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Sharia law (Arabic: شريعة šarīʿah, IPA: [ʃaˈriːʕa], "legislation"; sp. shariah, sharīʿah;[1] also Islamic law, قانون إسلامي qānūn ʾIslāmī) is the moral code and religious law of Islam. Sharia deals with many topics addressed by secular law, including crime, politics and economics, as well as personal matters such as sexual intercourse, hygiene, diet, prayer, and fasting. Though interpretations of sharia vary between cultures, in its strictest definition it is considered the infallible law of God—as opposed to the human interpretation of the laws (fiqh).
There are two primary sources of Islamic law: the precepts set forth in the Quran, and the example set by the Islamic prophet Muhammad in the Sunnah. Where it has official status, sharia is interpreted by Islamic judges (qadis) with varying responsibilities for the religious leaders (imams). For questions not directly addressed in the primary sources, they extend the application of sharia through consensus of the religious scholars (ulama) thought to embody the consensus of the Muslim Community (ijma). Islamic jurisprudence will also sometimes incorporate analogies from the Quran and Sunnah through qiyas, though Shia jurists prefer reasoning ('aql) to analogy.
The reintroduction of sharia is a longstanding goal for Islamist movements in Muslim countries, but attempts to impose sharia have been accompanied by controversy,[2][3][4] violence,[5][6][7][8][9][10] and even warfare such as the Second Sudanese Civil War.[11][12][13][14] Some in Israel and other countries in Asia have maintained institutional recognition of sharia, and use it to adjudicate their personal and community affairs. In western countries where Islamic immigration is more recent, Muslim minorities have introduced sharia family law for use in their own disputes, such as Britain's Muslim Arbitration Tribunal.
Scholars describe the word sharia as an archaic Arabic word denoting "pathway to be followed",[16][17] or "path to the water hole".[20] The latter definition comes from the fact that the path to water is the whole way of life in an arid desert environment.[18]
The etymology of sharia as a "path" or "way" comes from the Qur'anic verse[Quran 45:18]: "Then we put thee on the (right) Way of religion so follow thou that (Way), and follow not the desires of those who know not."[17] Abdul Mannan Omar in his Dictionary of the Holy Quran, believes the "Way" in 45:18 (quoted above) derives from shara'a (as prf. 3rd. p.m. sing.), meaning "He ordained". Other forms also appear: shara'u[Quran 45:13] as (prf. 3rd. p.m. plu.), "they decreed (a law)"[Quran 42:21]; and shir'atun (n.) meaning "spiritual law"[Quran 5:48].[21]
Sharia, in its strictest definition, is a divine law, as expressed in the Qur'an and Muhammad's example (often called the sunnah). As such, it is related to but different from fiqh, which is emphasized as the human interpretation of the law.[22][23] Many scholars have pointed out that the sharia is not formally a code,[24] nor a well-defined set of rules.[25] The sharia is characterized as a discussion on the duties of Muslims[24] based on both the opinion of the Muslim community and extensive literature.[26] Hunt Janin and Andre Kahlmeyer thus conclude that the sharia is "long, diverse, and complicated."[25]
From the 9th century, the power to interpret and refine law in traditional Islamic societies was in the hands of the scholars (ulema). This separation of powers served to limit the range of actions available to the ruler, who could not easily decree or reinterpret law independently and expect the continued support of the community.[27] Through succeeding centuries and empires, the balance between the ulema and the rulers shifted and reformed, but the balance of power was never decisively changed.[28] At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution introduced an era of European world hegemony that included the domination of most of the lands of Islam.[29][30] At the end of the Second World War, the European powers found themselves too weakened to maintain their empires.[31] The wide variety of forms of government, systems of law, attitudes toward modernity and interpretations of sharia are a result of the ensuing drives for independence and modernity in the Muslim world.[32][33]
There are two sources of Sharia (understood as the divine law): the Qur'an and Sunnah. According to Muslims, the Qur'an is the unalterable word of God. Much of the Qur'an exhorts Muslims to general moral values; only 80 verses of the Qur'an contain legal prescriptions.[34] The Sunnah is the life and example of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. The Sunnah's importance as a source of Sharia, is confirmed by several verses of the Qur'an (e.g. [Quran 33:21]).[35] The Sunnah is primarily contained in the hadith or reports of Muhammad's sayings, his actions, his tacit approval of actions and his demeanor. While there is only one Qur'an, there are many compilations of hadith, with the most authentic ones forming during the sahih period (850 to 915 CE). The six acclaimed Sunni collections were compiled by (in order of decreasing importance) Muhammad al-Bukhari, Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Abu Dawood, Tirmidhi, Al-Nasa'i, Ibn Majah. The collections by al-Bukhari and Muslim, regarded the most authentic, contain about 7,000 and 12,000 hadiths respectively (although the majority of entries are repetitions). The hadiths have been evaluated on authenticity, usually by determining the reliability of the narrators that transmitted them.[36] For Shi'ites, the Sunnah may also include anecdotes The Twelve Imams.[37]
The process of interpreting the two primary sources of Islamic law is called fiqh (literally meaning "intelligence") or Islamic jurisprudence. While the above two sources are regarded as infallible, the fiqh standards may change in different contexts. Fiqh covers all aspects of law, including religious, civil, political, constitutional and procedural law.[38] Fiqh depends on 4 sources:[38]
Amongst the sources unique to fiqh, i.e. ijma and qiyas/ijtihad, the former is preferred.[38] In Shi'a jurisprudence the fourth source may be expanded to include formal logic (mantiq).[39] Historically the fiqh also came to include comparative law,[37] local customs (urf)[40] and laws motivated by public interest, so long as they were allowed by the above four sources.[40] Because of the involvement of human interpretation, the fiqh is considered fallible, and thus not a part of Sharia (although scholars categorize it as Islamic law).[38]
There exist five schools of thought of fiqh, all founded within the first four centuries of Islam. Four are Sunni Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali and one Shia: Ja'afri (followed by most Shia Muslims[41]) Many Islamic scholars today advocate renewed approaches to fiqh that don't necessarily follow the traditional five allegiances.[38] The Salafi movement attracts followers from various schools of fiqh, and is based on the Quran, Sunnah and the actions and sayings of the first three generations of Muslims.[42]
Muslims have responded in a variety of ways to the forces of modernity. These responses cross the lines of tradition, sect and school. They affect the way sharia is interpreted by individuals in their personal lives, and the extent to which sharia is implemented in the public sphere by the state. These diverse movements can be referred to collectively as contemporary sharia(s).[43]
The legal systems in 21st century Muslim majority states can be classified as follows:
Sharia in the secular Muslim states: Muslim countries such as Mali, Kazakhstan and Turkey have declared themselves to be secular. Here, religious interference in state affairs, law and politics is prohibited.[44] In these Muslim countries, as well as the non-Muslim West, the role of sharia is limited to personal and family matters.
The Nigerian legal system is based on the English common law and the constitution guarantees freedom of religion and separation of church and State. However eleven northern states have adopted sharia law for those who practice the Muslim religion.[45] Similarly in Malaysia, the Malaysian legal system is based on the English common law. Sharia law is applicable only to Muslims, and is restricted to family law and religious observances. While the Constitution declares Islam as the official religion, with ceremonial rulers as head of Islam in their respective states, other religions may be freely practiced (albeit with restrictions against proselytizing to Muslims).
Muslim states with blended sources of law: Muslim countries including Pakistan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Sudan and Morocco have legal systems strongly influenced by sharia, but also cede ultimate authority to their constitutions and the rule of law. These countries conduct democratic elections, although some are also under the influence of authoritarian leaders. In these countries, politicians and jurists make law, rather than religious scholars. Most of these countries have modernized their laws and now have legal systems with significant differences when compared to classical sharia.[46]
Muslim states using classical sharia: Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf states do not have constitutions or legislatures. Their rulers have limited authority to change laws, since they are based on sharia as it is interpreted by their religious scholars. Iran shares some of these characteristics, but also has a parliament that legislates in a manner consistent with sharia.[47]
Against the backdrop of differing religious sects, scholarship, classical schools of thought, and governmental implementations, the following forces are at work influencing future developments in sharia law.
Around the world, Muslims are becoming more connected by the Internet and modern communications. This is leading to wider exchanges of ideas and cultures. Reactionary and fundamentalist movements are unlikely to halt this trend, as the sharia itself defends the right to privacy within the home.[48]
Modernists, traditionalists and fundamentalists all hold different views of sharia, as do adherents to different schools of Islamic thought and scholarship. Legal scholar L. Ali Khan claims that "the concept of sharia has been thoroughly confused in legal and common literature. For some Muslims, sharia consists of the Quran and Sunnah. For others, it also includes classical fiqh. Most encyclopedias define sharia as law based upon the Quran, the Sunnah, and classical fiqh derived from consensus (ijma) and analogy (qiyas). This definition of sharia lumps together the revealed with the unrevealed. This blending of sources has created a muddled assumption that scholarly interpretations are as sacred and beyond revision as are the Quran and the Sunnah. The Quran and the Sunnah constitute the immutable Basic Code, which should be kept separate from ever-evolving interpretive law (fiqh). This analytical separation between the Basic Code and fiqh is necessary to dissipate confusion around the term sharia."[49]
Simultaneously with liberalizing and modernizing forces, trends towards fundamentalism and movements for Islamic political power are also taking place. There has been a growing religious revival in Islam, beginning in the eighteenth century and continuing today. This movement has expressed itself in various forms ranging from wars to efforts towards improving education.[50]
A return to traditional views of sharia: There is a long-running worldwide movement underway by Muslims towards a better understanding and practice of their religion. Encouraged by their scholars and imams, Muslims have moved away from local customs and culture, and towards more universally accepted views of Islam. This movement towards traditional religious values served to help Muslims cope with the effects of European colonization. It also inspired modernist movements and the formation of new governments.[51]
The Islamist movement: Since the 1970s, the Islamist movements have become prominent; their goals are the establishment of Islamic states and sharia not just within their own borders, their means are political in nature. The Islamist power base is the millions of poor, particularly urban poor moving into the cities from the countryside. They are not international in nature (one exception being the Muslim Brotherhood). Their rhetoric opposes western culture and western power.[52] Political groups wishing to return to more traditional Islamic values are the source of threat to Turkey's secular government.[52] These movements can be considered neo-Sharism.[53]
The Fundamentalist movement: Fundamentalists, wishing to return to basic religious values and law, have in some instances imposed harsh sharia punishments for crimes, curtailed civil rights, and violated human rights. These movements are most active in areas of the world where there was contact with Western colonial powers.[54]
Extremism: Extremists have used the Quran and their own particular version of sharia[55] to justify acts of war and terror against Western individuals and governments, and also against other Muslims believed to have Western sympathies. [56] Friction between the West and Islam, particularly with regard to the Palestinian question, continues to fuel this conflict.[57]
Although there are many different interpretations of sharia, and differing perspectives on each interpretation, there is consensus among Muslims that sharia is a reflection of God's will for humankind. Sharia must therefore be, in its purest sense, perfect and unchanging.[58] The evolution or refinement of sharia is an effort to reflect God's will more perfectly.[59]
According to Jan Michiel Otto, Professor of Law and Governance in Developing Countries at Leiden University, "Anthropological research shows that people in local communities often do not distinguish clearly whether and to what extent their norms and practices are based on local tradition, tribal custom, or religion. Those who adhere to a confrontational view of sharia tend to ascribe many undesirable practices to sharia and religion overlooking custom and culture, even if high ranking religious authorities have stated the opposite." Otto's analysis appears in a paper commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[60]
According to Muslims, sharia law is founded on the words of Allah as revealed in the Quran, and traditions gathered from the life of the Prophet Muhammad. Muhammad was born ca. 570 CE in Mecca, a trading city in the Arabian desert. In addition to being a center of trade on the caravan routes, Mecca was a place of pilgrimage for Arabs of many beliefs.[61] The focus of religion in Mecca was the Ka'aba, a stone building believed to have been built by Adam at the beginning of time, and rebuilt by the Prophet Abraham and his son Ishmael.[62]
Mecca was inhabited by the Quraysh, a mostly pagan tribe with some Jews among them. Muhammad was orphaned at an early age, and came under the protection of an uncle. He grew up to become a trader and married his employer, a prosperous merchant named Khadija.[63] It was in middle age that Muhammad began to speak of revelations received from God through the angel Gabriel. Muhammad told others of his revelations, and attracted followers who transcribed them onto available materials.[64] Over the twenty three years from his first revelation until his death, Islam became the dominant force in the Arabian peninsula and Somalia, and a serious challenge to the Byzantine and Sasanian empires.[65] After Muhammad's death, the revelations were collected and organized into the Quran, and accounts of his life eventually formed the basis for the Sunnah.
In pre-Islamic Arabia, bonds of common ancestry formed the basis for tribal association.[66] The advent of Islam brought the tribes together under a single religion. As Islam is not just a religion, but also a culture, a new common basis of law and personal behavior (Sharia) began to take shape.[67]
Sharia continued to undergo fundamental changes, beginning with the reigns of caliphs Abu Bakr (632–34) and Umar (634–44), during which time many questions were brought to the attention of Muhammad's closest comrades for consultation.[68] During the reign of Muawiya b. Abu Sufyan ibn Harb, ca. 662 CE, Islam undertook an urban transformation, raising questions not originally covered by Islamic law.[68] Since then, changes in Islamic society have played an ongoing role in developing sharia, which branches out into fiqh and Qanun respectively.
