United Nations Security Council مجلس أمن الأمم المتحدة (Arabic) 联合国安全理事会 (Chinese) Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (French) Совет Безопасности Организации Объединённых Наций (Russian) Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas (Spanish)
UN Security Council Chamber in New York, also known as the Norwegian Room
Org type	Principal Organ
Head	Rotates between members
Status	Active
Established	1946
Website	http://un.org/sc/

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the principal organs of the United Nations and is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Its powers, outlined in the United Nations Charter, include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action. Its powers are exercised through United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House, Westminster, London. Since its first meeting, the Council, which exists in continuous session, has travelled widely, holding meetings in many cities, such as Paris and Addis Ababa, as well as at its current permanent home at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City.

There are 15 members of the Security Council, consisting of five veto-wielding permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—based on the great powers that were the victors of World War II,^[1] and 10 elected non-permanent members with two-year terms. This basic structure is set out in Chapter V of the UN Charter. Security Council members must always be present at UN headquarters in New York so that the Security Council can meet at any time. This requirement of the United Nations Charter was adopted to address a weakness of the League of Nations since that organization was often unable to respond quickly to a crisis.

Members[link]

Permanent members[link]

The Security Council's five permanent members have the power to veto any substantive resolution:

Country	Current representative	Current state representation	Former state representation
China	Li Baodong[2]	People's Republic of China (1971–present)	Republic of China (1946–1971)
France	Gérard Araud[2]	France (1946–present)	—
Russia	Vitaly Churkin[2]	Russian Federation (1992–present)	Soviet Union (1946–1991)
United Kingdom	Sir Mark Lyall Grant[2]	United Kingdom (1946–present)	—
United States	Susan Rice[2]	United States (1946–present)	—

At the UN's founding in 1946, the five permanent members of the Security Council were the French Republic, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union. There have been two seat changes since then, although not reflected in Article 23 of the United Nations Charter as it has not been accordingly amended:

Leaders of the five permanent member states at a summit in 2000. Clockwise from front left: Chinese President Jiang Zemin, U.S. President Bill Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and French President Jacques Chirac.

• China's seat was originally held by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government, known as the "Republic of China." However, the Nationalists were forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan in 1949, during the Chinese Civil War. The Communist government was left in control of mainland China, henceforth known as the "People's Republic of China." In 1971, Resolution 2758 recognized the People's Republic as the rightful representative of China in the UN and gave it the seat on the Security Council that had been held by the Republic of China, which was expelled from the UN altogether. Both governments still officially claim one another's territory, however only a few small nations continue to officially recognize Taiwan's sovereignty.
• After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia was recognized as the legal successor state of the Soviet Union and maintained the latter's position on the Security Council.

Additionally, France reformed its government into the French Fifth Republic in 1959, under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle. France maintained its seat as there was no change in its international status or recognition, although many of its overseas possessions eventually became independent.

The five permanent members of the Security Council were the victorious powers in World War II and have maintained the world's most powerful military forces ever since. They annually top the list of countries with the highest military expenditures; in 2011, they spent over US$1 trillion combined on defense, accounting for over 60% of global military expenditures (the U.S. alone accounting for over 40%). They are also the only countries officially recognized as "nuclear-weapon states" under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), though there are other states known or believed to be in possession of nuclear weapons.

Non-permanent members[link]

Ten other members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms starting on 1 January, with five replaced each year. The members are chosen by regional groups and confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly. To be approved, a candidate must receive at least 2/3 of all votes cast for that seat, which can result in deadlock if there are two roughly evenly matched candidates; in 1979, a standoff between Cuba and Colombia only ended after three months and 154 rounds of voting, when both withdrew in favor of Mexico as a compromise candidate.^[3]

The African bloc is represented by three members; the Latin America and the Caribbean, Asian, and Western European and Others blocs by two members each; and the Eastern European bloc by one member. Also, one of the members is an "Arab country," alternately from the Asian or African bloc.^[4] Currently, elections for terms beginning in even-numbered years select two African members, and one each within Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Additionally, the Arab state is represented in this group (Libya within Africa in 2008, Lebanon within Asia in 2010). Terms beginning in odd-numbered years consist of two Western European and Other members, and one within each of Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa.

The current elected members, with the regions they were elected to represent and their Permanent Representatives, are:

1 January 2011 – 31 December 2012 Country Regional bloc(s) Permanent Representative  Colombia Latin America and Caribbean Néstor Osorio Londoño  Germany Western Europe and Other Peter Wittig  India Asia Hardeep Singh Puri  Portugal Western Europe and Other José Filipe Moraes Cabral  South Africa Africa Baso Sangqu

1 January 2012 – 31 December 2013 Country Regional bloc(s) Permanent Representative  Azerbaijan Eastern Europe Agshin Mehdiyev  Guatemala Latin America and Caribbean Gert Rosenthal  Morocco Africa and Arab Group Mohammed Loulichki  Pakistan Asia Abdullah Hussain Haroon  Togo Africa Kodjo Menan

President[link]

The role of president of the Security Council involves setting the agenda, presiding at its meetings and overseeing any crisis. The President is authorized to issue both presidential statements (subject to consensus among Council members) and notes,^[5][6] which are used to make declarations of intent that the full Security Council can then pursue.^[6] The Presidency rotates monthly in alphabetical order of the Security Council member nations' names in English.^[7]

Veto power[link]

Number of resolutions vetoed by each of the five permanent members of the Security Council between 1946 and 2007.^[8]

Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, Security Council decisions on all substantive matters require the affirmative votes of nine members. A negative vote, or veto, also known as the rule of "great power unanimity", by a permanent member prevents adoption of a proposal, even if it has received the required number of affirmative votes (9). Abstention is not regarded as a veto despite the wording of the Charter. Since the Security Council's inception, China (ROC/PRC) has used its veto 6 times; France 18 times; Russia/USSR 123 times; the United Kingdom 32 times; and the United States 82 times. The majority of Russian/Soviet vetoes were in the first ten years of the Council's existence. Since 1984, China and France have vetoed three resolutions each; Russia/USSR four; the United Kingdom ten; and the United States 43.

