In the philosophy of perception, critical realism is the theory that some of our sense-data (for example, those of primary qualities) can and do accurately represent external objects, properties, and events, while other of our sense-data (for example, those of secondary qualities and perceptual illusions) do not accurately represent any external objects, properties, and events. Put simply, Critical Realism highlights a mind dependent aspect of the world, which reaches to understand (and comes to understanding of) the mind independent world.

Contemporary critical realism most commonly refers to a philosophical approach associated with Roy Bhaskar. Bhaskar's thought combines a general philosophy of science (transcendental realism) with a philosophy of social science (critical naturalism) to describe an interface between the natural and social worlds. Critical realism can, however, refer to several other schools of thought, such as the work of the American critical realists (Roy Wood Sellars, George Santayana, and Arthur Lovejoy). The term has also been appropriated by theorists in the science-religion interface community. The Canadian Jesuit Bernard Lonergan developed a comprehensive critical realist philosophy and this understanding of critical realism dominates North America's Catholic Universities.

Locke and Descartes[link]

According to Locke and Descartes, some sense-data, namely the sense-data of secondary qualities, do not represent anything in the external world, even if they are caused by external qualities (primary qualities). Thus it is natural to adopt a theory of critical realism.

By its talk of sense-data and representation, this theory depends on or presupposes the truth of representationalism. If critical realism is correct, then representationalism would have to be a correct theory of perception^{[citation needed]}.

American critical realism[link]

The American critical realist movement was a response both to direct realism (especially in its recent incarnation as new realism), as well as to idealism and pragmatism. In very broad terms, American critical realism was a form of representative realism, in which there are objects that stand as mediators between independent real objects and perceivers.

One innovation was that these mediators aren't ideas (British empiricism), but properties, essences, or "character complexes."

British realism[link]

Similar developments occurred in Britain. Major figures included Samuel Alexander, John Cook Wilson, H. A. Prichard, H. H. Price, and C. D. Broad.

Contemporary critical realism[link]

General philosophy[link]

Critical realism is presently most commonly associated with the work of Roy Bhaskar. Bhaskar developed a general philosophy of science that he described as transcendental realism, and a special philosophy of the human sciences that he called critical naturalism. The two terms were combined by other authors to form the umbrella term critical realism.

Transcendental realism attempts to establish that in order for scientific investigation to take place, the object of that investigation must have real, manipulable, internal mechanisms that can be actualised to produce particular outcomes. This is what we do when we conduct experiments. This stands in contrast to empiricist scientists' claim that all scientists can do is observe the relationship between cause and effect and impose meaning. Whilst empiricism, and positivism more generally, locate causal relationships at the level of events, Critical Realism locates them at the level of the generative mechanism, arguing that causal relationships are irreducible to empirical constant conjunctions of David Hume's doctrine; in other words, a constant conjunctive relationship between events is neither sufficient nor even necessary to establish a causal relationship.

The implication of this is that science should be understood as an ongoing process in which scientists improve the concepts they use to understand the mechanisms that they study. It should not, in contrast to the claim of empiricists, be about the identification of a coincidence between a postulated independent variable and dependent variable. Positivism/falsification^{[clarification needed]} are also rejected due to the observation that it is highly plausible that a mechanism will exist but either a) go unactivated, b) be activated, but not perceived, or c) be activated, but counteracted by other mechanisms, which results in its having unpredictable effects. Thus, non-realisation of a posited mechanism cannot (in contrast to the claim of positivists) be taken to signify its non-existence.

Critical naturalism argues that the transcendental realist model of science is equally applicable to both the physical and the human worlds. However, when we study the human world we are studying something fundamentally different from the physical world and must therefore adapt our strategy to studying it. Critical naturalism therefore prescribes social scientific method which seeks to identify the mechanisms producing social events, but with a recognition that these are in a much greater state of flux than those of the physical world (as human structures change much more readily than those of, say, a leaf). In particular, we must understand that human agency is made possible by social structures that themselves require the reproduction of certain actions/pre-conditions. Further, the individuals that inhabit these social structures are capable of consciously reflecting upon, and changing, the actions that produce them—a practice that is in part facilitated by social scientific research.

Critical realism has become an influential movement in British sociology and social science in general as a reaction to, and reconciliation of, so-called "postmodern" critiques.

Developments[link]

Since Bhaskar made the first big steps in popularising the theory of critical realism in the 1970s, it has become one of the major strands of social scientific method - rivalling positivism/empiricism, and post-structuralism/relativism/interpretivism.

Since his development of critical realism, Bhaskar has gone on to develop a philosophical system he calls dialectical critical realism, which is most clearly outlined in his weighty book, Dialectic: the pulse of freedom.

