Farmers protesting for Land Reform in Indonesia

Land reform (also agrarian reform, though that can have a broader meaning) involves the changing of laws, regulations or customs regarding land ownership.^[1] Land reform may consist of a government-initiated or government-backed property redistribution, generally of agricultural land. Land reform can, therefore, refer to transfer of ownership from the more powerful to the less powerful:such as from a relatively small number of wealthy (or noble) owners with extensive land holdings (e.g., plantations, large ranches, or agribusiness plots) to individual ownership by those who work the land.^[2] Such transfers of ownership may be with or without compensation; compensation may vary from token amounts to the full value of the land.^[3]

Land reform may also entail the transfer of land from individual ownership — even peasant ownership in smallholdings — to government-owned collective farms; it has also, in other times and places, referred to the exact opposite: division of government-owned collective farms into smallholdings.^[4] The common characteristic of all land reforms, however, is modification or replacement of existing institutional arrangements governing possession and use of land. Thus, while land reform may be radical in nature, such as through large-scale transfers of land from one group to another, it can also be less dramatic, such as regulatory reforms aimed at improving land administration.^[5]

Nonetheless, any revision or reform of a country's land laws can still be an intensely political process, as reforming land policies serves to change relationships within and between communities, as well as between communities and the state. Thus even small-scale land reforms and legal modifications may be subject to intense debate or conflict.^[6]

Land ownership and tenure[link]

Land ownership and tenure can be perceived as controversial in part because ideas defining what it means to access or control land, such as through "land ownership" or "land tenure", can vary considerably across regions and even within countries.^[7] Land reforms, which change what it means to control land, therefore create tensions and conflicts between those who lose and those who gain from these redefinitions (see next section).^[8]

Western conceptions of land have evolved over the past several centuries to place greater emphasis on individual land ownership, formalized through documents such as land titles.^[9] Control over land, however, may also be perceived less in terms of individual ownership and more in terms land use, or through what is known as land tenure.^[10] Historically, in many parts of Africa for example, land was not owned by an individual, but rather used by an extended family or a village community. Different people in a family or community had different rights to access this land for different purposes and at different times. Such rights were often conveyed through oral history and not formally documented.^[11]

These different ideas of land ownership and tenure are sometimes referred to using different terminology. For example, "formal" or "statutory" land systems refer to ideas of land control more closely affiliated with individual land ownership. "Informal" or "customary" land systems refer to ideas of land control more closely affiliated with land tenure.^[12]

Terms dictating control over and use of land can therefore take many forms. Some specific examples of present day or historic forms of formal and informal land ownership include:

• Traditional land tenure, as in the indigenous nations or tribes of North America in the Pre-Columbian era.
• Feudal land ownership, through fiefdoms
• Life estate, interest in real property that ends at death.
• Fee tail, hereditary, non-transferable ownership of real property.
• Fee simple. Under common law, this is the most complete ownership interest one can have in real property.
• Leasehold or rental
• Rights to use a common
• Sharecropping
• Easements
• Agricultural labor — under which someone works the land in exchange for money, payment in kind, or some combination of the two
• Collective ownership
• Access to land through a membership in a cooperative, or shares in a corporation, which owns the land (typically by fee simple or its equivalent, but possibly under other arrangements).
• Government collectives, such as those that might be found in communist states, whereby government ownership of most agricultural land is combined in various ways with tenure for farming collectives.

Arguments for and against land reform[link]

Land reform is a deeply political process^[13] and therefore many arguments for and against it have emerged. These arguments vary tremendously over time and place. For example, in the twentieth century, many land reforms emerged from a particular political ideology, such as communism or socialism. Or, as can be seen in the 19th century in colonized states, a colonial government may have changed the laws dictating land ownership to better consolidate political power or to support its colonial economy.^[14] In more recent times, electoral mobilization and the use of land as a patronage resource have been proposed as possible motivations for land reform efforts, such as the extensive redistributive land reforms of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.^[15]

Arguments for land reform[link]

Land reforms need not be as dramatic in scale as Zimbabwe. Today many arguments in support of land reform focus on its potential social and economic benefits, particularly in developing countries, that may emerge from reforms focused on greater land formalization. Such benefits may include eradicating food insecurity and alleviating rural poverty.^[16]

Arguments in support of such reforms gained particular momentum after the publication of "The Mystery of Capital" by Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto in 2000. The poor, he argues, are often unable to secure formal property rights, such as land titles, to the land on which they live or farm because of poor governance, corruption and/or overly complex bureaucracies. Without land titles or other formal documentation of their land assets, they are less able to access formal credit. Political and legal reforms within countries, according to de Soto, will help to include the poor in formal legal and economic systems, increase the poor's ability to access credit and contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction.^[18]

Many international development organizations and bilateral and multilateral donors, such as the World Bank, have embraced de Soto's ideas, or similar ideas, about the benefits of greater formalized land rights.^[19] This has translated into a number of development programs that work with governments and civil society organizations to initiate and implement land reforms.^[20] Evidence to support the economic and pro-poor benefits of increased formalized land rights are, however, still inconclusive according to some critics (see "Arguments against land reform" below).

Other arguments in support of land reform point to the need to alleviate conflicting land laws, particularly in former colonies, where formal and informal land systems may exist in tension with each other.^[21] Such conflicts can make marginalized groups vulnerable to further exploitation.^[22] For example, in many countries in Africa with conflicting land laws, AIDS stigmatization has led to an increasing number of AIDS widows being kicked off marital land by in-laws.^[23] While the woman may have both customary and statutory rights to the land, confusion over which set of laws has primacy, or even a lack of knowledge of relevant laws, leave many AIDS widows at a significant disadvantage. Also, conflicting formal and informal land laws can also clog a country's legal system, making it prone to corruption.^[24]

Additional arguments for land reform focus on the potential environmental benefits of reform. For example, if reform leads to greater security of land ownership, through either formal or informal means, then those that use the land will be better stewards of it.^[25]

Arguments against land reform[link]

Many of the arguments in support of land reform speak to its potentially positive social and economic outcomes. Yet, as mentioned previously, land reform is an intensely political process.^[8] Thus, many of those opposed to land reform are nervous as to the underlying motivations of those initiating the reform. For example, some may fear that they will disadvantaged or victimized as a result of the reforms. Others may fear that they will lose out in the economic and political power struggles that underlie many land reforms.^[26]

Other groups and individuals express concerns about land reforms focused on formalization of property rights. While the economic and social benefits of formalized land rights are often touted, some research suggests that such reforms are either ineffective or may cause further hardship or conflict.^[27]

Additional arguments against land reform focus on concerns over equity issues and potential elite capture of land, particularly in regards to reforms focused on greater land formalization. If improperly or inadequately implemented, critics worry that such reforms may further disadvantage marginalization groups such as indigenous communities or women.^[28] These concerns also lead to questions about the institutional capacity of governments to implement land reforms as they are designed. Even if a country does have this capacity, critics worry that corruption and patrimonalism will lead to further elite capture.^[29]

In looking at more radical reforms, such as large-scale land redistribution, arguments against reform include concerns that redistributed land will not be used productively and that owners of expropriated land will not be compensated adequately or compensated at all. Zimbabwe, again, is a commonly cited example of the perils of such large-scale reforms, whereby land redistribution contributed to economic decline and increased food insecurity in the country.^[30]

Evaluation of land reform[link]

While many issues divide proponents and opponents of land reform, the questions below can help one to evaluate land reform in a more objective manner:

• Is private property of any sort legitimate? If so, is land ownership legitimate and are historic property rights in this particular state and society legitimate?
• Even if property rights are legitimate, do they allow for or protect against expropriation? Do they entitle the property owner to partial or complete compensation of expropriated land?
• How should property rights be weighed against other rights, such as the right to life and liberty?
• Who should adjudicate land ownership disputes?
• What constitutes fair land reform?
• What are the social, economic and political effects of land reform?^[31]

Challenges for land reform in South Africa

Various researchers have identified various challenges facing land and agrarian reform in South Africa. The following are amongst the challenges as identified by Hall (2004) and the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (2008):

• Willing seller-willing buyer principle: it takes a long time to negotiate land price with the current land owners;
• Claim disputes: it is a long process to mediate and resolve claim disputes (e.g. unresolved disputes between Makgoba Traditional Council and the Trust in the Limpopo Province, South Africa);
• Capacity: there is lack of institutional capacity for community legal entities (e.g. Trust);
• Beneficiary selection: it is a lengthy process and time consuming process to select the rightful beneficiaries for land redistribution;
• Resettlement support: it requires enough resources and time to effectively facilitate post-resettlement support to new land owners;
• Monitoring and evaluation: there is lack of reliable monitoring system and evaluation thereof;
• Policy: there are gaps in the current policies which compromise effective implementation of land reform programme.
• Different political views: there is lack of common consensus among political parties on land reform debate.

Unresolved land claims, which are largely rural claims, are mostly affected by a number of challenges such as:

• disputes with land owners on the validity of claims, land prices, settlement models and conditions;
• family or community dispute;
• conflict among traditional leaders, community, trust and beneficiaries
• boundaries disputes among traditional leaders;
• reluctance of other government departments and institutions to release state land;
• high land prices and disputes on land valuation;
• land price negotiations with current owners;
• lack of technical and financial support;
• mismanagement of resources;
• untraceable claimants; and
• land claim disputes resolution and mediation.(source)

Land reform efforts[link]

Agrarian land reform has been a recurring theme of enormous consequence in world history — see, for example, the history of the Semproninan Law or Lex Sempronia agraria proposed by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and passed by the Roman Senate (133 BC), which led to the social and political wars that ended the Roman Republic.

A historically important source of pressure for land reform has been the accumulation of significant properties by tax-exempt individuals or entities. In ancient Egypt, the tax exemption for temple lands eventually drove almost all the good land into the hands of the priestly class, making them immensely rich (and leaving the world a stunning legacy of monumental temple architecture that still impresses several millennia later), but starving the government of revenue. In Rome, the land tax exemption for the noble senatorial families had a similar effect, leading to Pliny's famous observation that the latifundia (vast landed estates) had ruined Rome, and would likewise ruin the provinces. In the Christian world, this has frequently been true of churches and monasteries, a major reason that many of the French revolutionaries saw the Catholic Church as an accomplice of the landed aristos. In the Moslem world, land reforms such as that organized in Spain by al-Hurr in 718 have transferred property from Muslims to Christians, who were taxable by much higher rates.

