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Computer security is a branch of computer technology known as information security as applied to computers and networks. The objective of computer security includes protection of information and property from theft, corruption, or natural disaster, while allowing the information and property to remain accessible and productive to its intended users. The term computer system security means the collective processes and mechanisms by which sensitive and valuable information and services are protected from publication, tampering or collapse by unauthorized activities or untrustworthy individuals and unplanned events respectively. The strategies and methodologies of computer security often differ from most other computer technologies because of its somewhat elusive objective of preventing unwanted computer behavior instead of enabling wanted computer behavior.

Security by design[link]

The technologies of computer security are based on logic. As security is not necessarily the primary goal of most computer applications, designing a program with security in mind often imposes restrictions on that program's behavior.

There are 4 approaches to security in computing, sometimes a combination of approaches is valid:

1. Trust all the software to abide by a security policy but the software is not trustworthy (this is computer insecurity).
2. Trust all the software to abide by a security policy and the software is validated as trustworthy (by tedious branch and path analysis for example).
3. Trust no software but enforce a security policy with mechanisms that are not trustworthy (again this is computer insecurity).
4. Trust no software but enforce a security policy with trustworthy hardware mechanisms.

Many systems have unintentionally resulted in the first possibility. Since approach two is expensive and non-deterministic, its use is very limited. Approaches one and three lead to failure. Because approach number four is often based on hardware mechanisms and avoids abstractions and a multiplicity of degrees of freedom, it is more practical. Combinations of approaches two and four are often used in a layered architecture with thin layers of two and thick layers of four.

There are various strategies and techniques used to design security systems. However, there are few, if any, effective strategies to enhance security after design. One technique enforces the principle of least privilege to great extent, where an entity has only the privileges that are needed for its function. That way even if an attacker gains access to one part of the system, fine-grained security ensures that it is just as difficult for them to access the rest.

Furthermore, by breaking the system up into smaller components, the complexity of individual components is reduced, opening up the possibility of using techniques such as automated theorem proving to prove the correctness of crucial software subsystems. This enables a closed form solution to security that works well when only a single well-characterized property can be isolated as critical, and that property is also assessable to math. Not surprisingly, it is impractical for generalized correctness, which probably cannot even be defined, much less proven. Where formal correctness proofs are not possible, rigorous use of code review and unit testing represent a best-effort approach to make modules secure.

The design should use "defense in depth", where more than one subsystem needs to be violated to compromise the integrity of the system and the information it holds. Defense in depth works when the breaching of one security measure does not provide a platform to facilitate subverting another. Also, the cascading principle acknowledges that several low hurdles does not make a high hurdle. So cascading several weak mechanisms does not provide the safety of a single stronger mechanism.

Subsystems should default to secure settings, and wherever possible should be designed to "fail secure" rather than "fail insecure" (see fail-safe for the equivalent in safety engineering). Ideally, a secure system should require a deliberate, conscious, knowledgeable and free decision on the part of legitimate authorities in order to make it insecure.

In addition, security should not be an all or nothing issue. The designers and operators of systems should assume that security breaches are inevitable. Full audit trails should be kept of system activity, so that when a security breach occurs, the mechanism and extent of the breach can be determined. Storing audit trails remotely, where they can only be appended to, can keep intruders from covering their tracks. Finally, full disclosure helps to ensure that when bugs are found the "window of vulnerability" is kept as short as possible.

Security architecture[link]

Security Architecture can be defined as the design artifacts that describe how the security controls (security countermeasures) are positioned, and how they relate to the overall information technology architecture. These controls serve the purpose to maintain the system's quality attributes, among them confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability and assurance.^[1]

Hardware mechanisms that protect computers and data[link]

Hardware based or assisted computer security offers an alternative to software-only computer security. Devices such as dongles may be considered more secure due to the physical access required in order to be compromised^{[original research?]}.

Secure operating systems[link]

One use of the term computer security refers to technology to implement a secure operating system. Much of this technology is based on science developed in the 1980s and used to produce what may be some of the most impenetrable operating systems ever. Though still valid, the technology is in limited use today, primarily because it imposes some changes to system management and also because it is not widely understood. Such ultra-strong secure operating systems are based on operating system kernel technology that can guarantee that certain security policies are absolutely enforced in an operating environment. An example of such a Computer security policy is the Bell-LaPadula model. The strategy is based on a coupling of special microprocessor hardware features, often involving the memory management unit, to a special correctly implemented operating system kernel. This forms the foundation for a secure operating system which, if certain critical parts are designed and implemented correctly, can ensure the absolute impossibility of penetration by hostile elements. This capability is enabled because the configuration not only imposes a security policy, but in theory completely protects itself from corruption. Ordinary operating systems, on the other hand, lack the features that assure this maximal level of security. The design methodology to produce such secure systems is precise, deterministic and logical.