Procedural matters are not subject to a veto, so the veto cannot be used to avoid discussion of an issue. The same holds for certain decisions that directly regard permanent members.

Role[link]

Under Chapter Six of the Charter, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", the Security Council "may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute". The Council may "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" if it determines that the situation might endanger international peace and security. These recommendations are not binding on UN members.

Under Chapter Seven, the Council has broader power to decide what measures are to be taken in situations involving "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression". In such situations, the Council is not limited to recommendations but may take action, including the use of armed force "to maintain or restore international peace and security". This was the legal basis for UN armed action in Korea in 1950 during the Korean War and the use of coalition forces in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991 and Libya in 2011. Decisions taken under Chapter Seven, such as economic sanctions, are binding on UN members.

Then-United States Secretary of State Colin Powell holds a model vial of anthrax while giving a presentation to the United Nations Security Council in February 2003. Foreign ministers and heads of government sometimes appear in the UNSC in person to discuss issues.

The UN's role in international collective security is defined by the UN Charter, which gives the Security Council the power to:

• Investigate any situation threatening international peace;
• Recommend procedures for peaceful resolution of a dispute;
• Call upon other member nations to completely or partially interrupt economic relations as well as sea, air, postal, and radio communications, or to sever diplomatic relations;
• Enforce its decisions militarily, or by any means necessary;
• Avoid conflict and maintain focus on cooperation.

They also recommend the new Secretary-General to the General Assembly.^[9]

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recognizes that the Security Council has authority to refer cases to the Court, where the Court could not otherwise exercise jurisdiction.^[10] The Council exercised this power for the first time in March 2005, when it referred to the Court “the situation prevailing in Darfur since 1 July 2002”;^[11] since Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, the Court could not otherwise have exercised jurisdiction. The Security Council made its second such referral in February 2011 when it asked the ICC to investigate the Libyan government's violent response to the 2011 uprising.

Responsibility to protect[link]

Security Council Resolution 1674, adopted on 28 April 2006, "reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity".^[12] The resolution commits the Council to take action to protect civilians in an armed conflict. The Security Council's role in implementing the responsibility to protect is not limited to taking collective action against mass atrocities (pillar three of the responsibility to protect), but it can also make important contributions to structural and operational prevention of genocide, war, crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (pillar two of the responsibility to protect).^[13]

Resolutions[link]

The UN Charter is a multilateral treaty. It is the constitutional document that distributes powers and functions among the various UN organs. It authorizes the Security Council to take action on behalf of the members, and to make decisions and recommendations. The Charter mentions neither binding nor non-binding resolutions. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion in the 1949 "Reparations" case indicated that the United Nations Organization had both explicit and implied powers. The Court cited Articles 104 and 2(5) of the Charter, and noted that the members had granted the Organization the necessary legal authority to exercise its functions and fulfill its purposes as specified or implied in the Charter, and that they had agreed to give the United Nations every assistance in any action taken in accordance with the Charter.^[14]

Article 25 of the Charter says that "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter". The Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, is a UN legal publication that is published by the Secretariat units concerned in accordance with their operational responsibilities and under the guidance of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Charter Repertory. It says that during the United Nations Conference on International Organization which met in San Francisco in 1945, attempts to limit obligations of Members under Article 25 of the Charter to those decisions taken by the Council in the exercise of its specific powers under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter failed. It was stated at the time that those obligations also flowed from the authority conferred on the Council under Article 24(1) to act on the behalf of the members while exercising its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.^[15] Article 24, interpreted in this sense, becomes a source of authority which can be drawn upon to meet situations which are not covered by the more detailed provisions in the succeeding articles.^[16] The Repertory on Article 24 says: "The question whether Article 24 confers general powers on the Security Council ceased to be a subject of discussion following the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice rendered on 21 June 1971 in connection with the question of Namibia (ICJ Reports, 1971, page 16)".^[17]

In exercising its powers the Security Council seldom bothers to cite the particular article or articles of the UN Charter that its decisions are based upon. In cases where none are mentioned, a constitutional interpretation is required.^[18] This sometimes presents ambiguities as to what amounts to a decision as opposed to a recommendation, and also the relevance and interpretation of the phrase "in accordance with the present Charter".^[19]

In the preliminary rulings of the "Lockerbie" cases^[20] the ICJ held that the provisions of the Montreal Convention could be preempted by Security Council resolutions pursuant to Article 25 and Article 103 of the UN Charter. Article 103 provides that in the event of conflicts with other treaty obligations, the members obligations under the Charter prevail. There is consensus that the treaty-based powers of the Security Council are limited to preemption of other treaties. The UN cannot circumvent peremptory norms and its resolutions are subject to judicial review.^[21]

UN Security Council Resolutions
Sources: UN Security Council · UNBISnet · Wikisource
1 to 100 (1946–1953)
101 to 200 (1953–1965)
201 to 300 (1965–1971)
301 to 400 (1971–1976)
401 to 500 (1976–1982)
501 to 600 (1982–1987)
601 to 700 (1987–1991)
701 to 800 (1991–1993)
801 to 900 (1993–1994)
901 to 1000 (1994–1995)
1001 to 1100 (1995–1997)
1101 to 1200 (1997–1998)
1201 to 1300 (1998–2000)
1301 to 1400 (2000–2002)
1401 to 1500 (2002–2003)
1501 to 1600 (2003–2005)
1601 to 1700 (2005–2006)
1701 to 1800 (2006–2008)
1801 to 1900 (2008–2009)
1901 to 2000 (2009–2011)
2001 to 2100 (2011–present)
Wikisource has original text related to this article: Portal:United Nations Security Council Resolutions

Security Council Resolutions are legally binding if they are made under Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the Charter.