Bhaskar is frequently criticized for the density and obscurity of his writing. That said, some readers may^[who?] actually appreciate his meticulous linguistic precision, which can be time consuming to read, but read properly, it is possible to understand the precise and unambiguous meaning behind his writing^{[citation needed]}. An accessible introduction was written by Andrew Collier. Andrew Sayer has written accessible texts on critical realism in social science. Danermark et al. have also produced an accessible account. Margaret Archer is associated with this school, as is the ecosocialist writer Peter Dickens.

David Graeber relies on critical realism, which he understands as a form of 'heraclitean' philosophy, emphasizing flux and change over stable essences, in his anthropological book on the concept of value, Toward an anthropological theory of value: the false coin of our own dreams.

Robert Willmott has developed the realist ("morphogenetic") social theory of Margaret Archer in his Education Policy and Realist Social Theory: primary teachers, child-centred philosophy and the new managerialism, published by Routledge.

Theological critical realism[link]

Critical realism is employed by a community of scientists turned theologians. They are influenced by the scientist turned philosopher Michael Polanyi. Polanyi's ideas were taken up enthusiastically by T. F. Torrance whose work in this area has influenced many theologians calling themselves critical realists. This community includes John Polkinghorne, Ian Barbour, and Arthur Peacocke. The aim of the group is to show that the language of science and Christian theology are similar, forming a starting point for a dialogue between the two. Alister McGrath and Wentzel van Huyssteen (the latter of Princeton Theological Seminary) are recent contributors to this strand. N.T. Wright, New Testament scholar and retired Bishop of Durham (Anglican) also writes on this topic:

… I propose a form of critical realism. This is a way of describing the process of "knowing" that acknowledges the reality of the thing known, as something other than the knower (hence "realism"), while fully acknowledging that the only access we have to this reality lies along the spiralling path of appropriate dialogue or conversation between the knower and the thing known (hence "critical"). (The New Testament and the People of God, p. 35)

N.T. Wright's fellow biblical scholar—James Dunn—encountered the thought of Bernard Lonergan as mediated through Ben Meyer. Much of North American critical realism—later used in the service of theology—has its source in the thought of Lonergan rather than Polanyi.

Critical realism in economics[link]

Heterodox economists like Tony Lawson, Frederic Lee or Geoffrey Hodgson are trying to work the ideas of critical realism into economics, especially the dynamic idea of macro-micro interaction.

According to critical realist economists, the central aim of economic theory is to provide explanations in terms of hidden generative structures. This position combines transcendental realism with a critique of mainstream economics. It argues that mainstream economics (i) relies excessively on deductivist methodology, (ii) embraces an uncritical enthusiasm for formalism, and (iii) believes in strong conditional predictions in economics despite repeated failures.

The world that mainstream economists study is the empirical world. But this world is "out of phase" (Lawson) with the underlying ontology of economic regularities. The mainstream view is thus a limited reality because empirical realists presume that the objects of inquiry are solely "empirical regularities"—that is, objects and events at the level of the experienced.

The critical realist views the domain of real causal mechanisms as the appropriate object of economic science, whereas the positivist view is that the reality is exhausted in empirical, i.e. experienced reality. Tony Lawson argues that economics ought to embrace a "social ontology" to include the underlying causes of economic phenomena.

Critical realism and Marxism[link]

A development of Bhaskar's critical realism lies at the ontological root of contemporary streams of Marxist political and economic theory.^[1][2] The realist philosophy described by Bhaskar in A Realist Theory of Science is compatible with Marx's work in that it differentiates between an intransitive reality, which exists independently of human knowledge of it, and the socially produced world of science and empirical knowledge. This dualist logic is clearly present in the Marxian theory of ideology, according to which social reality may be very different from its empirically observable surface appearance. Notably, Alex Callinicos, whom Göran Therborn calls the 'most prolific of contemporary Marxist writers' in the UK,^[3] has argued for a 'critical realist' ontology in the philosophy of social science and explicitly acknowledges Bhaskar's influence (while also rejecting the latter's 'spiritualist turn' in his later work).^[4] The relationship between critical realist philosophy and Marxism has also been discussed in an article co-authored by Bhaskar and Callinicos and published in the Journal of Critical Realism^[5]

See also[link]

• Structure and agency
• Philosophy of social science
• Transformative Studies Institute

References[link]

1. ^ Marsh, D. (2002), “Marxism”, in Marsh D. Stoker, G. (Eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Science, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
2. ^ Marsh, D, & Furlong, P. (2002), “Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science”, in Marsh D. Stoker, G. (Eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Science, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
3. ^ Therborn, G. (2008), From Marxism to Post-Marxism?, London, Verso, pp.176-177.
4. ^ Callinicos, A. (2006), The Resources of Critique, Cambridge, Polity, pp.155-158
5. ^ Bhaskar, R. Callinicos, A. (2003), 'Marxism and Critical Realism: A Debate', in Journal of Critical Realism, 1.2

