Religious language refers to the language used to describe a deity. The study of religious language considers how God can be described meaningfully if he is incorporeal (lacking substance), infinite, and timeless. These are traditional conceptions of God and make it difficult to describe him properly and still talk meaningfully. The study of religious language is the study of any propositions or claims made about religion or a deity, with reference to their meaning. Discussion of religious language considers how God can be described, if traditional conceptions of God (as incorporeal, infinite, and timeless) that could render God indescribable are accepted.
Traditionally, religious language has been explained as via negativa, analogy, symbolism, or myth each of which describe a way of talking about God in human terms. The via negativa is a way of referring to God in the negative; it suggests that God cannot be understood in human terms so should be described according to what he is not. Analogy uses human qualities as a way of describing godly qualities; its proponents have argued that human characteristics such as love resemble the divine equivalent, but are slightly different. Symbolism is used to describe otherwise ineffable (or indescribable) experiences which should not be interpreted literally. A religious symbol points towards something divine but also holds divine meaning within itself. More recently, some philosophers have interpreted many parts of the Bible as mythological; theologian Rudolf Bultmann proposed that much of the Bible could be demythologised to reveal existential truths behind the stories. Alternative explanations of religious language have been offered, including political, performative, and imperative interpretations. A political interpretation considers the political goals of religious language; a performative approach covers the use of language in ceremonies, or to perform certain tasks by speaking; an imperative approach sees the key function of religious language as promoting people to act in a certain way.
The meaning of religious language was challenged by the logical positivist movement, particularly the philosopher A. J. Ayer. They proposed the verification theory of meaning which suggests that, for a statement to be meaningful, it must be possible to verify it with empirical, or scientific, evidence. The logical positivists argued that religious language cannot be empirically verified and so must be meaningless. Ludwig Wittgenstein has been cast as a logical positivist by some philosophers because he made a distinction between what can and cannot be spoken about; others have argued that Wittgenstein still gave great importance to the mystical. Antony Flew proposed a similar challenge based on his own falsification principle. He argued that, for a statement to be meaningful, there must in theory be a way to demonstrate it to be false and proposed that religious statements are qualified and modified by theists so much that they become meaningless.
The analogy of games – most commonly associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein – has been proposed as a way of establishing meaning in religious language. The language game theory asserts that language must be understood in terms of a game: just as each game has its own rules determining what can and cannot be done, so each context of language has its own rules determining what is and is not meaningful. Religious is classified as a possible and legitimate language game. The theory has been criticised by Peter Donovan, who argues that religious language makes universal statements, not just statements within the context of religion. Dewi Zephaniah Phillips has defended Wittgensteins theory, arguing that religious does not make empirical statements so cannot be criticised empircally. Various parables have also been proposed to solve the problem of meaning in religious language. R. M. Hare used the parable of a madman to introduce the concept of "bliks": unfalsifiable beliefs held by everyone, according to which a worldview is established which are not necessarily meaningless. Basil Mitchell used a parable to show that faith can be logical, even if it seems unverifiable. John Hick used his parable of the Celestial City to propose his theory of eschatological verification, the view that religious statements will be verifiable after death, if there is an afterlife.
