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- Agriculture in China
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Anhui
Coordinates: 31°50′N 117°0′E / 31.833°N 117°E / 31.833; 117
Anhui (Chinese: 安徽; pinyin: Ānhuī; Wade–Giles: An-hui, Mandarin pronunciation: [ánxwéi]) is a province in the People's Republic of China. Located in eastern China across the basins of the Yangtze River and the Huai River, it borders Jiangsu to the east, Zhejiang to the southeast, Jiangxi to the south, Hubei to the southwest, Henan to the northwest, and Shandong for a tiny section in the north. The capital of the province is Hefei.
The name "Anhui" derives from the names of two cities in south Anhui, Anqing and Huizhou (now Huangshan City). The abbreviation for Anhui is "皖" (Wǎn), because there were historically a State of Wan, a Mount Wan, and a Wan river in the province.
The province of Anhui was formed in the seventeenth century. Before then, there was no coherent concept of "Anhui". Northern Anhui was firmly a part of the North China Plain in terms of culture, together with modern-day Henan province. Central Anhui constituted most of the fertile and densely-populated Huai He River watershed. Southern Anhui, along the Yangtze, was closer to Hubei and southern Jiangsu provinces in culture. Finally, the hills of southeastern Anhui formed a unique and distinct cultural sphere of its own.
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Dalian
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Dingyuan County
Dingyuan County is a county of Anhui Province, China. It is under the administration of Chuzhou city.
Coordinates: 32°27′46″N 117°35′34″E / 32.46278°N 117.59278°E / 32.46278; 117.59278
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Fengyang County
Fengyang County is a county of Anhui Province, China. It is under the administration of Chuzhou, a prefecture-level city.
As most counties in China, Fengyang County is divided into towns (zhen) and townships (xiang). The county seat is in Fucheng Town.
Towns:
The only township is Huangwan Township (黄湾乡)
Some maps (maps.sogou.com) also show Xiangxi and Xiangnan townships just to the west and south of the county seat, respectively.
During the Xia, Shang and early Zhou dynasties, the Dongyi peoples inhabited this area and were collectively known as the Huaiyi after the Huai River. During the late Western Zhou Period and the early Spring and Autumn Period, the Dongyi became increasingly sinicized and formed their own states. During the late Spring and Autumn Period, the once-powerful Dongyi state of Xu was pressured from all directions and destroyed through a series of wars with its neighbors, such as the Chu State and the Wu State. Another Dongyi State was the small Zhongli State, which was a part of the Huaiyi Confederation led by the State of Xu. Tombs belonging to the royalty of the Zhongli State were discovered in excavations between 2005 and 2008 near Fengyang. Eventually, the Huaiyi peoples were either pushed south or assimilated.
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Liaoning
Coordinates: 41°06′N 122°18′E / 41.1°N 122.3°E / 41.1; 122.3
Liaoning (help·info) (simplified Chinese: 辽宁; traditional Chinese: 遼寧; pinyin: Liáoníng; Manchu: ᠯᡳᠶᠣᠣ ᠨᡳᠩ, Liyoo ning) is a province of the People's Republic of China, located in the northeast of the country. Its one-character abbreviation is "辽" (pinyin: liáo), a name taken from the Liao River that flows through the province. "Níng" means "peace". The modern province was established in 1907 as Fengtian province (奉天 pinyin: Fèngtiān; Postal map spelling: Fengtien; Manchu: ᠠᠪᡴᠠᡳ ᡳᠮᡳᠶᠠᠩᡤᠠ, Abkai imiyangga) and the name was changed to Liaoning in 1929. Under the Japanese puppet Manchukuo regime, the province reverted to its 1907 name, but the name Liaoning was restored in 1945.
Liaoning is located in the southern part of the Northeast, and is often called "the Golden Triangle" because of its superior geographical location, with the Yellow Sea (Korea Bay) and the Bohai Sea in the south, North Korea in the southeast, Jilin province to the northeast, Hebei province to the west, and Inner Mongolia to the northwest. The Yalu River marks the border between North Korea and the province. It empties into the Korea Bay between Dandong, Liaoning and Sinŭiju, North Korea.
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Peking University
Coordinates: 39°59′23″N 116°18′19″E / 39.98972°N 116.30528°E / 39.98972; 116.30528
Peking University (simplified Chinese: 北京大学; traditional Chinese: 北京大學; pinyin: Běijīng Dàxué), colloquially known in Chinese as Beida (北大, Běidà), is a major research university located in Beijing, China, and a member of the C9 League. It is the first established modern national university of China. It was founded as Imperial University of Peking in 1898 as a replacement of the ancient Guozijian (國子監 guózǐjiàn). By 1920 it had become a center for progressive thought. Today, many national and international rankings frequently place Peking University as one of the best universities in China. In addition to its academics, Peking University is especially renowned for the beauty of its traditional Chinese architecture on its campus grounds.
Throughout its history, the university has educated and hosted many prominent modern Chinese thinkers, including figures such as: Lu Xun, Mao Zedong, Gu Hongming, Hu Shih, Li Dazhao, and Chen Duxiu. Peking University was influential in the birth of China's New Culture Movement, May Fourth Movement, the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989 and many other significant events.
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Zhengzhou
Zhengzhou (Chinese: 郑州; pinyin: Zhèngzhōu; Mandarin pronunciation: [tʂɤ̂ŋtʂóu̯]; Postal map spelling: Chengchow), is the capital and largest city of Henan province in north-central China. A prefecture-level city, it also serves as the political, economic, technological, and educational centre of the province, as well as a major transportation hub for Central China. The city centre lies on the southern bank of the Yellow River, and is one of the Eight Great Ancient Capitals of China.
With 8,626,505 inhabitants according to the 2010 census and 3,980,250 in its built-up area (6 urban districts + 5 City + 1 County), the city is one of the main built up areas of Henan region. Zhengzhou is now a rapidly growing city.
The Shang Dynasty established Aodu (隞都) or Bodu (亳都) in Zhengzhou (see also: History of China). This pre-historical city had been long lost even before the time of the First Emperor of China. Since 1950 archaeological finds in a walled city in Eastern Zhengzhou known have provided evidence of Neolithic Shang Dynasty settlements in the area.[citation needed] Outside this city, in addition to remains of large public buildings, a complex of small settlements has been discovered. The site is generally identified with the Shang capital of Ao. It is preserved in the Shang Dynasty Ruins monument in Guanchen District. The Shang, who continually moved their capital due to frequent natural disasters, left Ao at around 13th century BC. The site, nevertheless, remained occupied; Zhou (post-1050 BC) tombs have also been discovered. Traditionally it is held that in the Western Zhou period (1111–771 BC) it became the fief of a family named Guan. From this derives the name borne by the county (xian) since the late 6th century BC — Guancheng (City of the Guan). The city first became the seat of a prefectural administration in AD 587, when it was named Guanzhou. In 605 it was first called Zhengzhou — a name by which it has been known virtually ever since.
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Anhui
Coordinates: 31°50′N 117°0′E / 31.833°N 117°E / 31.833; 117
Anhui (Chinese: 安徽; pinyin: Ānhuī; Wade–Giles: An-hui, Mandarin pronunciation: [ánxwéi]) is a province in the People's Republic of China. Located in eastern China across the basins of the Yangtze River and the Huai River, it borders Jiangsu to the east, Zhejiang to the southeast, Jiangxi to the south, Hubei to the southwest, Henan to the northwest, and Shandong for a tiny section in the north. The capital of the province is Hefei.
The name "Anhui" derives from the names of two cities in south Anhui, Anqing and Huizhou (now Huangshan City). The abbreviation for Anhui is "皖" (Wǎn), because there were historically a State of Wan, a Mount Wan, and a Wan river in the province.
The province of Anhui was formed in the seventeenth century. Before then, there was no coherent concept of "Anhui". Northern Anhui was firmly a part of the North China Plain in terms of culture, together with modern-day Henan province. Central Anhui constituted most of the fertile and densely-populated Huai He River watershed. Southern Anhui, along the Yangtze, was closer to Hubei and southern Jiangsu provinces in culture. Finally, the hills of southeastern Anhui formed a unique and distinct cultural sphere of its own.
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Chen Kuiyuan
Chen Kuiyuan (simplified Chinese: 陈奎元; traditional Chinese: 陳奎元; pinyin: Chén Kuíyuán; born January 1941 -) is a politician of the People's Republic of China. He currently serves as the vice chairman of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and the president and the Party chief of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Born in Kangping, Liaoning Province, Chen graduated from Inner Mongolia Normal College, majoring political education. He joined the Communist Party of China in May 1965. After graduation in 1964, Chen was assigned to work in the CPC party school in Hulunbuir of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. He later served in various posts in Hulunbuir and eventually became the Party chief of local CPC committee. In 1989, Chen became a standing member of CPC Inner Mongolia committee, and the secretary of commission for higher institutions of the autonomous region. In 1991, he was elevated to the vice chairman of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. In January 1992, Chen was transferred to Tibet Autonomous Region and became the vice Party chief. In November of that year, Chen succeeded Hu Jintao as the secretary of CPC Tibet committee.
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Chen Yun
Chen Yun (pronounced [tʂʰə̌n y̌n]; 13 June 1905 – 10 April 1995) was one of the most influential leaders of the People's Republic of China during the 1980s and 90's. He was also known as Liao Chengyun (廖程雲); it is unclear whether this was his original name or a pseudonym he used during his underground work in Shanghai. He was one of the Big Five in Chinese Civil War along with Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De and considered to be one of the Eight Elders of Communist Party of China.
Chen was a Central Committee Alternate in 1930-31 (a much more prestigious position than today, due to their very small numbers), Director of the CC Organization Department in 1938, and attended the 7th Comintern Congress in Moscow in 1935. He was elevated to the Central Committee and its Politburo in 1940, and remained on the Politburo until August 1966. He was elected party Vice Chairman in 1956, but was only an ordinary Central Committee member under the 9th CC (1969). Chen was reinstated to his Vice Chairmanship in January 1975.
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Chinese province
In the context of Chinese government, a province (sheng), formally provincial level division, is the highest-level administrative division. The People's Republic of China (PRC) currently administers 33 such divisions, classified as 22 provinces, 4 municipalities, 5 autonomous regions and 2 special administrative regions.
Additionally, the PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan Province, but since the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949 this area has been administered by the Republic of China (ROC) under a province of the same name. The ROC also administers some offshore islands including Quemoy/Kinmen (Jinmen) and Matsu (Mazu), which form Fujian Province, ROC. These were part of an originally unified Fujian province, which since 1949 has been divided between the PRC and ROC.
In the People's Republic of China, every province has a Communist Party of China provincial committee, headed by a secretary beside the two special administrative regions. The committee secretary is in charge of the province, rather than the governor of the provincial government.
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CPC party chief
In the Politics of the People's Republic of China, a party chief (simplified Chinese: 党委书记; traditional Chinese: 黨委書記; pinyin: Dǎngwěi shūji), variously called a party boss, and officially termed the Communist Party Committee Secretary for a certain region, is the leader of the local Communist Party of China division, and in most cases, the de facto first-in-charge of its area of jurisdiction. Aside from the regional or municipal affix, the title does not change regardless of the size of the jurisdiction.
Beginning at the provincial level, China's party-government dual administrative system arranges a hierarchy by which the party chief is in charge of determining the direction of policy as well as personnel changes, and the corresponding government leader is responsible for implementing party policy and arranging the annual budget, as well as other everyday government matters and ceremonial tasks. The list of party chief levels is as follows:
In writing and the mass media, the "CPC" designation before the title is not used often because it is assumed that "Provincial Committee Secretary" refers to the Communist Party secretary.
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Cultural Revolution
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, commonly known as the Cultural Revolution (Chinese: 文化大革命; pinyin: Wénhuà Dàgémìng), was a social-political movement that took place in the People's Republic of China from 1966 through 1976. Set into motion by Mao Zedong, then Chairman of the Communist Party of China, its stated goal was to enforce socialism in the country by removing capitalist, traditional and cultural elements from Chinese society, and to impose Maoist orthodoxy within the Party. The revolution marked the return of Mao Zedong to a position of absolute power after the failed Great Leap Forward. The movement politically paralyzed the country and significantly affected the country economically and socially.
The Revolution was launched in May 1966. Mao alleged that bourgeois elements were infiltrating the government and society at large, aiming to restore capitalism. He insisted that these "revisionists" be removed through violent class struggle. China's youth responded to Mao's appeal by forming Red Guard groups around the country. The movement spread into the military, urban workers, and the Communist Party leadership itself. It resulted in widespread factional struggles in all walks of life. In the top leadership, it led to a mass purge of senior officials who were accused of taking a "capitalist road", most notably Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. During the same period Mao's personality cult grew to immense proportions.
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Dai Bingguo
Dai Bingguo (simplified Chinese: 戴秉国; traditional Chinese: 戴秉國; pinyin: Dài Bǐngguó; born March 1941) is a Chinese politician and professional diplomat. Since 2008, Dai has emerged as one of the foremost and highest-ranking figures of Chinese foreign policy in the Hu Jintao administration.
A graduate of Sichuan University, majoring in Russian language, Dai was instrumental in the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union. Between 1989 and 1991 Dai served as the Chinese ambassador to Hungary. He then served in a succession of roles in the Department of Foreign Affairs. He currently serves as a State Councilor, director of general office of foreign affairs leadership group of CPC Central Committee, an office that acts as the primary foreign affairs organ of the Communist Party of China, and director of general office of National Security Leadership Group of the CPC Central Committee, in which he serves in the capacity as a national security advisor to the President.
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Deng Xiaoping
Deng Xiaoping (IPA: [tə̂ŋ ɕjɑ̀ʊpʰǐŋ] (
listen); 22 August 1904 – 19 February 1997) was a Chinese politician, statesman, and diplomat. As leader of the Communist Party of China, Deng was a reformer who led China towards a market economy. While Deng never held office as the head of state, head of government or General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (historically the highest position in Communist China), he nonetheless served as the paramount leader of the People's Republic of China from 1978 to 1992. As the core of the second generation leaders Deng shared his power with the two most powerful men after him: Li Xiannian and Chen Yun.
Born into a peasant background in Guang'an, Sichuan, China, Deng studied and worked in France in the 1920s, where he was influenced by Marxism. He joined the Communist Party of China in 1923. Upon his return to China he worked as a political commissar in rural regions and was considered a "revolutionary veteran" of the Long March. Following the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Deng worked in Tibet and other southwestern regions to consolidate Communist control. He was also instrumental in China's economic reconstruction following the Great Leap Forward in the early 1960s. His economic policies were at odds with the political ideologies of Chairman Mao Zedong. As a result, he was purged twice during the Cultural Revolution but regained prominence in 1978 by outmaneuvering Mao's chosen successor, Hua Guofeng.
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Governor of Henan
The Politics of Henan Province in the People's Republic of China is structured in a dual party-government system like all other governing institutions in mainland China.
The Governor of Henan is the highest ranking official in the People's Government of Henan. However, in the province's dual party-government governing system, the Governor has less power than the Henan Communist Party of China Provincial Committee Secretary, colloquially termed the "Henan CPC Party Chief".
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He Guoqiang
He Guoqiang (simplified Chinese: 贺国强; traditional Chinese: 賀國強; pinyin: Hè Guóqiáng; born October 1943) is a high-ranking government official in the People's Republic of China. Currently he is the eighth ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), China's highest ruling council, and the head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Previously He was the head of the Organization Department of the Communist Party, the Governor of Fujian, and the party chief of Chongqing. He Guoqiang is said to be a 'moderating' force on the PSC, with no apparent loyalties to any particular factions or patrons.
He Guoqiang is a native of Xiangxiang, Hunan. He joined the Communist Party of China in January 1966 and joined the work force in September 1966. He graduated from the Inorganic Chemistry Department at the Beijing Institute of Chemical Engineering where he had majored in Inorganics. With his university education, he holds the title of Senior Engineer. He was first assigned to work as a technician at the synthesis division of the Lunan Chemical Fertilizer Plant in Shandong. During his eleven years there he eventually made his way up to party branch secretary. Eventually became an official at the chemical industry department at the Shandong provincial government, ascending through the ranks to become party chief in Jinan, the capital of Shandong, in 1987. He was transferred to become Governor of Fujian between 1997 to 1999, and then as the party chief of Chongqing until 2002. He moved to national politics that year, becoming the head of the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China, overseeing personnel.
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Health in China
China is undertaking reform of its health-care system. The New Rural Co-operative Medical Care System (NRCMCS) is a 2005 initiative to overhaul the healthcare system, particularly intended to make it more affordable for the rural poor . Under the NRCMCS, the annual cost of medical coverage is 50 yuan (US$7) per person . Of that, 20 yuan is paid in by the central government, 20 yuan by the provincial government and a contribution of 10 yuan is made by the patient . As of September 2007, around 80% of the rural population of China had signed up (about 685 million people) . The system is tiered, depending on the location . If patients go to a small hospital or clinic in their local town, the system will cover roughly 70-80% of their bill . If the patient visits a county clinic, the percentage of the cost being covered falls to about 60% . If the patient requires a specialist in a modern city hospital, the plan would cover about 30% of the bill .
Indicators of the status of China’s health sector can be found in the nation’s fertility rate of 1.8 children per woman (a 2005 estimate) and the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births was 25.3 (a 2004 estimate) .
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Hu Jintao
Hu Jintao (Pinyin: Hú Jǐntāo, pronounced [xǔ tɕìntʰɑ́ʊ]; born 21 December 1942) is the current Paramount leader of the People's Republic of China. He has held the titles of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China since 2002, President of the People's Republic of China since 2003, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission since 2004, succeeding Jiang Zemin as the chief of the fourth generation of leadership of the Communist Party of China.
Hu has been involved in the Communist party bureaucracy for most of his adult life, notably as Party secretary for Guizhou province and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and then later first Secretary of the CPC Secretariat and Vice-President under former leader Jiang Zemin. Hu is the first leader of the Communist Party without any significant revolutionary credentials. As such, his rise to the presidency represented China's transition of leadership from establishment communists to younger, more pragmatic technocrats.
During his term in office, Hu has reintroduced state control in some sectors of the economy that were relaxed by the previous administration, and has been conservative with political reforms. Along with his colleague, Premier Wen Jiabao, Hu presided over nearly a decade of consistent economic growth and development that cemented China as a major world power. He sought to improve socio-economic equality domestically through the Scientific Development Concept, which aimed to build a "Harmonious Society" that was prosperous and free of social conflict. Meanwhile, Hu kept a tight lid on China politically, cracking down on social disturbances, ethnic minority protests, and dissident figures. In foreign policy, Hu advocated for "China's peaceful development", pursuing soft power in international relations and a business-oriented approach to diplomacy. Through Hu's tenure, China's influence in Africa, Latin America, and other developing countries has increased.
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Huang Ju
Huang Ju (28 September 1938 – 2 June 2007) was the Executive Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China. He joined the Communist Party of China in March 1966. He was ranked 6th out of 9, and was one of the least popular and most partisan members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Party. Huang, considered "one of China's most mysterious politicians", was a powerful member of the Shanghai clique.
Having been both the Mayor of Shanghai and the city's party chief in the 1990s, Huang enjoyed very close relations with his patron Jiang Zemin, he was known to be strongly opposed to General Secretary and President Hu Jintao. During his tenure in Shanghai Huang and his family members were involved in various corruption cases. He died in office on 2 June 2007.
Born in Jiashan, Zhejiang Province (浙江嘉善) as Huang Deyu (黄德钰), Huang was the second of five children. He attended Tsinghua University (清华大学) in 1956–63 where he graduated in Electrical Engineering.
Huang was employed as a Technician in the foundry section of the Shanghai Artificial-board Machinery Factory (上海人造板机器厂) from 1963 to 1967. From 1967 to 1977, Huang worked as Technician in the power section of the Shanghai Zhonghua Metallurgical Factory (上海中华冶金厂), where he was also Assistant Deputy Secretary Workshop Party Branch. He became Assistant Director of the Revolutionary Committee, Deputy Plant Manager, Engineer from 1977 to 1980. He was Assistant Manager of the Shanghai Petrochemical General Machinery Company (上海市石化通用机械制造公司) from 1980 to 1982. From 1982 to 1983 he was Deputy Commissioner of the Shanghai First Mechanical and Electrical Industry Bureau (上海市第一机电工业局).
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Hui Liangyu
Hui Liangyu (simplified Chinese: 回良玉; traditional Chinese: 回良玉; pinyin: Huí Liángyù : born October 1944 in Yushu, Changchun, Jilin) is the Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China in charge of agriculture in China.
He is part of the Hui ethnic group. Since 1969, he has been working for the Communist Party and the Chinese Government in a number of positions, rising to full membership in the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee since November 2002. He was the CPC party chief in Jiangsu from 2000 to 2002. Since 2003, he has been a Vice Premier.
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Jia Qinglin
Jia Qinglin (born March 1940 in Botou, Hebei, China) is a senior leader of the People's Republic of China. He is the fourth ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Chairman and Party secretary of the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference. Jia's functions as the head of China's consultative legislative body are largely ceremonial in nature. Earlier he had served as the CPC Party Chief in the country's southern Fujian province and Beijing.
An engineer by profession, and one of former General Secretary Jiang Zemin's trusted allies and protege, Jia Qinglin's rise in the politburo is attributed to his relationship with Jiang. Jia served as the Party chief in Fujian in the early 1990s. He was later transferred to Beijing in 1996 to replace then Beijing Party-chief Chen Xitong who was arrested on corruption charges. Jia served as the acting Mayor, Mayor and Party Chief in Beijing, coming onto the national and international spotlight during the 50th Anniversary of PRC celebrations as the event's host.
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Li Changchun
Li Changchun (simplified Chinese: 李长春; traditional Chinese: 李長春; pinyin: Lǐ Chángchūn; born February 1944) is the Propaganda chief of the Communist Party of China. He is the 5th ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, China's de facto top power organ, and has been a member since 2002. He also serves as Chairman of the CPC Central Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization, de facto Head of propaganda and media relations. Previously he had served in Liaoning, Henan and Guangdong.
Li Changchun was born in February 1944 at Dairen in the Japanese Kwantung Leased Territory. He joined the Communist Party of China in 1965 and graduated with a degree in electrical engineering from the Harbin Institute of Technology in 1966. In 1983, at age 39, he became the youngest mayor and Party secretary of a major city, of Shenyang, the capital of Liaoning. In 1987, he became governor of the province, a post he kept until 1990. As governor, mainland China's first expressway was built in the province, linking the cities of Shenyang and Dalian. After Zhao Ziyang was purged from the party leadership in 1989 during the fallout from the Tiananmen Square protests that same year, Li was initially also thought to have been removed from the leadership of the Communist Party because Li was a supporter of Zhao. Li's appearance on state television weeks later confirmed that this was not the case. Li served briefly as the Party chief in the agricultural province of Henan in the 1990s.Jiang Zemin sent him to serve as Guangdong Party Secretary, where he cracked down on corruption to 'put the house in order'. Li, again the youngest ever member, was promoted to the Politburo of the Communist Party of China in 1998, and made a member of its Standing Committee after General Secretary Jiang Zemin's retirement in 2002. In October 2007, the Communist Party of China announced that Li would serve another term as Propaganda Chief.
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Li Chengyu
Li Chengyu (Chinese: 李成玉; pinyin: Lǐ Chéngyù) (born August 1946) is a politician of the People's Republic of China. He currently serves as the president of All China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives.
Li Chengyu was born in Haiyuan County, Ningxia in 1946. He joined the Communist Party of China in 1971.
Li was the Governor of Henan from 2003 to 2008. He was the alternate member of the 16th CPC Central Committee and is a formal member of the 17th CPC Central Committee.
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Li Keqiang
Li Keqiang (born 1 July 1955) is the Executive Vice-Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, the seventh ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the People's Republic of China's de facto highest decision-making body. As Premier Wen Jiabao's top lieutenant, Li's official portfolio includes economic development, price controls, finance, climate change, and macroeconomic management.
Li rose through the ranks of the Communist Youth League. From 1998 to 2004, Li served as the Governor of Henan and the province's CPC party chief, and then the Liaoning party chief, an office that made him first-in-charge in that province. Li is speculated as the likely successor to Wen Jiabao as Premier in the "fifth generation" (Xi-Li Administration) of CPC leadership.
Li Keqiang was born in Dingyuan County, Anhui on 1 July 1955. His father was a local official in Anhui. Li graduated from high school in 1974, during the Cultural Revolution, and was sent for rural labour in Fengyang County, Anhui, where he eventually joined the Communist Party of China and made his way to becoming the party head of the local production team. He was awarded with the honour of Outstanding Individual in the Study of Mao Zedong Thought during this time.
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Li Lanqing
Li Lanqing (simplified Chinese: 李岚清; traditional Chinese: 李嵐清; pinyin: Lǐ Lánqīng; born May 1932 in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu) is a prominent Chinese politician.
He is a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China. While in government he was First Vice-Premier. In his capacity as Vice Premier, Li was responsible for national education policy. He is the author of "Education for 1.3 Billion: On 10 Years of Education Reform and Development." The book has sold more than 750,000 copies in China and has been translated into English.
Li graduated from the Business Management Department of Fudan University in 1952.
Early in his career, Li was part of the launch of China auto industry and later held positions in the First Ministry of Machine Building Industry and the State Economic Commission.
Li was involved in opening China up to the world from 1978 on. In this role, he was responsible for foreign governmental loans at the State Foreign Investment Administrative Commission.
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Liaoning
Coordinates: 41°06′N 122°18′E / 41.1°N 122.3°E / 41.1; 122.3
Liaoning (help·info) (simplified Chinese: 辽宁; traditional Chinese: 遼寧; pinyin: Liáoníng; Manchu: ᠯᡳᠶᠣᠣ ᠨᡳᠩ, Liyoo ning) is a province of the People's Republic of China, located in the northeast of the country. Its one-character abbreviation is "辽" (pinyin: liáo), a name taken from the Liao River that flows through the province. "Níng" means "peace". The modern province was established in 1907 as Fengtian province (奉天 pinyin: Fèngtiān; Postal map spelling: Fengtien; Manchu: ᠠᠪᡴᠠᡳ ᡳᠮᡳᠶᠠᠩᡤᠠ, Abkai imiyangga) and the name was changed to Liaoning in 1929. Under the Japanese puppet Manchukuo regime, the province reverted to its 1907 name, but the name Liaoning was restored in 1945.
Liaoning is located in the southern part of the Northeast, and is often called "the Golden Triangle" because of its superior geographical location, with the Yellow Sea (Korea Bay) and the Bohai Sea in the south, North Korea in the southeast, Jilin province to the northeast, Hebei province to the west, and Inner Mongolia to the northwest. The Yalu River marks the border between North Korea and the province. It empties into the Korea Bay between Dandong, Liaoning and Sinŭiju, North Korea.
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Lin Biao
Lin Biao (pinyin: Lín Biāo; IPA: [lǐn pjɑ́ʊ]; December 5, 1907– September 13, 1971) was a major Chinese Communist military leader who was pivotal in the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, especially in Northeastern China. Lin was the general who commanded the decisive Liaoshen Campaign and Pingjin Campaign, co-led the Northeast battlefield army of the People's Liberation Army into Beijing, and crossed the Yangtze River in 1949. He ranked third among the Ten Marshals. Zhu De and Peng Dehuai were considered senior to Lin, and Lin ranked ahead of He Long and Liu Bocheng.
Lin abstained from taking an active role in politics after the civil war, but became instrumental in creating the foundations for Mao Zedong's cult of personality in the early 1960s. Lin was rewarded for his service to Mao by being named Mao's designated successor during the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 until his death.
Lin died in September 1971 when his plane crashed in Mongolia, following what appeared to be a failed coup to oust Mao. Because little inside information is available to the public on this "Lin Biao incident", the exact events preceding Lin's death have been a source of speculation among China scholars ever since. Following Lin's death, he was officially condemned as a traitor by the Communist Party of China. He and Jiang Qing are still considered to be the two "major Counter-revolutionary cliques" blamed for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution.
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Liu Yandong
Liu Yandong (born November 1945) is an official of the Communist Party of China currently serving on the Politburo. She also holds the post of State Councilor. Since the retirement of Wu Yi, she has been the highest-ranked female politician in the Party, and the only woman with a seat on the Politburo.
A native of Nantong, Jiangsu, Liu graduated from Tsinghua University in 1970 with a degree in chemistry. Between 2002 and 2007, she served as the head of the United Front Work Department of the Communist Party of China, an organization that keeps non-Communist Chinese political parties in line with the general ideology of the Communist Party. Having long been an ally of President Hu Jintao and ascended from the ranks of the Communist Youth League, she entered the 17th Politburo of the Communist Party of China in 2007. At the 2008 National People's Congress she was elected State Councilor, and was not elected as a Vice-Premier. On April 13, 2009, Stony Brook University conferred Madame Liu Yandong with an Honorary Doctor of Laws.
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Ma Kai
Ma Kai (simplified Chinese: 马凯; traditional Chinese: 馬凱; pinyin: Mǎ Kǎi; born 1946 in Xingxian, Shanxi, China) is a State Councilor and Secretary General of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.
Ma Kai was born in Jinshan, Shanghai in 1946. He received his Master's degree from Renmin University of China in 1982.
