile.

Zahedi's new government soon reached an agreement with foreign oil companies to form a consortium and "restore the flow of Iranian oil to world markets in substantial quantities", giving the U.S. and Great Britain the lion's share of Iran's oil. In return, the U.S. massively funded the Shah's resulting government, including his army and secret police force, SAVAK, until the Shah's overthrow in 1979.^[52] Mosaddegh's supporters were rounded up, tortured or executed. The minister of Foreign Affairs and the closest associate of Mosaddegh, Hossein Fatemi, was executed by order of the Shah's military court. The order was carried out by firing squad on October 29, 1953.^[53]

Trial and final years[link]

Shortly after the Shah's return, Mosaddegh was tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. On December 21, 1953, he was sentenced to death but his sentence was later commuted to three years' solitary confinement in a military prison. Afterwards, he was kept under house arrest at his Ahmadabad residence, where he died on 5 March 1967.^{[54][55][56][57]}

Legacy[link]

Iran[link]

The secret U.S. overthrow of Mosaddegh served as a rallying point in anti-US protests during the 1979 Iranian Revolution and to this day he is said to be one of the most popular figures in Iranian history.^[58] Despite this, he is generally ignored by the government of the Islamic Republic because of his secularism and western manners.^[59]

The withdrawal of support for Mosaddegh by the powerful Shia clergy has been regarded as having been motivated by their fear of the chaos of a communist takeover.^[60] Some argue that while many elements of Mosaddegh's coalition abandoned him it was the loss of support from Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani and other clergy that was fatal to his cause, reflective of the dominance of the Ulema in Iranian society and a portent of the Islamic Revolution to come. The loss of the political clerics effectively cut Mosaddegh's connections with the lower middle classes and the Iranian masses which are crucial to any popular movement in Iran.^[61]

U.S. and other countries[link]

Prime Minister Mosaddegh with US President Truman in 1951

The US role in Mosaddegh's overthrow was not formally acknowledged for many years, although the Eisenhower administration vehemently opposed Mossadegh's policies. President Eisenhower wrote angrily about Mosaddegh in his memoirs, describing him as impractical and naive. However, Eisenhower did not admit any involvement with the coup.

Eventually the CIA's involvement with the coup was exposed. This caused controversy within the organization and the CIA congressional hearings of the 1970s. CIA supporters maintained that the coup was strategically necessary, and praised the efficiency of the agents responsible. Critics say the scheme was paranoid, colonial, illegal, and immoral—and truly caused the "blowback" suggested in the pre-coup analysis. The extent of this "blowback," over time, was not completely clear to the CIA, as they had an inaccurate picture of the stability of the Shah's regime. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 caught the CIA and the US very much off guard (as CIA reporting a mere month earlier predicted no imminent insurrectionary turbulence whatsoever for the Shah's regime), and resulted in the overthrow of the Shah (himself a non-democratic ruler) by a fundamentalist, non-democratic faction opposed to the US, headed by Ayatollah Khomeini. In retrospect, not only did the CIA and the US underestimate the extent of popular discontent for the Shah, but much of that discontent historically stemmed from the removal of Mosaddegh and the subsequent clientelism of the Shah. The US-backed coup, in effect, had ended Iran's last fully democratic government, and there would be no return of democracy even after the Shah's removal.

In March 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated her regret that Mosaddegh was ousted: "The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development and it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America." In the same year, The New York Times published a detailed report about the coup based on declassified CIA documents.^[2]

Due to his worldwide popularity, defiance of Britain, and fight for democracy, Mosaddegh was named as Time Magazine's 1951 Man of the Year. Others considered for that year's title included Dean Acheson, General (and future President) Dwight D. Eisenhower and General Douglas MacArthur.^[62]

In early 2004, the Egyptian government changed a street name in Cairo from Pahlavi to Mosaddegh to improve relations with Iran.

Mosaddegh in the media[link]

The figure of Mohammad Mosaddegh is an important element in the 2003 French TV production Soraya,^[63] which deals with the life of the Shah's second wife and former Queen of Iran, Princess Soraya Esfandiary Bakhtiari. Mosaddegh's role is played by the French actor Claude Brasseur.

An independent video game called The Cat and the Coup was released in 2011. It features the player playing as Mosaddegh's cat reversing Mossaddegh's life to the beginning.

During the debates with the 2012 Presidential candidates, Texas congressman Ron Paul stated the reason why Iran has resorted to becoming a theocratic dictatorship was because of the CIA backed Coup in 1953 overthrowing Mohammad Mosaddegh which led up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution causing many problems over the last 30 years ^[64]

See also[link]

• 1953 Iranian coup d'état
• Anglo Iranian Oil Company
• Operation Ajax
• Abolhassan Diba
• Hossein Fatemi
• Dariush Forouhar
• List of Iranian intellectuals
• Abadan Crisis timeline

References[link]

• In pronouncing his name, Mohammad Mosaddegh, (Persian: محمد مصدّق‎, IPA: [mohæmˈmæd(-e) mosædˈdeɣ] ( listen) the -[e] is the Izāfa, which is a grammatical marker linking two words together. It is not indicated in writing, and is not part of the name itself, but is used when a first and last name are used together.

