Suez Crisis The Tripartite Aggression The Sinai War
Part of the Cold War and the Arab–Israeli conflict
Damaged Egyptian equipment
Date 29 October (2012-10-29) – 7 November 1956 (Sinai under Israeli occupation until March 1957) Location Gaza Strip and Egypt (Sinai and Suez Canal zone) Result Egyptian and Soviet political victory Coalition military victory with subsequent forced Anglo-French withdrawal Israeli occupation of Sinai (until March 1957) United Nations cease-fire UNEF deployment in Sinai[1] Straits of Tiran re-opened to Israeli shipping Resignation of Anthony Eden as British Prime Minister. End of Britain's role as a Superpower[2][3][4] Guy Mollet's position as French Prime Minister heavily damaged and a major factor in his resignation five months after Eden's
Belligerents
Israel  United Kingdom France	Egypt Palestinian fedayeen
Commanders and leaders
Moshe Dayan Ariel Sharon Rafael Eitan Haim Bar-Lev Avraham Yoffe Israel Tal Mordechai Gur Avraham Adan Anthony Eden Charles Keightley Hugh Stockwell Manley Power Pierre Barjot Andre Beaufre Jacques Massu	Abdel Hakim Amer Saadedden Mutawally Sami Yassa Jaafar al-Abd Salahedin Moguy Raouf Mahfouz Zaki
Strength
175,000 45,000 34,000	300,000[5]
Casualties and losses
Israel: 231 killed[6] 899 wounded 4 captured[7] United Kingdom: 16 killed 96 wounded France: 10 killed 33 wounded	1650[8][9]-3,000 killed[10] 1000 civilians killed[8] 4,900 wounded 5000[11]-30,000+ captured[12]

The Suez Crisis, also referred to as the Tripartite Aggression or Suez War^[13][14] (Arabic: أزمة السويس – العدوان الثلاثي‎ ʾAzmat al-Sūwais / al-ʿUdwān al-Thulāthī; French: Crise du canal de Suez; Hebrew: מבצע קדש‎ Mivtza' Kadesh "Operation Kadesh," or מלחמת סיני Milẖemet Sinai, "Sinai War"), was a diplomatic and military confrontation in late 1956 between Egypt on one side, and Britain, France and Israel on the other, with the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations playing major roles in forcing Britain, France and Israel to withdraw.^[15]

Less than a day after Israel invaded Egypt, Britain and France issued a joint ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, and then began to bomb Cairo. Despite the denials of the Israeli, British and French governments, evidence began to emerge that the invasion of Egypt had been planned beforehand by the three powers.^[16] Anglo-French forces withdrew before the end of the year, but Israeli forces remained until March 1957, prolonging the crisis. In April, the canal was fully reopened to shipping, but other repercussions followed.

The attack followed the President of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision of 26 July 1956 to nationalize the Suez Canal, after the withdrawal of an offer by Britain and the United States to fund the building of the Aswan Dam, which was in response to Egypt's new ties with the Soviet Union and recognizing the People's Republic of China during the height of tensions between China and Taiwan.^[17] The aims of the attack were primarily to regain Western control of the canal and to remove Nasser from power.

The three allies, especially Israel, were mainly successful in attaining their immediate military objectives, but pressure from the United States and the USSR at the United Nations and elsewhere forced them to withdraw. As a result of the outside pressure Britain and France failed in their political and strategic aims of controlling the canal and removing Nasser from power. Israel fulfilled some of its objectives, such as attaining freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran. As a result of the conflict, the UNEF would police the Egyptian–Israeli border to prevent both sides from recommencing hostilities.

Some sources contend that the Crisis began on 26 July with the nationalisation of the Canal,^[18] and that the military actions by Britain, France and Israel were their response to the Crisis.

Background[link]

The location of the Suez Canal, which connects the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea.

The Suez Canal was opened in 1869, after ten years of work financed by the French and Egyptian governments.^[19] The canal was operated by the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal, an Egyptian-chartered company; the area surrounding the canal remained sovereign Egyptian territory and the only land-bridge between Africa and Asia.

The canal instantly became strategically important; it provided the shortest ocean link between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The canal eased commerce for trading nations and particularly helped European colonial powers to gain and govern their colonies.

In 1875, as a result of debt and financial crisis, the Egyptian ruler was forced to sell his shares in the canal operating company to the British government of Benjamin Disraeli. They were willing buyers and obtained a 44% share in the canal's operations for less than £4 million; this maintained the majority shareholdings of the mostly French private investors. With the 1882 invasion and occupation of Egypt, the United Kingdom took de facto control of the country as well as the canal proper, and its finances and operations. The 1888 Convention of Constantinople declared the canal a neutral zone under British protection.^[20] In ratifying it, the Ottoman Empire agreed to permit international shipping to pass freely through the canal, in time of war and peace.^[21] The Convention came into force in 1904, the same year as the Entente cordiale, between Britain and France.

Despite this convention, the strategic importance of the Suez Canal and its control were proven during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904—1905, after Japan and Britain entered into a separate bilateral agreement. Following the Japanese surprise attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet based at Port Arthur the Russians sent reinforcements from their fleet in the Baltic Sea. The British denied the Russian fleet use of the canal and forced it to steam around the entire continent of Africa, giving the Japanese forces time to solidify their position in the Far East.