Among the Muslims, tribal laws were adapted to conform to sharia "for they could not form part of the tribal law unless and until they were generally accepted as such."[66] Additionally, Noel James Coulson, Lecturer in Islamic law of the University of London, states that "to the tribe as a whole belonged the power to determine the standards by which its members should live. But here the tribe is conceived not merely as the group of its present representatives but as a historical entity embracing past, present, and future generations."[66] So, while "each and every law must be rooted in either the Qur'an or the Sunnah,"[69] without contradiction, tribal life brought about a sense of participation. Such participation was further reinforced by Muhammad who stated, "My community will never agree in error".[69]
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The formative period of fiqh stretches back to the time of the early Muslim communities. In this period, jurists were more concerned with pragmatic issues of authority and teaching than with theory.[70] Progress in theory happened with the coming of the early Muslim jurist Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafi'i (767–820), who laid down the basic principles of Islamic jurisprudence in his book Al-Risala. The book details the four roots of law (Quran, Sunnah, ijma, and qiyas) while specifying that the primary Islamic texts (the Quran and the hadith) be understood according to objective rules of interpretation derived from careful study of the Arabic language.[71]
A number of important legal concepts and institutions were developed by Islamic jurists during the classical period of Islam, known as the Islamic Golden Age, dated from the 7th to 13th centuries.[72][73][74][75]
Fiqh classifies behavior into the following types or grades: fard (obligatory), mustahabb (recommended), mubah (neutral), makruh (discouraged), and haraam (forbidden). Every human action belongs in one of these five categories.[76]
The recommended, neutral and discouraged categories are drawn largely from accounts of the life of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad. To say a behavior is sunnah is to say it is recommended as an example from the life and sayings of Muhammad. These categories form the basis for proper behavior in matters such as courtesy and manners, interpersonal relations, generosity, personal habits and hygiene.[76]
Sharia law can be organized in different ways:
Sharia can be divided into six main branches:
"Reliance of the Traveller", an English translation of a fourteenth century CE reference on the Shafi'i school of fiqh written by Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, organizes sharia law into the following topics:
In some areas, there are substantial differences in the law between different schools of fiqh, countries, cultures and schools of thought.
In Islam, purification has a spiritual dimension and a physical one. Muslims believe that certain human activities and contact with impure animals and substances cause impurity. Classic Islamic law details how to recognize impurity, and how to remedy it. Muslims use water for purification in most circumstances, although earth can also be used under certain conditions. Before prayer or other religious rituals, Muslims must clean themselves in a prescribed manner. The manner of cleansing, either wudhu or ghusl, depend on the circumstances. Muslims' cleaning of dishes, clothing and homes are all done in accordance with stated laws.[78][79]
Muslims are enjoined to pray five times each day, with certain exceptions. These obligatory prayers, salat, are performed during prescribed periods of the day, and most can be performed either in groups or by oneself; although it is recommended to pray in a group. There are also optional prayers which can be performed, as well as special prayers for certain seasons, days and events. Muslims must turn to face the Kaaba in Mecca when they pray, and they must be purified in order for their prayers to be accepted. Personal, informal prayer and invocation is practiced as well. Classic Islamic law details many aspects of the act of prayer, including who can pray, when to pray, how to pray, and where to pray.[80][81]
Muslims are encouraged to visit those among them who are sick and dying. Dying Muslims are reminded of God's mercy, and the value of prayer, by those who visit them. In turn, the visitors are reminded of their mortality, and the transient nature of life. Upon death, the Muslim will be washed and shrouded in clean, white cloth. A special prayer, Janazah, is performed for the deceased, preferably by the assembled Muslim community. The body is taken to a place which has ground set aside for the burial of Muslims. The grave is dug perpendicular to the direction of Mecca, and the body is lowered into the grave to rest on its side, with the face turned towards Mecca. Classic Islamic law details visitation of the ill, preparation of the dead for burial, the funeral prayer and the manner in which the Muslim is buried.[82]
All Muslims who live above the subsistence level must pay an annual alms, known as zakat. In the modern sense, this would be Islam's equivalent to US Social Security or UK National Insurance. This is not charity, but rather an obligation owed by the eligible Muslim to the poor of the community. The amount is calculated based on the wealth of the Muslim. There is no fixed rate stated in Quran; but the generally practiced rate is 2.5 percent. Eligibility and total payable varies; depending on the type and quantity of wealth being assessed.[83] If the Government wishes to create a comprehensive and robust welfare state, the rate can be increased. Wealth includes savings, jewelry and land. Classic Islamic law details the tax, how it is assessed, its collection, and its distribution.[84][85]
During the Islamic month of Ramadan, Muslims abstain from food, drink, and sex between dawn and sunset. Exceptions to this obligation are made for children who are pre-pubescent, the infirm, travelers, and pregnant or menstruating women.[86] During Ramadan, the daylight hours will often begin and end with a large meal. After dinner, many Muslims participate in special communal prayers held during Ramadan. The end of Ramadan fasting is celebrated with special prayers, gatherings of family and friends, and specially prepared meals. Muslims may also fast on other special days of the year, and to make up for missed days of fasting. Classic Islamic law details the exact definition of the fast, the times of fasting, how a fast may be broken, who must fast, and permitted exceptions to the fast.[87][88]
At least once in each Muslim's lifetime, they must attempt a visit to the Holy Places of Islam located in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The focus of this journey is the Kaaba, a small rectangular building around which a huge mosque has been built. This pilgrimage, known as the Hajj, begins two months after Ramadan each year. Dressed in symbolically simple clothing, Muslim pilgrims circle the Kaaba seven times, often followed by a drink from a special stream. Next, a symbolic search for water is performed by travelling back and forth between two nearby peaks. On the eighth day of the month, the pilgrims travel to Mina in the desert and spend the night in tents. The following day, over two million Muslims gather on the slopes of Mount Arafat, where the afternoon is spent in prayer. The Feast of Sacrifice, celebrated by Muslims worldwide, is performed by pilgrims in Mina the next day, and includes the slaughter of an animal. Finally, the pilgrims perform a ritual Stoning of the Devil by tossing pebbles at three pillars. Classic Islamic law details the manner in which the pilgrim dresses, behaves, arrives, departs and performs each of these rituals.[89][90]
Islamic law recognizes private and community property, as well as overlapping forms of entitlement for charitable purposes, known as waqf or trusts. Under sharia law, however, ownership of all property ultimately rests with God; while individual property rights are upheld, there is a corresponding obligation to share, particularly with those in need.[91] The laws of contract and obligation are also formed around this egalitarian Quranic requirement, prohibiting unequal exchanges or unfair advantage in trade. On this basis, the charging of interest on loans is prohibited, as are other transactions in which risks are borne disproportionately to the potential returns between parties to a transaction. The limits on personal liability afforded by incorporation are seen as a form of usury in this sense, as is insurance. All these inequities in risk and reward between parties to a transaction, known collectively as riba, are prohibited.[92] For this reason, Islamic banking and financing are partnerships between customers and institutions, where risk and reward are distributed equitably. Partnerships, rather than corporations, are the key concept in collective Islamic business. Financing and investments are accomplished in this manner, as purchases and resales, with equity shifting over time between the institution and the client as payments are made or returns are recognized. Conversely, no individual is shielded from the consequences of poor judgement or bad timing.[93] The Islamic financial and investment models have taken root in the West and begun to flourish, even as the financial underpinnings of large Western corporations collapse under the weight of unevenly distributed risks.[94][95] Classic Islamic law details the manner of contracting, the types of transactions, the assignment of liability and reward, and the responsibilities of the parties in Islamic trade.[96]
The rules of inheritance under sharia law are intricate, and a female's portion is generally half the amount a male would receive under the same circumstances.[97] Up to one third of a person's property may be distributed as bequests, or wasiyya, upon their death. After debts are settled, the remainder of the estate will be divided among the family of the deceased according to the rules of inheritance, or irth.[98] In Islamic societies, inherited wealth and property do not easily accumulate to, or remain in, certain families. Large concentrations of property will be divided into smaller portions over time among male inheritors. Property will tend to flow to other families as female inheritors take their shares into their marriages.[99] Classic Islamic law details the division of property, the shares family members are entitled to, adjustments and redistributions in the shares, orders of precedence among inheritors, and substitution among inheritors.[100]
The laws governing Islamic marriage vary substantially between sects, schools, states and cultures. The following outline is general in nature.
Marriage is mentioned in the Quran: nikah. It aims to be permanent, but can be terminated by the husband in the talaq process, or by the wife seeking divorce using khul'.
In nikah the couples inherit from each other. A dowry known as mahr is given to the bride, a legal contract is signed when entering the marriage, and the husband must pay for the wife's expenses. For the contract to be valid there must be two witnesses under Sunni jurisprudence. There is no witness requirement for Shia contracts. In Sunni jurisprudence, the contract is void if there is a determined divorce date in the nikah, whereas, in Shia jurisprudence, nikah contracts with determined divorce dates are transformed into nikah mut'ah.
Under Shia jurisprudence, nikah mut'ah is the second form of marriage. It is "Haraam" in Sunni Islam according to Muslim scholars. It is a fixed-term marriage, which is a marriage with a preset duration, after which the marriage is automatically dissolved. Traditionally the couple does not inherit from each other, the man usually is not responsible for the economic welfare of the woman, and she usually may leave her home at her own discretion. Nikah mut'ah does not count towards the maximum of four wives the Quran allows to Muslim men. The woman is still given her mahr dowry, and the woman must still observe the iddah, a period of five months at the end of the marriage where she is not permitted to remarry in the case she may have become pregnant before the divorce took place. This maintains the proper lineage of children. There is controversy about the Islamic legality of this type of marriage since the Prophet Muhammad is said by Sunnis to have prohibited the practice after having temporarily allowed it.
A third type of marriage contract, known as misyar, is emerging in Sunni Islam. This marriage is not for a fixed period of time like nikah mut'ah, but is similar in other respects including lack of inheritance, lack of financial responsibility and freedom of movement on the part of the wife. In misyar marriage, the couple need not cohabit. There is lots of controversy regarding this form of marriage and most Sunni scholars disagree with the basis of misyar marriage. Muslims do, on occasion, marry according to urf, or local custom, without following the requirements set forth in sharia law. This may be done for various reasons, such as an inability of the couple to obtain permission from the bride's guardian. In these cases, they may find their marriage to be unrecognized at a later point, and have difficulty availing themselves of legal remedies under sharia.
Requirements for Islamic Marriages:
The Qur'an permits a Muslim man to marry more than one woman at a time (up to a maximum of four), but does not encourage such behavior. Polygamy is only permitted in certain circumstances, such as when the death of another man has left his wife with no other means of support.[104] All wives are entitled to separate living quarters at the behest of the husband and, if possible, all should receive equal attention, support, treatment and inheritance. In modern practice, it is uncommon for a Muslim man to have more than one wife; if he does so, it is often due to the infertility of his first wife. The practice of polygamy has been regulated or abolished in some Muslim states.[104][105]
Historically, Muslim rulers have often remarried the wives of their conquered opponents in order to gain ties of kinship with their new subjects. In these cases, the wives of leaders have sometimes numbered in the tens or even hundreds. In Ottoman Turkey, the practice also filtered down to the aristocracy. This became the basis for the Western image of a powerful, wealthy Muslim with a vast harem.[106]
The laws governing divorce vary substantially between sects, schools, states and cultures. The following outline is general in nature.
A marriage can be terminated by the husband in the talaq process, or by the wife seeking divorce through khul'. Under faskh a marriage may be annulled or terminated by the qadi judge.
Men have the right of unilateral divorce under classical sharia. A Sunni Muslim divorce is effective when the man tells his wife that he is divorcing her, however a Shia divorce also requires four witnesses.[107] Upon divorce, the husband must pay the wife any delayed component of the dower. If a man divorces his wife in this manner three times, he may not re-marry her unless she first marries, and is subsequently divorced from, another man. Only then, and only if the divorce from the second husband is not intended as a means to re-marry her first husband, may the first husband and the woman re-marry.[Quran 2:230]
In practice, unilateral divorce is only common in a few areas of the Islamic world. It is much more common for divorces to be accomplished by mutual consent.[107]
If the wife asks for a divorce and the husband refuses, the wife has a right, under classical sharia, to divorce by khul'. Although this right is not recognized everywhere in Islam, it is becoming more common. In this scenario, the qadi judge will effect the divorce for the wife, and she may be required to return part, or all, of her dowry.[107]
Under faskh, a qadi judge can end or annul a marriage.[107] Apostasy, on the part of the husband or wife, ends a Muslim marriage in this way. Hardship or suffering on the part of the wife in a marriage may also be remedied in this way. This procedure is also used to annul a marriage in which one of the parties has a serious disability.[108]
Except in the case of a khul' divorce initiated by a woman, the divorced wife generally keeps her dowry from when she was married. A divorced woman is given child support until the age of weaning. The mother is usually granted custody of the child.[109] If the couple has divorced fewer than three times (meaning it is not a final divorce) the wife also receives spousal support for three menstrual cycles after the divorce, until it can be determined whether she is pregnant. Even in a threefold divorce, a pregnant wife will be supported during the waiting period, and the child will be supported afterwards.[110]
In a divorce, the child will stay with its mother until he or she is weaned,[111] or until the age of discernment, when the child may choose whom he or she lives with. The age of discernment is seven or eight years.[111]
The concept of justice embodied in sharia is different from that of secular Western law.[112] Muslims believe the sharia law has been revealed by God. In Islam, the laws that govern human affairs are just one facet of a universal set of laws governing nature itself. Violations of Islamic law are offenses against God and nature, including one's own human nature. Crime in Islam is sin. Whatever crime is committed, whatever punishment is prescribed for that crime in this world, one must ultimately answer to God on the Day of Judgement.[112]
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Sharia judicial proceedings have significant differences with other legal traditions, including those in both common law and civil law. Sharia courts traditionally do not rely on lawyers; plaintiffs and defendants represent themselves. Trials are conducted solely by the judge, and there is no jury system. There is no pre-trial discovery process, and no cross-examination of witnesses. Unlike common law, judges' verdicts do not set binding precedents[113][114][115] under the principle of stare decisis,[116] and unlike civil law, sharia does not utilize formally codified statutes[117] (these were first introduced only in the late 19th century during the decline of the Ottoman Empire, cf. mecelle). Instead of precedents and codes, sharia relies on jurists' manuals and collections of non-binding legal opinions, or hadith, (ulama, particularly a mufti); these can be made binding for a particular case at the discretion of a judge.