His portfolio also includes putting forth Chinese policies with regard to global warming. He was a member of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and is the current member of 17th Central Committee.
In 2003 he was given responsibility for the National Development and Reform Commission, an organisation which has broad administrative and planning control over the economy of the People's Republic of China.
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Ma Zhongchen
Ma Zhongchen (Chinese: 马忠臣; September 1936 - ) is a politician from the People's Republic of China.
Ma was born in Taian, Shandong Province, and joined the Communist Party of China in 1956. In 1966, Ma became the vice Party chief of Taian County, Shandong. In June 1976, he became the Party chief and chairman of revolutionary commission of Zhangqiu County, Shandong.
In December 1992, Ma was appointed as the vice secretary of CPC Henan Committee, and the acting governor of Henan. He was confirmed as the governor of Henan in April, 1993. In March, 1998, Ma was elevated to the secretary of CPC Henan Committee.
Ma was an alternate member of 12th, 13th and 14th Central Committee of CPC, and a full member of 15th Central Committee.
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Meng Jianzhu
Meng Jianzhu (Chinese: 孟建柱; pinyin: Mèng Jiànzhù; born July 1947) is the Minister of the Public Security of the People's Republic of China.
Meng was born in July 1947, a native of Suzhou, Jiangsu Province.
Meng was one of the deputy mayors of Shanghai from 1993 to 1996. In 1996 he was promoted to become the deputy Communist Party secretary of Shanghai, a position he held until 2001.
In 2001, Meng was appointed the Communist Party secretary of Jiangxi Province. He remained in that position until October 28, 2007, when he was transferred to Beijing and appointed the Minister of the Public Security, replacing Zhou Yongkang, who was elevated to become a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.
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Peking University
Coordinates: 39°59′23″N 116°18′19″E / 39.98972°N 116.30528°E / 39.98972; 116.30528
Peking University (simplified Chinese: 北京大学; traditional Chinese: 北京大學; pinyin: Běijīng Dàxué), colloquially known in Chinese as Beida (北大, Běidà), is a major research university located in Beijing, China, and a member of the C9 League. It is the first established modern national university of China. It was founded as Imperial University of Peking in 1898 as a replacement of the ancient Guozijian (國子監 guózǐjiàn). By 1920 it had become a center for progressive thought. Today, many national and international rankings frequently place Peking University as one of the best universities in China. In addition to its academics, Peking University is especially renowned for the beauty of its traditional Chinese architecture on its campus grounds.
Throughout its history, the university has educated and hosted many prominent modern Chinese thinkers, including figures such as: Lu Xun, Mao Zedong, Gu Hongming, Hu Shih, Li Dazhao, and Chen Duxiu. Peking University was influential in the birth of China's New Culture Movement, May Fourth Movement, the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989 and many other significant events.
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Politics of Henan
The Politics of Henan Province in the People's Republic of China is structured in a dual party-government system like all other governing institutions in mainland China.
The Governor of Henan is the highest ranking official in the People's Government of Henan. However, in the province's dual party-government governing system, the Governor has less power than the Henan Communist Party of China Provincial Committee Secretary, colloquially termed the "Henan CPC Party Chief".
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Politics of Liaoning
The politics of Liaoning Province in the People's Republic of China is structured in a single party-government system like all other governing institutions in mainland China.
The Governor of Liaoning (辽宁省省长) is the highest ranking official in the People's Government of Liaoning. However, in the province's single party-government governing system, the Governor has less power than the Liaoning Communist Party of China Provincial Committee Secretary (辽宁省委书记), colloquially termed the "Liaoning CPC Party Chief".
Previous to 1949 and the takeover of the Communist forces, Liaoning was governed by the Fengtian Clique of warlords and interchangeably officials of the Chiang Kai-shek bureaucracy. During the Qing Dynasty Liaoning was known as the province of Fengtian, and was governed by a zongdu or Viceroy (The Viceroy of the Three Eastern Provinces 东三省总督), along with the provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang. The province itself also had a governor (xunfu).
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Ports of China
China's coastal ports enable the transportation of coal, containers, imported iron ore, and grain; roll-on-roll-off operations between mainland and islands; and deep-water access to the sea.
In port construction, China has especially strengthened the container transport system, concentrating on the construction of a group of deep-water container wharves at Dalian, Tianjin, Qingdao, Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen and Shenzhen, and thus laying the foundations for China's container hubs. A new deep-water port has opened in Yangshan SW of Shanghai.
The coal transportation system has been further strengthened with the construction of a number of coal transport wharves. In addition, wharves handling crude oil and iron ore imports have been reconstructed or expanded.
At the end of 2004, China's coastal ports had over 2,500 berths of medium size or above, of which 650 were 10,000-ton-class berths; their handling capacity was 61.5 million standard containers for the year, ranking first in the world. Freight volumes handled by some large ports exceed 100 million tons a year; and the Shanghai, Shenzhen, Qingdao, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo and Dalian have been listed among the world's top 50 container ports.
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Song Defu
Song Defu (Chinese: 宋德福; pinyin: Sòng Défú; Pe̍h-ōe-jī: Song Tek-hok; February 1946 - September 13, 2007) was a politician of the People's Republic of China. He was born in Yanshan, Hebei Province, and was educated at college. He joined the People's Liberation Army in 1965, and the Communist Party of China the same year. He was an alternate member of CPC's 12th central committee, and a member of 13th - 16th central committee. He was a member of standing committee of the 9th National Political Consultative Conference. His former posts include the first secretary of central secretariat of Communist Youth League, Minister of Personnel, vice director of central specialists coordination group, the secretary of CPC's Fujian committee, the chairman of standing committee of Fujian people's congress. He died of disease at 4:56 am on September 13, 2007 in Beijing, at age of 61.
Song Defu was born into a CPC's official's family. He joined the army at 19, and retired from service in 1993. Thanks to the recommendation of the army, he entered Communist Youth League headquarter in 1983, and used to work with Hu Jintao. In 1985, he succeeded Hu as the first secretary of CYL. Meanwhile, he also served as vice director of organization department of General Political Department in the army. From 1985 - 1993, he remained a critical leader of Communist Youth League. His colleagues at CYL during that time included some prominent figures in future Chinese politics, such as Liu Yandong, Zhang Baoshun, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, Liu Qibao, Yuan Chunqing, etc. In 1993, Song entered the state council and became the Minister of Personnel. At age of 47, he was then the youngest minister in the government.
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State Councilor
The State Councilor (Chinese: 国务委员; pinyin: Guówù Wěiyuán) is a powerful position within the State Council of the People's Republic of China, i.e. the executive organ of China's central government (comparable to a cabinet). It ranks immediately below the Vice-Premiers and above the Ministers of various departments.
In theory, State Councilors are to assist the Premier and Vice-Premiers to oversee various government portfolios. They can also represent the State Council (and in turn, China's government) on foreign visits. State Councilors are part of a Standing Committee of the State Council, alongside the Premier, Vice-Premiers, and the Secretary General of the State Council. The organ holds weekly meetings. In practice, a state councilor's portfolios can be very wide-ranging. State councilors often accompany China's higher dignitaries on trips abroad - as was the case with State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan from 2003–08, and Dai Bingguo from 2008–present. Dai also became China's representative at the 2009 G8 Summit in Italy when President Hu Jintao decided to cut short his attendance to return to China in order to deal with the July 2009 Urumqi riots.
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Wan Li
Wan Li (simplified Chinese: 万里; traditional Chinese: 萬里; pinyin: Wàn Lǐ) (born 1 December 1916) was during a long administrative career in the People's Republic of China Vice Premier, National People's Congress Chairman, and a member of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, its Secretariat and its Politburo. He was born in Shandong.[citation needed]
Wan Li joined the Communist Party of China in 1936, and served in party administrative positions, many in Shandong province, from county level on up. In 1937-38, Wan was CPC Secretary (i.e., head) of Dongping County, in 1938-40 Propaganda and Organization Department director in Taixi Prefecture, deputy head of propaganda for Western Shandong regional CPC committee in 1940, and Secretary of the party's 2nd, 7th and 8th Prefectural Committees in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Area in 1940-47. In the last phases of the Civil War, he was Secretary-General of the Border Area committee (1947–49).
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Wan was named deputy director of the finance department of the Nanjing Municipality Military Control Committee, director of the Economic Department and Chief of the city Construction Bureau, all within a few months. He served as Deputy Director of the CCP South-west Military and Administrative Committee's Industrial Department (1949–52), where he would have encountered Deng Xiaoping.
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Wang Qishan
Wang Qishan (Chinese: 王岐山; pinyin: Wáng Qíshān; born July 1948 in Qingdao, Shandong) is a politician in the People's Republic of China who currently serves as the Vice-Premier in charge of economic, energy and financial affairs under premier Wen Jiabao. Previously Wang served in regional positions in Hainan and Beijing. He was elected to the 17th Politburo of the Communist Party of China, became a member 17th CPC Central Committee and was elected Vice-Premier in March 2008. Wang is speculated to be a core figure in the upcoming fifth generation of CPC leadership.
Wang Qishan was born in Qingdao, Shandong but his ancestral hometown is considered Tianzhen, Shanxi. Wang graduated from the History Department of Northwest University in 1976. Wang was the Governor of the China Construction Bank from 1994 to 1997. He first took over from Meng Xuenong when SARS struck Beijing in spring 2003, at which time he was the Party Secretary in Hainan, and was confirmed as mayor in early 2004. From 2004-2007, Wang served as the Mayor of Beijing. He is known to be frank and responsible. In a recent City Management Radio programme, listeners were astonished to hear the mayor apologize. In 2007, he became a member of the Politboro of the 17th CPC Central Committee, a member of the 17th CPC Central Committee and in 2008 he became Vice Premier of the State Council.
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Wen Jiabao
Wen Jiabao (born 19 September 1942) is the sixth and current Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, serving as China's head of government and leading its cabinet. In his capacity as Premier, Wen is regarded as the leading figure behind China's economic policy. He also holds membership in the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, the country's de facto top power organ, where he is ranked third out of nine members.
Wen has a professional background in geology and engineering. He holds a postgraduate degree from the Beijing Institute of Geology, where he graduated in 1968. He was subsequently sent to Gansu province for geological work, and remained in China's hinterland regions during his climb up the bureaucratic ladder. He was transferred to Beijing to work as the Chief of the Party General Office between 1986 and 1993, and accompanied General Secretary Zhao Ziyang to Tiananmen Square during the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests. In 1998, he was promoted to the post of Vice Premier under Zhu Rongji, his mentor, and oversaw the broad portfolios of agriculture and finance.
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Wu Bangguo
Wu Bangguo (born July 1941) is a high-ranking politician in the People's Republic of China. He is currently Chairman and Party secretary of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, a position that makes him China's chief legislator. He is also ranked second in official rankings of state and party leaders according to his qualifications in the Party. A native of Anhui, Wu is an electrical engineer by profession, and rose to national fame through regional work as the party chief of Shanghai and as Vice-Premier.
Wu was born at Feidong County in Anhui. He entered Tsinghua University in 1960, majoring in electron tube engineering at the Department of Radio Electronics, where he graduated in 1967. He subsequently was employed as a worker and technician at Shanghai's No. 3 Electronic Tube Factory, and then deputy chief and chief of the technical section from 1976 to 1978. He would eventually go on to lead the factory as its party secretary. In 1978 he was assigned to become the deputy manager of Shanghai Electronic Elements Company, and between 1979 and 1981 the deputy manager of Shanghai Electron Tube Company. Between 1981 and 1983 he worked as the deputy secretary of Shanghai Meters, Instruments and Telecommunications Bureau.
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Xi-Li Administration
The Xi-Li Administration (simplified Chinese: 习李体制; traditional Chinese: 習李體制; pinyin: Xi-Li Tizhi abbreviated as Xi-Li simplified Chinese: 习李; traditional Chinese: 習李) is the name given to the 5th-generation leadership of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang that will likely succeed Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in the second half of 2012 following the 18th National Congress of the CPC.
The fifth generation of the CPC leadership has not been formally declared yet, but most people expect that Xi Jinping will replace current Paramount Leader Hu Jintao as CPC General Secretary, and Li Keqiang will replace Wen Jiabao as Premier.
Xi Jinping was elected Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission at the fifth Central Committee Election of 17th National Congress of the CPC. Li Keqiang is currently the deputy party secretary of the State Council and the deputy head of the Financial Work Leading Group.
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Xu Guangchun
Xu Guangchun (Chinese: 徐光春; pinyin: Xú Guāngchūn; born November 1944) is a politician of the People's Republic of China who succeeded outgoing Henan Party Committee secretary Li Keqiang when he was transferred to Liaoning.
Xu Guangchun was born in Shaoxing, Zhejiang in November, 1944. Before he graduated from high school he went to work for the Hangzhou Daily newspaper as a reporter. He graduated from the Journalism Department of Renmin University of China in 1969 and joined the Communist Party of China in 1973. During this time he continued to work for local military publications, brginning in !972 with the Anhui Production and Construction Corprs, where he served as a reporter for Corps Soldiers Newspaper. In 1975 he began a seven-year stint with Xinhua News Agency's Anhui bureau. Seven years later he joined the Chinese Photographers Association and later chaired the Anhui Photojournalist Society. He was named to head Xinhua's Shanghai bureau in 1985, and the Beijing bureau in 1988.
In 1984 he held his first public office. Xu became the Secretary of the CPC Henan Committee in 2004, and inherited a Henan bureaucracy that underwent large restructuring under Li Keqiang. He has, thus far, continued on Li's general policy direction. He is the member of the 16th and 17th CPC Central Committee.
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Zhang Wenyue
Zhang Wenyue (simplified Chinese: 张文岳; traditional Chinese: 張文岳; pinyin: Zhāng Wényuè; ate October 1944), was the Communist Party of China Liaoning provincial committee Secretary, succeeding his colleague Li Keqiang from October 2007. In 2010 he retired and is succeeded by Wang Min.
A native of Fengcheng, Jiangxi[citation needed] and a graduate of the China University of Geosciences, Zhang joined the Communist Party of China in June 1965. During the Cultural Revolution Zhang was placed in an army work troupe, subsequently being sent to Sichuan in 1969. Since then his career had been largely concentrated in the geological field until 1995, when he was transferred to work in Xinjiang as the autonomous region's deputy party secretary.
From 1999 to 2001 he served as the commander-in-chief of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, before moving onto Liaoning to succeed Bo Xilai to become the province's governor in 2004.
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Zhou Qiang
Zhou Qiang (simplified Chinese: 周强; traditional Chinese: 周強; pinyin: Zhōu Qiáng; born April 1960) is a politician of the People's Republic of China. He currently serves as the Party chief of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Hunan committee, first-in-charge of the central Chinese province. He served as the province's governor between 2007 and 2010. Zhou's ascendancy to the party secretary position in Hunan makes him China's third youngest provincial party secretary. His rise to power is comparable to that of President Hu Jintao and Vice-Premier Li Keqiang; all three men have background in the Communist Youth League of China.
Born in Huangmei County, Hubei Province, Zhou has obtained a postgraduate degree, and is a member of the Communist Party of China (CPC). He started working in August 1976. In November 1995, he was elected to be the secretary of the central secretariat of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) at the 4th plenary session of the 13th CYL central committee. In June 1998, he was elevated to first secretary of the CYL central secretariat, and was re-elected in July 2003. In September 2006, Zhou was appointed as a standing committee member and vice secretary of the CPC Hunan committee. On September 30, he became the acting governor of Hunan, appointed by the standing committee of the 10th Hunan People's Congress. In December 2006, he resigned as the first secretary of the central secretariat of the CYL. On February 3, 2007, Zhou was confirmed as the governor of Hunan, and was re-elected on January 24, 2008. On April 25, 2010 he was appointed Secretary of the Hunan CPC Committee (and presumably also Chairman of the Hunan People's Congress Standing Committee). On November 23, 2011, Zhou was elected secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the CPC.
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Zhu Rongji
Zhū Róngjī (pinyin: Zhū Róngjī; Wade-Giles: Chu Jung-chi; IPA: [tʂú ʐʊ̌ŋtɕí]; born 23 October 1928 in Changsha, Hunan) is a prominent Chinese politician who served as the Mayor and Party chief in Shanghai between 1987 and 1991, before serving as Vice-Premier and then the fifth Premier of the People's Republic of China from March 1998 to March 2003.
A tough administrator, his time in office saw the continued double-digit growth of the Chinese economy and China's increased assertiveness in international affairs. Known to be engaged in a testy relationship with General Secretary Jiang Zemin, under whom he served, Zhu provided a novel pragmatism and strong work ethic in the government and party leadership increasingly infested by corruption, and as a result gained great popularity with the Chinese public. His opponents, however, charge that Zhu's tough and pragmatic stance on policy was unrealistic and unnecessary, and many of his promises were left unfulfilled. Zhu retired in 2003, and has not been a public figure since. Premier Zhu was also widely known for his charisma and tasteful humour.
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China - Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang Names Are Tested
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 2:05
- Updated: 16 Nov 2012
Nearly everyone knows who won the US presidential election, but few can name the new leaders of the world's second largest economy. Adam Fleming found few people in London's Chinatown who could name the new president, as Hu Jintao prepares to hand over power to Xi Jinping - and the prime minister Wen Jiabao gives way to Li Keqiang. If you like this video please subscribe to my channel to see more videos like this. Also when you click 'Like' please share on Twitter and Facebook. Thanks Copyright Disclaimer Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976, allowance is made for fair use for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. Fair use is a use permitted by copyright statute that might otherwise be infringing. Non-profit, educational or personal use tips the balance in favor of fair use
http://wn.com/China_Xi_Jinping_and_Li_Keqiang_Names_Are_Tested
李克強與香港大學學生會面China Vice-Premier Li Keqiang meets with HKU students
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 15:15
- Updated: 28 Jun 2012
Li learned about the history, development and research achievements of the University of Hong Kong when he toured the HKU Centenary Exhibition after attending HKU centenary ceremony
http://wn.com/李克強與香港大學學生會面China_Vice-Premier_Li_Keqiang_meets_with_HKU_students
Li Keqiang - Profile of China's future Politburo leaders
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 2:48
- Updated: 26 Oct 2012
Who is Li Keqiang? What is his background? Can we expect him to become the next Premier of the People's Republic of China? Read more: gbtimes.com
http://wn.com/Li_Keqiang_Profile_of_China's_future_Politburo_leaders
Li Keqiang, the Next Premier of China, and his Strategy for Supremacy
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 9:58
- Updated: 16 Nov 2012
"China will form an alliance with America for a while, but once Chinese power exceeds theirs, it will be China that becomes the world's police...." This is the excerpts of the interviews with the Li's guardian spirit. Recorded on August 13, 2012 global.the-liberty.com
http://wn.com/Li_Keqiang,_the_Next_Premier_of_China,_and_his_Strategy_for_Supremacy
Li Keqiang on the EU-China Urbanisation Partnership
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 15:43
- Updated: 10 May 2012
European Policy Summit, 3 May 2012, Brussels. bit.ly The EU-China Partnership for Sustainable Urbanisation must necessarily involve dialogue between all elements of both societies but efforts should begin on the local level in order to produce the best results. "To be successful, our partnership needs to be based on a peer-to-peer process between city mayors and local governments," advised Li Keqiang, Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China. The cross-cutting nature of the urbanisation process calls for a closer dialogue between stakeholders from all levels and across all sectors, from local initiatives aimed at bettering the quality of life for city dwellers, through national efforts at greening cities, to international economic cooperation. © European Union, 2012 www.friendsofeurope.org
http://wn.com/Li_Keqiang_on_the_EU-China_Urbanisation_Partnership
Meeting with Vice Prime Minister of China, Li Keqiang
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 0:44
- Updated: 16 Nov 2012
Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, meets Li Keqiang, Vice Prime Minister of China, in Brussels
http://wn.com/Meeting_with_Vice_Prime_Minister_of_China,_Li_Keqiang
New leadership takes charge in China, Jinping formally elected as President
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 2:19
- Updated: 15 Nov 2012
Chinese Vice-President Shi Jinping and Vice-Premier Li Keqiang have been elected to the Central Committee as the Communist Party Congress ended in Beijing on Wednesday. China's Communist Party re-elected the nation's future leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang onto its Central Committee on Wednesday, as it moved to conclude a pivotal transfer of power in the world's second-largest economy and rising superpower.
http://wn.com/New_leadership_takes_charge_in_China,_Jinping_formally_elected_as_President
China's Princeling President a 'More Decisive Leader' (LinkAsia: 11/16/12)
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 5:25
- Updated: 17 Nov 2012
China's new president Xi Jinping is the son of a revolutionary leader and has a reputation for being a business-friendly problem solver. But does this mean he will be a reformer? LinkAsia speaks with Josh Chin, Beijing Digital Editor for the Wall Street Journal, on what a Xi presidency will look like. Watch more at linkasia.org. IMAGE China's new Politburo Standing Committee members Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan and Zhang Gaoli, arrive to meet with the press at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing: REUTERS/China Daily
http://wn.com/China's_Princeling_President_a_'More_Decisive_Leader'_LinkAsia_11_16_12
Li Keqiang's Team Face Severe Situation
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 4:02
- Updated: 17 Nov 2012
Follow us on TWITTER: twitter.com Like us on FACEBOOK: www.facebook.com Once the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) new leader group launched, to everyone's surprise, Wang Qishan became the Secretary of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCFDI). For the CCP facing life and death, politics is the primary issue that they should solve. Under the difficult economic situation, the CCP got Li Keqiang to create a new team to solve the problem. Looked on as a popular candidate for Deputy Prime Minister, with extensive financial experience, vice premier Wang Qishan is the son-in-law of Yao Yilin, veteran member of the CCP. Joining the China Rural Trust and Investment Company, serving as president of China Construction Bank, sent to Guangdong to clean up financial issues, serving as Beijing major during "SARS", Wang Qishan was looked on as the "fire captain" of the CCP. However, under the power distribution of the 18th Party congress, Wang changed his occupation to Secretary of CCFDI. Beijing political observer Hua Po: "it's very strange. Wang is 'little Zhu Rongji' the economical Tsar in Chinese enterprises. However, due to the international economic crisis, European debt crisis and slowdown of Chinese economic growth, that he serves in the CCFDI, is so strange. For this phenomena, Chinese PhD economics scholar of US Princeton University Cheng Xiaonong thinks that probably Li Keqiang wants to use one of his own people. Cheng Xiaonong: "Since as premier, Li will appoint a ...
http://wn.com/Li_Keqiang's_Team_Face_Severe_Situation
1402MR CHINA-LI KEQIANG
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 3:01
- Updated: 04 Sep 2012
1402MR CHINA-LI KEQIANG
http://wn.com/1402MR_CHINA-LI_KEQIANG
Inside Story - China's influence in Europe
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 24:50
- Updated: 21 Nov 2012
Li Keqiang, China's vice premier, began the first leg of his European tour on Tuesday, starting with a three-day visit to Spain, and the unlikely allies are set to announce a series of economic agreements. But what is really behind Beijing's move? Is China buying political influence in Europe?
http://wn.com/Inside_Story_China's_influence_in_Europe
李克强副总理在匈牙利的讲话2012.05.01. Li Kö-csiang beszéde Budapesten
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 11:56
- Updated: 10 May 2012
中国国务院副总理李克强2012年4月30日至5月1日访问匈牙利。5月1日下午，李克强副总理在下榻的布达佩斯城堡山希尔顿酒店接见中国驻匈牙利大使馆工作人员和中资机构、华人华侨及留学生代表并发表讲话。 Magyarországon hivatalos látogatását töltő Li Kö-csiang (Li Keqiang) kínai miniszterelnök-helyettes 2012. május 1-jén Budapesten, a budavári Hilton Szállodában fogadja a kínai követség munkatársait, valamint a kínai vállalatok, kínai kolónia és ösztöndíjasak képviselőit, s beszédet mond a résztvevőknek. © EUCNews/video.
http://wn.com/李克强副总理在匈牙利的讲话20120501_Li_Kö-csiang_beszéde_Budapesten
Profile: Great expectations for China's next premier
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 2:44
- Updated: 25 Sep 2012
Sept. 3 - Meet Li Keqiang, who from humble beginnings has climbed China's bureaucratic ranks and will soon take the reins of the world's second-largest economy.
http://wn.com/Profile_Great_expectations_for_China's_next_premier
Davos Annual Meeting 2010 - Special Address by Li Keqiang
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 41:04
- Updated: 09 Nov 2012
www.weforum.org 28.01.2010 Special Address by Li Keqiang, Executive Vice-Premier, State Council of the People's Republic of China Chaired by Klaus Schwab, Founder and Executive Chairman, World Economic Forum
http://wn.com/Davos_Annual_Meeting_2010_Special_Address_by_Li_Keqiang
Vice-Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang ends HK visit (18.8.2011)
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 1:54
- Updated: 22 Nov 2011
Vice-Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang ended his three-day Hong Kong visit today, saying the trip has deepened his understanding of the city and reiterated his confidence in its future. Speaking before boarding his flight, he said: "Hong Kong's role and importance in the nation's reform, opening-up and modernisation drive is irreplaceable, and there is great potential in a wide range of Mainland-Hong Kong co-operation areas. ( j.mp )
http://wn.com/Vice-Premier_of_the_State_Council_Li_Keqiang_ends_HK_visit_1882011
Falun Gong Protest Li Keqiang in Hong Kong
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 1:40
- Updated: 06 Aug 2012
For more news and videos visit ☛ english.ntdtv.com Follow us on Twitter ☛ http Add us on Facebook ☛ facebook.com Chinese Vice President Li Keqiang has been in Hong Kong this week, focusing on economic development. However his trip attracted protests calling on the Chinese regime to end its persecution of the Falun Gong spiritual practice. Here's more on the story and the controversy surrounding it. The vice premier of China's state council, Li Keqiang, is visiting Hong Kong, focusing on economic development. But Chinese officials visiting outside the Mainland often attract protests, and Li's visit to Hong Kong is no different. Practitioners of the persecuted spiritual practice Falun Gong were outside Li's hotel to get their message across. They want those who started the persecution to be brought to justice... among them, former CCP leader Jiang Zemin. [Lu Jie, Hong Kong Falun Gong Practitioner]: "They must be brought to justice, the persecution of Falun Gong must be stopped, this major decision must be made immediately, otherwise heaven will not tolerate it. Right now various groups in the international community are investigating these people. Whenever these high level Chinese Communist officials leave the country, they encounter lawsuits." Practitioners say Li tried to avoid their protest. [Fu Xueying, Hong Kong Falun Gong Practitioner]: "Because he has persecuted Falun Gong, he feels persecuted. Someone just came over and told us that his car just passed by and ...
http://wn.com/Falun_Gong_Protest_Li_Keqiang_in_Hong_Kong
WikiLeaks Disclosed Hu and Li Alliance Due to Phony GDP
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 4:23
- Updated: 28 Jul 2012
Follow us on TWITTER: twitter.com Like us on FACEBOOK: www.facebook.com In recent decades, the issue of the successor for leadership in the Chinese Communist Party has not only resulted in conflict within the party. It has also attracted the close concern for Western countries. As the 18th Congress is getting closer, the relationship between Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang and President Hu Jintao is again being observed closely. Several messages from "WikiLeaks" seem to confirm President Hu Jintao was behind Li Keqiang's entering the Politburo Standing Committee. This was because of Li Keqiang´s admission of China's GDP figures being 'artificial'. It is certain the 'hardcore faction' of Vice Premier Li Keqiang will succeed Wen Jiabao as the next Prime Minister. In October 2007, Li directly entered the Politburo level. Li bypassed the political committee, which was an extraordinary move. Recently, media have reported many related Messages released by WikiLeaks last year. On August 30 2011, WikiLeaks released a message from the US Consulate General in Shanghai to Washington DC. On January 1 2007, Luo Yi, representative of China in the Carlyle Group, disclosed information. Li Keqiang did not enter the central committee because of his special talent. He entered because of his close relationship with President Hu Jintao. The "Hu-Li alliance" resulted from their past history together. Luo Yi said that there are rumors that Hu Jintao´s support for Li Keqiang in entering the ...