The importance of the canal as a strategic intersection was again apparent during the First World War, when Britain and France closed the canal to non-Allied shipping. The attempt by German-Ottoman forces to storm the Canal in February 1915 led the British to commit 100,000 troops to the defense of Egypt for the rest of the First World War.^[22] The canal continued to be strategically important after the Second World War as a conduit for the shipment of oil.^[23] Petroleum business historian Daniel Yergin wrote of the period: "In 1948, the canal abruptly lost its traditional rationale.... [British] control over the canal could no longer be preserved on grounds that it was critical to the defence either of India or of an empire that was being liquidated. And yet, at exactly the same moment, the canal was gaining a new role – as the highway not of empire, but of oil.... By 1955, petroleum accounted for half of the canal's traffic, and, in turn, two thirds of Europe's oil passed through it.^[24]

At the time, Western Europe imported two million barrels (bbls) per day from the Middle East, 1,200,000 by tanker through the Canal, and another 800,000 via pipeline from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, where tankers received it. The US imported another 300,000 bbls. daily from the Middle East.^[25] Though pipelines linked the oil fields of Iraq and the Persian Gulf states to the Mediterranean, these routes were prone to suffer from instability, which led British leaders to prefer to use the sea route through the Suez Canal.^[23] As it was, the rise of super-tankers for shipping Middle East oil to Europe, which were too big to use the Suez Canal meant that British policy-makers greatly overestimated the importance of the canal.^[23] By 2000, only 8% of the imported oil in Britain arrived via the Suez canal with the rest coming via the Cape route.^[23]

In August 1956 the Royal Institute of International Affairs published a report titled "Britain and the Suez Canal" revealing government perception of the Suez area. It reiterates several times the strategic necessity of the Suez Canal to the United Kingdom, including the need to meet military obligations under the Manila Pact in the Far East and the Baghdad Pact in Iraq, Iran, or Pakistan. The report also points out how the canal was used in past wars and could be used in future wars to transport troops from the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand in the event of war in Europe. The report also cites the amount of material and oil which passes through the canal to the United Kingdom, and the economic consequences of the canal being put out of commission, concluding:

The possibility of the Canal being closed to troopships makes the question of the control and regime of the Canal as important to Britain today as it ever was.^[26]

Events leading to the Suez Crisis[link]

The examples and perspective in this article deal primarily with the United Kingdom and do not represent a worldwide view of the subject. Please improve this article and discuss the issue on the talk page. (April 2011)

Post-war years[link]

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Britain was reassessing its role in the region in light of the severe economic constraints and its colonial history. The economic potential of the Middle East, with its vast oil reserves, as well as the Suez Canal's geo-strategic importance against the background of the Cold War, prompted Britain to consolidate and strengthen its position there. The kingdoms of Egypt and Iraq were seen as vital to maintaining strong British influence in the region.

Britain's military strength was spread throughout the region, including the vast military complex at Suez with a garrison of some 80,000, making it one of the largest military installations in the world. The Suez base was considered an important part of Britain's strategic position in the Middle East; however, increasingly it became a source of growing tension in Anglo-Egyptian relations.^[27] Egypt's post-war domestic politics were experiencing a radical change, prompted in no small part by economic instability, inflation, and unemployment. Unrest began to manifest itself in the growth of radical political groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and an increasingly hostile attitude towards Britain and her presence in the country. Added to this anti-British fervour was the role Britain had played in the creation of Israel.^[27] As a result, the actions of the Egyptian government began to mirror those of its populace and an anti-British policy began to permeate Egypt's relations with Britain.

In October 1951, the Egyptian government unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the terms of which granted Britain a lease on the Suez base for 20 more years.^[28] Britain refused to withdraw from Suez, relying upon its treaty rights, as well as the sheer presence of the Suez garrison. The price of such a course of action was a steady escalation in increasingly violent hostility towards Britain and British troops in Egypt, which the Egyptian authorities did little to curb.

On 25 January 1952, British attempts to disarm a troublesome auxiliary police force barracks in Ismailia resulted in the deaths of 41 Egyptians.^[29] This in turn led to anti-Western riots in Cairo resulting in heavy damage to property and the deaths of several foreigners, including 11 British citizens.^[29] This proved to be a catalyst for the removal of the Egyptian monarchy. On 23 July 1952 a military coup by the 'Free Officers Movement'—led by Muhammad Neguib and future Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser—overthrew King Farouk and established an Egyptian republic.

Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, cargo shipments to and from Israel had been subject to Egyptian authorization, search and seizure while attempting to pass through the Suez Canal.^[30] On 1 September 1951, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 95 called upon Egypt: "... to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial ships and goods through the Suez Canal, wherever bound, and to cease all interference with such shipping." This interference and confiscation, contrary to the laws of the canal (Article 1 of the 1888 Suez Canal Convention), increased following the coup.^{[citation needed]}.

Post-revolution period[link]

Britain's desire to mend Anglo-Egyptian relations in the wake of the coup saw her strive for rapprochement throughout 1953 and 1954. Part of this process was the agreement, in 1953, to terminate British rule in Sudan by 1956 in return for Cairo's abandoning of its claim to suzerainty over the Nile Valley region. In October 1954, Britain and Egypt concluded an agreement on the phased evacuation of British troops from the Suez base, the terms of which agreed to withdrawal of all troops within 20 months, maintenance of the base to be continued, and for Britain to hold the right to return for seven years.^[31] The Suez Canal Company was not due to revert to the Egyptian government until 16 November 1968 under the terms of the treaty.^[32]