Systems designed with such methodology represent the state of the art^{[clarification needed]} of computer security although products using such security are not widely known. In sharp contrast to most kinds of software, they meet specifications with verifiable certainty comparable to specifications for size, weight and power. Secure operating systems designed this way are used primarily to protect national security information, military secrets, and the data of international financial institutions. These are very powerful security tools and very few secure operating systems have been certified at the highest level (Orange Book A-1) to operate over the range of "Top Secret" to "unclassified" (including Honeywell SCOMP, USAF SACDIN, NSA Blacker and Boeing MLS LAN.) The assurance of security depends not only on the soundness of the design strategy, but also on the assurance of correctness of the implementation, and therefore there are degrees of security strength defined for COMPUSEC. The Common Criteria quantifies security strength of products in terms of two components, security functionality and assurance level (such as EAL levels), and these are specified in a Protection Profile for requirements and a Security Target for product descriptions. None of these ultra-high assurance secure general purpose operating systems have been produced for decades or certified under Common Criteria.

In USA parlance, the term High Assurance usually suggests the system has the right security functions that are implemented robustly enough to protect DoD and DoE classified information. Medium assurance suggests it can protect less valuable information, such as income tax information. Secure operating systems designed to meet medium robustness levels of security functionality and assurance have seen wider use within both government and commercial markets. Medium robust systems may provide the same security functions as high assurance secure operating systems but do so at a lower assurance level (such as Common Criteria levels EAL4 or EAL5). Lower levels mean we can be less certain that the security functions are implemented flawlessly, and therefore less dependable. These systems are found in use on web servers, guards, database servers, and management hosts and are used not only to protect the data stored on these systems but also to provide a high level of protection for network connections and routing services.

Secure coding[link]

If the operating environment is not based on a secure operating system capable of maintaining a domain for its own execution, and capable of protecting application code from malicious subversion, and capable of protecting the system from subverted code, then high degrees of security are understandably not possible. While such secure operating systems are possible and have been implemented, most commercial systems fall in a 'low security' category because they rely on features not supported by secure operating systems (like portability, and others). In low security operating environments, applications must be relied on to participate in their own protection. There are 'best effort' secure coding practices that can be followed to make an application more resistant to malicious subversion.

In commercial environments, the majority of software subversion vulnerabilities result from a few known kinds of coding defects. Common software defects include buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities, integer overflow, and code/command injection. These defects can be used to cause the target system to execute putative data. However, the "data" contain executable instructions, allowing the attacker to gain control of the processor.

Some common languages such as C and C++ are vulnerable to all of these defects (see Seacord, "Secure Coding in C and C++"). Other languages, such as Java, are more resistant to some of these defects, but are still prone to code/command injection and other software defects which facilitate subversion.

Recently another bad coding practice has come under scrutiny; dangling pointers. The first known exploit for this particular problem was presented in July 2007. Before this publication the problem was known but considered to be academic and not practically exploitable.^[2]

Unfortunately, there is no theoretical model of "secure coding" practices, nor is one practically achievable, insofar as the code (ideally, read-only) and data (generally read/write) generally tends to have some form of defect.

Capabilities and access control lists[link]

Within computer systems, two security models capable of enforcing privilege separation are access control lists (ACLs) and capability-based security. The semantics of ACLs have been proven to be insecure in many situations, for example, the confused deputy problem. It has also been shown that the promise of ACLs of giving access to an object to only one person can never be guaranteed in practice. Both of these problems are resolved by capabilities. This does not mean practical flaws exist in all ACL-based systems, but only that the designers of certain utilities must take responsibility to ensure that they do not introduce flaws.^{[citation needed]}

Capabilities have been mostly restricted to research operating systems and commercial OSs still use ACLs. Capabilities can, however, also be implemented at the language level, leading to a style of programming that is essentially a refinement of standard object-oriented design. An open source project in the area is the E language.

First the Plessey System 250 and then Cambridge CAP computer demonstrated the use of capabilities, both in hardware and software, in the 1970s. A reason for the lack of adoption of capabilities may be that ACLs appeared to offer a 'quick fix' for security without pervasive redesign of the operating system and hardware.^{[citation needed]}

The most secure computers are those not connected to the Internet and shielded from any interference. In the real world, the most security comes from operating systems where security is not an add-on.

Applications[link]

Computer security is critical in almost any technology-driven industry which operates on computer systems. Computer security can also be referred to as computer safety. The issues of computer based systems and addressing their countless vulnerabilities are an integral part of maintaining an operational industry.^[3]

Cloud computing security[link]

Security in the cloud is challenging^{[citation needed]}, due to varied degrees of security features and management schemes within the cloud entitites. In this connection one logical protocol base need to evolve so that the entire gamut of components operates synchronously and securely^{[original research?]}.

Aviation[link]

The aviation industry is especially important when analyzing computer security because the involved risks include human life, expensive equipment, cargo, and transportation infrastructure. Security can be compromised by hardware and software malpractice, human error, and faulty operating environments. Threats that exploit computer vulnerabilities can stem from sabotage, espionage, industrial competition, terrorist attack, mechanical malfunction, and human error.^[4]

The consequences of a successful deliberate or inadvertent misuse of a computer system in the aviation industry range from loss of confidentiality to loss of system integrity, which may lead to more serious concerns such as data theft or loss, network and air traffic control outages, which in turn can lead to airport closures, loss of aircraft, loss of passenger life. Military systems that control munitions can pose an even greater risk.

A proper attack does not need to be very high tech or well funded; for a power outage at an airport alone can cause repercussions worldwide.^[5] One of the easiest and, arguably, the most difficult to trace security vulnerabilities is achievable by transmitting unauthorized communications over specific radio frequencies. These transmissions may spoof air traffic controllers or simply disrupt communications altogether. These incidents are very common, having altered flight courses of commercial aircraft and caused panic and confusion in the past.^{[citation needed]} Controlling aircraft over oceans is especially dangerous because radar surveillance only extends 175 to 225 miles offshore. Beyond the radar's sight controllers must rely on periodic radio communications with a third party.