There are four categories of crimes in sharia law, qisas, hudud, tazir, and siyastan. Qisas involves personal injury and has several categories: intentional murder (first-degree), quasi-intentional murder (second-degree), unintentional murder (manslaughter), intentional injury, and semi-intentional/unintentional injury. A qisas (retaliation) offense is treated as a common law tort rather than a crime against the state. If the accused party is found guilty, the victim (or in death, victim's family) determines the punishment, choosing either retribution (qisas-e-nafs), which means execution in the case of intentional murder, and in cases of intentional battery, the amputation of the limb that was lost; or they can choose to forgive the perpetrator. If they forgive the perpetrator, they can receive blood money compensation (diyya) for the loss of life/limb/injury. The sharia judge can only convict someone for a qisas crime, the victim/victim's family determines the punishment. However, if the victim's family pardons the criminal, in addition to the sharia punishment the criminal would normally receive a tazir prison sentence (such as ten to twenty years in prison) for crimes such as "intentional loss of life", "tazir assault and battery" "disturbance of the peace", and so forth. However, if the murder/injury was unpremeditated (such as during a fight or if there were mitigating factors), then the person would be released after paying the blood money, or spend a short time in prison.
Semi-intentional murder/injury is rarely applied, only if a person carried out an act that would not normally be dangerous/lethal, but it resulted in death/injury. In most cases, semi-intentional murder/injury would be prosecuted as intentional murder/battery. And lastly, unintentional murder/battery is when the crime was clearly accidental. This is punishable by only paying diyya, If the perpetrator cannot afford the blood money, he/she can fast for two months straight to be forgiven. Neither semi-intentional or unintentional murder/injury is punishable by qisas.
This differs significantly from civil law and common law. In sharia law, murder and injury is seen as a tort, and the victim could either forgive the perpetrator or have him/her punished with the same injury/death inflicted (eye for an eye) if it was intentionally committed. Unlike common and civil law, there are very few mitigating factors for the death penalty, often those who murder under any circumstances would either die or be forgiven by the victim's family (Thou shalt not kill). As a result, those who kill others (non-accidentally), even in arguments, crimes of passion, and self-defense could be put to death, or have pay blood money. Sharia law in theory sees no homicide as "justifiable homicide", and if homicide is carried out, the person either forfeits his own life or pays for the blood of the murder victim. However, the sharia judge could recommend to the family to either give mercy to the murderer or allow them to die. Traditionally, the next of kin of the victim would carry out the execution, or the victim himself/herself would inflict the injury.
The mitigating factors to qisas are: -A father who murders his child cannot be punished by qisas (he can be punished by tazir penalty and executed/imprisoned, thus he cannot receive diyya for murdering his own child). If a mother killed her child, such as infanticide, the mother would pay diyya to charity or receive qisas. -A person who murders a spouse/lover caught in the act of adultery (only if the murderer has four witnesses, if he/she does, would receive tazir imprisonment). -Self defense murder (if there are two witnesses who can prove it was self-defense, or if crime is deemed to be manslaughter). -If the person was insane/retarded, then it would be considered semi-intentional murder. -If a person was under the legal age (typically 15–18 years of age). -If the person murdered on the orders of another, the mastermind would receive qisas/diyya, the actual murderer would receive tazir sentence (which would be death or imprisonment depending on whether the family forgave the mastermind). If someone induced a minor or an insane person to murder, -If it was an abortion, usually measured after three months in a pregnancy, the woman may pay 1/10 of the blood money to charity or face imprisonment (not qisas). If somebody forced a woman to have a miscarriage, the rule is the same.
If the next of kin forgave the murderer/injurer, he/she can ask for diyya (blood money). Traditionally, it is worth the equivalent of 100 camels in cash for a death, and lesser amounts for small body injuries. However, in serious injuries, such as those resulting in paralysis, the perpetrator must pay the victm their full blood money. Men receive twice as much blood money as a woman. That is because if a man, who by law should be the provider for his family is injured/killed, the family could be further compensated for the loss/disability of their breadwinner. However, more often blood money is settled through negotiation, and the sum could be more or less than the official amount, thus allowing women to receive more equal amounts as well.
The second category of crimes is hudud (or hadd). Hudud crimes are crimes whose penalties were laid down by the Quran, and are considered to be "claims against God". The hudud crimes are:
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Hudud penalties for these cases are not punishments tailored to the offense, but are intended to be deterrents, setting an example for the general public and prosecuting the most flagrant violations. The process is extremely exacting: at least two witnesses are required to corroborate the evidence, with four witnesses required in the case of sex crimes, so that in most such cases the most severe penalties are difficult, if not impossible, to impose. Circumstantial evidence is not allowed to be part of the testimony. When the severest penalties are imposed, the case is usually so obvious, obscene or flagrant that conviction is virtually inevitable.
Very often, Westerners mistake hudud punishment for the punishment regularly given under sharia law, but that is inaccurate;[dubious – discuss] hudud punishments are only meant as a deterrent for rare cases. Most punishments are given under tazir rules.
As a result most countries with classical sharia law formally use the hudud penalty only rarely.
The third category of crimes is tazir. It covers all other offenses not mentioned already. It is a "claim of the state" and it receives a discretionary sentence. The punishment may not be more severe than the punishment of a hudud crime. It can range, depending on the crime or circumstances, from death to imprisonment to even community service. Circumstantial evidence is allowed in court, and most countries prosecute their non-murder crimes as tazir crimes, due to the flexibility of the evidence-gathering and sentencing. The punishment is meant to fit the crime. For example, a rapist may not be able to be prosecuted for zina, but would still be convicted of tazir rape, or in theft, they would be found guilty of tazir theft and given prison time rather than amputation. A murderer would still spend time in prison if he had received the forgiveness of the family. The heavy hudud penalties of amputation and stoning are not applied (although some countries do use corporal punishment).
A fourth and lesser known category is "siyastan". A siyastan penalty is a punishment that is created on the authority of the government of the county. While it cannot contadict the provisions of sharia, it is not derived from sharia. For example, treason against the ruling system historically would be considered a siyastan crime. Beginning with the Ottoman Empire, many modern sharia jurisdictions have created penal law codes (Qanun) that covers areas that are not specifically mentioned in sharia law, although they may not contradict sharia law. Traffic penalties are a modern example. Another modern example is drug trafficking. Most modern countries using sharia law punish that crime with penal laws created by the government (often with death/imprisonment). It does not contradict sharia, because it is viewed as a crime that is "spreading corruption on the earth" (fasad-fel-arz).
The rules of evidence in sharia courts also maintain a distinctive custom of prioritizing oral testimony.[118][119] A confession, an oath, or the oral testimony of a witness are the main evidence admissible in a hudud case, written evidence is only admissible when deemed reliable by the judge, i.e., notaries.[120] Testimony must be from at least two witnesses, and preferably free Muslim male witnesses, who are not related parties and who are of sound mind and reliable character; testimony to establish the crime of adultery, or zina must be from four direct witnesses.[121] Forensic evidence (i.e., fingerprints, ballistics, blood samples, DNA etc.) and other circumstantial evidence is likewise rejected in hudud cases in favor of eyewitnesses, a practice which can cause severe difficulties for women plaintiffs in rape cases.[122] Testimony from women is given only half the weight of men,[citation needed] and testimony from non-Muslims may be excluded altogether (if against a Muslim).[citation needed] Non-Muslim minorities, however, could and did use sharia courts, even amongst themselves.[123][not in citation given]
Sharia's rules on written evidence necessarily diminish the utility of written contracts to structure economic relations, and Timur Kuran has noted the predominance of a "largely oral contracting culture" in pre-modern Islamic society.[124]
In lieu of written evidence, oaths are accorded much greater weight; rather than being used simply to guarantee the truth of ensuing testimony, they are themselves used as evidence. Plaintiffs lacking other evidence to support their claims may demand that defendants take an oath swearing their innocence, refusal thereof can result in a verdict for the plaintiff.[125] Taking an oath for Muslims can be a grave act; one study of courts in Morocco found that lying litigants would often "maintain their testimony 'right up to the moment of oath-taking and then to stop, refuse the oath, and surrender the case."[126] Accordingly, defendants are not routinely required to swear before testifying, which would risk casually profaning the Quran should the defendant commit perjury;[126] instead oaths are a solemn procedure performed as a final part of the evidence process.
In some countries, sharia courts, with their tradition of pro se representation, simple rules of evidence, and absence of appeals courts, prosecutors, cross examination, complex documentary evidence and discovery proceedings, juries and voir dire proceedings, circumstantial evidence, forensics, case law, standardized codes, exclusionary rules, and most of the other infrastructure of civil and common law court systems, have as a result, comparatively informal and streamlined proceedings. This can provide significant increases in speed and efficiency, and can be an advantage in jurisdictions where the general court system is slow or corrupt, and where few litigants can afford lawyers. In Nigeria, where imposition of sharia was highly controversial, even Nigeria's justice minister was compelled to admit that in sharia courts, "if a man owes you money, you can get paid in the evening. Whereas in the regular courts, you can sit in court for ten years and get no justice."[127] In places using sharia law such as Iran and Pakistan, while having a fixed legal system, with prosecuters, appeals courts and a supreme court, and a definite civil law style penal code, they are still heavily based on the informality and simplicity of a "pure" sharia court, and trials often still take a matter of hours or sometimes days.
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The punishment depends on whether the criminal was convicted of qesas, hudud or tazir.
In a tazir crime, the penalty would be usually a prison sentence, corporal punishment in some countries, or a execution in a very serious case. Since hudud crimes are extremely hard to punish, this is the usual route that would be taken. Stoning and amputation would certainly not be carried out in a tazir sentence, and the punishment would not be fixed, but discretionary. This allows the judge to have the authority to give a punishment that fits the crime.
In the rarest of rare case when a person is convicted of a hudud crime, the punishment is much harsher.
In accordance with the Quran and several hadith, theft is punished by imprisonment or amputation of hands.[128] Several requirements are in place for the amputation of hands, they are:
All of these must be met under the scrutiny of judicial authority.[Quran 5:38][129]
In accordance with hadith, stoning to death is the penalty for married men and women who commit adultery. In addition, there are several conditions related to the person who commits it that must be met. One of the difficult ones is that the punishment cannot be enforced unless there is a confession of the person, or four male eyewitnesses who each saw the act being committed. All of these must be met under the scrutiny of judicial authority[130] For unmarried men and women, the punishment prescribed in the Quran and hadith is 100 lashes.[131]
The "four witness" standard comes from the Quran itself, a revelation Muhammad announced in response to accusations of adultery leveled at his wife, Aisha: "Why did they not produce four witnesses? Since they produce not witnesses, they verily are liars in the sight of Allah."[Quran 24:13]
Punishments are authorized by other passages in the Quran and hadiths for certain crimes (e.g., extramarital sex, adultery), and are employed by some as rationale for extra-legal punitive action while others disagree:
“The woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication—flog each of them with hundred stripes: Let no compassion move you in their case, in a matter prescribed by God, if ye believe in God and the last day.”[Quran 24:2] “Nor come nigh to adultery: for it is a shameful (deed) and an evil, opening the road (to other evils).”[Quran 17:32]
Rape is punishable by death in sharia law. However there is some dispute as to which crime it is a part of. In some countries, like Pakistan, rape is considered to be a part of adultery (zina). This has led to some cases where rapists were unable to be punished due to the rape victim lacking 4 witnesses. However, in most countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, rape is considered a part of armed robbery (hiraba), making it easier to convict rapists. However, in most cases, rape is punished as a tazir crime, which could still be the death penalty. Many rape cases are settled out of court, with the rapist paying monetary compensation (jirah) to the victim, and in some cases they pay diyya for injuries inflicted.
In most interpretations of sharia, conversion by Muslims to other religions or becoming non-religious, is strictly forbidden and is termed apostasy. Non-Muslims, however, are allowed to convert into Islam.[132] Muslim theology equates apostasy to treason, and in some interpretations of sharia, the penalty for apostasy is death. During the time of Muhammad, treason and apostasy were considered one and the same; nowadays, many scholars differentiate between treason and apostasy, believing that the punishment for apostasy is not death, while the punishment for treason is death.[citation needed]
The accusation of apostasy may be used against non-conventional interpretations of the Quran. The severe persecution[weasel words] of the famous expert in Arabic literature, Nasr Abu Zayd, is an example of this.[133] Similar accusations and persecutions[weasel words] were famously leveled against the author Salman Rushdie.[134][not in citation given]
Islamic law does not present a comprehensive list of pure foods and drinks. However, it prohibits:[135]
The prohibition of dead meat is not applicable to fish and locusts.[137][138][139] Also hadith literature prohibits beasts having sharp canine teeth, birds having claws and talons in their feet,[140] Jallalah (animals whose meat carries a stink in it because they feed on filth),[141] tamed donkeys,[142] and any piece cut from a living animal.[135][143]
Liquor and gambling are expressly prohibited in the Quran, and sharia law.
Muhammad is reported to have said: "He who plays with dice is like the one who handles the flesh and blood of swine."
Abd-Allah ibn Amr reported that Muhammad prohibited all games of chance and card playing that caused financial gain or loss.[144]
Practitioners of Islam are generally taught to follow some specific customs in their daily lives. Most of these customs can be traced back to Abrahamic traditions in Pre-Islamic Arabian society.[145] Due to Muhammad's sanction or tacit approval of such practices, these customs are considered to be Sunnah (practices of Muhammad as part of the religion) by the Ummah (Muslim nation). It includes customs like:
There are two festivals that are considered Sunnah.[157][158]
Rituals associated with these festivals:[157]
The Quran also places a dress code upon its followers. The rule for men has been ordained before the women: “say to the believing men to lower their gaze and preserve their modesty, it will make for greater purity for them and Allah is well aware of all that they do.”[Quran 24:30] Allah then says in the Quran, “And say to the believing women that they cast down their looks and guard their private parts and do not display their ornaments except what appears thereof, and let them wear their khumūr over their bosoms, and not display their ornaments except to their husbands...”[24:31] All those men in whose presence a woman is not obliged to practise the dress code are known as her mahrams. Men have a more relaxed dress code: the body must be covered from knee to waist. However, under sharia law, women are required to cover all of their bodies except hands and face.[161][162] Covering the face is the subject of some divergence of opinion amongst the scholars – some consider it to be compulsory since the face is the major source of attraction, whilst others consider it to be highly recommended. The rationale given for these rules is that men and women are not to be viewed as sexual objects. Men are required to keep their guard up and women to protect themselves. In theory, should either one fail, the other prevents the society from falling into fitna (temptation or discord).