In the modern world and in the aftermath of colonialism and the Industrial Revolution, land reform has occurred around the world, from the Mexican Revolution (1917; the revolution began in 1910) to Communist China to Bolivia (1952, 2006) to Zimbabwe and Namibia. Land reform has been especially popular as part of decolonization struggles in Africa and the Arab world, where it was part of the program for African socialism and Arab nationalism. Cuba has seen one of the most complete agrarian reforms in Latin America. Land reform was an important step in achieving economic development in many Third World countries since the post-World War II period, especially in the East Asian Tigers and "Tiger Cubs" nations such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Malaysia.

Since mainland China's economic reforms led by Deng Xiaoping land reforms have also played a key role in the development of the People's Republic of China, with the re-emergence of rich property developers in urban areas (though as in Hong Kong, land in China is not privately owned but leased from the state, typically on very long terms that allow substantial opportunity for private speculative gain).

Latin America[link]

"The first liberating revolutions never destroyed the large landholding powers that always constituted a reactionary force and upheld the principle of servitude on the land. In most countries the large landholders realized they couldn't survive alone and promptly entered into alliances with the monopolies — the strongest and most ruthless oppressors of the Latin American peoples. U.S. capital arrived on the scene to exploit the virgin lands and later carried off, unnoticed, all the funds so 'generously' given, plus several times the amount originally invested in the 'beneficiary' country."

— Che Guevara, Marxist revolutionary, 1961^[32]

Children singing the Internationale, at the 20th Anniversary of Brazil's Landless Workers Movement

• Brazil: In the 1930s, Getúlio Vargas reneged on a promised land reform. A first attempt to make a national scale reform was set up in the government of José Sarney, as a result of the strong popular movement that had contributed to the fall of the military government. However, the so-called First Land Reform National Plan never was put into force. Strong campaign including direct action by the Landless Workers' Movement throughout the 1990s has managed to get some advances for the past 10 years, during the Fernando Cardoso and Lula da Silva administrations.
• Bolivia: The revolution of 1952 was followed by a land reform law (Law Decree 3464) on August 2, 1953. However, in 1970 only 45% of peasant families had received title to land, although more land reform projects continued in the 1970s and 1980s. A 1996 Agrarian Reform Law (also Spanish: Ley INRA) increased protection for smallholdings and indigenous territories, but also protected absentee landholders who pay taxes from expropriation.^[33] Bolivian president Evo Morales restarted land reform when he took office in 2006.^[34] On 29 November 2006, the Bolivian Senate passed a bill authorizing the government redistribution of land among the nation's mostly indigenous poor. The bill was signed into law hours later, though significant opposition is expected^[35]
• Chile: Attempts at land reform began under the government of Jorge Alessandri in 1960, were accelerated during the government of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964–1970), and reached its climax during the 1970-1973 presidency of Salvador Allende. Farms of more than 198 acres (80 hectares) were expropriated. After the 1973 coup the process was halted, and up to a point reversed by the market forces.
• Colombia: Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934–1938) passed the Law 200 of 1936, which allowed for the expropriation of private properties, in order to promote "social interest". Later attempts declined, until the National Front presidencies of Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958–1962) and Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966–1970), which respectively created the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCORA) and further developed land entitlement. In 1968 and 1969 alone, the INCORA issued more than 60,000 land titles to farmers and workers. Despite this, matsetela (2000) stated that the process was then halted and the situation began to reverse itself, as the subsequent violent actions of drug lords, paramilitaries, guerrillas and opportunistic large landowners severely contributed to a renewed concentration of land and to the displacement of small landowners. In the early 21st century, tentative government plans to use the land legally expropriated from drug lords and/or the properties given back by demobilized paramilitary groups have not caused much practical improvement yet.
• Cuba: (See also main article Agrarian Reform Laws of Cuba) Land reform was among the chief planks of the revolutionary platform of 1959. Almost all large holdings were seized by the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA), which dealt with all areas of agricultural policy. A ceiling of 166 acres (67 hectares) was established, and tenants were given ownership rights, though these rights are constrained by government production quotas and a prohibition of real estate transactions.
• El Salvador: One among several land reform efforts was made during the revolution/civil-war during the 1980s. Salvadoran President Thapelo Miglous Matsetela promoted land-reform as counter-strategy in the war, while the FMLN carried out their own land-reform in the territory under their control.
• Guatemala: land reform occurred during the "Ten Years of Spring", 1944–1954 under the governments of Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz. It has been remarked that it was one of the most successful land reforms in history, given that it was relatively thorough and had minimal detrimental effects on the economy and on the incomes of wealthy classes (who were mostly spared because only uncultivated land was expropriated). The reforms were reversed entirely after a US-backed coup deposed the Arbenz government.^[36]
• Mexico: The first land reform was driven by Ley Lerdo (the Lerdo Law of 1856), enacted by the liberals during the Reform War of the 1850s. One of the aims of the reform government was to develop the economy by returning to productive cultivation the underutilized lands of the Church and the municipal communities (Indian commons), which required the distribution of these lands to small owners. This was to be accomplished through the provisions of Ley Lerdo that prohibited ownership of land by the Church and the municipalities.^[37] The reform government also financed its war effort by seizing and selling church property and other large estates. After the war the principles of the Ley Lerdo were perverted by Pres. Porfirio Diaz, which contributed to causing the Mexican Revolution in 1910. A certain degree of land reform was introduced, albeit unevenly, as part of the Mexican Revolution. Francisco Madero and Emiliano Zapata were strongly identified with land reform, as are the present-day (as of 2006) Zapatista Army of National Liberation. See Mexican Agrarian Land Reform.
• Nicaragua: Land reform was one of the programs of the Sandinista government. The last months of Sandinista rule were criticized for the Piñata Plan which distributed large tracts of land to prominent Sandinistas.
• Peru: land reform in the 1950s largely eliminated a centuries-old system of debt peonage. Further land reform occurred after the 1968 coup by left-wing colonel Juan Velasco Alvarado, and again as part of a counterterrorism effort against the Shining Path during the Internal conflict in Peru roughly 1988–1995, led by Hernando de Soto and the Institute for Liberty and Democracy during the early years of the government of Alberto Fujimori, before the latter's auto-coup.
• Venezuela: Hugo Chávez's government enacted Plan Zamora to redistribute government and unused private land to campesinos in need.

Middle East and North Africa[link]

Land reform is discussed in the article on Arab Socialism

photo of the Shah distributing land deeds during Iran's White Revolution

• Ottoman Empire: The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 (1274 in the Islamic Calendar)was the beginning of a systematic land reform programme started during the Tanzimat period by Sultan Abdülmecid I of the Ottoman Empire during the latter half of the 19th Century, with the overall aims of increasing state revenue generated from land and for the state to be able to have greater control over individual plots of land. This was followed by the 1873 land emancipation act.
• Egypt: Initially, Egyptian land reform essentially abolished the political influence of major land owners. However, land reform only resulted in the redistribution of about 15% of Egypt's land under cultivation, and by the early 1980s, the effects of land reform in Egypt drew to a halt as the population of Egypt moved away from agriculture. The Egyptian land reform laws were greatly curtailed under Anwar Sadat and eventually abolished.
• Syria: Land reforms were first implemented in Syria during 1958. The Agricultural Relations Law laid down a redistribution of rights in landownership, tenancy and management . A culmination of factors led to the halt of the reforms in 1961, these included opposition from large landowners and sever crop failure during a drought between 1958 and 1961, whilst Syria was a member of the doomed United Arab Republic (UAR). After the Ba'th Party gained power in 1963 the reforms were resumed.

The reforms were portrayed by the governing Ba'th Party as politically motivated to benefit the rural property-less communities. According to Arsuzi, a co-founder of the Ba'th Party, the reforms would, "liberate 75 percent of the Syrian population and prepare them to be citizens qualified to participate in the building of the state".^[38]

It has been argued that the land reform represented work by the 'socialist government' however, by 1984 the private sector controlled 74 percent of Syria's arable land.^[39] This questions both Ba'th claims of commitment to the redistribution of land to the majority of peasants as well as the state government being socialist - if it allowed the majority of land to be owned in the private sector how could it truly be socialist. Hinnebusch argued that the reforms were a way of galvanising support from the large rural population, "they[Ba'th Party members] used the implementation of agrarian reform to win over and organise peasants and curb traditional power in the countryside".^[40] To this extent the reforms succeeded with increase in Ba'th party membership, they also prevented political threat emerging from rural areas by bringing the rural population into the system as supporters.

• Iran: Significant land reform in Iran took place under the Shah as part of the socio-economic reforms of the White Revolution, begun in 1962, and agreed upon through a public referendum. At this time the Iranian economy was not performing well and there was political unrest. Essentially, the land reforms amounted to a huge redistribution of land to rural peasants who previously had no possibility of owning land as they were poorly paid labourers.

The land reforms continued from 1962 until 1971 with three distinct phases of land distribution: private, government-owned and endowed land. These reforms resulted in the newly-created peasant landowners owning six to seven million hectares, around 52-63% of Iran's agricultural land. According to Country-Data, even though there had been a considerable redistribution of land, the amount received by individual peasants was not enough to meet most families' basic needs, "About 75 percent of the peasant owners [however] had less than 7 hectares, an amount generally insufficient for anything but subsistence agriculture.".^[41]

By 1979 a quarter of prime land was in disputed ownership and half of the productive land was in the hands of 200,000 absentee landlords^[41] The large land owners were able to retain the best land with the best access to fresh water and irrigation facilities. In contrast, not only were the new peasant land holdings too small to produce an income but the peasants also lacked both quality irrigation system and sustained government support to enable them to develop their land to make a reasonable living. Set against the economic boom from oil revenue it became apparent that the Land Reforms did not make life better for the rural population: according to Amid, "..only a small group of rural people experienced increasing improvements in their welfare and poverty remained the lot of the majority".^[42]

Moghadam argues^{[citation needed]} that the structural changes to Iran, including the land reforms, initiated by the White Revolution, contributed to the revolution in 1979 which overthrew the Shah and turned Iran into an Islamic republic.

