A Hukou refers to the system of 'class system' residency permits which dates back to ancient China, where household registration is required by law in the People's Republic of China (China) and in the Republic of China (Taiwan).

A household registration record officially identifies a person as a resident of an area and includes identifying information such as name, parents, spouse, and date of birth.

A hukou can also refer to a family register in many contexts since the household registration record (simplified Chinese: 户籍謄本; traditional Chinese: 戶籍謄本; pinyin: hùjí téngběn) is issued per family, and usually includes the births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and moves, of all members in the family. A similar household registration system exists within the public administration structures of Japan (koseki), Vietnam (Hộ khẩu), and North Korea (Hoju). In South Korea the Hoju system was abolished on 1 January 2008.

Nomenclature[link]

The formal name for the system is "huji." Within the huji system, a "hukou" is the registered residency status of a particular individual in this system. "Hukou" is more commonly used in everyday conversation. "Hukou" has been adopted by English-language audiences to refer to both the huji system and an individual's hukou.

History[link]

Family registers were in existence in China as early as the Xia Dynasty (c. 2100 BCE - 1600 BCE). In the centuries which followed, the family register developed into an organization of families and clans for purposes of taxation, conscription and social control.^{[citation needed]}

According to the Examination of Hukou in Wenxian Tongkao published in 1317, there was a minister for population management during the Zhou Dynasty named Simin (Chinese: 司民), who was responsible for recording births, deaths, emigrations and immigrations. The Rites of Zhou notes that three copies of documents were kept in different places. The administrative divisions in Zhou Dynasty were a function of the distance to the state capital. The top division nearest the capital was named Dubi (Chinese: 都鄙), top division in more distant areas were named Xiang (Chinese: 鄉) and Sui (Chinese: 遂). Families are organized under the Baojia system.

Guan Zhong, Prime Minister of the Qi state 7th century BCE, imposed different taxation and conscription policies on different areas.^[1] In addition, Guan Zhong also banned immigration, emigration, and separation of families without permission.^[2] In the Book of Lord Shang, Shang Yang also described his policy restricting immigrations and emigrations.^[3]

Xiao He, the first Chancellor of the Han Dynasty, added the chapter of Hu (Chinese: 户律) as one of the nine basic laws of Han (Chinese: 九章律), and established the Hukou system as the basis of tax revenue and conscription.

Household registration in China[link]

Hukou certificate of P.R.C.

The Communist Party instigated a command economy when it came to power in 1949. In 1958, the Chinese government officially promulgated the family register system to control the movement of people between urban and rural areas. Individuals were broadly categorised as a "rural" or "urban" worker.^[4] A worker seeking to move from the country to urban areas to take up non-agricultural work would have to apply through the relevant bureaucracies. The number of workers allowed to make such moves was tightly controlled. Migrant workers would require six passes to work in provinces other than their own.^[5] People who worked outside their authorized domain or geographical area would not qualify for grain rations, employer-provided housing, or health care.^[6] There were controls over education, employment, marriage and so on.^[4]

Rationale[link]

With its large rural population of poor farm workers, hukou limited mass migration from the land to the cities to ensure some structural stability. The hukou system was an instrument of the command economy. By regulating labour, it ensured an adequate supply of low cost workers to the plethora of state owned businesses.^[7] Like the internal passports of the Soviet Union, the hukou system allowed the state to provide preferential treatment to industrial workers and intelligentsia who would be more likely to protest and even revolt during periods of unrest.^{[citation needed]}

For some time, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security continued to justify the hukou system on public order grounds, and also provided demographic data for government central planning.^[8]

The Hukou system has been justified by some scholars as increasing the stability of China by better monitoring of "targeted persons", people who are politically dubious by the Party's standards. This is still a significant function as of 2006.^[9]

Enforcement[link]

From around 1953 to 1976, Police would periodically round up those who were without valid residence permit, place them in detention centres and expel them from cities.^[10]

Administration regulations issued in 1982 known as "custody and repatriation" authorized police to detain people, and "repatriate" them to their permanent residency location.

Although an individual is technically required to live in the area designated on his/her permit, in practice the system has largely broken down. After the Chinese economic reforms, it became possible for some to unofficially migrate and get a job without a valid permit. Economic reforms also created pressures to encourage migration from the interior to the coast. It also provided incentives for officials not to enforce regulations on migration.