There are many different opinions, however, as to whether the veil or headscarf is a real Quranic obligation. Some scholars such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi claim it is, while others, such as Mohammed Arkoun, Soheib Bencheikh, Abdoldjavad Falaturi, Gamal al-Banna claim it is not. However, the first group appears dominant:[161] "Jamal al Banna has been for a number of years one of the few mainstream Muslim scholars to argue that the Muslim headscarf, or hijab, is not an Islamic obligation."[163]
During the 19th century, the history of Islamic law took a sharp turn due to new challenges the Muslim world faced: the West had risen to a global power and colonized a large part of the world, including Muslim territories. In the Western world, societies changed from the agricultural to the industrial stage, new social and political ideas emerged, and social models slowly shifted from hierarchical towards egalitarian. The Ottoman Empire and the rest of the Muslim world were in decline, and calls for reform became louder. In Muslim countries, codified state law started replacing the role of scholarly legal opinion. Western countries sometimes inspired, sometimes pressured, and sometimes forced Muslim states to change their laws. Secularist movements pushed for laws deviating from the opinions of the Islamic legal scholars. Islamic legal scholarship remained the sole authority for guidance in matters of rituals, worship, and spirituality, while they lost authority to the state in other areas. The Muslim community became divided into groups reacting differently to the change. This division persists until the present day (Brown 1996, Hallaq 2001, Ramadan 2005, Aslan 2006, Safi 2003, Nenezich 2006).
There is tremendous variety in the interpretation and implementation of Islamic law in Muslim societies today. Liberal movements within Islam have questioned the relevance and applicability of sharia from a variety of perspectives; Islamic feminism brings multiple points of view to the discussion. Some countries, such as Saudi Arabia fully use sharia and have no constitution or legal code. Others, such as Pakistan and Iran have constitutions, but they reflect the principles of sharia, and have sharia legal systems with corresponding civil laws (qanun). Some of the largest Muslim countries, including Indonesia and Bangladesh have largely secular constitutions and laws, but with Islamic law provisions in family law. However, most of their secular laws still do not contradict sharia law. Turkey has a constitution that is officially strongly secular, and has virtually no resemblance to sharia law. India and the Philippines have fully separate Muslim civil laws, wholly based on sharia. In India, Muslim civil laws are framed by the Muslim Personal Law board while, in the Philippines, it is framed by the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. However, the criminal laws in both the countries are uniform.
In September 2008, newspapers in the United Kingdom stated the government had "quietly sanctioned" the recognition of sharia courts. This refers to situations where both sides in a legal dispute freely choose a sharia court as a binding arbitrator rather than taking a matter before the official courts. The decision did not break new ground: the decisions of similar Jewish beth din court arbitrations have been recognized in England for over 100 years.[167] Neither party can be forced into arbitration by a sharia or a Jewish court.
Most countries of the Middle East and North Africa maintain a dual system of secular courts and religious courts, in which the religious courts mainly regulate marriage and inheritance. Saudi Arabia and Iran maintain religious courts for all aspects of jurisprudence, and the Mutaween (religious police) assert social compliance, while Somaliland, and Maldives adopted sharia in legal aspects but with a western style of judiciary system (Common law or civil law). Laws derived from sharia are also applied in Afghanistan, Libya and Sudan. Sharia law is officially recognised by the justice system in Israel in matters of personal status of Muslims if they choose a sharia court (e.g. marriage, divorce, guardianship). Judges' salaries are paid by the state.[168] Lebanon also incorporates sharia law for Muslims in family matters.[169] Some states in northern Nigeria have reintroduced sharia courts.[170] In practice the new sharia courts in Nigeria have most often meant the reintroduction of harsh punishments without respecting the much tougher rules of evidence and testimony. The punishments include amputation of one/both hands for theft and stoning for adultery.[171]
Many Westerners consider the punishments prescribed by some countries' interpretation of Islamic law to be "barbaric and cruel". Islamic scholars argue that, if implemented properly, the punishments serve as a deterrent to crime.[172] In international media, practices by countries applying Islamic law have fallen under considerable criticism at times. This is particularly the case when the sentence carried out is seen to greatly tilt away from established standards of international human rights. This is true for the application of the death penalty for the crimes of adultery, blasphemy, apostasy and homosexuality, amputations for the crime of theft, and flogging for fornication or public intoxication.[173]
A bill proposed by lawmakers in the Indonesian province of Aceh would implement sharia law for all non-Muslims, the armed forces and law enforcement officers, a local police official has announced.[clarification needed] The news comes two months after the Deutsche Presse-Agentur warned of "Taliban-style Islamic police terrorizing Indonesia's Aceh".[174][175][176]
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Sharia law involves elements of a democratic system, namely electoral procedure, though syntax as to what a "democracy" constitutes leaves this in question.[177] Legal scholar L. Ali Khan argues that "constitutional orders founded on the principles of sharia are fully compatible with democracy, provided that religious minorities are protected and the incumbent Islamic leadership remains committed to the right to recall".[178][179]
However, European and American courts have generally ruled against the implementation of Sharia law, both in jurisprudence and within a community context, based on Sharia's religious background. Whereas groups within a number of nations are actively seeking to implement Sharia law, in 1998 the Constitutional Court of Turkey banned and dissolved Turkey's Refah Party on the grounds that "Democracy is the antithesis of Sharia", the latter of which Refah sought to introduce.
On appeal by Refah the European Court of Human Rights determined that "sharia is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy".[180][181][182] Refah's sharia-based notion of a "plurality of legal systems, grounded on religion" was ruled to contravene the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It was determined that it would "do away with the State's role as the guarantor of individual rights and freedoms" and "infringe the principle of non-discrimination between individuals as regards their enjoyment of public freedoms, which is one of the fundamental principles of democracy".[183]
Several major, predominantly Muslim countries criticized the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) for its perceived failure to take into account the cultural and religious context of non-Western countries. Iran claimed that the UDHR was "a secular understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition", which could not be implemented by Muslims without trespassing the Islamic law. Therefore in 1990 the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, a group representing all Muslim majority nations, adopted the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points to notable absences from the Cairo Declaration: provisions for democratic principles, protection for religious freedom, freedom of association and freedom of the press, as well as equality in rights and equal protection under the law. Article 24 of the Cairo declaration states that "all the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic shari'a".[184]
Professor H. Patrick Glenn asserts that the European concept of human rights developed in reaction to an entrenched hierarchy of class and privilege contrary to, and rejected by, Islam. As implemented in sharia law, protection for the individual is defined in terms of mutual obligation rather than human rights. The concept of human rights, as applied in the European framework, is therefore unnecessary and potentially destructive to Islamic societies.[185]
Many secularist, human rights, and leading organisations have criticized Islamic states' stance on human rights. In 2009, the journal Free Inquiry summarized this criticism in an editorial: "We are deeply concerned with the changes to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by a coalition of Islamic states within the United Nations that wishes to prohibit any criticism of religion and would thus protect Islam's limited view of human rights. In view of the conditions inside the Islamic Republic of Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Bangdalesh, Iraq, and Afghanistan, we should expect that at the top of their human rights agenda would be to rectify the legal inequality of women, the suppression of political dissent, the curtailment of free expression, the persecution of ethnic minorities and religious dissenters — in short, protecting their citizens from egregious human rights violations. Instead, they are worrying about protecting Islam."[186]
Qadi 'Iyad argues that insulting the Prophet Muhammad is prohibited. Such criticism is blasphemy and punishable by death.
Slander, gossip, and backbiting, or "ghiba" is regarded as a major sin in the Sharia law.[187]
Homosexual activity is illegal under sharia, though the prescribed penalties differ from one school of jurisprudence to another. For example, these Muslim-majority countries may impose the death penalty for acts perceived as sodomy and homosexual activities: Iran,[188] Nigeria,[189] Saudi Arabia,[190] Somalia.[191] In contrast, in some Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia (outside of Aceh province),[192] Egypt and Iraq, same-sex sexual acts are illegal but there is no specific penalty.[193][original research?] In Turkey and Jordan, homosexual acts between consenting individuals are legal[194].
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In terms of religious obligations, such as certain elements of prayer, payment of the zakat poor-tax, observance of the Ramadan fast, and the Hajj pilgrimage, women are treated no differently from men. There are, however, some exceptions made in the case of prayers and fasting, as women are relieved from the duty of the five daily prayers or fasting during their menstruation.[citation needed]
There are no priests or clergy needed in order to perform rites and sacraments in Islam. The leader of prayer is known as an imam. Men can lead both men and women in prayer, but women do not traditionally lead men in prayer.[195] In practice, it is much more common for men to be scholars than women, however in the early days of Islam, female scholars were much more common.[196] Islam does not prohibit women from working, as it says, "Treat your women well and be kind to them for they are your partners and committed helpers."[197] Married women have the right to seek employment although it is often thought in patriarchal societies that the woman's role as a wife and mother should have first priority.[citation needed]
Islam unequivocally allows both single and married women to own property in their own right.[198] Islam grants women the right to inherit property from other family members, and these rights are detailed in the Quran. A woman's inheritance is different from a man's, both in quantity and attached obligations.[Quran 4:12] For instance, a daughter's inheritance is usually half that of her brother's.[Quran 4:11] Sharia law requires family members females or males to support each other as needed; compare female inheritance in Salic law. Men are fully obliged to financially maintain their household, whereas women are not; it is often said that even if the woman is a millionaire and he is poor, he is still obliged to spend on her. She is not obliged to share her wealth with her husband unless she does so out of kindness.[citation needed]
Islamic jurists have traditionally held that Muslim women may enter into marriage with only Muslim men,[199] although some contemporary jurists question the basis of this restriction.[199][200][201] On the other hand, the Quran allows a Muslim man to marry a chaste woman from the People of the Book, a term that includes Jews, Sabians, and Christians.[199][Quran 5:5] However, fiqh law[which?] has held that it is makruh (reprehensible) for a Muslim man to marry a non-Muslim woman in a non-Muslim country.[199]
In 2003, a Malaysian court ruled that, under sharia law, a man may divorce his wife via text messaging as long as the message was clear and unequivocal.[202]
The divorced wife always keeps her dowry from when she was married, and is given child support until the age of weaning. The mother is usually granted custody of the child.[109] If the couple has divorced fewer than three times (meaning it is not a final divorce) the wife also receives spousal support for three menstrual cycles after the divorce, until it can be determined whether she is pregnant.[110]
Historically, Islamic law granted women certain legal rights that Western legal systems did not grant women until the 20th century.[203] Noah Feldman, a Harvard University law professor, has noted:
As for sexism, the common law long denied married women any property rights or indeed legal personality apart from their husbands. When the British applied their law to Muslims in place of shariah, as they did in some colonies, the result was to strip married women of the property that Islamic law had always granted them – hardly progress toward equality of the sexes.[204]
Since the 20th century, Western legal systems have generally allowed for "greater women's rights" than Islamic law.[205]
The major juristic schools of Islam have traditionally accepted the institution of slavery. However, Islam has prescribed five ways to free slaves, has severely chastised those who enslave free people, and regulated the slave trade. The source of slaves was restricted to war in preference to killing whole tribes en masse, as was the tradition at the time. Slaves also had more rights under Islam as an owner could not mistreat them. Many slaves were freed after a certain period of time, if they accepted to convert to Islam, or if they were ransomed.
Based on Quranic verses and Islamic traditions, classical sharia distinguishes between Muslims, followers of other Abrahamic monotheistic religions, and pagans or people belonging to other polytheistic religions. As monotheists, Jews and Christians have traditionally been considered "People of The Book," and afforded a special status known as dhimmi derived from a theoretical contract - "dhimma" or "residence in return for taxes". There are parallels for this in Roman and Jewish law.[206] Hindus were originally considered pagans and given the choice between conversion to Islam and death (or slavery), as pagans are not afforded the rights and protections of the dhimma contract.[207][dubious – discuss] Muslim governments in the Indus basin readily extended the dhimmi status to the Hindus and Buddhists of India.[208] Eventually, the largest school of Islamic scholarship applied this term to all non-Muslims living in Islamic lands outside the sacred area surrounding Mecca, Saudi Arabia.[209]
Classical sharia attributes different legal rights and obligations to different religious groups; in practice, this consisted of curbs on the rights and freedoms of non-Muslims.[210] However, the classical dhimma contract is no longer enforced. Western influence has been instrumental in eliminating the restrictions and protections of the dhimma contract, thereby contributing to the current state of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims living in Islamic lands.[211]
According to law professor H. Patrick Glenn of the Canadian McGill University, located in Montreal, Quebec, "[t]oday it is said that the dhimmi are 'excluded from the specifically Muslim privileges, but on the other hand they are excluded from the specifically Muslim duties' while (and here there are clear parallels with western public and private law treatment of aliens – Fremdenrecht, la condition de estrangers), '[f]or the rest, the Muslim and the dhimmi are equal in practically the whole of the law of property and of contracts and obligations'."[212]
Classical sharia incorporated the religious laws and courts of Christians, Jews and Hindus, as seen in the early Caliphate, Al-Andalus, Indian subcontinent, and the Ottoman Millet system.[213][214] In medieval Islamic societies, the qadi (Islamic judges) usually could not interfere in the matters of non-Muslims unless the parties voluntarily choose to be judged according to Islamic law, thus the dhimmi communities living in Islamic states usually had their own laws independent from the sharia law, such as the Jews who would have their own Halakha courts.[215] These courts did not cover cases involved other religious groups, or capital offences or threats to public order. By the 18th century, however, dhimmis frequently attended the Ottoman Muslim courts, where cases were taken against them by Muslims, or they took cases against Muslims or other dhimmis. Oaths sworn by dhimmis in these courts were tailored to their beliefs.[216]
Non-Muslims were allowed to engage in certain practices (such as the consumption of alcohol and pork) that were usually forbidden by Islamic law. Zoroastrian "self-marriages", that were considered incestuous under sharia, were also tolerated. Ibn Qayyim (1292–1350) opined that non-Muslims were entitled to such practices since they could not be presented to sharia courts and the religious minorities in question held it permissible. This ruling was based on the precedent that the prophet Muhammad did not forbid such self-marriages among Zoroastrians despite coming into contact with Zoroastrians and knowing about this practice.[217] Religious minorities were also free to do whatever they wished in their own homes, provided they did not publicly engage in illicit sexual activity in ways that could threaten public morals.[218]
Parallels to common law concepts are found in classical Islamic law and jurisprudence including ratio decidendi (illah). Several fundamental common law institutions may have been adapted from similar legal institutions in Islamic law and jurisprudence, and introduced to England after the Norman conquest of England by the Normans, who conquered and inherited the Islamic legal administration of the Emirate of Sicily, and also by Crusaders during the Crusades. In particular, the "royal English contract protected by the action of debt is identified with the Islamic Aqd, the English assize of novel disseisin is identified with the Islamic Istihqaq, and the English jury is identified with the Islamic Lafif."[citation needed] The English trust and agency institutions in common law were possible adapted from the Islamic Waqf and Hawala institutions respectively during the Crusades. It is worth noting, however, that transferring property to another for the "use" of another developed largely in response to the requirements of feudal inheritance law. Trust law, in particular, is a creature of equity which derived from the parallel jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor to decide matters independently to the Royal Courts.