• Maghreb: As elsewhere in North Africa, lands formerly held by European farmers have been taken over. The nationalisation of agricultural land in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia led to the departure of the majority of Europeans.^[43]
• Iraq (1970) mentioned in Arab Socialism

Europe[link]

• Albania has gone through three waves of land reform since the end of World War II: in 1946 the land in estates and large farms was expropriated by the communist government and redistributed among small peasants; in the 1950s the land was reorganized into large-scale collective farms; and after 1991 the land was again redistributed among private smallholders. At the end of World War II, the farm structure in Albania was characterized by high concentration of land in large farms. In 1945, farms larger than 10 hectares, representing numerically a mere 3% of all farms in the country, managed 27% of agricultural land and just seven large estates (out of 155,000 farms) controlled 4% of agricultural land, averaging more than 2,000 hectares each (compared to the average farm size of 2.5 hectares at that time).^[44] The first post-war constitution of independent Albania (March 1946) declared that land belonged to the tiller and that large estates under no circumstances could be owned by private individuals (article 10). The post-war land reform of 1946 redistributed 155,000 hectares (40% of the land stock) from 19,355 relatively large farms (typically larger than 5 hectares) to 70,211 small farms and landless households.^[44] As a result, the share of large farms with more than 10 hectares declined from 27% of agricultural land in 1945 to 3% in 1954. By 1954, more than 90% of land was held in small and mid-sized farms of between 1 hectare and 10 hectares. The distributive effects of the post-war land reform were eliminated by the collectivization drive of the late 1950s-early 1960s, and by 1962 less than 18% of agricultural land had remained in family farms and household plots (the rest had shifted to Soviet-style collective and state farms).^[44] By 1971 independent family farms had virtually disappeared and individual farming survived only in household plots cultivated part time by cooperative members (approximately 6% of agricultural land). The post-communist land reform begun in 1991 as part of the transition to the market was in effect a replay of the 1946 land reform, and the arable land held in cooperatives and state farms was equally distributed among all rural households without regard to pre-communist ownership rights. Contrary to other transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Albania adopted a distributive land reform (like the CIS) and did not restitute land to former owners. The post-communist land reform of the 1990s was accompanied by special land privatization legislation, as Albania was the only country outside the former Soviet Union that had nationalized all agricultural land (in stages between 1946 and 1976).^[45]
• Bulgaria: Upon independence in 1878 the overwhelmingly Turkish nobles estates were redistributed among peasant smallholdings. Additional reforms were implemented in 1920-23 and a maximum ownership 30 hectares was fixed.
• Czechoslovakia: Major land reform was passed in 1919 redistributing mainly German noble's estates to peasant smallholdings. By 1937 60% of noble land was expropriated with remaining land mainly in unarable arias or German and Hungarian lands. Almost all remaining lands were redistributed in reforms of 1945 and 1948.
• Denmark: In 1849 a section in the constitution had forbidden the creation of new fiefs and promised the abolition of existing fiefs. However fiefholders dominated the government and it was not until 1919 that the necessary legislation could be passed. This legislation transferred the fiefs to ordinary property that could be bought, sold and inherited like all other property. The state previously gained ownership to the fief if there was no male heirs and as compensation for the loss of this right the state demanded a one-time 25 % tax on the land and inventory of the fiefs. The value of the fiefs was assessed by the state itself. The tax rose each year the fiefholders waited to abolish their fiefs so the fiefs quickly disappeared. As part of the reform the state was entitled to take over one third of the land for a compensation that has since been criticised for being too small. This land was later handed over to smallholders. The tax levied on the estates as well as the division of land by ingheritance meant that the large estates as well as the estate holder class disappeared from Danish society and politics.

Finnish Karelian family, evacuated from areas ceded to Soviet Union, toiling at their new homestead

• Finland: In the general reparcelling out of land, begun in 1757 when Finland was a part of Sweden, the medieval model of all fields consisting of numerous strips, each belonging to a farm, was replaced by a model of fields and forest areas each belonging to a single farm. In the further reparcellings, which started in 1848 when Finland was part of Russia, the idea of concentrating all the land in a farm to a single piece of real estate was reinforced. In these reparcelling processes, the land is redistributed in direct proportion to earlier prescription. Both the general reparcelling and the further reparcelling processes are still active in some parts of the country. After the Finnish Civil War, when Finland had become independent, a series of land reforms followed. These included the compensated transfer of lease-holdings (torppa) to the leasers and prohibition of forestry companies to acquire land. After the Second World War, Karelians evacuated from areas ceded to Russia were given land in remaining Finnish areas, taken from public and private holdings. The war veterans also benefited from these allotments.
• France: a major and lasting land reform took place under the Directory during the latter phases of the French Revolution.
• Greece: At independence in 1835 the predominately Turkish nobles estates were redistributed as peasant smallholdings.
• Estonia and Latvia: at their founding as states in 1918–1919, they expropriate the large estates of Baltic German landowners, most of which was distributed among the peasants and became smallholdings.
• Hungary: In 1945 every estate bigger than 142 acres (57 ha) was expropriated without compensation and distributed among the peasants. In the 1950s collective ownership was introduced according to the Soviet model, but after 1990 co-ops were dissolved and the land was redistributed among private smallholders.
• Ireland: after the Irish Famine, land reform became the dominant issue in Ireland, where almost all of the land was owned by the Protestant Ascendancy. The Irish Parliamentary Party pressed for reform in a largely indifferent British House of Commons. Reform began tentatively in 1870 and continued for fifty years during which a number of Irish Land Acts were passed (see also Land War).
• Lithuania: the major land reform was initiated since the 1919 and was fully launched in 1922. The excess land was taken from the major landowners, mostly aristocracy, and redistributed among new landowners, primarily soldiers, or small landowners, 65,000 in total.
• Montenegro and Serbia: At independence in 1830 the predominately Turkish nobles estates were divided up among peasant smallholdings.
• Poland: there have been several land reforms in Poland. The most important include the land reforms in the Second Polish Republic (1919, 1921, 1923, 1925 and 1928) and in the People's Republic of Poland (1944).
• Prussia: One of Europe's earliest planned land redistributions was carried out in response to Napoleon's land reforms by Prussian King Frederick William I. Land owners were compensated for lost land. The reform helped to create an empowered middle class of Prussian small farmers.
• Romania: After failed attempts at land reform by Mihail Kogălniceanu in the years immediately after Romanian unification in 1863, a major land reform finally occurred in 1921, with a few additional reforms carried out in 1945.
• Slovenia and Croatia: With absorption into the kingdom of Yugoslavia, land reform was passed in 1919 with subsidiary laws thereafter redistributing nobles estates among peasant smallholders. Additional reform was implemented in 1945 under the communist.
• Soviet Union
  • Imperial Russia: Stolypin reform
  • Bolshevist Russia: Decree on Land
• Scotland: the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 ends the historic legacy of feudal law and creates a framework for rural or croft communities right to buy land in their area.
• Sweden: In 1757, the general reparcelling out of land began. In this process, the medieval principle of dividing all the fields in a village into strips, each belonging to a farm, was changed into a principle of each farm consisting of a few relatively large areas of land. The land was redistributed in proportion to earlier possession of land, while uninhabited forests far from villages were socialized. In the 20th century, Sweden, almost non-violently, arrived at regulating the length minimum of tenant farming contracts at 25 years.

Africa[link]

• Ethiopia: The Derg carried out one of the most extensive land reforms in Africa in 1975.
• Kenya: Kenyatta launched a "willing buyer-willing seller" based land reform program in the 1960s, funded by Britain, the former colonial power. In 2006 president Mwai Kibaki said it will repossess all land owned by "absentee landlords" in the coastal strip and redistribute it to squatters.^[46]
• Namibia: A limited land reform has been a hallmark of the regime of Sam Nujoma; legislation passed in September 1994, with a compulsory, compensated approach.^[47]
• South Africa:The Native Lands Act of 1913 "prohibited the establishment of new farming operations, sharecropping or cash rentals by blacks outside of the reserves"^[48] where they were forced to live. "Land restitution" was one of the promises made by the African National Congress when it came to power in South Africa in 1994.

These property rights are extremely important as, not only do they empower farmer workers (who now have the opportunity to become farmers) and reduce inequality^[49] but they also increase production due to inverse farm size productivity. Farmers with smaller plots who live on the farm, often use family members for labor, making these farms efficient. Their transaction costs are less than larger plots with hired labor.^[50] Since many of these family members were unemployed it allows previously unemployed people to now participate in the economy and better the country's economic growth.^[51]

The Land Reform Process focused on three areas: restitution, land tenure reform and land redistribution.^[48][52] Restitution, where the government compensates (monetary) individuals who had been forcefully removed, has been very unsuccessful and the policy has now shifted to redistribution with secure land tenure. Land tenure reform is a system of recognizing people's right to own land and therefore control of the land.

Redistribution is the most important component of land reform in South Africa.^[53] Initially, land was bought from its owners (willing seller) by the government (willing buyer) and redistributed, in order to maintain public confidence in the land market.^[48]

Although this system has worked in various countries in the world, in South Africa is has proved to be very difficult to implement. This is because many owners do not actually see the land they are purchasing and are not involved in the important decisions made at the beginning of the purchase and negotiation.

In 2000 the South African Government decided to review and change the redistribution and tenure process to a more decentralized and area based planning process. The idea is to have local integrated development plans in 47 districts. This will hopefully mean more community participation and more redistribution taking place, but there are also various concerns and challenges with this system too.^[54]

These include the use of third parties, agents accredited by the state, and who are held accountable to the government. The result has been local land holding elites dominating the system in many of these areas. The government still hopes that with "improved identification and selection of beneficiaries, better planning of land and ultimately greater productivity of the land acquired..."^[55] the land reform process will begin moving faster.^[56]

As of early 2006, the ANC government announced that it will start expropriating the land, although according to the country's chief land-claims commissioner, Tozi Gwanya, unlike Zimbabwe there will be compensation to those whose land is expropriated, "but it must be a just amount, not inflated sums."^[57][58]

Despite these moves towards decentralization, these improved practices and government promises are not very evident. South Africa still remains hugely unequal, with black South Africans still dispossessed of land and many still homeless. The challenge for the incumbent politicians is to improve the various bureaucratic processes, and find solutions to giving more South Africans secure land tenure.

Challenges for Land Reform in South Africa

Various researchers have identified various challenges facing land and agrarian reform in South Africa. The following are amongst the challenges as identified by Hall (2004) and the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (2008):

• Willing seller-willing buyer principle: it takes a long time to negotiate land price with the current land owners;
• Claim disputes: it is a long process to mediate and resolve claim disputes (e.g. unresolved disputes between Makgoba Traditional Council and the Trust in the Limpopo Province, South Africa);
• Capacity: there is lack of institutional capacity for community legal entities (e.g. Trust);
• Beneficiary selection: it is a lengthy process and time consuming process to select the rightful beneficiaries for land redistribution;
• Resettlement support: it requires enough resources and time to effectively facilitate post-resettlement support to new land owners;
• Monitoring and evaluation: there is lack of reliable monitoring system and evaluation thereof;
• Policy: there are gaps in the current policies which compromise effective implementation of land reform programme.
• Different political views: there is lack of common consensus among political parties on land reform debate.