In the 1950s the Middle East was dominated by four different but overlapping struggles, each distinct from the other, but linked in various ways. The first was the geopolitical struggle for influence between the United States and the Soviet Union known as the Cold War. The second was the struggle between local nationalists against the two imperial powers, Britain and France. The third was the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the fourth was the struggle between different Arab states for the leadership of the Arab world. In regard to the latter, particulary venomous was the feud between Nasser and the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri el-Said, for Arab leadership, with the Cairo-based Voice of the Arabs radio station regularly calling for the overthrow of the government in Baghdad.^[33] The most important deteriminates of Egyptian foreign policy in this period was on the one hand, a determination to see the entire Middle East as Egypt's rightful sphere of influence, and on the other, a tendency on the part of Nasser to fortify his pan-Arabist and nationalist credibility by seeking to oppose any and all Western security initiatives in the Near East.^[34]

Despite the establishment of such an agreement with the British, Nasser's position remained tenuous. The loss of Egypt's claim to Sudan, coupled with the continued presence of Britain at Suez for a further two years, led to domestic unrest including an assassination attempt against him in October 1954. The tenuous nature of Nasser's rule caused him to believe that neither his regime, nor Egypt's independence would be safe until Egypt had established itself as head of the Arab world.^[35] This would manifest itself in the challenging of British Middle Eastern interests throughout 1955.

At the same time, the United States was attempting to woo Nasser into an alliance.^[36] The central problem for American policy in the Middle East was that this region was perceived as strategically important due to its oil, but the United States, weighed down by defense commitments in Europe and the Far East, lacked sufficient troops to resist a Soviet invasion of the Middle East.^[37] In 1952, General Omar Bradley of Joint Chiefs of Staff declared at a planning session about what to do in the event of a Soviet invasion of the Near East: "Where will the staff come from? It will take a lot of stuff to do a job there".^[37] As a consequence, American diplomats favored the creation of a NATO-type organization in the Near East to provide the necessary military power to deter the Soviets from invading the region.^[37] The Eisenhower administration, even more than the Truman administration saw the Near East as a huge gap into which Soviet influence could be projected, and accordingly required an American-supported security system.^[38] An American diplomat later recalled:

"It's hard to put ourselves back in this period. There was really a definite fear of hostilities, of an active Russian occupation of the Middle East physically, and you practically hear the Russian boots clumping down over the hot desert sands".^[39]

The projected Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) was to be centered around Egypt.^[40] A National Security Council directive of March 1953 called Egypt the "key" to the Near East and advised that Washington "...should develop Egypt as a point of strength".^[41]

A major dilemma for American policy was that the two strongest powers in the Near East, Britain and France, were also the nations whose influence many local nationalists most resented.^[37] From 1953 onwards, American diplomacy had attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the powers involved in the Near East, both local and imperial, to set aside their differences and unite against the Soviet Union.^[42] The Americans took the view that, just as fear of the Soviet Union had helped to end the historic Franco-German enmity, so too could anti-Communism end the more recent Arab-Israeli dispute. It was a source of constant puzzlement to American officials in the 1950s that the Arab states and the Israelis had seemed to have more interest in fighting each other rather that uniting against the Soviet Union. After his visit to the Middle East in May 1953 to drum up support for MEDO, the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles found much to his astonishment that the Arab states were "more fearful of Zionism than of the Communists".^[43]

The policy of the United States was colored by considerable uncertainty as to whom to befriend in the Near East. Americian policy was torn between a desire to maintain good relations with NATO allies such as Britain and France who were also major colonial powers, and a desire to align Third World nationalists with the Free World camp.^[44] Through it would be entirely false to describe the coup which deposed King Farouk in July 1952 as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) coup, Nasser and his Society of Free Officers were nonetheless in close contact with CIA operatives led by Miles Copeland beforehand (Nasser maintained links with any and all potential allies from the Egyptian Communist Party on the left to the Muslim Brotherhood on the right).^[45] Nasser's friendship with certain CIA officers in Cairo led Washington to vastly overestimate its influence in Egypt.^[46] The principle reason for Nasser's courting of the CIA before the July Revolution of 1952 was his hope that the Americians wold act a restraining influence on the British should Whitehall should decide on intervention to put an end to the revolution (until Egypt renounced it in 1951, the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty allowed Britian the right of intervention against all foreign and domestic threats).^[47] In turn, many American officials, such as Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, saw the continued British military presence in Egypt as anachronistic, and viewed the Revolutionary Command Council (as Nasser called his government after the coup) in a highly favorable light.^[48] Caffery was consistently very positive about Nasser in his reports to Washington right up until his departure from Cairo in 1955. The regime of King Farouk was viewed in Washington as weak, corrupt, unstable, and anti-American, so Free Officers' July coup was welcomed by the United States.^[49] As it was, Nasser's contacts with the CIA were not necessary to prevent British intervention against the July coup as Anglo-Egyptian relations had deteriorated so badly in 1951-52 that the British viewed any Egyptian goverment not headed by King Farouk as a huge improvement.^[50]

In May 1953, during a meeting with the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who asked Egypt to join an anti-Soviet alliance, Nasser responded by saying that the Soviet Union has

never occupied our territory..but the British have been here for seventy years. How can I go to my people and tell them I am disregarding a killer with a pistol sixty miles from me at the Suez Canal to worry about somebody who is holding a knife a thousand miles away?.^[36]

Dulles informed Nasser of his belief that the Soviet Union was seeking world conquest, that the principal danger to the Near East came from the Kremlin, and urged Nasser to set aside his differences with Britain to focus on countering the Soviet Union.^[36] In this spirit, Dulles suggested that the Nasser negotiate a deal that would see Egypt assume sovereignty over the Canal Zone base, but then allow the British to have "technical control" in the same way that Ford auto company provided parts and training to its Egyptian dealers.^[36]