http://wn.com/WikiLeaks_Disclosed_Hu_and_Li_Alliance_Due_to_Phony_GDP
Li Keqiang meets Jao Tsung-I (18.8.2011)
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 0:57
- Updated: 07 Jul 2012
Vice-Premier Li Keqiang met with renowned contemporary Sinologist Professor Jao Tsung-I on the last day of his Hong Kong visit on August 18. Prior to the University of Hong Kong centenary ceremony today, Mr Li called on Prof Jao on the university campus. Saying he was pleased to see Prof Jao in good health, Mr Li commended him for his great achievements in Sinology, calligraphy and Chinese painting. ( j.mp )
http://wn.com/Li_Keqiang_meets_Jao_Tsung-I_1882011
Apple's Cook Meets Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 2:14
- Updated: 10 Jul 2012
Bloomberg's Cory Johnson reports on Apple Inc. Chief Executive Officer Tim Cook's visit to China, which included a meeting with Vice Premier Li Keqiang. (Source: Bloomberg)
http://wn.com/Apple's_Cook_Meets_Chinese_Vice_Premier_Li_Keqiang
China's Taxes Need Re-structuring in 2012: Li Keqiang
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 2:44
- Updated: 06 Aug 2012
For more news and videos visit ☛ english.ntdtv.com Follow us on Twitter ☛ http Add us on Facebook ☛ me.lt The Chinese regime's tax system may go through restructuring in 2012, according to recent comments from Deputy Party Secretary Li Keqiang. Economists say that under the current structure, low-income earners and small businesses are losing out due to high tax rates and indirect taxes being passed down the supply chain. Chinese Deputy Party Secretary Li Keqiang has stressed the importance of increasing domestic demand in the coming year, amid a gloomy global economic outlook. Li acknowledges that to do that, taxes must be lowered and re-structured. Li gave his comments at the annual Work and Finance conference that ended on Monday in Beijing. He spoke of a more flexible fiscal policy and structural tax reductions, in order to improve people's livelihoods. A professor at the Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Li Weiguang, says that in addition to direct taxes on people's salaries in China, many indirect taxes get passed down the supply chain that get charged to the consumer—making products very expensive. He says small businesses are also struggling under the current tax structure. [Li Weiguang, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics]: "70 percent of our country's tax revenues are already made up of direct taxes, so why are the prices of products on the market so high? Apart from the inflation factor, there is also the issue of the tax burden. Indirect ...
http://wn.com/China's_Taxes_Need_Re-structuring_in_2012_Li_Keqiang
China facing huge housing shortage
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 6:05
- Updated: 22 Oct 2012
China is facing a huge shortage in available housing due to mass migration from the countryside to the cities. It will be a major challenge for China's next premier Li Keqiang. Huey Fern Tay reports.
http://wn.com/China_facing_huge_housing_shortage
The Communist party chooses 'Xi Jinping' as new leader
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 1:12
- Updated: 20 Nov 2012
As China's 18th Party Congress draws to a close just one day before the announcement of the country's new leaders, the state-owned news agency has reported that as expected Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have been elected to the party's Central Committee in the first step towards becoming the president and premier of the country. Jingping will replace the outgoing President Hu Jintao, who said in a closing statement the congress had "replaced older leaders with younger ones" and made decisions of "far-reaching historical significance." Around 2250 party delegates cast their votes behind closed doors to elect the new Central Committee in Beijing, which will approve the country's main policy body, the 25-member Politburo Standing Committee. The line of fresh leaders are expected to be under close scrutiny for early indications on China's future economic and political course. Written and presented by Ann Salter.
http://wn.com/The_Communist_party_chooses_'Xi_Jinping'_as_new_leader
China's next leaders inherit health shortfall
- Order: Reorder
- Duration: 5:28
- Updated: 13 Nov 2012
The man expected to be China's next Premier, Li Keqiang, has made health care reform one of his key priorities. But despite a radical overhaul of the public health care system, the country is struggling to juggle the rising cost of health care with the needs of its people. China correspondent Huey Fern Tay reports from Shanghai.
http://wn.com/China's_next_leaders_inherit_health_shortfall
photo: AP / Pablo Martinez Monsivais
20 Nov 2012
Article by WN.com Correspondent Dallas Darling President Barack Obama's whirlwind tour of southeast Asia and meetings with dignitaries will have to walk a tightrope between either appearing to endorse military juntas or truly being committed to ongoing pro-democracy movements. Specifically at issue is Burma's Aung San Suu Kyi, a democratic advocate...(size: 5.0Kb)
photo: AP / Sebastian D'souza
21 Nov 2012
MUMBAI, India - India executed the lone surviving gunman from the 2008 terror attack on Mumbai early Wednesday, India's home ministry said. Ajmal Kasab, a Pakistani citizen, was one of 10 gunmen who rampaged through the streets of India's financial capital in November 2008, killing 166 people. Kasab was hung at 7:30 a.m. Wednesday at a jail in...(size: 4.5Kb)
photo: AP / Melanie Gouby
21 Nov 2012
Hundreds of government soldiers and police in the Democratic Republic of Congo have surrendered to rebels at a stadium in Goma, Al Jazeera's Nazanine Moshiri has reported from the scene. The M23 rebel group, believed to be backed by Rwanda seized the strategic, provincial capital of Goma in eastern Congo on Tuesday, home to more than 1 million...(size: 18.7Kb)
photo: AP / Hatem Moussa
19 Nov 2012
Gaza/Jerusalem - Israel bombed dozens of targets in the Gaza Strip on Monday and said that while it was prepared to step up its offensive by sending in troops, it preferred a diplomatic solution that would end Palestinian rocket fire. Mediator Egypt said a deal for a truce to end the fighting could be close. The leader of Hamas said it was up to...(size: 4.1Kb)
photo: UN / Logan Abassi
21 Nov 2012
A report by the UN says global attempts to curb emissions of CO2 are falling well short of what is needed to stem dangerous climate change. The UN's Environment Programme says greenhouse gases are 14% above where they need to be in 2020 for temperature rises this century to remain below 2C. The authors say this target is still technically...(size: 3.5Kb)
The Independent
22 Nov 2012
Li Keqiang, set to become China's premier in March, said the nation must deepen its rural-urban population shift to support growth while avoiding the economic stagnation associated with middle-income countries. Urbanization is a "huge engine" of China's future economic growth, Li, currently vice premier, said Wednesday in a full-page...(size: 2.4Kb)
The Telegraph India
22 Nov 2012
Bloomberg
22 Nov 2012
China’s manufacturing may expand in November for the first time in 13 months, adding to signs that economic growth is rebounding after a seven-quarter slowdown. The preliminary reading was 50.4 for a purchasing managers’ index released today...(size: 1.6Kb)
Business Day
22 Nov 2012
RECENTLY the world was treated to a spectacular study in political contrast, with the American and Chinese leadership elections coming to a close within two weeks of each other. In the US we saw the end of a campaign that lasted the best part of 18 months, while in China the newly elected leaders stepped out in a ceremony lasting less than an hour....(size: 4.7Kb)
Bloomberg
22 Nov 2012
Euro-area services and manufacturing output shrank for a 10th month in November as the debt crisis continued to weigh on confidence across the currency bloc. A composite index based on a survey of purchasing managers in both industries rose to 45.8 from 45.7, London-based Markit Economics said today. Economists had forecast a November reading of...(size: 3.7Kb)
Bloomberg
22 Nov 2012
China’s manufacturing may expand in November for the first time in 13 months, adding to signs that economic growth is rebounding after a seven-quarter slowdown. The preliminary reading was 50.4 for a purchasing managers’ index released today by HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA) and Markit Economics. It compares with a final level of 49.5 for October. A...(size: 4.0Kb)
Bloomberg
21 Nov 2012
Li Keqiang, set to become China’s premier in March, said the nation must deepen its rural-urban population shift to support growth while avoiding the economic stagnation associated with middle-income countries. Urbanization is a “huge engine” of China’s future economic growth, Li, currently vice premier, said today in a full-page article on...(size: 3.3Kb)
BBC News
21 Nov 2012
Newspapers report Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's meeting with US President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the Asean summit in Phnom Penh. China Daily, the Global Times and People's Daily say Mr Obama promised Mr Wen the US would not take sides in the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes. People's Daily also reports Mr Wen reiterated China's...(size: 4.0Kb)
Sun Sentinel
21 Nov 2012
BEIJING (Reuters) - Retired leaders in China's Communist Party used a last-minute straw poll to block two pro-reform candidates from joining the policymaking standing committee, including one who had alienated party elders, sources with ties to the leadership said. Two sources said the influential retirees flexed their muscles in landmark informal...(size: 4.7Kb)
New Straits/Business Times
21 Nov 2012
HU'S LEGACY: Xi-Li team must ensure that transition in 2017 is as smooth as the current leadership handover WHEN Hu Jintao became China's leader a decade ago, many hoped that the quiet, taciturn 59-year-old would turn out to be a closet liberal who would launch political reforms. They were disappointed. Last week, when he stepped down as general...(size: 4.6Kb)
Huffington Post
21 Nov 2012
The Star
21 Nov 2012
BEIJING (Reuters) - Retired leaders in China's Communist Party used a last-minute straw poll to block two pro-reform candidates from joining the policymaking standing committee, including one who had alienated party elders, sources with ties to the leadership said. A security person closes a door as he guards an area of the Great Hall of the...(size: 6.7Kb)
Seeking Alpha
21 Nov 2012
Edward Morse at Citi (via Business Insider) has made a bearish call on the commodity supercycle based on a slowing Chinese economy and re-balancing growth away from infrastructure spending toward the consumer. (click to enlarge) I beg to differ. The secular commodity bull cycle is not ending this cycle, but in the next downturn. More of the...(size: 9.1Kb)
| Li Keqiang 李克强 |
|
|---|---|
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| 9th First Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China | |
| Incumbent | |
| Assumed office 17 March 2008 |
|
| Premier | Wen Jiabao |
| Preceded by | Wu Yi (Acting) |
| Member of the National People's Congress |
|
| Incumbent | |
| Assumed office 15 March 1993 |
|
| Constituency | Anhui At-large (93–98) Henan At-large (98-08) Liaoning At-large (08-) |
| 11th Communist Party Committee Secretary of Liaoning | |
| In office December 2004 – October 2007 |
|
| Deputy | Zhang Wenyue |
| Preceded by | Wen Shizhen |
| Succeeded by | Zhang Wenyue |
| 12th Communist Party Committee Secretary of Henan | |
| In office December 2002 – December 2004 |
|
| Deputy | Li Chengyu |
| Preceded by | Chen Kuiyuan |
| Succeeded by | Xu Guangchun |
| First Secretary of the Communist Youth League of China | |
| In office May 1993 – June 1998 |
|
| Preceded by | Song Defu |
| Succeeded by | Zhou Qiang |
| Personal details | |
| Born | (1955-07-01) 1 July 1955 (age 56) Dingyuan, China |
| Political party | Communist Party of China |
| Spouse(s) | Cheng Hong |
| Alma mater | Peking University |
| Signature |  |
| Li Keqiang | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional Chinese | 李克強 | ||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 李克强 | ||||||||
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Li Keqiang (born 1 July 1955) is the Executive Vice-Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, the seventh ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the People's Republic of China's de facto highest decision-making body. As Premier Wen Jiabao's top lieutenant, Li's official portfolio includes economic development, price controls, finance, climate change, and macroeconomic management.
Li rose through the ranks of the Communist Youth League. From 1998 to 2004, Li served as the Governor of Henan and the province's CPC party chief, and then the Liaoning party chief, an office that made him first-in-charge in that province. Li is speculated as the likely successor to Wen Jiabao as Premier in the "fifth generation" (Xi-Li Administration) of CPC leadership.
Contents |
Biography[link]
Early life[link]
Li Keqiang was born in Dingyuan County, Anhui on 1 July 1955. His father was a local official in Anhui. Li graduated from high school in 1974, during the Cultural Revolution, and was sent for rural labour in Fengyang County, Anhui, where he eventually joined the Communist Party of China and made his way to becoming the party head of the local production team. He was awarded with the honour of Outstanding Individual in the Study of Mao Zedong Thought during this time.[1]
He refused his father's offer of grooming him for the local county's party leadership and entered the School of Law at Peking University, where he received his LLB and became the President of the University's Student Council. He would go on to acquire a PhD in Economics. In 1980 he became the Communist Youth League Secretary at Peking University. He entered the top leadership of the Communist Youth League (CYL) in 1982 as a member of its Secretariat, and has worked closely with current General Secretary Hu Jintao, who also rose through the ranks of the CYL, ever since. Li became the organization's General Secretary in 1993, and served until 1998. He is a representative member of the first generation to have risen from the CYL leadership.
Provincial tenures[link]
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The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. (February 2012) |
Li became China's youngest governor when appointed to the position of Governor of Henan, one of China's most populous provinces, in June 1998, at the age of 43. Knowing the complicated situation Henan was in, and the issues associated with networking in the province, Li consciously left his family in Beijing to head to Zhengzhou alone. In addition, according to provincial government officials working with him at the time, Li refused to participate in any banquets or large fancy events not related to government activities.[2] During his time as governor a public sense of his ‘bad luck’ grew due to the occurrence of three major fires in the province.[3]
He is known to be outspoken, and led economic development in the central province, transforming the poor inland region into an attractive area for investment. Li did not waste time pursuing superficial projects, but rather trekked all regions of Henan trying to search for a comprehensive solution to the province's growing problems. Henan jumped in national GDP rankings from 28th in the early 1990s to 18th in 2004, when Li left Henan. However,he was unable to control the widespread of AIDS in the province during his governing, which has been proved to be disastrous.
He was transferred to work as the CPC Committee Secretary in Liaoning in December 2004. In Liaoning he is known for the "Five-points to one Line" project, where he linked up Dalian and Dandong, as well as a series of other ports into a comprehensive network.
National politics[link]
Predictions he would eventually advance to the national level at the 17th Party Congress proved correct when he was elected to the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) in October 2007. He was succeeded in his provincial post by Governor Zhang Wenyue. Li has been touted as a possible successor to Hu Jintao, whose second term as General Secretary, expected to be his last, will end in 2012. At the 2008 National People's Congress, he was elected Vice-Premier, first in rank. This position makes it seem more likely that he will succeed Premier Wen Jiabao. As a result of this it is considered that he has lost out to Xi Jinping in the internal power struggle.[3]
Since his ascendancy to the PSC, Li has taken on the most important portfolios in the Chinese government, ostensibly being groomed for his upcoming premiership. Li's first major appearance internationally was at the 2010 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The event was seen as an "acid test" for Li, whereby he succinctly presented China's long-term vision for development in front of world business and political leaders.[4] In particular, Li briefed the WEF on China's commitment to sustainable development, green energy, decrease the income gap, and the modernization of key strategic industries.[4] While reiterating China's commitment to peaceful development and its focus in increasing domestic demand in the face of external pressures during the global financial crisis, Li also warned against protectionism, saying "opening up can be both bilateral and multilateral... in this sense, one plus one is more often than not bigger than two." He also touched upon the importance of international development, and international financial reform. He called for a global governance structure that was "more reflective of the changes in the global political and economic landscape."[5]
In February 2010, Li gave a speech to ministerial and provincial-level leaders about the importance of changing the economic structure of the country to be better poised for future growth. The speech was published with minor omissions in the 1 June issue of Qiushi, the Communist Party's political theory publication. Li said that China has come to a historical juncture whereby a change in the economic structure must take place for the country to continue its path of growth. Li particularly emphasized the need to boost domestic consumption, and said that urbanization is crucial in this phase.[6] Li also emphasized that China should be moving towards a more middle class-oriented society with an "olive"-shaped wealth distribution, with the majority of the country's population and wealth belonging to the middle class.[7]
He has also reiterated the importance of industrialization, urbanization and agricultural modernization in China in order to improve its competitiveness, food security, energy security, affordable housing and healthcare.[8]
In August 2011, Li went on an official visit to Hong Kong, including a trip to the University of Hong Kong. The political sensitivities and heightened security surrounding the event resulted in the Hong Kong 818 incident, an event that caused controversy in the territory.
Personal life[link]
Li is married to Cheng Hong, a professor at Capital University of Economics and Business in Beijing. His father-in-law was once the vice-secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee.[9]
References[link]
- ^ 《多维月刊》：李克强出身非平民，成长靠恩师（2）
- ^ Duowei: Li Keqiang helps Henan fight off the poverty
- ^ a b Power Players: Li Keqiang
- ^ a b Maidment, Paul (28 January 2010). "China's Li Delivers A Polished Future". Forbes. http://blogs.forbes.com/davos/2010/01/28/chinas-li-delivers-a-polished-future/.
- ^ Li, Keqiang. "Davos Annual Meeting 2010 – Special Address by Li Keqiang". World Economic Forum. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ybzXrKw6rPk. Retrieved 4 June 2010.
- ^ Li, Keqiang. "Questions Concerning Changes to China's Economic Structure (关于调整经济结构促进持续发展的几个问题)". Qiushi. http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2010/201011/201005/t20100527_31316.htm. Retrieved 1 June 2010.
- ^ http://china.globaltimes.cn/society/2010-06/538531.html
- ^ Xinhua News Agency (11 October 2010). "China's vice premier urges accelerating industrialization, urbanization". English.news.cn. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-10/11/c_13550478.htm. Retrieved 22 October 2010.
- ^ [Duowei Monthly: Li Keqiang's Wife and In-laws. http://www.dwnews.com/gb/MainNews/Forums/BackStage/2008_11_20_16_59_35_980.html]
External links[link]
 |
Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Li Keqiang |
- 中国政治明星李克强甩掉河南“穷帽子” (Chinese)
- A Louie & Associates Articles: President Hu's Top 4 Aides (2007)
- 胡錦濤愛將李克強的仕途和足跡 (Chinese)
- 李克强出身非平民，成长靠恩师 (Chinese)
| Political offices | ||
|---|---|---|
| Preceded by Ma Zhongchen |
Governor of Henan 1998–2003 |
Succeeded by Li Chengyu |
| Preceded by Ren Keli |
Chairperson of Henan People's Congress 2003–2005 |
Succeeded by Xu Guangchun |
| Preceded by Wen Shizhen |
Chairperson of Liaoning People's Congress 2005–2007 |
Succeeded by Zhang Xilin |
| Preceded by Wu Yi Acting |
First Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China 2008–present |
Incumbent |
| Party political offices | ||
| Preceded by Song Defu |
First Secretary of the Communist Youth League of China 1993–1998 |
Succeeded by Zhou Qiang |
| Preceded by Chen Kuiyuan |
Communist Party Committee Secretary of Henan 2002–2004 |
Succeeded by Xu Guangchun |
| Preceded by Wen Shizhen |
Communist Party Committee Secretary of Liaoning 2004–2007 |
Succeeded by Zhang Wenyue |
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| Persondata | |
|---|---|
| Name | Li, Keqiang |
| Alternative names | |
| Short description | Chinese politician |
| Date of birth | 1955-07-01 |
| Place of birth | Dingyuan County, Anhui, China |
| Date of death | |
| Place of death | |
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| First Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国国务院副总理 (排名第一) |
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|---|---|
 Emblem of the People's Republic of China |
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| Residence | Zhongnanhai |
| Nominator | the Premier of the State Council |
| Appointer | the National People's Congress |
| Term length | five years, renewable once consecutively |
| Inaugural holder | Chen Yun |
| Formation | September 1954 |
| Website | State Council |
| People's Republic of China |
This article is part of the series: |
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Other countries · Atlas Politics portal |
The Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (simplified Chinese: 中华人民共和国国务院副总理; traditional Chinese: 中華人民共和國國務院副總理; pinyin: Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Guówùyuàn Fùzǒnglǐ) is a high-ranking executive assistant to the Premier. Generally, the title is held by multiple individuals at one time, with each Vice-Premier holding a broad portfolio of responsibilities. The highest-ranked office holder is informally called the Executive Vice Premier (常务副总理).[1] The EVP takes over duties of the Premier at the time of the latter's incapacity.
Current Vice Premiers, in order of rank, are Li Keqiang, Hui Liangyu, Zhang Dejiang and Wang Qishan.
In irregular instances, the position of a First Vice Premier (第一副总理) has been named either to indicate degree of power, nominal power, or when the Premier is incapacitated and requires a full time assistant to carry out his regular duties. The most prominent case of this is Deng Xiaoping between 1978 and 1980.
List of Current Vice Premiers[link]
| Portrait | Information | Posts | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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Rank | 1st | Member of the Politburo Standing Committee
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| Name | Li Keqiang | ||||
| Constituency | Liaoning At-large | ||||
| Ethnicity | Han | ||||
| Birthplace | Dingyuan County, Chuzhou, Anhui | ||||
| took office since | 17 March 2008 | ||||
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Rank | 2nd | Member of the CPC Politburo
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| Name | Hui Liangyu | ||||
| Constituency | Guangxi At-large | ||||
| Ethnicity | Hui | ||||
| Birthplace | Yushu, Changchun, Jilin | ||||
| took office since | 17 March 2003 | ||||
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Rank | 3rd | Member of the CPC Politburo
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| Name | Zhang Dejiang | ||||
| Constituency | Zhejiang At-large | ||||
| Ethnicity | Han | ||||
| Birthplace | Tai'an County, Anshan, Liaoning | ||||
| took office since | 17 March 2008 | ||||
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Rank | 4th | Member of the CPC Politburo
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| Name | Wang Qishan | ||||
| Constituency | Shangdong At-large | ||||
| Ethnicity | Han | ||||
| Birthplace | Qingdao, Shandong | ||||
| took office since | 17 March 2008 | ||||
See also[link]
- List of Vice premiers of the People's Republic of China
- Premier of the People's Republic of China
- State Councilor
- Political position ranking of the People's Republic of China
Notes[link]
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Related pages:
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| State Council of the People's Republic of China |
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| 中华人民共和国国务院 | |
| Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Guówùyuàn | |
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| Emblem of the People's Republic of China | |
| Agency overview | |
| Formed | 27 September 1954 |
| Preceding agency | Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government |
| Jurisdiction | Government of the People's Republic of China |
| Headquarters | Zhongnanhai, Beijing |
| Agency executives | Wen Jiabao, Premier Li Keqiang Hui Liangyu Zhang Dejiang Wang Qishan, Vice-Premiers |
| Website | |
| http://english.gov.cn | |
| People's Republic of China |
This article is part of the series: |
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Ideology
Other issues
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Other countries · Atlas Politics portal |
The State Council (simplified Chinese: 国务院; traditional Chinese: 國務院; pinyin: Guówùyuàn), synonymous with the Central People's Government (Chinese: 中央人民政府) since 1954 (particularly in relation to local governments), is the chief administrative authority of the People's Republic of China.[1] It is chaired by the Premier and includes the heads of each governmental department and agency.[2] Currently, the council has 35 members: the premier, one executive vice premier, three vice premiers, five state councilors (of whom two are also ministers), and 25 additional ministers and chairs of major agencies.[3] In the politics of the People's Republic of China, the Central People's Government forms one of three interlocking branches of power, the others being the Communist Party of China and the People's Liberation Army. The State Council directly oversees the various subordinate People's Governments in the provinces, and in practice maintains an interlocking membership with the top levels of the Communist Party of China creating a fused center of power.
Contents
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Organization[link]
The State Council meets once every six months. Between meetings it is guided by a standing committee which meets weekly. The standing committee includes the premier, one executive vice premier, three vice premiers, and five other state councilors (one of whom serves as Secretary General of the State Council, and two of whom concurrently serve as ministers).
The vice-premiers and state councilors are nominated by the premier, and appointed by the president with National People's Congress' (NPC) approval. The premier is nominated and appointed by the president with NPC approval. Incumbents may serve two successive five-year terms.
Each vice premier oversees certain areas of administration. Each State Councilor performs duties as designated by the Premier. The secretary-general heads the General Office which handles the day-to-day work of the State Council. The secretary-general has relatively little power and should not be confused with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China.
Each ministry supervises one sector. Commissions outrank ministries and set policies for and coordinate the related activities of different administrative organs. Offices deal with matters of ongoing concern. Bureaus and administrations rank below ministries.
In addition to the 27 ministries, there are 38 centrally administered government organizations that report directly to the state council. The heads of these organizations attend full meetings of the state committee on an irregular basis.
Although the State Council is formally responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee in conducting a wide range of government functions both at the national and at the local levels, in practice the NPC's authority is rather limited, although it not completely non-existent. The State Council acts by virtue of the NPC's authority and there has been at least one case where the NPC has outright rejected an initiative of the State Council and a few cases where the State Council has withdrawn or greatly modified a proposal in response to NPC opposition.
The State Council and the Communist Party of China are also tightly interlocked. Most of the members of the State Council are high level party members. Although, as party members, they are supposed to follow party instructions, because they tend to be senior members of the party they also have large amounts of influence over what those instructions are. This results in a system which is unlike the Soviet practice in which the Party effectively controlled the state. Rather the party and state are fused at this level of government. The members of the State Council derive their authority from being members of the state, while as members of the Party they coordinate their activities and determine key decisions such as the naming of personnel.
Although there were attempts to separate the party and state in the late 1980s under Zhao Ziyang and have the Party in charge of formulating policy and the State Council executing policy, these efforts were largely abandoned in the early 1990s.
As the chief administrative organ of government, its main functions are to formulate administrative measures, issue decisions and orders, and monitor their implementation; draft legislative bills for submission to the NPC or its Standing Committee; and prepare the economic plan and the state budget for deliberation and approval by the NPC. The State Council is the functional center of state power and clearinghouse for government initiatives at all levels. With the government's emphasis on economic modernization, the State Council clearly acquired additional importance and influence.
The State Council controls the Ministry for National Defense but does not control the People's Liberation Army, which is instead controlled by the Central Military Commission.
Principal officers[link]
- Wen I and II Cabinet
| Office | Officeholder(s) | Tenure |
|---|---|---|
| Premier | Wen Jiabao | 2003– |
| First Vice Premier (Financial Affairs) | Huang Ju Li Keqiang |
2003–2007 2008– |
| Vice Premier (Foreign Affairs and Commerce) | Wu Yi Wang Qishan |
2003–2008 2008– |
| Vice Premier (Economy) | Zeng Peiyan Zhang Dejiang |
2002–2008 2008– |
| Vice Premier (Agriculture) | Hui Liangyu | 2003– |
| Secretary General | Hua Jianmin Ma Kai |
2003–2008 2008– |
| Finance Minister | Jin Renqing Xie Xuren |
2003–2007 2007– |
| Foreign Minister | Li Zhaoxing Yang Jiechi |
2003–2007 2007– |
| Defense Minister | Cao Gangchuan Liang Guanglie |
2003–2007 2007– |
| Education Minister | Zhou Ji Yuan Guiren |
2003–2009 2009 |
| Commerce Minister | Bo Xilai Chen Deming |
2004–2007 2007– |
| Health Minister | Zhang Wenkang Wu Yi Gao Qiang Chen Zhu |
1998–2003 2003–2005 2005–2007 2007- |
| National Development and Reform Commission Chairman | Ma Kai Zhang Ping |
2003–2008 2008– |
| Railways Minister | Liu Zhijun Sheng Guangzu |
2003–2011 2011– |
| Civil Affairs Minister | Li Xueju | 2003– |
| Labour Minister | Tian Chengping | 2005– |
| PBOC Governor | Zhou Xiaochuan | 2005– |
Organizational structure[link]
General Office of the State Council[link]
Ministries and Commissions under the State Council[link]
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ministry of National Defense
- National Development and Reform Commission
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Science and Technology
- State Ethnic Affairs Commission
- Ministry of Public Security
- Ministry of State Security
- Ministry of Supervision
- Ministry of Civil Affairs
- Ministry of Justice
- Ministry of Finance
- Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
- Ministry of Land and Resources
- Ministry of Environmental Protection
- Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Construction
- Ministry of Railways
- Ministry of Transport
- Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
- Ministry of Water Resources
- Ministry of Agriculture
- Ministry of Commerce
- Ministry of Culture
- Ministry of Health
- National Population and Family Planning Commission
- People's Bank of China
- National Audit Office
Special Organization directly under the State Council[link]
Organizations directly under the State Council[link]
- General Administration of Customs
- State Administration of Taxation
- State Administration for Industry and Commerce
- General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine
- State Administration of Radio, Film and Television
- General Administration of Press and Publication (National Copyright Administration)
- State General Administration of Sports
- National Bureau of Statistics
- State Forestry Administration
- State Administration of Work Safety
- State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO)
- National Tourism Administration
- State Administration for Religious Affairs
- Counselor's Office of the State Council
- Government Offices Administration of the State Council
- National Bureau of Corruption Prevention
Administrative Offices under the State Council[link]
- Overseas Chinese Affairs Office
- Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office
- Legislative Affairs Office
- State Council Research Office
Institutions directly under the State Council[link]
- Xinhua News Agency
- Chinese Academy of Sciences
- Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
- Chinese Academy of Engineering
- Development Research Center
- China National School of Administration
- China Earthquake Administration
- China Meteorological Administration
- China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
- China Securities Regulatory Commission
- China Insurance Regulatory Commission
- State Electricity Regulatory Commission
- National Council for Social Security Fund
- National Natural Science Foundation
- Taiwan Affairs Office (also as a CPC institution), under CPC Central Committee
- State Council Information Office (also as a CPC institution), under CPC Central Committee
- State Archives Administration (also as a CPC institution), under General Office of CPC Central Committee
State Administrations and Bureaus under the Ministries and Commissions[link]
- State Bureau for Letters and Calls, under General Office of the State Council
- State Administration of Grain, under National Development and Reform Commission
- National Energy Administration, under National Development and Reform Commission
- State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, under Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
- State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (China National Tobacco Corporation), under Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
- State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs, under Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
- State Bureau of Civil Servants, under Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
- State Oceanic Administration, under Ministry of Land and Resources
- Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), under Ministry of Transport
- State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping, under Ministry of Land and Resources
- State Post Bureau, under Ministry of Transport
- State Administration of Cultural Heritage, under Ministry of Culture
- State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA), under Ministry of Health
- State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, under Ministry of Health
- State Administration of Foreign Exchange, under People's Bank of China
- State Administration of Coal Mine Safety, under State Administration of Work Safety
- National Administration for the Protection of State Secrets (also as a CPC institution), under General Office of CPC Central Committee
- State Cryptography Administration (also as a CPC institution), under General Office of CPC Central Committee
- China National Space Administration, a name resereved by Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
- China Atomic Energy Authority, a name resereved by Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
- State Language Commission, a name resereved by Ministry of Education
- National Nuclear Safety Administration, a name resereved by Ministry of Environmental Protection
See also[link]
References[link]
External links[link]
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http://fr.wn.com/Conseil des affaires de l'État de la République populaire de Chine
http://de.wn.com/Staatsrat der Volksrepublik China
http://pl.wn.com/Rada Państwa (ChRL)
http://id.wn.com/Dewan Kenegaraan Republik Rakyat Cina
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| Falun Gong | |||||||||||||||||
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| The Falun Dafa emblem | |||||||||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 法輪功 | ||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 法轮功 | ||||||||||||||||
| Literal meaning | Dharma Wheel Practice or Dharma Wheel Work/Power/Energy | ||||||||||||||||
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| Falun Dafa | |||||||||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 法輪大法 | ||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 法轮大法 | ||||||||||||||||
| Literal meaning | Great Dharma Wheel Practice | ||||||||||||||||
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This article contains Chinese text. Without proper rendering support, you may see question marks, boxes, or other symbols instead of Chinese characters. |
Falun Gong or Falun Dafa (literally means "Dharma Wheel Practice") is a spiritual discipline first introduced in China in 1992 through public lectures by its founder, Li Hongzhi.[1] It combines the practice of meditation and slow-moving qigong exercises with a moral philosophy. Falun Gong emphasises morality and the cultivation of virtue in its central tenets of Truthfulness, Compassion, and Forbearance (Chinese: 真、善、忍), and identifies as a qigong practice of the Buddhist school, though its teachings also incorporate elements drawn from Taoist traditions.[2][3] Through moral rectitude and the practice of meditation, practitioners of Falun Gong aspire to better health and, ultimately, spiritual enlightenment.