Other English legal institutions such as "the scholastic method, the license to teach", the "law schools known as Inns of Court in England and Madrasas in Islam” and the "European commenda" (Islamic Qirad) may have also originated from Islamic law. The methodology of legal precedent and reasoning by analogy (Qiyas) are also similar in both the Islamic and common law systems. These similarities and influences have led some scholars to suggest that Islamic law may have laid the foundations for "the common law as an integrated whole".[219]
One of the institutions developed by classical Islamic jurists that influenced civil law was the Hawala, an early informal value transfer system, which is mentioned in texts of Islamic jurisprudence as early as the 8th century. Hawala itself later influenced the development of the Aval in French civil law and the Avallo in Italian law.[73] The "European commenda" limited partnerships (Islamic Qirad) used in civil law as well as the civil law conception of res judicata may also have origins in Islamic law.[72]
Islamic law also made "major contributions" to international admiralty law, departing from the previous Roman and Byzantine maritime laws in several ways.[220][221] These included Muslim sailors being "paid a fixed wage "in advance" with an understanding that they would owe money in the event of desertion or malfeasance, in keeping with Islamic conventions" in which contracts should specify "a known fee for a known duration", in contrast to Roman and Byzantine sailors who were "stakeholders in a maritime venture, in as much as captain and crew, with few exceptions, were paid proportional divisions of a sea venture's profit, with shares allotted by rank, only after a voyage's successful conclusion." Muslim jurists also distinguished between "coastal navigation, or cabotage," and voyages on the "high seas", and they also made shippers "liable for freight in most cases except the seizure of both a ship and its cargo." Islamic law also "departed from Justinian's Digest and the Nomos Rhodion Nautikos in condemning slave jettison", and the Islamic Qirad was also a precursor to the European commenda limited partnership. The "Islamic influence on the development of an international law of the sea" can thus be discerned alongside that of the Roman influence.[220]
The origins of the Ijazah dates back to the ijazat attadris wa 'l-ifttd ("license to teach and issue legal opinions") in the medieval Islamic legal education system, which was equivalent to the Doctor of Laws qualification and was developed during the 9th century after the formation of the Madh'hab legal schools. To obtain a doctorate, a student "had to study in a guild school of law, usually four years for the basic undergraduate course" and ten or more years for a post-graduate course. The "doctorate was obtained after an oral examination to determine the originality of the candidate's theses," and to test the student's "ability to defend them against all objections, in disputations set up for the purpose," which were scholarly exercises practiced throughout the student's "career as a graduate student of law." After students completed their post-graduate education, they were awarded doctorates giving them the status of faqih (meaning "master of law"), mufti (meaning "professor of legal opinions") and mudarris (meaning "teacher"), which were later translated into Latin as magister, professor and doctor respectively.[222]
Sharia classically recognizes only natural persons, and never developed the concept of a legal person, or corporation, i.e., a legal entity that limits the liabilities of its managers, shareholders, and employees; exists beyond the lifetimes of its founders; and that can own assets, sign contracts, and appear in court through representatives.[223] Thus, sharia has no native tradition of corporate law. This, combined with egalitarian rules of inheritance for male descendants (compare with primogeniture), hindered the concentration of wealth and the development of larger and more sophisticated enterprises, according to Timur Kuran of American Duke University, located in Durham, North Carolina. Prohibitions on interest, or "riba" also disadvantaged Muslims vis-à-vis non-Muslim minorities in accessing banks and insurance when these services were first introduced by Westerners. Interest prohibitions, also imposed secondary costs by discouraging record keeping, and delaying the introduction of modern accounting.[224] Such factors, according to Kuran, have played a significant role in retarding economic development in the Middle East.[225] Though, it is argued, the West caught up in the economic crises at the outset of the 21st century when many of the aforementioned economic policies backfired on a global scale and threatened to bankrupt entire countries.
After the fall of the Abbasids in 1258, a practice known to the Turks and Mongols transformed itself into Qanun, which gave power to caliphs, governors, and sultans alike to "make their own regulations for activities not addressed by the sharia."[226] The Qanun began to unfold as early as Umar I (586-644 CE).[226] Many of the regulations covered by Qanun were based on financial matters or tax systems adapted through the law and regulations of those territories Islam conquered.[226] Qanun in Arabic means law or rules.
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Nouman Ali Khan | |
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Religion | Sunni Islam |
The topic of this article may not meet Wikipedia's general notability guideline. Please help to establish notability by adding reliable, secondary sources about the topic. If notability cannot be established, the article is likely to be merged, redirected, or deleted. (May 2011) |
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Nouman Ali Khan is a Muslim speaker and the CEO and founder of Bayyinah, an Islamic educational institution in the United States.[1][2]
His early education in Arabic started under in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and continued in Pakistan. His serious Arabic training began in 1999 in the United States. He has been teaching Modern Standard and Classical Arabic at various venues for several years with over 10,000 students nationwide.[1] Nouman Ali Khan teaches about the religion of Islam through his video speeches.[3] He also frequently speaks at Islamic Circle of North America Conventions about Islam, family, and other life topics.[4]
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Name | Khan, Nouman Ali |
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This article relies on references to primary sources or sources affiliated with the subject, rather than references from independent authors and third-party publications. Please add citations from reliable sources. (March 2011) |
Benjamin Fulford (古歩道ベンジャミン 1961–) is a Canadian journalist living in Japan.
He is the great-grandson of George Taylor Fulford.[1]
In the early 1980s he went to Japan to study at Sophia University. After receiving a B.A. from the University of British Columbia, he returned to Japan in the mid-1980s to pursue a career in journalism.
On July 14, 2009 the Tokyo District Court awarded American broadcast journalist Steven L. Herman more than Yen 1,700,000 (17K euro) in the civil libel case brought against Fulford and his publisher (Herman vs. Fulford, Fusosha & M. Katagiri).[2]
After the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami, Fulford claimed on Japanese television that "[t]he American government in cooperation with [the] Federal Reserve, the Rockefellers, and other powerful groups, they are planning the eruption of Mt. Fuji Volcano. The earthquake and the tsunami was March 11th, 2011, 03.11.11. The Mt. Fuji Eruption they are planning is for April 11th, 2011." Fulford attributed the earthquake, tsunami and his predicted eruption of Mt. Fuji to HAARP, a scientific facility used by physicists to research the upper atmosphere. There has been no such eruption of Mt. Fuji since 1708.[3][4][5]
etc.
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Name | Fulford, Benjamin |
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Geert Wilders | |
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Parliamentary leader – Party for Freedom House of Representatives of the Netherlands |
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Assumed office 23 November 2006 |
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Member of the House of Representatives – Party for Freedom | |
Incumbent | |
Assumed office 30 November 2006 |
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Member of the House of Representatives – Group Wilders | |
In office 2 September 2004 – 30 November 2006 |
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Member of the House of Representatives – People's Party for Freedom and Democracy | |
In office 26 July 2002 – 2 September 2004 |
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In office 25 August 1998 – 23 May 2002 |
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Personal details | |
Born | Geert Wilders (1963-09-06) 6 September 1963 (age 48) Venlo, Netherlands |
Nationality | Dutch |
Political party | Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid – PVV) (2006–present) People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie – VVD) (1989–2004) |
Spouse(s) | Krisztina Wilders (1992–present) |
Residence | The Hague, Netherlands |
Alma mater | Open University in the Netherlands |
Occupation | Politician |
Religion | None (agnostic) |
Website | (Dutch) Party for Freedom website |
Geert Wilders (Dutch pronunciation: [ˈɣɪːrt ˈʋɪldərs] or [ˈʝɪːrt ˈβ̞ɪldərs], born 6 September 1963) is a Dutch right-wing politician and the founder and leader of the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid – PVV), the third-largest political party in the Netherlands.[1][2] Wilders is the Parliamentary group leader of his party in the Dutch House of Representatives. In the formation in 2010 of the current Rutte cabinet, a minority cabinet of VVD and CDA, he actively participated in the negotiations, resulting in a "support agreement" (gedoogakkoord) between the PVV and these parties, but withdrew his support in April 2012, citing disagreements with the cabinet on proposed budget cuts.[3] Wilders is best known for his criticism of Islam, summing up his views by saying, "I don't hate Muslims, I hate Islam".[4] Wilders' views regarding Islam have made him a deeply divisive figure in the Netherlands and abroad.
Raised a Roman Catholic, Wilders left the church at his coming of age. His travels to Israel as a young adult, as well as to neighbouring Arab countries, helped form his political views. Wilders worked as a speechwriter for the conservative-liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie – VVD), and later served as parliamentary assistant to party leader Frits Bolkestein from 1990 to 1998. He was elected to the Utrecht city council in 1996, and later to the House of Representatives. Citing irreconcilable differences over the party's position on the accession of Turkey to the European Union, he left the VVD in 2004 to form his own party, the Party for Freedom.
Wilders has campaigned to stop what he views as the "Islamisation of the Netherlands". He compares the Quran with Mein Kampf and has campaigned to have the book banned in the Netherlands.[5][6][7] He advocates ending immigration from Muslim countries,[5][8] and supports banning the construction of new mosques.[9] Wilders was a speaker at the Facing Jihad Conference held in Jerusalem in 2008, which discussed the dangers of jihad, and has called for a hard line against what he called the "street terror" exerted by minorities in Dutch cities.[10] His controversial 2008 film about his views on Islam, Fitna, received international attention. He has been described in the media as populist[11][12][13] and labeled far-right,[14][15] though this is disputed by other observers.[11][16][17] Wilders, who has refused to align himself with other European far-right leaders such as Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jörg Haider, views himself as a right-wing liberal and has expressed concern of being "linked with the wrong rightist fascist groups."[18]
Wilders was banned from entering the United Kingdom between 12 February 2009 and 13 October 2009 by the Labour government, the Home Office saying his presence would be a "threat to one of the fundamental interests of society".[19] The ban was overturned after Wilders appealed[20] and he visited the UK in October 2009,[21] and again in March 2010 to show his film. In January 2009, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ordered Wilders' prosecution for "incitement to hatred and discrimination".[22] Wilders was acquitted of these charges on 23 June 2011.[23]
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Wilders was born in the city of Venlo, in the northern part of the Dutch Province of Limburg on the southeastern border with Germany. He is the youngest of four children,[24] and was raised Catholic. He was born to a Dutch father and a Dutch mother born in the Dutch East Indies, of Dutch, Frisian, German[25][26] and Dutch-Indonesian descent or Indo heritage through her mother's side.[27][28] His father worked as a manager for the printing and copying manufacturing company Océ.[29] His father fled the area to avoid the Nazis and became so traumatised from the experience that he refused to physically enter Germany even forty years later.[30]
Wilders received his secondary education at the Mavo and Havo middle school and high school in Venlo. Reflecting passions that came to the fore later in his career, Wilders took a course in health insurance at the Stichting Opleiding Sociale Verzekeringen in Amsterdam and earned several law certificates at the Dutch Open University.
