Berliners watching a
C-54 land at Tempelhof Airport (1948)
The Berlin Blockade (24 June 1948 – 12 May 1949) was one of the first major international crises of the Cold War. During the multinational occupation of post–World War II Germany, the Soviet Union blocked the Western Allies' railway, road and canal access to the sectors of Berlin under Allied control. Their aim was to force the western powers to allow the Soviet zone to start supplying Berlin with food and fuel, thereby giving the Soviets practical control over the entire city.
In response, the Western Allies organized the Berlin Airlift to carry supplies to the people in West Berlin.[1][2] The recently independent United States Air Force and the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force flew over 200,000 flights in one year, providing up to 4700 tons of daily necessities such as fuel and food to the Berliners.[3] Alongside US and British personnel, the airlift involved aircrews from the Royal Australian Air Force, Royal Canadian Air Force, Royal New Zealand Air Force, and South African Air Force[4]:338.
By the spring of 1949, the effort was clearly succeeding and, by April, the airlift was delivering more cargo than had previously been transported into the city by rail. The success of the Berlin Airlift brought embarrassment to the Soviets who had refused to believe it could make a difference. The blockade was lifted in May 1949 and resulted in the creation of two separate German states.[3] The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) split up Berlin.[3] In remembrance of the airlift, three airports in the former western zones of the city served as the primary gateways to Germany for another fifty years.
From 17 July to 2 August 1945, the victorious Allied Powers reached the Potsdam Agreement on the fate of postwar Europe, calling for the division of defeated Germany into four temporary occupation zones (thus re-affirming principles laid out earlier by the Yalta Conference). These zones were located roughly around the current locations of the allied armies.[5] Additionally, the German capital of Berlin was to be divided into four sectors: the French sector, British Sector, American sector and the Soviet sector.[5]
Berlin was located 100 miles inside the Soviet occupation zone.[5] The Soviet zone produced much of Germany's food supply, while the territory of the British and American zones had to rely on food imports even before the war.[5] In addition, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin ordered the incorporation of part of eastern Poland into the Soviet Union, compensating Poland by ceding to it a large portion of Germany east of the Oder-Neisse line. This area had contained much of Germany's fertile land.[6] The administration of occupied Germany was coordinated by the Four Power Allied Control Council (ACC).[7]
Sectors of divided Berlin
The only three permissible air corridors to Berlin.
In the eastern zone, the Soviet authorities forcibly unified the Communist Party of Germany and Social Democratic Party in the Socialist Unity Party ("SED"), claiming at the time that it would not have a Marxist-Leninist or Soviet orientation.[8] The SED leaders then called for the "establishment of an anti-fascist, democratic regime, a parliamentary democratic republic" while the Soviet Military Administration suppressed all other political activities.[9] Factories, equipment, technicians, managers and skilled personnel were removed to the Soviet Union.[10]
In a June 1945 meeting, Stalin told German communist leaders that he expected slowly to undermine the British position within their occupation zone, that the United States would withdraw within a year or two and that nothing would then stand in the way of a united Germany under communist control within the Soviet orbit.[11] Stalin and other leaders told visiting Bulgarian and Yugoslavian delegations in early 1946 that Germany must be both Soviet and communist.[11]
A further factor contributing to the Blockade was that there had never been a formal agreement guaranteeing rail and road access to Berlin through the Soviet zone. At the end of the war, western leaders had relied on Soviet goodwill to provide them with a tacit right to such access.[12] At that time, the western allies assumed that the Soviets' refusal to grant any cargo access other than one rail line, limited to ten trains per day, was temporary, but the Soviets refused expansion to the various additional routes that were later proposed.[13]
The Soviets also granted only three air corridors for access to Berlin from Hamburg, Bückeburg and Frankfurt.[13] In 1946 the Soviets stopped delivering agricultural goods from their zone in eastern Germany, and the American commander, Lucius D. Clay, responded by stopping shipments of dismantled industries from western Germany to the Soviet Union. In response, the Soviets started a public relations campaign against American policy, and began to obstruct the administrative work of all four zones of occupation.
Until the blockade began in 1948, the Truman Administration had not decided whether American forces should remain in West Berlin after the establishment of a West German government, planned for 1949.[14]
Berlin quickly became the focal point of both US and Soviet efforts to re-align Europe to their respective visions. As Molotov noted, "What happens to Berlin, happens to Germany; what happens to Germany, happens to Europe."[15] Berlin had suffered enormous damage, its prewar population of 4.6 million people was reduced to 2.8 million, but the city could only produce 2% of its food needs.[12] The Western allies were not permitted to enter the city until two months after Germany's surrender, during which time the local populace suffered brutal treatment at the hands of the Soviet army.[12]
After harsh treatment, forced emigration, political repression and the particularly hard winter of 1945–1946, Germans in the Soviet-controlled zone were hostile to Soviet endeavors.[11] Local elections in mid-1946 resulted in a massive anti-communist protest vote, especially in the Soviet sector of Berlin.[11] Berlin's citizens overwhelmingly elected democratic members to its city council (with an 86% majority) — strongly rejecting Communist candidates.