There is a general agreement among legal scholars outside the organization that resolutions made under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are not legally binding.^{[22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30]} One argument is that since they have no enforcement mechanism, except self-help, they may not be legally binding.^[31] Some States give constitutional or special legal status to the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions. In such cases non-recognition regimes or other sanctions can be implemented under the provisions of the laws of the individual member states.^[32]

The Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs was established because "Records of the cumulating practice of international organizations may be regarded as evidence of customary international law with reference to States' relations to the organizations."^[33] The repertory cites the remarks made by the representative of Israel, Mr Eban, regarding a Chapter VI resolution. He maintained that the Security Council's resolution of 1 September 1951 possessed, within the meaning of Article 25, a compelling force beyond that pertaining to any resolution of any other organ of the United Nations, in his view the importance of the resolution had to be envisaged in the light of Article 25, under which the decisions of the Council on matters affecting international peace and security assumed an obligatory character for all Member States. The Egyptian representative disagreed.^[34]

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali related that during a press conference his remarks about a "non-binding" resolution started a dispute. His assistant released a hasty clarification which only made the situation worse. It said that the Secretary had only meant to say that Chapter VI contains no means of insuring compliance and that resolutions adopted under its terms are not enforceable. When the Secretary finally submitted the question to the UN Legal Advisor, the response was a long memo the bottom line of which read, in capital letters: "NO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CAN BE DESCRIBED AS UNENFORCEABLE." The Secretary said "I got the message."^[35]

Prof. Jared Schott explains that "Though certainly possessing judicial language, without the legally binding force of Chapter VII, such declarations were at worst political and at best advisory".^[36]

In 1971, a majority of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) members in the Namibia advisory opinion held that the resolution contained legal declarations that were made while the Council was acting on behalf of the members in accordance with Article 24. The Court also said that an interpretation of the charter that limits the domain of binding decision only to those taken under Chapter VII would render Article 25 "superfluous, since this [binding] effect is secured by Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter", and that the "language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect".^[37] The ICJ judgment has been criticized by Erika De Wet and others.^[38] De Wet argues that Chapter VI resolutions cannot be binding. Her reasoning, in part states:

Allowing the Security Council to adopt binding measures under Chapter VI would undermine the structural division of competencies foreseen by Chapters VI and VII, respectively. The whole aim of separating these chapters is to distinguish between voluntary and binding measures. Whereas the pacific settlement of disputes provided by the former is underpinned by the consent of the parties, binding measures in terms of Chapter VII are characterized by the absence of such consent. A further indication of the non-binding nature of measures taken in terms of Chapter VI is the obligation on members of the Security Council who are parties to a dispute, to refrain from voting when resolutions under Chapter VI are adopted. No similar obligation exists with respect to binding resolutions adopted under Chapter VII... If one applies this reasoning to the Namibia opinion, the decisive point is that none of the Articles under Chapter VI facilitate the adoption of the type of binding measures that were adopted by the Security Council in Resolution 276(1970)... Resolution 260(1970) was indeed adopted in terms of Chapter VII, even though the ICJ went to some length to give the opposite impression.^[39]

Others disagree with this interpretation. Professor Stephen Zunes asserts that "[t]his does not mean that resolutions under Chapter VI are merely advisory, however. These are still directives by the Security Council and differ only in that they do not have the same stringent enforcement options, such as the use of military force".^[40] Former President of the International Court of Justice Rosalyn Higgins argues that the location of Article 25, outside of Chapter VI and VII and with no reference to either, suggests its application is not limited to Chapter VII decisions.^[41] She asserts that the Travaux préparatoires to the UN Charter "provide some evidence that Article 25 was not intended to be limited to Chapter VII, or inapplicable to Chapter VI."^[42] She argues that early state practice into what resolutions UN members considered binding has been somewhat ambiguous, but seems to "rely not upon whether they are to be regarded as "Chapter VI or "Chapter VII" resolutions [...] but upon whether the parties intended them to be "decisions" or "recommendations" ... One is left with the view that in certain limited, and perhaps rare, cases a binding decision may be taken under Chapter VI".^[43] She supports the view of the ICJ that "clearly regarded Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII as lex specialis while Article 24 contained the lex generalis ... [and] that resolutions validly adopted under Article 24 were binding on the membership as a whole".^[44]

Those resolutions made dealing with the internal governance of the organization (such as the admission of new Member States) are legally binding where the Charter gives the Security Council power to make them.

If the council cannot reach consensus or a passing vote on a resolution, they may choose to produce a non-binding presidential statement instead of a Resolution. These are adopted by consensus. They are meant to apply political pressure — a warning that the council is paying attention and further action may follow.

Press statements typically accompany both resolutions and presidential statements, carrying the text of the document adopted by the body and also some explanatory text. They may also be released independently, after a significant meeting.

Criticism[link]

This article may be unbalanced towards certain viewpoints. Please improve the article by adding information on neglected viewpoints, or discuss the issue on the talk page. (August 2010)

It has been argued^{[by whom?]} that the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, who are all nuclear powers, have created an exclusive nuclear club that predominately addresses the strategic interests and political motives of the permanent members; for example, protecting the oil-rich Kuwaitis in 1991 but poorly protecting resource-poor Rwandans in 1994.^[45]. Since 60% of the permanent members are also European, and 80% predominantly white Western nations, the Security Council has been described as a pillar of global apartheid by Titus Alexander, former Chair of Westminster United Nations Association. ^[46]

Another criticism^{[by whom?]} of the Security Council involves the veto power of the five permanent nations. The veto power was adopted at the insistence of the Soviet Union and the United States after World War II. According to the by-rules of the UN, a “no” vote by any one permanent Security Council member is enough to strike down any given proposal. The “no” vote is the same as a veto. Permanent members often use this veto power to strike down measures that run contrary to their individual national interests. For example, the People's Republic of China, which, in 1971, replaced the Republic of China as a permanent Security Council member, has vetoed sparingly, but always and only on issues relating to Chinese national interests. In another example, in the first ten years of the UN's existence, Russia was responsible for 79 vetoes—more than half of all the vetoes cast during that period—and cast them to dispute the U.S.'s refusal to admit all of the Soviet Republics as member states of the UN. In another example of the use of the veto power to advance national interests, between 1982 and today, the U.S. vetoed 32 Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel.^[47] Due to the immense power of the veto, permanent members often now meet privately and then present their resolutions to the full council, which critics from the Global Policy Forum characterise as a fait accompli.^[48]