Wilders' goal after he graduated from secondary school was to see the world. Because he did not have enough money to travel to Australia, his preferred destination, he went to Israel instead.[30] For several years he volunteered in a moshav and worked for several firms, becoming in his own words "a true friend of Israel".[31] With the money he saved, he travelled to the neighbouring Arab countries, and was moved by the lack of democracy in the region. When he returned to the Netherlands, he retained Israeli ideas about counter-terrorism and a "special feeling of solidarity" for the country.[32]
Living in Utrecht, Wilders initially worked in the health insurance industry. His interest in the subject led him into politics as a speech-writer for the Netherlands' People's Party for Freedom and Democracy.[30][33] He started his formal political career as a parliamentary assistant to the party leader Frits Bolkestein, specialising in foreign policy. He held this job from 1990 to 1998. During this time Geert Wilders travelled extensively,[34] visiting countries all across the Middle East, including Iran, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Israel. Bolkestein was the first Dutch politician to address the consequences of mass immigration for Dutch society, including a sharp criticism of Muslim immigrants. He set an example for Wilders not only in his ideas but also in his confrontational speaking style.[30][34]
On 10 November 2004, two suspected attackers were captured after an hour-long siege of a building in The Hague. They were in possession of three grenades and were accused of planning to murder Wilders as well as a fellow MP, Ayaan Hirsi Ali.[35] The suspects were presumed to be members of what the Dutch intelligence agency, the General Intelligence and Security Service, has termed the Hofstadgroep. Since this incident Wilders has been under constant security protection because of frequent threats to his life.[36] In September 2007, a Dutch woman was sentenced to a one-year prison term for sending more than 100 threatening emails to Wilders.[37][38] Wilders remained the most threatened politician in the Netherlands in 2008.[39]
On 18 December 2009, the Rotterdam rapper Mo$heb was sentenced to 80 hours community service and a two-month suspended jail term for threatening Wilders in a rap titled "Wie is de volgende" ("Who's next"), which included that if he met Wilders, it would be "bam bam". The rapper also called on Wilders to take back his words if he wanted to stay alive and said "This is no joke. Last night I dreamed I chopped your head off". The public prosecutor said the threat could reasonably lead to Wilders fearing for his life or that he would be subjected to violence. The court agreed with this conclusion and said the rap was threatening. "A politician must be able to do his work", the judges said.[40]
Wilders is said to have been "deprived... of a personal life for his... hatred of Islam".[30] He is moved by his state-provided bodyguards to a different location every night, and does not receive visitors unless they are carefully screened and escorted at all times.[41] He is married to Krisztina Wilders (née Marfai), a former diplomat of Hungarian origin,[42] with whom he can only meet about once every week because of security concerns.[30] The restrictions on his life because of this, he said, are "a situation that I wouldn't wish on my worst enemy".[28]
In January 2010, Karen Geurtsen, a Dutch journalist from the magazine HP-De Tijd, revealed a painful breach of security. She spent four months working undercover, posing as an intern, for the PVV party. She claimed that she had had unchecked access to Wilders. "I could have killed him", were the first words of the article that she published about this operation. According to her, she had "dozens" of opportunities to take his life.[43]
Wilders has acquired nicknames such as "Mozart" and "Captain Peroxide" because of his flamboyant platinum blond hairstyle.[33] Radio Netherlands calls him "the most famous bleach-blond since Marilyn Monroe".[44]
Wilders is an agnostic,[45] but he has stated that he thinks Dutch Christians "are my allies" and that they fundamentally should want the same thing.[28][46]
In June 2011, a part of Wilder's personal finance was disclosed. It was revealed that Wilders had founded one year earlier a self-administered company but not reported this via the public records of the Tweede Kamer, as he should have done being a parliamentarian.[47]
In 1997, Wilders was elected for the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) to the municipal council of Utrecht, the fourth largest city of the Netherlands.[33][34] He lived in Kanaleneiland, a suburb with cheap social housing and high apartment blocks, and which has a relatively high number of immigrants. While a city councilor, Wilders was mugged in his own neighbourhood; some have speculated that this may have catalysed his political transformation.[14][30] He was not rewarded for his time on the municipal council of Utrecht, for in the following elections he would score well below the national average in the University city.[48]
A year later, he was elected to the Netherlands' national parliament,[33] but his first four years in parliament drew little attention.[34] However, his appointment in 2002 as a public spokesman for the VVD led Wilders to become more well known for his outspoken criticism of Islamic extremism. Tensions immediately developed within the party, as Wilders found himself to be to the right of most members, and challenged the party line in his public statements.[24] He was expelled from the VVD parliamentary party, and in September 2004, Wilders left the VVD, having been a member since 1989, to form his own political party, Groep Wilders, later renamed the Party for Freedom.[49] The crunch issue with the VVD party line was about his refusal to endorse the party's position that European Union accession negotiations must be started with Turkey.[34]
The Party for Freedom's political platform often overlaps those of the assassinated Rotterdam politician Pim Fortuyn and his Pim Fortuyn List.[33] After his death, Fortuyn's impact remained, as more and more politicians sought to gain political mileage by directly confronting topics such as a ban on immigration that were, from a politically correct point of view, considered unmentionable in the Netherlands until Fortuyn came on the scene and upended the Dutch tradition of consensus politics with an anti-immigration stance. Wilders would position himself to inherit Fortuyn's constituency.[50] He bases his ideas on an ideological framework of small government, law and order and direct democracy. The Party for Freedom call for a €16 billion tax reduction, a far stricter policy toward recreational drug use, investing more in roads and other infrastructure, building nuclear power plants and including animal rights in the Dutch constitution.[51] In the 2006 Dutch parliamentary election, their first parliamentary election, the Party for Freedom won 9 out of the 150 open seats.[52]
In March 2009, in a party meeting in Venlo, Wilders said "I want to be prime minister", believing the PVV will eventually become the Netherlands’ biggest party. "At some point it's going to happen and then it will be a big honour to fulfil the post of prime minister".[53]
Polling conducted throughout March 2009 by Maurice de Hond indicated the Party for Freedom was the most popular parliamentary party. The polls predicted that the party would take 21% of the national vote, winning 32 out of 150 seats in the Dutch parliament.[54] If the polling results were replicated in an election, Wilders would be a major power broker. Under such circumstances, there would also be some likelihood of him becoming Prime Minister of the Netherlands.[55][56] This has been partially attributed to timely prosecution attempts against him for hate speech and the travel ban imposed on him by the United Kingdom,[57] as well as dissatisfaction with the Dutch government's response to the global financial crisis of 2008–2009.[54]
On 3 March 2010, elections for the local councils were held in the municipalities of The Netherlands. The PVV only contested these local elections in the Dutch towns The Hague and Almere, because of a shortage of good candidates. The big gains that were scored indicated that the party and Wilders might dominate the political scene in the run-up to the parliamentary elections scheduled on 9 June 2010. The PVV won in Almere and came second to the Dutch Labour party in The Hague. In Almere, the PVV won 21 percent of the vote to Labour's 18 percent, preliminary results showed. In The Hague, the PVV had 8 seats—second to Labour with 10 seats.
On 8 March 2010, Wilders announced that he would take a seat on the Hague city council, after it became clear he won 13,000 preference votes. Earlier he had said he would not take up a seat if he won.[58][59] In the parliamentary elections on 9 June 2010, the PVV went from 9 to 24 seats (out of 150) resulting from over 15% of the vote. This made the PVV the third party in size. With a fragmented parliament, at least three parties were required for an absolute majority. A coalition of VVD and Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) was negotiated with parliamentary support by the PVV. The PVV did not become part of the government formed by VVD and CDA but actively participated in the negotiations and thus policy decisions and – as part of the outcome agreed that they would not support any motion to dismiss ministers concerning topics listed in a so-called "support agreement" – much like the Danish model where the Danish People's Party plays a similar role.[60] The very fact of the participation of Wilder's party in these negotiations caused fierce discussions in political circles.
On 21 April 2012, Wilders withdrew his support from the Rutte cabinet because of new austerity measures that were about to be taken. Commenting on his withdrawal Wilders blamed the "European dictates" pointing to the 3% rule on budget deficit for European countries although his party had supported these rules earlier on. The cabinet blamed Wilders for what they call his "lack of political will" and "political cowardice" in regards to addressing the economic woes of the Netherlands.[3]
Wilders has become a controversial figure[30][61] with polarized opinions[62] on him from the world news media. Regarding his reputation in the Netherlands, Wilders stated in 2009, "Half of Holland loves me and half of Holland hates me. There is no in-between." In 2005, the Dutch public expressed mixed reactions to Wilders' general agenda, with 53% calling it "implausible" and 47% more supportive.[63] He has been described as populist,[11][12][13] labelled as both "extreme right"[64] and far-right,[14][15] and defended by others as a mainstream politician with legitimate concerns[11] saying that such labels are shallow smear attempts. Wilders himself rejects the labels and has called the new description "scandalous".[11] He has been accused of building his popularity on fear and resentment[65][66] and vociferously defended for having the courage to talk openly about the problems unfettered immigration brings with it and the incompatibility of fundamentalist Islam with western values.[67]
On 15 December 2007, Wilders was declared "Politician of the Year" by NOS-radio, a mainstream Dutch radio station. The parliamentary press praised his ability to dominate political discussion and to attract the debate and to get into publicity with his well-timed one-liners.[68] The editors eventually gave the title to Wilders because he was the only one who scored high amongst both the press and the general public.[69][70]
In December 2009, Wilders came in second in two polls in the Netherlands for Politician of the Year. A panel of Dutch television viewers praised him as "the second best" politician this year (after his outspoken critic Alexander Pechtold), while his colleagues in parliament named him "the second worst" (after Rita Verdonk).[71]
Some Muslim critics of Wilders accuse him of using Koranic verses out of context.[72] Because of Wilders' perceived positions on Islam, the Dutch–Moroccan rapper Appa, when interviewed about Wilders for a newspaper, said "if someone were to put a bullet in his head, I wouldn't mind".[73] Wilders' views on Islam prompted the Muslim Mayor of Rotterdam, Ahmed Aboutaleb, to reprimand him.[74]
Editorials by AlterNet, The Montreal Gazette, The Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, and The New York Times have accused Wilders of hypocrisy given that, in their view, Wilders has called for the ban of the sale of the Quran while simultaneously arguing for his own personal freedom of speech.[75][76][77][78] In a speech during a Dutch parliamentary debate, Wilders elaborated that he calls for the consistent application of Dutch laws restricting any act of expression that incites violence.[79] Ideally, he would prefer to see nearly all such laws abolished.[63][80][81] As such, he supports a European-wide constitutional protection of freedom of speech like that which exists in the United States.[81]
Wilders has also been compared to the assassinated fellow critic of Islam and filmmaker Theo van Gogh, but he does not see himself as taking on van Gogh's mantle.[28] Wilders has stated that he supports the free speech rights of his critics, saying that "An Imam who wants a politician dead is—however reprehensible—allowed to say so".[63] He has responded to charges of racism and Islamophobia by stating, "I don't hate Muslims. I hate their book and their ideology".[4]
In February 2010, the trailer of a newly published online satirical video on the website of the Dutch radio station FunX, which targets a young urban audience, spoofed a murder attempt on Wilders.[82]
In July 2010, the magazine Inspire announced that Wilders, as well as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Kurt Westergaard and Salman Rushdie, were mentioned on a "death list" of an international Islamist terrorist network.[83]
Shortly before this publication it was revealed in The Hague that Dutch law enforcement officers succeeded twice in smuggling a firearm into the parliament buildings and into the guarded headquarters of Wilders' party. This check was carried out by the Special Security Assignments Brigade BSB, a special unit of the Dutch Military Police. The test was carried out following a complaint from Wilders about his security being inadequate.[84]
In July 2011, Anders Behring Breivik, the man who carried out the 2011 Norway attacks, declared himself to be a great admirer of Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom.[85] However, Wilders immediately distanced himself strongly from Breivik.[86][better source needed]
On 11 September 2010, 2,000 people gathered close by the site of a planned Muslim community center near the site of the World Trade Center attacks, on 11 September 2001, where they were addressed by Wilders who flew from The Netherlands to urge the crowd: "This is where we have draw the line. We must never give a free hand to those who want to subjugate us," Wilders added. "Draw this line so that New York... will never become New Mecca."[87]
Wilders was extensively discussed in American diplomatic cables, released by WikiLeaks in December 2010. In a briefing to President Barack Obama, he was described as "no friend of the US: he opposes Dutch military involvement in Afghanistan; he believes development assistance is money wasted; he opposes NATO missions outside 'allied' territory; he is against most EU initiatives; and, most troubling, he foments fear and hatred of immigrants."[88]
On 2 October 2011 Radio Netherlands Worldwide reported that a retired Dutch politician of the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) Frits Bolkestein, who is sometime called the 'mentor' of Geert Wilders, "does not share his views". He reportedly said that “Wilders says things that are just not right and I think he totally exaggerates.” While giving his opinion on burqa ban Mr Bolkestein said that he "disagrees with the recent introduction of a burqa ban, an idea championed by Geert Wilders." The Netherlands, he said, is the third European country to introduce such a ban after France and Belgium. “A ban makes martyrs of the few burqa wearers there are in the Netherlands" he said.[89]
Wilders generally considers himself to be a right-wing liberal, with a specific mix of positions independent of the European political spectrum and particular to iconoclastic Dutch society. He has stated that "My allies are not Le Pen or Haider... We'll never join up with the fascists and Mussolinis of Italy. I'm very afraid of being linked with the wrong rightist fascist groups", saying instead his drive is issues such as freedom of expression and Dutch iconoclasm.[4] Wilders views British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as his greatest political role model.[4] People's Party for Freedom and Democracy figure Frits Bolkestein also heavily influenced his beliefs.[34]
Wilders strongly opposes the Dutch political system in general. He believes that there is a ruling elite of parliamentarians who only care about their own personal careers and disregard the will of the people. He also blames the Dutch system of multi-party coalition governments for a lack of clear and effective policies.[34] In his view, Dutch society advocates rule by consensus and cultural relativism, while he believes that this should change so as to "not tolerate the intolerant".[90]
On foreign relations, Wilders has largely supported Israel and has criticized countries he perceives as enemies of Israel.[32] Furthermore, he has made some proposals in the Dutch Parliament inspired by Israeli policies. For example, he supports implementing Israel's administrative detention in the Netherlands, a practice heavily criticized by human rights groups, which he calls "common sense".[90]
Wilders often mentions Henk and Ingrid in his speeches, fictitious common Dutch subjects who he claims to work for.[91]
Furthermore, Wilders has revived the ancient idea of reuniting Flanders and the Netherlands.[92]
Wilders published the version of his political manifesto called Klare Wijn ("Clear Wine") in March 2006. The program proposed ten key points to be implemented:
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Criticism of Islam |
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Wilders is best known for his criticism of Islam, summing up his views by saying, "I don't hate Muslims, I hate Islam".[4] Although identifying Islamic extremists as 5–15% of Muslims,[90] he argues that "there is no such thing as 'moderate Islam'" and that the "Koran also states that Muslims who believe in only part of the Koran are in fact apostates".[79] He suggests that Muslims should "tear out half of the Koran if they wished to stay in the Netherlands" because it contains "terrible things" and that Muhammad would "... in these days be hunted down as a terrorist".[95]
On 8 August 2007, Wilders opined in an open letter[96] to the Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant that the Koran, which he called a "fascist book", should be outlawed in the Netherlands, like Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf.[97] He has stated that "The book incites hatred and killing and therefore has no place in our legal order".[98] He has also referred to Mohammed as "the devil".[31] In September 2009 Wilders proposed to put a tax on Hijab wearing by Muslim women. He suggested women could purchase a license at a cost of €1000 and that the money raised could be used in projects beneficial to women's emancipation.[99][100]
He believes that all Muslim immigration to the Netherlands should be halted and all settled immigrants should be paid to leave.[4] Referring to the increased population of Muslims in the Netherlands, he has said:
Take a walk down the street and see where this is going. You no longer feel like you are living in your own country. There is a battle going on and we have to defend ourselves. Before you know it there will be more mosques than churches![101]
In a speech before the Dutch Parliament, he stated:
Islam is the Trojan Horse in Europe. If we do not stop Islamification now, Eurabia and Netherabia will just be a matter of time. One century ago, there were approximately 50 Muslims in the Netherlands. Today, there are about 1 million Muslims in this country. Where will it end? We are heading for the end of European and Dutch civilisation as we know it. Where is our Prime Minister in all this? In reply to my questions in the House he said, without batting an eyelid, that there is no question of our country being Islamified. Now, this reply constituted a historical error as soon as it was uttered. Very many Dutch citizens, Madam Speaker, experience the presence of Islam around them. And I can report that they have had enough of burkas, headscarves, the ritual slaughter of animals, so‑called honour revenge, blaring minarets, female circumcision, hymen restoration operations, abuse of homosexuals, Turkish and Arabic on the buses and trains as well as on town hall leaflets, halal meat at grocery shops and department stores, Sharia exams, the Finance Minister's Sharia mortgages, and the enormous overrepresentation of Muslims in the area of crime, including Moroccan street terrorists.[79]
Nonetheless, Wilders has traveled widely in the Arab world and Der Spiegel has stated that Wilders will "wax poetic" over those "magnificent countries". Wilders has also said that "It's a real shame that these places are so chaotic."[30]
Wilders argues that Islam is not a religion, but rather a totalitarian political ideology such as communism and fascism.[102]
Wilders lived in Israel for two years during his youth and has visited the country 40 times in the last 25 years.[103]
Wilders stated about Israel: "I have visited many interesting countries in the Middle East – from Syria to Egypt, from Tunisia to Turkey, from Cyprus to Iran – but nowhere did I have the special feeling of solidarity that I always get when I land at Ben Gurion International Airport."[32] Dutch public TV channel Nederland 2's daily news programme Netwerk reported that numerous American supporters of Israel financially supported Wilders' Party for Freedom (PVV) and openly approved of his message towards Islam and Islamic terrorism.[104] Wilders told an audience during the report that "We [in the West] are all Israel".[104] He has also said "Israel is the West's first line of defence" against what he perceives to be a threat posed by Islam.[105]
Following the Dutch general election, 2010, in which the PVV were the third biggest party, Wilders said Jordan should be renamed Palestine.[106] The Jordanian government responded saying Wilders' speech was reminiscent of the Israeli right wing. His speech said "Jordan is Palestine. Changing its name to Palestine will end the conflict in the Middle East and provide the Palestinians with an alternate homeland." He also said Israel deserves a special status in the Dutch government because it was fighting for "Jerusalem" in its name.