Religious language is discussed because of the difficulties in accurately describing God. God is generally conceived to be incorporeal, infinite, and timeless, which means that ordinary language cannot always apply to God.[1] This causes problems for religious belief, since being able to describe and talk about God is important in religious life.[2] The French philosopher Simone Weil expressed this problem in her work Waiting for God, where she outlined her dilemma: she was simultaneously certain of God's love and conscious that she could not adequately describe him.[3]
The medieval doctrine of divine simplicity also poses problems for religious language. This suggests that God has no accidental properties - these are properties that a being can have, but that do not contribute to their essence. If God has no accidental properties, he cannot have traditional properties, such as goodness, because they are accidental. If divine simplicity is accepted, then to describe God as good would entail that goodness and God have the same definition.[1] Such limits can also be problematic to religious believers; for example, the Bible regularly ascribes different emotions to God, which would be implausible according to the doctrine of divine simplicity.[4]
The theologian Sallie McFague believes that the more recent problem of religious language is based on individual experience, owing to the increased secularisation of society. She notes that human experience is of this world, rather than regular encounters with the divine, making the experience of God uncommon and potentially unnecessary. Because of this, she argues, religious language is both idolatrous, because it fails to express sufficient awe at God, and irrelevant, because without adequate words, it becomes meaningless.[5]
18th-century depiction of Maimonides, who developed the
via negativa
The via negativa, or apophatic way, is a way of understanding religious language in terms of negation. It suggests that God cannot be known in human terms, and so describes God according to what he is not. For example, God may be described as incorporeal or ineffable (without substance and indescribable).[6] Scholastic theologian Thomas Aquinas proposed the use of the via negativa as a negative path to God. Aquinas believed that knowledge of God is beyond anything that can be conceived and so argued that the best way to describe God is by speaking negatively. He accepted that using the negative leaves a certain confusion, but maintained that this confusion was the closest to God's mystery that one could get.[7]
Jewish philosopher Maimonides believed that God can only be ascribed negative attributes, a view based on two fundamental Jewish beliefs: that the existence of God must be accepted, and that it is forbidden to describe God.[8] Maimonides believed that God is simple and so cannot be ascribed any essential attributes.[9] He therefore argued that statements about God must be taken negatively, for example, "God lives" should be taken as "God does not lack vitality".[10] Maimonides did not believe that God holds all of his attributes perfectly and without impairment; rather, he proposed that God lies outside of such measures. To say that God is powerful, for example, would mean that God's power is beyond worldly power, and incomparable with any other power. In doing so, Maimonides attempted to illustrate God's indescribable nature and draw attention to the linguistic limits of describing God.[11]
Thomas Aquinas argued that statements about God are analogous to human experience.[1] An analogous term is partly univocal (only one meaning) and partly equivocal (more than one potential meaning) because an analogy is in some ways the same and in some ways different from the subject.[12] He proposed that godly qualities that resemble human qualities are described analogously, with reference to human terms; for example, when God is described as good, it does not mean that God is good in human terms, but that human goodness is used as a reference to describe God's goodness.[1]
Philosopher Taede Smedes argued that religious language is symbolic.[13] Denying any conflict between science and religion, he proposed that 'to believe' means to accept a conviction (that God exists, in the context of Christianity), which is different from 'knowing', which only occurs once something is proven. Thus, according to Smedes, we believe things that we do not know for sure.[14] Smedes argued that, rather than being part of the world, God is so far beyond the world that there can be no common standard to which both God and the world can be compared.[15] He argued that people can still believe in God, even though he cannot be compared to anything in the world, because belief in God is just an alternative way of viewing that world (he likens this to two people viewing a painting differently).[16] Smedes claimed that there should be no reason to look for a meaning behind our metaphors and symbols of God, as the metaphors are all we have of God. He suggested that we can only talk of God pro nobis (for us) and not in se (as such) or sine nobis (without us). The point, he argues, is not that our concept of God should correspond with reality, but that we can only conceive of God through metaphors.[13]
In the twentieth century, Ian Ramsey developed the theory of analogy, a development later cited in numerous works by Alister McGrath. He argued that various models of God are provided in religious writings that interact with each other: a range of analogies for salvation and the nature of God. Ramsey proposed that the models used modify and qualify each other, defining the limits of other analogies. As a result, no one analogy on its own is sufficient, but the combination of every analogy presented in Scripture gives a full and consistent depiction of God.[17] The use of other analogies may then be used to determine if any one model of God is abused or improperly applied.[18]