Lightning, power fluctuations, surges, brownouts, blown fuses, and various other power outages instantly disable all computer systems, since they are dependent on an electrical source. Other accidental and intentional faults have caused significant disruption of safety critical systems throughout the last few decades and dependence on reliable communication and electrical power only jeopardizes computer safety.^{[citation needed]}

Notable system accidents[link]

In 1994, over a hundred intrusions were made by unidentified crackers into the Rome Laboratory, the US Air Force's main command and research facility. Using trojan horse viruses, hackers were able to obtain unrestricted access to Rome's networking systems and remove traces of their activities. The intruders were able to obtain classified files, such as air tasking order systems data and furthermore able to penetrate connected networks of National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Goddard Space Flight Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, some Defense contractors, and other private sector organizations, by posing as a trusted Rome center user.^[6]

Cybersecurity breach stories[link]

One true story that shows what mainstream generative technology leads to in terms of online security breaches is the story of the Internet's first worm.

In 1988, 60000 computers were connected to the Internet, but not all of them were PCs. Most were mainframes, minicomputers and professional workstations. On November 2, 1988, the computers acted strangely. They started to slow down, because they were running a malicious code that demanded processor time and that spread itself to other computers. The purpose of such software was to transmit a copy to the machines and run in parallel with existing software and repeat all over again. It exploited a flaw in a common e-mail transmission program running on a computer by rewriting it to facilitate its entrance or it guessed users' password, because, at that time, passwords were simple (e.g. username 'harry' with a password '...harry') or were obviously related to a list of 432 common passwords tested at each computer.^[7]

The software was traced back to 23 year old Cornell University graduate student Robert Tappan Morris, Jr.. When questioned about the motive for his actions, Morris said 'he wanted to count how many machines were connected to the Internet'.^[7] His explanation was verified with his code, but it turned out to be buggy, nevertheless.

Computer security policy[link]

The examples and perspective in this section may not represent a worldwide view of the subject. Please improve this article and discuss the issue on the talk page. (December 2010)

United States[link]

Cybersecurity Act of 2010[link]

On April 1, 2009, Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) introduced the "Cybersecurity Act of 2009 - S. 773" (full text) in the Senate; the bill, co-written with Senators Evan Bayh (D-IN), Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), Bill Nelson (D-FL), and Olympia Snowe (R-ME), was referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, which approved a revised version of the same bill (the "Cybersecurity Act of 2010") on March 24, 2010.^[8] The bill seeks to increase collaboration between the public and the private sector on cybersecurity issues, especially those private entities that own infrastructures that are critical to national security interests (the bill quotes John Brennan, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism: "our nation’s security and economic prosperity depend on the security, stability, and integrity of communications and information infrastructure that are largely privately owned and globally operated" and talks about the country's response to a "cyber-Katrina".^[9]), increase public awareness on cybersecurity issues, and foster and fund cybersecurity research. Some of the most controversial parts of the bill include Paragraph 315, which grants the President the right to "order the limitation or shutdown of Internet traffic to and from any compromised Federal Government or United States critical infrastructure information system or network."^[9] The Electronic Frontier Foundation, an international non-profit digital rights advocacy and legal organization based in the United States, characterized the bill as promoting a "potentially dangerous approach that favors the dramatic over the sober response".^[10]

International Cybercrime Reporting and Cooperation Act[link]

On March 25, 2010, Representative Yvette Clarke (D-NY) introduced the "International Cybercrime Reporting and Cooperation Act - H.R.4962" (full text) in the House of Representatives; the bill, co-sponsored by seven other representatives (among whom only one Republican), was referred to three House committees.^[11] The bill seeks to make sure that the administration keeps Congress informed on information infrastructure, cybercrime, and end-user protection worldwide. It also "directs the President to give priority for assistance to improve legal, judicial, and enforcement capabilities with respect to cybercrime to countries with low information and communications technology levels of development or utilization in their critical infrastructure, telecommunications systems, and financial industries"^[11] as well as to develop an action plan and an annual compliance assessment for countries of "cyber concern".^[11]

Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010[link]

On June 19, 2010, United States Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) introduced a bill called "Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010 - S.3480" (full text in pdf), which he co-wrote with Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) and Senator Thomas Carper (D-DE). If signed into law, this controversial bill, which the American media dubbed the "Kill switch bill", would grant the President emergency powers over the Internet. However, all three co-authors of the bill issued a statement claiming that instead, the bill "[narrowed] existing broad Presidential authority to take over telecommunications networks".^[12]

White House proposes cybersecurity legislation[link]

On May 12, 2010, The White House sent Congress a proposed cybersecurity law designed to force companies to do more to fend off cyberattacks, a threat that has been reinforced by recent reports about vulnerabilities in systems used in power and water utilities.^[13]

Germany[link]

Berlin starts National Cyber Defense Initiative[link]

On June 16, 2011, the German Minister for Home Affairs, officially opened the new German NCAZ (National Center for Cyber Defense) de:Nationales Cyber-Abwehrzentrum, which is located in Bonn. The NCAZ closely cooperates with BSI (Federal Office for Information Security) de:Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BKA (Federal Police Organisation) de:Bundeskriminalamt (Deutschland), BND (Federal Intelligence Service) de:Bundesnachrichtendienst, MAD (Military Intelligence Service) de:Amt für den Militärischen Abschirmdienst and other national organisations in Germany taking care of national security aspects. According to the Minister the primary task of the new organisation founded on Feb. 23, 2011, is to detect and prevent attacks against the national infrastructure and mentioned incidents like Stuxnet de:Stuxnet

Terminology[link]

This section may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. No cleanup reason has been specified. Please help improve this section if you can; the talk page may contain suggestions. (November 2010)

The following terms used in engineering secure systems are explained below.