Further reading[link]

• Archer, M., Bhaskar, R., Collier, A., Lawson, T. and Norrie, A., 1998, Critical Realism: Essential Readings, (London, Routledge).
• Bhaskar, R., 1975 [1997], A Realist Theory of Science: 2nd edition, (London, Verso).
• Bhaskar, R., 1998, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences: Third Edition, (London, Routledge)
• Bhaskar, R., 1993, Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom, (London, Verso).
• Coelho, Ivo, 2010. "Critical Realism." ACPI Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal. (Bangalore, ATC).1:341-344.
• Collier, A, 1994, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy, (London, Verso).
• Lonergan, B. 1957. "Insight", (London, DTL).
• Lopez, J. and Potter, G., 2001, After Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical Realism, (London, The Athlone Press).
• Losch, A., 2009. On the Origins of Critical Realism. Theology & Science vol. 7 no.1, 85-106
• McGrath, A. E., 2001, A Scientific Theology, (London, T&T Clark)
• Meyer, B. 1989 "Critical Realism and the New Testament", (San Jose, Pickwick Publications)
• Page, J. 2003 'Critical Realism and the Theological Science of Wolfhart Pannenberg: Exploring the Commonalities'. Bridges: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Theology, History and Science 10(1/2):pp. 71–84 <http://eprints.qut.edu.au/archive/00003612/>.
• Polkinghorne, J, 1991, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between science and theology, (London, SPCK)
• Polkinghorne, J., and Oord, T.J., 2010, * The Polkinghorne Reader] : Science, Faith, and the Search for Meaning (SPCK and Templeton Foundation Press) ISBN 1-59947-315-1 and ISBN 978-0-281-06053-5
• Sayer, A. (1992) Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach, (London, Routledge)
• Sayer, A. (2000) Realism and Social Science, (London, Sage)
• Willmott, R. (2002) Education Policy and Realist Social Theory, (London, Routledge)

External links[link]

• Bhaskar and American Critical Realism
• Chapter XI: Realism (Introduction to Philosophy by Dallas M. Roark)
• Critical Realism (philosophypages.com)

This biographical article needs additional citations for verification. Please help by adding reliable sources. Contentious material about living persons that is unsourced or poorly sourced must be removed immediately, especially if potentially libelous or harmful. (April 2010)

Margaret Archer (born January 20, 1943) is Professor of Sociology at the University of Warwick, UK, since 1973. She is best known for coining the term elisionism in her 1995 book Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach.

She studied at the University of London, graduating B.Sc. in 1964 and Ph.D. in 1967 with a thesis on The Educational Aspirations of English Working Class Parents. She was a lecturer at the University of Reading from 1966 to 1973.

She is one of the most influential theorists in the critical realist tradition. At the 12th World Congress of Sociology, she was elected as the first woman President of the International Sociological Association, is a founder member of both the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences and the Academy of Learned Societies in the Social Sciences. She is a Trustee of the Centre for Critical Realism.

She has supervised many PhD students, many of whom have gone on to contribute towards the substantive development of critical realism in the social sciences. Notably, Dr Robert Willmott, author of Education Policy and Realist Social Theory and Dr Justin Cruickshank, senior lecturer at the University of Birmingham.

Analytical dualism[link]

Archer argues that much social theory suffers from the generic defect of conflation where, due to a reluctance or inability to theorize emergent relationships between social phenomena, causal autonomy is denied to one side of the relation. This can take the form of autonomy being denied to agency with causal efficacy only granted to structure (downwards conflation). Alternatively it can take the form of autonomy being denied to structure with causal efficacy only granted to agency (upwards conflation). Finally it may take the form of central conflation where structure and agency are seen as being co-constitutive i.e. structure is reproduced through agency which is simultaneously constrained and enabled by structure. The most prominent example of central conflation is the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens. While not objecting to this approach on philosophical grounds, Archer does object to it on analytical grounds: by conflating structure and agency into unspecified movements of co-constitution, central conflationary approaches preclude the possibility of sociological exploration of the relative influence of each aspect.

In contradistinction Archer offers the approach of analytical dualism.^[1] While recognizing the interdependence of structure and agency (i.e. without people there would be no structures) she argues that they operate on different timescales. At any particular moment, antecedently existing structures constrain and enable agents, whose interactions produce intended and unintended consequences, which leads to structural elaboration and the reproduction or transformation of the initial structure. The resulting structure then provides a similar context of action for future agents. Likewise the initial antecedently existing structure was itself the outcome of structural elaboration resulting from the action of prior agents. So while structure and agency are interdependent, Archer argues that it is possible to unpick them analytically. By isolating structural and/or cultural factors which provide a context of action for agents, it is possible to investigate how those factors shape the subsequent interactions of agents and how those interactions in turn reproduce or transform the initial context. Archer calls this a morphogenetic sequence. Social processes are constituted through an endless array of such sequences but, as a consequence of their temporal ordering, it is possible to disengage any such sequence in order to investigate its internal causal dynamics. Through doing so, argues Archer, it's possible to give empirical accounts of how structural and agential phenomena interlink over time rather than merely stating their theoretical interdependence.