Nasser did not share Dulles's fear of the Soviet Union taking over the Middle East, and insisted quite vehemently that he wanted to see the total end of all British influence not only in Egypt, but all the Middle East.^[36] The CIA offered Nasser a $3 million bribe if he would joined the proposed Middle East Defence Organization; Nasser took the money, but then refused to join.^[51] At most, Nasser made it clear to the Americans that he wanted an Egyptian-dominated Arab League to be the principle defense organization in the Near East, which might be informally associated with the United States, and most of all, he wanted the United States to supply arms on a generous scale to Egypt.^[52] Nasser refused to promise that any U.S. arms he might buy would not be used against Israel, and rejected out of hand the American demand for Military Advisory Group to be sent to Egypt as part of the price of arms sales.^[53]

After he returned to Washington, Dulles advised Eisenhower that the Arab states believed "the United States will back the new state of Israel in aggressive expansion. Our basic political problem...is to improve the Moslem states' attitudes towards Western democracies because our prestige in that area had been in constant decline ever since the war".^[54] The immediate consequence was a new policy of "evenhandedness" where the United States very publicly sided with the Arab states in several disputes with Israel in 1953-54.^[55] Moreover, Dulles did not share any sentimental regard for the Anglo-American "special relationship", which led the Americans to lean towards the Egyptian side in the Anglo-Egyptian disputes.^[56] During the extremely difficult negotiations over the British evacuation of the Suez Canal base in 1954-55, the Americans generally supported Egypt, through at the same time trying hard to limit the extent of the damage that this might cause to Anglo-American relations.^[57]

While the Americans were attempting to erect an alliance in the form of the still-born Middle East Defence Organization to keep the Soviet Union out of the Near East, the Soviet Union under the new leadership of Nikita Khrushchev was making a major effort to win influence in the so-called "third world".^[58] As part of the diplomatic offensive, Khrushchev had abandoned Moscow's traditional line of treating all non-communists as enemies and adopted a new tactic of befriending so-called "non-aligned" nations, which often led by leaders who were non-Communists, but in varying ways and degrees were hostile towards the West.^[58] Khrushchev had realized that by treating non-communists as being the same thing as being anti-communist, Moscow had needlessly alienated many potential friends over the years in the third world.^[58] Under the banner of anti-imperialism, Khrushchev made it clear that the Soviet Union would provide arms to any left-wing government in the third world as a way of undercutting Western influnce.^[59]

The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai who met Nasser at the 1955 Bandung Summit and was impressed by him, recommended that Khrushchev treat Nasser as a potential ally.^[58] Zhou described Nasser to Khrushchev as a young nationalist, who though no Communist, could if used correctly do much damage to Western interests in the Middle East. Marshal Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, who also come to know Nasser at Bandung told Khrushchev in a 1955 meeting that "Nasser was a young man without much political experience, but if we give him the benefit of the doubt, we might be able to exert a beneficial influence on him, both for the sake of the Communist movement, and...the Egyptian people".^[58] Traditionally, most of the equipment in the Egyptian military had come from Britain, but Nasser's desire to break British influence in Egypt meant that he was desperate to find a new source of weapons to replace Britain.^[60] Nasser had first broached the subject of buying weapons from the Soviet Union in 1954.^[61]

Instead of siding with either super-power, Nasser took the role of the spoiler and tried to play off the super-powers in order to have them compete with each other in attempts to buy his friendship.^[62] Nasser's first choice for buying weapons was the United States, but his frequent anti-Israeli speeches and his sponsorship for the fedayeen who were making raids into Israel had made it difficult for the Eisenhower administration to get the approval of Congress to sell weapons to Egypt. American public opinion was deeply hostile towards selling arms to Egypt that might be used against Israel, and moreover Eisenhower feared starting a Middle Eastern arms race.^[63] Nasser had let it be known in 1954-55 that he was considering buying weapons from the Soviet Union as a way of pressuring the Americans into selling him arms he desired.^[58] In 1950, in order to limit the extent that the Arabs and the Isrealis could engage in a arms race, the three nations which dominated the arms trade in the non-Communist world, namely the United States, the United Kingdom and France had signed the Tripartite Declaration, where they had committed themselves to limiting how many arms they could sell in the Near East, and also to ensuring that any arms sales to one side was matched by arms sales of equal quantity and quantity to the other.^[64] Eisenhower viewed the Tripartite Declaration, which sharply restricted how many arms Egypt could buy in the West, as one of the key elements in keeping the peace between Israel and the Arabs, and believed that settling off an arms race would inevitably led to a new war.

Nasser's hope was that faced with the prospect of Egypt buying Soviet weapons, and thus coming under Soviet influence the Eisenhower administration would be forced to sell Egypt the weapons he wanted.^[58] Khrushchev who very much wanted to win the Soviet Union influence in the Middle East, was more than ready to arm Egypt if the Americans proved unwilling.^[58] During secret talks with the Soviets in 1955, Nasser's demands for weapons were more than amply satisfied as the Soviet Union did not sign the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.^[65] The news in September 1955 of the Egyptian purchase of a huge quantity of Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia was greeted with shock and rage in the West, where this was seen as major increase in Soviet influence in the Near East.^[66]