Philosopher Paul Tillich argued that religious faith is best expressed through symbolism, because a symbol points to a meaning beyond itself and best expresses transcendent religious beliefs. He believed that any statement about God is symbolic and participates in the meaning of a concept.[19] Tillich used the example of a national flag to illustrate his point: a flag points to something beyond itself, the country it represents, but also participates in the meaning of the country. He believed that symbols could unite a religious believer with a deeper dimension of himself as well as with a greater reality.[20] Tillich believed that a symbol must emerge out of an individual collective unconsciousness and can only function when they are accepted by the unconscious. He believed that symbols cannot be invented, but live and die at the appropriate times.[21]
Louis Dupré differentiated between signs and symbols, proposing that a sign points to something while a symbol represents it. A symbol holds its own meaning: rather than merely pointing someone to another object, it takes the place of and represents that object. He believed that a symbol has some ambiguity which does not exist with a sign.[22] Dupré believed that a symbol may deserve respect because it contains what is signified within itself.[23] A symbol reveals a reality beyond what is already perceived and transforms how the current reality is perceived.[24] Dupré differentiated between religious and aesthetic symbols, suggesting that a religious symbol points towards something which "remains forever beyond our reach". He proposed that a religious symbol does not reveal the nature of what it signifies, but conceals it.[25]
Langdon Brown Gilkey explained religious language and experience in terms of symbolism. He identified "three characteristic features" of religious symbolism which distinguish it from other language use. Firstly, religious symbolism has a double-focus, referring both to something empirical and to something transcendent; Gilkey argued that the empirical manifestation points towards the transcendent being. Secondly, he believed that religious symbolism concerns fundamental questions of life, involving important issues to an individual or community. Finally, he argued that religious symbols provide standards by which life should be lived.[26]
In the Sikh religious text, the Guru Granth Sahib, religious language is used symbolically and metaphorically. In the text, Sikh Gurus repeat that the experiences they have while meditating are ineffable, incognizable, incomprehensible, and transensuous - this means that there is no object of their experience that can be conceptualised.[27] To overcome this, the Sikh Gurus used symbolic and metaphorical language, assuming that there is a resemblance between the sabad (the mystical experience of the divine) and those experiencing it. For example, light is used to refer to the spiritual reality.[28]
William Paden argued that religious language uses myth to present truths through stories. He argued that, to those who practice a religion, myths are not mere fiction, but provide religious truths. Paden believed that a myth must explain something in the world with reference to a sacred being or force; he dismissed any myths which did not as "folktales".[29] Using the example of creation myths, he differentiated myths from scientific hypotheses, the latter of which can be scientifically verified and do not reveal a greater truth; a myth cannot be analysed in the same way as a scientific theory.[29]
Lutheran theologian Rudolf Bultmann proposed that the Bible contains existential content which is expressed through mythology; Bultmann sought to find the existential truths behind the veil of mythology, a task known as 'demythologising'.[30] Bultmann distinguished between informative language and language with 'personal import', the latter of which commands obedience. He believed that God interacts with humans as the divine Word, perceiving a linguistic character inherent in God, which seeks to provide humans with self-understanding.[31] Bultmann believed that the cultural embeddedness of the Bible could be overcome by demythologising the Bible, a process which he believed would allow readers to better encounter the word of God.[32]
Christian philosopher John Hick believed that the language of the Bible should be demythologised to be compatible with naturalism. He offered a demythologised Christology, arguing that Jesus was not God incarnate, but a man with incredible experience of divine reality. To Hick, calling Jesus the Son of God was a metaphor used by Jesus' followers to describe their commitment to what Jesus represented.[33] Hick believed that demythologising the incarnation would make make sense of the variety of world religions and give them equal validity in ways to encounter God.[34]
Islamic philosopher Carl Ernst has argued that religious language is often political, especially in the public sphere. He argues that its purpose is to persuade people and establish authority, as well as convey information. He explains the modern criticisms of the West made by some sections of Islam as an ideological reaction to colonialism which intentionally uses the same language used by colonialists.[35] Ernst argues that, when it is used rhetorically, religious language cannot be taken as face value because of its political implications.[36]
Peter Donovan has argued that most religious language is not about making truth-claims; instead, it is used to achieve certain goals.[37] He notes that language can be used in alternative ways beyond making statements of fact, such as expressing feelings or asking questions. Donovan calls many of these uses "performative", as they serve to perform a certain function within religious life. For example, the words "I promise" themselves perform the action of promising - Donovan argues that much of religious language fulfils this function.[38] Ludwig Wittgenstein also proposed that language could be performative and presented a list of the different uses of language. Wittgenstein argued that "the meaning of the language is in the use", taking the use of the action to be performative.[39] The philosopher J. L. Austin argued that religious language is not just cognitive but can perform social acts, including vowss, blessings, and the naming of children.[40] He distinguished performative statements as those that do not simply describe a state of affairs, but bring them about.[41] Historian of religion Benjamin Ray uses the performance of rituals within religions as evidence for a performative interpretation of language. He argues that the language of rituals can perform social tasks: when a priest announces that a spiritual event has occurred, those present believe it because of the spiritual authority of the priest. He believed that the meaning of a ritual is defined by the language used by the speaker, who is defined culturally as a superhuman agent.[42]
