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This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (January 2008)

Privatization (also spelled privatisation) is the incidence or process of transferring ownership of a business, enterprise, agency, public service or property from the public sector (the state or government) to the private sector (businesses that operate for a private profit) or to private non-profit organizations. The term is also used in a quite different sense, to mean government out-sourcing of services to private firms, e.g. functions like revenue collection, law enforcement, and prison management.^[1]

The term "privatization" also has been used to describe two unrelated transactions. The first is a buyout, by the majority owner, of all shares of a public corporation or holding company's stock, privatizing a publicly traded stock, and often described as private equity. The second is a demutualization of a mutual organization or cooperative to form a joint stock company.^[2]

Forms of privatization[link]

There are four main methods^{[citation needed]} of privatization:

1. Share issue privatization (SIP) - selling shares on the stock market
2. Asset sale privatization - selling an entire organization (or part of it) to a strategic investor, usually by auction or by using the Treuhand model
3. Voucher privatization - distributing shares of ownership to all citizens, usually for free or at a very low price.
4. Privatization from below - Start-up of new private businesses in formerly socialist countries.

Choice of sale method is influenced by the capital market, political and firm-specific factors. SIPs are more likely to be used when capital markets are less developed and there is lower income inequality. Share issues can broaden and deepen domestic capital markets, boosting liquidity and (potentially) economic growth, but if the capital markets are insufficiently developed it may be difficult to find enough buyers, and transaction costs (e.g. underpricing required) may be higher. For this reason, many governments elect for listings in the more developed and liquid markets, for example Euronext, and the London, New York and Hong Kong stock exchanges.

As a result of higher political and currency risk deterring foreign investors, asset sales occur more commonly in developing countries.

Voucher privatization has mainly occurred in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Additionally, Privatization from below is/has been an important type of economic growth in transition economies.

A substantial benefit of share or asset-sale privatizations is that bidders compete to offer the highest price, creating income for the state in addition to tax revenues. Voucher privatizations, on the other hand, could be a genuine transfer of assets to the general population, creating a real sense of participation and inclusion. If the transfer of vouchers is permitted, a market in vouchers could be created, with companies offering to pay money for them.

Secured borrowing[link]

Some privatization transactions can be interpreted as a form of a secured loan^[3][4] and are criticized as a "particularly noxious form of governmental debt".^[3] In this interpretation, the upfront payment from the privatization sale corresponds to the principal amount of the loan, while the proceeds from the underlying asset correspond to secured interest payments – the transaction can be considered substantively the same as a secured loan, though it is structured as a sale.^[3] This interpretation is particularly argued to apply to recent municipal transactions in the United States, particularly for fixed term, such as the 2008 sale of the proceeds from Chicago parking meters for 75 years. It is argued that this is motivated by "politicians' desires to borrow money surreptitiously",^[3] due to legal restrictions on and political resistance to alternative sources of revenue, viz, raising taxes or issuing debt.

Etymology[link]

The Economist magazine introduced the term in the 1930s in covering Nazi German economic policy.^[5][6]

History[link]

This section requires expansion.

The history of privatization dates from Ancient Greece, when governments contracted out almost everything to the private sector.^[7] In the Roman Republic private individuals and companies performed the majority of services including tax collection (tax farming), army supplies (military contractors), religious sacrifices and construction. However, the Roman Empire also created state-owned enterprises—for example, much of the grain was eventually produced on estates owned by the Emperor. Some scholars suggest that the cost of bureaucracy was one of the reasons for the fall of the Roman Empire.^[7]

Perhaps one of the first ideological movements towards privatization came during China's golden age of the Han dynasty. Taoism came into prominence for the first time at a state level, and it advocated the laissez-faire principle of Wu wei (無為), literally meaning "do nothing".^[8] The rulers were counseled by the Taoist clergy that a strong ruler was virtually invisible.

During the Renaissance, most of Europe was still by and large following the feudal economic model. By contrast, the Ming dynasty in China began once more to practice privatization, especially with regards to their manufacturing industries. This was a reversal of the earlier Song dynasty policies, which had themselves overturned earlier policies in favor of more rigorous state control.^[9]

In Britain, the privatization of common lands is referred to as enclosure (in Scotland as the Lowland Clearances and the Highland Clearances). Significant privatizations of this nature occurred from 1760 to 1820, coincident with the industrial revolution in that country.