In the same report of May 1953 to Eisenhower calling for "evenhandedness", Dulles stated that the Egyptians were not interested in joining the proposed MEDO; that the Arabs were more interested in their disputes with the British, the French, the Isrealis and each other then in standing against the Soviets; and that the "Northern Tier" states of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan were more useful as allies at present than Egypt.^[67] Accordingly, the best American policy towards Egypt was to work towards Arab-Isreali peace and the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the British Suez Canal base as the best way of securing Egypt's ultimate adhesion to an American sponsored alliance centered around the "Northern Tier" states.^[68] The "Northern Tier" alliance was achieved in early 1955 with the creation of the Baghdad Pact comprising Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq and the United Kingdom.^[69] The presence of the last two states was to the British desire to continue to maintain influence in the Middle East, and Nuri Said's wish to assoicate his country with the West as the best way of counter-balancing the increasing aggresssive Egyptian claims to regional predomiance.^[70] The conclusion of the Baghdad Pact occurred almost simultaneously with a dramatic Israeli raid on the Gaza Strip on February 28, 1955 in retaliation for fedayeen raids into Israel, during which the Israeli Unit 101 commanded by Ariel Sharon gave the Egyptian Army a bloody nose.^[71] The close occurrence of the two events was mistakenly interpreted by Nasser as part of coordinated Western effort to push him into joining the Baghdad Pact.^[72] The signing of the Baghdad Pact and the Gaza raid marked the beginning of the end of Nasser's once good relations with the Americans.^[73] In particular, Nasser saw Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact as a Western attempt to promote his archenemy Nuri al-Said as an alternative leader of the Arab world.^[74]

Britain's close relationship with the two Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan were of particular concern to Nasser. In particular, Iraq's increasingly amicable relations with Britain were a threat to Nasser's desire to see Egypt as head of the Arab world. The creation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 seemed to confirm Nasser's fears that Britain was attempting to draw the Eastern Arab World into a bloc centred upon Iraq, and sympathetic to Britain.^[75] Nasser's response was a series of challenges to British influence in the region that would culminate in the Suez Crisis.

The Travels of Mr. Anderson[link]

In January 1956 in an effort to end the incipient arms race in the Middle East set off by the Soviet Union selling Egypt arms on a scale unlimited by the Tripartite Declaration, which he saw as opening the Near East to Soviet influence, Eisenhower launched a major effort to make peace between Egypt and Israel. Eisenhower sent out his close friend Robert B. Anderson to serve as a secret envoy who would end the Arab-Isreali dispute once and for all.^[76] During his meetings with Nasser, Anderson offered bountiful quantities of American aid in exchange for a peace treaty with Isreal, only to see his offer rejected as unacceptable to Egypt.^[77] Andreson was no more successful in his talks with the Isreali Prime Minister David Ben Gurion.^[78] A second round of secret diplomacy by Anderson in February 1956 was equally fruitless.^[79] Nasser sometimes suggested during his talks with Anderson that he was interested in peace with Isreal if only the Americans would supply him with unlimited quantites of military and economic aid and ensure that Isreal accepted the return of the Palestinians displayed in 1948-49. It is not clear if Nasser was sincerely interested in peace, or just merely saying what the Americans wanted to hear in the hope of obtaining American funding for the Aswan high dam and American weapons. The truth will likely never to known as Nasser was an intensely secretive man, who managed to hide his true opinions on most issues from both contemporaries and historians.^[80] However, the British historian P.J. Vatikitos noted that Nasser's determination to promote Egypt as the world's foremost anti-Zionist state as a way of reinforcing his claim to Arab leadership did not bode well for the prospects of peace.^[81]

Frustration of British aims[link]

Throughout 1955 and 1956 Nasser pursued a number of policies that would frustrate British aims throughout the Middle East, and result in increasing hostility between Britain and Egypt. Nasser saw Iraq's inclusion in the Baghdad Pact as indicating that the United States and Britain had sided with his much hated archenemy Nuri as-Said's efforts to be the leader of the Arab world, and much of the motivation for Nasser's turn to active anti-Western policy staring in 1955 was due to his displeasure with the Baghdad Pact.^[82] For Nasser, attendance at such events as the Bandung conference in April 1955 served as the both the means of striking an posture as a global leader, and of playing hard to get in his talks with the Americans, especially his demand that the United States sell him vast quantities of arms.^[83] Nasser "... played on the widespread suspicion that any Western defence pact was merely veiled colonialism and that Arab disunity and weakness—especially in the struggle with Israel—was a consequence of British machinations."^[75] He also began to align Egypt with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia—whose rulers were hereditary enemies of the Hashemites—in an effort to frustrate British efforts to draw Syria, Jordan and Lebanon into the orbit of the Baghdad Pact. Nasser struck a further blow against Britain by negotiating an arms deal with communist Czechoslovakia in September 1955^[84] thereby ending Egypt's reliance on Western arms. Later, other members of the Warsaw Pact also sold arms to Egypt and Syria. In practice, all sales from the Eastern Bloc were authorised by the Soviet Union, as an attempt to increase Soviet influence over the Middle East. This caused tensions in the United States because Warsaw Pact nations now had a strong presence in the region.

Nasser frustrated British attempts to draw Jordan into the pact by sponsoring demonstrations in Amman, leading King Hussein to dismiss the British commander of the Arab Legion, Sir John Bagot Glubb (known to the Arabs as Glubb Pasha) in March 1956 and throwing Britain's Middle Eastern security policy into chaos.^[85] After one round of bloody rioting in December 1955 and another in March 1956 against Jordan joining the Baghdad Pact, both instigated by Cairo-based Voice of the Arabs radio station, Hussein believed his throne was in danger.^[86] In private, Hussein assured the British that he was still committed to continuing the traditional Hashemite alliance with Britain, and that his sacking of Glubb Pasha and all the other British officers in the Arab Legion were just gestures to appease the rioters. Eden was especially upset at the sacking of the Glubb Pasha, and as one British politician recalled:

"For Eden...this was the last straw...This reverse, he insisted was Nasser's doing...Nasser was our Enemy No. 1 in the Middle East and he would not rest until he destroyed all our friends and eliminated the last vestiges of our influence...Nasser must therefore be...destroyed"^[87].