Bibliography[link]

• M. Archer, M. Vaughan M (1971) "Social Conflict and Educational Change in England and France: 1789-1848", Cambridge University Press
• M. Archer (1984) "Social Origins of Educational Systems", London: Sage
• M. Archer (1988) Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• M. Archer (1995) Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• M. Archer, R. Bhaskar, A. Collier, T. Lawson and A. Norrie (eds) (1998) Critical Realism: Essential Readings, Routledge, London.
• M. Archer (2000) Being Human: The Problem of Agency, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• M. Archer and J. Tritter (eds) (2000) Rational Choice Theory: Resisting Colonisation, Routledge, London.
• M. Archer (2003) Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• M. Archer, A. Collier and D. Porpora (eds) (2004) Transcendence: Critical Realism and God, Routledge, London.
• M. Archer (2007) Making our Way Through the World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

References[link]

1. ^ M.S. Archer (1995) Realist Social Theory ch 3 to 6

External links[link]

• Margaret Archer's page at the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences

Wolfgang Petrick (born 12 January 1939, Berlin, Germany) is a German artist.

Biography[link]

From 1958 to 1965 Petrick completed a course of studies in biology at the Freie Universität Berlin and in art at the Hochschule der Künste (HdK) as a master scholar with Werner Volkert. From 1975 to 2007 he was a professor at the HdK, and he has been a member of the Akademie der Künste in Berlin since 1993. He lives and works in Berlin and, since 1994,^[1] has also been working in New York.

Together with Karl Horst Hödicke, Markus Lüpertz, Peter Sorge and others, Petrick founded in 1965 in Berlin the exhibition association "Großgörschen 35",^[2] Germany's first self-help gallery (a producers' gallery in the present day sense). Years later as a "Kritischer Realist" he belonged to the group "Aspekt".^[3]

His initial creative work primarily concentrated on painting, drawing, sculpture, and graphic arts and prints. Since 2000 he has also worked in photography. He has been designing books since 2003 and has so far worked in collaboration with the authors Hans Christoph Buch (Morovia, Mon Amour)^[4] and Bora Ćosić (Alaska).^[5]

1. ^ For an overview of contemporary art in Berlin see "BERLINART 1961 - 1987", Exhibition catalogue, The Museum of Modern Art, New York, 1987.
2. ^ Stationen der Moderne - Die bedeutenden Kunstausstellungen des 20. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland", Exhibition catalogue, Berlinische Galerie, Berlin, 1988.
3. ^ Karin Thomas Kunst in Deutschland seit 1945, Cologne, 2002.
4. ^ Mariannenpresse, Berlin, 2002.
5. ^ Literaturhaus, Berlin, 2008.

Works[link]

• Works 1962-1979, Zeichnungen, Bilder, Objekte, Druckgraphik. Exhibition Catalog, Neuer Berliner Kunstverein, Berlin 1979.
• 1962-1989: Sprung durch die Sonne. Exhibition Catalog, Esslingen (Villa Merkel), Hamburg, Hamburger Kunsthalle, 1989, ISBN 3-923717-54-7.
• Narziss. Exhibition Catalog, Raab-Galerie. Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-926639-30-X.
• Malerei und Material. Exhibition Catalog, Haus am Lützowplatz, Berlin 1999.
• Batteria-GlasBau-Raum-Objekt-Drawing. Exhibition Catalog, Akademie der Künste, Berlin 2000.
• Deep-Action. Wolfgang Petrick and Meisterschüler. Exhibition Catalog, Georg Kolbe Museum, Berlin 2005.
• Good Slave-Bad Master. Exhibition Catalog, Galerie Michael Schultz, Berlin 2006.
• Mutatio. Exhibitions Catalog, Sara Asperger Gallery, Berlin 2008.

Literature[link]

• Peter Sager: Neue Formen des Realismus Kunst Zwischen Illusion und Wirklichkeit. Dumont, Köln 1977, ISBN 3-7701-0656-3.

External links[link]

• Wolfgang Petrick's Website
• Wolfgang Petrick and Master Scholars (grand retrospective)
• Galleries, Exhibitions
• Wolfgang Petrick Studio Visit Part I | Abstract Reality
• Wolfgang Petrick Studio Visit Part II
• Additional bibliography