Unresolved land claims, which are largely rural claims, are mostly affected by a number of challenges such as:

• disputes with land owners on the validity of claims, land prices, settlement models and conditions;
• family or community dispute;
• conflict among traditional leaders, community, trust and beneficiaries
• boundaries disputes among traditional leaders;
• reluctance of other government departments and institutions to release state land;
• high land prices and disputes on land valuation;
• land price negotiations with current owners;
• lack of technical and financial support;
• mismanagement of resources;
• untraceable claimants; and
• land claim disputes resolution and mediation.(source)

• Zimbabwe: Efforts at land reform in Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe moved, after 15 years, in the 1990s, from a "willing seller, willing buyer" approach to the "fast track" land reform program. This was accelerated by "popular seizure" led by machete gangs of "war veterans" associated with the ruling party. Many parcels of land came under the control of people close to the government, as is the case throughout Africa. The several forms of forcible change in management caused a severe drop in production and other economic disruptions. In addition, the human rights violations and bad press led Britain, the European Union, the United States, and other Western allies to impose sanctions on the Zimbabwean government. All this has caused the collapse of the economy^{[citation needed]}. The results have been disastrous and have resulted in widespread food shortages and large scale refugee flight.

North America[link]

• Canada: A land reform was carried out as part of Prince Edward Island's agreement to join the Canadian Confederation in 1873. Most of the land was owned by absentee landlords in England, and as part of the deal Canada was to buy all the land and give it to the farmers.
• United States:
  • Following the American Civil War, the Radical Republicans attempted to put a land reform through Congress, promising "forty acres and a mule" to newly-freed blacks in the South, which was ultimately rejected by moderate elements as "socialistic."^{[citation needed]}
  • The Dawes Act of 1887 split the Indian tribal lands into allotments held by individual Indians. Most tribal land still owned by ethnic Indians was recollectivized in 1934.

Asia[link]

• Afghanistan has had a couple of attempts at land reform
  • The government of Mohammad Daoud Khan responded to the inequities of the existing land tenure conditions by issuing a Land Reform Law in 1975.
    • The government limited individual holdings to a maximum of 20 hectares of irrigated, double-cropped land.
    • Larger holdings were allowed for less productive land.
    • The government was to expropriate all surplus land and pay compensation.
    • To prevent the proliferation of small, uneconomic holdings, priority for redistributed lands was to be given to neighboring farmers with two hectares or less.
    • Landless sharecroppers, laborers, tenants, and nomads had next priority.
  • Despite the government's rhetorical commitment to land reform, the program was quickly postponed. Because the government's landholding limits applied to families, not individuals, wealthy families avoided expropriation by dividing their lands nominally between family members. The high ceilings for landholdings restricted the amount of land actually subject to redistribution. Finally, the government lacked the technical data and organizational bodies to pursue the program after it was announced.
  • Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
    • The first step was Decree No. 6, which canceled gerau and other mortgage debts of agricultural laborers, tenants, and small landowners with less than two hectares of land. The cancellation applied only to debts contracted before 1973.
    • Decree No. 8 November 1978: New landholdings from the 20 hectares of prime irrigated land in the 1975 law to just six hectares. It divided all land into seven classes and again allowed for larger holdings of less productive land.
      • no compensation for government-expropriated surplus land
      • established categories of farmers who had priority for redistributed land; sharecroppers already working on the land had highest priority.^[59][60]
• China has been through a series of land reforms:
  • In the 1940s, the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, funded with American money, with the support of the national government, carried out land reform and community action programs in several provinces.
  • The thorough land reform launched by the Communist Party of China in 1946, three years before the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), won the party millions of supporters among the poor and middle peasantry. The land and other property of landlords were expropriated and redistributed so that each household in a rural village would have a comparable holding. This agrarian revolution was made famous in the West by William Hinton's book Fanshen. In 1948, Mao Zedong envisaged that "one-tenth of the peasants" (or about 50,000,000) "would have to be destroyed" to facilitate agrarian reform.^[61] Jen Pi-shih, a member of the party's Central Committee, likewise stated in a 1948 speech that "30,000,000 landlords and rich peasants would have to be destroyed."^[61] Shortly after the founding of the PRC, land reform, according to Mao biographer Philip Short, "lurched violently to the left" with Mao laying down new guidelines for "not correcting excesses prematurely."^[62] Mao insisted that the people themselves, not the security organs, should become involved in the killing of landlords who had oppressed them.^[62] This was quite different from Soviet practice, in which the NKVD would arrest counterrevolutionaries and then have them secretly executed and often buried before sunrise. Mao felt that peasants who killed landlords with their bare hands would become permanently linked to the revolutionary process in a way that passive spectators could not be.^[62] Actual numbers killed in land reform are believed to have been lower, but did rank in the millions,^[61] as there was a policy to select "at least one landlord, and usually several, in virtually every village for public execution."^[63] R.J. Rummel, an analyst of government killings, or "democide", gives a "reasonably conservative figure" of about 4,500,000 landlords and better-off peasants killed.^[61] Philip Short estimates that at least one to three million landlords and members of their families were killed, either beaten to death on the spot by enraged peasants at mass meetings organized by local communist party work teams or reserved for public execution later on.^[62] Estimates abroad ranged as high as 28,000,000 deaths.^[61] In 1976 the U.S. State department estimated that there may have been a million killed in the land reform;^[64] Mao estimated that only 800,000 landlords were killed.^[61]
  • In the mid-1950s, a second land reform during the Great Leap Forward compelled individual farmers to join collectives, which, in turn, were grouped into People's communes with centrally controlled property rights and an egalitarian principle of distribution. This policy was generally a failure in terms of production.^[65] The PRC reversed this policy in 1962 through the proclamation of the Sixty Articles. As a result, the ownership of the basic means of production was divided into three levels with collective land ownership vested in the production team (see also Ho [2001]).
  • A third land reform beginning in the late 1970s re-introduced the family-based contract system known as the Household Responsibility System, which had enormous initial success, followed by a period of relative stagnation. Chen, Wang, and Davis [1998] suggest that the later stagnation was due, in part, to a system of periodic redistribution that encouraged over-exploitation rather than capital investment in future productivity.^[65] However, although land use rights were returned to individual farmers, collective land ownership was left undefined after the disbandment of the People's Communes.
  • Since 1998 China is in the midst of drafting the new Property Law which is the first piece of national legislation that will define the land ownership structure in China for years to come. The Property Law forms the basis for China's future land policy of establishing a system of freehold, rather than of private ownership (see also Ho, [2005]).

• India: Due to the taxation and regulation under the British Raj, at the time of independence, India inherited a semi-feudal agrarian system, with ownership of land concentrated in the hands of a few individual landlords (Zamindars, Zamindari System). Since independence, there has been voluntary and state initiated/mediated land reforms in several states. The most notable and successful example of land reforms are in the states of West Bengal and Kerala. After promising land reforms and elected to power in West Bengal in 1977, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) kept their word and initiated gradual land reforms, such as Operation Barga. The result was a more equitable distribution of land among the landless farmers, and enumeration of landless farmers. This has ensured an almost life long loyalty from the farmers and the communists were in power till 2011 assembly election.^[66] In Kerala, the only other large state where the CPI(M) came to power, state administrations have actually carried out the most extensive land, tenancy and agrarian labor wage reforms in the non-socialist late-industrializing world.^[67] Another successful land reform program was launched in Jammu and Kashmir after 1947. However, this success was not replicated in other areas like the states of Andhra and Madhya Pradesh, where the more radical Communist Party of India (Maoist) or Naxalites resorted to violence as it failed to secure power. In the state of Bihar, tensions between land owners militia, villagers and Maoists have resulted in numerous massacres. All in all, land reforms have been successful only in pockets of the country, as people have often found loopholes in the laws setting limits on the maximum area of land held by any one person.
• Japan: The first land reform, called the Land Tax Reform or chisokaisei (地租改正^?) was passed in 1873 as a part of the Meiji Restoration. Another land reform of Japan was carried out in 1947 (at the occupied era after World War II) by the instructions of SCAP by the proposal from the Japanese government. It was prepared before the defeat of the Greater Japanese Empire. It is also called Nōchi-kaihō (農地解放,emancipation of farming land ).
• Sri Lanka: In 1972, the Government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, through the Land Reform Law, imposed a ceiling of twenty hectares on privately owned land and sought to distribute lands in excess of the ceiling for the benefit of landless peasants. Both land owned by public companies and paddy lands under ten hectares in extent were exempted from this ceiling. Between 1972 and 1974, the Land Reform Commission took over nearly 228,000 hectares. In 1975 the Land Reform (Amendment) Law brought over 169,000 hectares of plantations owned by companies (including British-owned companies) under state control.^[68]
• Taiwan: In the 1950s, after the Nationalist government came to Taiwan, land reform and community development was carried out by the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. This course of action was made attractive, in part, by the fact that many of the large landowners were Japanese who had fled, and the other large landowners were compensated with Japanese commercial and industrial properties seized after Taiwan reverted from Japanese rule in 1945. The land program succeeded also because the Kuomintang were mostly from the mainland and had few ties to the remaining indigenous landowners. See also: Taiwan Land Reform Museum
• Vietnam: In the years after World War II, even before the formal division of Vietnam, land reform was initiated in North Vietnam. This land reform (1953–1956) redistributed land to more than 2 million poor peasants, but at a cost of from tens^[69] to hundreds of thousands of lives^[70] and was one of the main reason for the mass exodus of 1 million people from the North to the South in 1954. The probable democide for this four year period then totals 283,000 North Vietnamese.^[71] South Vietnam made several further attempts in the post-Diem years, the most ambitious being the Land to the Tiller program instituted in 1970 by President Nguyen Van Thieu. This limited individuals to 15 hectares, compensated the owners of expropriated tracts, and extended legal title to peasants who in areas under control of the South Vietnamese government to whom had land had previously been distributed by the Viet Cong.
• South Korea: In 1945–1950, United States and South Korean authorities carried out a land reform that retained the institution of private property. They confiscated and redistributed all land held by the Japanese colonial government, Japanese companies, and individual Japanese colonists. The Korean government carried out a reform whereby Koreans with large landholdings were obliged to divest most of their land. A new class of independent, family proprietors was created.^[72]

This unreferenced section requires citations to ensure verifiability.