In more recent times, Winston Churchill's government privatized the British steel industry in the 1950s, and West Germany's government embarked on large-scale privatization, including selling its majority stake in Volkswagen to small investors in a public share offering in 1961.^[7] In the 1970s General Pinochet implemented a significant privatization program in Chile. However, it was in the 1980s under the leaderships of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA, that privatization gained worldwide momentum. In the UK this culminated in the 1993 privatization of British Rail under Thatcher's successor, John Major; British Rail having been formed by prior nationalization of private rail companies.

Significant privatization of state owned enterprises in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union was undertaken in the 1990s with assistance from the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the German Treuhand, and other governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

A major ongoing privatization, that of Japan Post, involves the Japanese post service and the largest bank in the world. This privatization, spearheaded by Junichiro Koizumi, started in 2007 following generations of debate. The privatization process is expected^{[by whom?]} to last until 2017.

Results[link]

Literature reviews^[10][11] find that in competitive industries with well-informed consumers, privatization consistently improves efficiency. The more competitive the industry, the greater the improvement in output, profitability, and efficiency.^[12] Such efficiency gains mean a one-off increase in GDP, but through improved incentives to innovate and reduce costs also tend to raise the rate of economic growth. Although typically there many costs associated with these efficiency gains,^[13] many economists argue that these can be dealt with by appropriate government support through redistribution and perhaps retraining.

Privatizations in Russia and Latin America were accompanied by large-scale corruption during the sale of the state-owned companies. Those with political connections unfairly gained large wealth, which has discredited privatization in these regions. While media have reported widely the grand corruption that accompanied the sales, studies have argued that in addition to increased operating efficiency, daily petty corruption is, or would be, larger without privatization, and that corruption is more prevalent in non-privatized sectors. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that extralegal and unofficial activities are more prevalent in countries that privatized less.^[14]

Opinion[link]

Support[link]

Studies show that private market factors can more efficiently deliver many goods or service than governments due to free market competition.^[10][11][12] Over time this tends to lead to lower prices, improved quality, more choices, less corruption, less red tape, and/or quicker delivery. Many proponents do not argue that everything should be privatized. According to them, market failures and natural monopolies could be problematic. However, anarcho-capitalists prefer that every function of the state be privatized, including defense and dispute resolution.

Proponents of privatization^[who?] make the following arguments:

• Performance. State-run industries tend to be bureaucratic. A political government may only be motivated to improve a function when its poor performance becomes politically sensitive.
• Increased efficiency. Private companies and firms have a greater incentive to produce more goods and services for the sake of reaching a customer base and hence increasing profits. A public organization would not be as productive due to the lack of financing allocated by the entire government's budget that must consider other areas of the economy.
• Specialization. A private business has the ability to focus all relevant human and financial resources onto specific functions. A state-owned firm does not have the necessary resources to specialize its goods and services as a result of the general products provided to the greatest number of people in the population.
• Improvements. Conversely, the government may put off improvements due to political sensitivity and special interests—even in cases of companies that are run well and better serve their customers' needs.
• Corruption. A state-monopolized function is prone to corruption; decisions are made primarily for political reasons, personal gain of the decision-maker (i.e. "graft"), rather than economic ones. Corruption (or principal-agent issues) in a state-run corporation affects the ongoing asset stream and company performance, whereas any corruption that may occur during the privatization process is a one-time event and does not affect ongoing cash flow or performance of the company.
• Accountability. Managers of privately owned companies are accountable to their owners/shareholders and to the consumer, and can only exist and thrive where needs are met. Managers of publicly owned companies are required to be more accountable to the broader community and to political "stakeholders". This can reduce their ability to directly and specifically serve the needs of their customers, and can bias investment decisions away from otherwise profitable areas.
• Civil-liberty concerns. A company controlled by the state may have access to information or assets which may be used against dissidents or any individuals who disagree with their policies.
• Goals. A political government tends to run an industry or company for political goals rather than economic ones.
• Capital. Privately held companies can sometimes more easily raise investment capital in the financial markets when such local markets exist and are suitably liquid. While interest rates for private companies are often higher than for government debt, this can serve as a useful constraint to promote efficient investments by private companies, instead of cross-subsidizing them with the overall credit-risk of the country. Investment decisions are then governed by market interest rates. State-owned industries have to compete with demands from other government departments and special interests. In either case, for smaller markets, political risk may add substantially to the cost of capital.
• Security. Governments have had the tendency to "bail out" poorly run businesses, often due to the sensitivity of job losses, when economically, it may be better to let the business fold.
• Lack of market discipline. Poorly managed state companies are insulated from the same discipline as private companies, which could go bankrupt, have their management removed, or be taken over by competitors. Private companies are also able to take greater risks and then seek bankruptcy protection against creditors if those risks turn sour.
• Natural monopolies. The existence of natural monopolies does not mean that these sectors must be state owned. Governments can enact or are armed with anti-trust legislation and bodies to deal with anti-competitive behavior of all companies public or private.
• Concentration of wealth. Ownership of and profits from successful enterprises tend to be dispersed and diversified -particularly in voucher privatization. The availability of more investment vehicles stimulates capital markets and promotes liquidity and job creation.
• Political influence. Nationalized industries are prone to interference from politicians for political or populist reasons. Examples include making an industry buy supplies from local producers (when that may be more expensive than buying from abroad), forcing an industry to freeze its prices/fares to satisfy the electorate or control inflation, increasing its staffing to reduce unemployment, or moving its operations to marginal constituencies.
• Profits. Corporations exist to generate profits for their shareholders. Private companies make a profit by enticing consumers to buy their products in preference to their competitors' (or by increasing primary demand for their products, or by reducing costs). Private corporations typically profit more if they serve the needs of their clients well. Corporations of different sizes may target different market niches in order to focus on marginal groups and satisfy their demand. A company with good corporate governance will therefore be incentivized to meet the needs of its customers efficiently.
• Job gains. As the economy becomes more efficient, more profits are obtained and no government subsidies and less taxes are needed, there will be more private money available for investments and consumption and more profitable and better-paid jobs will be created than in the case of a more regulated economy.^{[15][unreliable source?]}