Further reading[link]

• Abrahamian, Ervand, Khomeinism: essays on the Islamic Republic. Berkeley: University of California Press, c 1993. 0-520-08173-0
• Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions, By Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982
• Amir Taheri, The Persian Night: Iran under the Khomeinist Revolution. Encounter Books, 2009, ISBN 978-1-59403-240-0
• Farhad Diba, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh; A Political Biography. London: Croom Helm, 1986, ISBN 0-7099-4517-5
• Mostafa Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994, ISBN 0-8156-2642-8
• Mark Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran, Cornell University Press, 1991, ISBN 0-8014-2412-7
• Mary Ann Heiss, Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950–1954, Columbia University Press,1997, ISBN 0-231-10819-2
• Sattareh Farman Farmaian & Dona Munker, Daughter of Persia: A Woman's Journey from Her Father's Harem through the Islamic Revolution. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006. ISBN 0-307-33974-2
• Stephen Kinzer, All The Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley & Sons, 2003, ISBN 0-471-26517-9
• Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq, Times Books, 2006, ISBN 0-8050-7861-4
• Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, Yale University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-300-09856-1
• Homa Katouzian, Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran, I B Tauris & Co, 1991, ISBN 1-85043-210-4
• Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne. Translated into Persian as Mosaddegh va Coup de Etat by Ali Morshedizad, Ghasidehsara Pub. Co.
• Mark J. Gasiorowski, The 1953 Coup D'État in Iran, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 261–86 (1987). JSTOR
• Tom Gabbay, "The Tehran Conviction" William Morrow, (2009), ISBN 978-0-06-118860-2
• Mehdi Shamshiri: Zendegi Nameh Mohammad Mossadegh. (farsi) 2 ed. lulu.com. ISBN 978-0-578-08305-6.
• Christopher de Bellaigue, "Patriot of Persia". ISBN 978-1-84792-108-6.

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Mohammad Mosaddegh

Wikisource has original text related to this article: The Single Article Law of March 20, 1951

• Dr Mosasdegh's genealogy (Qajar website)
• (Persian) Ardeshir Zahedi website contains number of articles related to Mosaddegh
• James Risen: Secrets of History: The C.I.A. in Iran — A special report; How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79). The New York Times, 16 April 2000.
• New York Times Archive containing declassified US intelligence Documents on the Coup of 1953
• In Memory of 19 August 1953 by Sasan Fayazmanesh, 18 August 2003.
• Mosaddegh's photo album
• Mohammad Mosaddegh and the 1953 Coup in Iran Book and declassified documents from the National Security Archive, 22 June 2004
• The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup – U.S. National Security Archive
• An alternative view by Ardeshir Zahedi
• "50 Years After the CIA's First Overthrow of a Democratically Elected Foreign Government"
• How to Overthrow A Government: The 1953 U.S. Coup in Iran
• A short account of 1953 Coup in Iran
• The Sunday Herald, Over A Barrel
• Fariba Amini, Don't call me "Sir" – Mosaddegh: Humanity and integrity in government, The Iranian, 9 May 2001.
• Dr Mohammad Mossadeqs Lebenswerk und Kampf
• (Persian) A video of Dr. Mosaddegh's house in Ahmadabad

v t e Prime Ministers of Iran (List) Qajar dynasty (1906–1925) Nasrullah Khan · Amir Asghar Khan · Tonekaboni · Mafi · Hedayat · Kamran Mirza · Tonekaboni · Saad ad-Daula · Tonekaboni · Vosough · Mostowfi · Vosough · Tonekaboni · Saad ad-Daula · Mirza Mohammed-Ali Khan · Mostowfi · Farmanfarma · Majid Mirza · Mostowfi · Farmanfarma · Vosough · Mostowfi · Majid Mirza · Pirnia · Momtaz os-Saltaneh · Pirnia · Fathollah Khan Akbar · Tabatabaee · Qavam · Malek Mansur Mirza · Pirnia · Qavam · Mostowfi · Pirnia · Reza Khan Sardar Sepah Imperial State of Iran (1925–1979) Foroughi · Mostowfi · Hedayat · Foroughi · Jam · Matin-Daftari · A.Mansur · Foroughi · Soheili · Qavam · Soheili · Sa'ed · Bayat · Hakimi · Sadr · Hakimi · Qavam · Hekmat · Hakimi · Hazhir · Sa'ed · A.Mansur · Razmara · Ala' · Mosaddegh · Qavam · Mosaddegh · Zahedi · Ala' · Eghbal · Sharif-Emami · Amini · Alam · H.A.Mansur · Hoveida · Amouzegar · Sharif-Emami · Azhari · Bakhtiar Islamic Republic of Iran (1979–present) Bazargan · Rajai · Bahonar · Mahdavi Kani · Mousavi · Post Abolished (since 1989)