"If Jerusalem falls into the hands of the Muslims, Athens and Rome will be next. Thus, Jerusalem is the main front protecting the West. It is not a conflict over territory but rather an ideological battle, between the mentality of the liberated West and the ideology of Islamic barbarism. There has been an independent Palestinian state since 1946, and it is the kingdom of Jordan."
He called on the Dutch government to refer to Jordan as Palestine and move its embassy to Jerusalem.[107]
Fitna is a 2008 short film written and commissioned by Wilders that explores Koranic-inspired motivations for terrorism, Islamic universalism, and Islam in the Netherlands. Its title comes from the Arabic word fitna, which describes "disagreement and division among people" or a "test of faith in times of trial".[108]
It is the subject of an international controversy and debate on free speech.[109] Despite the legal troubles surrounding the film, Wilders insists that before he released it, he consulted numerous lawyers in the field, who found nothing worth prosecution. Jordan has summoned Wilders to court, with the film deemed to "incite hatred".[110] Militant Sunni Islamist group Al-Qaeda issued a call to murder Wilders after its release.[15]
In the spring of 2009, Wilders launched the "Facing Jihad World Tour", a series of screenings of Fitna to public officials and influential organizations around the globe, starting in Rome.[111] In the United States, Wilders showed the film to the United States Congress on 26 February having been invited by Arizona Republican Senator Jon Kyl.[112] Around 40 people attended the screening.[55] American Muslims protested, but the groups said that they supported his right of free speech while still condemning his opinions.[112] Wilders spoke at the Conservative Political Action Conference on 28 February.[113] He appeared before the National Press Club and the Republican Jewish Coalition that week as well.[75] Similar attempts in Britain led to a travel ban,[15] and legislative blocks have prevented an appearance in Denmark.[114]
Lord Pearson of Rannoch and Baroness Cox, members of the House of Lords (the upper chamber of the British Parliament), invited Wilders to a 12 February 2009 showing of Fitna in the Palace of Westminster.[115] Two days before the showing, Home Secretary Jacqui Smith banned Wilders from entering the territory of the United Kingdom, labelling him an "undesirable person".[19][116] Entry was denied under EU law, and reportedly supported under regulation 19 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, an EU law which allows a member state to refuse entry to individuals if they are regarded as constituting a threat to public policy, security or health.[15] A Home Office spokesperson elaborated that "The Government opposes extremism in all its forms ... and that was the driving force behind tighter rules on exclusions for unacceptable behaviour that the Home Secretary announced in October last year".[15][117][118]
Wilders defied the ban and entered via London Heathrow Airport on 12 February, trailed by television crews. He was quickly detained by Border Patrol officials and sent back on one of the next flights to the Netherlands.[119][119][120][121] He called Prime Minister Gordon Brown "the biggest coward in Europe" and remarked, "Of course I will come back".[122] Wilders had visited the United Kingdom in December 2008 without any problem.[123] Lord Pearson did not support Wilders' decision to defy the government.[15] But in response to the ban, both Pearson and Cox accused the government of "appeasing" militant Islam.[115]
The International Herald Tribune stated that the ban was broadly condemned in the British news media.[122] The Dutch Foreign Secretary, Maxime Verhagen, called the decision "highly regrettable" and complained to his British counterpart.[15] Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende complained to Gordon Brown about the "disappointing" decision.[124] The Quilliam Foundation, a British think tank, criticised the ban,[78] as did National Secular Society president Terry Sanderson.[123] The Muslim Labour peer Lord Ahmed expressed support for Smith's ban on Wilders entering the country;[78] the Ramadhan Foundation and the Muslim Council of Britain also did so, the council labeling Wilders "an open and relentless preacher of hate".[123][125]
After being declared persona non grata by Jacqui Smith, then the Home Secretary, in February 2009, Wilders appealed the decision to Britain's Asylum and Immigration Tribunal.[126] In October 2009, the tribunal overturned the ban.[127][128][129] Wilders subsequently praised the ruling as "a triumph for freedom of speech" and stated that he plans to visit the United Kingdom in the near future.[20][127]
The ruling was criticized by the British Home Office, which stated that an appeal of the tribunal's ruling is being considered. A spokesman stated:
"The Government opposes extremism in all its forms. The decision to refuse Wilders admission was taken on the basis that his presence could have inflamed tensions between our communities and have led to inter-faith violence. We still maintain this view."[20][127]
On 16 October 2009, Wilders arrived in the United Kingdom and was quickly forced to move his press conference due to protests by about forty members of the organization Islam4UK, an organization that was later shut down under the UK's Terrorism Act 2000 on 14 January 2010. Though the Home Office had asserted that his entry into the country would not be blocked, a spokesman said his "statements and behaviour during a visit will inevitably impact on any future decisions to admit him."[130][131] His visit to the UK met with protest,[132] but Wilders called it "a victory" in a press conference.[128] On his outspoken views on Islam, he said: "I have a problem with the Islamic ideology, the Islamic culture, because I feel that the more Islam that we get in our societies the less freedom we get." He opened the press conference with a quote from George Orwell's preface to Animal Farm: "If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they don't want to hear". Lord Pearson, who had invited him, said his arrival was
"a celebration of the victory of freedom of speech over those who would prevent it in this country, particularly the Islamists, the violent Jihadists who are on the march across the world and in the UK."[132]
In January 2010, Wilders was invited again to show his anti-Quran movie Fitna in the British House of Lords by Lord Pearson UK Independence Party (UKIP), and Baroness Cox cross-bencher. Wilders accepted the invitation and was present for a presentation of the movie in the House of Lords on 5 March. In his speech he quoted ominous words from Winston Churchill's book The River War from 1899:
"Mohammedanism is a militant and proselytizing faith. No stronger retrograde force exists in the World. It has already spread throughout Central Africa, raising fearless warriors at every step ... the civilization of modern Europe might fall, as fell the civilization of ancient Rome."[133][134][135][136]
At the ensuing press conferences, he called the prophet Muhammad a "barbarian, a mass murderer, and a pedophile" and referring to Islam as a "fascist ideology" which was "violent, dangerous, and retarded". Wilders also reportedly called Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan a "total freak".[137] Dutch Prime Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende called these comments "irresponsible",[138] and Maxime Verhagen, Dutch caretaker Minister of Foreign Affairs, publicly condemned Wilders's remarks and behaviour:
"He incites discord among people in a distasteful manner. And in the meantime he damages the interests of the Dutch population and the reputation of the Netherlands in the world."[139][140][141]
Bernard Wientjes, the president of the Dutch employers' organization Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW), also accused Wilders of "seriously" damaging Dutch interests abroad. He called it outrageous that Wilders had presented himself in London as "the next Dutch prime minister" and then derided Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan. Emphasizing that three quarters of the Dutch GDP comes from revenue earned abroad, according to Wientjes, Wilders poses "a serious threat to the Netherlands and the Dutch economy".[142][143]
In March 2010, Wilders was told he is "not welcome" in the western German tourist resort of Monschau in the Eifel area, after he spent a weekend there, along with several armed bodyguards. Mayor Margareta Ritter (CDU) said she was concerned that his presence tainted her town with the suspicion that it was sympathetic to his views. As a result, Monschau was said to have been unfairly connected with "extremism" in the European press.
"Anyone who pollutes the integration debate in the Netherlands with poisonous right-wing populism as Wilders has, and advocates prohibition of the Koran by a comparison with Hitler's Mein Kampf, is not welcome in Monschau. I wanted to distinguish Monschau from that."
She was unable to say whether Wilders was merely enjoying a short vacation in her town or had been meeting with like-minded people.[12][13][144][145][146] A demonstration to support Wilders was announced to take place in Berlin on 17 April.[147]
In July 2010, Wilders announced the International Freedom Alliance, a network of groups and individuals who "are fighting for freedom against Islam".[148][149][150][151]
Wilders plans IFA branches in the United States, Canada, Britain, France and Germany by late 2010. "The message, 'stop Islam, defend freedom', is a message that's not only important for the Netherlands but for the whole free Western world", Wilders stated in an address to reporters at the Dutch Parliament.[152][153]
On 6 August 2010, Wilders, who had become a regular guest with American conservatives and libertarians, announced that he would speak at a rally on 11 September in New York to protest the plans for Park51, a Muslim community center with a prayer space to be built near the World Trade Center site. The rally, to be held on the ten-year anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks, was organised by Stop Islamization of America, which is supported by a number of conservative US politicians[not in citation given] including former House speaker Newt Gingrich and 2008 vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin.[154][155] According to SIOA's website world leaders, prominent politicians and 9/11 family members would be speaking at the rally, but Wilders was not mentioned by name,[156][157][158] though he did attend as he had announced.[159]
In political circles in The Netherlands, the announcement caused widespread irritation about his plan.[160] Christian Democrat senator Hans Hillen remarked that Wilders' words could endanger Dutch interests.[161] Former NATO General Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer advised Wilders not to make a speech, arguing that the international public does not know who is in the Dutch cabinet and who is in parliament and thus Wilders' speech could be mistaken as an official statement of the Dutch government. Also Christian Democrat party leader and acting Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Maxime Verhagen issued a warning.[162][163]
Also, the Dutch Foreign Ministry allegedly would have issued guidelines to its embassies on how to react to questions about the role being played by the PVV and Wilders in the formation of a new government. On 10 August 2010, the website of Dutch daily newspaper NRC Handelsblad published the ministry memo. The ministry itself however had declined "to confirm or deny" the authenticity of these guidelines. One question posed is how Wilders could be taking part in negotiations on forming a government coalition when he has been indicted for inciting hatred and discrimination, and for insulting a group of persons. Other questions covered possible bans on the building of new mosques, on the Quran and on Islamic schools in the Netherlands. The memo stressed that such bans would breach the Dutch constitution.[164][165]
Wilders spoke on Thursday, 12 May 2011, at Cornerstone Church in Madison, Tennessee, at the Tennessee Freedom Coalition inaugural Signature Series event.[166]
Several groups and persons in the Netherlands have called for legal action against Wilders, while others have defended his right to free speech.[109] On 15 August 2007, a representative of the Prosecutors' Office in Amsterdam declared that dozens of reports against Wilders had been filed, and that they were all being considered.[167] Attempts to prosecute Wilders under Dutch anti-hate speech laws in June 2008 failed, with the public prosecutor's office stating that Wilders' comments contributed to the debate on Islam in Dutch society and also had been made outside parliament, The office released a statement reading: "That comments are hurtful and offensive for a large number of Muslims does not mean that they are punishable. Freedom of expression fulfils an essential role in public debate in a democratic society. That means that offensive comments can be made in a political debate".[109][168][169]
On 21 January 2009, a three-judge court ordered prosecutors to try him.[169][170]
The Middle East Forum has established a Legal Defence Fund for Wilders's defence.[171][172] The New York Times ran an op-ed criticizing his views and arguing that "for a man who calls for a ban on the Koran to act as the champion of free speech is a bit rich", concluding, however that the lawsuit against Wilders might not be "a good thing for democracy", because it made him "look more important than he should be."[77]
A survey by Angus Reid Global Monitor has found that public opinion is deeply split on the prosecution, with 50% supporting Wilders and 43% opposed.[168] However, public support for the Party for Freedom has greatly increased since Wilders' legal troubles began, with the Party for Freedom virtually tied with the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy to be the third most popular party.[65][173] According to Radio Netherlands, "Dutch politicians themselves seem to be keeping quiet on the issue; they are probably worried that media attention will only serve to make the controversial politician more popular".[61]
In late October 2010, the Dutch court approved a request from Geert Wilders to have new judges appointed forcing the court to retry the case.[174] On 7 February 2011, Wilders returned to the court room in order that his legal team could present evidence from Islamic experts which the court rejected in 2010, including Mohammed Bouyeri, who murdered film-maker Theo van Gogh, and Dutch academic Hans Jansen.[175]
On 23 June 2011, Wilders was acquitted of all charges. A Dutch court noted that his speech was legitimate political debate, but on the edge.[176] Because both the public prosecutor and the defence requested complete acquittal, the verdict will most likely not be appealed.[177][178]
Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Geert Wilders |
Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Geert Wilders |
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Persondata | |
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Name | Wilders, Geert |
Alternative names | |
Short description | Dutch politician |
Date of birth | 6 September 1963 |
Place of birth | Venlo, Netherlands |
Date of death | |
Place of death |
Ezra Levant | |
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Ezra Levant in 2008 |
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Born | February 20,[citation needed] 1972 Calgary, Alberta, Canada |
Education | B.Comm; LLB |
Alma mater | University of Calgary, University of Alberta |
Religion | Judaism |
Website | |
Ezra Levant |
Ezra Isaac Levant (born 1972) is a Canadian media personality, conservative political activist and author. He is the founder and former publisher of the Western Standard, is a broadcaster and columnist for Sun Media and has written several books on politics and public policy.