After the sacking of Glubb Pasha, which he saw as a grievous blow to British influence, Eden become consumed with an obsessional hatred for Nasser, and from March 1956 onwards, was in private committed to the overthrowal of Nasser.^[88]

Increasingly Nasser came to be viewed in British circles – and in particular by Prime Minister Anthony Eden – as a dictator, akin to Benito Mussolini. Ironically, in the build up to the crisis, it was the Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell and the left-leaning tabloid newspaper The Mirror that first made the comparison between Nasser and Mussolini. Anglo-Egyptian relations would continue on their downward spiral.

At the same time, the French Premier Guy Mollet, who facing an increasing serious war in Algeria, where the rebels of the FLN were being supported by Egypt, had come to perceive Nasser as a major threat.^[89] During a visit to London in March 1956, Mollet told Eden that his country was faced with an Islamic threat to the very soul of France supported by the Soviet Union.^[89] Mollet stated that: "All this is in the works of Nasser, just as Hitler's policy was written down in Mein Kampf. Nasser has the ambition to recreate the conquests of Islam. But his present position is largely due to the policy of the West in building up and flattening him".^[89]

In May 1956, at a gathering of French veterans, where Louis Mangin, who was speaking in place of the Minister of Defence who was unable to attend the meeting, gave a violently anti-Nasser speech, comparing the Egyptian leader to Hitler, and accused Nasser of plotting to rule the entire Middle East and of seeking to annex Algeria, whose "people live in community with France".^[90] Mangin urged France to stand up to Nasser, and being a strong friend of Israel, urged an alliance with that nation against Egypt.^[91]

Nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the road to crisis[link]

Nasser announces the nationalization of the canal (Universal Newsreel, 30 July 1956).

Britain was eager to tame Nasser and looked towards the United States for support. However, President Eisenhower strongly opposed British-French military action.^[92] America's closest Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, was just as fundamentally opposed to the Hashemite-dominated Baghdad Pact as Egypt, and the U.S. was keen to increase its own influence in the region.^[93] The failure of the Baghdad Pact aided such a goal by reducing Britain's dominance over the region. "Great Britain would have preferred to overthrow Nasser; America, however uncomfortable with the 'Czech arms deal', thought it wiser to propitiate him."^[94]

The events that brought the crisis to a head occurred in the spring and summer of 1956. On 16 May, Nasser officially recognised the People's Republic of China, a move that angered the U.S. and its secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, a keen sponsor of Taiwan.^[85] This move, coupled with the impression that the project was beyond Egypt's economic capabilities, caused Eisenhower to withdraw all American financial aid for the Aswan Dam project on 19 July.^[85]

The Eisenhower administration took the view that if Nasser were able to secure Soviet economic support for the high dam, that would be beyond the capacity of the Soviet Union to support, and in turn would strain Soviet-Egyptian relations.^[95] Eisenhower wrote in March 1956 that "If Egypt finds herself thus isolated from the rest of the Arab world, and with no ally in sight except Soviet Russia, she would very quickly get sick of the prospect and would join us in the search for a just and decent peace in the region".^[95] Dulles told his brother, CIA director Allen Dulles "If they [the Soviets] do make this offer we can make a lot of use of it in propaganda within the satellite bloc. You don't get bread because you are being squeezed to build a dam".^[95]

Finally, the Eisenhower administration had became very annoyed at Nasser's efforts to play the United States off against the Soviet Union, and decided to call Nasser's bluff by refusing to finance the Aswan high dam with the intention of teaching Nasser a lesson. As early as September 1955, when Nasser announced the purchase of the Soviet military equipment via Czechoslovakia, Dulles had written that competing for Nasser's favour was probably going to be "an expensive process", one that Dulles wanted to avoid as much as possible.^[96]

Nationalisation[link]

Port Said, at the entrance to the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean.

Nasser's response was the nationalization of the Suez Canal. On 26 July, in a speech in Alexandria, Nasser gave a riposte to Dulles. During his speech he deliberately pronounced the name of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of the canal, a code-word for Egyptian forces to seize control of the canal and implement its nationalization.^[97] He announced that the Nationalization Law had been published, that all assets of the Suez Canal Company had been frozen, and that stockholders would be paid the price of their shares according to the day's closing price on the Paris Stock Exchange.^[98]

That same day, Egypt closed the canal to Israeli shipping.^[99] Egypt also closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, in contravention of the Constantinople Convention of 1888. Many argued that this was also a violation of the 1949 Armistice Agreements.^[100][101]

The nationalization of the Suez Canal hit British economic and military interests in the region. Prime Minister Anthony Eden was under immense domestic pressure from Conservative MPs who drew direct comparisons between the events of 1956 and those of the Munich Agreement in 1938. Since the US government did not support the British protests, the British government decided in favour of military intervention against Egypt to avoid the complete collapse of British prestige in the region.^[102]

Eden was hosting a dinner for King Feisal II of Iraq and his Prime Minister, Nuri es-Said, when he learned the Canal had been nationalised. They both unequivocally advised Eden to "hit Nasser hard, hit him soon, and hit him by yourself" – a stance shared by the vast majority of the British people in subsequent weeks. "There is a lot of humbug about Suez," Guy Millard, Eden's private secretary, later recorded. "People forget that the policy at the time was extremely popular." Opposition leader Hugh Gaitskell was also at the dinner. He immediately agreed that military action might be inevitable, but warned Eden would have to keep the Americans closely informed. Jo Grimond, who became Liberal Party leader that November, thought if Nasser went unchallenged the whole Middle East would go his way.^[103]