Concurring with the view of Clay, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that the "complete revival of Germany industry, particularly coal mining" was now of "primary importance" to American security.[16] In January 1947, Truman appointed General George Marshall as Secretary of State, in July 1947 he scrapped JCS 1067[17] and supplanted it with JCS 1779, which decreed that an orderly and prosperous Europe required the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany.[16]
Administration officials met with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and others to press for an economically self-sufficient Germany, and demanded a detailed account of the industrial plants, goods and infrastructure previously removed by the Soviets.[18] After six weeks of negotiations, Molotov refused the demands and the talks were adjourned.[18] Marshall was particularly discouraged after a personal meeting with Stalin, who expressed little interest in a solution to German economic problems.[18]
The United States concluded that, for Europe's sake, a solution could not be delayed any longer.[18] In a 5 June 1947 speech,[19] Marshall announced a comprehensive program of American assistance to all European countries wanting to participate, including the Soviet Union and those of Eastern Europe. This was to be called the European Recovery Programme, but it became more widely known as the Marshall Plan.[18]
Stalin opposed the Marshall Plan. He had built up a belt of Soviet-controlled nations on his Western border, the Eastern bloc, which included Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.[20] Stalin wanted to maintain this buffer zone of states, combined with a weakened Germany under Soviet control.[9] He felt that American aid would "buy" a pro-US re-alignment of the new Europe. He stated "This is a ploy by Truman. It is nothing like Lend-Lease — a different situation. They don't want to help us. What they want is to infiltrate European countries."[21]
While Molotov was initially interested in the program and attended its early meetings, he later described it as "dollar imperialism". Fearing American political, cultural and economic penetration, Stalin eventually forbade Soviet Eastern bloc countries of the newly formed Cominform from accepting the aid.[18] In Czechoslovakia, this demand resulted in the Soviet-backed Czechoslovak coup d'état of 1948,[22] the brutality of which shocked Western powers more than any event so far and briefly provoked fear of a new war. This swept away the last vestiges of opposition to the Marshall Plan in the United States Congress.[23]
Meanwhile, to coordinate the economies of the British and United States occupation zones, these were combined into what was referred to as the Bizone.[11] (to be renamed the Trizone when France later joined). Representatives of these three governments, along with the Benelux nations, met twice in London (London 6-Power Conference) in the first half of 1948 to discuss the future of Germany, going ahead despite Soviet threats to ignore any decisions taken.[24][25]
In response to the announcement of the first of these meetings, in late January 1948, the Soviets began stopping British and American trains to Berlin to check passenger identities.[26] As outlined in an announcement on 7 March 1948, all of the governments present approved the extension of the Marshall Plan to Germany, finalized the economic merger of the western occupation zones in Germany and agreed upon the establishment of a federal system of government for them.[24][25]
After a 9 March meeting between Stalin and his military advisers, a secret memorandum was sent to Molotov on 12 March 1948, outlining a plan to force the policy of the western allies into line with the wishes of the Soviet government by "regulating" access to Berlin.[23] The Allied Control Council (ACC) met for the last time on 20 March 1948, when Vasily Sokolovsky demanded to know the outcome of the London Conference and, on being told by negotiators that they had not yet heard the final results from their governments, he said, "I see no sense in continuing this meeting, and I declare it adjourned."[23] The entire Soviet delegation rose and walked out. Truman later noted, "For most of Germany, this act merely formalized what had been an obvious fact for some time, namely, that the four-power control machinery had become unworkable. For the city of Berlin, however, this was the curtain-raiser for a major crisis."[22]
On 25 March 1948, the Soviets issued orders restricting Western military and passenger traffic between the American, British and French occupation zones and Berlin.[26] These new measures began on 1 April along with an announcement that no cargo could leave Berlin by rail without the permission of the Soviet commander. Each train and truck was to be searched by the Soviet authorities.[26] On 2 April, General Clay ordered a halt to all military trains and required that supplies to the military garrison be transported by air, in what was dubbed the "Little Lift".[26]
The Soviets eased their restrictions on Allied military trains on 10 April 1948, but continued periodically to interrupt rail and road traffic during the next 75 days, while the United States continued supplying its military forces by using cargo aircraft.[27] At the same time, Soviet military aircraft began to violate West Berlin airspace and harass, or what the military called "buzz", flights in and out of West Berlin.[28]
On 5 April, a Soviet Air Force Yakovlev Yak-3 fighter collided with a British European Airways Vickers Viking 1B airliner near RAF Gatow airfield, killing all aboard both aircraft. The Gatow air disaster exacerbated tensions between the Soviets and the other allied powers.[29][30][31] Internal Soviet reports in April stated that "Our control and restrictive measures have dealt a strong blow to the prestige of the Americans and British in Germany" and that the Americans have "admitted" that the idea of an airlift would be too expensive.[32]
On 9 April, Soviet officials demanded that American military personnel maintaining communication equipment in the Eastern zone must withdraw, thus preventing the use of navigation beacons to mark air routes.[27] On 20 April, the Soviets demanded that all barges obtain clearance before entering the Soviet zone.[33]
Creation of an economically stable western Germany required reform of the unstable Reichsmark German currency introduced after the 1920s German inflation. The Soviets had debased the Reichsmark by excessive printing, resulting in Germans using cigarettes as a de facto currency or for bartering.[34][35] The Soviets opposed western plans for a reform.[34][35] In February 1948, the Americans and British had proposed to the ACC that a new German currency be created, replacing the over-circulated and de-valued Reichsmark. The Soviets refused to accept this proposal, hoping to continue the German recession, in keeping with their policy of a weak Germany.[36]
Anticipating the introduction of new currency by the other countries in the non-Soviet zones, the Soviet Union in May 1948 directed its military to introduce its own new currency and to permit only the Soviet currency to be used in their sector of Berlin, if the other countries brought in a different currency there.[34] On 18 June the United States, Britain and France announced that on 21 June the Deutsche Mark would be introduced, but the Soviets refused to permit its use as legal tender in Berlin.[34] The Allies had already transported 250,000,000 Deutsche marks into the city and it quickly became the standard currency in all four sectors. This new currency, along with the Marshall Plan that backed it, appeared to have the potential to revitalize Germany, even against the wishes of the Soviets. Further, the introduction of the currency into western Berlin threatened to create a bastion of western economic resurgence deep within the Soviet zone. Stalin considered this a provocation and now wanted the West completely out of Berlin.
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The day after the 18 June 1948 announcement of the new Deutsche Mark, Soviet guards halted all passenger trains and traffic on the autobahn to Berlin, delayed Western and German freight shipments and required that all water transport secure special Soviet permission.[34] On 21 June, the day the Deutsche Mark was introduced, the Soviets halted a United States military supply train to Berlin and sent it back to western Germany.[34] On 22 June, the Soviets announced that they would introduce a new currency in their zone. This was known as the "Ostmark".[37]
That same day, a Soviet representative told the other three occupying powers that "We are warning both you and the population of Berlin that we shall apply economic and administrative sanctions that will lead to the circulation in Berlin exclusively of the currency of the Soviet occupation zone."[37] The Soviets launched a massive propaganda campaign condemning Britain, the United States and France by radio, newspaper and loudspeaker.[37] The Soviets conducted well-advertised military maneuvers just outside the city. Rumors of a potential occupation by Soviet troops spread quickly. German communists demonstrated, rioted and attacked pro-West German leaders when these attended meetings of the municipal government in the Soviet sector.[37]