Falun Gong emerged at the end of China's "qigong boom", a period which saw the proliferation of similar practices of meditation, slow-moving exercises and regulated breathing.[4] It differs from other qigong schools in its absence of fees or formal membership, lack of daily rituals of worship,[5] its greater emphasis on morality, and the theological nature of its teachings.[6] Western academics have described Falun Gong as a qigong discipline, a "spiritual movement" based on the teachings of its founder,[7] a "cultivation system" in the tradition of Chinese antiquity,[8] and sometimes a religion[9] or new religious movement.
Although the practice initially enjoyed considerable support from Chinese officialdom, by the mid- to late-1990s, the Communist Party and public security organs increasingly viewed Falun Gong as a potential threat due to its size, independence from the state, and spiritual teachings. By 1999, some estimates placed the number of Falun Gong adherents in the tens of millions.[10][11][12]
In July 1999, Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership initiated a nationwide crackdown and multifaceted propaganda campaign intended to eradicate the practice. In October 1999 it declared Falun Gong a "heretical organization" and began banning Internet access to websites that mention Falun Gong.[2][13][14] Human rights groups report that Falun Gong practitioners in China are subject to a wide range of human rights abuses; hundreds of thousands are believed to have been imprisoned extrajudicially, and practitioners in detention are subject to forced labor, psychiatric abuse, torture, and other coercive methods of thought reform at the hands of Chinese authorities.[15][16][17][18] In the years since the suppression campaign began, Falun Gong adherents have emerged as a prominent voice in the Chinese dissident community, advocating for greater human rights and an end to Communist Party rule.
Li Hongzhi has lived in New York since 1998,[19] and Falun Gong has a sizable global constituency; inside China, some sources estimate that millions may continue to practice Falun Gong in spite of suppression.[20][21] Hundreds of thousands are believed to practice Falun Gong outside China across some 70 countries worldwide.[22]
Contents |
Origins[link]
Falun Gong is most frequently identified with the qigong movement in China. Qigong is a modern term describing a variety of practices involving slow movement, meditation, and regulated breathing. Qigong-like exercises have historically been practiced by Buddhist monks, Daoist martial artists, and Confucian scholars as a means of spiritual, moral, and physical refinement.
The modern qigong movement emerged in the early 1950s, when Communist cadres embraced the techniques as a way to improve health.[23] The new term was constructed to avoid association with religious practices, that were prone to being labeled as "feudal superstition" and persecuted during the Maoist era.[24] Early adopters of qigong eschewed its religious overtones, and regarded qigong principally as a branch of Chinese medicine. In the late 1970s, Chinese scientists purported to have "discovered" the material existence of the qi energy which qigong seeks to harness, thus lending a level of scientific credibility to the movement.[25] In the spiritual vacuum of the post-Mao era, tens of millions of mostly urban and elderly Chinese citizens took up the practice of qigong,[26][27] and a variety of charismatic qigong masters established practices. At one time, over 2,000 disciplines of qigong were being taught.[28] The state-run China Qigong Science Research Society (CQRS) was created to oversee and administer the movement.
On 13 May 1992, Li Hongzhi gave his first public seminar on Falun Gong (alternately called Falun Dafa) in the northeastern city of Changchun. In his hagiographic spiritual biography Li Hongzhi is said to have been taught ways of "cultivation practice" by several masters of the Buddhist and Daoist traditions, including Quan Jue, the 10th Heir to the Great Law of the Buddha School, a Taoist master from age eight to twelve, and a master of the Great Way School with the Taoist alias of True Taoist from the Changbai Mountains. Falun Dafa is said to be the result of his reorganizing and writing down the teachings that were passed to him.[29]
Li presented Falun Gong as part of a "centuries-old tradition of cultivation",[3] and in effect sought to revive the religious and spiritual elements of qigong practice that had been discarded in the earlier Communist era. David Palmer says Li "redefined his method as having entirely different objectives from qigong: the purpose of practice should neither be physical health nor the development of extraordinary powers, but to purify one's heart and attain spiritual salvation."[30]
Falun Gong is distinct from other qigong schools in that its teachings cover a wide range of spiritual and metaphysical topics, placing emphasis on morality and virtue, and elaborating a complete cosmology.[31] The practice identifies with the Buddhist School (Fojia), but also draws on concepts and language found in Taoism and Confucianism.[32] This has led some scholars to label the practice as a syncretic faith.[33]
Beliefs and practices[link]
Main article: Teachings of Falun Gong
Central teachings[link]
Falun Gong aspires to enable the practitioner to ascend spiritually through moral rectitude and the practice of a set of exercises and meditation. The three central tenets of the belief are 'Truthfulness' (眞, Zhēn), 'Compassion' (善, Shàn), and 'Forbearance' (忍, Rěn).[34][35] Together these principles are regarded as the fundamental nature of the cosmos, the criterion for differentiating right from wrong, and are held to be the highest manifestation of the Tao, or Buddhist Dharma.[36][37][38][39] Adherence to and cultivation of these virtues is regarded as a fundamental part of Falun Gong practice.[40] In Zhuan Falun (轉法輪), the foundational text published in 1995, Li Hongzhi writes "It doesn't matter how mankind's moral standard changes…The nature of the cosmos doesn't change, and it is the only standard for determining who's good and who's bad. So to be a cultivator you have to take the nature of the cosmos as your guide for improving yourself.”[36][41]
Practice of Falun Gong consists of two features: performance of the exercises, and the refinement of one’s xinxing (moral character, or temperament). In Falun Gong's central text, Li states that xinxing "includes virtue (which is a type of matter), it includes forbearance, it includes awakening to things, it includes giving up things—giving up all the desires and all the attachments that are found in an ordinary person—and you also have to endure hardship, to name just a few things."[36][42] The elevation of one's xinxing, or moral character, is achieved, on the one hand, by aligning one's life with truth, compassion, and tolerance; and on the other, by abandoning desires and "negative thoughts and behaviors, such as greed, profit, lust, desire, killing, fighting, theft, robbery, deception, jealousy, etc."[43]
Among the central concepts found in the teachings of Falun Gong is the existence of 'Virtue' ('德, Dé) and 'Karma' (Ye).[44][45] The former is generated through doing good deeds and suffering, while the latter is accumulated through doing wrong deeds. A person's ratio of karma or virtue is said to determine his or her fortunes in this life or the next; while virtue engenders good fortune and enables spiritual transformation, an accumulation of karma results in suffering, illness, and alienation from the nature of the universe.[9][45][46] Spiritual elevation is achieved through the elimination of negative karma and the accumulation of virtue.[9][47]
Falun Gong's teachings posit that human beings are originally and innately good—even divine—but that they descended into a realm of delusion and suffering after developing selfishness and accruing karma.[36][48] [49] In order to re-ascend and return to the "original, true self", practitioners of Falun Gong are therefore supposed to assimilate themselves to the qualities of truthfulness, compassion and tolerance, let go of "attachments and desires" and suffer to repay karma.[9][36][50] The ultimate goal of the practice is enlightenment or spiritual perfection (yuanman), and release from the cycle of reincarnation, known in Buddhist tradition as samsara.[36][51]
Traditional Chinese cultural thought and modernity are two focuses of Li Hongzhi's teachings. Falun Gong echoes traditional Chinese beliefs that humans are connected to the universe through mind and body, and Li seeks to challenge "conventional mentalities", concerning the nature and genesis of the universe, time-space, and the human body.[52][53] The practice draws on East Asian mysticism and traditional Chinese medicine, criticizes the purportedly self-imposed limits of modern science, and views traditional Chinese science as an entirely different, yet equally valid ontological system.[54]
Exercises[link]
In addition to its moral philosophy, Falun Gong consists of four standing exercises and one sitting meditation. The exercises are regarded as secondary to moral elevation, though is still an essential component of Falun Gong cultivation practice.[9][55]
The first exercises, called "Buddha Stretching a Thousand Arms", are intended to facilitate the free flow of energy through the body and open up the meridians. The second exercise, "Falun Standing Stance", involves holding four static poses—each of which resembles holding a wheel—for an extended period. The objective of this exercise is to "enhances wisdom, increases strength, raises a person’s level, and strengthens divine powers". The third, "Coursing between the Two Poles", involves three sets of movements which aim to enable the expulsion of bad energy (e.g. pathogenic or black qi) and the absorption of good energy into the body. Through practice of this exercise, the practitioner aspires to cleanse and purify the body. The fourth exercise, "Falun Cosmic Orbit", seeks to circulate energy freely throughout the body. Unlike the first through fourth exercises, the fifth exercise is performed in the seated lotus position. Called "Reinforcing Supernatural Powers", it is a meditation intended to be maintained as long as possible. Some of its postures correspond to the traditional meditative gestures of Buddhism, and is described by Li as more advanced than the previous four.[56]
Falun Gong exercises can be practiced individually or in group settings, and can be performed for varying lengths of time in accordance with the needs and abilities of the individual practitioner.[36][57] Porter writes that practitioners of Falun Gong are encouraged to read Falun Gong books and practice its exercises on a regular basis, preferably daily.[58] Falun Gong exercises are practiced in group settings in parks, university campuses, and other public spaces in 70 countries worldwide, and are taught for free by volunteers.[59][60]
Social practices[link]
Falun Gong differentiates itself from Buddhist monastic traditions in that it places great importance on participation in the secular world. Falun Gong adherents are required to maintain regular jobs and family lives, to observe the laws of their respective governments, and are instructed not to distance themselves from society. An exemption is made for Buddhist monks and nuns, who are permitted to continue a monastic lifestyle while practicing Falun Gong.[36][61]
As part of its emphasis on ethical behavior, Falun Gong's teachings prescribe a strict personal morality for practitioners, which includes abstention from smoking, drugs, gambling, premarital or extramarital sex, and homosexuality.[36][62] These behaviors are said to generate negative karma, and are therefore viewed as counterproductive to the goals of the practice.[63]
Practitioners of Falun Gong are forbidden to kill living things—including animals for the purpose of obtaining food—though it does not require the adoption of a vegetarian diet.[64] The practice teaches against the consumption of alcohol on the basis that it is a potentially addictive attachment that can interfere with the cultivation of the body and lead to "irrationality".[36][65]
Falun Gong doctrine also counsels against participation in political or social issues.[66] Excessive interest in politics is viewed as an attachment to worldly power and influence, and Falun Gong aims for transcendence of such pursuits. According to Hu Ping, "Falun Gong deals only with purifying the individual through exercise, and does not touch on social or national concerns. It has not suggested or even intimated a model for social change. Many religions ... pursue social reform to some extent ... but there is no such tendency evident in Falun Gong."[67]
Texts[link]
The first book of Falun Gong teachings was published in April 1993. Called China Falun Gong, or simply Falun Gong, is an introductory text that discusses qigong, Falun Gong's relationship to Buddhism, the principles of cultivation practice and the improvement of moral character (xinxing). The book also and provides illustrations and explanations of the exercises and meditation.[55][68]
The main body of teachings is articulated in the core book Zhuan Falun, published in Chinese in January 1995. The book is divided into nine "lectures", and was based on edited transcriptions of the talks Li gave throughout China in the preceding three years.[69] Falun Gong texts have since been translated into an additional 38 languages. In addition to these central texts, Li has published several books, lectures, articles, books of poetry, which are made available on Falun Gong websites.[70][71]
The Falun Gong teachings use numerous untranslated Chinese religious and philosophical terms, and make frequent allusion to characters and incidents in Chinese folk literature and concepts drawn from Chinese popular religion, including such concepts as spirit possession.[72][72] This, coupled with the literal translation style of the texts, which imitate the tone and cadences of Li's colloquial Chinese speech, can make Falun Gong scriptures difficult to approach for Westerners.[72]
Symbols[link]
The main symbol of the practice is the Falun (dharma wheel, or Dharmacakra in Sanskrit). In Buddhism, the Dharmacakra represents the completeness of the doctrine. To "turn the wheel of dharma" (Zhuan Falun) means to preach the Buddhist doctrine, and is the title of Falun Gong's main text.[73] Despite the invocation of Buddhist language and symbols, the law wheel as understood in Falun Gong has distinct connotations, and is held to represent the universe.[74] It is conceptualized by an emblem consisting of one large and four small Swastika symbols, representing the Buddha, and four small Taiji (yin-yang) symbols of the Daoist tradition.[36][74]
Categorization[link]
Falun Gong is a multifaceted discipline that means different things to different people, ranging from a set of physical exercises for the attainment of better health and a praxis of self-transformation, to a moral philosophy and a new knowledge system.[54] Scholars and journalists have adopted a variety of terms and classifications in describing Falun Gong, some of them more precise than others.
In the cultural context of China, Falun Gong is generally described either as a system of qigong, or a type of "cultivation practice" (xiulian). Cultivation is a Chinese term that describes the process by which an individual seeks spiritual perfection, often through both physical and moral conditioning. Varieties of cultivation practice are found throughout Chinese history, spanning Buddhist, Daoist and Confucian traditions.[9] Benjamin Penny, a professor of Chinese history at the Australian National University, writes "the best way to describe Falun Gong is as a cultivation system. Cultivation systems have been a feature of Chinese life for at least 2,500 years."[8] Qigong practices can also be understood as a part of a broader tradition of "cultivation practice".[9]
In the West, Falun Gong is frequently classified as a religion on the basis of its theological and moral teachings,[75] its concerns with spiritual cultivation and transformation, and its extensive body of scripture.[9] Human rights groups report on the suppression of Falun Gong as a violation of religious freedom, and in 2001, Falun Gong was given an International Religious Freedom Award from Freedom House.[9] Falun Gong practitioners themselves have sometimes disavowed this classification, however. This rejection reflects the relatively narrow definition of "religion" (zongjiao) in contemporary China. According to David Ownby, religion has, since 1912, been defined to refer to "world-historical faiths" that have "well-developed institutions, clergy, and textual traditions"—namely, Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism.[76] Falun Gong lacks these features, having no temples, rituals of worship, clergy or formal hierarchy. Moreover, if Falun Gong had described itself as a religion in China, it likely would have invited immediate suppression.[9] These historical and cultural circumstances notwithstanding, the practice has often been described as a form of Chinese religion.[77]
Although it is often referred to as such in journalistic literature, Falun Gong does not satisfy the definition of a "sect".[78] A sect is generally defined as a branch or denomination of an established belief system or mainstream church. Although Falun Gong draws on both Buddhist and Daoist ideas and terminology, it claims no direct relationship or lineage connection to these religions.[3][79] Sociologists[who?] regard sects as exclusive groups that exist within clearly defined boundaries, with rigorous standards for admission and strict allegiances. However, as noted by Noah Porter, Falun Gong does not share these qualities: it does not have clearly defined boundaries, and anyone may practice it.[80]
Cheris Shun-ching Chan describes Falun Gong as a new religious movement. Chan considers cults to be new religious movements that focus on the individual experience of the encounter with the sacred rather than collective worship, and to that end describes Falun Gong as having cult-like characteristics (Chan uses the term in the sociological, rather than derogatory context).[81] Some scholars avoid the term "cult" altogether because "of the confusion between the historic meaning of the term and current pejorative use".[82][83] These scholars prefer terms like "spiritual movement", "new religious syncretism", or "new religious movement" to avoid the negative connotations of "cult" or to avoid improperly categorizing those which do not fit mainstream definitions.[84][85]
Organization[link]
As a matter of doctrinal significance, Falun Gong is intended to be "formless", having little to no material or formal organization.[86] Practitioners of Falun Gong cannot collect money or charge fees, conduct healings, or teach or interpret doctrine for others.[86] There are no administrators or officials within the practice, no system of membership, and no churches or physical places of worship.[87][88][89][90] In the absence of membership or initiation rituals, Falun Gong practitioners can be anyone who chooses to identify themselves as such. Students are free to participate in the practice and follow its teachings as much or as little as they like, and practitioners do not instruct others on what to believe or how to behave.[91][92][93]
Falun Gong has been described as highly centralized in the sense that neither spiritual nor practical authority is dispersed; local branches and assistants are afforded no special rights or titles; "assistants" or volunteer "contact persons" do not hold authority over other practitioners, regardless of how long they have practiced Falun Gong.[94][95] As such, spiritual and ideological authority in the practice is completely centralized with Li Hongzhi.[96] Li's spiritual authority within the practice is absolute, yet the organization of Falun Gong works against totalistic control, and Li does not intervene in the personal lives of adherents. Practitioners of Falun Gong have little to no contact with Li, except through the study of his teachings.[80][94] Falun Gong's organizational structure works against totalistic control, with no hierarchy in place to enforce orthodoxy and little or no emphasis on dogmatic discipline; the only thing emphasized is the need for strict moral behavior, according to Craig Burgdoff, a professor of religious studies.[97]
To the extent that organization is achieved in Falun Gong, it is accomplished through a global, networked, and largely virtual online community. In particular, electronic communications, email lists and a collection of websites are the primary means of coordinating activities and disseminating Li Hongzhi's teachings.[98] The extent of Falun Gong's reliance on the internet as a means of organizing has led to the group's characterization as "a virtual religious community".[99]
Outside of Mainland China, a network of volunteer 'contact persons', regional Falun Dafa Associations and university clubs exists in approximately 70 countries.[100] Li Hongzhi's teachings are principally spread through the Internet.[89][101] In most mid- to large-sized cities, Falun Gong practitioners organize regular group meditation or study sessions in which they practice Falun Gong exercises and read Li Hongzhi's writings. The exercise and meditation sessions are described as informal groups of practitioners who gather in public parks—usually in the morning—for one to two hours.[80][89][102] Group study sessions typically take place in the evenings in private residences or university or high school classrooms, and are described by David Ownby as "the closest thing to a regular 'congregational experience'" that Falun Gong offers.[57] Individuals who are too busy, isolated, or who simply prefer solitude may elect to practice privately.[57] When there are expenses to be covered (such as for the rental of facilities for large-scale conferences), costs are borne by self-nominated and relatively affluent individual members of the community.[57][103]
Organization within China[link]
In 1993, the Beijing-based Falun Dafa Research Society was accepted as a branch of the state-run China Qigong Research Society (CQRS), which oversaw the administration of the country's various qigong schools, and sponsored activities and seminars. As per the requirements of the CQRS, Falun Gong was organized into a nationwide network of assistance centers, "main stations", "branches", "guidance stations", and local practice sites, mirroring the structure of the qigong society or even of the Communist Party itself.[104][105] Falun Gong assistants were self-selecting volunteers who taught the exercises, organized events, and disseminated new writings from Li Hongzhi. The Falun Dafa Research Society served to provide advice on meditation techniques, translation services, and coordination for the practice nationwide.[104]
Following its departure from the CQRS in 1996, Falun Gong came under increased scrutiny from authorities and responded by adopting a more decentralized and loose organizational structure.[80] In 1997, the Falun Dafa Research Society was formally dissolved, along with the regional "main stations."[106] Yet practitioners continued to organize themselves at local levels, being connected through electronic communications, interpersonal networks and group exercise sites.[80][107] Both Falun Gong sources and Chinese government sources claimed that there were some 1,900 "guidance stations" and 28,263 local Falun Gong exercise sites nationwide by 1999, though they disagree over the extent of vertical coordination among these organizational units.[108] In response to the suppression that began in 1999, Falun Gong was driven underground, the organizational structure grew yet more informal within China, and the internet took precedence as a means of connecting practitioners.[109]
Following the ban of Falun Gong in 1999, Chinese authorities sought to portray Falun Gong as a hierarchical and well-funded organization. James Tong writes that it was in the government's interest to portray Falun Gong as highly organized in order to justify its repression of the group: "The more organized the Falun Gong could be shown to be, then the more justified the regime's repression in the name of social order was."[110] He concluded that Party's claims lacked "both internal and external substantiating evidence", and that despite the arrests and scrutiny, the authorities never "credibly countered Falun Gong rebuttals".[111]
Demography[link]
Prior to July 1999, official estimates placed the number of Falun Gong practitioners as high as 60 to 70 million nationwide, rivaling membership in the Communist Party.[11][112][113][114] By the time of the suppression on July 22, 1999, most Chinese government numbers said the population of Falun Gong was between 2 and 3 million,[107][115] though some publications supported an estimate of 40 million.[88][116] Most Falun Gong estimates in the same period estimated the total number of practitioners in China at 70 to 80 million.[117][118][119] Other sources have estimated the Falun Gong population in China to have peaked between 10 and 60 million practitioners.[120][121] The number of Falun Gong adherents still practicing in China today is difficult to confirm, though some sources estimate that millions may continue to practice privately.[21][122]
Demographic surveys conducted in China in 1998 found a population that was mostly female and elderly. Of 34,351 Falun Gong practitioners surveyed, 27% were male and 73% female. Only 38% were under 50 years old.[123] Falun Gong attracted a range of other individuals, from young college students to bureaucrats, intellectuals and Party officials.[124] Surveys in China from the 1990s found that between 23% - 40% of practitioners held university degrees at the college or graduate level—several times higher than the general population.[citation needed]
Falun Gong is practiced by tens, and possibly hundreds of thousands outside China, with the largest communities found in Taiwan and North American cities with large Chinese populations, such as New York and Toronto. Demographic surveys by Palmer and Ownby in these communities found that 90% of practitioners are ethnic Chinese. The average age was approximately 42.[125] Among survey respondents, 56% were female and 44% male; 80% were married. The surveys found the respondents to be highly educated: 9% held PhDs, 34% had Masters degrees, and 24% had a Bachelors degree.
The most commonly reported reasons for being attracted to Falun Gong were intellectual content, cultivation exercises, and health benefits.[126] Non-Chinese adherents of Falun Gong tend to fit the profile of "spiritual seekers"—people who had tried a variety of qigong, yoga, or religious practices before finding Falun Gong. According to Richard Madsen, Chinese scientists with doctorates from prestigious American universities who practice Falun Gong claim that modern physics (for example, superstring theory) and biology (specifically the pineal gland's function) provide a scientific basis for their beliefs. From their point of view, "Falun Dafa is knowledge rather than religion, a new form of science rather than faith."[75]
History inside China[link]
Main article: History of Falun Gong
1992–1996[link]
Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong to the public in May 13, 1992, in Changchun, Jilin Province.[127]
Shortly after his first public teaching, in September 1992 Falun Gong was recognized as a branch of qigong under the administration of the state-run China Qigong Scientific Research Society (CQRS). Li was recognized as a qigong master, and was authorized to teach his practice nationwide.[128] Like many qigong masters at the time, Li toured major cities in China from 1992 to 1994 to teach the practice. He was granted a number of awards by PRC governmental organizations.[129][130][131][132]
According to David Ownby, Professor of History and Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Université de Montréal, Li became an "instant star of the qigong movement",[133] and Falun Gong was embraced by the government as an effective means of lowering health care costs, promoting Chinese culture, and improving public morality. In 1993, a publication of the Ministry of Public Security praised Li for "promoting the traditional crime-fighting virtues of the Chinese people, in safeguarding social order and security, and in promoting rectitude in society."[134]
Falun Gong had differentiated itself from other qigong groups in its emphasis on morality, low cost, and health benefits. It rapidly spread via word-of-mouth, attracting a wide range of adherents from all walks of life, including numerous members of the Chinese Communist Party.[135][136]
Li charged less than competing qigong systems for lectures, tapes, and books, and in 1994 had altogether stopped collecting fees for his lectures.[137] With the publication of the books Falun Gong and Zhuan Falun, Li made his teachings more widely accessible. Zhuan Falun, published in January 1995 at an unveiling ceremony held in the auditorium of the Ministry of Public Security,[90] became a best-seller in China.[78][138]
In 1995, Chinese authorities began looking to Falun Gong to solidify its organizational structure and ties to the party-state.[139] Li was approached by the Chinese National Sports Committee, Ministry of Public Health, and China Qigong Science Research Association (CQRS) to jointly establish a Falun Gong association. Li declined the offer. The same year, the CQRS issued a new regulation mandating that all qigong denominations establish a Communist Party branch. Li again refused.[140]
Tensions continued to mount between Li and the CQRS in 1996. In the face of Falun Gong's rise in popularity, a large part of which was attributed to its low cost, competing qigong masters accused Li of undercutting them. According to Schechter, the qigong society under which Li and other qigong masters belonged asked Li to hike his tuition, but again Li refused,[78] and emphasised the need for the teachings to be free of charge.
In March, 1996, in response to mounting disagreements, Falun Gong withdrew from the Qigong Association, after which time it operated outside the official sanction of the state. Falun Gong representatives attempted to register with other government entities, but were rebuffed.[141] Li and Falun Gong were then outside the circuit of personal relations and financial exchanges through which masters and their qigong organizations could find a place within the state system, and also the protections this afforded.[142]
1996–1999[link]
The rapid rise and influence of Falun Gong received little journalistic attention until mid-1996. Chinese media were not supposed to report on qigong at all, but in 1994 and 1995, after some groups had grown very large, the tone began to shift in order to curb the growth of the qigong practices, some of which had attracted tens of millions of practitioners.[137]
Falun Gong was initially shielded from the mounting criticism of qigong, but following its withdrawal from the CQRS in March 1996, it lost its protection. On 17 June 1996, the Guangming Daily, an influential state-run newspaper, published a polemic against Falun Gong.[90][143] The author wrote that the history of humanity is a "struggle between science and superstition," and called on Chinese publishers not to print "pseudo-scientific books of the swindlers."[143] The article cited Zhuan Falun as an example of the rising number of publications riddled with "feudal superstition" (fengjian mixin) and "pseudoscience" (wei kexue).[7]:215 Until this juncture, Falun Gong had successfully negotiated the space between science and native tradition in the public representation of its teachings, avoiding any suggestion of superstition.[144] The article set off a wave of criticism in the official press, with twenty major newspapers also issuing criticisms of Falun Gong. Soon after, on 24 July, the Central Propaganda Department banned all publication of Falun Gong books (though the ban was not consistently enforced).[143] The state-administered Buddhist Association of China also began issuing criticisms of Falun Gong, urging lay Buddhists not to take up the practice.[145]
The events were an important challenge to Falun Gong, which practitioners did not take lightly.[146] Thousands of Falun Gong followers wrote to Guangming Daily and to the CQRS to complain against the measures, claiming that they violated Hu Yaobang's 1982 'Triple No' directive.[143] In other instances, Falun Gong adherents staged peaceful demonstrations outside media or local government offices to request retractions of perceived unfair coverage. Li made statements that practitioners' response to criticism showed their hearts and "would separate the false disciples from the true ones", also indicating that publicly defending the practice was a righteous act and an important aspect of Falun Gong cultivation.