Technology has made it easier to enforce the Hukou system as now the police force has a national database of official Hukou registrations. This was made possible by computerisation in the 1990s, as well as greater co-operation between the different regional police authorities.^[9]

During the Great Leap Forward's famine[link]

During the mass famine of the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1962, having an urban versus a rural hukou could mean the difference between life and death.^[11] During this period, nearly all of the approximately 600 million rural hukou residents were collectivized into village communal farms, where their agricultural output - after state taxes - would be their only source of food. With institutionalized exaggeration of output figures by local Communist leaders and massive declines in production, state taxes during those years confiscated nearly all food in many rural communes, leading to mass starvation and the deaths of more than 30 million Chinese.^[12]

The 100 million urban hukou residents, however, were fed by fixed food rations established by the central government, which declined to an average of 1500 calories per day at times but still allowed survival for almost all during the famine. An estimated 95% or higher of all deaths occurred among rural hukou holders. With the suppression of news internally, many city residents were not aware that mass deaths were occurring in the countryside at all, which was essential to preventing organized opposition to Mao's scheme.^[13]

Many of the starving peasants tried to flee to the cities to beg for food, but tight security at entry points and through regular inspections of resident documents on the streets led to the deportation and subsequent death of most. In fact, it was only when rural family members of higher military officers, who were often isolated from the countryside in cities or bases, began dying from starvation that higher Communist officials began seriously worrying about the stability of the state, and eventually forced Mao to end the program. This was the most extreme demonstration of how much impact a different hukou could have in China, but significant interference in all aspects of life only began declining in the 1980s and 1990s.

Effect on rural workers[link]

From around 1953 to 1976, the restriction of a citizen's rights by his domicile caused rural citizens to be separated into an underclass. Urban citizens enjoyed a range of social, economic and cultural benefits that China's rural citizens did not receive.^[7] The ruling party did however make some concessions to rural workers to make life in rural areas "survivable... if not easy or pleasant".^[14]

From 1978 to 2001, while China changed from state socialism to market capitalism, export-processing zones were created in city suburbs and migrants, most of them female, ^[15] worked there under conditions far below the contemporary standard of western countries.^{[14] [5]}There were restrictions upon the mobility of migrant workers that forced them to live precarious lives in company dormitories or shanty towns where they were exposed to abusive treatment.^[16]

The impact of the hukou system upon migrant laborers became onerous in the 1980s after hundreds of millions were ejected from state corporations and cooperatives.^[5] Since the 1980s, an estimated 200 million Chinese live outside their officially registered areas and under far less eligibility to education and government services, living therefore in a condition similar in many ways to that of illegal immigrants.^[7] The millions of peasants who have left their land remain trapped at the margins of the urban society. They are often blamed for rising crime and unemployment and under pressure from their citizens, the city governments have imposed discriminatory rules.^[4] For example, the children of "Nong Min Gong - 农民工" (farmer workers) are not allowed to enroll in the city schools, and even now must live with their grandparents or other relatives in order to attend school in their hometowns. They are commonly referred to as the home-staying children. There are around 130 million such home-staying children, living without their parents, as reported by Chinese researchers.^[17]

Comparison with other systems[link]

The hukou system, being partially hereditary, has been likened to South Africa's apartheid system.^[18][19][20] Two areas differ from South Africa's apartheid system: Firstly, under a system called xia fang, or "sending down", individuals or groups of urban workers were sometimes re-classified as rural workers and banished to the countryside (at lower wages and benefits), often as a sentence for "bourgeois imperialist crimes" during the Cultural Revolution; by contrast, white workers in South Africa were never sent to work in Bantustans. Second, the ideology driving China's apartheid system was Maoism, not racism.^[14] More significantly it is possible to move up from a rural to an urban hukou by obtaining a college degree and gaining employment with a corporation or the government.

Some China-based scholars claim that though the Hukou system is discriminatory, it is not significantly different than the passport system keeping people from developing countries from resettling in the West.^[9]

Reform[link]

Reformation of hukou has been controversial in the PRC. It is a system widely regarded as unfair by citizens of the PRC, but there is also fear that its liberalization would lead to massive movement of people into the cities, causing strain to city government services, damage to the rural economies, and increase in social unrest and crime.