The Security Council's effectiveness and relevance is questioned^{[by whom?]} because, in most high-profile cases, there are essentially no consequences for violating a Security Council resolution. During the Darfur crisis, Janjaweed militias, allowed by elements of the Sudanese government, committed violence against an indigenous population, killing thousands of civilians. In the Srebrenica massacre, Serbian troops committed genocide against Bosniaks, although Srebrenica had been declared a UN “safe area” and was even “protected” by 400 armed Dutch peacekeepers.^[49] The UN Charter gives all three powers of the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches to the Security Council.^[50]

Another criticism, posed by alternative-media researcher Anup Shah, is that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are five of the top ten largest arms exporting countries in the world.^[51]

The amount of time devoted to the Israeli-Arab conflict in the UNSC has been described as excessive by some pro-Israel political organizations such as the UN Watch^[52] and the Anti-Defamation League,^[53] and academics such as Alan Dershowitz,^[54] Martin Kramer, and Mitchell Bard. This “excessiveness” is partially due to the existence of the Security Council Resolution 1322 (2000), that serves the legal basis for a monthly discussion on this protracted conflict.^[55][56] Paragraph 7 stated that “invites the Secretary-General to continue to follow the situation and to keep the Security Council informed.” In accordance with its general practices, it is considered that this issue has to be dealt on a regular basis (i.e. every month). The resolution was adopted with 14 affirmative votes and one abstention.^[57]

Membership reform[link]

The G4 nations: Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan. Most support one another's bids for permanent seats on the Security Council, though they are heavily opposed by various member nations of the UN.^[58]

There has been discussion of increasing the number of permanent members. The countries who have made the strongest demands for permanent seats are Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan. Japan and Germany, the main defeated powers in WWII, are now the UN's second- and third-largest funders respectively, while Brazil and India are two of the largest contributors of troops to UN-mandated peace-keeping missions. This proposal has found opposition in a group of countries called Uniting for Consensus.

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked a team of advisers to come up with recommendations for reforming the United Nations by the end of 2004. One proposed measure is to increase the number of permanent members by five, which, in most proposals, would include Brazil, Germany, India, Japan (known as the G4 nations), one seat from Africa (most likely between Egypt, Nigeria or South Africa) and/or one seat from the Arab League.^[59] On 21 September 2004, the G4 nations issued a joint statement mutually backing each other's claim to permanent status, together with two African countries. Currently the proposal has to be accepted by two-thirds of the General Assembly (128 votes).

The permanent members, each holding the right of veto, announced their positions on Security Council reform reluctantly. The United States has unequivocally supported the permanent membership of Japan and lent its support to India and a small number of additional non-permanent members. The United Kingdom and France essentially supported the G4 position, with the expansion of permanent and non-permanent members and the accession of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan to permanent member status, as well as an increase in the presence by African countries on the Council. China has supported the stronger representation of developing countries and firmly opposed Japan's membership.^[60]

Chamber[link]

The designated Security Council Chamber in the United Nations Conference Building, designed by the Norwegian architect Arnstein Arneberg, was the specific gift of Norway. The mural painted by the Norwegian artist Per Krohg depicts a phoenix rising from its ashes, symbolic of the world reborn after World War II. In the blue and gold silk tapestry on the walls and in the draperies of the windows overlooking the East River appear the anchor of faith, the wheat stems of hope, and the heart of charity.^{[61][broken citation]}

See also[link]

• Military Staff Committee, a sub-organ of the Security Council
• Reform of the United Nations
• United Nations Department of Political Affairs, provides secretarial support to the Security Council
• United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, a standing committee of the Security Council

References[link]

Further reading[link]

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: United Nations Security Council

• UN Security Council — official site
  • UN Security Council – Background
• Global Policy Forum – UN Security Council
  • Global Policy Forum – veto patterns of the Security Council
• Security Council Report — timely, accurate and objective information and analysis on the Council's activities
• Center for UN Reform Education – objective information on current reform issues at the United Nations
• Verbatim record of the 1st session of the Security Council
• UN Democracy: hyperlinked transcripts of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council
• Hans Köchler, The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security CouncilPDF (238 KB)
• Reform the United Nations website — tracking developments
• History of the United Nations — UK Government
• Who will be the next Secretary General?
• (French) The different projects of reform (G4, Africa Union, United for consensus) (2006)
• UNSC cyberschool

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Lamberto Zannier, born in 1954, is an Italian diplomat who currently serves as the United Nations Special Representative for Kosovo and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), with the rank of UN Undersecretary-General. He was appointed to this position by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in June 2008.^[1] On 30 June 2011, Ambassador Lamberto Zannier was appointed the new Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)] Secretary General through a unanimous Ministerial Council decision by the 56 participating States^[2]. Zannier will take up the post of OSCE Secretary General on 1 July 2011.

Zannier has served for the Foreign Service of Italy for more than 30 years. Before his appointment as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Kosovo, he played a leading role at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a coordinator for EU Foreign Policy and as a Director for EU Security and Defence issues. Between 2002 and 2006, he was Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna. In this capacity, he managed more than 20 civilian field operations in Europe and Central Asia.

From 2000 to 2002, he served as Permanent Representative of Italy to the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague. From 1997 to 2000, he was chairperson of the negotiations on the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. From 1991 to 1997, he served as Head of Disarmament, Arms Control and Cooperative Security at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Previously, he served in Rome, Abu Dhabi and Vienna, mainly specialising in multilateral and security affairs. He has authored several publications on security, conflict prevention and crisis management issues. He is currently member of the Steering Committee of the Centre for International Negotiation and mediation of the Gorizia University. He routinely holds lessons and conferences on international relations and international security.