Falun Gong was not the only target of the domestic media criticism, nor the only group to protest, but theirs was the most mobilised and steadfast response.[54] Many of Falun Gong's protests against negative media portrayals were successful, resulting in the retraction of several newspaper stories critical of Falun Gong. This contributed to practitioners' belief that the media claims against them were false or exaggerated, and that their stance was justified.[147]
In June 1998, Tianjin professor He Zuoxiu, an outspoken critic of qigong, appeared on a talk show on Beijing Television and openly disparaged qigong groups, making particular mention of Falun Gong.[148] Falun Gong practitioners responded with peaceful protests, which was considered audacious under the circumstances,[149] and lobbying of the station. The reporter responsible for the program was reportedly fired, and a program favorable to Falun Gong was aired several days later.[7]:215[150] Falun Gong practitioners also mounted demonstrations at 14 other media outlets.[7]
In 1997, The Ministry of Public Security launched an investigation into whether Falun Gong should be deemed xie jiao (邪教, "heretical teaching"). The report concluded that "no evidence has appeared thus far".[151] The following year, however, on July 21, 1998, the Ministry of Public Security issued Document No. 555, "Notice of the Investigation of Falun Gong". The document asserted that Falun Gong is a "heretical teaching", and mandated that another investigation be launched to seek evidence in support of the conclusion. Falun Gong practitioners report having phone lines tapped, homes ransacked and raided, and Falun Gong exercise sites disrupted.[152]
In this time period, even as criticism of qigong and Falun Gong mounted in some circles, Falun Gong maintained a number of high-profile supporters. In 1998, Qiao Shi, the recently retired Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, initiated his own investigation into Falun Gong in response to Document No. 555. After months of investigations, his group concluded that "Falun Gong has hundreds of benefits for the Chinese people and nation, and does not do a bit of harm."[151] In May of the same year, China's National Sports Commission launches its own investigation into Falun Gong. Based on interviews with over 12,000 Falun Gong adherents in Guangdong province,[140] they stated that they were "convinced the exercises and effects of Falun Gong are excellent. It has done an extraordinary amount to improve society's stability and ethics."
In 1998 Li Hongzhi moved to United States and established his home in New York, from where he reaches his followers using Internet and travels for "experience-sharing conferences".[19]
By 1999, estimates provided by the State Sports Commission suggest there were 60 to 70 millions Falun Gong practitioners in China.[11][153] Wu Shaozu, an official from China's National Sports Commission, was at this time quoted in an interview with U.S. News & World Report that as many as 100 million may have taken up Falun Gong and other forms of qigong. Wu noted that the popularity of these practices dramatically reduces health care costs, and that "Premier Zhu Rongji is very happy about that."[154][155]
Tianjin and Zhongnanhai protests[link]
File:April25Zhognanhai.jpg
Falun Gong practitioners protest outside the Zhongnanhai compound.
By the late 1990s, the Communist Party's relationship to the growing Falun Gong movement had become increasingly tense. Reports of discrimination and surveillance by the Public Security Bureau were escalating, and Falun Gong adherents were routinely organizing sit-in demonstrations responding to media articles they deemed to be unfair. The conflicting investigations launched by the Ministry of the Public Security on one side and the State Sports Commission and Qiao Shi on the other spoke of the disagreements among China's elites on how to regard the growing practice.
In April 1999, an article critical of Falun Gong was published in Tianjin Normal University's Youth Reader magazine. The article was authored by physicist He Zuoxiu who, as Porter and Gutmann note, is a relative of Politburo member and public security tsar Luo Gan.[80][156] The article cast qigong, and Falun Gong in particular, as superstitious and potentially dangerous.[157] Falun Gong practitioners responded by picketing the offices of the newspaper requesting a retraction of the article.[158]
Unlike past instances in which Falun Gong protests were successful, on April 22 the Tianjin demonstration was broken up by the arrival of three hundred riot police. Some of the practitioners were beaten, and forty-five arrested.[78][158][159] Other Falun Gong practitioners were told that if they wished to appeal further, they needed to take the issue up with the Ministry of Public Security and go to Beijing to appeal[156][159][160]
The Falun Gong community quickly mobilized a response, and on the morning of April 25, upwards of 10,000 practitioners gathered near the central appeals office to demand an end to the escalating harassment against the movement, and request the release of the Tianjin practitioners. Practitioners sought redress from the leadership of the country by going to them and, "albeit very quietly and politely, making it clear that they would not be treated so shabbily."[8] According an journalist Ethan Gutmann, security officers had been expecting them, and corralled the practitioners onto Fuyou Street in front of the Zhongnanhai government compound.[156] They sat or read quietly on the sidewalks surrounding the Zhongnanhai.[161]
Five Falun Gong representatives met with Premier Zhu Rongji and other senior officials to negotiate a resolution. The Falun Gong representatives were assured that the regime supported physical exercises for health improvements and did not consider the Falun Gong to be anti-government.[161] Upon reaching this resolution, the crowd of Falun Gong protesters dispersed.[156]
President Jiang Zemin was alerted to the demonstration by Politburo member Luo Gan,[115] and was reportedly angered by the audacity of the demonstration—the largest since the Tiananmen Square protests ten years earlier, and called for resolute action to suppress the group.[107] Jiang reportedly criticized Premier Zhu for being "too soft" in his handling of the situation.[78] That evening, Jiang composed a letter indicating his desire to see Falun Gong "defeated". In the letter, Jiang expressed concerns over the size and popularity of Falun Gong, and in particular about the large number of senior Communist Party members found among Falun Gong adherents. He also intimated that Falun Gong's moral philosophy was at odds with the atheist values of Marxist-Leninism, and therefore constituted a form of ideological competition.[162]
Jiang is held by Falun Gong to be personally responsible for this decision to suppress Falun Gong.[163][164] Peerman cited reasons such as suspected personal jealousy of Li Hongzhi; Saich points to Jiang's anger at Falun Gong's widespread appeal, and ideological struggle as causes for the crackdown that followed. Willy Wo-Lap Lam suggests Jiang's decision to suppress Falun Gong was related to a desire to consolidate his power within the Politburo.[165] According to Human Rights Watch, Communist Party leaders and ruling elite were far from unified in their support for the crackdown;.[166]
Suppression[link]
Main article: Persecution of Falun Gong
On July 20, 1999, security forces abducted and detained thousands of Falun Gong leaders. Two days later on July 22, the PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs outlawed the Falun Dafa Research Society as an illegal organization "engaged in illegal activities, advocating superstition and spreading fallacies, hoodwinking people, inciting and creating disturbances, and jeopardizing social stability",[167] and the Ministry of Public Security declared it a crime to practice Falun Gong in groups, to possess Falun Gong's teachings, to display Falun Gong banners or symbols, or to protest the ban.
The ensuing campaign aimed to "eradicate" the group through a combination of propaganda, imprisonment, and coercive thought reform of adherents, sometimes resulting in deaths. In October 1999, four months after the ban, legislation was created to outlaw "heterodox religions" and applied to Falun Gong retroactively.[168]
Falun Gong adherents are estimated to comprise a large portion of the labor camp population in China. The U.S. Department of State and Congressional-Executive Commission on China cite estimates that as many as half of China's reeducation-through-labor camp population is made up of Falun Gong adherents.[169][170] Researcher Ethan Gutmann estimates that Falun Gong represents an average of 15 to 20 percent of the total "laogai" population.[171] Former detainees of the labor camp system have reported that Falun Gong practitioners are one of the largest groups of prisoners; in some labor camp and prison facilities, they comprise the majority of detainees, and are often said to receive the longest sentences and the worst treatment.[172][173]
According to Johnson, the campaign against Falun Gong extends to many aspects of society, including the media apparatus, police force, military, education system, and workplaces.[14] An extra-constitutional body, the "6-10 Office" was created to "oversee" the effort.[168][174][175] Human Rights Watch (2002) noted that families and workplaces were urged to cooperate with the government.[166]
In February 2001, in an attempt to show unity, the Communist Party held a Central Work Conference and discussed Falun Gong.[166] Under Jiang's leadership, the crackdown on Falun Gong became part of the Chinese political ethos of "upholding stability" – much the same rhetoric employed by the party during Tiananmen in 1989. Jiang's message was echoed at the 2001 National People's Congress, where Premier Zhu Rongji made special mention of Falun Gong in his outline of the PRC Tenth Five-Year Plan, saying "we must continue our campaign against the Falun Gong cult", effectively tying Falun Gong's eradication to China's economic progress.[166] Though less prominent on the national agenda, the suppression against Falun Gong has carried on during the tenure of Hu Jintao; successive, high-level "strike hard" campaigns against Falun Gong have been initiated in both 2008 and 2009. In 2010, a three-year campaign was launched to renew effects at the coercive "transformation" of Falun Gong adherents.[176]
Speculation on rationale[link]
Foreign observers have attempted to explain the Party's rationale for banning Falun Gong as stemming from a variety of factors. These include Falun Gong's popularity, China’s history of quasi-religious movements which turned into violent insurrections, its independence from the state and refusal to toe the Party line, internal power politics within the Communist Party, and Falun Gong's moral and spiritual content, which put it at odds with the atheist aspects of the official Marxist ideology.
Xinhua News Agency, the official news organisation of the Communist Party, declared that Falun Gong is "opposed to the Communist Party of China and the central government, preaches idealism, theism and feudal superstition."[177] Xinhua also asserted that "the so-called 'truth, kindness and forbearance' principle preached by Li has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve", and argued that it was necessary to crush Falun Gong in order to preserve the "vanguard role and purity" of the Communist Party.[178] Other articles appearing in the state-run media in the first days and weeks of the ban posited that Falun Gong must be defeated because its "theistic" philosophy was at odds with the Marxist-Leninism paradigm and with the secular values of materialism.
Willy Wo-Lap Lam writes that president Jiang Zemin's campaign against Falun Gong may have been used to promote allegiance to himself; Lam quotes one party veteran as saying "by unleashing a Mao-style movement [against Falun Gong], Jiang is forcing senior cadres to pledge allegiance to his line."[179] The Washington Post reported that sources indicated not all of the standing committee of the Politburo shared Jiang's view that Falun Gong should be eradicated,[180] but James Tong suggests there was not substantial resistance from the Politburo.
Human Rights Watch notes that the crackdown on Falun Gong reflects historical efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to eradicate religion, which the government believes is inherently subversive.[181] The Chinese government protects five "patriotic", Communist Party-sanctioned religious groups. Unregistered religions that fall outside the state-sanctioned organizations are thus vulnerable to suppression.[182] The Globe and Mail wrote : "...any group that does not come under the control of the Party is a threat"[183] Craig S. Smith of The Wall Street Journal suggests that the government which has by definition no view of spirituality, lacks moral credibility with which to fight an expressly spiritual foe; the party feels increasingly threatened by any belief system that challenges its ideology and has an ability to organize itself.[184] That Falun Gong, whose belief system represented a revival of traditional Chinese religion, was being practiced by a large number of Communist Party members and members of the military was seen as particularly disturbing to Jiang Zemin. "Jiang accepts the threat of Falun Gong as an ideological one: spiritual beliefs against militant atheism and historical materialism. He [wished] to purge the government and the military of such beliefs".[185]
Yuezhi Zhao argues that a number of factors contributed to the souring of relations between Falun Gong and the Chinese state and media.[54] These included infighting between China's qigong establishment and Falun Gong, speculation over blackmailing and lobbying by qigong opponents and "scientists-cum-ideologues with political motives and affiliations with competing central Party leaders", which caused the shift in the state's position, and the struggles from mid-1996 to mid-1999 between Falun Gong and the Chinese power elite over the status and treatment of the movement.[54] According to Zhao, Falun Gong practitioners have established a "resistance identity"—one that stands against prevailing pursuits of wealth, power, scientific rationality, and "the entire value system associated with China's project of modernization."[54] In China the practice represented an indigenous spiritual and moral tradition, a cultural revitalization movement, and drew a sharp contrast to "Marxism with Chinese characteristics".[186]
Vivienne Shue similarly writes that Falun Gong presented a comprehensive challenge to the Communist Party's legitimacy. Shue argues that Chinese rulers historically have derived their legitimacy from a claim to possess an exclusive connection to the "Truth". In imperial China, truth was based on a Confucian and Daoist cosmology, where in the case of the Communist Party, the truth is represented by Marxist-Leninism and historical materialism. Falun Gong challenged the Marxist-Leninism paradigm, reviving an understanding based on more traditionally Buddhist or Daoist conceptions.[187] David Ownby contends that Falun Gong also challenged the Communist Party's hegemony over Chinese nationalist discourse: "[Falun Gong's] evocation of a different vision of Chinese tradition and its contemporary value is now so threatening to the state and party because it denies them the sole right to define the meaning of Chinese nationalism, and perhaps of Chineseness."[188]
Maria Chang noted that since the overthrow of the Qin Dynasty, "millenarian movements had exerted a profound impact on the course of Chinese history", cumulating in the Chinese Revolutions of 1949 which brought the Chinese Communists to power.[189] Patsy Rahn (2002) describes a paradigm of conflict between Chinese sectarian groups and the rulers they often challenge. According to Rahn, the history of this paradigm goes back to the collapse of the Han dynasty: "The pattern of ruling power keeping a watchful eye on sectarian groups, at times threatened by them, at times raising campaigns against them, began as early as the second century and continued throughout the dynastic period, through the Mao era and into the present."[190]
Conversion program[link]
According to James Tong, the regime aimed at both coercive dissolution of the Falun Gong denomination and "transformation" of the practitioners.[191] By 2000, the Party upped its campaign by sentencing "recidivist" practitioners to "re-education through labor", in an effort to have them renounce their beliefs and "transform" their thoughts.[166] Terms were also arbitrarily extended by police, while some practitioners had ambiguous charges levied against them, such as "disrupting social order", "endangering national security", or "subverting the socialist system".[18] According to Bejesky, the majority of long-term Falun Gong detainees are processed administratively through this system instead of the criminal justice system.[18] Upon completion of their re-education sentences, those practitioners who refused to recant were then incarcerated in "legal education centers" set up by provincial authorities to "transform minds".
Much of the conversion program relied on Mao-style techniques of indoctrination and thought reform, where Falun Gong practitioners were organized to view anti-Falun Gong television programs and enroll in Marxism and materialism study sessions.[192] Traditional Marxism and materialism were the core content of the sessions.[193]
The government-sponsored image of the conversion process emphasises psychological persuasion and a variety of "soft-sell" techniques; this is the "ideal norm" in regime reports, according to Tong. Falun Gong reports, on the other hand, depict "disturbing and sinister" forms of coercion against practitioners who fail to renounce their beliefs.[194] 14,474 cases are classified by different methods of torture, according to Tong (Falun Gong agencies document over 63,000 individual cases of torture).[195] Among them are cases of severe beatings; psychological torment, corporal punishment and forced intense, heavy-burden hard labor and stress positions; solitary confinement in squalid conditions;[194] "heat treatment" including burning and freezing; electric shocks delivered to sensitive parts of the body that may result in nausea, convulsions, or fainting;[194] "devastative" forced feeding; sticking bamboo strips into fingernails; deprivation of food, sleep, and use of toilet;[194] rape and gang rape; asphyxiation; and threat, extortion, and termination of employment and student status.[194]
The cases appear verifiable, and the great majority identify (1) the individual practitioner, often with age, occupation, and residence; (2) the time and location that the alleged abuse took place, down to the level of the district, township, village, and often the specific jail institution; and (3) the names and ranks of the alleged perpetrators. Many such reports include lists of the names of witnesses and descriptions of injuries, Tong says.[194] The publication of "persistent abusive, often brutal behavior by named individuals with their official title, place, and time of torture" suggests that there is no official will to cease and desist such activities.[194]
Deaths[link]
Due to the difficulty in corroborating reports of torture deaths in China, estimates on the number of Falun Gong adherents killed under persecution vary widely. In 2009, the New York Times reported that, according to human rights groups, the repressions had claimed "at least 2,000" lives.[196] Amnesty International reported that at least 100 Falun Gong practitioners were believed to have been killed in the 2008 calendar year, either in custody or shortly after their release.[197] Falun Gong sources have reported approximately 3,400 deaths.[198] Journalist Ethan Gutmann of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies produced a median estimated death toll of 65,000 based on a refugee testimony,[199][200] while researchers David Kilgour and David Matas produced an estimate of 41,500 killed from 2000 - 2005.[201]
Chinese authorities do not publish statistics on Falun Gong adherents killed amidst the crackdown. In individual cases, however, authorities have denied that deaths in custody were due to torture.[202]
Alleged organ harvesting[link]
Further information: Kilgour-Matas report
In March 2006 the Falun Gong-affiliated Epoch Times published a number of articles alleging that the China was conducting widespread and systematic organ harvesting of living Falun Gong practitioners.[203] The website alleged that practitioners detained in labour camps, hospital basements, or prisons, were being blood- and urine-tested, their information stored on computer databases, and then matched with organ recipients.[204] Within one month, third party investigators including representatives of the US Department of State, said that there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation.[136] Former Canadian Secretary of State David Kilgour and human rights lawyer David Matas were commissioned by Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong to investigate the allegations. In July 2006, they published "Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China",[205] which concluded that large numbers of Falun Gong practitioners were victims of systematic organ harvesting throughout China, while still alive.[206]
Ethan Gutmann, adjunct fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, approached the allegations by conducting extensive interviews around the world with a variety of former prisoners from Chinese labor camps and prisons, including Falun Gong practitioners and non-practitioners. He calculates that the number of practitioners killed for organs could be as high as 120,000, with a low estimate of 9,000, and 65,000 being the median. Estimates have been revised downwards from earlier numbers to reflect changing estimates of the overall Laogai System population by the Laogai Research Foundation.[207][207][208][209]
Chinese officials have repeatedly and firmly denied the organ harvesting allegations in the report.[210][211] Upon release of the initial report on July 6, a spokesperson immediately declared that China abided by World Health Organization principles that prohibit the sale of human organs without written consent from donors. They denounced the report as smears "based on rumours and false allegations", and said the claims had been investigated and found to be without any merit.[212][213] However, in December 2005, China's Deputy Health Minister acknowledged that the practice of removing organs from executed prisoners for transplant was widespread – as many as 95% of all organ transplants in China derived from executions,[214] and he promised steps to prevent abuse.[136][215]
Media campaign[link]
File:Anti-Falun Gong poster.png
A propaganda poster by Cheng Guoying (程国英), 1999. The poster reads "Firmly support the decision of the Central Committee to deal with the illegal organization of 'Falun Gong'".
Leung remarked that the effort was driven by large-scale propaganda through television, newspapers, radio and internet.[168] According to Amnesty International, the Chinese government banned Falun Gong on 22 July 1999 and launched a massive propaganda campaign. For instance, Ye Xiaowen, Director of the Bureau of Religious Affairs of the State Council (government), said at a news conference on 4 November 1999 "Falun Gong had brainwashed and bilked [double-crossed] followers, caused more than 1,400 deaths, and threatened both social and political stability". Most of the deaths were alleged to have resulted from people refusing medical treatment because of their Falun Gong beliefs. Additionally the government published statements, whose authenticity can not be verified, from people identified as former Falun Gong practitioners who denounce the movement and its leader. The government promised not to hurt those who would leave xiéjiào (邪教), translated as an "evil cult/religion" or a "heretical organization".[216]
Within the first month of the crackdown, 300–400 articles attacking Falun Gong appeared in each of the main state-run papers, while primetime television replayed alleged exposés on the group, with no divergent views aired in the media.[217] The "massive propaganda campaign" focused on allegations that Falun Gong jeopardized social stability, was deceiving and dangerous, was "anti-science" and threatened progress, and argued that Falun Gong's moral philosophy was incompatible with a Marxist social ethic.
State propaganda initially used the appeal of scientific rationalism to argue that Falun Gong's worldview was in "complete opposition to science" and communism.[218][219] The People's Daily asserted on 27 July 1999, that it "was a struggle between theism and atheism, superstition and science, idealism and materialism." A polarized depiction was created where the scientific worldview represented by Marxist-Leninism was legitimized as "moral and truthful," while the Falun Gong discourse was "evil and deceptive."[219] In a society where virtue is defined by scientific progress, obedience, and unquestioning allegiance to the government, Falun Gong was juxtaposed with Marxist-Leninist thought, depicted as scientifically incorrect, superstitious without basis in reality, and the opposite of communism.
Despite Party efforts, initial charges levelled against Falun Gong failed to elicit widespread popular support for the suppression of the group. In the months following July 1999, the rhetoric in the state-run press escalated to include charges that Falun Gong was colluding with foreign, "anti-China" forces. In October 1999, three months after the suppression began, the Supreme People's Court issued a judicial interpretation officially classifying Falun Gong as a xiejiao, (heretical religion, sometimes rendered as "evil cult") under Article 300 of the criminal code.[81][220][221] Anti-Falun Gong propaganda activities dominated the Chinese media during that time as the government justified its actions, arguing that Falun Gong practices were dangerous and damaged people's physical and mental health.[222] The CCP accused the Falun Gong movement of causing the deaths of hundreds of adherents, arguing that its emphasis on self-healing through meditation discourages people to seek vital medical treatment. Additionally, the CCP said that Falun Gong caused and/or exacerbated mental disorders, resulting in destructive behavior that led to violence.[223]
China scholars Daniel Wright and Joseph Fewsmith assert that for several months after Falun Gong was outlawed, China Central Television's evening news contained little but anti-Falun Gong rhetoric charging that it cheats its followers, separates families, damages health, and hurts social stability. The government operation was "a study in all-out demonization", they write.[224] Falun Gong was compared to "a rat crossing the street that everyone shouts out to squash" by Beijing Daily;[225] other officials said it would be a "long-term, complex and serious" struggle to "eradicate" Falun Gong.[226] David Ownby and Ian Johnson have argued that the Chinese state gave the cultic appellation to Falun Gong by borrowing arguments from Margaret Singer and the West's anti-cult movement to blunt the appeal of Falun Gong.[14][90] According to John Powers and Meg Y. M. Lee, because the Falun Gong was categorized in the popular perception as an "apolitical, qigong exercise club," it was not seen as a threat to the government. The most critical strategy in the Falun Gong suppression campaign, therefore, was to convince people to reclassify the Falun Gong into a number of "negatively charged religious labels",[227] like "evil cult", "sect", or "superstition". The group's non-violent and relatively silent protests were reclassified as creating "social disturbances". In this process of reclassification and relabelling, the government was attempting to tap into a "deep reservoir of negative feelings related to the historical role of quasi-religious cults as a destabilising force in Chinese political history."[227]
On the eve of Chinese New Year on 23 January 2001, five people attempted to set themselves ablaze on Tiananmen Square. The official Chinese press agency, Xinhua News Agency, and other state media asserted that the self-immolators were practitioners, though the Falun Dafa Information Center disputed this,[228] on the grounds that the movement's teachings explicitly forbid suicide and killing,[229] further alleging that the event was a cruel but clever piece of stunt-work.[230] The incident received international news coverage, and video footage of the burnings were broadcast later inside China by China Central Television (CCTV). Images of a 12 year old girl, Liu Siying, burning and interviews with the other participants in which they stated their belief that self-immolation would lead them to paradise were shown.[228][231] Falun Gong-related commentators pointed out that the main participants' account of the incident and other aspects of the participants' behavior were inconsistent with the teachings of Falun Dafa.[232] Washington Post journalist Phillip Pan wrote that the two self-immolators who died were not actually Falun Gong practitioners.[233] Time reported that prior to the self-immolation incident, many Chinese had felt that Falun Gong posed no real threat, and that the state's crackdown had gone too far. After the event, however, the mainland Chinese media campaign against Falun Gong gained significant traction.[234] As public sympathy for Falun Gong declined, the government began sanctioning "systematic use of violence" against the group.[235] According to Falun Gong websites, the number of Falun Gong adherents tortured to death rose from 245 in 2000 to 419 in 2001.[236]
Anti-Falun Gong propaganda efforts have also permeated the Chinese education system. Following Jiang Zemin's 1999 ban of Falun Gong, then-Minister of Education Chen Zhili launched an active campaign to promote the Party's line on Falun Gong within all levels of academic institutions, including graduate schools, universities and colleges, middle schools, primary schools, and kindergartens. Her efforts included a "Cultural Revolution-like pledge" in Chinese schools that required faculty members, staff, and students to publicly denounce Falun Gong, showing anti-Falun Gong propaganda movies, and the "Million Signature" campaign which required students to sign an anti-Falun Gong petition. Chen also altered teaching materials and entrance exams to reflect the propaganda campaign against Falun Gong, even using Chinese Central TV Stations (CCTV) programs condemning Falun Gong as everyday study materials. Teachers who did not comply with Chen's program were dismissed or detained; uncooperative students were refused academic advancement, expelled from school, or sent to "transformation" camps to alter their thinking. The Ministry of Education also organized anti-Falun Gong events and activities in 1,500 youth communities throughout China, resulting in over 12 million signed pledges to "not to believe, not to spread but resist" Falun Gong. This far-sighted initiative was intended to influence the minds of younger generations and future teachers against Falun Gong so that in a couple decades, China would have a young adult population accustomed to viewing Falun Gong as an enemy of society.[237]
Chen's directive to colleges and universities was to "fully take advantage of the highly concentrated population of intellectuals, complete range of disciplines, and rich resources in theory and science research to play a distinctive role in the thorough exposing and criticizing of Falun Gong, promoting Marxist materialism and atheism, and popularizing science and literacy." Concurrent with anti-Falun Gong seminars, photo exhibits, art performances, and club activities, Chen worked with advanced institutions to expand the research sector involving internet censorship technology in order to "resist Falun Gong's online offensive". She also worked to spread the anti-Falun Gong academic propaganda movement overseas, using domestic educational funding to donate aid to foreign institutions, encouraging them to oppose Falun Gong.[237]
Falun Gong's response to suppression[link]
File:Ny-shengjiang-01.jpg
Falun Gong protests at a Manhattan Parade, holding banners calling for Jiang Zemin to be "brought to justice."
Falun Gong's response to the suppression in China began in July 1999 with appeals to local, provincial and central petitioning offices in Beijing.[238] It soon progressed to larger demonstrations on Tiananmen Square, in which hundreds of Falun Gong adherents traveling daily to the Square to practice Falun Gong exercises or raise banners in defense of the practice. These demonstrations were invariably broken up by security forces, and the practitioners involved were arrested, sometimes violently, and detained. By 25 April 2000, within one year after the demonstration at Zhongnanhai, a total of more than 30,000 practitioners were arrested there,[239] and seven hundred Falun Gong followers were arrested during a demonstration in the Square on 1 January 2001.[240] Public protests continued well into 2001. Writing for the Wall Street Journal, Ian Johnson noted that "Falun Gong faithful have mustered what is arguably the most sustained challenge to authority in 50 years of Communist rule."[241]
By late 2001, demonstrations in Tiananmen Square had become less frequent, and the practice was driven deeper underground. As public protest fell out of favor, practitioners established underground "material sites" which would produce literature and DVDs to counter the portrayal of Falun Gong in the official media. Practitioners then distribute these materials, often door-to-door.[242] Falun Gong sources estimated in 2009 that over 200,000 such sites exists across China today.[243] The production, possession, or distribution of these materials is frequently grounds for security agents to incarcerate or sentence Falun Gong adherents.[244]
In 2002, Falun Gong activists in China tapped into television broadcasts, replacing regular state-run programming with their own content. Among the more notable instances occurred in March 2002, when Falun Gong practitioners in Changchun intercepted eight cable television networks in Jilin Province, and for nearly an hour, televised a program titled "Self-Immolation or a Staged Act?". All six of the Falun Gong practitioners involved were captured over the next few months. Two were killed immediately, the other four were all dead by 2010 as a result of injuries sustained while imprisoned.[245][246]
Outside China, Falun Gong practitioners have set up international media organizations to gain wider exposure for their cause and challenge narratives of the Chinese state-run media. These include The Epoch Times newspaper, New Tang Dynasty Television, and Sound of Hope radio station.[247] and Epoch Press Inc.[248] According to Zhao, through The Epoch Times it can be discerned how Falun Gong is building a "de facto media alliance" with China's democracy movements in exile, as demonstrated by its frequent printing of articles by prominent overseas Chinese critics of the PRC government.[54] In 2004, the Epoch Times published a collection of nine editorials which presented a critical history of Communist Party rule.[249][250] This catalyzed the Tuidang movement, which encourages Chinese citizens to renounce their affiliations to the Chinese Communist Party, including ex post facto renunciations of the Communist Youth League and Young Pioneers. The Epoch Times claims that tens of millions have renounced the Communist Party as part of the movement, though these numbers have not been independently verified.[251]
In 2007, Falun Gong adherents in the United States formed Shen Yun Performing Arts, a dance and music company that tours internationally. Falun Gong software developers in the United States are also responsible for the creation of several popular censorship-circumvention tools employed by internet users in China.[252]
Falun Gong Practitioners outside China have filed dozens of largely symbolic lawsuits against Jiang Zemin, Luo Gan, and other Chinese officials alleging genocide and crimes against humanity.[253] According to International Advocates for Justice, Falun Gong has filed the largest number of human rights lawsuits in the 21st century and the charges are among the most severe international crimes defined by international criminal laws.[254] Ownby stated that 54 civil and criminal lawsuits were under way in 33 countries in 2006. In many instances, courts have refused to adjudicate the cases on the grounds of sovereign immunity. In late 2009, separate courts in Spain and Argentina indicted Jiang Zemin and other officials on the charge of "crimes of humanity" and genocide, and asked for their arrest, although the ruling is acknowledged to be largely symbolic and unlikely to be carried out.[255][256][257] Falun Gong practitioners and their supporters also filed a lawsuit in May 2011 against the technology company Cisco Systems, alleging that the company helped design and implement a surveillance system for the Chinese government to suppress Falun Gong (Cisco denied customizing their technology for this purpose).[258]
Falun Gong outside China[link]
Main article: Falun Gong outside mainland China
Falun Gong volunteer instructors and Falun Dafa Associations are currently found in over 70 countries outside China, with the most active communities in the United States and Canada.[259] Falun Gong adherents overseas have responded to the suppression in China through regular demonstrations, parades, and through the creation of media outlets, performing arts companies, and censorship-circumvention software mainly intended to reach Mainland Chinese audiences.