• Philippines: During the Macapagal Administration in the early 1960s, a limited land reform program was initiated in Central Luzon covering rice fields. During the martial law era of the Marcos Administration, Presidential Decree 27 instituted a land reform program covering rice and corn farms. Rice and corn production under this land reform program was heavily supported by the Marcos Administration with land distribution and financing program known as the Masagana 99 and other production loans that led to increased rice and corn production. The country produced enough rice for local consumption and became a rice exporter during that period. The Aquino Administration in the mid 1980s instituted a very controversial land reform known as CARP which covered all agricultural lands. The program led to rice shortages in the succeeding years and lasted for 20 years without accomplishing the goal of land distribution. The program caused entrepreneurs to stay away from agriculture and a number of productive farmers left the farming sector. The CARP was a monumental failure in terms of cost to the government and the landowners whose lands were subjective legal landgrabbing by the government. CARP expired at the end of December 2008.^[73]

Oceania[link]

• Australia: See Aboriginal Land Rights Acts.
• Fiji: In a reverse that proves the rule of land reform to benefit the native and indigenous people, the land in Fiji has always been owned by native Fijians, but much of it has been leased long-term to immigrant Indians. As these leases have reached their end-of-term native Fijians increasingly have refused to renew leases and have expelled the Indians.^{[citation needed]}

See also[link]

• Agrarian reform
• Anti-globalization movement
• Communism
• Eminent domain
• Georgism
• Homestead principle
• Land Banking
• Land claim
• Land rights
• México Indígena
• Restitution
• Squatter

Contrast:

• Inclosure
• Land reform in Vietnam
• Land reform in Zimbabwe

References[link]

Further reading[link]

• Michael Lipton, Land Reform in Developing Countries: Property Rights and Property Wrongs, Routledge, 2009
• P.P.S. Ho, Who Owns China's Land? Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity, The China Quarterly, Vol. 166, June 2001, pp. 387–414
• R. H. Tawney, Land and Labour in China New York, Harcourt Brace & Company (1932).
• Fu Chen, Liming Wang and John Davis, "Land reform in rural China since the mid-1980s", Land Reform 1998/2, a publication of the Sustainable Development Department of the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
• William H. Hinton. Fanshen: A documentary of revolution in a Chinese village. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966. ISBN 0-520-21040-9.
• P.P.S. Ho, Institutions in Transition: Land Ownership, Property Rights and Social Conflict in China, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)
• Mark Moyar, "Villager attitudes during the final decade of the Vietnam War". Presented at 1996 Vietnam Symposium "After the Cold War: Reassessing Vietnam".
• Summary of "Efficiency and wellbeing for 80 years" by Tarmo Luoma on site of TEHO magazine.

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Land reform

• Land Research Action Network:News, Analysis, and Research on Land Reform
• Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe
• The Land Reform of 1919–1940: Lithuania and the Countries of East and Central Europe
• FAO Multilingual Thesaurus on Land Tenure
• Global Food Security Threatened by Corporate Land Grabs in Poor Countries - video report by Democracy Now!
• FAO International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD), March 2006
• Civil Society conference "Land, Territory and Dignity", March 2006
• William Rees-Mogg, South Africa's bitter harvest, The Times, 11 September 2006
• World Bank archived online discussion: "Can Formal Property Titling Programs Ensure Increased Business Investments and Growth?"
• Promised Land: New Documentary Follows Struggles Over Land in South Africa - video report by Democracy Now!
• Rural Development Institute, Securing land rights for the world's poorest
• Perspectives on South Africa's Land Reform Debate.

Jacob Zuma GCB
President of South Africa
Incumbent
Assumed office 9 May 2009
Deputy	Kgalema Motlanthe
Preceded by	Kgalema Motlanthe
President of the African National Congress
Incumbent
Assumed office 18 December 2007
Deputy	Kgalema Motlanthe
Preceded by	Thabo Mbeki
Deputy President of South Africa
In office 14 June 1999 – 14 June 2005
President	Thabo Mbeki
Preceded by	Thabo Mbeki
Succeeded by	Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka
Member of Parliament
In office 1999–2005
Personal details
Born	Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma (1942-04-12) 12 April 1942 (age 70) Inkandla, South Africa
Nationality	South African
Political party	African National Congress (1959–present)
Spouse(s)	Gertrude Sizakele Khumalo (1973–present) Kate Zuma (1976–2000)[1] Nkosazana Dlamini (1982–1998) Nompumelelo Ntuli (2008–present) Thobeka Mabhija (2010–present)[2] Gloria Bongekile Ngema (2012-present)[3]
Children	20
Religion	Protestantism (Full Gospel Church of Southern Africa)[4]

Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma (born 12 April 1942) is the President of South Africa,^[5] elected by parliament following his party's victory in the 2009 general election.

Zuma is the President of the African National Congress (ANC), the governing political party, and was Deputy President of South Africa from 1999 to 2005.^[6] Zuma is also referred to by his initials JZ^[7] and his clan name Msholozi.^[8][9] Zuma became the President of the ANC on 18 December 2007 after defeating incumbent Thabo Mbeki at the ANC conference in Polokwane. Zuma was also a member of the South African Communist Party (SACP),^[10] briefly serving on the party's Politburo until he left the party in 1990.^[11] On 20 September 2008, Thabo Mbeki announced his resignation after being recalled by the African National Congress's National Executive Committee,^[12] following a conclusion by Judge Nicholson of improper interference in the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), including the prosecution of Jacob Zuma for corruption.

Zuma has faced significant legal challenges. He was charged with rape in 2005, but was acquitted. In addition, he fought a long legal battle over allegations of racketeering and corruption, resulting from his financial advisor Schabir Shaik's conviction for corruption and fraud. On 6 April 2009, the National Prosecuting Authority decided to drop the charges, citing political interference.

Life and career[link]

Early years[link]

Zuma was born in Nkandla, Zululand (now part of KwaZulu-Natal).^[13] His father was a policeman who died when Zuma was still a young boy, and his mother a domestic worker.^[14] He received no formal schooling.^[15] As a child, he was constantly moving between Zululand and the suburbs of Durban in the area of Umkhumbane (near Chesterville).^[16] He has two brothers, Michael and Joseph.^[17]

Imprisonment and ban[link]

Zuma engaged in politics at an early age and joined the African National Congress in 1959. He became an active member of Umkhonto we Sizwe in 1962, following the banning of the ANC in 1961. He joined the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1963.^[10] In 1963, he was arrested with a group of 45 recruits near Zeerust in the western Transvaal, currently part of the North West Province. Convicted of conspiring to overthrow the Apartheid government which was led by white minorities, he was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, which he served on Robben Island with Nelson Mandela and other notable ANC leaders who were also imprisoned there. Whilst imprisoned Zuma served as a referee for prisoners' association football games, organised by the prisoners' own governing body, Makana F.A.^[18]

After his release, he was instrumental in the re-establishment of ANC underground structures in the Natal province.^[6]

He first left South Africa in 1975 and met Thabo Mbeki in Swaziland, and proceeded to Mozambique, where he dealt with the arrival of thousands of exiles in the wake of the Soweto uprising.

He became a member of the ANC National Executive Committee in 1977. He also served as Deputy Chief Representative of the ANC in Mozambique, a post he occupied until the signing of the Nkomati Accord between the Mozambican and South African governments in 1984. After signing the Accord, he was appointed as Chief Representative of the ANC.

He served on the ANC's political and military council when it was formed in the mid-1980s, and was elected to the politburo of the SACP on April 1989.^[19]

In January 1987, Zuma was again forced to leave a country, this time by the government of Mozambique. He moved to the ANC Head Office in Lusaka, Zambia, where he was appointed Head of Underground Structures and shortly thereafter Chief of the Intelligence Department. His tenure there remains the subject of considerable controversy.^[10]

Return from exile[link]

Following the end of the ban on the ANC in February 1990, he was one of the first ANC leaders to return to South Africa to begin the process of negotiations.^[6]

In 1990, he was elected Chairperson of the ANC for the Southern Natal region, and took a leading role in fighting political violence in the region between members of the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). He was elected the Deputy Secretary General of the ANC the next year, and in January 1994, he was nominated as the ANC candidate for the Premiership of KwaZulu Natal.

The IFP, led by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, put particular emphasis on Zulu pride and political power during this period. In this context, Zuma's Zulu heritage made his role especially important in the ANC's efforts to end the violence, to emphasise the political (rather than tribal) roots of the violence, and to win the support of Zulu people in the region.

Rise to national leadership[link]

Zuma had experience in national leadership, as he started serving in the National Executive committee of the ANC in 1977 when the party was still a liberation movement. By the time he became its president he had served the ANC for thirty years. After the 1994 general election, with the ANC becoming a governing party but having lost KwaZulu-Natal province to the IFP, he was appointed as Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) of Economic Affairs and Tourism for the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government, after stepping aside to allow Thabo Mbeki to run unopposed for deputy presidency. In December 1994, he was elected National Chairperson of the ANC and chairperson of the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, and was re-elected to the latter position in 1996. He was elected Deputy President of the ANC at the National Conference held at Mafikeng in December 1997 and consequently appointed executive Deputy President of South Africa in June 1999.

During this time, he also worked in Kampala, Uganda, as facilitator of the Burundi peace process, along with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. Museveni chairs the Great Lakes Regional Initiative, a grouping of regional presidents overseeing the peace process in Burundi, where several armed Hutu groups took up arms in 1993 against a government and army dominated by the Tutsi minority that they claimed had assassinated the first president elected from the Hutu majority.^[20]

On 14 June 2005 Zuma was expelled from his post as Deputy President due to corruption and fraud related to the $5-billion weapons acquisition deal by the South African government in 1999. Zuma's successor as Deputy President of South Africa was Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, the wife of Bulelani Ngcuka. Mlambo-Ngcuka had been Minister of Minerals and Energy since 1999. While her appointment was widely welcomed by the business community, she was booed publicly at many ANC rallies by Zuma supporters between the time corruption charges had been filed but before rape charges were made with the first booing taking place in Utrecht.^[21]

Election as ANC President[link]

Zuma with Barack Obama and Michelle Obama in New York, 2009

In terms of party tradition, as the deputy president of the ANC, Zuma was already in line to succeed Mbeki. The party structures held their nominations conferences in October and November 2007, where Zuma appeared favourite for the post of ANC President, and, by implication, the President of South Africa in 2009.^[22][23][24] Zuma was elected President of the ANC on 18 December 2007 with 2329 votes, beating the second-term ANC and South African president Thabo Mbeki's 1505 votes. On 28 December 2007, the National Prosecuting Authority served Zuma an indictment to stand trial in the High Court on various counts of racketeering, money laundering, corruption and fraud.^[25]

President of South Africa[link]

Argentinean President Cristina Fernández and South African President Zuma speaking together.

In September 2008, the ANC ruled Thabo Mbeki unfit to rule a country, thus ending his parliamentary support and forcing his resignation from the country's presidency. It was announced that the party's deputy president, Kgalema Motlanthe, would become president until 2009 general elections, after which Zuma would become president.^[26][27] He won the election on 6 May and was sworn in as president of South Africa on 9 May 2009.