On 24 June, the Soviets severed land and water communications between the non-Soviet zones and Berlin.[37] That same day, they halted all rail and barge traffic in and out of Berlin.[37] On 25 June, the Soviets stopped supplying food to the civilian population in the non-Soviet sectors of Berlin.[37] Motor traffic from Berlin to the western zones was permitted, but this required a 23 kilometer detour to a ferry crossing because of alleged "repairs" to a bridge.[37] They also cut off the electricity relied on by Berlin, using their control over the generating plants in the Soviet zone.[35]
Surface traffic from non-Soviet zones to Berlin was blockaded, leaving open only the air corridors.[37] The Soviets rejected arguments that the occupation rights in the non-Soviet sectors of Berlin and the use of the supply routes during the previous three years had given Britain, France and the United States a legal claim to use of the highways, tunnels, railroads, and canals. Relying on Soviet good will after the war, Britain, France, and the United States had never negotiated an agreement with the Soviets to guarantee these land-based rights of access to Berlin through the Soviet zone.[12]
At the time, West Berlin had thirty-six days' worth of food, and forty-five days' worth of coal. Militarily, the Americans and British were greatly outnumbered due to the postwar scaling back of their armies. The United States, like other western countries, had disbanded most of its troops and was largely inferior in the European theater.[38] The entire United States Army had been reduced to 552,000 men by February 1948.[39] Military forces in the western sectors of Berlin numbered only 8,973 Americans, 7,606 British and 6,100 French.[40] Because of the imbalance American war plans were based on using hundreds of atomic bombs but only about 50 bombs existed in mid-1948. As of March 1948 only 35 "Silverplate" atomic-capable B-29s and a few trained flight and assembly crews existed. Three B-29 groups arrived in England in July and August 1948, but the Soviets likely knew that none was atomic-capable; the first Silverplate bombers arrived in April 1949.[41]
Soviet military forces in the Soviet sector that surrounded Berlin totaled one and a half million.[42] The two United States regiments in Berlin could have provided little resistance against a Soviet attack.[43] General Lucius D. Clay, in charge of the US Occupation Zone in Germany, summed up the reasons for not retreating in a cable to Washington, D.C., on 13 June 1948: "There is no practicability in maintaining our position in Berlin and it must not be evaluated on that basis.... We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent."[44]
Believing that Britain, France, and the United States had little option than to acquiesce, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany celebrated the beginning of the blockade.[45] General Clay felt that the Soviets were bluffing about Berlin since they would not want to be viewed as starting a Third World War. He believed that Stalin did not want a war and that Soviet actions were aimed at exerting military and political pressure on the West to obtain concessions, relying on the West's prudence and unwillingness to provoke a war.[40] Commander of United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) General Curtis LeMay reportedly favored an aggressive response to the blockade, in which his B-29s with fighter escort would approach Soviet air bases while ground troops attempted to reach Berlin; Clay vetoed the plan.[41]
Although the ground routes had never been negotiated, the same was not true of the air. On 30 November 1945, it had been agreed in writing that there would be three twenty-mile-wide air corridors providing free access to Berlin.[46] Additionally, unlike a force of tanks and trucks, the Soviets could not claim that cargo aircraft were some sort of military threat. In the face of unarmed aircraft refusing to turn around, the only way to enforce the blockade would have been to shoot them down. An airlift would force the Soviet Union into the position of either taking military action in a morally reprehensible fashion, breaking their own agreements, or back down.
Enforcing this would require an airlift that really worked. If the supplies could not be flown in fast enough, Soviet help would eventually be needed to prevent starvation. Clay was told to take advice from LeMay to see if an airlift was possible. LeMay, initially taken aback by the inquiry, which was "Can you haul coal?", replied "We can haul anything."[46]
When American forces consulted Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF) about a possible joint airlift, they learned the RAF was already running an airlift in support of British troops in Berlin. General Clay's counterpart, General Sir Brian Robertson, was ready with some concrete numbers. During the Little Lift earlier that year, British Air Commodore Reginald Waite had calculated the resources required to support the entire city.
His calculations indicated that they would need to supply seventeen hundred calories per person per day, giving a grand total of 646 tons of flour and wheat, 125 tons of cereal, 64 tons of fat, 109 tons of meat and fish, 180 tons of dehydrated potatoes, 180 tons of sugar, 11 tons of coffee, 19 tons of powdered milk, 5 tons of whole milk for children, 3 tons of fresh yeast for baking, 144 tons of dehydrated vegetables, 38 tons of salt and 10 tons of cheese. In total, 1,534 tons were needed daily to keep the over two million people alive.[46] Additionally, the city needed to be kept heated and powered, which would require another 3,475 tons of coal and gasoline.[47]
C-47 Skytrains unloading at Tempelhof Airport during Berlin Airlift.
Carrying all this in would not be easy. The postwar demobilization left the US forces in Europe with only two squadrons of C-47 Skytrain aircraft (the military version of the Douglas DC-3, which the British called "Dakota"), which could each carry about 3.5 tons of cargo. Clay estimated these would be able to haul about 300 tons of supplies a day. The RAF was somewhat better prepared, since it had already moved some aircraft into the German area, and they expected to be able to supply about 400 tons a day.
This was not nearly enough to move the 5,000 tons a day that would be needed, but these numbers could be increased as new aircraft arrived from the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Canada. The RAF would be relied on to increase its numbers quickly. It could fly additional aircraft in from Britain in a single hop, bringing the RAF fleet to about 150 Dakotas and 40 of the larger Avro Yorks with a 10 ton payload.
With this fleet, the British contribution was expected to rise to 750 tons a day in the short term. For a longer-term operation, the US would have to add additional aircraft as soon as possible, and those would have to be as large as possible while still able to fly into the Berlin airports. Only one aircraft type was suitable, the four-engine C-54 Skymaster and its US Navy equivalent, the R5D, of which the U.S. military had approximately 565, with 268 in MATS.
Given the feasibility assessment made by the British, an airlift appeared the best course of action. One remaining concern was the population of Berlin. Clay called in Ernst Reuter, the mayor-elect of Berlin, accompanied by his aide, Willy Brandt. Clay told Reuter, "Look, I am ready to try an airlift. I can't guarantee it will work. I am sure that even at its best, people are going to be cold and people are going to be hungry. And if the people of Berlin won't stand that, it will fail. And I don't want to go into this unless I have your assurance that the people will be heavily in approval." Reuter, although skeptical, assured Clay that Berlin would make all the necessary sacrifices and that the Berliners would support his actions.[44]
General Albert Wedemeyer, the US Army Chief of Plans and Operations, was in Europe on an inspection tour when the crisis broke out. He had been the commander of the US China-Burma-India Theater in 1944–45 and he had a detailed knowledge of the previous largest airlift—the World War II American airlift from India over the Hump of the Himalayas to China. His endorsement of the airlift option gave it a major boost.[44] The British and Americans agreed to start a joint operation without delay; the US action was dubbed "Operation Vittles,"[48] while the British one was called "Operation Plainfare".[49] The Australian contribution to the airlift, begun in September 1948, was designated "Operation Pelican."[50]
Loading milk on a West Berlin-bound aircraft
On 24 June 1948 LeMay appointed Brigadier General Joseph Smith, headquarters commandant for USAFE at Camp Lindsey, as the Provisional Task Force Commander of the airlift. Smith had been chief of staff in LeMay's B-29 command in India during World War II and had no airlift experience. On 25 June 1948 Clay gave the order to launch Operation Vittles. The next day thirty-two C-47s lifted off for Berlin hauling 80 tons of cargo, including milk, flour, and medicine. The first British aircraft flew on 28 June. At that time, the airlift was expected to last three weeks.