Opposition[link]

This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (July 2011)

Opponents of certain privatizations believe that certain public goods and services should remain primarily in the hands of government in order to ensure that everyone in society has access to them (such as law enforcement, basic health care, and basic education). There is a positive externality when the government provides society at large with public goods and services such as defense and disease control. Some national constitutions in effect define their governments' "core businesses" as being the provision of such things as justice, tranquility, defense, and general welfare. These governments' direct provision of security, stability, and safety, is intended to be done for the common good (in the public interest) with a long-term (for posterity) perspective. As for natural monopolies, opponents of privatisation claim that they aren't subject to fair competition, and better administrated by the state. Likewise, private goods and services should remain in the hands of the private sector.

Some^[who?] would also point out that privatizing certain functions of government might hamper coordination, and charge firms with specialized and limited capabilities to perform functions which they are not suited for. In rebuilding a war torn nation's infrastructure, for example, a private firm would, in order to provide security, either have to hire security, which would be both necessarily limited and complicate their functions, or coordinate with government, which, due to a lack of command structure shared between firm and government, might be difficult. A government agency, on the other hand, would have the entire military of a nation to draw upon for security, whose chain of command is clearly defined. Opponents would say that this is a false assertion: numerous books refer to poor organization between government departments (for example the Hurricane Katrina incident).

Although private companies will provide a similar good or service alongside the government, opponents of privatization are careful about completely transferring the provision of public goods, services and assets into private hands for the following reasons:

• Performance. A democratically elected government is accountable to the people through a legislature, Congress or Parliament, and is motivated to safeguarding the assets of the nation. The profit motive may be subordinated to social objectives.
• Improvements. the government is motivated to performance improvements as well run businesses contribute to the State's revenues.
• Corruption. Government ministers and civil servants are bound to uphold the highest ethical standards, and standards of probity are guaranteed through codes of conduct and declarations of interest. However, the selling process could lack transparency, allowing the purchaser and civil servants controlling the sale to gain personally.
• Accountability. The public does not have any control or oversight of private companies.
• Civil-liberty concerns. A democratically elected government is accountable to the people through a parliament, and can intervene when civil liberties are threatened.
• Goals. The government may seek to use state companies as instruments to further social goals for the benefit of the nation as a whole.
• Capital. Governments can raise money in the financial markets most cheaply to re-lend to state-owned enterprises.
• Strategic and Sensitive areas. Governments have chosen to keep certain companies/industries under public control because of their strategic importance or sensitive nature.
• Cuts in essential services. If a government-owned company providing an essential service (such as the water supply) to all citizens is privatized, its new owner(s) could lead to the abandoning of the social obligation to those who are less able to pay, or to regions where this service is unprofitable.
• Natural monopolies. Privatization will not result in true competition if a natural monopoly exists.
• Concentration of wealth. Profits from successful enterprises end up in private, often foreign, hands instead of being available for the common good.
• Political influence. Governments may more easily exert pressure on state-owned firms to help implementing government policy.
• Downsizing. Private companies often face a conflict between profitability and service levels, and could over-react to short-term events. A state-owned company might have a longer-term view, and thus be less likely to cut back on maintenance or staff costs, training etc., to stem short term losses. Many private companies have downsized while making record profits.
• Profit. Private companies do not have any goal other than to maximize profits. A private company will serve the needs of those who are most willing (and able) to pay, as opposed to the needs of the majority, and are thus anti-democratic. The more necessary a good is, the lower the price elasticity of demand, as people will attempt to buy it no matter the price. In the case of price elasticity of demand is zero (perfectly inelastic good), demand part of supply and demand theories does not work.
• Privatization and Poverty. It is acknowledged by many studies that there are winners and losers with privatization. The number of losers —which may add up to the size and severity of poverty—can be unexpectedly large if the method and process of privatization and how it is implemented are seriously flawed (e.g. lack of transparency leading to state-owned assets being appropriated at minuscule amounts by those with political connections, absence of regulatory institutions leading to transfer of monopoly rents from public to private sector, improper design and inadequate control of the privatization process leading to asset stripping.^[16]
• Job Loss. Due to the additional financial burden placed on privatized companies to succeed without any government help, unlike the public companies, jobs could be lost to keep more money in the company.

Notable examples[link]

The largest privatization in history^{[citation needed]} involved Japan Post. It was the nation's largest employer and one third of all Japanese government employees worked for Japan Post. Japan Post was often said to be the largest holder of personal savings in the world.

Japan Post was thought to be inefficient and a source for corruption. In September 2003, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's cabinet proposed splitting Japan Post into four separate companies: A bank, an insurance company, a postal service company, and a fourth company to handle the post offices as retail storefronts of the other three.

After the Upper House rejected privatization, Koizumi scheduled nationwide elections for September 11, 2005. He declared the election to be a referendum on postal privatization. Koizumi subsequently won this election, gaining the necessary supermajority and a mandate for reform, and in October 2005, the bill was passed to privatize Japan Post in 2007.^[17]

Nippon Telegraph and Telephone's privatization in 1987 involved the largest share-offering in financial history at the time.^[18] 15 of the world's 20 largest public share offerings have been privatizations of telecoms.^[18]

The United Kingdom's largest public-share offerings were privatizations of British Telecom and British Gas during the 1980s under the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, when many state-run firms were sold off to the private sector. This attracted very mixed views from the public and parliament, and even a former Conservative prime minister, Harold Macmillan, was critical of the policy; likening it to "selling the family silver".^[19]There were around 3,000,000 shareholders in Britain when Thatcher took office in 1979, but the subsequent sale of state-run firms saw the level of shareholders double to 6,000,000 by 1985 and by the time of her resignation as prime minister in 1990 there were more than 10,000,000 shareholders in Britain.^[20]

The largest public-share offering in France was France Telecom.

Egypt undertook widespread privatization under President Hosni Mubarak. After his overthrow in the 2011 revolution, the association of the newly private businesses with the crony capitalism of the old regime along with the new look at long-festering labor and police-state issues have led to calls for re-nationalization.^[21]

See also[link]

• Corporatization
• Deregulation
• Marketization
• Private sector development
• Special Economic Zone

Notes[link]

References[link]

• Alexander, Jason. 2009. Contracting Through the Lens of Classical Pragmatism: An Exploration of Local Government Contracting. Applied Research Project. Texas State University. http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/288/.
• Dovalina, Jessica. 2006. Assessing the Ethical Issues Found in the Contracting Out Process. Applied Research Project. Texas State University. http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/108/.
• Segerfeldt, Fredrik. 2006. Water for sale: how business and the market can resolve the world’s water crisis. Stockholm Network. http://www.stockholm-network.org/downloads/events/d41d8cd9-Amigo%20Segerfeldt.pdf
• Bernard Black et al., 'Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1731