Political-economic orientation[link]

Zuma is an economic leftist, who described himself as a socialist.^[28] He has received support from trade unions and from the South African Communist Party. He also received support from women's and youth leagues of the African National Congress.^[28] According to The Guardian and The New York Times, he supports redistribution of wealth, and has allied himself with socialists and communists that seek to redistribute wealth.^[28][29] But The Guardian (UK) also reported that Zuma has tried "to reassure foreign investors their interests will be protected."

Corruption charges[link]

Zuma became embroiled in a corruption related controversy after his financial advisor, Schabir Shaik, was charged with corruption and fraud. Bulelani Ngcuka, the national director of Public Prosecutions at the time, investigated both Zuma and the Chief Whip of the ANC, Tony Yengeni, after allegations of abuse of power were levelled against them. This concerned improper influence in the controversial arms deal, and the question of financial benefit as a result of such influence. While Yengeni was found guilty, the case was dropped against Zuma, with Ngcuka stating, "...that there was prima facie evidence of corruption, but insufficient to win the case in court".^[30] Ngcuka moved to private practice after criticism from the ANC over this incident.

In 2004, Zuma became a key figure mentioned in the Schabir Shaik trial. Schabir Shaik, a Durban businessman and his financial advisor, was questioned over bribery in the course of the purchase of Valour class frigates for the South African Navy, a proposed waterfront development in Durban, and lavish spending on Zuma's residence in Nkandla. In the trial Shaik was shown to have solicited a bribe of R500 000 per annum for Zuma in return for Zuma's support for the defence contractor Thomson CSF, documented in the infamous "encrypted fax".^[31][32] On 2 June 2005, Shaik was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years in prison.^[33]

Judge Hilary Squires elaborates in detail on the numerous transactions that transpired between Zuma and Shaik, summarising with "all the accused companies were used at one time or another to pay sums of money to Jacob Zuma". The media mis-quoted Squires with the phrase "A generally corrupt relationship" (existed between Zuma and Shaik), whereas these exact words do not appear in the court transcripts.^[34] To the defence of the originators of this phrase, the full transcript^[35][36] of the judgment against Shaik actually does mention Zuma 471 times, uses word "corrupt" or "corruption" 54 times, and contains 12 sentences with both the word "corrupt" and the name "Zuma". Media sources later switched to the phrase "mutually beneficial symbiosis", from the judgment's paragraph 235: "It would be flying in the face of commonsense and ordinary human nature to think that he did not realise the advantages to him of continuing to enjoy Zuma's goodwill to an even greater extent than before 1997; and even if nothing was ever said between them to establish the mutually beneficial symbiosis that the evidence shows existed, the circumstances of the commencement and the sustained continuation thereafter of these payments, can only have generated a sense of obligation in the recipient."

After twelve days of intense media speculation about his future, President Thabo Mbeki relieved Zuma of his duties as deputy president on 14 June 2005. Mbeki told a joint sitting of parliament that "in the interest of the honourable Deputy President, the government, our young democratic system and our country, it would be best to release the honourable Jacob Zuma from his responsibilities as Deputy President of the republic and member of the cabinet." Zuma then resigned as a Member of Parliament.

In the aftermath of the Shaik trial, Zuma was formally charged with corruption by the National Prosecuting Authority. The case was struck from the roll of the Pietermaritzburg High Court after the prosecution's application for a postponement (petitioned in order to allow the NPA to secure admissible forms of documentation required as evidence) was dismissed. In dismissing the application for postponement the Court rendered moot the defence's application for a permanent stay of proceedings which would prevent Zuma from being criminally prosecuted.^[37]

Zuma's legal team continued to delay proceedings and in spite of Zuma's claim that he desired the matter to appear in court, succeeded in making critical evidence unavailable to the court resulting in the prosecution making an application for postponement on the set date. As the prosecution was not ready the case was struck from the roll after the prosecution's application for a postponement was dismissed,^[37] however Zuma's legal team was unsuccessful in its attempts to have the courts grant a permanent stay of proceedings (which would have rendered Zuma immune to prosecution on the charges). This left Zuma open to being recharged with corruption as soon as the NPA completed preparing its case.

On 8 November 2007 the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the National Prosecuting Authority with respect to appeals relating to various search and seizure exercises performed by the and rejected four appeals made by Zuma's defence team. This ruling pertained to the National Prosecuting Authority obtaining the personal diary of senior member of a French arms company, which may have provided information relating to Zuma's possible corrupt practices during the awarding of an arms deal.

On 28 December 2007, the Scorpions served Zuma an indictment to stand trial in the High Court on various counts of racketeering, money laundering, corruption and fraud. A conviction and sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year would have rendered Zuma ineligible for election to the South African Parliament and consequently he would not have been eligible to serve as President of South Africa.

Charges declared unlawful[link]

Zuma appeared in court on 4 August 2008. On 12 September 2008, Pietermaritzburg Judge Chris Nicholson held that Zuma's corruption charges were unlawful on procedural grounds in that the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions ("NDPP") did not give Zuma a chance to make representations before deciding to charge him (this is a requirement of the South Africa Constitution), and directed the state to pay legal costs.^[38][39][40] Nicholson also added, however that he believed political interference played a role in the decision to recharge Zuma, although he did not say this was the reason why he held that the charges brought against Zuma were unlawful. Nicholson also stressed that his ruling did not relate to Zuma's guilt or innocence, but was merely on a procedural point. Various media reports had incorrectly reported that the charges against Zuma had been dismissed.^[41][42] This was not the case. It remained competent for the NDPP to recharge Zuma, however, only once he had been given an opportunity to make representations to the NDPP in respect of the NDPP's decision to do so. In paragraph 47 of the Judgment, Judge Nicholson wrote,

The obligation to hear representations forms part of the audi alteram partem principle. What is required is that a person who may be adversely affected by a decision be given an opportunity to make representations with a view to procuring a favourable result. The affected person should usually be informed of the gist or the substance of the case, which he is to answer.

The Court held that the NDPP's failure to follow the procedure outlined in Section 179(5)(d) of the Constitution rendered the decision by the NDPP to recharge Zuma unlawful. Judge Nicholson found that there were various inferences to be drawn from the timing of the charges levelled against Zuma (such as the fact that he was charged soon after he was elected president of the ANC) which would warrant a conclusion that there had been a degree of political interference by the Executive arm of government. Judge Nicholson writes in paragraph 210 of his judgement,

The timing of the indictment [of Zuma] by Mr Mpshe on 28 December 2007, after the President suffered a political defeat at Polokwane was most unfortunate. This factor, together with the suspension of Mr Pikoli, who was supposed to be independent and immune from executive interference, persuade me that the most plausible inference is that the baleful political influence was continuing.

In paragraph 220 of the Judgement Judge Nicholson went on to write,

There is a distressing pattern in the behaviour which I have set out above indicative of political interference, pressure or influence. It commences with the "political leadership" given by Minister Maduna to Mr Ngcuka, when he declined to prosecute the applicant, to his communications and meetings with Thint representatives and the other matters to which I have alluded. Given the rules of evidence the court is forced to accept the inference which is the least favourable to the party's cause who had peculiar knowledge of the true facts. It is certainly more egregious than the "hint or suggestion" of political interference referred to in the Yengeni matter. It is a matter of grave concern that this process has taken place in the new South Africa given the ravages it caused under the Apartheid order."^[43]

Prior to the hearing there had been a spate of criticism of the South African Judiciary by Zuma supporters,^[44] amongst whom were some prominent legal minds, such as Paul Ngobeni^[45] In that context, the irony was that this was the third time the South African Judiciary had found in his favour, including Zuma's acquittal of the rape charge brought against him. The NDPP soon announced its intention to appeal the decision.

Charges reinstated on appeal[link]

Thabo Mbeki filed an affidavit and applied to the Constitutional Court to appeal Pietermaritzburg High Court Judge Chris Nicholson's ruling:

It was improper for the court to make such far-reaching "vexatious, scandalous and prejudicial" findings concerning me, to be judged and condemned on the basis of the findings in the Zuma matter. The interests of justice, in my respectful submission would demand that the matter be rectified. These adverse findings have led to my being recalled by my political party, the ANC – a request I have acceded to as a committed and loyal member of the ANC for the past 52 years. I fear that if not rectified, I might suffer further prejudice.^[46]

Tlali Tlali, National Prosecuting Authority spokesman, stated by phone from Pretoria, on 23 September, "We have received the papers. It's under consideration."^[47]

The judgement for the appeal was handed down on 12 January 2009 at the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bloemfontein. Deputy Judge President Louis Harmse had to rule on two aspects of the appeal. The first aspect was whether or not Zuma had the right to be invited to make representations to the NPA before they decided to reinstate charges of bribery and corruption against him. The second aspect was whether Judge Nicholson was correct in implying political meddling by the then President Thabo Mbeki with regards to the NPA's decision to charge Zuma.

On the question of the NPA's obligation to invite representations when reviewing decisions Harmse DP found that Nicholson's interpretation of section 179 of the Constitution was incorrect in that the NPA did not have such an obligation and thus was free to have charged Zuma as it did. On the question of Nicholson's inferences of political meddling by Mbeki, Harmse DP found that the lower court "overstepped the limits of its authority".

Charges dropped[link]

On 6 April 2009, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) dropped all charges against Zuma, as well as co-accused French arms company Thint, in light of new revelations about serious flaws in the prosecution.^[48] The revelations were in the form of intercepted phone calls showing that the head of the Scorpions, Leonard McCarthy, and the former National Director of Public Prosecutions, Bulelani Ngcuka, had conspired over the timing of the charges laid against Zuma, presumably to the political advantage of Zuma's political rival, President Thabo Mbeki. The announcement of the withdrawal of charges was made by the acting head of the NPA, Mokothedi Mpshe, who however stressed that the withdrawal was due to abuse which left the legal process "tainted", and did not amount to an acquittal.^[49]

Just before the NPA's announcement, however, at least two political parties intimated that they would consider legal action of their own should the charges be dropped.^[50] The Democratic Alliance subsequently filed for a judicial review of the NPA's decision, with party leader Helen Zille stating that Mpshe had "not taken a decision based in law, but [instead had] buckled to political pressure".^[51] The case was set to be heard on 9 June 2009.^[52] Whilst Zuma filed his responses timeously, Mpshe delayed the hearing of the matter, requesting two extensions to file the NPA's response. NPA spokesperson Mthunzi Mhaga said he could not file papers because there were "outstanding matters" to be resolved. Zille, the Democratic Alliance's party head contended that Zuma's response was fundamentally wrong and "devoid of any constitutional basis".^[53] Whilst the legal challenges continued, a survey showed that, as at June 2009, more than half of South Africans believed President Jacob Zuma was doing a good job. The poll, conducted by TNS Research Studies in the last half of June 2009, revealed that Zuma's approval ratings had steadily improved. Around 57% of the people polled said they thought Zuma was a capable leader – this was up 3% from April 2009 when the president was inaugurated. In November 2008, just months after former president Thabo Mbeki was recalled and when Zuma was facing graft charges, only 36% of South Africans were positive about him.^[54]

Rape charges[link]

In December 2005, Zuma was charged with raping a 31 year old woman at his home in Forest Town, Gauteng. The alleged victim was from a prominent ANC family, the daughter of a deceased struggle comrade of Zuma, and also an AIDS activist who was known to be HIV positive. Zuma denied the charges and claimed that the sex was consensual.