The French Premier Guy Mollet was outraged by Nasser's move, and was utterly determined that Nasser would not be allowed to get away with it.^[104] French public opinion was very supportive of Mollet, and besides for the Communists, all of the criticism of his government came from the right, who very publicly doubted that a socialist like Mollet had the guts to go to war with Nasser.^[104] During an interview with Henry Luce, Mollet held up a copy of Nasser's book The Philosophy of the Revolution and said: "This is Nasser's Mein Kampf. If we're too stupid not to read it, understand it and draw the obvious conclusions, then so much the worse for us".^[105]

On July 29, 1956, the French Cabinet had decided upon military action against Egypt in alliance with Israel, and Admiral Nomy of the French Naval General Staff was sent to Britain to inform the leaders of that country of what France had decided to, and to invite them to join if they were interested.^[105] At the same time, Mollet was very much offended by what he considered to be the lackadaisical attitude of the Eisenhower administration to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.^[106] This was especially the case because earlier in 1956 the Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had offered the French a deal in exchange for which Moscow ended its support of the FLN in Algeria, Paris would pull out of NATO and became neutral in the Cold War.^[106]

Given the way that the Algeria (which was considered to be intergal part of France) had become engulfed in a spiral of increasing savage violence that French leaders longed to put an end to, the Mollet cabinet had been tempted by Molotov's offer, but in the end, Mollet who was a firm Atlanticist had chosen to remain faithful towards NATO.^[106] In Mollet's view, his fidelity to NATO had earned him the right to expect firm American support against Egypt, and when that support was not forthcoming, he became an more determined that if the Americans were not willing to do anything about Nasser, then France would.^[106]

Direct military intervention, however, ran the risk of angering Washington and damaging Anglo-Arab relations. As a result, the British government concluded a secret military pact with France and Israel that was aimed at regaining control over the Suez Canal.

Anglo-Franco-American diplomacy[link]

1956 newsreels about the reactions to the nationalization.

On 1 August 1956, a tripartite meeting was opened at 10 Downing Street between British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, U.S. Ambassador Robert D. Murphy and French Foreign Affairs Minister Christian Pineau.^[107]

An alliance was soon formed between Eden and Guy Mollet, French Prime Minister, with headquarters based in London. General Hugh Stockwell and Admiral Barjot were appointed as Chief of Staff. Britain sought co-operation with the United States throughout 1956 to deal with what it maintained was a threat of an Israeli attack against Egypt, but to little effect. Between July and October 1956, unsuccessful initiatives encouraged by the United States were made to reduce the tension that would ultimately lead to war. International conferences were organised to secure agreement on Suez Canal operations but all were ultimately fruitless.

The Menzies Committee[link]

Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies led an international committee in negotiations with Nasser in September 1956, which sought to achieve international management of the Canal. The mission was a failure.

Following an 18 power London Conference - involving Australia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, West Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Britain, and the United States - the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, was despatched to Cairo to act as chairman of a committee charged with leading negotiations with Nasser.^[108]

Menzies, was an elder statesman of the British Commonwealth, who felt that Nasser's actions threatened trading nations like Australia. Menzies' argued publicly that Western powers had built the trade canal, but Egypt was now seeking to exclude them from a role in its ownership or management.^[108][109]

Menzies' September 7 official communique to Nasser presented a case for compensation for the Suez Canal Company and the "establishment of principles" for the future use of the Canal that would ensure that it would "continue to be an international waterway operated free of politics or national discrimination, and with financial structure so secure and an international confidence so high that an expanding and improving future for the Canal could be guaranteed" and called for a Convention to recognise Egyptian sovereignty of the Canal, but for the establishment of an international body to run the canal. Nasser saw such measures as a "derogation from Egyptian sovereignty" and rejected Menzies' proposals.^[108] Menzies hinted to Nasser that Britain and France might use force to resolve the crisis, but United States President Eisenhower openly opposed the use of force and Menzies left Egypt without success.^[109]

Protocol of Sèvres[link]

Three months after Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal company, a secret meeting took place at Sèvres, outside Paris. Britain and France enlisted Israeli support for an alliance against Egypt. The parties agreed that Israel would invade the Sinai. Britain and France would then intervene, purportedly to separate the warring Israeli and Egyptian forces, instructing both to withdraw to a distance of 16 kilometres from either side of the canal.^[110]

The British and French would then argue that Egypt's control of such an important route was too tenuous, and that it needed be placed under Anglo-French management. David Ben-Gurion did not trust the British in view of their treaty with Jordan and he was not initially in favour of the plan, since it would make Israel alone look like the aggressor; however he soon agreed to it since such a good opportunity to strike back at Egypt might never again present itself.^[111]

Motivation of the involved states[link]

The interests of the parties were various. Britain was anxious lest it lose efficient access to the remains of its empire. Both the French and the British felt that Nasser should be removed from power. The French "held the Egyptian president responsible for assisting the anticolonial rebellion in Algeria."^[112]

France was nervous about the growing influence that Nasser exerted on its North African colonies and protectorates. Both Britain and France were eager that the canal should remain open as an important conduit of oil. Israel wanted to reopen the Straits of Tiran leading to the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, and saw the opportunity to strengthen its southern border and to weaken what it saw as a dangerous and hostile state. This was particularly felt in the form of attacks injuring approximately 1,300 civilians emanating from the Egyptian-held Gaza Strip.^[113]