Zannier obtained a law degree from the University of Trieste.

References[link]

External links[link]

• United Nations Press Release SG/A/1139
• http://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/index.htm

Dore Gold דורי גולד
11th Israel Ambassador to the United Nations
In office 1997–1999
Preceded by	Gad Yaacobi
Succeeded by	Yehuda Lancry

Dore Gold (Hebrew: דורי גולד‎, born 1953) is an Israeli statesman who has served in various diplomatic positions under several Israeli governments. He is the current President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He also served as an advisor to former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his first term in office.

Early life[link]

Dore Gold was born in 1953 in Hartford, Connecticut, in the United States, and was raised in a Conservative Jewish home. His primary education was spent at the Orthodox Yeshiva of Hartford^[1] In the 1970s, Gold attended Northfield Mount Hermon School (Class of 1971) and then enrolled in Columbia University. There Gold earned BA and MA in Political Science, and then a PhD in Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies.^[2]

He studied literary Arabic and specialized in International Law, and his doctoral dissertation was about Saudi Arabia. This research later formed the foundation for his 2003 New York Times bestseller, Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. In the book, Gold argues that Saudi Arabia actively funds terrorism by supporting the enemies of the U.S. and attacking its allies.^[3] Today, Gold lives in Jerusalem with his wife, Ofra, and his two children, Yael and Ariel.

Career[link]

Dore Gold's political career began in 1985 when Gold served as senior research associate at Tel Aviv University's Moshe Dayan Centre for Near East Studies. Later, he was appointed Director of the U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy Project at the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.

Peace Negotiations[link]

In 1991 Gold was an advisor to the Israeli delegation at the Madrid Peace Conference. From June 1996 to June 1997 he served as Foreign Policy Adviser to former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.^[4] During the period in which Benjamin Netanyahu served as the head of the Israeli opposition, Gold was instrumental in forging the relationship between the Likud Party leadership and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in response to the strategic ties that were growing between Israel's Labor government and the PLO under Yasser Arafat. Gold accompanied Netanyahu to meetings with the Jordanian leadership in 1994 and 1995 in London, Amman, and in Aqaba. As the Foreign Policy Adviser under Netanyahu after the 1996 elections, Gold worked with the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan and others in the Arab world. He was also involved in negotiations leading up to the Hebron Agreement and the Note for the Record.

East Jerusalem and the Oslo Accords[link]

Gold himself has not written about the period in which he served as an envoy to the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world; nonetheless, a number of revelations have been disclosed by other authors. According to Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Gold and Netanyahu advisor Yitzhak Molcho were the first envoys of the newly-elected Likud government to meet with Yasser Arafat in the Gaza Strip on June 27, 1996.^[5] Dennis Ross relates to the "Abu-Mazen-Dore Gold" talks that ensued afterwards as a result of which the Palestinians closed down offices in East Jerusalem that Israel had argued were a violation of the Oslo Accords.^[6] This was the price that Arafat had to pay for his first meeting with Netanyahu. It was a hard concession for the Palestinians, according to Ross, for it was viewed by them as a "symbolic retreat on East Jerusalem."

Syria and the Golan Heights[link]

On the Syrian negotiating track, former Israeli ambassador to the US, Itamar Rabinovich, describes how he concluded with Gold an understanding over the Monitoring Group for Southern Lebanon, which was followed by a direct discussion between Gold and the Syrian ambassador to the US, Walid Muallam.^[7] According to the French journalist, Charles Enderline, Gold secured a commitment from Secretary of State Warren Christopher that the Rabin "deposit" on the future of the Golan Heights did not bind the State of Israel. This effort also included obtaining a new US commitment from the Clinton administration to the September 1975 Ford letter, in which it was stated that the US would give great weight to Israel remaining on the Golan Heights.^[8] According to the Israeli Hebrew daily, Maariv, Christopher wrote this re-newed commitment in a formal letter of assurances to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 19, 1996.^[9]

Ambassador to the United Nations[link]

From 1997 to 1999 Gold was the Israeli ambassador to the United Nations. In 1998 Gold served as a member of the Israeli delegation at the Wye River negotiations between Israel, the PLO, and then U.S. President Bill Clinton at the Wye River Plantation in Maryland.

Later life[link]

Since 2000 Gold has served as president of the non-profit institute, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. From 2001 to 2003 Gold served as an advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, most notably at the Aqaba Summit with President George W. Bush. During this period, Gold regularly appeared on US network television programs on behalf of the Sharon government, including Meet the Press, The Today Show, CNN's Late Edition, as well as on Fox and Friends. In July 2003, Gold testified as an expert before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on Saudi Arabia's alleged role in providing ideological and financial support for international terrorism.

Measures Against Ahmadinejad[link]

Since 2006 Gold led an international effort by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs to advocate that UN member states take legal measures against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran on grounds that he violated the anti-incitement clauses of the 1948 Genocide Convention, with his repeated statements about "wiping Israel off the map." Gold led a delegation to a conference held jointly with the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations at the New York County Bar Association on December 14, 2006. Speakers included former Canadian Justice Minister Irwin Cotler, Prof. Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School, and the US ambassador to the UN John Bolton. Senator Hillary Clinton sent a letter of support to the conference.