A crowd of supporters and the curious outside the Johannesburg High Court.

Even before charges were filed, as rumours about rape accusations surfaced later in November, Zuma's political prospects began to appear to take a turn for the worse. Most of his higher-level political supporters could not respond to these new charges the way they had the corruption charges. In a hearing prior to the rape trial, a group of thousands of his supporters gathered near the courthouse, as a smaller gathering of anti-rape groups demonstrated on behalf of the alleged rape victim.^[55] As he did throughout the trial, Zuma sang Lethu Mshini Wami (Bring me my machine gun) with the crowd, and ANC Youth League and Communist Party Youth League spokesmen spoke in support of Zuma.^[56]

As the rape trial proceeded, reports surfaced that the South African Communist Party was severely divided over how to address the issue of Zuma and the SACP's relationship to him. Many members of the party's youth wing supported Zuma while others in the SACP were sceptical about the value of rallying behind a particular person as opposed to emphasising principles of governance.^[57][58][59]

Despite the defection of some former supporters, many Zuma supporters continued to rally outside the courthouse, arousing criticism by anti-rape groups for regular attacks on the integrity and moral standing of Zuma's accuser, insults yelled at a close friend of the accuser, and even stones thrown at a woman that members of the crowd mistook for the accuser.^[60] Zuma's defence team introduced evidence relating to the woman's sexual past, and asserted that the sex that took place was consensual. The prosecution asserted that her lack of resistance was due to a state of shock, and that the relationship between the two was like that of a 'father-daughter' pair.^[61][62]

The trial also generated political controversy when Zuma, who at the time headed the National AIDS Council, admitted that he had not used a condom when having sex with the woman who now accuses him of rape, despite knowing that she was HIV-positive. He stated in court that he took a shower afterwards to "cut the risk of contracting HIV". This statement was condemned by the judge, health experts, and AIDS activists. The popular South African comic strip, Madam & Eve, and well known political cartoonist, Zapiro, repeatedly lampooned the matter. HIV educators emphasised that this would do nothing to prevent HIV transmission.^[63]

On 8 May 2006, the court found Zuma not guilty of rape, agreeing with Zuma that the sexual act in question was consensual. Judge van der Merwe lambasted the accuser for lying to the court, but also censured Zuma for his recklessness.

As his rape trial ended, many South Africans wondered how their political system would recover from the rifts that Zuma's trials have exposed. A Mail and Guardian analysis saw these events as especially troubling:

The political damage is incalculable, with the ruling African National Congress now an openly divided and faltering movement. This has had a domino effect on the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions, which have floundered and fractured in the face of damaging charges against a man they ardently backed as the country's next president.

The trial has been fought against the backdrop of a bitter succession war between Mbeki and Zuma... Mbeki's support in the ANC has crumbled, with the party faithful refusing to accept that he will anoint a leader... But even Zuma's most diehard supporters privately acknowledge that he cannot now be president, regardless of the trial outcome.^[64]

Nonetheless, Business Day's Karima Brown told The Guardian after the rape trial's verdict was handed down, "Jacob Zuma is back. This poses a serious dilemma for the ANC leadership. Now Zuma is marching back into Luthuli House [the ANC party HQ]. He will demand to be reinstated as deputy president and the others will find it difficult to block him ... This is a major victory for Zuma's political career."^[65]

The prospect of Zuma's return as a contender for the presidency caused concern for international investors. An Independent analyst suggested, "The fear of seeing Zuma and his crowd marching to the Union Buildings wielding machine guns is unnerving mostly to the middle class and businessmen, according to recent surveys."^[66]

Continued support after corruption charges[link]

While serving as deputy president, Zuma enjoyed considerable support in parts of the left wing of the ANC, including many in the ANC Youth League, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)^{[citation needed]}. While Zuma faced corruption charges, these organisations remained supportive of him. The influence of the semi-autonomous structures within the party helped Zuma retain support even as he was removed from the deputy presidency of the country.^{[citation needed]}

Zuma's dismissal was interpreted in two ways. Many international observers hailed it as a clear sign that the South African government was dedicated to rooting out corruption within its own ranks. On the other hand, some within South Africa focused on the fact that Zuma and Mbeki represent different constituencies within the African National Congress. Some left-wing supporters claimed that Mbeki and his more market-oriented wing of the party had conspired to oust Zuma to entrench their dominance in the ANC.^[67]

Zuma's cause rallied large crowds of supporters at each of his corruption-related court appearances in 2005. At one court date, Zuma supporters burned t-shirts with Mbeki's picture on them, which earned the condemnation of the ANC; Zuma and his allies urged a return to party discipline for subsequent gatherings. At the next court date in November, Zuma supporters numbering in the thousands gathered to support him; he addressed the Durban crowd in Zulu, urging party unity and singing the apartheid-era struggle song Lethu Mshini Wami with lyrics that translate literally as "bring me my machine" but understood to refer to a machine gun. At an October tour for the ANC Youth League elsewhere in the country, Zuma also earned the cheers of large crowds. While his political strength is at least partly based on his relationships within intra-party politics, one analyst argued that his supporters' loyalty could be explained as rooted in a Zulu approach to loyalty and mutual aid.^[68]

Because of his support among elements of the party, Zuma remained a powerful political figure, retaining a high position in the ANC even after his dismissal as the country's deputy president. A panel of political analysts convened in November 2005 agreed that if he was to be found innocent of the corruption charges brought against him, it would be hard for any other potential ANC candidate to beat Zuma in the race for the country's presidency in 2009. However, these analysts also questioned whether Zuma was indeed a left-wing candidate of the sort that many of his supporters seem to seek, and noted that the global and national economic constraints that have shaped Mbeki's presidency would be no different in the next presidential term.^[69]

Personal life[link]

Wives[link]

Jacob Zuma is a polygamist who has been married six times^[70][71] and in 2007 it has been alleged that he had 18 children.^[72]

1. Gertrude Sizakele Khumalo, whom he met in 1959 and married shortly after his release from prison in 1973.^[73] She lives at his home at Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal. They have no children.
2. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a cabinet minister since 1999, with whom he has four children, Msholozi (born 1982), Gugulethu (born 1985), Thuli (Nokuthula Nomaqhawe) (born 1987) and Thuthu (Thuthukile Xolile Nomonde) (born 1988). They divorced in June 1998.^[74]
3. Kate Mantsho, from Mozambique, with whom he had five children, Mxolisi Saady (born 1980), twins Duduzile and Duduzane (born 1984), Phumzile (born 1989) and Vusi (born 1993). She committed suicide on 8 December 2000.^[74]
4. Nompumelelo Ntuli (MaNtuli), married on 8 January 2008. Ntuli, born 1975, is a resident of KwaMaphumulo near Stanger and has three children with Zuma—Thandisiwe, born 2002, Sinqobile, born February 2006 and Manqoba Kholwani born August 2010.^[74]
5. Thobeka Stacie Madiba (born Mabhija, her mother's name), married 4 January 2010 with whom he has one child.^[75] Zuma paid lobola to her clan in 2007. Their child was born in October 2007. She has another of Zuma's out-of-wedlock children living with her.^[75] Mabhija grew up in Umlazi, where she matriculated at Umlazi Commercial High School. She has worked at Standard Bank, Ithala, Cell C and SA Homeloans in La Lucia.^[76][77][78]
6. Gloria Bongekile Ngema, married on 20 April 2012. The wedding took place in Nkandla and was attended by Zuma's three other wives. Following a traditional ceremony known as umgcagco, the bridal party participated in a traditional Zulu competitive celebratory dance. Ngema has one son, Sinqumo (born 2005), with Zuma.^[3]

Fiancées[link]

1. Zuma paid 10 cattle as lobola for Swazi Princess Sebentile Dlamini in 2002.^[79]

Other children[link]

• He has another son, Edward, with Minah Shongwe, sister of Judge Jeremiah Shongwe, who asked to be recused from Zuma's rape trial because of the liaison.^[80]
• He has two daughters, born 18 January 1998 and 19 September 2002, with Pietermaritzburg businesswoman Priscilla Nonkwaleko Mhlongo.^[81]
• There are reports of four other children – three from a woman from Johannesburg and one from a woman from Richard's Bay.^[75]

2009 "love-child"[link]

In January 2010, The Sunday Times reported that Sonono Khoza, the daughter of Irvin Khoza, gave birth to Zuma's 20th child on 8 October 2009, a daughter called Thandekile Matina Zuma.^[82][83]

On 3 February, Zuma responded, confirming that the child was his, and that he had paid inhlawulo, acknowledging paternity. He protested the publishing of the child's name, saying it was illegal exploitation of the child. He denied that the incident had relevance to the government's AIDS programme, and appealed for privacy.^[84] On 6 February, Zuma said he "deeply regretted the pain that he caused to his family, the ANC, the alliance and South Africans in general."^[85] The office of the presidency's comment was that it was a private matter.^[86]

The mother of the child said: "What baby are you talking about? I have two children. They are in school. These are people's lives. Let me be," she told the Sowetan.^[87]

Government reaction[link]

The ANC defended Zuma, saying it saw no links between its policies on HIV/AIDS and Mr Zuma's personal life.^[88] ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema, said "We are Africans and sitting here all of us, Zuma is our father so we are not qualified to talk about that". Malema said the ANCYL would emphasise its HIV programme and "one boyfriend, one girlfriend" stance in an awareness campaign across the country.^[89] ANC Women's League deputy president Nosipho Dorothy Ntwanambi said: "it is not right to have an extramarital affair if you have committed to yourself to a marriage. But under the Customary Marriages Act, if the first wife agrees, and if all these issues are discussed with her, we can't do anything."^[90] On 5 February, the ANC acknowledged the widespread disapproval by saying that the experience had "taught us many valuable lessons", and they had listened to the people.^[91]

COSATU, an ANC alliance partner, passed no judgment but hoped that it will be "a matter on Zuma's conscience"^[91] Vavi reiterated Zuma's appeal this week that the president be accorded his "right to privacy" and the child protected from undue publicity.