Falun Gong was first taught at the Chinese consulate in New York in 1995 as part of the Party's "cultural propaganda to the West," alongside Chinese silk craft and cooking.[155] The consulate at that time also set up Falun Gong clubs at MIT and Columbia University which are active to this day. Starting in 1995, Li himself taught the practice outside of China, chairing a series of conferences in Sweden and at the Chinese embassy in Paris, upon invitation by the PRC ambassador to France.[90][155] Li taught in Australia and North America in August and October 1996, respectively.
Falun Gong's growth outside China largely corresponded to the migration of students from Mainland China to the West in the early- to mid-1990s, and in North America and Europe, the practice was taught mainly on university campuses. It is organized by regional Falun Dafa Associations and contact persons who volunteer to teach the practice.
International reception[link]
Since its ban in China, numerous Western governments and human rights organizations have expressed condemnation for the suppression in China and sympathized with Falun Gong's plight.[260] Since 1999, members of the United States Congress have made public pronouncements and introduced several resolutions in support of Falun Gong.[2] In 2010, House Resolution 605 called for "an immediate end to the campaign to persecute, intimidate, imprison, and torture Falun Gong practitioners," condemned the Chinese authorities' efforts to distribute "false propaganda" about the practice worldwide, and expressed sympathy to persecuted Falun Gong practitioners and their families.[261][262]
Adam Frank writes that in reporting on the Falun Gong, the Western tradition of casting the Chinese as "exotic" took dominance, and that "the facts were generally correct, but the normalcy that millions of Chinese practitioners associated with the practice had all but disappeared."[263] From 1999–2001, Western media reports on Falun Gong—and in particular, the mistreatment of practitioners—were frequent, if mixed.[217] By the latter half of 2001, however, the volume of media reports declined precipitously, and by 2002, major news organizations like the New York Times and Washington Post had almost completely ceased their coverage of Falun Gong from China.[217] In a study of media discourse on Falun Gong, researcher Leeshai Lemish found that Western news organizations also became less balanced, and more likely to uncritically present the narratives of the Communist Party, rather than those of Falun Gong or human rights groups.[217]
To counter the support of Falun Gong in the West, the Chinese government has launched their own propaganda campaign, which included visits to newspaper officers by diplomats to "extol the virtues of Communist China and the evils of Falun Gong",[264] linking support for Falun Gong with "jeopardizing trade relations," and sending letters to local politicians telling them to withdraw support for the practice.[264] According to Perry Link, pressure on Western institutions also takes more subtle forms, including academic self-censorship, whereby research on Falun Gong could result in a denial of visa for fieldwork in China; or exclusion and discrimination from business and community groups who have connections with China and fear angering the Communist Party.[264][265] Ethan Gutmann also noted that media organizations and human rights groups also self-censor on the topic, given the PRC governments vehement attitude toward the practice, and the potential repercussions that may follow for making overt representations on Falun Gong's behalf.[266]
David Ownby noted that alongside these tactics, the "cult" label applied to Falun Gong by the Chinese authorities never entirely went away in the minds of some Westerners, and the stigma still plays a role in wary public perceptions of Falun Gong.[267]
Ethan Gutmann, a journalist reporting on China since the early 1990s, has attempted to explain the apparent dearth of public sympathy for Falun Gong as stemming, in part, from the group's shortcomings in public relations. Unlike the democracy activists or Tibetans, who have found a comfortable place in Western perceptions, "Falun Gong marched to a distinctly Chinese drum", Gutmann writes. Moreover, practitioners' attempts at getting their message across carried some of the uncouthness of Communist party culture, including a perception that practitioners tended to exaggerate, create "torture tableaux straight out of a Cultural Revolution opera", or "spout slogans rather than facts". This is coupled with a general doubtfulness in the West of persecuted refugees.[268]
Gutmann observes that Falun Gong also lacks robust backing from the American constituencies that usually support religious freedom: liberals are wary of Falun Gong's conservative sexual morality, while Christian conservatives don't accord the practice the same space as persecuted Christians.[269] He charges that the American political center does not want to push the human rights issue so hard that it would disrupt commercial and political engagement with China. Thus, Falun Gong practitioners have largely had to rely on their own resources in responding to suppression.[269]
Controversies[link]
Among the most persistent controversies surrounding Falun Gong is its characterization by the PRC government as "xiejiao"—a "heterodox organization", "evil religion", or "evil cult". The state-run Chinese Buddhist Association, concerned with Buddhist apostates taking up Falun Gong practice, were the first to term Falun Gong xiejiao in the latter half of 1996. A direct translation of that term is "heretical teaching",[13] but during the anti-Falun Gong propaganda campaign was rendered as "evil cult" in English. Western media initially adopted this language after the PRC government's media reports,[84] but soon began using less loaded terms.[270] According to Chang, in the context of imperial China, the term "xiejiao" was used to refer to non-Confucian religions, though in the context of Communist China, it has been used to target religious organizations which do not submit to the authority of the Communist Party.[271][272]
The Chinese government's view that Falun Gong is a destructive cult, widely used as part of state propaganda against the practice, was later picked up by some elements of the anti-cult movement in the West.[273][274] However, such views are largely criticized or dismissed in mainstream Western scholarship of the practice.[275]
Opinions differ on whether or not Li made money from the practice, and if so, how much. Dai Qing states that by 1997, Li was receiving annual income in excess of ¥10 million through sales of his books, noting that Falun Gong practitioners purchased numerous copies of Li's works, pictures, and made voluntary donations.[276] Ian Johnson disputes the theory that Li made any serious money from Falun Gong, and noted that during the period of Falun Gong's greatest book sales in China, Li Hongzhi did not receive royalties because all publications were bootleg (the texts having been banned by the authorities in 1996 in an attempt to curb the practice's growth).[14]
Danny Schechter noted that from 1992–1994, while Li did charge fees for the lectures seminars he was giving across China at the invitation of local qigong societies, his fees were said to be considerably lower than those of competing qigong practices, and the local qigong associations received a substantial share.[277] Li justified the fees as being necessary to cover travel costs and other expenses, and on some occasions, he donated the money earned to charitable causes. In 1994, Li ceased charging fees altogether, thereafter stipulating that Falun Gong must always be taught for free.[278] The practice's teachings are available for free download online.
Li Hongzhi's conservative moral teachings have attracted some concern in the West, including his views on homosexuality. During a lecture in Australia, for instance, Li Hongzhi said, "Things such as organized crime, homosexuality, and promiscuous sex, etc., none are the standards of being human."[279] In light of Li's teachings on homosexuality as immoral, a nomination of Li for the Nobel Peace Prize by San Francisco legislators was withdrawn in 2001.[280][281][282] The Falun Dafa Information Center states that the group welcomes gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to the practice, that they are not accorded special treatment, and that while Falun Gong teaches that certain practices "generate more karma", this does not equate to a position statement, social stance, or regulation.[283] In discussing the portrayal of Falun Gong as "anti-gay", Ethan Gutmann notes that Falun Gong's teachings are "essentially indistinguishable" from traditional religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism.[284] Some journalists have also expressed concern over Falun Gong's teachings[clarification needed] on the children of interracial marriages,[184][285] and noted a belief in distinct heavens for people of different races.[286] Concern stems from a statement of Li's identifying such children as products of "a chaotic situation brought about by mankind" indicative of "the Dharma-ending period".[279] The Falun Dafa Information Center responded that this aspect of the practice's cosmology "in no way amounts to an endorsement of racial purity", adding that many Falun Gong practitioners have interracial children.[287]
Opinions among scholars differ as to whether Falun Gong contains an apocalyptic message, and if so what the consequences of that are. Li situates his teaching of Falun Gong amidst the "Dharma-ending period" (Mo Fa, 末法), described in Buddhist scriptures as an era of moral decline when the teachings of Buddhism would need to be rectified.[9][90] The current era is described in Falun Gong teachings as the "Fa rectification" period (zhengfa, which might also be translated as "to correct the dharma"), a time of cosmic transition and renewal.[9] The process of Fa rectification is necessitated by the moral decline and degeneration of life in the universe, and in the post-1999 context, the persecution of Falun Gong by the Chinese government has come to be described as a tangible symptom of this moral decay.[97] Through the process of Li's Fa rectification, life will be reordered according to the moral and spiritual quality of each, with good people being saved and ascending to higher spiritual planes, and bad ones being eliminated or cast down.[97] In this paradigm, Li assumes a messianic role of offering salvation through his moral teachings.[9][30]
Some scholars, such as Maria Hsia Chang and Susan Palmer, have described Li's rhetoric about the "Fa rectification" and providing salvation "in the final period of the Last Havoc", as apocalyptic.[89][189] However, Benjamin Penny argues that Li's teachings are better understood in the context of a "Buddhist notion of the cycle of the Dharma or the Buddhist law".[288] Richard Gunde notes that unlike apocalyptic groups in the West, Falun Gong does not fixate on death or the end of the world, and instead "has a simple, innocuous ethical message".[289] Li Hongzhi does not discuss a "time of reckoning",[288] and has rejected predictions of an impending apocalypse in his teachings.[290] Although he expressed concern over Li's totalizing discourse and millennial themes, Craig Burgdoff writes that such concerns are tempered by the fact that Falun Gong practice does not require unquestioning acceptance of all of Li's teachings, and there is no overt emphasis on dogmatically enforcing orthodoxy, Instead, Burgdoff writes that he found "practitioners to be engaged seriously in a highly disciplined spiritual and ethical practice."[97]
See also[link]
References[link]
- ^ Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China
- ^ a b c Thomas Lum (25 May 2006). "CRS Report for Congress: China and Falun Gong" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67820.pdf.
- ^ a b c Ownby, David, "A History for Falun Gong: Popular Religion and the Chinese State Since the Ming Dynasty", Nova Religio, Vol., pp. 223–243
- ^ Penny, Benjamin, "Qigong, Daoism and Science: some contexts for the qigong boom" in M. Lee and A.D. Syrokomla-Stefanowska (eds.), Modernisation of the Chinese Past (Sydney: Wild Peopy, 1993) 166-179
- ^ Haar, Barendter. "Evaluation and Further References". http://website.leidenuniv.nl/~haarbjter/faluntext3.html. Retrieved 21 December 2009. "One difference between the Falun Gong and traditional groups is the absence of rituals of daily worship or rites of passage"
- ^ Statement of Professor David Ownby, Unofficial Religions in China: Beyond the Party's Rules, 2005. Quote: "The history of Falun Gong, and of the larger qigong movement from which Falun Gong emerged (...) The Falun Gong emerged in 1992, toward the end of the boom, and was in fact one of the least flamboyant of the schools of qigong"
- ^ a b c d Østergaard, Clemens Stubbe (2003). Jude Howell. ed. Governance and the Political Challenge of Falun Gong. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 214–223. ISBN 0-7425-1988-0. http://books.google.com/?id=H80YZqSj7EEC&pg=PP1&dq=Governance+in+China+~+Jude+Howell#v=onepage&q=.
- ^ a b c Benjamin Penny, The Past, Present, and Future of Falun Gong, 2001, accessed 16 March 2008, Quote: "The best way to describe Falun Gong is as a cultivation system. Cultivation systems have been a feature of Chinese life for at least 2 500 years"
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Benjamin Penny, "The Religion of Falun Gong," (University of Chicago Press, 2012).
- ^ Joseph Kahn (27 April 1999). "Notoriety Now for Movement's Leader". New York Times. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9507E7D9173DF934A15757C0A96F958260.
- ^ a b c Seth Faison, "In Beijing: A Roar of Silent Protestors", New York Times, April 27, 1999. Quote: "Buddhist Law, led by a qigong master named Li Hongzhi, claims to have more than 100 million followers. Even if that is an exaggeration, the government's estimate of 70 million adherents represents a large group in a nation of 1.2 billion."
- ^ Bay Fang, "An opiate of the masses?" U.S. News and World Report, February 22, 1999.
- ^ a b "China: The crackdown on Falun Gong and other so-called 'heretical organizations'". Amnesty International. 23 March 2000. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA17/011/2000/en/7a361a8e-df70-11dd-acaa-7d9091d4638f/asa170112000en.html. Retrieved 17 March 2010.
- ^ a b c d Johnson, Ian, Wild Grass: three portraits of change in modern china, Vintage (8 March 2005)
- ^ US press release (4 February 2004) Press Release HR/CN/1073. United Nations Retrieved 12 September 2006.
- ^ Sunny Y. Lu, MD, PhD, and Viviana B. Galli, MD, "Psychiatric Abuse of Falun Gong Practitioners in China", J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, 30:126–30, 2002
- ^ Robin J. Munro, "Judicial Psychiatry in China and its Political Abuses", Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Columbia University, Volume 14, Number 1, Fall 2000, p 114
- ^ a b c Robert Bejesky, "Falun Gong & reeducation through labor", Columbia Journal of Asian Law, 17:2, Spring 2004, pp. 147–189
- ^ a b Eugene V. Gallagher; W. Michael Ashcraft (2006). Introduction to New and Alternative Religions in America: African diaspora traditions and other American innovations. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 174. ISBN 978-0-275-98717-6. http://books.google.com/books?id=ClaySHbUEogC&pg=PA174. Retrieved 4 February 2012.
- ^ Malcolm Moore, "Falun Gong 'growing' in China despite 10-year ban," Telegraph, April 24, 2009
- ^ a b U.S. Department of State, 2009 International Religious Freedom Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau)
- ^ Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 126
- ^ David Palmer. "Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China". New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- ^ "Falungong as a Cultural Revitalization Movement: An Historian Looks at Contemporary China". Professor David Ownby, Department of History, University of Montreal, accessed 2007-12-31
- ^ Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p 10
- ^ Richard Gunde. "Culture and Customs of China". Greenwood Publishing Group: 2002.
- ^ Nancy Chen. "Breathing spaces: qigong, psychiatry, and healing in China". Columbia University Press, 2003.
- ^ Zhu Xiaoyang and Benjamin Penny. "The Qigong Boom". Chinese Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1994)
- ^ Li Hongzhi, 9-day Lectures in Guangzhou (audio), lecture 1, 1994.
- ^ a b David Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science, and Utopia in China (2007), Columbia University Press
- ^ Scott Lowe, Chinese and InternationalContexts for the Rise of Falun Gong. Nova Religio 6 (2 April 2003)
- ^ KA Thomas, "Falun Gong: An Analysis of China's National Security Concerns," Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 2000
- ^ Edward Irons, "Falun Gong and the Sectarian Religion Paradigm", Nova Religio, 2003, University of California Press
- ^ Li Hongzhi, Zhuan Falun, "Zhen Shan Ren Is the Sole Criterion Used to Judge a Good Person from a Bad One". 1999. Quote: "The most fundamental characteristic of this universe, Zhen-Shan-Ren, is the highest manifestation of the Buddha Fa. It is the most fundamental Buddha Fa."
- ^ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p 93; 102
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Li Hongzhi, Zhuan Falun, Lecture One, 2000
- ^ Noah Porter, Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic Study. Quote: "According to the Falun Gong belief system, there are three virtues that are also principles of the universe: Zhen, Shan, and Ren (真, 善, 忍). Zhen is truthfulness and sincerity. Shan is compassion, benevolence, and kindness. Ren is forbearance, tolerance, and endurance. These three virtues are the only criteria that truly distinguish good people and bad people (Li Hongzhi 1999b: 13). Human society has deviated from these moral standards (Li Hongzhi 1999b: 16). All matter in the universe contains Zhen- Shan-Ren (Li Hongzhi 1999b: 15). All three are equally important.”
- ^ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China. Quote: "The very structure of the universe, according to Li Hongzhi, is made up of the moral qualities that cultivators are enjoined to practice in their own lives: truth, compassion, and forbearance."
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong. Quote: "For Li, as he often repeats in Zhuan Falun, the special characteristic or particular nature of the cosmos is the moral triumvirate of zhen (truth), shan (compassion), and ren (forbearance). He does not mean this metaphorically; for him zhen, shan, and ren are the basic organizing principles of all things… it is embedded in the very essence of everything in the universe that they adhere to the principles of truth, compassion, and forbearance."
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong. Quote: "In addition, in Falun Gong cultivation adherence to the code of truth, compassion, and forbearance is not just regarded as the right and responsible course of action for practitioners; it is an essential part of the cultivation process. Lapsing from it will render any other efforts in cultivation worthless."
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p 125.
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p 169.
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p 170.
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p 172. Quote: "Transforming karma into virtue is fundamental in the cultivation practice of Falun Gong"
- ^ a b David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp 110 -112.
- ^ Li Hongzhi, "Zhuan Falun", pp 27 - 35; 362 - 365.
- ^ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p 93. Quote: "The goal of cultivation, and hence of life itself, is spiritual elevation, achieved through eliminating negative karma—the built-up sins of past and present lives—and accumulating virtue."
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p 135.
- ^ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp 103-105.
- ^ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p 93. Quote: "One finds few lists of do's and don'ts in Li's writings, nor are there sophisticated ethical discussions. Instead, followers are advised to rid themselves of unnecessary "attachments", to do what they know is right, and hence to return to "the origin", to their "original self".; p 103.
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p 213.
- ^ Schechter 2001, pp. 47–50
- ^ Kai-Ti Chou, Contemporary Religious Movements in Taiwan: Rhetorics of Persuasion. Edwin Mellen Press, 2008. ISBN 0-7734-5241-9. pp. 186–187 and pp. 152–165
- ^ a b c d e f g Zhao, Yuezhi (2003). Nick Couldry and James Curran. ed. Falun Gong, Identity, and the Struggle over Meaning Inside and Outside China. Rowman & Littlefield publishers, inc.. pp. 209–223. ISBN 978-0-7425-2385-2. http://books.google.com/?id=tiFY59xGHBkC&pg=PA209&dq=Falun+Gong,+Identity,+and+the+Struggle+over+Meaning+Inside+and+Outside+China&cd=1#v=onepage&q=Falun%20Gong%2C%20Identity%2C%20and%20the%20Struggle%20over%20Meaning%20Inside%20and%20Outside%20China. "the most dramatic episode in the contestation over media power in the Chinese language symbolic universe."
- ^ a b Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong, 4th Translation Edition, Updated in April 2001
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp 163 - 168.
- ^ a b c d David Ownby, "Falun Gong in the New World", European Journal of East Asian Studies (2003), p 313-314
- ^ Porter, p 126.
- ^ Porter, pp 121 - 125.
- ^ Falundafa.org, 'Find your local volunteer contact person'.
- ^ Porter, p 205.
- ^ Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p 102; 181.
- ^ Falun Dafa Information Center, Misconceptions: "Intolerant"?, 16 June 2008, accessed 27 November 2010
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p 181.
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p 123.
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p 48.
- ^ Hu Ping, "The Falun Gong Phenomenon", in Challenging China: Struggle and Hope in an Era of Change, Sharon Hom and Stacy Mosher (ed) (New York: The New Press, 2007).
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp 93 - 94.
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p 97.
- ^ See http://www.falundafa.org/eng/books.html (English) or http://www.falundafa.org/book/chigb.htm (Simplified Chinese)
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp 100 - 103.
- ^ a b c Lowe 2003, pp. 275–276
- ^ Benjamin Penny, "Falun Gong, Buddhism, and Buddhist qigong". Asian Studies Review 29 (March 2009).
- ^ a b George Bruseker, "Falun Gong: A Modern Chinese Folk Buddhist Movement in Crisis," 26 April 2000.
- ^ a b Madsen (2000), p. 244
- ^ David Ownby, "Unofficial Religions in China: Beyond the Party's Rules", Testimony for the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, May 23, 2005.
- ^ Penny (2012), p 226. Quote: "Falun Gong is a new form of Chinese religion, even if its adherents themselves may not recognize it as being religion at all."
- ^ a b c d e Danny Schechter, Falun Gong's Challenge to China: Spiritual Practice or Evil Cult?, Akashic books: New York, 2001, p. 66
- ^ Penny (2012), p 26. Quote: "[Falun Gong] claims no immediate predecessor in the sense of asserting its position in a lineage of religions. Nonetheless, as will be clear throughout this book, many of the terms Li Hongzhi uses and the ideas that underpin Falun Gong teachings are found in Chinese religions of the past."
- ^ a b c d e f Porter, Noah. "Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic Study". University of South Florida, 2003
- ^ a b Chan, Cheris Shun-ching (2004). "The Falun Gong in China: A Sociological Perspective". The China Quarterly, 179 , pp 665–683
- ^ Bainbridge, William Sims 1997 The sociology of religious movements, Routledge, 1997, page 24, ISBN 0-415-91202-4
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- ^ a b Frank, Adam. (2004) Falun Gong and the threat of history. in Gods, guns, and globalization: religious radicalism and international political economy edited by Mary Ann Tétreault, Robert Allen Denemark, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, ISBN 1-58826-253-7, pp 241–243
- ^ Kai-Ti Chou, Contemporary Religious Movements in Taiwan. Edwin Mellen Press, 2008. pp. 184–185. ISBN 978-0-7734-5241-1
- ^ a b David Palmer, "Qigong Fever", (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pg241-6.
- ^ Porter, Noah, "Professional Practitioners and Contact Persons Explicating Special Types of Falun Gong Practitioners", Nova Religio, November 2005, Vol. 9, No. 2, Pages 62–83
- ^ a b Tong, James (September 2002). "An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing". The China Quarterly 171: 636–660. DOI:10.1017/S0009443902000402.
- ^ a b c d Susan Palmer and David Ownby, Field Notes: Falun Dafa Practitioners: A Preliminary Research Report, Nova Religio, 2000.4.1.133
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- ^ David Ownby, "Falungong and Canada's China Policy." International Journal, Spring 2001, p 193.| Quote: "These people have discovered what is to them the truth of the universe. They have arrived freely at this discovery, and, if they change their mind, they are fee to go on to something else. The Falungong community seems to be supportive but not constraining – aside from the peer pressure that exists in many groups situations; there is no visible power structure to chastise a misbehaving practitioner, nor do practitioners tell one another what to do or what to believe."
- ^ a b Craig Burgdoff, "How Falun Gong Practice Undermines Li Hongzhi's Totalistic Rhetoric". p 334.
- ^ Chou, Kai-Ti; Alexander, Philip S. (2007). Contemporary religious movements in Taiwan: rhetorics of persuasion. Edwin Mellen Press. ISBN 978-0-7734-5241-1. http://books.google.com/books?id=e_sQAQAAIAAJ&q=Contemporary+Religious+Movements+in+Taiwan:+Rhetorics+of+Persuasion&dq=Contemporary+Religious+Movements+in+Taiwan:+Rhetorics+of+Persuasion&cd=1.
- ^ David Palmer, "Qigong Fever," (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pg241-246.
- ^ a b c d Burgdoff, Craig A. How Falun Gong Practice Undermines Li Hongzhi's Totalistic Rhetoric. Nova Religio April 2003, Vol. 6, No. 2 332–347
- ^ McDonald, Kevin (2006). Global movements: action and culture. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-1-4051-1613-8. http://books.google.com/books?id=lrQV2Wi1RdgC&pg=PA140&dq=Kevin+McDonald,+Global+Movements:+Action+and+Culture,+chapter+7,+‘Healing+Movements,+embodied+subjects’,+Wiley-Blackwell+(2006)&cd=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false.
- ^ Chou, Kai-Ti; Alexander, Philip S. (2007). Contemporary religious movements in Taiwan: rhetorics of persuasion. Edwin Mellen Press. ISBN 978-0-7734-5241-1. http://books.google.com/books?id=e_sQAQAAIAAJ&q=Contemporary+Religious+Movements+in+Taiwan:+Rhetorics+of+Persuasion&dq=Contemporary+Religious+Movements+in+Taiwan:+Rhetorics+of+Persuasion&cd=1. , p 141.
- ^ Falundafa.org, ‘Local Contacts’.
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- ^ Burgdoff, 336.
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- ^ Renee Schoff, "Growing group poses a dilemma for China", Associated Press, April 26, 1999. Quote: "It teaches morality and acceptance, just what the Beijing government likes to see. But, with more members than the Communist Party—at least 70 million, according to the State Sports Administration—Falun is also a formidable social network…"
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- ^ Johnson, Ian (25 April 2000). "Defiant Falun Dafa Members Converge on Tiananmen". The Wall Street Journal. Pulitzer.org. p. A21. http://www.pulitzer.org/archives/6464.
- ^ Selden, Elizabeth J.; Perry, Mark (2003). Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-30170-X.
- ^ Johnson, Ian. "A Deadly Exercise: Practicing Falun Gong was a right, Ms. Chen said, to her last day", Wall Street Journal, 20 April 2000.
- ^ Liao Yiwu. "The Corpse Walker: Real Life Stories: China from the Bottom Up." p 230.
- ^ Falun Dafa Information Center, "2010 Annual Report: Falun Gong Beliefs and Demography of Practitioners". 26 April 2010
- ^ Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2009 Annual Report, CECC report
- ^ He Qinglian (2008). The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China. Human Rights in China. pp. xii. ISBN 978-0-9717356-2-0. http://hrichina.org/sites/default/files/oldsite/PDFs/Reports/HRIC-Fog-of-Censorship.pdf.
- ^ Gutmann, Ethan (6 December 2010). "Into Thin Airwaves". The Weekly Standard. http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/thin-airwaves_519589.html?nopager=1.
- ^ The gospel truth: Falun Gong, Sunday Star Times, March 2, 2008
- ^ Mata Press Service, "Punjabi Publisher fights for press freedom in BC" South Asian Post, March 2009
- ^ Hu, Ping. The Falun Gong Phenomenon, in "Challenging China: Struggle and Hope in an Era of Change". Sharon Hom and Stacy Mosher ed. Human Rights in China, 2008. pp 228 - 230.
- ^ Steel, Kevin. 'Revolution number nine', The Western Standard, 11 July 2005.
- ^ Gutmann, Ethan. The Chinese Internet: A dream deferred?. Testimony given at the National Endowment for Democracy panel discussion "Tiananmen 20 years on", 2 June 2009.
- ^ Beiser, Vince. "Digital Weapons Help Dissidents Punch Holes in China's Great Firewall," Wired, 1 November 2010.
- ^ Human Rights Law Foundation, Direct Litigation, accessed 19 Mar 2011
- ^ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, 2008
- ^ La Audiencia pide interrogar al ex presidente chino Jiang por genocidio, Nov 14, 2009
- ^ Luis Andres Henao, Argentine judge asks China arrests over Falun Gong, Dec 22, 2009
- ^ http://www.faluninfo.net/article/935/?cid=82
- ^ Terry Baynes, 'Suit claims Cisco helped China repress religious group', Reuters, 20 May 2011.
- ^ [4]
- ^ Ownby (2008), p. 229
- ^ United States House Resolution 605, United States Government Printing Office, 17 March 2010
- ^ Einhorn, Bruce, (17 March 2010). "Congress Challenges China on Falun Gong & Yuan, Business Week
- ^ Frank 2004, p. 241
- ^ a b c Turley-Ewart, John, Falun Gong persecution spreads to Canada: Ottawa does little, National Post, 20 March 2004
- ^ Link, Perry, The Anaconda in the Chandelier: Chinese censorship today, 5/27/2005
- ^ Gutmann, Ethan. "Carrying a Torch for China", Weekly Standard, 21 April 2008, Vol. 13, No. 30
- ^ Ownby (2000), p. 248
- ^ Gutmann, Ethan. "China's Gruesome Organ Harvest" Weekly Standard, 24 November 2008, Vol. 14, No. 10
- ^ a b Madsen (2000), p. 248
- ^ Kipnis, Andrew B. 2001, The Flourishing of Religion in Post-Mao China and the Anthropological Category of Religion, The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 12:1, 32–46 Anthropology, Australian National University
- ^ Maria Hsia Chang, "Falun Gong:The End of Days," (Yale University Press, 2004).
- ^ Freedom House, "Report Analyzing Seven Secret Chinese Government Documents", 11 February 2002.
- ^ http://www.rickross.com/reference/fa_lun_gong/falun169.html Engardio, Joel. Spiritual Cultivation. New Times, March 23, 2000
- ^ http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/12/18/MNGGAG8MO31.DTL Hua, Vanessa. Critics and followers of Falun Gong. San Francisco Chronicle, December 18, 2005
- ^ Substantiation may be found in: Ownby 2008, p. vii and elsewhere; Madsen 2000; Chan 2004; Richardson & Edelman 2004; Hill et al 2001, pp. 34–35, et al.
- ^ Dai Qing: Members of Falungong in an Autocratic Society. Asia Quarterly, Volume IV, No.3, Summer 2000 http://asiaquarterly.com/2006/01/28/ii-45/
- ^ Schechter, Falun Gong's Challenge to China: Spiritual Practice or Evil Cult?
- ^ Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p 86.
- ^ a b Li Hongzhi (2011 [last update]). "Lecture in Sydney". falundafa.org. http://www.falundafa.org/book/eng/lectures/1996L.html. Retrieved 29 October 2011.
- ^ Ellis, David H.. "Falun Gong tries to join Chinatown Independence parade". Downtown Eexpress. http://www.downtownexpress.com/de_60/falungong.html.