On 27 June Clay cabled William Draper with an estimate of the current situation:
I have already arranged for our maximum airlift to start on Monday [June 28]. For a sustained effort, we can use seventy Dakotas [C-47s]. The number which the British can make available is not yet known, although General Robertson is somewhat doubtful of their ability to make this number available. Our two Berlin airports can handle in the neighborhood of fifty additional airplanes per day. These would have to be C-47s, C-54s or planes with similar landing characteristics, as our airports cannot take larger planes. LeMay is urging two C-54 groups. With this airlift, we should be able to bring in 600 or 700 tons a day. While 2,000 tons a day is required in normal foods, 600 tons a day (utilizing dried foods to the maximum extent) will substantially increase the morale of the German people and will unquestionably seriously disturb the Soviet blockade. To accomplish this, it is urgent that we be given approximately 50 additional transport planes to arrive in Germany at the earliest practicable date, and each day's delay will of course decrease our ability to sustain our position in Berlin. Crews would be needed to permit maximum operation of these planes.
By 1 July the system was getting underway. C-54s were starting to arrive in quantity, and Rhein-Main Air Base became exclusively a C-54 hub, while Wiesbaden retained a mix of C-54s and C-47s. Aircraft flew northeast through the American air corridor into Tempelhof Airport, then returned due west flying out on through the British air corridor. After reaching the British Zone, they turned south to return to their bases.
Germans watching supply planes at Tempelhof
The British ran a similar system, flying southeast from several airports in the Hamburg area through their second corridor into RAF Gatow in the British Sector, and then also returning out on the center corridor, turning for home or landing at Hanover. However, unlike the Americans, the British also ran some round-trips, using their southeast corridor. On 6 July the Yorks and Dakotas were joined by Short Sunderland flying boats. Flying from Finkenwerder on the Elbe near Hamburg to the Havel river next to Gatow, their corrosion-resistant hulls suited them to the particular task of delivering baking and other salt into the city.
Accommodating the large number of flights to Berlin required maintenance schedules and fixed cargo loading times. Smith and his staff developed a complex timetable for flights called the "block system": three eight-hour shifts of a C-54 section to Berlin followed by a C-47 section. Aircraft were scheduled to take off every four minutes, flying 1000 feet higher than the flight in front. This pattern began at 5,000 feet and was repeated five times. (This system of stacked inbound serials was later dubbed "the ladder.")[51][52][53]
During the first week the airlift averaged only ninety tons a day, but by the second week it reached 1000 tons. This likely would have sufficed had the effort lasted only a few weeks, as originally believed. The Communist press in East Berlin ridiculed the project. It derisively referred to "the futile attempts of the Americans to save face and to maintain their untenable position in Berlin."[54]
Despite the excitement engendered by glamorous publicity extolling the work (and over-work) of the crews and the daily increase of tonnage levels, the airlift was not close to being operated to its capability because USAFE was a tactical organization without any airlift expertise. Maintenance was barely adequate, crews were not being efficiently utilized, transports stood idle and disused, necessary record-keeping was scant, and ad hoc flight crews of publicity-seeking desk personnel were disrupting a business-like atmosphere.[55] This was recognized by the United States National Security Council at a meeting with Clay on 22 July 1948, when it became clear that a long-term airlift was necessary. Wedemeyer immediately recommended that the deputy commander for operations of the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), Maj. Gen. William H. Tunner command the operation. Under Wedemeyer's command, Tunner had successfully reorganized the wartime Hump airbridge between India and China, doubling the tonnage and hours flown. USAF Chief of Staff Hoyt S. Vandenberg endorsed the recommendation.[51]
On 28 July 1948, Tunner arrived in Wiesbaden to take over the operation.[56] "Tonnage" Tunner had significant experience in commanding and re-organizing the airlift over the Hump to China in 1944–45.[44] He revamped the entire airlift operation, reaching an agreement with LeMay to form the Combined Air Lift Task Force (CALTF) to control both the USAF and RAF lift operations from a central location, which went into effect in mid-October 1948. MATS immediately deployed eight squadrons of C-54s—72 aircraft to Wiesbaden and Rhein-Main Air Base to reinforce the 54 already in operation, the first by 30 July and the remainder by mid-August, and two-thirds of all C-54 aircrew worldwide began transferring to Germany.[57]
Two weeks after his arrival, on 13 August, Tunner decided to fly to Berlin to grant an award to Lt. Paul O. Lykins, an airlift pilot who had made the most flights into Berlin up to that time, as symbolic of the entire effort to date.[58] Cloud cover over Berlin dropped to the height of the buildings, and heavy rain showers made radar visibility poor. A C-54 crashed and burned at the end of the runway, and a second one landing behind it burst its tires while trying to avoid it. A third aircraft ground looped on the auxiliary runway, closing the entire airport. While no one was killed, Tunner was embarrassed that the control tower at Tempelhof had lost control of the situation while the commander of the airlift was circling overhead, stacked with a dozen other transports. General Tunner radioed for all stacked aircraft to return home immediately. This became known as "Black Friday," and Tunner personally noted it was from that date that the success of the airlift stemmed.[59]
A C-74 Globemaster plane at Gatow airfield on August 19 with more than 20 tons of flour from the United States.
As a result of Black Friday, Tunner instituted a number of new rules; instrument flight rules (IFR) would be in effect at all times, regardless of actual visibility, and each sortie would have only one chance to land in Berlin, returning to its air base if it missed its slot. Accident rates and delays dropped immediately. Another decision was made when it was realized that it took just as long to unload a 3.5-ton C-47 as a 10-ton C-54. One of the reasons for this was the sloping cargo floor of the "taildragger" C-47s, which made truck loading difficult. The tricycle geared C-54's cargo deck was level, so that a truck could back up to it and offload cargo quickly. Tunner decided to replace all C-47s in the Airlift with C-54s or larger aircraft.
Having noticed on his first inspection trip to Berlin on 31 July that there were long delays as the flight crews returned to their aircraft after getting refreshments from the terminal, Tunner banned aircrew from leaving their aircraft for any reason while in Berlin. Instead, he equipped jeeps as mobile snack bars, handing out refreshments to the crews at their aircraft while it was being unloaded. Gail Halvorsen later noted, "he put some beautiful German Fräuleins in that snack bar. They knew we couldn't date them, we had no time. So they were very friendly."[47] Operations officers handed pilots their clearance slips and pertinent information while they snacked. With unloading begun as soon as engines were shut down on the ramp, turnaround before takeoff back to Rhein-Main or Wiesbaden was reduced to thirty minutes.[60]
To maximize utilization of a limited number of aircraft, Tunner altered the "ladder" to three minutes and 500 feet of separation, stacked from 4,000 to 6,000 feet.[52] Maintenance, particularly adherence to 25-hour, 200-hour, and 1000-hour inspections, became the highest priority and further maximized utilization.[61] Tunner also shortened block times to six hours to squeeze in another shift, making 1440 (the number of minutes in a day) landings in Berlin a daily goal.[62] His purpose, illustrating his basic philosophy of the airlift business, was to create a "conveyor belt" approach to scheduling that could be sped up or slowed down as situations might dictate. However, the single most effective measure taken by Tunner, and the most initially resisted until it demonstrated its efficiency, was creation of a single control point in the CALTF for controlling all air movements into Berlin, rather than each air force doing its own.