Opposition reaction[link]

Helen Zille of the Democratic Alliance said Zuma contradicted his public message of safe sex to South Africans, among the worst sufferers of AIDS.^[92] She said it was wrong to say it was purely a private matter, and elected public officials had to embody the principles and values for which they stand.^[93]

The African Christian Democratic Party said Zuma was undermining the government's drive to persuade people to practise safe sex to combat HIV and Aids.^[92]

The Congress of the People (COPE) said Zuma could no longer use African cultural practices to justify his "promiscuity".^[92]

Independent Democrats leader Patricia de Lille, said Zuma was asking people "to do as I say and not as I do".^[94]

Zuma and Zimbabwe[link]

The African National Congress, of which Zuma is now president, historically has considered the ZANU-PF party a natural ally, born out of mutual struggle against white oppression. Former South African president Thabo Mbeki has never publicly criticised Mugabe's policies – preferring "quiet diplomacy" rather than "megaphone diplomacy", his term for the harsh Western condemnations of Mugabe's leadership.^[95][96] However, the left of the party and extra-party organisations such as the ANC Youth League, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) have advocated for a tougher stance on Zimbabwe.^[97][98] It is from these organisations that Zuma derives his support.

Zuma's stance on Zimbabwe has been mixed. In a 2006 interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, he expressed more sympathetic sentiments towards Mugabe, saying that "Europeans often ignore the fact that Mugabe is very popular among Africans. In their eyes, he has given blacks their country back after centuries of colonialism." He continued: "The people love him, so how can we condemn him? Many in Africa believe that there is a racist aspect to European and American criticism of Mugabe. Millions of blacks died in Angola, the Republic of Congo and Rwanda. A few whites lost their lives in Zimbabwe, unfortunately, and already the West is bent out of shape."^[99]

However, by December 2007, he was more forthright in criticising Zimbabwe's leadership, increasingly defining his own policy in contrast to that of Mbeki:

It is even more tragic that other world leaders who witness repression pretend it is not happening, or is exaggerated. When history eventually deals with the dictators, those who stood by and watched should also bear the consequences. A shameful quality of the modern world is to turn away from injustice and ignore the hardships of others.^[100]

Zuma criticised Mbeki, accusing him of being lenient on dictators.^[101]

Following the disputed elections in Zimbabwe on 29 March 2008, he became critical of the election process in Zimbabwe^[102] referring to delays in the outcome as "suspicious".^[103] In a press conference on 24 June, he asserted: "We cannot agree with ZANU-PF. We cannot agree with them on values. We fought for the right of people to vote, we fought for democracy."^[104] At an ANC dinner in July, he rebuked Mugabe for refusing to step down.^[105]

Zuma vs the media[link]

As a backlash to the frenzied media following of his rape trial, Zuma filed a series of defamation lawsuits on 30 June 2006 against various South African media outlets for publishing content that allegedly besmirched his public profile, in the form of cartoons, commentary, photos and parody pieces. The media outlets that came under fire were The Star for R 20 million, Rapport for R 10 million, Highveld Stereo for R 6 million, The Citizen for R 5 million, Sunday Sun for R 5 million, Sunday Independent for R 5 million, and Sunday World for R 5 million.

Zuma appointed Former Conservative Party MP advocate Jurg Prinsloo, as well as Wycliffe Mothuloe to tackle his so-called "crucifixion by the media". Zuma said:^[106]

For a period of five years my person has been subjected to all types of allegations and innuendo, paraded through the media and other corridors of influence without these allegations having being [sic] tested. I have thereby been denied my constitutional right to reply and defend myself.

The response from the challenged media was highly critical, and written protests to various media outlets accused Zuma of challenging their freedom of speech.

Zuma was parodied further in an advertisement for Pronto Condoms, using his famous shower statement.^[107]

In 2012, Zuma featured in a satirical painting by Cape Town-based artist Brett Murray, who depicted him in his painting The Spear, in a pose similar to Lenin, but with his genitals exposed. The ANC responded by threatening court action against the gallery showing the painting, and further demanding that the image should be removed from online sources. The subsequent aggressive sharing of the image through social networks can be considered a form of the Streisand Effect.^[108][109] On 22 May 2012, the painting was vandalized while it was hanging in an art gallery in Johannesburg. The face and genitals of Zuma were painted over.^[110]

Political positions[link]

Remarks on same-sex marriage[link]

Zuma was criticised by gay and lesbian groups after he criticised same-sex marriage at a Heritage Day celebration on 24 September 2006 in Stanger, saying that same-sex marriage was "a disgrace to the nation and to God": "When I was growing up, an ungqingili (a homosexual) would not have stood in front of me. I would knock him out."^[111]

The Joint Working Group (an LGBT advocacy coalition) questioned Zuma's leadership skills and stated that a "true leader leads with intellect and wisdom – not popularity or favour. How can a narrow-minded person like this be expected to lead our nation?"^[112] Zuma subsequently apologised to those who were offended by the statement,^[113] stating, "I also respect, acknowledge and applaud the sterling contribution of many gay and lesbian compatriots in the struggle that brought about our freedom, and the role they continue to play in the building of a successful non-racial, non-discriminatory South Africa."

Remarks on Western Sahara[link]

Habib Defouad, Morocco's ambassador to South Africa, criticised Zuma's support for the independence of Western Sahara in June 2007.^[114] The ANC has since the 1970s supported the Sahrawi independence movement Front Polisario, under both Mandela and Mbeki. In 2004 South Africa recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, or SADR, as a legitimate government-in-exile.

Remarks on teenage pregnancy[link]

Zuma's solution to pregnancy in South African teenagers is to confiscate their babies and have the mothers taken to colleges and "forced" to obtain degrees.^[115][116]

Remarks on the Second Coming[link]

Zuma also drew censure from religious and secular groups alike when he declared that the ANC would rule South Africa until the return of Jesus Christ, and that its continued governance was just what God wanted:

God expects us to rule this country because we are the only organisation which was blessed by pastors when it was formed. It is even blessed in Heaven. That is why we will rule until Jesus comes back. We should not allow anyone to govern our city when we are ruling the country.^[117][118]

Zuma later defended his remarks by describing them as a "political expression": "Talking about Jesus is not abusing his name; it's actually saying historically, 'This is what the ANC is all about.' It's just a political expression that we are strong and will be strong for a long time. I want to apologise if this reality sits uncomfortably with others."^[119] He added that he had been baptised and knew Jesus: "I fear God [.... I]t's not because I'm despising God, not at all."^[119]

Remarks on Afrikaners[link]

Not long before the NPA dropped its corruption case against him, Zuma met with controversy once again. Speaking at the Hilton Hotel in Sandton, Johannesburg, whose Afrikaans community he was addressing (not, he claimed, for electioneering purposes), Zuma said,

Of all the white groups that are in South Africa, it is only the Afrikaners that are truly South Africans in the true sense of the word.

Up to this day, they don't carry two passports; they carry one. They are here to stay.^[119]

Addressing the matter of apartheid, Zuma employed wry humour in praising ironically the "innovative" Afrikaner approach to protests, which couched its crimes in terms like "separate development". He also confronted the matter of police corruption, declaring that "you cannot put the trust of the country to a person who is actually a criminal."^[119]

Controversy[link]

Shaik's parole[link]

In March 2009, Schabir Shaik was released from prison just 28 months into his fifteen-year sentence. He had been granted medical parole, a leniency meant only for the terminally ill, despite the opinion of his doctors that he was fighting fit and free for hospital discharge.

Media speculation had it that Zuma may have played a role in this eventuality, but the ANC President's spokesman firmly denied it. Only days before, however, he had publicly stated that, as President of South Africa, he would personally ensure Shaik's release.^[120]

Ngcobo's nomination as Chief Justice[link]

On 6 August 2009, Zuma nominated Sandile Ngcobo as Chief Justice of South Africa,^[121] drawing criticism from four opposition groups.^[122] On 1 October 2009, the appointment was confirmed. The Democratic Alliance, the Congress of the People, the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Independent Democrats accused Zuma of failing to consult properly ahead of his nomination of Ngcobo. The opposition urged Zuma to restart the process from scratch saying they would prefer current Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke for the post.^[123]

Failure to disclose assets after taking office as President of South Africa[link]

Zuma, as President of South Africa, was required to declare his financial interests within 60 days of taking office. But, as of March 2010, he had failed to do so, nine months after taking office. This led to calls for him to do so by opposition parties, and ANC alliance partner COSATU.^[124] ANC spokesman Brian Sokutu stated that Zuma constituted a "special case", because of his "large family" making it difficult to declare his assets. The ANC later distanced itself from this statement.^[125] Zuma disclosed his interests shortly after.^[126]

Alleged abuses by bodyguards[link]

In 2010, Zuma's bodyguards were implicated in multiple incidents involving members of the public and journalists. In February, a Cape Town student, Chumani Maxwele was detained by police after allegedly showing Zuma's motorcade a "rude gesture". Maxwele, an active ANC member,^[127] was released after 24 hours, having provided a written apology to police, which he later claimed was coerced. He also claimed that his home had been raided by plain clothes policemen, and that he had been forced into the vehicle at gunpoint. Maxwele later instituted legal action against the police,^[128] and a complaint was filed on his behalf to the Human Rights Commission.^[129] The incident led to a heated dispute when it was discussed in Parliament.^[130]

In March, Journalist Tshepo Lesole was forced to delete pictures of Zuma's convoy from his camera by police, and two photographers were detained by police when photographing Zuma's Johannesburg home.^{[131][citation needed]} Sky News reporter Emma Hurd claimed she had been pushed, manhandled and "groped" by Zuma's bodyguards in 2009.^[132]

"Shoot the Boer" song[link]

On January 8th, 2012, after giving a speech at the ANC Centennial 2012 celebrations in Bloemfontein, South Africa, president Jacob Zuma sang the lyrics "shoot the Boer."^[133][134] This is the same song that got Julius Malema convicted of hate speech.^[135][136]

See also[link]

	South Africa portal
	Biography portal

• Schabir Shaik trial

Filmography[link]

• The Passion of Jacob Zuma, French documentary by Jean-Baptiste Dusséaux and Matthieu Niango (France Ô, 2009)
• Motherland (film), 2009 Documentary^[137] directed by Owen Alik Shahadah

References[link]