- ^ Ontaria Consultants on Religious Tolerance. "INTRODUCTION TO FALUN GONG & FALUN DAFA Its terminology, symbol, texts, beliefs, web sites, & books". religioustolerance.org. http://www.religioustolerance.org/falungong1.htm. Retrieved 6 January 2010.
- ^ Lubman, Sarah [ "A Chinese Battle on U.S. Soil" in San Jose Mercury News (23 December 2001)] retrieved 14 June 2006
- ^ Falun Dafa Information Center, "Misconceptions: "Intolerant"?", 16 June 2008
- ^ Ethan Gutmann, "China's Policies Toward Spiritual Movements", Congressional-Executive Commission on China Roundtable discussion, 18 June 2010.
- ^ Paul Vallely and Clifford Coonan (22 April 2006). "China's enemy within: The story of Falun Gong - Asia, World - The Independent". The Independent (London: INM). ISSN 0951-9467. OCLC 185201487. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/chinas-enemy-within-the-story-of-falun-gong-475128.html. Retrieved 28 October 2011.
- ^ Ian Johnson, A Deadly Exercise, The Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2000
- ^ "FalunInfo.net - Misconceptions: 'Intolerant'?". faluninfo.net. 2011 [last update]. http://faluninfo.net/article/654/?cid=23. Retrieved 29 October 2011. "practice"
- ^ a b Radio National, Falun Gong: Cult or Culture?, produced by Chris Bullock, [5], accessed 2012-04-21.
- ^ Gunde, Richard. Culture and customs of China. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002, p. 215
- ^ Danny Schechter (1 September 2001). Falun Gong's challenge to China: spiritual practice or "evil cult"? : a report and reader. Akashic Books. p. 57. ISBN 978-1-888451-27-6. http://books.google.com/books?id=v20J18hL1MAC&pg=PA57. Retrieved 15 February 2012.
Further reading[link]
- David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (Oxford University Press, 2008) ISBN 978-0-19-532905-6
- Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004) ISBN 0-300-10227-5
- Danny Schechter, Falun Gong's Challenge to China (Akashic Books, 2000) hardback ISBN 1-888451-13-0, paperback ISBN 1-888451-27-0
- Palmer, David A. (2007). Qigong fever: body, science, and utopia in China. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-14066-5. http://books.google.com/?id=RXeuibmD2dsC&lpg=PR7&dq=Qigong%20fever%3A%20body%2C%20science%2C%20and%20utopia%20in%20China%E2%80%8E%20-%20Page%20241&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q=.
- James Tong. "Revenge of the Forbidden City: The suppression of the Falungong in China, 1999-2005". Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Vivienne Shue. "Legitimacy Crisis in China?" In Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds.), State and Society in 21st-century China. Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004.
- Ian Johnson. "Wild Grass: Three Stories of Change in Modern China". Pantheon: 2004.
- Ian Johnson. Original Pulitzer Prize winning articles in the Wall Street Journal, 2001 [6]
External links[link]
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"HK" redirects here. For other uses, see HK (disambiguation).
Coordinates: 22°16′42″N 114°09′32″E / 22.27833°N 114.15889°E / 22.27833; 114.15889
| Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China[note 1]
中華人民共和國香港特別行政區
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| Anthem: March of the Volunteers 《義勇軍進行曲》 |
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 View at night from Victoria Peak
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| Official language(s) | Chinese, English[note 2] | |||||
| Spoken languages | Cantonese, English | |||||
| Writing systems | Traditional Chinese, English alphabet | |||||
| Demonym | Hong Konger | |||||
| Government | Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China | |||||
| - | Chief Executive | Donald Tsang | ||||
| - | Chief Executive-elect | CY Leung | ||||
| - | Chief Justice | Geoffrey Ma | ||||
| - | President of the Legislative Council |
Jasper Tsang | ||||
| Legislature | Legislative Council | |||||
| Establishment | ||||||
| - | Treaty of Nanking | 29 August 1842 | ||||
| - | Japanese occupation | 25 December 1941 – 15 August 1945 |
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| - | Conveyance from British sovereignty to Chinese sovereignty | 1 July 1997 | ||||
| Area | ||||||
| - | Total | 1,104 km2 (179th) 426 sq mi |
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| - | Water (%) | 4.58 (50 km²; 19 mi²)[3] | ||||
| Population | ||||||
| - | 2010 census | 7,061,200[4] | ||||
| - | Density | 6,480[5]/km2 (4th) 16,576/sq mi |
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| GDP (PPP) | 2011 estimate | |||||
| - | Total | $351.119 billion[6] | ||||
| - | Per capita | $49,137[6] | ||||
| GDP (nominal) | 2011 estimate | |||||
| - | Total | $243.302 billion[6] | ||||
| - | Per capita | $34,049[6] | ||||
| Gini (2007) | 43.4[7] | |||||
| HDI (2011) |  0.898[8] (very high) (13th) |
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| Currency | Hong Kong dollar (HKD) |
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| Time zone | HKT (UTC+8) | |||||
| Date formats | yyyy年m月d日 (Chinese) dd-mm-yyyy (English) |
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| Drives on the | left | |||||
| ISO 3166 code | HK | |||||
| Internet TLD | .hk and .香港 | |||||
| Calling code | +852 | |||||
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| Chinese | 香港 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Cantonese Jyutping | Hoeng1gong2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Cantonese Yale | Hēunggóng | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Hanyu Pinyin | Xiānggǎng | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Literal meaning | Fragrant harbour | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Hong Kong Special Administrative Region | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 香港特別行政區 (or 香港特區) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 香港特别行政区 (or 香港特区) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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This article contains Chinese text. Without proper rendering support, you may see question marks, boxes, or other symbols instead of Chinese characters. |
Hong Kong[note 3] (Chinese: 香港) is one of two special administrative regions (SARs) of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the other being Macau. A city-state[9] situated on China's south coast and enclosed by the Pearl River Delta and South China Sea,[10] it is known for its expansive skyline and deep natural harbour. With a land mass of 1,104 km2 (426 sq mi) and a population of seven million people, Hong Kong is one of the most densely populated areas in the world.[11] Hong Kong's population is 95 percent ethnic Chinese and 5 percent from other groups.[12] Hong Kong's Han Chinese majority originate mainly from the cities of Guangzhou and Taishan in the neighbouring Guangdong province.[13]
Hong Kong became a colony of the British Empire after the First Opium War (1839–42). Originally confined to Hong Kong Island, the colony's boundaries were extended in stages to the Kowloon Peninsula in 1860 and then the New Territories in 1898. It was occupied by Japan during the Pacific War, after which the British resumed control until 1997, when China resumed sovereignty.[14][15] The region espoused minimum government intervention under the ethos of positive non-interventionism during the colonial era.[16] The time period greatly influenced the current culture of Hong Kong, often described as "East meets West",[17] and the educational system, which used to loosely follow the system in England[18] until reforms implemented in 2009.[19]
Under the principle of "one country, two systems", Hong Kong has a different political system from mainland China.[20] Hong Kong's independent judiciary functions under the common law framework.[21][22] Hong Kong Basic Law, its constitutional document, stipulates that Hong Kong shall have a "high degree of autonomy" in all matters except foreign relations and military defence, governs its political system.[23][24] Although it has a burgeoning multi-party system, a small-circle electorate[clarification needed] controls half of its legislature. The Chief Executive of Hong Kong, the head of government, is selected by a Selection Committee / Election Committee with 400 to 1200 members, during the first 20 years.[25] [26][27] [28]
As one of the world's leading international financial centres, Hong Kong has a major capitalist service economy characterised by low taxation and free trade, and the currency, Hong Kong dollar, is the eighth most traded currency in the world.[29] The lack of space caused demand for denser constructions, which developed the city to a centre for modern architecture and the world's most vertical city.[30][31] Hong Kong has one of the highest per capita income in the world.[6] The dense space also led to a highly developed transportation network with public transport travelling rate exceeding 90 percent,[32] the highest in the world.[33] Hong Kong has numerous high international rankings in various aspects. For instance, its economic freedom, financial and economic competitiveness, quality of life, corruption perception, Human Development Index, etc., are all ranked highly.[34][35][36][37][38][39][40] According to both UN and WHO estimates, Hong Kong has the second longest life expectancy of any country in the world. [41][42]
Contents |
Etymology[link]
The name "Hong Kong" is an approximate phonetic rendering of the pronunciation of the spoken Cantonese or Hakka name "香港", meaning "fragrant harbour".[43] Before 1842, the name referred to a small inlet – now Aberdeen Harbour or 香港仔 hoeng1 gong2 zai2 "Little Hong Kong" – between the Aberdeen Island and the south side of Hong Kong Island, which was one of the first points of contact between British sailors and local fishermen.[44]
The reference to fragrance may refer to the harbour waters sweetened by the fresh water estuarine influx of the Pearl River, or to the incense from factories lining the coast to the north of Kowloon, which was stored around Aberdeen Harbour for export before the development of Victoria Harbour.[43] In 1842, the Treaty of Nanking was signed, and the name Hong Kong was first recorded on official documents to encompass the entirety of the island.[45]
History[link]
Main article: History of Hong Kong
Pre-colonial[link]
Main articles: Prehistoric Hong Kong and History of Hong Kong under Imperial China
Archaeological studies support a human presence in the Chek Lap Kok area from 35,000 to 39,000 years ago, and in Sai Kung Peninsula from 6,000 years ago.[46][47][48] Wong Tei Tung and Three Fathoms Cove are the two earliest sites of human habitation in the Paleolithic period. It is believed the Three Fathom Cove was a river valley settlement and Wong Tei Tung was a lithic manufacturing site. Excavated Neolithic artefacts suggest cultural differences from the Longshan culture in northern China and settlement by the Che people prior to the migration of the Baiyue.[49][50] Eight petroglyphs were discovered on surrounding islands, which dated to the Shang Dynasty in China.[51]
In 214 BC, Qin Shi Huang, the first emperor of China, conquered the Baiyue tribes in Jiaozhi (modern Liangguang region) and incorporated the territory into imperial China for the first time. Modern Hong Kong is located in Nanhai commandery (modern Nanhai District) and near the ancient capital city Pun Yue.[52][53][54] The area was consolidated under the kingdom of Nanyue, founded by general Zhao Tuo in 204 BC after the Qin Dynasty collapsed.[55] When the kingdom was conquered by Emperor Wu of Han in 111 BC, the land was assigned to the Jiaozhi commandery under the Han Dynasty. Archaeological evidence indicates the population increased and early salt production flourished in this time period. Lei Cheng Uk Han Tomb in the Kowloon Peninsula is believed to have been built during the Han Dynasty.[56]
During the Tang Dynasty period, the Guangdong region flourished as a regional trading center. In 736, Emperor Xuanzong of Tang established a military town in Tuen Mun to defend the coastal area in the region.[57] The first village school, Li Ying College, was established around 1075 in the New Territories under the Northern Song Dynasty.[58] During the Mongol invasion in 1276, the Southern Song Dynasty court moved to Fujian, then to Lantau Island and later to Sung Wong Toi (modern Kowloon City), but the child Emperor Bing of Song committed suicide by drowning with his officials after being defeated in the Battle of Yamen. Hau Wong, an official of the emperor is still worshipped in Hong Kong today.[59]
The earliest recorded European visitor was Jorge Álvares, a Portuguese explorer who arrived in 1513.[60][61] After establishing settlements in the region, Portuguese merchants began trading in southern China. At the same time, they invaded and built up military fortifications in Tuen Mun. Military clashes between China and Portugal led to the expulsion of the Portuguese. In the mid-16th century, the Haijin order banned maritime activities and prevented contact with foreigners; it also restricted local sea activity.[59] In 1661–69, the territory was affected by the Great Clearance ordered by Kangxi Emperor, which required the evacuation of the coastal areas of Guangdong. It is recorded that about 16,000 persons from Xin'an County were driven inland, and 1,648 of those who left are said to have returned when the evacuation was rescinded in 1669.[62] What is now the territory of Hong Kong became largely wasteland during the ban.[63] In 1685, Kangxi became the first emperor to open limited trading with foreigners, which started with the Canton territory. He also imposed strict terms for trades such as requiring foreign traders to live in restricted areas, staying only for the trading seasons, banning firearms, and trading with silver only.[64] The East India Company made the first sea venture to China in 1699, and the region's trade with British merchants developed rapidly soon after. In 1711, the company established its first trading post in Canton. By 1773, the British reached a landmark 1,000 chests of opium in Canton with China consuming 2,000 chests annually by 1799.[64]
British colonial era[link]
Main articles: British Hong Kong, History of Hong Kong (1800s–1930s)
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Flag of the British colony of Hong Kong(used in between 1870-1876)
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Flag of the British colony of Hong Kong(used in between 1876-1910)
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Flag of the British colony of Hong Kong(used in between 1910-1959)
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Flag of the British colony of Hong Kong (Unofficial Red ensign for Hong Kong used in between 1959 to prior the Handover of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997)
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In 1839, the refusal by Qing Dynasty authorities to import opium resulted in the First Opium War between China and Britain. Hong Kong Island was occupied by British forces on 20 January 1841 and was initially ceded under the Convention of Chuenpee as part of a ceasefire agreement between Captain Charles Elliot and Governor Qishan, but the agreement was never ratified due to a dispute between high ranking officials in both governments.[65] It was not until 29 August 1842 that the island was formally ceded in perpetuity to the United Kingdom under the Treaty of Nanking. The British established a crown colony with the founding of Victoria City the following year.[66]
Under British rule, the population of Hong Kong island had increased from 7,450 Chinese residents, mostly fishermen, in 1841 to over 115,000 Chinese and 8,754 Europeans in Hong Kong (including Kowloon) in 1870.[67]
In 1860, after China's defeat in the Second Opium War, the Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutter's Island were ceded in perpetuity to Britain under the Convention of Peking.
In 1894, the deadly Third Pandemic of bubonic plague spread from China to Hong Kong, causing 50,000–100,000 deaths.[68]
In 1898, under the terms of the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, Britain obtained a 99-year lease of Lantau Island and the adjacent northern lands, which became known as the New Territories.[69] Hong Kong's territory has remained unchanged to the present.[70][71]
During the first half of the 20th century, Hong Kong was a free port, serving as an entrepôt of the British Empire. The British introduced an education system based on their own model, while the local Chinese population had little contact with the European community of wealthy tai-pans settled near Victoria Peak.[69]
Japanese invasion[link]
In conjunction with its military campaign, the Empire of Japan invaded Hong Kong on 8 December 1941.[72] The Battle of Hong Kong ended with British and Canadian defenders surrendering control of the colony to Japan on 25 December.[73] During the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, civilians suffered widespread food shortages, rationing, and hyper-inflation due to forced exchange of currency for military notes. Through a policy of enforced repatriation of the unemployed to the mainland throughout the period, because of the scarcity of food, the population of Hong Kong had dwindled from 1.6 million in 1941 to 600,000 in 1945, when the United Kingdom resumed control of the colony.[74]
Cold war era[link]
.svg)
Granted by the College of Arms on 21 January 1959, the Blue Ensign colonial flag and coat of arms of Hong Kong were used by British Hong Kong during 1959–1997.
File:Flag of Immigration Department, 1988-1997.gif
Flag of British Hong Kong Immigration Department,1988-1997
Hong Kong's population recovered quickly as a wave of migrants from China arrived for refuge from the ongoing Chinese Civil War. When the PRC was proclaimed in 1949, more migrants fled to Hong Kong for fear of persecution by the Communist Party.[69] Many corporations in Shanghai and Guangzhou shifted their operations to Hong Kong.[69]
In the 1950s, Hong Kong's rapid industrialization was driven by textile exports and other expanded manufacturing industries. As the population grew and labour costs remained low, living standards rose steadily. [75] The construction of Shek Kip Mei Estate in 1953 followed a massive slum fire, and marked the beginning of the public housing estate programme designed to cope with the huge influx of immigrants. Trade in Hong Kong accelerated even further when Shenzhen, immediately north of Hong Kong, became a special economic zone of the PRC, and Hong Kong was established as the main source of foreign investment in China.[76] The manufacturing competitiveness gradually declined in Hong Kong due to the development of the manufacturing industry in southern China beginning in the early 1980s. By contrast, the service industry in Hong Kong experienced high rates of growth in the 1980s and 1990s after absorbing workers released from the manufacturing industry.[77]
Throughout the British colonial era, Hong Kong was industrialized and improved in all aspects from its economy to its health care system. Many health facilities were built for its citizens, for example the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Hong Kong, the Queen Mary Hospital, Hong Kong, the Princess Margaret Hospital, Hong Kong and the Prince of Wales Hospital. Many changes happened during this era shaped the future of Hong Kong. In the year 1983, when the United Kingdom reclassified Hong Kong from a British crown colony to a dependent territory, the governments of the United Kingdom and China were already discussing the issue of Hong Kong's sovereignty due to the impending expiry (within two decades) of the lease of the New Territories. In 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration – an agreement to transfer sovereignty to the People's Republic of China in 1997 – was signed.[69] It stipulated that Hong Kong would be governed as a special administrative region, retaining its laws and a high degree of autonomy for at least 50 years after the transfer. The Hong Kong Basic Law, which is based on the English law would serve as the constitutional document after the transfer, was ratified in 1990.[69]
Since 1997[link]
Main articles: Transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong and 2000s in Hong Kong
Left:Old British passports issued to Hong Kong citizens. Right:The British National (Overseas) passport issued to residents of Hong Kong prior 1997, holders are British nationals and Commonwealth citizens, but not British Citizens.
On 1 July 1997, the transfer of sovereignty from United Kingdom to the PRC occurred, officially ending 156 years of British colonial rule. Hong Kong became China's first special administrative region, and Tung Chee Hwa took office as the first Chief Executive of Hong Kong. That same year, Hong Kong suffered an economic double blow from the Asian financial crisis and the H5N1 avian influenza.[69] In 2003, Hong Kong was gravely affected by the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).[78][79] The World Health Organization reported 1,755 infected and 299 deaths in Hong Kong.[80] An estimated 380 million Hong Kong dollars (US$48.9 million) in contracts were lost as a result of the epidemic.[81]
On 10 March 2005, Tung Chee Hwa announced his resignation as Chief Executive due to "health problems".[82] Donald Tsang, the Chief Secretary for Administration at the time, entered the 2005 election unopposed and became the second Chief Executive of Hong Kong on 21 June 2005.[83] In 2007, Tsang won the Chief Executive election and continued his second term in office.[84]
In 2009, Hong Kong hosted the fifth East Asian Games, in which nine national teams competed. It was the first and largest international multi-sport event ever held in the territory.[85] Today, Hong Kong continues to serve as an important global financial centre, but faces uncertainty over its future due to the growing mainland China economy, and its relationship with the PRC government in areas such as democratic reform and universal suffrage.[86]
Governance[link]
In accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and the underlying principle of one country, two systems, Hong Kong has a "high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region in all areas except defence and foreign affairs."[note 4] The declaration stipulates that the region maintain its capitalist economic system and guarantees the rights and freedoms of its people for at least 50 years beyond the 1997 handover.[note 5] The guarantees over the territory's autonomy and the individual rights and freedoms are enshrined in a constitution, the Hong Kong Basic Law(formed based on the Common law of England), which outlines the system of governance of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, but which is subject to the interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC).[87][88]
The primary pillars of government are the Executive Council, the civil service, the Legislative Council, and the Judiciary. The Executive Council is headed by the Chief Executive who is elected by the Election Committee and then appointed by the Central People's Government.[89][90] The civil service is a politically neutral body that implements policies and provides government services, where public servants are appointed based on meritocracy.[26][91] The Legislative Council has 60 members, half of whom are directly elected by universal suffrage by permanent residents of Hong Kong according to five geographical constituencies. The other half, known as functional constituencies, are directly elected by a smaller electorate, which consists of corporate bodies and persons from various stipulated functional sectors. The entire council is headed by the President of the Legislative Council who serves as the speaker.[92][93] Judges are appointed by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of an independent commission.[21][94]
The implementation of the Basic Law, including how and when the universal suffrage promised therein is to be achieved, has been a major issue of political debate since the transfer of sovereignty. In 2002, the government's proposed anti-subversion bill pursuant to Article 23 of the Basic Law, which required the enactment of laws prohibiting acts of treason and subversion against the Chinese government, was met with fierce opposition, and eventually shelved.[23][95][96] Debate between pro-Beijing groups, which tend to support the Executive branch, and the Pan-democracy camp characterises Hong Kong's political scene, with the latter supporting a faster pace of democratisation, and the principle of one man, one vote.[97]
In 2004, the government failed to gain pan-democrat support to pass its so-called "district council model" for political reform.[98] In 2009, the government reissued the proposals as the "Consultation Document on the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive and for Forming the LegCo in 2012". The document proposed the enlargement of the Election Committee, Hong Kong's electoral college, from 800 members to 1,200 in 2012 and expansion of the legislature from 60 to 70 seats. The 10 new legislative seats would consist of five geographical constituency seats and five functional constituency seats, to be voted in by elected district council members from among themselves.[99] The proposals were destined for rejection by pan-democrats once again, but a significant breakthrough occurred after the Central People's Government accepted a counter-proposal by the Democratic Party. In particular, the Pan-democracy camp was split when the proposal to directly elect five newly created functional seats was not acceptable to two constituent parties. The Democratic Party sided with the government for the first time since the handover and passed the proposals with a vote of 46–12.[100]
Legal system and judiciary[link]
Main articles: Law of Hong Kong and Judiciary of Hong Kong
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Statue of Themis on the Legislative Council Building.
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The Court of Final Appeal in Central is the supreme court of Hong Kong.
Hong Kong's legal system is completely independent from the legal system of Mainland China. In contrast to mainland China's civil law system, Hong Kong continues to follow the English Common Law tradition established under British rule.[101] Hong Kong's courts may refer to decisions rendered by courts of other common law jurisdictions as precedents,[21][102] and judges from other common law jurisdictions are allowed to sit as non-permanent judges of the Court of Final Appeal.[21][102]
Structurally, the court system consists of the Court of Final Appeal, the High Court, which is made up of the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance, and the District Court, which includes the Family Court.[103] Other adjudicative bodies include the Lands Tribunal, the Magistrates' Courts, the Juvenile Court, the Coroner's Court, the Labour Tribunal, the Small Claims Tribunal, and the Obscene Articles Tribunal.[103] Justices of the Court of Final Appeal are appointed by Hong Kong's Chief Executive.[21][102]
The Department of Justice is responsible for handling legal matters for the government. Its responsibilities include providing legal advice, criminal prosecution, civil representation, legal and policy drafting and reform, and international legal cooperation between different jurisdictions.[101] Apart from prosecuting criminal cases, lawyers of the Department of Justice act on behalf of the government in all civil and administrative lawsuits against the government.[101] As protector of the public interest, the department may apply for judicial reviews and may intervene in any cases involving the greater public interest.[104] The Basic Law protects the Department of Justice from any interference by the government when exercising its control over criminal prosecution.[105][106]
Human rights[link]
Main article: Human rights in Hong Kong
Hong Kong's Basic law is based on the English law and so in general, Hong Kong is perceived to enjoy a high level of civil liberties.[107] The Hong Kong government generally respect the human rights of the citizens, although core issues remain.[108] There are concerns over the freedom of assembly which is restricted by the Public Order Ordinance. The police has been occasionally accused of using heavy-handed tactics towards protestors[109] and questions are asked towards the extensive powers of the police.[110] As to the right of privacy, covert surveillance remains the major concern.[111] There is a lack of protection for gay men and lesbians due to the absence of a sexual orientation discrimination law, though there are currently no laws that criminalize homosexuality per se.[112] There are also comments regarding a lack of protection for labour rights.[108]
Internet censorship in Hong Kong operates under different principles and regulations than under the rest of China.[113]
Administrative districts[link]
Statistics
| New Territories | |||
| No. | District | Population[114] | Area[115] |
| 1. | Islands | 138,900 | 175.03 km2 (67.58 sq mi) |
| 2. | Kwai Tsing | 510,300 | 21.82 km2 (8.42 sq mi) |
| 3. | North | 287,700 | 137.31 km2 (53.02 sq mi) |
| 4. | Sai Kung | 407,300 | 136.39 km2 (52.66 sq mi) |
| 5. | Sha Tin | 606,700 | 69.46 km2 (26.82 sq mi) |
| 6. | Tai Po | 292,700 | 147.42 km2 (56.92 sq mi) |
| 7. | Tsuen Wan | 292,300 | 60.7 km2 (23.44 sq mi) |
| 8. | Tuen Mun | 493,800 | 84.45 km2 (32.61 sq mi) |
| 9. | Yuen Long | 533,300 | 138.43 km2 (53.45 sq mi) |
| Kowloon | |||
| No. | District | Population | Area |
| 10. | Kowloon City | 359,400 | 9.97 km2 (3.85 sq mi) |
| 11. | Kwun Tong | 579,400 | 11.05 km2 (4.27 sq mi) |
| 12. | Sham Shui Po | 365,600 | 9.48 km2 (3.66 sq mi) |
| 13. | Wong Tai Sin | 421,900 | 9.36 km2 (3.61 sq mi) |
| 14. | Yau Tsim Mong | 285,300 | 6.85 km2 (2.64 sq mi) |
| Hong Kong Island | |||
| No. | District | Population | Area |
| 15. | Central and Western | 253,100 | 12.52 km2 (4.83 sq mi) |
| 16. | Eastern | 588,700 | 18.81 km2 (7.26 sq mi) |
| 17. | Southern | 275,700 | 38.95 km2 (15.04 sq mi) |
| 18. | Wan Chai | 155,700 | 10.02 km2 (3.87 sq mi) |
Main article: Districts of Hong Kong
Hong Kong has a unitary system of government; no local government has existed since the two municipal councils were abolished in 2000. As such there is no formal definition for its cities and towns. Administratively, Hong Kong is subdivided into 18 geographic districts, each represented by a district council which advises the government on local matters such as public facilities, community programmes, cultural activities, and environmental improvements.[116]
There are a total of 534 district council seats, 405 of which are elected; the rest are appointed by the Chief Executive and 27 ex officio chairmen of rural committees.[116] The Home Affairs Department communicates government policies and plans to the public through the district offices.[117]
Military[link]
Main articles: Royal Hong Kong Regiment, Hong Kong Military Service Corps, and British Forces Overseas Hong Kong
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Coat of Arms of the Royal Hong Kong Regiment(UK)
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Badge of the Royal Hong Kong Auxiliary Air Force.gif
Royal Hong Kong Auxiliary Air Force(UK)
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HKMSC.jpg
Hong Kong Military Service Corps(UK)
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The Cenotaph of Hong Kong.Constructed in 1923 and located between Statue Square and the City Hall in Central, Hong Kong,[1] commemorates the dead in the First and Second World War[2] that served in Hong Kong in the Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force.
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When Hong Kong was a British colony and later, a dependent territory, defence was provided by the British military under the command of the Governor of Hong Kong who was ex officio Commander-in-chief.[118] Most of the members of the British Forces in Hong Kong were from Britain but there were locally enlisted personnel (LEP) who served as regular British Forces members in the Hong Kong Squadron of the Royal Navy as well as the Hong Kong Military Service Corps. The Royal Hong Kong Regiment a military unit part of the Hong Kong Government, trained and organised along timelines of British Territorial Army and supported by British Army personnel holding key positions. These British Army personnel, for their duration of service to the Royal Hong Kong Regiment, are seconded to the Hong Kong Government. In the post-WWII era, the majority of the regiment's members have been local citizens of Chinese descent. The Hong Kong Military Service Corps maintained its reputation for loyalty and military skill at the highest level, often outshining British and Gurkha troops based in Hong Kong. The HKMSC Shooting Team won the Team and Individual champion pistol shot a number of times at RASAAM (the Regular Army Skill at Arms Meeting) at Bisley, in the UK, and in 1992 a Training Company team representing the HQ and Depot HKMSC won the Dragon Cup for military skills (outperforming the Queen's Gurkha Signals in signalling and the British Military Hospital team in first aid); the competition was not held again.
The HKMSC reached a peak strength of 1,200 men, providing the British garrison in Hong Kong with supporting personnel. All HKMSC soldiers were basically trained in Hong Kong and from time to time attended upgrading and trade courses in the United Kingdom. HKMSC soldiers who were posted to and served with other non-HKMSC units, wore the other units' cap badge. Unit personnel were enlisted as officers and drivers in 29 Squadron, Royal Corps of Transport (RCT) based in Gun Club Hill Barracks. It provided crews for 415 Maritime Troop based on Stonecutters' Island, dog handlers in the Defence Animal Support Unit (DASU) of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps (RAVC) based in Sek Kong, officer instructors in the Royal Army Educational Corps (RAEC), officers and clerks in the Royal Army Pay Corps (RAPC), technicians in the Royal Signals (R Sigs) of the Queen's Gurkha Signals (QGS) and engineers and armourers in the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME). The HKMC trained physical training instructors (PTI) in the Army Physical Training Corps (APTC), medics in the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) based in the British Military Hospital (BMH), military police in the Royal Military Police (RMP), helicopter support crews in 660 Squadron Army Air Corps (AAC) based at Sek Kong Airfield, cooks in the Army Catering Corps (ACC), Weapons and Supplies Storekeepers in the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) and intelligence staff in the Intelligence Corps. They also provided interpreters, clerks, Regimental Police and light-infantry personnel in Dragon Company of the General Service Corps (GSC) headquartered in Osborn Baracks, Kowloon Tong. The HKMSC offered Hong Kong Chinese soldiers the opportunity to pursue a full career in the British Regular Army up to and including a Queen's Commissioned officer rank of the General List (HKMSC). As all members of the HKMSC were British Regular Army soldiers, they received a Regular Army Service Record Book when they left the army. Many of them had also been awarded the Long Service and Good Conduct Medal (LS&GC) after 15 years of good and loyal service. British gallantry awards, Orders, Decorations and Medal Ribbons had also been presented to some HKMSC soldiers; such as the Queen's Gallantry Medal (QGM), the British Empire Medal (BEM), Members of the Order of the British Empire (MBE) and the Officers of the Order of the British Empire (OBE).