British philosopher R. B. Braithwaite attempted to approach religious language empirically and adopted Wittgenstein's idea of "meaning as use".[43] He likened religious statements to moral statements because they are both non-descriptive, yet still have a use and a meaning: he argued that they do not describe the world, but the believer's attitudes toward it. Braithwaite believed that the main difference between a religious and a moral statement was that religious statements are part of a linguistic system of stories, metaphors, and parables.[44]
Professor Nathan Katz writes of the analogy of a burning building, used by the Buddha in the Lotus Sutra, which casts religious language as imperative. In the analogy, a father sees his children at the top of a burning building. He persuades them to leave, but only by promising them toys if they leave. Katz argues that the message is not that the Buddha has been telling lies; rather, he believes that the Buddha was illustrating the imperative use of language. Katz believes that religious language is an imperative and an invitation, rather than a truth-claim.[45]
The logical positivism movement originated in the Vienna Circle and was continued by British philosopher A. J. Ayer. The Vienna Circle distinguished between analytic and synthetic statements. Analytic statements are those whose meaning is contained within the words themselves, such as definitions, tautologies or mathematical statements, while synthetic statements make a claim about reality.[46] To determine whether a synthetic statement is meaningful, the Vienna Circle developed a verifiability theory of meaning that proposed that, for a synthetic statement to have cognitive meaning, its truthfulness needs to be empirically verifiable.[47] Because claims about God cannot be empirically verified, the logical positivists argued that religious propositions are meaningless.[46]
In 1936, Ayer wrote Language, Truth and Logic, in which he claimed that religious language is meaningless.[48] He put forward a strong empirical position, arguing that all knowledge must either come from observations of the world or be necessarily true (such as mathematical statements).[49] In doing so, he rejected metaphysics, which considers the reality of a world beyond the natural world or science. Because it is based on metaphysics and is therefore unverifiable, Ayer denounced religious language, as well as statements about ethics or aesthetics, as meaningless.[50] Ayer challenged the meaningfulness of all statements about God – theistic, atheistic and agnostic – arguing that they are all equally meaningless, because they all discuss the existence of a metaphysical, unverifiable being.[46]
Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein finished his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus with the proposition that "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." Beverly and Brian Clack have suggested that, because of this, Wittgenstein was taken for a positivist by many of his disciples as he made a distinction between what can and cannot be spoken about. They argued that this interpretation is inaccurate because of Wittgenstein's consideration of the "mystical", which cannot be described, which he held as important.[51] Rather than dismissing the mystical as meaningless as the logical positivists did, Wittgenstein believed that, while the facts of the world remain the same, the perspective from which they are viewed will vary.[52]
As well as being attacked as unverifiable, religious language has been criticised for being unfalsifiable because there is no way for empirically proving it false. Antony Flew argued that a meaningful statement must simultaneously assert and deny a state of affairs; for example, the statement "God loves us" both asserts that God loves us and denies that God does not love us. Flew maintained that, if a religious believer could not say what circumstances would have to exist for their statements about God to be false, then they are unfalsifiable.[49]
Using John Wisdom's parable of the invisible gardener, Flew attempted to demonstrate that religious language is indeed unfalsifiable. The parable tells the story of two people who discover a garden on a deserted island; one believes it tended to by a gardener, the other believes that it formed naturally, without the existence of a gardener. The two watch out for the gardener but never find him; whereas the non-believer maintains that there is no gardener, the believer suggests that the gardener is invisible and cannot be detected.[53] Flew contended that, if this interpretation is accepted, there is nothing left of the original gardener proposed by the believer. He argued that, in a similar fashion, religious beliefs suffer a "death by a thousand qualifications" because religious beliefs are qualified and modified so much that they end up asserting nothing meaningful at all.[54] Flew applied his principles to religious claims such as God's love for humans, arguing that if they are meaningful assertions, they would deny a certain state of affairs. He argued that, when faced with evidence against the existence of God (such the terminal illness of a child), theists will qualify their claims to allow for such evidence (suggesting that God's love is different to human love, for example). Such qualifications, Flew argues, make the original proposition meaningless: he asks what God's love actually promises and what is guarantees against, proposing that God's qualified love becomes worthless.[55]
The analogy of a game was first proposed by Hans-Georg Gadamer in an attempt to demonstrate the epistemic unity of language. He suggested that language is like a game which everyone participates in and is played by a greater being.[56] Gadamer believed that language makes up the fundamental structure of reality and that human language participates in a greater language; Christianity teaches this to be the divine word which created the world and was incarnate in Jesus Christ.[57]
Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein proposed a 'calculus' theory of language, which maintained that all language should be analysable in a uniform way. Later in his life, he rejected this theory, instead proposing an alternative language game analogy.[58] He likened the differences in languages to the differences in games, arguing that, just as there are many different games, with different rules, so there are many different kinds of language.[59] Wittgenstein argued that languages have rules, such as grammar, which determine whether or not a proposition is meaningful. Thus, a proposition is meaningless outside of its language-game. He believed that the meaning of a proposition depends on the situation it is in and on the rules that are thus applied to it.[60] Wittgenstein presented a language game as a situation in which certain kinds of language are used. He provided some examples of language games: "Asking, thanking, greeting, cursing, praying".[61]
It is as if someone were to say: 'A game consists of moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules...' – and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others
More than the actuality of God's existence, Wittgenstein believed that religion was significant because it offered a certain way of life. He therefore believed that religious language is confessional – a confession of what someone feels and believes – rather than consisting of claims to truth. Wittgenstein believed that religious language is different from language used to describe physical objects: it occupies a different language game.[62]
Peter Donovan has argued that religious languages operates in a world containing other ideas and that many religious people believe that they make factual claims. He notes that many religious believers not only believe their religion to be meaningful and true in its own context, but claim that their religion is true against all other possible beliefs. If the language games analogy is accepted, such a comparison between beliefs is impossible.[63] Donovan proposed that the debates between different religions, and the apologetics of certain religions, demonstrates that religions interact with each other and the wider world and so cannot be treated as isolated language games.[64]
Dewi Zephaniah Phillips defended Wittgenstein's theory by arguing that religious language games, though autonomous, should not be viewed in isolation because they make statements about secular events, such as birth and death. Phillips argued that, owing to this connection, religious can still be criticised based on human experiences of these events. He maintained that religion cannot be criticised for being wrong because religious is not empirical.[65]
John Hick challenged the notion that religious language is unverifiable, proposing the idea of eschatological verification.
In response to Flew's falsification principle, R. M. Hare told a parable in an attempt to demonstrate that religious language is meaningful. Hare describes a madman who believes that all university professors want to kill him; no amount of evidence of kindly professors will dissuade him from this view. Hare called this kind of unfalsifiable conviction a "blik", and argued that it formed an unfalsifiable, yet still meaningful, worldview. He proposed that all people hold bliks – religious and non-religious – and that they cannot be unseated by empirical evidence. Nevertheless, he maintained that a blik is meaningful, as it forms the basis of a person's understanding of the world.[66] Hare believed that some bliks are correct and others are not, though he did not provide any way of distinguishing between which are right and wrong.[67]
Basil Mitchell responded to Flew's falsification principle with his own parable. He described an underground resistance soldier who meets a stranger that claims to be leading the resistance movement. The stranger tells the soldier to keep faith in him, even if he is seen to be fighting for the other side. The soldier's faith is regularly tested, as the stranger is observed fighting for both sides, but his faith remains strong.[68] In contrast to Hare's bliks, Mitchell accepted that there are some things that could count against his faith, but maintained that there is reason for the soldier's belief.[69] He argued that, although a believer will not allow anything to count decisively against his beliefs, the theist still accepts the existence of evidence which could count against religious belief.[70]
Responding to the verification principle, John Hick used his parable of the Celestial City to describe his theory of eschatological verificationism. His parable is of two travellers, a theist and an atheist, together on a road. The theist believes that there is a Celestial City at the end of the road; the atheist believes that there is no such city. Hick's parable was an allegory of the Christian belief in an afterlife, which he argued can be verified upon death.[71] Hick believed that eschatological verification was 'unsymmetrical', in that it could be verified if it was true, but not falsified. This was in contrast to ordinary 'symmetrical' statements, which can be verified and falsified.[72] In his biography of John Hick, David Cheetham notes a criticism of Hick's theory: waiting for eschatological verification could make religious belief provisional, preventing totally committed faith.[73] Cheetham argues that such criticism is misapplied because Hick's theory was not directed to religious believers, but to philosophers who argued that religion meaningless as it is unverifiable.[73] James Morris notes that Hick's eschatological verification theory has been criticised for being inconsistent with his belief in religious pluralism. Morris argues that such criticism can be overcome by modifying Hick's parable to include multiple travellers, all with different beliefs, on the road. He argues that, even if some beliefs about life after death are unverifiable, Hick's belief in bodily resurrection can still be verified.[70]
- ^ a b c d Weed, Jennifer Hart (February 19, 2007). "Religious Language". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/rel-lang/. Retrieved February 16, 2012.