• Authentication techniques can be used to ensure that communication end-points are who they say they are.
• Automated theorem proving and other verification tools can enable critical algorithms and code used in secure systems to be mathematically proven to meet their specifications.
• Capability and access control list techniques can be used to ensure privilege separation and mandatory access control. This section discusses their use.
• Chain of trust techniques can be used to attempt to ensure that all software loaded has been certified as authentic by the system's designers.
• Cryptographic techniques can be used to defend data in transit between systems, reducing the probability that data exchanged between systems can be intercepted or modified.
• Firewalls can provide some protection from online intrusion.

• A microkernel is a carefully crafted, deliberately small corpus of software that underlies the operating system per se and is used solely to provide very low-level, very precisely defined primitives upon which an operating system can be developed. A simple example with considerable didactic value is the early '90s GEMSOS (Gemini Computers), which provided extremely low-level primitives, such as "segment" management, atop which an operating system could be built. The theory (in the case of "segments") was that—rather than have the operating system itself worry about mandatory access separation by means of military-style labeling—it is safer if a low-level, independently scrutinized module can be charged solely with the management of individually labeled segments, be they memory "segments" or file system "segments" or executable text "segments." If software below the visibility of the operating system is (as in this case) charged with labeling, there is no theoretically viable means for a clever hacker to subvert the labeling scheme, since the operating system per se does not provide mechanisms for interfering with labeling: the operating system is, essentially, a client (an "application," arguably) atop the microkernel and, as such, subject to its restrictions.

• Endpoint Security software helps networks to prevent data theft and virus infection through portable storage devices, such as USB drives.

• Confidentiality is the nondisclosure of information except to another authorized person.^[14]

• Data Integrity is the accuracy and consistency of stored data, indicated by an absence of any alteration in data between two updates of a data record.^[15]

Some of the following items may belong to the computer insecurity article:

• Access authorization restricts access to a computer to group of users through the use of authentication systems. These systems can protect either the whole computer – such as through an interactive login screen – or individual services, such as an FTP server. There are many methods for identifying and authenticating users, such as passwords, identification cards, and, more recently, smart cards and biometric systems.
• Anti-virus software consists of computer programs that attempt to identify, thwart and eliminate computer viruses and other malicious software (malware).
• Applications with known security flaws should not be run. Either leave it turned off until it can be patched or otherwise fixed, or delete it and replace it with some other application. Publicly known flaws are the main entry used by worms to automatically break into a system and then spread to other systems connected to it. The security website Secunia provides a search tool for unpatched known flaws in popular products.
• Backups are a way of securing information; they are another copy of all the important computer files kept in another location. These files are kept on hard disks, CD-Rs, CD-RWs, and tapes. Suggested locations for backups are a fireproof, waterproof, and heat proof safe, or in a separate, offsite location than that in which the original files are contained. Some individuals and companies also keep their backups in safe deposit boxes inside bank vaults. There is also a fourth option, which involves using one of the file hosting services that backs up files over the Internet for both business and individuals.
  • Backups are also important for reasons other than security. Natural disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, or tornadoes, may strike the building where the computer is located. The building can be on fire, or an explosion may occur. There needs to be a recent backup at an alternate secure location, in case of such kind of disaster. Further, it is recommended that the alternate location be placed where the same disaster would not affect both locations. Examples of alternate disaster recovery sites being compromised by the same disaster that affected the primary site include having had a primary site in World Trade Center I and the recovery site in 7 World Trade Center, both of which were destroyed in the 9/11 attack, and having one's primary site and recovery site in the same coastal region, which leads to both being vulnerable to hurricane damage (for example, primary site in New Orleans and recovery site in Jefferson Parish, both of which were hit by Hurricane Katrina in 2005). The backup media should be moved between the geographic sites in a secure manner, in order to prevent them from being stolen.

Cryptographic techniques involve transforming information, scrambling it so it becomes unreadable during transmission. The intended recipient can unscramble the message, but eavesdroppers cannot, ideally.

• Encryption is used to protect the message from the eyes of others. Cryptographically secure ciphers are designed to make any practical attempt of breaking infeasible. Symmetric-key ciphers are suitable for bulk encryption using shared keys, and public-key encryption using digital certificates can provide a practical solution for the problem of securely communicating when no key is shared in advance.
• Firewalls are systems that help protect computers and computer networks from attack and subsequent intrusion by restricting the network traffic that can pass through them, based on a set of system administrator-defined rules.
• Honey pots are computers that are either intentionally or unintentionally left vulnerable to attack by crackers. They can be used to catch crackers or fix vulnerabilities.
• Intrusion-detection systems can scan a network for people that are on the network but who should not be there or are doing things that they should not be doing, for example trying a lot of passwords to gain access to the network.
• Pinging The ping application can be used by potential crackers to find if an IP address is reachable. If a cracker finds a computer, they can try a port scan to detect and attack services on that computer.
• Social engineering awareness keeps employees aware of the dangers of social engineering and/or having a policy in place to prevent social engineering can reduce successful breaches of the network and servers.