The Berliners themselves solved the other problem, the lack of manpower. Crews unloading and making airfield repairs at the Berlin airports were replaced almost entirely by local people, who were given additional rations in return. As the crews improved, the times for unloading continued to fall, with a record being set by the unloading of an entire 10-ton shipment of coal from a C-54 in ten minutes, later beaten when a twelve-man crew unloaded the same quantity in five minutes and 45 seconds.
By the end of August, after only one month, the Airlift was succeeding; daily operations flew more than 1,500 flights a day and delivered more than 4,500 tons of cargo, enough to keep West Berlin supplied. All of the C-47s were withdrawn by the end of September, and eventually 225 C-54s (40% of USAF and USN Skymasters worldwide)[57] were devoted to the lift. Supplies improved to 5,000 tons a day.
US Air Force pilot
Gail Halvorsen, who pioneered the idea of dropping candy bars and bubble gum with handmade miniature parachutes, which later became known as "Operation Little Vittles".
Gail Halvorsen, one of the many Airlift pilots, decided to use his off time to fly into Berlin and make movies with his hand-held camera. He arrived at Tempelhof on 17 July on one of the C-54s and walked over to a crowd of children who had gathered at the end of the runway to watch the aircraft. He introduced himself and they started to ask him questions about the aircraft and their flights. As a goodwill gesture, he handed out his only two sticks of Wrigley's Doublemint Gum, and promised that, if they did not fight over them, the next time he returned he would drop off more. The children quickly divided up the pieces as best they could. Before he left them, a child asked him how they would know it was him flying over, and he replied, "I'll wiggle my wings."[46]
The next day, on his approach to Berlin, he rocked the aircraft and dropped some chocolate bars attached to a handkerchief parachute to the children waiting below. Every day after that the number of children increased and he made several more drops. Soon there was a stack of mail in Base Ops addressed to "Uncle Wiggly Wings", "The Chocolate Uncle" and "The Chocolate Flier". His commanding officer was upset when the story appeared in the news, but when Tunner heard about it he approved of the gesture and immediately expanded it into "Operation Little Vittles". Other pilots participated, and when news reached the US, children all over the country sent in their own candy to help out. Soon, the major manufacturers joined in. In the end, over three tons of candy were dropped on Berlin,[46] and the "operation" became a major propaganda success. The candy-dropping aircraft were christened "raisin bombers" by the German children.[63]
As the tempo of the Airlift grew, it became apparent that the Western powers might be able to pull off the impossible: indefinitely supplying an entire city by air alone. In response, starting on 1 August, the Soviets offered free food to anyone who crossed into East Berlin and registered their ration cards there, but West Berliners overwhelmingly rejected Soviet offers of food.[64]
Throughout the airlift, Soviet and German communists subjected the hard-pressed West Berliners to sustained psychological warfare.[64] In radio broadcasts, they relentlessly proclaimed that all Berlin came under Soviet authority and predicted the imminent abandonment of the city by the Western occupying powers.[64] The Soviets also harassed members of the democratically elected city-wide administration, which had to conduct its business in the city hall located in the Soviet sector.[64]
During the early months of the airlift, the Soviets used various methods to harass allied aircraft. These included buzzing by Soviet planes, obstructive parachute jumps within the corridors, and shining searchlights to dazzle pilots at night. Although the USAFE reported 733 separate harassing events, including flak, air-to-air fire, rocketing, bombing, and explosions, this is now considered to be exaggerated. None of these measures were effective.[65][66]
In the autumn of 1948 it became impossible for the non-Communist majority in Greater Berlin's city-wide parliament (Stadtverordnetenversammlung von Groß-Berlin) elected – as provided by the provisional constitution of Berlin – two years earlier (20 October 1946) to attend sessions, as usual, within the Soviet sector.[64] As SED-controlled policemen looked on passively, Communist-led mobs repeatedly invaded the city hall, then the Neues Stadthaus, the provisional city hall, on Parochialstraße since all other central municipal buildings had been destroyed in the War, interrupted the parliament's sessions, and physically menaced its non-Communist members.[64] The Kremlin organized an attempted putsch for control of all of Berlin through a 6 September takeover of the city hall by SED members.[67]
Three days later RIAS Radio urged Berliners to protest against the actions of the communists. On 9 September 1948 a crowd of 500,000 people gathered at the Brandenburg Gate, next to the ruined Reichstag in the British sector. The Airlift was working so far, but many West Berliners feared that the Allies would eventually abandon them to the Soviets. They needed reassurance that their sacrifices would not be for nothing. Then SPD city councillor Ernst Reuter took the microphone and pleaded for his city, "You peoples of the world, you people of America, of England, of France, look on this city, and recognize that this city, this people, must not be abandoned — cannot be abandoned!" The crowd surged towards the eastern sector and someone ripped down the Red Flag from the Brandenburg Gate. Soviet military police responded, killing one.[47] The situation could have escalated further, but a British deputy provost intervened and pointedly pushed the Soviet police back with his swagger stick.[68] Never before had so many Berliners gathered. The resonance worldwide was enormous, notably in the United States, where a strong feeling of solidarity with Berliners reinforced a determination not to abandon them.[67]
Berlin's parliament decided to meet instead in the canteen of the Technical College of Berlin-Charlottenburg in the British sector, boycotted by the members of SED, which had gained 19.8% of the electoral votes in 1946. On 30 November 1948 the SED gathered its elected parliament members and 1,100 further activists and held an unconstitutional so-called extraordinary city assembly (außerordentliche Stadtverordnetenversammlung) in East Berlin's Metropol-Theater which declared the elected city government (Magistrat) and its democratic members (city councillors) to be deposed and replaced it with a new one led by Oberbürgermeister (lord mayor) Friedrich Ebert junior and consisting of communists only.[67] This arbitrary act had no legal effect in West Berlin, but the Soviet occupants inhibited the elected city government for all of Berlin to further act in the eastern sector.
The city parliament, boycotted by its SED members, then voted for its re-election on 5 December 1948, however, inhibited in the eastern sector and defamed by the SED as Spalterwahl (about: divisive election). The SED did not nominate any candidates for this election and appealed to the electorate in the western sectors to boycott the election, while the democratic parties ran for seats. The turnout amounted to 86.3% of the western electorate with the SPD gaining 64.5% of the votes (= 76 seats), the CDU 19.4% (= 26 seats), and the Liberal-Demokratische Partei (LDP, merged in the FDP in 1949) 16.1% (= 17 seats).[64] On 7 December the new, de facto only West Berlin city parliament elected a new city government in West Berlin headed by Lord Mayor Reuter, who had already once been elected lord mayor in early 1946 but prevented from taking office by a Soviet veto.[67] Thus two separate city governments officiated in the city divided into East and West versions of its former self. In the east, a communist system supervised by house, street, and block wardens was quickly implemented.