And yet, there has been recognition that hukou is an impediment to economic development. China's accession to the World Trade Organization has forced it to allow reformation to hukou in order to liberate the movement of labor for the benefit of the economy.^[21]

Further relaxation of the system has happened since the 1990s. A provision was made to allow the rural resident to buy "temporary urban residency permits" so the resident could work legally within the cities. The fee for these permits decreased over time and have become reasonably affordable. The inheritance of hukou was changed to allow succession through the lines of both the father and the mother, which corrected the disadvantage of hukou against rural women.^[20]

Hukou has been further weakened since 2001. In 2003, after protests over the death of Sun Zhigang alarmed the government, the laws of custody and repatriation were repealed.^[20] By 2004 over 100 million rural citizens were working in cities, according to the estimate of the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture.

Chan and Buckingham's (2008) article, "Is China Abolishing its Hukou System," argues that previous reforms have not fundamentally changed the hukou system, but have only decentralized the powers of hukou to local governments. The present hukou system remains active and continues to contribute to China's rural and urban disparity.

The system is currently only partially enforced, and it has been argued that the system will have to be further relaxed in order to increase availability of skilled workers to industries.^[22]

Household registration in Taiwan[link]

When Taiwan was under Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945, the Japanese government maintained the same system of household registration (koseki) as they did in other parts of the Empire of Japan. This system of household registration, with minor changes, has been continued. Records concerning native Taiwanese are fairly complete. Records of mainlanders date back to the date they first applied for registration with the local household registration office, and are based on information provided by the applicant.

While all ROC nationals, including overseas Chinese with no connection to Taiwan, can apply for a ROC passport, proper household registration is required for obtaining a ROC ID Card, which is often used as proof of citizenship, such as in national elections, and an ID number is needed to open bank accounts. Unlike in China, residency can be easily changed with the local authorities and household registration does not serve as a tool to limit a resident's movements within Taiwan.

Special administrative regions[link]

Hukou is not employed in the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau, though identification cards are mandatory for residents there.

See also[link]

	China portal
	People's Republic of China portal
	Republic of China portal

• Propiska
• Internal passport
• Dangan
• REAL ID Act
• Domicile (law)

References[link]

Wong DFK, Chang, YL, He XS. Rural migrant workers in urban China: living a marginalised life Int J Soc Welfare 2007: 16: 32–40. © 2007 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the International Journal of Social Welfare.

External links[link]

• Visa Reciprocity and Country Documents Finder - Taiwan
• SOUTH KOREA: Male-Oriented Family Registry System to Change in 2008
• Wang Jianshuo: Hukou system in China
• Congressional-Executive Commission on China: Recent Chinese Hukou Reforms
• [1]

This biographical article needs additional citations for verification. Please help by adding reliable sources. Contentious material about living persons that is unsourced or poorly sourced must be removed immediately, especially if potentially libelous or harmful. (August 2010)

Jonathan Fenby (born 11 November 1942) is a founding partner and Managing Director of the China team at Trusted Sources^[1], the emerging markets research and consultancy firm headquartered in London. His investment and strategy research is focused towards China's policy interpretation, politics and broader political economy^[2]. He is also an author^[3] and journalist^[4], and was Editor of The Observer newspaper from 1993-1995 and then Editor of the South China Morning Post from 1995-2000, during the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. He had earlier been Deputy Editor of The Guardian (1988-93), Home Editor of The Independent (at launch 1986-8), and Editor of Reuters World Service (1973-7). He was also chief correspondent for The Economist in France and Germany (1981-6) and wrote three books during that period.

Since returning to London from Hong Kong in 2000, he has worked at various on-line services and as Associate Editor of the newspaper, Sunday Business. Between 1998 and 2008, he published ten books, five on China and others on the Second World War and France^[5]. He contributes to a wide range of publications in the UK, US and Far East and broadcasts often^[6][7], as well as speaking at conferences and lecturing at universities and public forums on China.

He was named a Commander of the British Empire (CBE) in 2000 and a Chevalier of the French Order of Merit in 1991. He is a board member of the European Journalism Centre^[8] and the Belgian-British Conference.