Gold led an Israeli delegation to a second conference at the British House of Commons on January 25, 2007 which was chaired by Lord David Trimble and supported by members of the British Labor Party and the Conservative Party. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu joined the Israeli team. As a result of this effort, over 60 members of the House of Commons called for the indictment of Ahmadinejad. A third event organized by Gold and the International Association of Genocide Scholars was held on September 23, 2008 in Washington D.C. Speaking at the third conference was Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, former US ambassador to the UN, as well as Salih Mahmoud Osman, a member of the Sudanese Parliament and advocate for human rights in Darfur.^[10]

The Doha Debates[link]

In April 2009 Gold participated in the Doha Debates at Georgetown University in Washington DC, where he debated against the motion "this house believes that it is time for the USA to get tough on Israel" with fellow speaker Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz. Speakers for the motion were Avraham Burg, former Chairman of the Jewish Agency for Israel and former Speaker of the Knesset and Michael Scheuer, former Chief of the CIA Bin Laden Issue Station. Gold and Dershowitz lost the debate, with 63% of the audience voting for the motion.^[11]

Debate with Justice Richard Goldstone[link]

Brandeis University invited Gold to debate Justice Richard Goldstone on November 5, 2009. The subject was the U.N. Gaza Report. Jeff Jacoby wrote in the Boston Globe on November 7: "Dore Gold, Israel's former ambassador to the U.N. brought facts and figures, maps and photographs, audio and video in English, Arabic, and Hebrew. Last night's encounter marked the first time Goldstone publicly debated the report's merits with a leading Israeli figure. It would not surprise me that he is in no hurry for a second." In the Israeli daily, Maariv, Ben Dror Yemini wrote on November 7: "The former Israeli Ambassador to the U.N. was prepared and articulate in the debate." Goldstone refused to debate with any more Israelis for at least two years afterwards.^{[citation needed]}

Appearing at the International Criminal Court in the Hague[link]

Ambassador Gold was invited to attend a roundtable meeting at the office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in the Hague, held on October 20, 2010. A total of eight specialists appeared and submitted papers. They discussed the Palestinian Authority's declaration on January 22, 2009 recognizing the jurisdiction of the ICC, in accordance with an article in the Rome Stature, normally reserved for states. The PA was seeking the implicit recognition of the ICC Prosecutor that it already was a state.

Reactions[link]

Harris Schoenberg, Director of UN Affairs for Bnai Brith[link]

"He was forceful, he was eloquent. He was dramatic," said the director of United Nations affairs for Bnai Brith, Harris Schoenberg, on Ambassador Gold's maiden address at the UN^[12]

[edit] A.M. Rosenthal, New York Times

Writing in his weekly column on Israel not belonging to a regional group in the U.N., New York Times op-ed writer and former editor, A.M. Rosenthal, noted on October 8, 1999: "Dore Gold, leaving soon after a tour of duty as one of the best U.N. representatives Israel ever had, points out that membership in regional groups is a requirement for nomination to the Security Council."

Prince Bandar bin Sultan[link]

In response to Dore Gold's testimony before the United States House of Representatives International Relations Subcommittee, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Ambassador to the United States, remarked, "It should be known that Dore Gold is not an expert on Saudi society, faith or culture. He is simply hatred's scribe.^[13]

Positions held[link]

• 1985-1996 - Senior research associate, Dayan Centre for Near East Studies. Director, US Foreign and Defense Policy Project at the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.
• 1991 - Advisor, Madrid Peace Conference.
• 1996-1997 - Foreign policy advisor, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
• 1997-1999 - Israeli ambassador, United Nations
• 1998 - Israeli delegation, Wye River negotiations
• 2000–Present - President, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
• 2002-2004 - Advisor, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon

Publications[link]

Books[link]

• The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West (Regnery, 2009). ISBN 1-59698-571-2
• The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City (ISBN 0786147849 / Publisher: Regnery, Blackstone Audiobooks / Date: Jan 2007)
• Tower of Babble: How the United Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos (Crown Forum, November, 2004). ISBN 1-4000-5475-3
• Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism (Regnery, 2003). ISBN 0-89526-135-9
• American Military Strategy in the Middle East: The Implications of the US Regional Command Structure (CENTCOM) For Israel (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publications), 1993.
• Israel as an American Non-NATO Ally: Parameters of Defense and Industrial Cooperation (Boulder: Westview Press), 1992.

Selected articles[link]

• 'Land Swaps' and the 1967 Lines. The Weekly Standard. June 20, 2011.
• Israel's 1967 Borders Aren't Defensible. The Wall Street Journal. May 21, 2011.
• Countdown to September. Jerusalem Viewpoints. May, 2011.
• Foreign Policy. April, 2011.
• Statement before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives . April 5, 2011.
• The International Context of the U.S. Veto at the UN Security Council . Makor Rishon. February 25, 2011.
• Israel’s Naval Blockade of Gaza Is Legal, Necessary . Bloomberg. June 10, 2010.
• Iran's Nuclear Aspirations Threaten the World. LA Times. August 6, 2009.
• Israel's Forgotten Rights in Jerusalem. Haaretz. May, 2009.
• Did Israel use "Disproportionate Force" in Gaza?. JCPA. December 28, 2008.
• The Dangers of 'Peace' Making: America's Latest Efforts Merely Entrenched al Qaeda in the Gaza Strip. Wall Street Journal. August 12, 2007.
• Wartime Witch Hunt: Blaming Israel for the Iraq War. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. June 1, 2004.
• Saudi Arabia's Dubious Denials of Involvement in International Terrorism. Jerusalem Viewpoints. Oct 1, 2003.
• Saudi Support for International Terrorism. U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. July 31, 2003.
• The Kingdom of Incitement. Wall Street Journal. April 14, 2003.
• Baseless Comparisons: UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq and Israel (Jerusalem Issue Brief, 24 September 2002).
• Only Buffer Zones Can Protect Israel. The New York Times. Feb 27, 2002.