West Berlin's parliament accounted for the de facto political partition of Berlin and replaced the provisional constitution of Berlin by the Verfassung von Berlin (constitution of Berlin), meant for all Berlin, with effect of 1 October 1950 and de facto restricted to the western sectors only, also renaming city parliament (from Stadtverordnetenversammlung von Groß-Berlin to Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin), city government (from Magistrat von Groß-Berlin to Senate of Berlin), and head of government (from Oberbürgermeister to Governing Mayor of Berlin).[69]
Although the early estimates were that about 4,000 to 5,000 tons would be needed to supply the city, this was made in the context of summer weather, when the Airlift was only expected to last a few weeks. As the operation dragged on into the fall, the situation changed considerably. The food requirements would remain the same (around 1,500 tons), but the need for additional coal to heat the city dramatically increased the total amount of cargo to be transported by an additional 6,000 tons a day.
To maintain the Airlift under these conditions, the current system would have to be greatly expanded. Aircraft were available, and the British started adding their larger Handley Page Hastings in November, but maintaining the fleet proved to be a serious problem. Tunner looked to the Germans once again, hiring (plentiful) ex-Luftwaffe ground crews.
Another problem was the lack of runways in Berlin to land on: two at Tempelhof and one at Gatow — neither of which was designed to support the loads the C-54s were putting on them. All of the existing runways required hundreds of laborers, who ran onto them between landings and dumped sand into the runway's Marsden Matting (pierced steel planking) to soften the surface and help the planking survive. Since this system could not endure through the winter, between July and September 1948 a 6,000 ft.-long asphalt runway was constructed at Tempelhof. Far from ideal, with the approach being over Berlin's apartment blocks, the runway was, nevertheless, a major upgrade to the airport's capabilities. With it in place, the auxiliary runway was upgraded from Marsden Matting to asphalt between September and October 1948. A similar upgrade program was carried out by the British at Gatow during the same period, also adding a second runway, using concrete.
The French Air Force, meanwhile, had become involved in the First Indochina War, so it could only bring up some old Junkers Ju 52s to support its own troops. However, France agreed to build a complete, new and larger, airport in its sector, on the shores of Lake Tegel. French military engineers, managing German construction crews, were able to complete the construction in under 90 days. The airport was mostly built by hand, by thousands of female laborers, who worked day and night.
Heavy equipment was needed to level the ground, equipment that was too large and heavy to fly in on any existing cargo aircraft. A solution was found by a Brazilian engineer, H.B. Lacombe, who had perfected the technique of dismantling large machines for transport, and then re-assembling them. (The same technique had been used by Americans involved in flying "over the Hump" from India to China in 1944.) He was flown in to advise the effort and, using the five largest American C-82 Packet transports, it was possible to fly the machinery into West Berlin. This not only helped to build the airfield, but also demonstrated that the Soviet blockade could not keep anything out of Berlin.
There was an obstacle in the approach to the Tegel airfield, however. A Soviet-controlled radio tower caused problems by its proximity to the airfield. Pleas to remove it went unheard, so on 20 November 1948, French General Jean Ganeval made the decision simply to blow it up. The mission was carried out on 16 December, much to the delight of Berliners, and provoking complaints from the Soviets. When his Soviet counterpart, General Alexej Kotikow, asked him angrily on the phone how he could have done this, Ganeval is said to have answered him laconically, "With dynamite, my dear colleague." The Tegel airfield later evolved into Berlin-Tegel Airport.
To improve air traffic control, which would be critical as the number of flights grew, the newly developed Ground Controlled Approach radar system (GCA) was flown to Europe for installation at Tempelhof, with a second set installed at Fassberg in the British Zone in West Germany. With the installation of GCA, all-weather airlift operations were assured.
None of these efforts could fix the weather, though, which would be the biggest problem. November and December 1948 proved to be the worst months of the airlift operation. One of the longest-lasting fogs ever experienced there blanketed the entire European continent for weeks. All too often, aircraft would make the entire flight and then be unable to land in Berlin. On 20 November, 42 aircraft departed for Berlin, but only one landed there. At one point, the city had only a week's supply of coal left.
The weather improved, however. More than 171,000 tons were delivered in January 1949, 152,000 tons in February, and 196,223 tons in March.[54]
By April 1949 airlift operations were running smoothly and Tunner wanted to break the monotony. He liked the idea of a big event that would give everyone a morale boost. He decided that on Easter Sunday the airlift would break all records. To do this, maximum efficiency was needed. To simplify handling, the only cargo would be coal, and stockpiles were built up for the effort. Maintenance schedules were altered so that the maximum number of aircraft was available.
From noon on 15 April to noon on 16 April 1949, crews worked around the clock. When it was over, 12,941 tons of coal had been delivered in 1,383 flights, without a single accident. A welcome side effect of the effort was that operations in general were boosted, and tonnage increased from 6,729 tons to 8,893 tons per day thereafter. In total, the airlift delivered 234,476 tons in April.[54]
On 21 April the tonnage of supplies flown into the city exceeded that previously brought by rail. The Berlin Airlift had finally succeeded, and appeared able to operate indefinitely.
Berlin Airlift Monument in Berlin-Tempelhof, displaying the names of the 39 British and 31 American airmen who lost their lives during the operation. Similar monuments can be found at the military airfield of Wietzenbruch near the former
RAF Celle and at
Rhein-Main Air Base.
Berlin Airlift Monument in Berlin-Tempelhof with inscription "
They gave their lives for the freedom of Berlin in service of the Berlin Airlift 1948/49".
The continued success of the Airlift humiliated the Soviets, and the "Easter Parade" of 1949 was the last straw. On 15 April 1949 the Russian news agency TASS reported a willingness by the Soviets to lift the blockade. The next day the US State Department stated the "way appears clear" for the blockade to end. Soon afterwards, the four powers began serious negotiations, and a settlement was reached, on Western terms. On 4 May 1949 the Allies announced an agreement to end the blockade in eight days' time.
The Soviet blockade of Berlin was lifted at one minute after midnight on 12 May 1949.[7] A British convoy immediately drove through to Berlin, and the first train from West Germany reached Berlin at 5:32 A.M. Later that day an enormous crowd celebrated the end of the blockade. General Clay, whose retirement had been announced by U.S. President Truman on 3 May, was saluted by 11,000 US soldiers and dozens of aircraft. Once home, Clay received a ticker-tape parade in New York City, was invited to address the US Congress, and was honored with a medal from President Truman.