Unindexed

• David T. Beito, Peter Gordon, and Alexander Tabarrok (editors); foreword by Paul Johnson (2002). The voluntary city: choice, community, and civil society. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press/The Independent Institute. ISBN 0-472-08837-8. 
• Bel, Germà (2006), "The coining of `privatisation´and Germany's National Socialist Party", Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(3), 187-194
• Clarke, Thomas (ed.) (1994) "International Privatisation: Strategies and Practices" Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, ISBN 3-11-013569-8
• Clarke, Thomas and Pitelis, Christos (eds.) (1995) "The Political Economy of Privatisation" London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 0-415-12705-X
• Juliet D’Souza, William L. Megginson (1999), "The Financial and Operating Performance of Privatised Firms during the 1990s", Journal of Finance August 1999
• von Hayek, Friedrich, (1960) The Constitution of Liberty
• Roger L. Kemp, PhD, "Privatization: The Provision of Public Services by the Private Sector," McFarland & Co., Jefferson, NC, USA; and London, UK., 2007.
• Kosar, Kevin R. (2006), "Privatisation and the Federal Government: An Introduction", Report from the Congressional Research Service
• Mayer, Florian (2006) Vom Niedergang des unternehmerisch tätigen Staates: Privatisierungspolitik in Großbritannien, Frankreich, Italien und Deutschland, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, ISBN 3-531-14918-0
• Megginson and Netter, From state to market: A survey of empirical studies on privatization, Journal of Economic Literature 39(2), June 2001, 321-89.
• Onses, Richard (2004). Benchmarking Privatization: the building of privatization index using fuzzy logic. Valladolid: International Conference on Modeling and Simulation. ISBN 84-688-7867-7. 
• Onses, Richard (2004). The privatization leaders guide. e-privatization.com publication. ISBN 84-607-9613-2. 
• Nico Perrone (2002), Economia pubblica rimossa, Milan, Giuffrè ISBN 88-14-10088-8
• Smith, Adam (1776) The Wealth of Nations
• Jeb Sprague, 2007. Haiti: Workers Protest Privatisation Layoffs. Inter Press Service.
• Stiglitz, Joseph Globalization and its Discontents
• von Weizsäcker, Ernst, Oran Young, and Matthias Finger (editors): Limits to Privatisation. Earthscan, London 2005 ISBN 1-84407-177-4
• Wolin, Sheldon S. (2008) Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism (Princeton University Press, 2008). ISBN 978-0-691-13566-3 (Trad. esp.: Democracia S. A., Buenos Aires/Madrid, Katz editores S.A, 2008, ISBN 978-84-96859-46-3)
• Zullo, Roland. (2009). Does Fiscal Stress Induce Privatization? Correlates of Private and Intermunicipal Contracting, 1992-2002. Governance 22.3 (July): 459-481.

External links[link]

Look up privatization in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

• In the Public Interest is a Resource Center on privatization and responsible contracting.
• Privatization's Rise from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
• Reports of the Public Services International Research Unit at the University of Greenwich Research database with many articles on the effects of privatization
• Parker, David. "Privatisation ten years on : a critical analysis of its rationale and results". Cranfield University, School of Management. http://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/handle/1826/606. 
• Privatization Blog is a resource dedicated to recent developments in privatization.

Peter J. Ferrara (born 1955)^[1][2] is an American lawyer, policy analyst, and columnist who is the current general counsel for the American Civil Rights Union and analyst for The Heartland Institute. A libertarian scholar, he is most well known for supporting privatization of the Social Security program.

Early life and education[link]

A 2005 profile for the Harvard Law Bulletin reported that Ferrara recalled at age nine "being transfixed while watching television as Barry Goldwater stormed the 1964 Republican National Convention."^[2] Ferrara grew up in Phoenix, Arizona and graduated in 1976 from Harvard College with an A.B. in economics magna cum laude and from Harvard Law School in 1979 cum laude.^[3][4][5] At Harvard, Ferrara wrote at the student newspaper The Harvard Crimson.^[6] While in law school, he also participated in the Harvard Libertarian Association.^[7] Future Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts attended both Harvard College and Law School with Ferrara.^[4]

Career[link]

His senior law school thesis evolved into the debut hardcover publication by the libertarian Cato Institute in 1980, Social Security: The Inherent Contradiction.^[2] From 1981 to 1983, Ferrara served in the White House Office of Policy Development under President Ronald Reagan and was an Associate Deputy Attorney General from 1991 to 1993.^[3] Between those positions, Ferrara became a Heritage Foundation analyst specializing in Social Security issues.^[8] He also became an insurance consultant^[9] and provided expertise in Social Security to media.^[10][11] In 1987, Ferrara joined the faculty of the George Mason University School of Law and directed its legal writing programs until 1991.^[12] As late as 2003, Ferrara has taught there.^[13]