Notes[link]

See also[link]

Computer security portal Attack tree Authentication Authorization CAPTCHA CERT Cloud computing security Computer insecurity Computer security model Computer security compromised by hardware failure Content security Countermeasure (computer) Cryptography Cyber security standards Dancing pigs Data loss prevention products Data security Differentiated security Disk encryption Exploit (computer security) Fault tolerance Firewalls Full disclosure Human-computer interaction (security)

Identity management Information Leak Prevention Information security Internet privacy ISO/IEC 15408 IT risk Kish cypher Mobile security Network Security Toolkit Network security Open security OWASP Penetration test Physical information security Physical security Presumed security Privacy software Proactive Cyber Defence Sandbox (computer security) Security Architecture Separation of protection and security Threat (computer) Vulnerability (computing)

References[link]

This section includes a list of references, but its sources remain unclear because it has insufficient inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (September 2010)

External links[link]

• Security advisories links from the Open Directory Project
• The Repository of Industrial Security Incidents

Janet Napolitano
3rd Secretary of Homeland Security
Incumbent
Assumed office January 21, 2009
President	Barack Obama
Deputy	Jane Lute
Preceded by	Michael Chertoff
21st Governor of Arizona
In office January 6, 2003 – January 21, 2009
Preceded by	Jane Dee Hull
Succeeded by	Jan Brewer
23rd Attorney General of Arizona
In office January 4, 1999 – January 6, 2003
Governor	Jane Dee Hull
Preceded by	Grant Woods
Succeeded by	Terry Goddard
Personal details
Born	(1957-11-29) November 29, 1957 (age 54) New York City, New York, United States
Political party	Democratic Party
Alma mater	Santa Clara University University of Virginia
Profession	Lawyer
Religion	Methodism

Janet Napolitano (/nəpɒlɨˈtænoʊ/;^[1] born November 29, 1957) is the third and current United States Secretary of Homeland Security, serving in the administration of President Barack Obama. She is the fourth person (including an acting Secretary) to hold the position, which was created after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A member of the Democratic Party, she was the 21st Governor of Arizona from 2003 to 2009. She was Arizona's third female governor, and the first woman to win re-election. Prior to her election as governor, she served as Attorney General of Arizona from 1999 to 2002. She was the first woman and the 23rd person to serve in that office. Napolitano is the 1977 Truman Scholar from New Mexico. Forbes ranked her as the world's 15th most powerful woman in 2011.^[2]

Early life[link]

Janet Napolitano was born on November 29, 1957, in New York City, the daughter of Jane Marie (née Winer) and Leonard Michael Napolitano, who was the dean of the University of New Mexico School of Medicine.^[3] She is of half Italian ancestry^[3][4] and is a Methodist.^[5] She was the eldest of three children; she has a younger brother and sister. She was raised in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Albuquerque, New Mexico, where she graduated from Sandia High School in Albuquerque in 1975 and was voted Most Likely to Succeed. She graduated from Santa Clara University in Santa Clara, California, where she won a Truman Scholarship, and was valedictorian. In 1978, she studied for a term at the London School of Economics as part of the Santa Clara's exchange programme through IES Abroad. She then received her Juris Doctor (J.D.) from the University of Virginia School of Law. After law school she served as a law clerk for Judge Mary M. Schroeder of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and then joined Schroeder's former firm, the Phoenix law firm Lewis and Roca.^[6]

Early political career[link]

In 1991, while a partner with the private Phoenix law firm Lewis and Roca LLP, Napolitano served as an attorney for Anita Hill.^[6][7] Anita Hill testified in the U.S. Senate that then U.S. Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas had sexually harassed her ten years earlier when she was his subordinate at the federal EEOC.^[8]

In 1993, Napolitano was appointed by President Bill Clinton as United States Attorney for the District of Arizona.^[6] As U.S. Attorney, she was involved in the investigation of Michael Fortier of Kingman, Arizona, in connection with the Oklahoma City bombing. She ran for and won the position of Arizona Attorney General in 1998. Her tenure as attorney general focused on consumer protection issues and improving general law enforcement.

While still serving as attorney general, she spoke at the 2000 Democratic National Convention just three weeks after having a mastectomy. Napolitano recalls that the pain was so unbearable that she couldn't stand up. "Work and family helped me focus on other things while I battled the cancer," says Napolitano. "I am very grateful for all the support I had from family, friends and Arizonans."^[9]

In March 2009, Napolitano received the Council on Litigation Management's [1] Professionalism Award, which recognizes and commemorates an individual who has demonstrated the unique ability to lead others by example in the highest standard of their profession.

Governor of Arizona[link]

Napolitano speaks during the second day of the 2008 Democratic National Convention in Denver, Colorado.