When the PRC assumed sovereignty in 1997, the British barracks were replaced by a garrison of the People's Liberation Army, comprising ground, naval, and air forces, and under the command of the Chinese Central Military Commission.
The Hong Kong Basic Law is formed based on the Common law of England and it protects local civil affairs against interference by the garrison, and members of the garrison are subject to Hong Kong laws. The Hong Kong Government remains responsible for the maintenance of public order; however, it may ask the PRC government for help from the garrison in maintaining public order and in disaster relief. The PRC government is responsible for the costs of maintaining the garrison.[23][119]
Geography and climate[link]
Hong Kong is located on China's south coast, 60 km (37 mi) east of Macau on the opposite side of the Pearl River Delta. It is surrounded by the South China Sea on the east, south, and west, and borders the Guangdong city of Shenzhen to the north over the Shenzhen River. The territory's 1,104 km2 (426 sq mi) area consists of Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, the New Territories, and over 200 offshore islands, of which the largest is Lantau Island. Of the total area, 1,054 km2 (407 sq mi) is land and 50 km2 (19 sq mi) is inland water. Hong Kong claims territorial waters to a distance of 3 nautical miles (5.6 km). Its land area makes Hong Kong the 179th largest inhabited territory in the world.[3][10]
As much of Hong Kong's terrain is hilly to mountainous with steep slopes, less than 25% of the territory's landmass is developed, and about 40% of the remaining land area is reserved as country parks and nature reserves.[120] Most of the territory's urban development exists on Kowloon peninsula, along the northern edge of Hong Kong Island, and in scattered settlements throughout the New Territories.[121] The highest elevation in the territory is at Tai Mo Shan, 957 metres (3,140 ft) above sea level.[122] Hong Kong's long and irregular coast provides it with many bays, rivers and beaches.[123] On September 18, 2011, UNESCO listed the Hong Kong National Geopark as part of its Global Geoparks Network. Hong Kong Geopark is made up of eight Geo-Areas distributed across the Sai Kung Volcanic Rock Region and Northeast New Territories Sedimentary Rock Region.[124]
Despite Hong Kong's reputation of being intensely urbanised, the territory has tried to promote a green environment,[125] and recent growing public concern has prompted the severe restriction of further land reclamation from Victoria Harbour.[126] Awareness of the environment is growing as Hong Kong suffers from increasing pollution compounded by its geography and tall buildings. Approximately 80% of the city's smog originates from other parts of the Pearl River Delta.[127]
Though it is situated just south of the Tropic of Cancer, Hong Kong has a humid subtropical climate (Köppen Cwa). Summer is hot and humid with occasional showers and thunderstorms, and warm air coming from the southwest. Summer is when typhoons are most likely, sometimes resulting in flooding or landslides. Winters are mild and usually start sunny, becoming cloudier towards February; the occasional cold front brings strong, cooling winds from the north. The most temperate seasons are spring, which can be changeable, and autumn, which is generally sunny and dry.[128] Hong Kong averages 1,948 hours of sunshine per year,[129] while the highest and lowest ever recorded temperatures at the Hong Kong Observatory are 36.1 °C (97.0 °F) and 0.0 °C (32.0 °F), respectively.[130]
| Climate data for Hong Kong (1981–2010) | |||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Year |
| Average high °C (°F) | 18.6 (65.5) |
18.9 (66.0) |
21.4 (70.5) |
25.0 (77.0) |
28.4 (83.1) |
30.2 (86.4) |
31.4 (88.5) |
31.1 (88.0) |
30.1 (86.2) |
27.8 (82.0) |
24.1 (75.4) |
20.2 (68.4) |
25.6 (78.1) |
| Daily mean °C (°F) | 16.3 (61.3) |
16.8 (62.2) |
19.1 (66.4) |
22.6 (72.7) |
25.9 (78.6) |
27.9 (82.2) |
28.8 (83.8) |
28.6 (83.5) |
27.7 (81.9) |
25.5 (77.9) |
21.8 (71.2) |
17.9 (64.2) |
23.24 (73.84) |
| Average low °C (°F) | 14.5 (58.1) |
15.0 (59.0) |
17.2 (63.0) |
20.8 (69.4) |
24.1 (75.4) |
26.2 (79.2) |
26.8 (80.2) |
26.6 (79.9) |
25.8 (78.4) |
23.7 (74.7) |
19.8 (67.6) |
15.9 (60.6) |
21.4 (70.5) |
| Rainfall mm (inches) | 24.7 (0.972) |
54.4 (2.142) |
82.2 (3.236) |
174.7 (6.878) |
304.7 (11.996) |
456.1 (17.957) |
376.5 (14.823) |
432.2 (17.016) |
327.6 (12.898) |
100.9 (3.972) |
37.6 (1.48) |
26.8 (1.055) |
2,398.4 (94.425) |
| % humidity | 74 | 80 | 82 | 83 | 83 | 82 | 81 | 81 | 78 | 73 | 71 | 69 | 78.0 |
| Avg. rainy days (≥ 0.1 mm) | 5.37 | 9.07 | 10.90 | 12.00 | 14.67 | 19.07 | 17.60 | 16.93 | 14.67 | 7.43 | 5.47 | 4.47 | 137.65 |
| Mean monthly sunshine hours | 143.0 | 94.2 | 90.8 | 101.7 | 140.4 | 146.1 | 212.0 | 188.9 | 172.3 | 193.9 | 180.1 | 172.2 | 1,835.6 |
| Source: Hong Kong Observatory [131] | |||||||||||||
Economy[link]
Main article: Economy of Hong Kong
As one of the world's leading international financial centres, Hong Kong has a major capitalist service economy characterised by low taxation and free trade. The currency, Hong Kong dollar, is the eighth most traded currency in the world as of 2010.[29] Hong Kong was once described by Milton Friedman as the world’s greatest experiment in laissez-faire capitalism.[132] It maintains a highly developed capitalist economy, ranked the freest in the world by the Index of Economic Freedom every year since 1995.[133][134][135] It is an important centre for international finance and trade, with one of the greatest concentrations of corporate headquarters in the Asia-Pacific region,[136] and is known as one of the Four Asian Tigers for its high growth rates and rapid development from the 1960s to the 1990s. Between 1961 and 1997 Hong Kong's gross domestic product grew 180 times while per-capita GDP increased 87 times over.[137][138][139]
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange is the seventh largest in the world, with a market capitalisation of US$2.3 trillion as of December 2009.[140] In that year, Hong Kong raised 22 percent of worldwide initial public offering (IPO) capital, making it the largest centre of IPOs in the world [141] and the easiest place to raise capital.[142] Hong Kong's currency is the Hong Kong dollar, which has been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1983.[143]
The Hong Kong Government has traditionally played a mostly passive role in the economy, with little by way of industrial policy and almost no import or export controls. Market forces and the private sector were allowed to determine practical development. Under the official policy of "positive non-interventionism", Hong Kong is often cited as an example of laissez-faire capitalism. Following the Second World War, Hong Kong industrialised rapidly as a manufacturing centre driven by exports, and then underwent a rapid transition to a service-based economy in the 1980s.[144] Since then, it has grown to become a leading center for management, financial, IT, business consultation and professional services.[142]
Hong Kong matured to become a financial centre in the 1990s, but was greatly affected by the Asian financial crisis in 1998, and again in 2003 by the SARS outbreak. A revival of external and domestic demand has led to a strong recovery, as cost decreases strengthened the competitiveness of Hong Kong exports and a long deflationary period ended.[145][146] Government intervention, initiated by the later colonial governments and continued since 1997, has steadily increased, with the introduction of export credit guarantees, a compulsory pension scheme, a minimum wage, anti-discrimination laws, and a state mortgage backer.[132]
The territory has little arable land and few natural resources, so it imports most of its food and raw materials. Agricultural activity—relatively unimportant to Hong Kong’s economy and contributing just 0.1% of its GDP—primarily consists of growing premium food and flower varieties.[142] Hong Kong is the world's eleventh largest trading entity,[147] with the total value of imports and exports exceeding its gross domestic product. It is the world's largest re-export centre.[148] Much of Hong Kong's exports consist of re-exports,[149] which are products made outside of the territory, especially in mainland China, and distributed via Hong Kong. Its physical location has allowed the city to establish a transportation and logistics infrastructure that includes the world’s second busiest container port and the world’s busiest airport for international cargo.[142] Even before the transfer of sovereignty, Hong Kong had established extensive trade and investment ties with the mainland, which now enable it to serve as a point of entry for investment flowing into the mainland. At the end of 2007, there were 3.46 million people employed full-time, with the unemployment rate averaging 4.1% for the fourth straight year of decline.[150] Hong Kong's economy is dominated by the service sector, which accounts for over 90% of its GDP, while industry constitutes 9%. Inflation was at 2.5% in 2007.[151] Hong Kong's largest export markets are mainland China, the United States, and Japan.[3]
As of 2010, Hong Kong is the eighth most expensive city for expatriates, falling from fifth position in the previous year.[152] Hong Kong is ranked fourth in terms of the highest percentage of millionaire households, behind Switzerland, Qatar, and Singapore with 8.5 percent of all households owning at least one million US dollars.[153] In 2011, Hong Kong was ranked second in the Ease of Doing Business Index, behind Singapore.[154] General principle No. 5 of the Basic Law of the SAR suggests that the CPC expects that it shall have brought the economic system of the Mainland and Hong Kong into harmony by 2047, by which time the Chinese economy is predicted by Businessweek to have been the largest by any measure of GDP for decades.[155]
Demographics[link]
The territory's population is 7.03 million. In 2009, Hong Kong had a birth rate of 11.7 per 1,000 population and a fertility rate of 1,032 children per 1,000 women.[156] Residents from mainland China do not have the right of abode in Hong Kong, nor are they allowed to enter the territory freely.[95] However, the influx of immigrants from mainland China, approximating 45,000 per year, is a significant contributor to its population growth – a daily quota of 150 Mainland Chinese with family ties in Hong Kong are granted a "one way permit".[157] Life expectancy in Hong Kong is 79.16 years for males and 84.79 years for females as of 2009, making it one of the highest life expectancies in the world.[3]
About 95% of the people of Hong Kong are of Chinese descent,[12] the majority of whom are Taishanese, Chiu Chow, other Cantonese people, and Hakka. Hong Kong's Han majority originate mainly from the Guangzhou and Taishan regions in Guangdong province.[13] The remaining 5% of the population is composed of non-ethnic Chinese.[12] There is a South Asian population of Indians, Pakistanis and Nepalese; some Vietnamese refugees have become permanent residents of Hong Kong. There are also Europeans (mostly British), Americans, Canadians, Japanese, and Koreans working in the city's commercial and financial sector.[note 6] In 2008, there were an estimate of 252,500 foreign domestic helpers from Indonesia and the Philippines working in Hong Kong.[159]
Hong Kong's de facto official language is Cantonese, a Chinese language originating from Guangdong province to the north of Hong Kong.[160] English is also an official language, and according to a 1996 by-census is spoken by 3.1 percent of the population as an everyday language and by 34.9 percent of the population as a second language.[161] Signs displaying both Chinese and English are common throughout the territory. Since the 1997 handover, an increase in immigrants from mainland China and greater integration with the mainland economy have brought an increasing number of Mandarin speakers to Hong Kong.[162]
A majority of residents of Hong Kong would claim no religious affiliation, professing a form of agnosticism or atheism.[163] According to the U.S Department of State only 43 percent of the population practices some form of religion.[164] Some figures put it higher, according to a Gallup poll, 64% of Hong Kong residents do not believe in any religion,[165][166] and possibly 80% of Hong Kong claim no religion.[167] In Hong Kong teaching evolution won out in curriculum dispute about whether to teach other explanations, and that creationism and intelligent design will form no part of the senior secondary biology curriculum[168] [169]
Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of religious freedom, guaranteed by the Basic Law. Hong Kong's main religions are Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism; a local religious scholar in contact with major denominations estimates there are approximately 1.5 million Buddhists and Taoists.[164] A Christian community of around 600,000 forms about 8% of the total population;[170][171] it is nearly equally divided between Catholics and Protestants, although smaller Christian communities exist, including the Latter-Day Saints[172] and Jehovah's Witnesses.[173] The Anglican and Roman Catholic churches each freely appoint their own bishops, unlike in mainland China. There are also Sikh, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu and Bahá'í communities.[170] The practice of Falun Gong is tolerated.[174]
Statistically Hong Kong's income gap is the greatest in Asia Pacific. According to a report by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme in 2008, Hong Kong's Gini coefficient, at 0.53, was the highest in Asia and "relatively high by international standards".[175][176] However, the government has stressed that income disparity does not equate to worsening of the poverty situation, and that the Gini coefficient is not strictly comparable between regions. The government has named economic restructuring, changes in household sizes, and the increase of high-income jobs as factors that have skewed the Gini coefficient.[177][178][179]
Education[link]
Main article: Education in Hong Kong
Hong Kong's education system used to roughly follow the system in England,[18] although international systems exist. The government maintains a policy of "mother tongue instruction" (Chinese: 母語教學) in which the medium of instruction is Cantonese,[180] with written Chinese and English. In secondary schools, 'biliterate and trilingual' proficiency is emphasised, and Mandarin-language education has been increasing.[181] The Programme for International Student Assessment ranked Hong Kong's education system as the second best in the world.[182] Hong Kong's public schools are operated by the Education Bureau. The system features a non-compulsory three-year kindergarten, followed by a compulsory six-year primary education, a compulsory three-year junior secondary education, a non-compulsory two-year senior secondary education leading to the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examinations and a two-year matriculation course leading to the Hong Kong Advanced Level Examinations.[183] The New Senior Secondary academic structure and curriculum was implemented in September 2009, which provides for all students to receive three years of compulsory junior and three years of compulsory senior secondary education.[19][184] Under the new curriculum, there is only one public examination, namely the Hong Kong Diploma of Secondary Education.[185]
Most comprehensive schools in Hong Kong fall under three categories: the rarer public schools; the more common subsidised schools, including government aids-and-grant schools; and private schools, often run by Christian organisations and having admissions based on academic merit rather than on financial resources. Outside this system are the schools under the Direct Subsidy Scheme and private international schools.[184]
There are nine public universities in Hong Kong, and a number of private higher institutions, offering various bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees, other higher diplomas, and associate degree courses.The University of Hong Kong, the oldest institution of tertiary education in the territory, was described by Quacquarelli Symonds as a "world-class comprehensive research university"[186] and was ranked 24th on the 2009 THES - QS World University Rankings,[187] making it first in Asia.[188] The Hong Kong University of Science & Technology was ranked 35th in the world in 2009 and ranked second in Asia for 2010. The Chinese University of Hong Kong was ranked 46th in the world in 2009 and ranked fourth in Asia for 2010.[188] Based on the 2011 rankings published by career and education network QS, three of the top five Asian universities are in Hong Kong. They are the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, the University of Hong Kong and Chinese University of Hong kong as first, second and fifth rank, respectively.[189]
Healthcare[link]
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This unreferenced section requires citations to ensure verifiability. |
There are 13 private hospitals and more than 50 public hospitals in Hong Kong. Among the widest range of healthcare services throughout the globe are on offer, and some of the SAR's private hospitals are rightly considered to be among the very best of their type in the world.
There are two medical schools in the SAR, one based at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the other at Hong Kong University. Both have strong links with public sector hospitals.
With respect to postgraduate education, traditionally many doctors in Hong Kong have looked overseas for further training, and many took British Royal College exams such as the MRCP(UK) and the MRCS(UK). However, Hong Kong has been developing its own postgraduate medical institutions, in particular the Hong Kong Academy of Medicine, and this is gradually taking over the responsibility for all postgraduate medical training in the SAR.
There are also strong public health systems in Hong Kong, and the Centre for Health Protection, founded after the SARS outbreak of 2003, is particularly worthy of mention.
By 2011, however, there have been growing concerns that mothers-to-be from Mainland China, in a bid to obtain the right of abode in Hong Kong and the benefits that come with it, have saturated the neonatal wards of the city's hospitals, both public and private sectors, which has led to outcries and protests from local pregnant women for the government to remedy the issue, as they have found difficulty securing a bed space for giving birth and arrange routine check-ups. Other concerns in the decade of 2001-2010 relate to the workload medical staff experience; and medical errors and mishaps, which are frequently highlighted in local news.
Culture[link]
Main article: Culture of Hong Kong
Hong Kong is frequently described as a place where "East meets West", reflecting the culture's mix of the territory's Chinese roots with influences from its time as a British colony.[17] Hong Kong balances a modernised way of life with traditional Chinese practices. Concepts like feng shui are taken very seriously, with expensive construction projects often hiring expert consultants, and are often believed to make or break a business.[190] Other objects like Ba gua mirrors are still regularly used to deflect evil spirits,[191] and buildings often lack any floor number that has a 4 in it,[192] due to its similarity to the word for "die" in Cantonese.[193] The fusion of east and west also characterises Hong Kong's cuisine, where dim sum, hot pot, and fast food restaurants coexist with haute cuisine.[194]
Hong Kong is a recognised global centre of trade, and calls itself an "entertainment hub".[195] Its martial arts film genre gained a high level of popularity in the late 1960s and 1970s. Several Hollywood performers, notable actors and martial artists have originated from Hong Kong cinema, notably Bruce Lee, Jackie Chan, Chow Yun-fat, Michelle Yeoh, Maggie Cheung and Jet Li. A number of Hong Kong film-makers have achieved widespread fame in Hollywood, such as John Woo, Wong Kar-wai, and Stephen Chow.[195] Homegrown films such as Chungking Express, Infernal Affairs, Shaolin Soccer, Rumble in the Bronx, In the Mood for Love and Echoes of the Rainbow have gained international recognition. Hong Kong is the centre for Cantopop music, which draws its influence from other forms of Chinese music and Western genres, and has a multinational fanbase.[196]
The Hong Kong government supports cultural institutions such as the Hong Kong Heritage Museum, the Hong Kong Museum of Art, the Hong Kong Academy for Performing Arts, and the Hong Kong Philharmonic Orchestra. The government's Leisure and Cultural Services Department subsidises and sponsors international performers brought to Hong Kong. Many international cultural activities are organised by the government, consulates, and privately.[197][198]
Hong Kong has two licensed terrestrial broadcasters – ATV and TVB. There are three local and a number of foreign suppliers of cable and satellite services.[199] The production of Hong Kong's soap dramas, comedy series, and variety shows reach audiences throughout the Chinese-speaking world. Magazine and newspaper publishers in Hong Kong distribute and print in both Chinese and English, with a focus on sensationalism and celebrity gossip.[200] The media in Hong Kong is relatively free from official interference compared to mainland China, although the Far Eastern Economic Review points to signs of self-censorship by journals whose owners have close ties to or business interests in the People's Republic of China and states that even Western media outlets are not immune to growing Chinese economic power.[201]
Hong Kong offers wide recreational and competitive sport opportunities despite its limited land area. It sends delegates to international competitions such as the Olympic Games and Asian Games, and played host to the equestrian events during the 2008 Summer Olympics.[202] There are major multipurpose venues like Hong Kong Coliseum and MacPherson Stadium. Hong Kong's steep terrain and extensive trail network with expansive views attracts hikers, and its rugged coastline provides many beaches for swimming.[203]
Cityscape[link]
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Architecture[link]
Main article: Architecture of Hong Kong
See also: List of tallest buildings in Hong Kong
According to Emporis, there are 7,650 skyscrapers in Hong Kong, which puts the city at the top of world rankings.[204] It has more buildings higher than 500ft (or 150m) than any other city. The high density and tall skyline of Hong Kong's urban area is due to a lack of available sprawl space, with the average distance from the harbour front to the steep hills of Hong Kong Island at 1.3 km (0.81 mi),[205] much of it reclaimed land. This lack of space causes demand for dense, high-rise offices and housing. Thirty-six of the world's 100 tallest residential buildings are in Hong Kong.[206] More people in Hong Kong live or work above the 14th floor than anywhere else on Earth, making it the world's most vertical city.[30][31]
As a result of the lack of space and demand for construction, few older buildings remain, and the city is becoming a centre for modern architecture. The International Commerce Centre (ICC), at 484 m (1,588 ft) high, is the tallest building in Hong Kong and the third tallest in the world, by height to roof measurement.[207] The tallest building prior to the ICC is Two International Finance Centre, at 415 m (1,362 ft) high.[208] Other recognisable skyline features include the HSBC Headquarters Building, the triangular-topped Central Plaza with its pyramid-shaped spire, The Center with its night-time multi-coloured neon light show; A Symphony of Lights and I. M. Pei's Bank of China Tower with its sharp, angular façade. According to the Emporis website, the city skyline has the biggest visual impact of all world cities.[209] Also, Hong Kong's skyline is often regarded to be the best in the world,[210] with the surrounding mountains and Victoria Harbour complementing the skyscrapers.[211][212] Most of the oldest remaining historic structures, including the Tsim Sha Tsui Clock Tower, the Central Police Station, and the remains of Kowloon Walled City were constructed during the 19th and early 20th centuries.[213][214][215]
There are many development plans in place, including the construction of new government buildings,[216] waterfront redevelopment in Central,[217] and a series of projects in West Kowloon.[218] More high-rise development is set to take place on the other side of Victoria Harbour in Kowloon, as the 1998 closure of the nearby Kai Tak Airport lifted strict height restrictions.[219]
Transport[link]
Main article: Transport in Hong Kong
Hong Kong's transportation network is highly developed. Over 90% of daily travels (11 million) are on public transport,[32] the highest such percentage in the world.[33] Payment can be made using the Octopus card, a stored value system introduced by the Mass Transit Railway (MTR), which is widely accepted on railways, buses and ferries, and accepted like cash at other outlets.[220][221]
The city's main railway company (KCRC) was merged with the urban mass transit operator (MTR) in 2007, creating a comprehensive rail network for the whole territory (also called MTR).[222] This MTR rapid transit system has 152 stations, which serve 3.4 million people a day.[223] Hong Kong Tramways, which has served the territory since 1904, covers the northern parts of Hong Kong Island.[224]
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Hong Kong's bus service is franchised and run by private operators. Five privately owned companies provide franchised bus service across the territory, together operating more than 700 routes. The two largest, Kowloon Motor Bus provides 402 routes in Kowloon and New Territories; Citybus operates 154 routes on Hong Kong Island; both run cross-harbour services. Double-decker buses were introduced to Hong Kong in 1949, and are now almost exclusively used; single-decker buses remain in use for routes with lower demand or roads with lower load capacity. Public light buses serve most parts of Hong Kong, particularly areas where standard bus lines cannot reach or do not reach as frequently, quickly, or directly.[225]
The Star Ferry service, founded in 1888, operates four lines across Victoria Harbour and provides scenic views of Hong Kong's skyline for its 53,000 daily passengers.[226] It acquired iconic status following its use as a setting on The World of Suzie Wong. Travel writer Ryan Levitt considered the main Tsim Sha Tsui to Central crossing one of the most picturesque in the world.[227] Other ferry services are provided by operators serving outlying islands, new towns, Macau, and cities in mainland China. Hong Kong is famous for its junks traversing the harbour, and small kai-to ferries that serve remote coastal settlements.[228][229] The Port of Hong Kong is a busy deepwater port, specialising in container shipping.[230]
Hong Kong Island's steep, hilly terrain was initially served by sedan chairs.[231] The Peak Tram, the first public transport system in Hong Kong, has provided vertical rail transport between Central and Victoria Peak since 1888.[232] In Central and Western district, there is an extensive system of escalators and moving pavements, including the longest outdoor covered escalator system in the world, the Mid-Levels escalator.[233]
Hong Kong International Airport is a leading air passenger gateway and logistics hub in Asia and one of the world's busiest airports in terms of international passenger and cargo movement, serving more than 47 million passengers and handling 3.74 million tonnes (4.12 million tons) of cargo in 2007.[234] It replaced the overcrowded Kai Tak Airport in Kowloon in 1998, and has been rated as the world's best airport in a number of surveys.[235] Over 85 airlines operate at the two-terminal airport and it is the primary hub of Cathay Pacific, Dragonair, Air Hong Kong, Hong Kong Airlines, and Hong Kong Express.[234][236]
See also[link]
- Outline of Hong Kong
- Index of Hong Kong-related articles
- List of cities with most skyscrapers
- Public holidays in Hong Kong
Footnotes[link]
- ^ This is the official convention employed on the Chinese text of the Hong Kong regional emblem, the text of the Hong Kong Basic Law, and the Hong Kong Government website,[1] although "Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" and "Hong Kong" are also accepted.
- ^ The Hong Kong Basic Law states that the official languages are "Chinese and English".[2] It does not explicitly specify the standard for "Chinese". While Mandarin written in Simplified Chinese characters are the standards in mainland China, Cantonese and Traditional Chinese characters are the de facto standards in Hong Kong. See also: Bilingualism in Hong Kong.
- ^ The name was often written as Hongkong until the government adopted the current form in 1926 (Hongkong Government Gazette, Notification 479, 3 September 1926). Nevertheless, some century-old organisations still use the name, such as the Hongkong Post, Hongkong Electric and The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. While the names of most Chinese place names are romanised into English using Pinyin, the official English name is Hong Kong rather than the pinyin Xianggang.
- ^ Section 3(2) of the Sino-British Joint Declaration states in part, "The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which, are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government."
- ^ Section 3(5) of the Sino-British Joint Declaration states that the social and economic systems and lifestyle in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and mentions rights and freedoms ensured by law. Section 3(12) states in part, "The above-stated basic policies of the People's Republic of China ... will remain unchanged for 50 years."
- ^ The results of the 2006 census showed that the "white" population had declined from 46,584 in 2001 to 36,384, a decline of 22 percent.[158]
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- ^ Thomson, John (1873). Illustrations of China and Its People. Sampson Low, Marston, Low, and Searle. p. 96.
- ^ Cavaliero, Eric (24 July 1997). "Grand old lady to turn 110". The Standard. http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=&art_id=52189&sid=&con_type=1&d_str=19970724&sear_year=1997. Retrieved 1 September 2010.
- ^ Gold, Anne (6 July 2001). "Hong Kong's Mile-Long Escalator System Elevates the Senses : A Stairway to Urban Heaven". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/06/style/06iht-trhk_ed2_.html?scp=7&sq=hong%20kong%20escalator%20System%20Stairway&st=cse. Retrieved 22 October 2010.
- ^ a b "About Us". Hong Kong International Airport. Archived from the original on 21 August 2007. http://web.archive.org/web/20070821101759/http://www.hongkongairport.com/eng/aboutus/index.html. Retrieved 28 April 2008.
- ^ "International travellers have voted Hong Kong the best airport in the world". Skytrax. 8 August 2007. http://www.airlinequality.com/news/080807-Awards.htm. Retrieved 28 April 2008.
- ^ "Air Cargo and Aviation Logistic Services". Hong Kong International Airport. p. 1. http://www.hongkongairport.com/eng/pdf/business/about-the-airport/air-cargo/AirCargo_brochure.pdf. Retrieved 31 August 2010.
Further reading[link]
- Endacott, G. B (1964). An Eastern Entrepot;: A Collection of Documents Illustrating the History of Hong Kong. Her Majesty's Stationary Office. p. 293. ASIN B0007J07G6.
- Fu, Poshek; Deser, David (2002). The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Arts, Identity. Cambridge University Press. p. 346. ISBN 978-0-521-77602-8.
- Lui, Adam Yuen-chung (1990). Forts and Pirates – A History of Hong Kong. Hong Kong History Society. p. 114. ISBN 962-7489-01-8.
- Liu, Shuyong; Wang, Wenjiong; Chang, Mingyu (1997). An Outline History of Hong Kong. Foreign Languages Press. p. 291. ISBN 978-7-119-01946-8.
- Ngo, Tak-Wing (1 August 1999). Hong Kong's History: State and Society Under Colonial Rule. Routledge. p. 205. ISBN 978-0-415-20868-0.
- Tsang, Steve (1995). Government and Politics: A Documentary History of Hong Kong. Hong Kong University Press. p. 312. ISBN 962-209-392-2.
- Tsang, Steve (4 September 2007). A Modern History of Hong Kong. I. B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-84511-419-0.
- Welsh, Frank (1993). A Borrowed place: the history of Hong Kong. Kodansha International. p. 624. ISBN 978-1-56836-002-7.
External links[link]
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- Hong Kong at Encyclopædia Britannica
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- Key Development Forecasts for Hong Kong from International Futures
- Government
- Discover Hong Kong – Official site of the Hong Kong Tourism Board
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