References[link]

External links[link]

• Dore Gold's Personal Website
• Biography of Dore Gold from the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
• Biography of Dore Gold from the Jewish Virtual Library
• Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
• Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
• Prince Bandar responds to remarks by former Israeli official (Saudi Arabia Embassy press release)
• Dore Gold interviewed for the Jerusalem Post

Alan Dershowitz
Born	Alan Morton Dershowitz (1938-09-01) September 1, 1938 (age 73) Brooklyn, New York
Nationality	American
Ethnicity	Jewish
Education	Brooklyn College (A.B.) Yale Law School (LL.B)
Occupation	Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School
Spouse	1. Sue Barlach 2. Carolyn Cohen
Parents	Harry and Claire Dershowitz
Website
www.alandershowitz.com

Alan Morton Dershowitz (born September 1, 1938) is an American lawyer, jurist, and political commentator. He has spent most of his career at Harvard Law School where in 1967, at the age of 28, he became the youngest full professor of law in its history. He has held the Felix Frankfurter professorship there since 1993.^[1]

Dershowitz is known for his involvement in several high-profile legal cases and as a commentator on the Arab–Israeli conflict. As a criminal appellate lawyer, he has won 13 of the 15 murder and attempted murder cases he has handled, and has represented a series of celebrity clients, including Mike Tyson, Patty Hearst, and Jim Bakker.^[2] His most notable cases include his role in 1984 in overturning the conviction of Claus von Bülow for the attempted murder of his wife, Sunny, and as the appellate adviser for the defense in the O.J. Simpson trial in 1995.^[3]

A political liberal,^[4][5][6][7] he is the author of a number of books about politics and law, including Reversal of Fortune: Inside the von Bülow Case (1985), the basis of the 1990 film; Chutzpah (1991); Reasonable Doubts: The Criminal Justice System and the O.J. Simpson Case (1996); the best-selling The Case for Israel (2003); Rights From Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights (2004)^[8] and The Case for Peace (2005).

Early life[link]

Dershowitz was born in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, to Harry and Claire Dershowitz, an Orthodox Jewish couple, and was raised in Borough Park.^[9] His father was a founder and president of the Young Israel Synagogue in the 1960s, served on the board of directors of the Etz Chaim School in Borough Park, and in retirement was co-owner of the Manhattan-based Merit Sales Company.^[10] According to Dershowitz, Harry had a strong sense of justice and talked about how it was "the Jew's job to defend the underdog."^[11]

Dershowitz's first job was at a deli factory on Manhattan's Lower East Side in 1952, at age 14. He recalls tying the strings that separated the hot dogs and once getting locked in the freezer.^[12] He attended Yeshiva University High School, where he played on the basketball team. He was a rebellious student, often criticized by his teachers. The school's career placement center told him he had talent and was capable of becoming an advertising executive, funeral director, or salesman. He later said his teachers told him to do something that "requires a big mouth and no brain ... so I became a lawyer."^[13] After graduating from high school, he attended Brooklyn College and received his A.B. in 1959. Next he attended Yale Law School, where he was editor-in-chief of the Yale Law Journal,^[9] and graduated first in his class with a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) in 1962.^[1] He has been a member of a Conservative minyan at Harvard Hillel, but is now a secular Jew.^[14] He is married to Carolyn Cohen and has three children.^[15]

Career[link]

After being admitted to the bar, Dershowitz served as a clerk for David L. Bazelon, the chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. He said that "Bazelon was my best and worst boss at once ... He worked me to the bone; he didn't hesitate to call at 2 a.m. He taught me everything—how to be a civil libertarian, a Jewish activist, a mensch. He was halfway between a slave master and a father figure." During the 1963–1964 term, he served as law clerk for the Supreme Court Associate Justice Arthur Goldberg. He told Tom Van Riper of Forbes that getting a Supreme Court clerkship was probably his second big break; his first was when, at age 14 or 15, a camp counselor told him he was smart but that his mind operated a little differently.^[12] He joined the faculty of Harvard Law School as an assistant professor in 1964, and was made a full professor in 1967 at the age of 28, at that time the youngest full professor of law in the school's history.^[16] He was appointed Felix Frankfurter professor of law in 1993.^[1]

Much of his legal career has focused on criminal law, and his clients have included high-profile figures such as Patty Hearst, Harry Reems, Leona Helmsley, Jim Bakker, Mike Tyson, Michael Milken, O.J. Simpson and Kirtanananda Swami. He sees himself as a "lawyer of last resort"—someone to turn to when the defendant has few other legal options—and takes those cases that are what he calls "the most challenging, the most difficult and precedent-setting cases."^[15] He is currently advising Julian Assange's legal team.^[17]

Recognition[link]

Dershowitz has been described by Newsweek as America's "most peripatetic civil liberties lawyer and one of its most distinguished defenders of individual rights."^[1] He was named a Guggenheim Fellow in 1979, and in 1983 received the William O. Douglas First Amendment Award from the Anti-Defamation League for his work on civil rights.^[18] In November 2007, he was awarded the Soviet Jewry Freedom Award by the Russian Jewish Community Foundation.^[19] In December 2011, he was awarded the Menachem Begin Award of Honor by the Menachem Begin Heritage Center at an event co-sponsored by NGO Monitor.^[20] He has been awarded honorary doctorates in law from Yeshiva University, the Hebrew Union College, Monmouth University, University of Haifa, Syracuse University, Fitchburg State College, Bar-Ilan University, and Brooklyn College.^[1] In addition, he is a member of the International Advisory Board of NGO Monitor.^[21]

Cases[link]

Pornography (1976)[link]

In 1976, Dershowitz handled the successful appeal of Harry Reems, who had been convicted of distribution of obscenity resulting from his acting in the pornographic movie Deep Throat. In public debates, Dershowitz commonly argues against censorship of pornography on First Amendment grounds, and maintains that consumption of pornography is not harmful.^[22]

Claus von Bülow (1984)[link]

Dershowitz represented Claus von Bülow, a British socialite, at appeal for the attempted murder of his wife, Sunny von Bülow, who died in 2008 after going into a coma in Newport, Rhode Island in 1980. He had the conviction overturned, and von Bülow was acquitted in a retrial.^[23] Dershowitz told the story of the case in his book, Reversal of Fortune: Inside the von Bülow case (1985), which was turned into a movie in 1990. Dershowitz was played by actor Ron Silver, and Dershowitz himself had a cameo role as a judge.