Nevertheless, flights continued for some time, in order to build up a comfortable surplus, though night flying and then weekend flights could be eliminated once the surplus was large enough. By 24 July 1949 three months' worth of supplies had been amassed, ensuring that there was ample time to re-start the Airlift if needed. The Berlin Airlift officially ended on 30 September 1949, after fifteen months. In total the USA delivered 1,783,573 tons and the RAF 541,937 tons, totaling 2,326,406 tons, nearly two-thirds of which was coal, on 278,228 flights to Berlin.[70] The RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) delivered 7,968 tonnes of freight and 6,964 passengers during 2,062 sorties. The C-47s and C-54s together flew over 92 million miles in the process, almost the distance from Earth to the Sun.[70] At the height of the Airlift, one plane reached West Berlin every thirty seconds.[7]
A total of 101 fatalities were recorded as a result of the operation, including 40 Britons and 31 Americans,[7] mostly due to crashes. Seventeen American and eight British aircraft crashed during the operation.
The cost of the Airlift was approximately US$224 million[71] (equivalent to approximately $2.19 billion now[72]).
Operational control of the three Allied air corridors was assigned to BARTCC (Berlin Air Route Traffic Control Center) air traffic control located at Tempelhof. Diplomatic approval was granted by a four-power organization called the Berlin Air Safety Center, also located in the American sector.
Tegel was developed into West Berlin's principal airport. In 2007 it was joined by a re-developed Berlin-Schönefeld International Airport in Brandenburg. As a result of the development of these two airports, Tempelhof was closed in October 2008,[73] while Gatow is now home of the Museum of the German Luftwaffe and a housing development. During the 1970s and 1980s Schönefeld had its own crossing points through the Berlin Wall and communist fortifications for western citizens.
The Soviets' contravention by the blockade of the agreement reached by the London 6-Power Conference, and the Czechoslovak coup d'état of 1948, convinced Western leaders that they must take swift and decisive measures to strengthen the portions of Germany not occupied by the Soviets.[7] The Blockade also helped to overcome any remaining differences between the French, British and Americans regarding West Germany, leading to a merger of all three countries' occupation zones into "trizonia".[74]
These countries also agreed to replace their military administrations in those zones with High Commissioners operating within the terms of a three-power occupation statute.[74] The Blockade also helped to unify German politicians in these zones in support of the creation of a West German state; some of them had hitherto been fearful of Soviet opposition.[74] The blockade also increased the perception among many Europeans that the Soviets posed a danger, helping to prompt the entry into NATO of Portugal, Iceland, Italy, Denmark, Norway, and the Benelux countries.[75]
Animosities between Germans and the western Allies, Britain, France and the United States, were greatly reduced by the airlift, with the former enemies recognizing common interests, shared values and mutual respect.[76] The Soviets refused to return to the Allied Control Council in Berlin, rendering useless the four-power occupation authority set up at the Potsdam conference.[7] It has been argued that the events of the Berlin Blockade are proof that the Allies conducted their affairs within a rational framework, since they were keen to avoid war.[77]
A British Short Sunderland flying boat
A British Avro York transport aircraft
In the early days the Americans used their C-47 Skytrain or its civilian counterpart Douglas DC-3. These machines could carry a payload of up to 3.5 tons, but were replaced by C-54 Skymasters and Douglas DC-4s, which could carry up to 10 tons and were faster. These made up a total of 330 aircraft, which made them the most used types. Other American aircraft such as the 5 C-82 Packets, and the one YC-97A Stratofreighter 45-9595, with a payload of 20 tons;— a gigantic load for that time;— were only sparsely used.
The British used a considerable variety of aircraft types. Many aircraft were either former bombers or civil versions of bombers. In the absence of enough transports, the British chartered many civilian aircraft. British European Airways (BEA) co-ordinated all British civil aircraft operations. Apart from BEA itself, the participating airlines included British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) and most British independent[nb 1] airlines of that era — e.g. Eagle Aviation,[78] Silver City Airways, British South American Airways (BSAA), the Lancashire Aircraft Corporation, Airwork, Air Flight, Aquila Airways, Flight Refuelling Ltd (which used their Lancaster tankers to deliver aviation fuel), Skyways, Scottish Airlines and Ciro's Aviation. Altogether, BEA was responsible to the RAF for the direction and operation of 25 British airlines taking part in "Operation Plainfare".[79] The British also used flying boats, particularly for transporting corrosive salt. These included civilian aircraft operated by Aquila Airways.[80] These took off and landed on water and were designed to be corrosion-resistant. In winter, when ice covered the Berlin rivers and made the use of flying boats difficult, the British used other aircraft in their place.
Altogether, a total of 692 aircraft were engaged in the Berlin Airlift, more than 100 of which belonged to civilian operators.[81]
- Notes
- Citations
- ^ Journey Across Berlin (1961). Universal Newsreel. 1957. http://www.archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.49495. Retrieved February 22, 2012.
- ^ Air Force Story, The -- Cold War, 1948-1950 (1953). Universal Newsreel. 1953. http://www.archive.org/details/gov.dod.dimoc.26164. Retrieved February 22, 2012.
- ^ a b c Nash, Gary B. "The Next Steps: The Marshall Plan, NATO, and NSC-68." The American People: Creating a Nation and a Society. New York: Pearson Longman, 2008. 828. Print.
- ^ "5 - National Security" (pdf). South Africa: a country study. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 1997. ISBN 0-8444-0796-8. http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/South%20Africa%20Study_4.pdf.
- ^ a b c d Miller 2000, p. 4
- ^ Miller 2000, p. 5
- ^ a b c d e f Turner 1987, p. 27
- ^ Wettig 2008, pp. 96–100
- ^ a b Miller 2000, p. 11
- ^ Miller 2000, p. 12
- ^ a b c d e Miller 2000, p. 13
- ^ a b c d Miller 2000, p. 6
- ^ a b Miller 2000, p. 7
- ^ Larson (2011)
- ^ Airbridge to Berlin, "Background on Conflict" chapter
- ^ a b Beschloss 2003, p. 277
- ^ Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany; April 1945
- ^ a b c d e f Miller 2000, p. 16
- ^ Marshall, George C, The Marshal Plan Speech, 5 June 1947
- ^ Miller 2000, p. 10
- ^ Why Stalin Rejected Marshall Aid
- ^ a b Airbridge to Berlin, "Eye of the Storm" chapter
- ^ a b c Miller 2000, p. 19
- ^ a b Miller 2000, p. 18
- ^ a b Turner 1987, p. 23
- ^ a b c d Miller 2000, p. 20
- ^ a b Miller 2000, p. 26
- ^ Delbert Clarks. " Clay Halts Trains." The New York Times 1948 2: pg. 1.
- ^ "Accident Details". PlaneCrashInfo.com. http://www.planecrashinfo.com/1948/1948-25.htm. Retrieved 2006 December.
- ^ "Accident". http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19480405-0&lang=en. Retrieved 2006 December.
- ^ Delbert Clarks. "Soviet-British Plane Collision Kills 15; Russian Apologizes." The New York Times 1948 6: pg. 1.