She narrowly won the Arizona gubernatorial election of 2002 with 46 percent of the vote, succeeding Republican Jane Dee Hull and defeating her Republican opponent, former congressman Matt Salmon, who received 45 percent of the vote. She was Arizona's third female governor and the first woman in the United States to be elected governor to succeed another elected female governor.^[10].In 2003, she introduced a new tradition of interfaith breakfasts - as Arizona Governor Elect- inviting clergies and community leaders for prayers before start of every session.^[11] In 2005, she gracefully accepted sprinkling of holy Ganges water on her forehead twice along with blessed garlands from Hare Krishna.^[12] Further, she was the first ever government official in the world to issue Proclamation for Krishna Janmashtami - the largest Hindu festival celebrating appearance of Lord Krishna. During the Sankirtan in Phoenix, she once stopped by to greet Hare Krishna devotees who were singing the Holy Names of the Lord.^[13]

She spoke at the 2004 Democratic Convention^[14] after some initially considered her to be a possible running mate for presidential candidate Sen. John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election but Kerry selected Sen. John Edwards instead. In November 2005, Time magazine named her one of the five best governors in the U.S.^[15]

As Governor, Napolitano set records for total number of vetoes issued. In 2005, she set a single session record of 58 vetoes, breaking Jane Dee Hull's 2001 record of 28.^[16][17] This was followed in June 2006, less than four years into her term, when she issued her 115th veto and set the all-time record for vetoes by an Arizona governor. The previous record of 114 vetoes was set by Bruce Babbitt during his nine years in office.^[17][18] By the time she left office, the governor had issued 180 vetoes.^[19]

In November 2006, Napolitano won the gubernatorial election of 2006, defeating the Republican challenger, Len Munsil, by a nearly 2–1 ratio and becoming the first woman to be re-elected to that office. Arizona's constitution provides a two-consecutive-term term limit for its governors,^[20] meaning Napolitano would have been barred from seeking a third term in office in 2010.

In January 2006, she won the Woodrow Wilson Award for Public Service. She was a member of the Democratic Governors Association Executive Committee. Furthermore, she has also served previously as Chair of the Western Governors Association, and the National Governors Association. She served as NGA Chair from 2006 to 2007,^[21] and was the first female governor and first governor of Arizona ever to serve in that position.

Secretary of Homeland Security[link]

Napolitano announcing a border security task force.

In February 2006, Napolitano was named by The White House Project as one of "8 in '08", a group of eight female politicians who could possibly run for president in 2008.^[22] On January 11, 2008, Napolitano endorsed then Illinois Senator Barack Obama as the Democratic nominee for president.^[23] On November 5, 2008, Napolitano was named to the advisory board of the Obama-Biden Transition Project.^[24] On December 1, 2008, Barack Obama introduced Napolitano as his nominee for United States Secretary of Homeland Security.^[25][26] On January 20, 2009, Napolitano was confirmed, becoming the first woman appointed Secretary in the relatively new department. Arizona Secretary of State Jan Brewer became the governor of Arizona, as the state does not have a lieutenant governor.

Napolitano discussing security at a Super Bowl XLIV press conference. The Super Bowl is designated as a National Special Security Event by Homeland Security.

In March 2009, Napolitano told the German news site "Spiegel Online" that while she presumes there is always a threat from terrorism: "I referred to 'man-caused' disasters. That is perhaps only a nuance, but it demonstrates that we want to move away from the politics of fear toward a policy of being prepared for all risks that can occur."^[27] In April 2009 Napolitano, trying to defend her plans to thicken U.S.-Canadian border security, claimed incorrectly that September 11 attack perpetrators entered the United States from Canada. Her comments provoked an angry response from the Canadian ambassador, media, and public.^[28]

In response to criticism, she later said, "Nonetheless, to the extent that terrorists have come into our country or suspected or known terrorists have entered our country across a border, it's been across the Canadian border. There are real issues there". Though there has only been one case, that of Ahmed Ressam an Algerian citizen who was in Canada illegally.^[29]

Napolitano was a leading contender for appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court when vacancies occurred in 2009 and 2010^[30] but was passed over by President Obama in favor of Judge Sonia Sotomayor and then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan, respectively.

Right-wing extremism memo controversy[link]

Napolitano was the subject of controversy after a Department of Homeland Security threat assessment report, one of two reports, the other focused on left wing extremism that was issued in January without any controversy,^[31] entitled "Rightwing [sic] Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment,"^[32] was made public in April 2009. The report suggested several factors, including the election of the first black or mixed race President in the person of Barack Obama, perceived future gun control measures, illegal immigration, the economic downturn beginning in 2008, the abortion controversy, and disgruntled military veterans' possible vulnerability to recruitment efforts by extremist groups as potential risk factors regarding right-wing extremism recruitment.^[33]

Napolitano made multiple apologies for any offense veterans groups had taken at the reference to veterans in the assessment, and promised to meet with those groups to discuss the issue.^[32] The Department of Homeland Security admitted a "breakdown in an internal process" by ignoring objections by the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to an unnamed portion of the document.^[34]

While the American Legion reportedly criticized the assessment, Glen M. Gardner Jr., the national commander of the 2.2 million-member Veterans of Foreign Wars, defended it generally, saying it "should have been worded differently" but served a vital purpose. "A government that does not assess internal and external security threats would be negligent of a critical public responsibility," he said in a statement.^[31]

"The system worked" controversy[link]