The Israelis were also deeply troubled by Egypt’s procurement of large amounts of Soviet weaponry that included 530 armored vehicles, of which 230 were tanks; 500 guns; 150 MiG 15 jet fighters; 50 Iluyshin-28 bombers; submarines and other naval craft. The influx of this advanced weaponry altered an already shaky balance of power.^[114] Additionally, Israel believed Egypt had formed a secret alliance with Jordan and Syria.^[115]

Washington disagreed with Paris and London on whether to use force to resolve the crisis. The United States worked hard through diplomatic channels to resolve the crisis without resorting to conflict. "The British and French reluctantly agreed to pursue the diplomatic avenue but viewed it as merely an attempt to buy time, during which they continued their military preparations."^[116] The British, Washington's closest ally, ignored Eisenhower's pointed warning that the American people would not accept a military solution.^[117]

Prior to the operation, London deliberately neglected to consult the Americans, trusting instead that Nasser's engagement with communist states would persuade the Americans to accept British and French actions if they were presented as a fait accompli. This proved to be a critical miscalculation. The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was taking high-altitude photos of the allied activities, and more details came from human sources in London, Paris and Tel Aviv. CIA chief Allen Dulles said that "intelligence was well alerted as to what Israel and then Britain and France were likely to do ... In fact, United States intelligence had kept the government informed".^[118]

Forces[link]

Britain[link]

Universal Newsreel from August 6 about the departure of British and French ships for Egypt.

British troops were well-trained, experienced, and had good morale, but suffered from the economic and technological limitations imposed by post-war austerity.^[119] The 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group, which was intended to be the main British strike force against Egypt, was heavily involved in the Cyprus Emergency, which led to a neglect of paratroop training in favour of counter-insurgency operations.^[119] The Royal Navy could project formidable power through the guns of its warships and aircraft flown from its carriers, but a shortage of landing craft proved to be a serious weakness.^[120]

It had just undergone a major and innovative carrier modernization program. The Royal Air Force (RAF) had just introduced two long-range bombers, the Vickers Valiant and the English Electric Canberra, but owing to their recent entry into service the RAF had not yet established proper bombing techniques for these aircraft.^[120] Despite this, General Sir Charles Keightley, the commander of the invasion force, believed that air power alone was sufficient to defeat Egypt.^[120] By contrast, Keightley's deputy General Hugh Stockwell believed that methodical and systematic armored operations centered around the Centurion battle tank would be the key to victory.^[121]

France[link]

French troops were experienced and well-trained but suffered from cutbacks imposed by post-war politics of economic austerity.^[122] In 1956, the French military was heavily involved in the Algerian war, which made operations against Egypt a major distraction.^[122] French paratroopers of the elite Regiment de Parachutistes Coloniaux (RPC) were extremely experienced, battle-hardened, and very tough soldiers, who had greatly distinguished themselves in the fighting in Indochina and in Algeria.^[122] The men of the RPC followed a "shoot first, ask questions later" policy towards civilians, first adopted in Vietnam, which was to lead to the killing of a number of Egyptian civilians.^[122] The rest of the French troops were described by the American military historian Derek Varble as "...competent, but not outstanding".^[122]

The main French (and Israeli) battle tank, the AMX-13, was designed for mobile, outflanking operations, which led to a tank that was lightly armoured but very fast.^[122] General André Beaufre, who served as Stockwell's subordinate favored a swift campaign of movement in which the main objective was to encircle the enemy.^[122] Throughout the operation, Beaufre proved himself be more aggressive than his British counterparts, always urging that some bold step be taken at once.^[122] The French Navy had a powerful carrier force which was excellent for projecting power inland, but, like its British counterpart, suffered from a lack of landing craft.^[122]

Israel[link]

American military historian Derek Varble called the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the "best" military force in the Middle East while at the same time suffering from "deficiencies" such as "immature doctrine, faulty logistics, and technical inadequacies".^[123] The IDF's Chief of Staff, Major General Moshe Dayan, encouraged aggression, initiative, and ingenuity amongst the Israeli officer corps while ignoring logistics and armoured operations.^[123] Dayan, a firm infantry man, preferred that arm of the service at the expense of armour, which Dayan saw as clumsy, pricey, and suffering from frequent breakdowns.^[123]

At the same time, the IDF had a rather disorganized logistics arm, which was put under severe strain when the IDF invaded the Sinai.^[123] Most of the IDF weapons in 1956 came from France.^[123] The main IDF tank was the AMX-13 and the main aircraft were the Dassault Mystère IVA and the Ouragan.^[124] Superior pilot training was to give the Israeli Air Force an unbeatable edge over their Egyptian opponents.^[123] The Israeli Navy consisted of two destroyers, seven frigates, eight minesweepers, several landing craft, and fourteen torpedo boats.

Egypt[link]

In the Egyptian military, politics rather than military competence was the main criterion for promotion.^[125] The Egyptian commander, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, was a purely political appointee who owed his position to his close friendship with Nasser. A heavy drinker, he would prove himself grossly incompetent as a general during the Crisis.^[125] In 1956, the Egyptian military was well equipped with weapons from the Soviet Union such as T-34 and JS-3 tanks, MiG-15 fighters, Ilyushin Il-28 bombers, SU-100 self-propelled guns and assault rifles.^[125]

Rigid lines between officers and men in the Egyptian Army led to a mutual "mistrust and contempt" between officers and the men who served under them.^[126] Egyptian troops were excellent in defensive operations, but had little capacity for offensive operations owning to the lack of "rapport and effective small-unit leadership".^[126]

Planning[link]