Publications[link]

• Tiger Head, Snake Tails: China today, how it got there and where it is heading, Simon & Schuster, 2012. ISBN-13: 9781847373939
• The History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, Penguin Press and Harper Collins. ISBN 978-0-7139-9832-0
• Dealing with the Dragon: A Year in the New Hong Kong, ISBN 978-1-55970-559-2
• China's Journey, 1850-1949
• The Seventy Wonders of China
• Dragon Throne: the imperial dynasties of China
• On the Brink: The Trouble with France, ISBN 978-0-349-11491-0
• Alliance: The Inside Story of How Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill Won One War and Began Another, by Jonathan Fenby.
• Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the China He lost
• The Sinking of the Lancastria: Britain's Worst Naval Disaster and Churchill's Cover-up
• The General: Charles de Gaulle and The France He Saved, Simon and Schuster, 2010. ISBN 978-1-84737-392-2
• Jonathan Fenby China blog

References[link]

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Chinese People shopping

The term Chinese people may refer to any of the following:

• People with Han Chinese ethnicity (often simply referred to as "Chinese" or "ethnic Chinese" in English).^[1]
• The Zhonghua minzu, a supra-ethnic concept which includes all 56 ethnic groups living in China that are officially recognized by the government of the People's Republic of China, such as Han, Zhuang, Manchu, Tibetans, and other established ethnic groups who have lived within the borders of China since at least the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911).^[2]
• People who hold citizenship of the People's Republic of China (mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau).^[1]
• People who hold citizenship of Republic of China (Taiwan) (See political status of Taiwan).^[3]

Race (hereditary reasons), nationality, citizenship, place of residence (geographical factors), and ancestry (historical and genealogical factors) can be used to define someone as Chinese.

See also[link]

China portal

• List of ethnic groups in China
• Chinese nationality
• Overseas Chinese

Note[link]

References[link]

• Chinese Ethnic Minorities

External links[link]

• The Ranking of Ethnic Chinese Population, Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, Republic of China, http://www.ocac.gov.tw/english/public/public.asp?selno=1163&no=1163&level=B, retrieved 2008-11-02  (covers the years 2004 and 2005)

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Sketch of the location of the original Zhegguo Canal

The Zhengguo Canal, Zhengguoqu or Chengkuo Canal (simplified Chinese: 郑国渠; traditional Chinese: 鄭國渠; pinyin: Zhèng Guó Qú), named after its designer, Zheng Guo, is a large canal located in Shaanxi province, China. The canal irrigates the Guanzhong plain, north of Xi'an. Together with the Dujiangyan Irrigation System and Lingqu Canal, it is one of the three biggest water conservation projects before the Qin Dynasty in ancient China^[1]. The canal connects the Jing and Luo rivers, northern tributaries of the Wei River.

History[link]

Historian Sima Qian in his Records of the Grand Historian wrote of the Zhengguo Canal:

But Han heard that Qin was fond of embarking on enterprises, so with the intention of causing its energies to be dissipated and in order to prevent it from making an attack to the east, it accordingly dispatched a water engineer named Zheng Guo to give controversial advice to Qin by making it excavate a canal from the Jing River west of Mount Zhong as far as Hukou, from where it was to go east along the Northern Mountains and flow into the Luo. It would be more than 300 li long, and the intention would be to use it to irrigate the fields. When it was half completed the true purpose was realized, and Qin intended to kill Zheng Guo, but Zheng Guo said: ‘At first I was acting in order to cause dissension, but when the canal is completed it will surely be a benefit to Qin.’ Qin thought this was true, so in the end had the progress on the canal continued. When the canal did make further progress, it was used to cause the stagnant waters to flow, and irrigate the salty land over an area of more than 40,000 qing, so that the harvest totalled one zhong per mou. Thereupon the area within the passes was turned into fertile but uncultivated land, and there were no calamitous years, and thus Qin became rich and strong, and in the end unified the feudal states. Because of this it was called the Zheng Guo Canal.

—Sima Qian, Shiji^[2]

The plan to drain the resources of the State of Qin back-fired as Qin successfully completed the canal, which irrigated c. 27 000 square kilometres of additional agricultural land, providing the kingdom with sufficient resources to increase the size of its already massive armies. To this day the land surrounding the Zhengguo Canal is extremely fertile.^[3]

By the time of its completion in 246 BC, during the Han Dynasty, the canal was already much silted. Under the supervision of Bai Gong, a new canal was cut to feed the irrigation in 95 BC. For the next 2000 years re-cutting and moving the canal's feeder mouth upstream of the Jing River became a pattern as silt built up in the canals and river deepened its bed, diminishing water flow and the efficiency of the system.^[3]

See also[link]

• Dujiangyan Irrigation System
• Lingqu Canal
• Grand Canal of China

References[link]

Coordinates: 34°35′09″N 108°46′33″E / 34.58583°N 108.77583°E / 34.58583; 108.77583

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