- ^ White 2010, p. 1
- ^ McFague 1982, p. 1
- ^ White 2010, pp. 1–2
- ^ McFague 1982, pp. 1–2
- ^ Bowie 2002, p. 86
- ^ Rocca 2004, p. 56
- ^ Schweid & Levin 2008, p. 237
- ^ Hyman 2008, p. 400
- ^ Seeskin 2005, p. 88
- ^ Seeskin 2005, p. 89
- ^ Cahalan 1985, p. 438
- ^ a b Depoortere, van Erp & Boeve 2010, p. 44
- ^ Depoortere, van Erp & Boeve 2010, p. 41
- ^ Depoortere, van Erp & Boeve 2010, p. 43
- ^ Depoortere, van Erp & Boeve 2010, p. 45-46
- ^ McGrath 2011, ch. 13
- ^ McGrath 1998, p. 183
- ^ Cooper 1997, p. 134
- ^ Dourley 1975, pp. 85–6
- ^ Rees 2001, p. 80
- ^ Dupré 2000, p. 1
- ^ Dupré 2000, pp. 1–2
- ^ Dupré 2000, p. 2
- ^ Dupré 2000, p. 6
- ^ Pasewark & Pool 1999, p. 103
- ^ Singh 1990, p. 185
- ^ Singh 1990, p. 186
- ^ a b Paden 1994, pp. 73–74
- ^ Sherratt 2006, p. 81
- ^ Sherratt 2006, p. 82
- ^ Dray 259
- ^ Mbogu 2008, p. 117
- ^ Hebblethwaite 1987, p. 7
- ^ Ernst 2004, p. 8
- ^ Ernst 2004, p. 9
- ^ Donovan 1982 p. 78
- ^ Donovan 1982 pp. 79-80
- ^ Robinson 2003, p. 29
- ^ Hoffman 2007, p. 26
- ^ Lawson & McCauley 1993, p. 51
- ^ Lawson & McCauley 1993, pp. 51-2
- ^ Harris 2002, p. 49
- ^ Tracy 1996, p. 121
- ^ Katz 1982, p. 232
- ^ a b c Evans 1985, p. 142
- ^ Weinberg 2001, p. 1
- ^ Attfield 2006, p. 11
- ^ a b Tracy 1996, p. 120
- ^ Oppy & Scott 2010, p. 8
- ^ Clack & Clack 1998, p. 110
- ^ Clack & Clack 1998, p. 111
- ^ Lumsden 2009, p. 44
- ^ Jones 2006, p. 172
- ^ Allen 1992, pp. 283-284
- ^ Horn 2005, p. 111
- ^ Cooper 2006, pp. 217–218
- ^ Labron 2006, p. 28
- ^ a b Horn 2005, p. 112
- ^ Glock 1996, pp. 192–193
- ^ Brenner 1999, p. 16
- ^ Clack 1999, p. 79
- ^ Donovan 1982, p. 93
- ^ Donovan 1982, p. 94-5
- ^ Lacewing & Pascal 2007, pp. 173–4
- ^ Jones 2006, p. 173
- ^ Harris 2002, pp. 37–38
- ^ Clarke 2001, p. 148
- ^ Taliafero & Griffiths 2003, pp. 108–109
- ^ a b Harris 2002, p. 64
- ^ Polkinghorne 2003, pp. 145–146
- ^ Cheetham 2003, p. 39
- ^ a b Cheetham 2003, p. 30
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