Napolitano was criticized^[35] for stating in an interview with CNN's Candy Crowley that, "the system worked" with regard to an attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 approaching Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. She later went on NBC's Today Show with host Matt Lauer and admitted that the security system had indeed failed.^[36]

The statement by Napolitano to Crowley that received criticism was as follows:

What we are focused on is making sure that the air environment remains safe, that people are confident when they travel. And one thing I'd like to point out is that the system worked. Everybody played an important role here. The passengers and crew of the flight took appropriate action. Within literally an hour to 90 minutes of the incident occurring, all 128 flights in the air had been notified to take some special measures in light of what had occurred on the Northwest Airlines flight. We instituted new measures on the ground and at screening areas, both here in the United States and in Europe, where this flight originated. So the whole process of making sure that we respond properly, correctly and effectively went very smoothly.^[37]

In her interview with Lauer, Napolitano said that her earlier statement was "taken out of context" and maintained "air travel is safe," but admitted, "our system did not work in this instance" and no one "is happy or satisfied with that."^[36] Lauer asked her whether the system failed up until the moment the bomber tried to blow up the plane, and Napolitano answered, "It did [fail]."^[36]

Secure Communities[link]

Secure Communities is a deportation program managed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a subdivision of Homeland Security. Napolitano came under scrutiny for contradicting herself publicly on whether the program is voluntary or mandatory for local jurisdictions to join. On September 7, 2010, Napolitano said in a letter to Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren that jurisdictions that wished to withdraw from the program could do so. Yet an October 2010 Washington Post article quoted an anonymous senior ICE official asserting: “Secure Communities is not based on state or local cooperation in federal law enforcement…State and local law enforcement agencies are going to continue to fingerprint people and those fingerprints are forwarded to FBI for criminal checks. ICE will take immigration action appropriately.”^[38]

At a press conference days later, Napolitano modified her position: “What my letter said was that we would work with them on the implementation in terms of timing and the like…But we do not view this as an opt-in, opt-out program.”^[39] She did not provide legal justification. Meanwhile, in Arlington, Virginia, the Board of Supervisors unanimously passed a resolution to opt out of SComm.^[40] A subordinate DHS employee David Venturella stated at a policy conference: "Have we created some of the confusion out there? Absolutely we have."^[41]

Printer bomb attempt[link]

Janet Napolitano has issued a ban for toner & ink cartridges weighing more than one pound on passenger flights, in response to the October 2010 Yemen bomb plot.^[42][43] In response to the printer bomb attempt and the "underwear" bomb attempt of 2009, Napolitano has instituted "enhanced pat downs". These pat downs may include the touching of sensitive areas such as breasts and genitals.^{[44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51]}

Walmart–DHS partnership[link]

On December 6, 2010, it was announced that Napolitano was again expanding her reach by creating a "partnership" with Walmart.^[52] This is a video message from Napolitano on TV screens in Wal-Mart stores playing a "public service announcement" to ask customers to report suspicious activity to a Wal-Mart manager. The rationale is that national security begins at home. Napolitano "compares the undertaking to the Cold War fight against communists."^[53]

Tucson memorial[link]

Napolitano stands next to Mark Kelly, husband of shooting survivor Gabrielle Giffords, at the memorial event.

On January 12, 2011, along with President Barack Obama, Napolitano was one of many speakers selected to express sympathies to the community of Tucson, the State of Arizona, and the Nation in a televised memorial for the 2011 Tucson shooting. Napolitano confessed that she was at a loss for words during the painful memorial, and elected to read from the Old Testament book of Isaiah. Isaiah 40:1-5, 26-31.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Inside the DHS

Starting in the fourth quarter of 2011, Secretary Napolitano will appear on Inside the DHS, an AMC reality television program about the inner workings of her department.^[54]

Personal life[link]

Napolitano is an avid basketball fan and regularly plays tennis.^[55] Whitewater rafting and hiking are among Napolitano's hobbies. She has hiked in Arizona's Superstition Mountains and New Mexico's Sandia Mountains and has climbed Mount Kilimanjaro and the Himalayas.^[56] Napolitano survived breast cancer that was discovered in 1998.^{[citation needed]}

Electoral history[link]

See also[link]

	Arizona portal
	Biography portal

• AHCCCS: Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (state Medicaid program)
• AIMS: Arizona's Instrument to Measure Standards (state standardized test for high school students)
• Protect Arizona Now: Proposition 200
• Arizona-Mexico Commission

References[link]

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Janet Napolitano

• Biography at the Department of Homeland Security
• Biography at the National Governors Association
• Biography, interest group ratings, public statements, vetoes and campaign finances at Project Vote Smart
• Biography at WhoRunsGov.com at The Washington Post
• Issue positions and quotes at On the Issues
• Campaign contributions at FollowTheMoney.org
• Appearances on C-SPAN programs
• Collected news and commentary at The New York Times
• Janet Napolitano on Charlie Rose
• Works by or about Janet Napolitano in libraries (WorldCat catalog)
• Janet Napolitano at the Internet Movie Database
• NPR's Wait Wait, Don't Tell Me guest on Not My Job segment