In the early 2000s (decade), he founded the Virginia chapter of Club for Growth and directed the International Center for Law and Economics.^[14]

Ferrara took money from erstwhile lobbyist Jack Abramoff to write op-ed pieces favorable to Abramoff clients. (Ferrara did not disclose which pieces he was paid to write, but Business Week noted that he wrote favorable articles in the Washington Times about the Northern Marianas Islands and the Choctaw Indian tribe, both Abramoff clients.) Ferrara argued those writings were entirely consistent with his independently held views, remained unrepentant, and intended to pursue the practice in the future: "I do that all the time. I've done that in the past, and I'll do it in the future."^[15]

Ferrara was a senior policy adviser at the conservative Institute for Policy Innovation. In April 2011, Ferrara became senior fellow for entitlement and budget policy at The Heartland Institute. Concurrently, he serves as general counsel for the American Civil Rights Union and policy director of the Carleson Center for Public Policy.^[5]

Ferrara's articles have been published in such outlets as National Review,^[13][14] The Washington Times,^[16][17] The American Spectator,^[18][19] and FoxNews.com.^[20] He is a regular guest on the Thom Hartmann radio program.

Viewpoints[link]

In 1987, The New York Times published an op-ed by Ferrara in which he advocated capping the Social Security payroll tax.^[21] The newspaper also interviewed Ferrara that year about a proposal by Secretary of Health and Human Services Otis R. Bowen to expand Medicare; Ferrara criticized the program for "a lot of gaps in medical coverage for the elderly" and found "no basis for just expanding Medicare to take over coverage that private sector provides now."^[22] The George W. Bush administration championed Ferrara's plan to privatize Social Security.^[1]

National Review magazine published his essay "What Is An American?" in its September 25, 2001 issue, after the September 11 attacks.^[13] In the essay, he claims that "there are more Muslims in America than in Afghanistan"^[13], a statement which is patently false.^[23] The essay was reproduced in a chain e-mail claiming that an Australian dentist wrote it.^[24] Ferrara, reflecting on that essay in 2007, still stood by it and supported "more selective immigration so that the U.S. gets a 'better-educated class of Mexican immigrants.'"^[25]

Bibliography[link]

• America's Ticking Bankruptcy Bomb (2011)
• Stop the Raid: Social Security the Biggest Rip Off in History (with Denison Smith) (2008)
• Common Cents, Common Dreams: A layman's guide to social security privatization (ISBN 1882577760) (September 1999)
• The Choctaw Revolution: Lessons for Federal Indian Policy (ISBN 096658340X) (September 1, 1998)
• Religion and the Constitution: A reinterpretation (1983)
• Social Security: The Inherent Contradiction (1980)

References[link]