- ^ Miller 2000, p. 23
- ^ Miller 2000, p. 27
- ^ a b c d e f Miller 2000, p. 31
- ^ a b c Turner 1987, p. 24
- ^ Stent 2000, p. x
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Miller 2000, p. 32
- ^ Wettig 2008, p. 168
- ^ Miller 2000, p. 28
- ^ a b Miller 2000, p. 33
- ^ a b Young, Ken (January 2007). "US 'Atomic Capability' and the British Forward Bases in the Early Cold War". Journal of Contemporary History 42 (1): 117–136. JSTOR . 30036432 ..
- ^ Miller 2000, p. 30
- ^ Miller 2000, p. 29
- ^ a b c d e Airbridge to Berlin, Chapter 11
- ^ Miller 2000, p. 35
- ^ a b c d e spiritoffreedom.org: The Berlin Airlift
- ^ a b c pbs.org: The Berlin Airlift
- ^ Miller 2000, p. 58. Miller acknowledges that most histories credit Smith with coining the term by dramatically stating: "Hell's Fire! We're hauling grub. Call it Operation Vittles!" However, he states that the origin is "probably more prosaic" and due to Col. William O. Large, Jr., an duty officer in the Operations Division of Headquarters USAF in the Pentagon. At the time a codename was needed to coordinate activities. Large suggested "Vittles" because of its probable unfamiliarity to the Soviets.
- ^ Miller 2000, p. 65. The original code name was "Carter Paterson", a noted British hauling (U.S.="moving") firm. A caustic Soviet jest caused the change to "Plainfare", a deliberate pun on "plane fare" (airplane/food), on 19 July.
- ^ Dr Chris Clark (March 2008). "Operation Pelican: The Australian Air Force in the Berlin Airlift". http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/Publications/Details/226/Operation-Pelican-The-Australian-Air-Force-in-the-Berlin-Airlift-with-companion-CDROM.aspx. Retrieved 14 February 2010.
- ^ a b Miller 2000, p. 90
- ^ a b Miller 2000, pp. 116–117
- ^ MAC and the Legacy of the Berlin Airlift
- ^ a b c Fifty years ago, a massive airlift into Berlin showed the Soviets that a post-WW II blockade would not work, C.V. Glines
- ^ Tunner 1964, p. 160
- ^ Miller 2000, p. 87
- ^ a b Miller 2000, p. 93
- ^ Miller 1998, pp. 62–64
- ^ Tunner 1964, p. 155
- ^ Tunner 1964, p. 164
- ^ Tunner 1964, p. 169
- ^ It is interesting to contrast this with Military Airlift Command's hot-war requirements of only 1,600 sorties a day for all of Europe. See "The Cognitive Dynamics of Computer Science", John Wiley and Sons, 2006, pg. 213
- ^ Smoler, Fredric (April/May 2003). "Where Berlin and America Meet" American Heritage. Retrieved 7-29-2010.
- ^ a b c d e f g Turner 1987, p. 29
- ^ Cherny 2008, pp. 129–130
- ^ Canwell 2008, p. 200
- ^ a b c d Wettig 2008, p. 173
- ^ MacDonogh, G "After the Reich" John Murray London 2007 pg 533
- ^ Cf. articles 25 and 40 of Die Verfassung von Berlin (Constitution of Berlin [West]), Berlin (West): Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit Berlin, 1982, pp. 34 and 37.
- ^ a b Berlin Airlift: Logistics, Humanitarian Aid, and Strategic Success, Major Gregory C. Tine, Army Logistician
- ^ "The Berlin Airlift – Die Luftbrücke 1948–49". http://www.german-way.com/airlift.html. Retrieved 24 June 2008.
- ^ Staff. Consumer Price Index (estimate) 1800–2012. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Retrieved February 22, 2012.
- ^ Hebel, Christina (30 October 2008). "An Era Ends with Closing of Berlin Airport". De Speigel (Speigel Online). http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,587535,00.html. Retrieved 31 October 2008.
- ^ a b c Turner 1987, p. 28
- ^ Wettig 2008, p. 174
- ^ Turner 1987, p. 30
- ^ Lewkowicz 2008[page needed]
- ^ "The Home Of Eagle" ... – Berlin Airlift commemorative stamp depicting Handley Page 61 Halifax 8 G-ALEF Red Eagle (c/n 1399)
- ^ One-Eleven 500 into service ..., Flight International, 7 November 1968, p. 742
- ^ Eglin & Ritchie 1980, pp. 14–19
- ^ Eglin & Ritchie 1980, p. 17
- Durie, W. (2012). The British Garrison Berlin 1945-1994 "No where to go" Berlin: Vergangenheits/Berlin. ISBN 978-3-86408-068-5.
- Beschloss, Michael R (2003), The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941–1945, Simon and Schuster, ISBN 0-7432-6085-6
- Canwell, Diane (2008), Berlin Airlift, the, Gretna: Pelican Publishing, ISBN 978-1-58980-550-7
- Cherny, Andrei (2008), The Candy Bombers: The Untold Story of the Berlin Airlift and America's Finest Hour, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, ISBN 978-0-399-15496-6
- De Vos, Luc; Rooms, Etienne (2006) (in Dutch), Het Belgisch buitenlands beleid: Geschiedenis en actoren, Acco, ISBN 90-334-5973-6
- Eglin, Roger; Ritchie, Berry (1980), Fly me, I'm Freddie, London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, ISBN 0-297-77746-7
- Giangreco, D. M.; Griffin, Robert E. (1988), Airbridge to Berlin : The Berlin Crisis of 1948, Its Origins and Aftermath, Presidio Press, ISBN 0-89141-329-4, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/BERLIN_A/INDEX.HTM
- Larson, Deborah Welch. "The Origins of Commitment: Truman and West Berlin," Journal of Cold War Studies, 13#1 Winter 2011, pp. 180–212
- Launius, Roger D.; Cross, Coy F. (1989), MAC and the Legacy of the Berlin Airlift, Scott Air Force Base IL: Office of History, Military Airlift Command,, OCLC 21306003
- Lewkowicz, N (2008), The German Question and the Origins of the Cold War, Milan: IPOC, ISBN 978-88-95145-27-3
- Miller, Roger Gene (1998) (pdf), To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949, US Government printing office, 1998-433-155/92107, http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/To_Save_a_City.pdf
- Miller, Roger Gene (2000), To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949, Texas A&M University Press, ISBN 0-89096-967-1
- Nash, Gary B.; Jeffrey, Julie Roy; Howe, John R.; Frederick, Peter J. (2007), The American People Creating a Nation and a Society (6th ed.), New York: Longman, ISBN 978-0-205-56843-7
- Stent, Angela (2000), Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe, Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0-691-05040-9
- Tunner, LTG (USAF) WIlliam H. (1964, 1998), Over the Hump, Duell, Sloan and Pearce (USAF History and Museums Program)
- Turner, Henry Ashby (1987), The Two Germanies Since 1945: East and West, Yale University Press, ISBN 0-300-03865-8
- Wettig, Gerhard (2008), Stalin and the Cold War in Europe, Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0-7425-5542-9
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