Józef Glemp (1989)[link]

In 1989, Dershowitz filed a defamation suit against Cardinal Józef Glemp, then Archbishop of Warsaw, on behalf of Rabbi Avi Weiss. Glemp had accused Weiss and six other New York Jews of attacking nuns at a much-disputed convent on the site of the Auschwitz concentration camp. Glemp's statement about Weiss, made in July 1989, was coupled with suggestions that Jews control the world's news media. Dershowitz's account of the lawsuit appears in his book Chutzpah (1991).^[24]

Mike Barnicle (1990)[link]

Dershowitz sued The Boston Globe in 1990 over a remark reporter Mike Barnicle attributed to him, in which Dershowitz allegedly said he preferred Asian women because they are deferential to men. Dershowitz reportedly received a $75,000 out-of-court settlement and the newspaper's ombudsman questioned Barnicle's credibility, according to The Boston Phoenix.^[25]

O.J. Simpson (1995)[link]

O.J. Simpson murder case Dershowitz acted as an appellate adviser to O.J. Simpson's defense team during the trial, and later wrote a book about it, Reasonable Doubts: The Criminal Justice System and the O.J. Simpson Case (1996). He wrote: "the Simpson case will not be remembered in the next century. It will not rank as one of the trials of the century. It will not rank with the Nuremberg trials, the Rosenberg trial, Sacco and Vanzetti. It is on par with Leopold and Loeb and the Lindbergh case, all involving celebrities. It is also not one of the most important cases of my own career. I would rank it somewhere in the middle in terms of interest and importance."^[26] The case has been described as the most publicized criminal trial in American history.^[27]

Jeffrey Epstein (2006)[link]

Dershowitz provided legal assistance to friend and reported billionaire Jeffrey Epstein, who was investigated following accusations that he had repeatedly solicited sex from minors. Dershowitz investigated some of Epstein's accusers and provided both the police and the State attorney’s office with a dossier containing information about their personal behavior, which had been obtained from their personal MySpace pages, including allegations of alcohol and drug use. Eventually, in 2008, Epstein plead guilty to a single state charge of soliciting prostitution and began serving an 18-month sentence.^[28]

Views[link]

On Israel[link]

While Dershowitz is a leading supporter of Israel, Dershowitz self-identifies as "Pro-Israel and Pro-Palestine".^[29] Dershowitz engaged in highly publicized debates with a number of other commentators, including Meir Kahane, Noam Chomsky, and Norman Finkelstein. When former U.S. President Jimmy Carter had his book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (2006) published—in which he argues that Israel's control of Palestinian land is the primary obstacle to peace—Dershowitz challenged Carter to a debate at Brandeis University. Carter declined, saying, "I don't want to have a conversation even indirectly with Dershowitz. There is no need to debate somebody who, in my opinion, knows nothing about the situation in Palestine."^[30] Carter did address Brandeis in January 2007, but only Brandeis students and staff were allowed to attend. Dershowitz was invited to respond on the same stage only after Carter had left.^[31]

He also took part in the Doha Debates at Georgetown University in April 2009, where he spoke against the motion "this House believes it's time for the US to get tough on Israel," with Dore Gold, President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Speakers for the motion were Avraham Burg, former Chairman of the Jewish Agency for Israel and former Speaker of the Knesset; and Michael Scheuer, former Chief of the CIA Bin Laden Issue Station. Dershowitz's side lost the debate, with 63 percent of the audience voting for the motion.^[32]

Harvard-MIT divestment petition[link]

Randall Adams of The Harvard Crimson writes that, in the spring of 2002, a petition within Harvard calling for Harvard and MIT to divest from Israel and American companies that sell arms to Israel gathered over 600 signatures, including 74 from the Harvard faculty and 56 from the MIT faculty. Among the signatures was that of Harvard's Winthrop House Master Paul D. Hanson, in response to which Dershowitz staged a debate for 200 students in the Winthrop Junior Common Room. He called the petition's signatories antisemitic, bigots, and said they knew nothing about the Middle East. "Your House master is a bigot," he told the students, "and you ought to know that." Adams writes that Dershowitz cited examples of human rights violations in countries that the United States supports, such as the execution of homosexuals in Egypt and the repression of women in Saudi Arabia, and said he would sue any professor who voted against the tenure of another academic because of the candidate's position toward Israel, calling them "ignoramuses with PhDs."^[33]

"New Response to Palestinian Terrorism" (2002)[link]

In March 2002, Dershowitz published an article in The Jerusalem Post entitled "New Response to Palestinian Terrorism." In it, he wrote that Israel should announce a unilateral cessation in retaliation, at the end of which it would "announce precisely what it will do in response to the next act of terrorism. For example, it could announce the first act of terrorism following the moratorium will result in the destruction of a small village which has been used as a base for terrorist operations. The residents would be given 24 hours to leave, and then troops will come in and bulldoze all of the buildings." The list of targets would be made public in advance.^[34] The proposal attracted criticism from within Harvard University and beyond.^[35] James Bamford argued in The Washington Post that it would violate international law.^[36] Norman Finkelstein wrote that "it is hard to make out any difference between the policy Dershowitz advocates and the Nazi destruction of Lidice, for which he expresses abhorrence—except that Jews, not Germans, would be implementing it."^[37]

Mearsheimer and Walt[link]

In March 2006, John Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, co-wrote a paper entitled "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," published in The London Review of Books.^[38] Mearsheimer and Walt criticized what they described as "the Israel lobby" for influencing U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East in a direction away from U.S. interests and toward Israel's interests. They referred to Dershowitz specifically as an "apologist" for the Israel lobby. In an interview in March 2006 for The Harvard Crimson, Dershowitz called the article "one-sided" and its authors "liars" and "bigots."^[39] The following day on MSNBC's Scarborough Country, he suggested the paper had been taken from various hate sites: "every paragraph virtually is copied from a neo-Nazi Web site, from a radical Islamic Web site, from David Duke’s Web site."^[40] Dershowitz subsequently wrote a report challenging the paper, arguing that it contained "three types of major errors: quotations are wrenched out of context, important facts are misstated or omitted, and embarrassingly weak logic is employed."^[41] In a letter in the London Review of Books in May 2006, Mearsheimer and Walt denied that they had used any racist sources for their article, writing that Dershowitz had offered no evidence to support what they said was his false claim.^[42]