1. ^ ^{a b} Birnbaum, Jeffrey H. (February 22, 2005). "Private-Account Concept Grew From Obscure Roots". The Washington Post: p. A1. http://washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42525-2005Feb21. "Twenty-five years ago, Peter J. Ferrara was a Harvard Law School student with what he called "the craziest idea in the world." In a paper he wrote before graduating, he suggested converting the government-run Social Security program into a web of private investments...the proposal by the 24-year-old Ferrara began an improbable journey from the fringes of public policy into the mainstream."  Ferrara graduated from the law school in 1979, according to his ACRU biography
2. ^ ^{a b c} Stern, Seth (Summer 2005). "26 Years Later". Harvard Law Bulletin. http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/2005/summer/classnotes_03.php. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
3. ^ ^{a b} "ACRU Experts". American Civil Rights Union. http://www.theacru.org/acru/acru_experts/index.html. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
4. ^ ^{a b} Scott, Janny (August 21, 2005). "Roberts's Harvard Roots: A Movement Was Stirring". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/21/politics/politicsspecial1/21harvard.html?pagewanted=all. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
5. ^ ^{a b} "Peter Ferrara Named Senior Fellow by The Heartland Institute". Heartland Institute. http://www.prweb.com/releases/2011/4/prweb8349958.htm. Retrieved September 4, 2011. 
6. ^ "Peter J. Ferrara". The Harvard Crimson. http://www.thecrimson.com/writer/2197/Peter_J._Ferrara/. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
7. ^ Berry, William J.; Davis, Lisa E. (April 11, 1978). "Psychiatrist Szasz Contends Mental Illness Does not Exist". The Harvard Crimson. http://www.thecrimson.harvard.edu/article/1978/4/11/psychiatrist-szasz-contends-mental-illness-does/. 
8. ^ "Reagan criticized on Social Security". The New York Times: pp. A1. July 8, 1984. http://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/08/us/reagan-criticized-on-social-security.html. Retrieved July 15, 2011 via LexisNexis Academic. 
9. ^ "Agency asking U.S. care in 'catastrophic' ills". The New York Times. November 2, 1986. http://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/02/us/agency-asking-us-care-in-catastrophic-ills.html. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
10. ^ Pear, Robert (January 29, 1986). "Social Security to repay loan early". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/29/us/social-security-to-repay-loan-early.html. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
11. ^ Pear, Robert (February 9, 1986). "Chipping Away at the Idea of 'Entitlement'". The New York Times: p. D4. http://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/09/weekinreview/chipping-away-at-the-idea-of-entitlement.html. Retrieved July 15, 2011 via LexisNexis Academic. 
12. ^ "Law Faculty Directory: Peter Ferrara". George Mason University School of Law. Archived from the original on December 12, 2000. http://web.archive.org/web/200012120208/http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/bios/ferrara.html. 
13. ^ ^{a b c d} Peter Ferrara: What Is An American? National Review online, September 25, 2001.
14. ^ ^{a b} Ferrara, Peter (May 20, 2003). "The Tax-Cut Critics". National Review. http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/206963/tax-cut-critics/peter-ferrara. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
15. ^ Javers, Eamon (December 16, 2005). "Op-Eds for Sale". Business Week. http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/dec2005/nf20051216_1037_db016.htm. Retrieved July 14, 2009. "...he doesn't see a conflict of interest in taking undisclosed money to write op-ed pieces because his columns never violated his ideological principles." 
16. ^ Ferrara, Peter (November 4, 2003). "Unleash the new TV". The Washington Times. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/nov/4/20031104-102049-4600r/. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
17. ^ Ferrara, Peter (April 5, 2009). "FERRARA: Rush’s fans have rights, too". The Washington Times. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/05/rushs-fans-have-rights-too/. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
18. ^ "Media ran with now-retracted attack on IPCC in their assault on global warming science". Media Matters for America. June 30, 2010. http://mediamatters.org/research/201006300033. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
19. ^ "REPORT: Limbaugh conservatives continue 75-year-old "socialized medicine" smear". Media Matters for America. March 5, 2009. http://mediamatters.org/research/200903050012. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
20. ^ "Fox News on religious freedom: There are already "a bunch" of mosques in New York". Media Matters for America. August 16, 2010. http://mediamatters.org/research/201008160020. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
21. ^ Ferrara, Peter J. (January 25, 1987). "Business Forum: Scaling back hikes in Social Security; Put a Permanent Lid on Payroll Taxes". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/25/business/business-forum-scaling-back-hikes-social-security-put-permanent-lid-payroll.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
22. ^ Pear, Robert (February 1, 1987). "Health care debate: How to pay for extended coverage; Congress takes on catastrophic illness issue". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/01/weekinreview/health-care-debate-pay-for-extended-coverage-congress-takes-catastrophic-illness.html?scp=9&sq=%22Peter+J+Ferrara%22&st=nyt&pagewanted=all. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
23. ^ "Muslim Population by Country". The Future of the Global Muslim Population. Pew Research Center. http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-population/?sort=Pop2010. Retrieved 27 February 2012. 
24. ^ "What Is An American?". snopes.com. http://www.snopes.com/rumors/america2.asp. Retrieved July 15, 2011. 
25. ^ Ramage, Stephanie (July 13, 2007). "What is an American? Immigration debate reveals patriotism—and nationalism". The Sunday Paper (Atlanta, Georgia). Archived from the original on January 9, 2009. http://web.archive.org/web/20090109163259/http://www.sundaypaper.com/More/Archives/tabid/98/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/347/071507-NEWS1-What-is-an-American.aspx. 

External links[link]

• "Peter J. Ferrara". SourceWatch (Madison, Wisconsin: Center for Media and Democracy). 11 August 2008. http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Peter_J._Ferrara. Retrieved 2009-07-14.