v t e United States Secretaries of Homeland Security Ridge Chertoff Napolitano

v t e Governors of Arizona Territorial (1863–1912) Goodwin McCormick Safford Hoyt Frémont Tritle Zulick Wolfley Irwin Murphy Hughes Franklin McCord Murphy Brodie Kibbey Sloan State (since 1912) Hunt Campbell Hunt Campbell Hunt Phillips Hunt Moeur Stanford Jones Osborn Garvey Pyle McFarland Fannin Goddard Williams Castro Bolin Babbitt Mecham Mofford Symington Hull Napolitano Brewer

v t e Current members of the Cabinet of the United States Obama Biden Bryson Chu Clinton Donovan Duncan Geithner Holder Jacksonc Kirkc Kruegerc LaHood Lewc Millsc Napolitano Panetta Ricec Salazar Sebelius Solis Shinseki Vilsack Zientsca c - cabinet-level; a - acting

v t e Cabinet of President Barack Obama (since 2009)   Cabinet Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2009–present) Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner (2009–present) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2009–2011) Leon Panetta (2011–present) Attorney General Eric Holder (2009–present) Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar (2009–present) Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack (2009–present) Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke (2009–2011) John Bryson (2011–present) Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis (2009–present) Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius (2009–present) Secretary of Education Arne Duncan (2009–present) Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Shaun Donovan (2009–present) Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood (2009–present) Secretary of Energy Steven Chu (2009–present) Secretary of Veterans Affairs Eric Shinseki (2009–present) Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano (2009–present)   Cabinet-level Vice President Joe Biden (2009–present) White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel (2009–2010) William Daley (2011–2012) Jacob Lew (2012–present) Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency Lisa Jackson (2009–present) Director of the Office of Management and Budget Peter Orszag (2009–2010) Jacob Lew (2010–2012) Trade Representative Ron Kirk (2009–present) Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice (2009–present) Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers Christina Romer (2009–2010) Austan Goolsbee (2010–2011) Alan Krueger (2011–present) Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Leon Panetta (2009–2011) David Petraeus (2011–present) Administrator of the Small Business Administration Karen Mills (2012–present)* * took office in 2009, raised to cabinet-rank in 2012 See also: Confirmations of Barack Obama's Cabinet

Maria Bartiromo
Bartiromo moderating a session at the World Economic Forum.
Born	(1967-09-11) September 11, 1967 (age 44) Brooklyn, New York
Ethnicity	Italian-American
Education	New York University
Occupation	Journalist, columnist, news anchor
Title	CNBC's The Wall Street Journal Report anchor, Closing Bell co-anchor
Spouse	Jonathan Steinberg (1999–)
Website
http://www.bartiromo.com/

Maria Bartiromo (born September 11, 1967) is an American television journalist, magazine columnist and author of three books. Bartiromo is a native of New York and attended New York University. She worked at CNN for five years before joining CNBC television. At CNBC, she has been the co-host of the Closing Bell program and the host and managing editor of The Wall Street Journal Report and is credited for becoming the first reporter to broadcast live from the floor of the New York Stock Exchange.^[1] She has appeared on various television shows and been the recipient of various journalism awards including being inducted into the Cable Hall of Fame.

Early life and education[link]

Bartiromo grew up in the Bay Ridge section of southern Brooklyn. As a teenager, she worked in the coat check room of her parents' Italian restaurant where her father was the chef.

Bartiromo attended Fontbonne Hall Academy, an all-girls Roman Catholic high school in Bay Ridge and graduated from New York University with a Bachelor of Arts degree with majors in journalism and economics.^[2]

Career[link]

Maria Bartiromo at World Economic Forum Annual Meeting Davos 2008

Before joining CNBC in 1993, Bartiromo spent 5 years as a producer and assignment editor with CNN Business News.^[3] She replaced analyst Roy Blumberg at CNBC when she began reporting live from the floor of the New York Stock Exchange and began hosting and contributing to the Market Watch and Squawk Box segments.

Bartiromo is the anchor and managing editor of CNBC's Wall Street Journal Report with Maria Bartiromo which features interviews with financial experts, entertainers, athletes, and politicians.^[2] Since 2007, Bartiromo has been the host of the TV show The Business of Innovation. She has hosted several other programs, including Closing Bell (2002–present), Market Wrap (1998–2000), and Business Center (1997–1999).

Bartiromo has also appeared on the television shows: NBC Universal's The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, The Oprah Winfrey Show, Real Time with Bill Maher, Late Night with Conan O'Brien, The Caroline Rhea Show, McEnroe, and The Colbert Report, as well as guest-hosting on Live with Regis and Kelly.^{[citation needed]}

Bartiromo was nicknamed the "Money Honey" in the late 1990s due to her striking looks and for being the first woman to report live from the raucous floor of the New York Stock Exchange.^[3][4] She also received the nickname "Econo Babe".^[5] In January 2007, Bartiromo filed trademark applications to use the term "Money Honey" as a brand name for a line of children's products including toys, puzzles and coloring books to teach kids about money.^[6][7] and was also the subject of a conflict of interest controversy triggered by questions about her relationship with Todd Thompson, then a senior executive of Citigroup.^[8][9][10]

Bartiromo has anchored the television coverage of New York City's world famous New York City Columbus Day Parade since 1995 and was the Grand Marshall in 2010.^[11]

She appeared as herself in in the following films: Risk/Reward, the documentary about the lives of women on Wall Street (2003), The Taking of Pelham 123, an action film about armed men who hijack a New York City subway train (2009), the drama film Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps (2010) ^[12] and in the documentary Inside Job (2010).