Contents |
Born in Calgary, Levant holds a commerce degree from the University of Calgary and a law degree from the University of Alberta. His great-grandfather emigrated to Canada in 1903 from Russia to establish a homestead near Drumheller, Alberta.[1] Levant grew up in a suburb of Calgary. He attended a Jewish day school in his childhood before transferring to a public junior high school.
Levant campaigned for the Reform Party of Canada as a teenager and joined it as a university student.[1] In 1992, while at the University of Calgary, his two-person team won the "best debating" category in the Intercollegiate Business Competition held at Queen's University.[2] In 1994, he was featured in a Globe and Mail article on young conservatives after accusing the University of Alberta of racism for instituting an affirmative action program of hiring women and aboriginal professors. His actions outraged aboriginal law students, feminists, and a number of professors, and he was called to a meeting with the assistant dean who advised him of the university's non-academic code of conduct and defamation laws. As head of the university's speakers committee, Levant organized a debate between Doug Christie, a lawyer known for his advocacy in defence of Holocaust deniers and accused Nazi war criminals, and Thomas Kuttner, a Jewish lawyer from the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission.[1]
Levant gained a reputation as the university's leading conservative. He was invited to write a guest column for the Edmonton Journal and interviewed on television.[3] He spent the summer of 1994 in Washington, D.C., in an internship arranged by the libertarian Charles G. Koch Foundation Summer Fellow Program. He worked for the Fraser Institute in 1995, writing Youthquake, which argued for smaller government, including privatization of the Canada Pension Plan. Levant saw "youthquake", the term he used to describe what he identified as a conservative youth movement of the 1990s, as similar to the 1960s civil rights movement except that instead of being enslaved by racism, his generation was "enslaved by debt" and, in order to liberate itself, society needed to dismantle elements such as trade unions, the minimum wage, universal health care, subsidized tuition and public pension plans.[4]
Levant favoured Quebec separatism and a yes vote during the 1995 Quebec referendum in a Calgary Sun column titled "10 Reasons to Hope for a Yes Victory"[5] Among his 10 reasons were Levant's views that the departure of Quebec from Canadian confederation would lead to the elimination of bilingualism and multiculturalism, that it would give the Canadian government the "fortitude" to say no to "other special interest groups" such as First Nations and environmentalists; it would end corruption in Parliament, which Levant blamed on Quebec politicians, and clear the way for Preston Manning to become Prime Minister of Canada.[6]
In 1996, Levant wrote a column saying that if the federal Liberals were re-elected, Alberta could separate from Canada making it "free from Quebec's demands."[6]
In 1996, Levant worked with David Frum to organize the "Winds of Change" conference in Calgary, an early attempt to encourage the Reform Party of Canada and Progressive Conservative Party of Canada to merge so that a united rightwing party could defeat the Liberal Party of Canada in the subsequent election.[7] While unsuccessful, the conference anticipated future attempts at a Unite the Right movement which ultimately led to the formation of the Conservative Party of Canada in 2003. Levant supported Preston Manning's United Alternative initiative in 1999, a more advanced attempt to unite the country's conservative movement[8] and was one of the leaders of the movement to create the Canadian Alliance as an attempt to broaden the party's base.[9]
While he was a student-at-law, Levant was an active political organizer in the Reform Party, and guided the successful attempts by Rahim Jaffer (as the campaign manager for his nomination in Edmonton-Strathcona and later as his communications-director during the 1997 Federal Election) and Rob Anders to win party nominations.[10] In 1997, he went to Ottawa to work for the Reform Party, becoming a parliamentary aide to party leader Preston Manning and being put in charge of Question Period strategy.[6] Along with newly-elected MP's Rob Anders, Jason Kenney and Rahim Jaffer, Levant was part of an up and coming group of young Reformers which pundits dubbed the "Snack Pack" due to their relative youth.
In 1999, after being dismissed as Preston Manning's legislative-assistant, Levant left Ottawa to join the editorial board of the fledgling National Post newspaper in Toronto.[9][11] A close friend of Stockwell Day's son Logan, Levant proclaimed himself a "Stockaholic"[12] and supported the elder Day in his successful attempt to defeat Reform Party leader Preston Manning for the leadership of the new Canadian Alliance.[citation needed]
In February 2001, he returned to Ottawa as communications director to Day.[13] In May of that year he resigned after leaking to the National Post a letter that he sent to dissident MP Chuck Strahl in which he threatened to sue over Strahl's criticisms of his office.[14][15][16]
Later in 2001, Levant returned to Calgary to practice law. By February 2002 he had won the Canadian Alliance party nomination for the riding of Calgary Southwest,[17] but stepped aside after public pressure so that new party leader Stephen Harper could run there in a 2002 by-election. When the by-election was called, Levant, who said he spent over $150,000 to gain the nomination,[18] announced on March 28 that he would not step aside.[12][19] Later that night, however, he relented after widespread pressure from the party and accusations that he was putting himself ahead of the party.[20]
In 2004 Levant co-founded the Western Standard, an Alberta-based magazine with an emphasis on Western Canada, political conservatism, and libertarianism.[21] In October 2007 the magazine stopped publishing its print edition after failing to become profitable,[22] becoming an online magazine. Levant later sold the publication's remaining assets to Matthew Johnson, the former legislative aide to Rahim Jaffer.[23]
Levant wrote an irregular column for the Calgary Sun for ten years, until he was dropped in October 2007 because of "internal decisions."[24] He continued to write occasional columns for the National Post on a freelance basis.[25]
In 2010, Levant joined Sun Media a columnist and now has an on-air position on the Sun TV News Channel as host of The Source.[26]
In February 2006, the Western Standard published the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons depicting Muhammad.[27] Syed Soharwardy of the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada and the Edmonton Council of Muslim Communities complained about the publication to the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship Commission and a hearing was scheduled for January 2008. On the day of the hearing Levant republished the cartoons on his website.[25]
At the request of Levant and his lawyers Levant was allowed to videotape his interview with Shirlene McGovern, a human rights investigator with the Alberta Human Rights Commission. Levant later published that video on YouTube where it spent several days among the top-ten viewed videos. Soharwardy's complaint was ultimately withdrawn,[28] and a complaint he filed with Calgary police came to naught. An identical complaint by the Edmonton Muslim Council was dismissed by the Commission on August 5, 2008.
The timing of the Levant case was notable in that it coincided with a high-profile case considered by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (which Levant has criticized), the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal and the Ontario Human Rights Commission regarding complaints by the Canadian Islamic Congress about a column by Mark Steyn in Maclean's Magazine. None of the complaints obtained a ruling against Steyn or Maclean's.
Levant is a fierce critic of the Alberta Human Rights Commission, particularly concerning Rev. Stephen Boissoin, who in the Lund v. Boissoin matter was fined $7,000 and banned from publicly "disparaging ... gays and lesbians" in May 2008. This case concerned a letter published by the Red Deer Advocate in 2002 in which Boissoin attacked the "homosexual agenda" as "wicked". In June 2008, Levant republished Boissoin's letter on his blog.[29] When the AHRC dismissed the resulting complaint in November 2008, Levant accused the HRCs of religious discrimination, asserting that "100% of the CHRC's targets have been white, Christian or conservative" and that "It's legal for a Jew like me to publish [Boissoin’s letter]. It's illegal for a Christian like Rev. Boissoin to publish it."[30] The HRC's ruling was overturned by the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta in 2009, on the grounds that Levant had the right to free speech.[31]
Levant's case has attracted the attention of organizations such as PEN Canada,[32] the Canadian Association of Journalists,[33] and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association[34] — all of which have called for reform of the commissions. He has been featured on Glenn Beck's show on CNN.[35] Levant supported the Canadian government's decision to refuse George Galloway entry into Canada in March 2009. Although Levant described it as "an immigration matter", free speech advocates protested this move, citing it as a hypocritical double standard.[36]
Ezra has been a frequent critic of Calgary mayor Naheed Nenshi, who is Muslim, calling him an "anti-Christian bigot".[37][38]
In 1988, Levant wrote a Reform Party fundraising letter in which he criticized Alberta Progressive Conservative Senator Ron Ghitter . Ghitter sued for defamation and in 2000, Canadian Alliance MP Rob Anders and Levant admitted liability and issued a formal apology and undisclosed damages to settle the suit.[39][40]
According to Levant, after the HRC cases against him were dismissed, "the most aggressive members of the human rights industry proceeded to punish [him] by filing over 20 law society complaints and five defamation suits against [him]. ... the point of all these lawsuits [is] just to bury [him] in an avalanche of paperwork and bills, to get [him] to shut up. So far, it ain't working."[41]
The Law Society of Alberta had found that Levant violated the following rules of professional conduct: to “respect and uphold the law in personal conduct,” to “seek to improve the justice system,” to not “ act in a manner that might weaken public respect for the law,” to be “courteous and candid,” and to not “harass any person or discriminate against any person” on various prohibited grounds and ordered Levant to attend a "mandatory conduct advisory" after which the matter was dropped.[42]
As a result of one lawsuit, Levant was ordered to pay $25,000 to Giacomo Vigna, a Canadian Human Rights Commission lawyer, for libelling him with "reckless indifference" in his blog. Justice Robert Smith ruled that Levant "spoke in reckless disregard of the truth and for an ulterior purpose of denormalizing the Human Rights Commission across Canada which makes his statements malicious in that sense" and ordered Levant to remove the libellous materials from his blog.[43]
Lawyer Richard Warman is also suing Levant as well as Kathy Shaidle, Kate McMillan of Small Dead Animals and several other conservative bloggers for libel over statements made about Warman on Free Dominion.[44] Levant says this "lawsuit isn't logical, or serious. It's a nuisance suit."[45]
Levant is also being sued by Warren Kinsella for libel, asking for $5,000,000. Levant has called Kinsella's suit "laughable".[46]
In September 2010, Levant wrote a column for Sun Media accusing George Soros of funding avaaz.org, a group lobbying to stop Sun Media being granted a license for Sun TV News Channel, and strongly attacking Soros's character and history by alleging that as a child he collaborated with the Nazis.[47] Soros threatened to sue Sun Media for libel[47] and on September 18, Sun Media issued a retraction and apology to Soros.[48]
In July 2008, Levant was invited to be a witness before the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus "about the threat posed by radical Islam using Western legal mechanisms as weapons".[49]
From 2009 until 2010, Levant worked as a lobbyist for Rothman's Incorporated, a manufacturer and distributor of tobacco products.[50]
In March 2010, Levant accompanied U.S. conservative personality Ann Coulter on a Canadian speaking tour. Her speech at the University of Ottawa was canceled at the last minute, apparently by its organizers, because of what Levant called "physical danger to Coulter and the audience" from protesters. The Ottawa Police later disputed any claims of unrest or violence.[51][52][53]
In September 2010, Levant published a book, Ethical Oil: The Case for Canada's Oil Sands, arguing a moral case for developing the Athabasca oil sands rather than importing oil from nations with bad records concerning human rights and the environment.[54] The book was the winner of the 2011 National Business Book Award, awarded on May 12, 2011 in Toronto.
Levant hosts The Source, an evening talk show host on the Sun News Network and writes a regular column for the Sun Media chain of newspapers.[55]
Sun Media, owned by Quebecor, has also systematically opposed funding for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, led by Levant and Brian Lilley.[56]
Persondata | |
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Name | Levant, Ezra |
Alternative names | |
Short description | Canadian politician |
Date of birth | 1972 |
Place of birth | Calgary, Alberta, Canada |
Date of death | |
Place of death |