The One-China policy (simplified Chinese: 一个中国政策; traditional Chinese: 一個中國政策 ; pinyin: yī gè Zhōngguó zhèngcè) refers to the policy or view that there is only one state called "China", despite the existence of two governments that claim to be "China". As a policy, this means that countries seeking diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) must break official relations with the Republic of China (ROC), and vice versa. Hence, all the countries recognizing the ROC recognize it as the sole legitimate representative of all of China, and not just the island of Taiwan and other islands which it controls.^[1] Similarly, all states that recognise the PRC either recognise the PRC as the legitimate representative of Taiwan or acknowledge the PRC's views on the matter—the latter is the position adopted by the United States, which prefers to leave that question ambiguous.^[2]

The One China policy is also different from the "One China" principle (一個中國原則/"一个中国"原則), which is the principle that insists both Taiwan and mainland China are inalienable parts of a single "China".^[3] A modified form of the "One China" principle known as the 1992 Consensus is the current policy of both the PRC and ROC governments. Under this consensus, both governments agree that there is only one sovereign state encompassing both mainland China and Taiwan, but disagree about which of the two governments is the legitimate government of this state.

The One-China principle faces opposition from the movement for Taiwan independence, which pushes to establish Republic of Taiwan and cultivate a separate identity apart from China called Taiwanization. Taiwanization's influence on the government of the ROC has caused instability: after the Communist Party of China expelled the ROC in the Chinese Civil War from most of Chinese territory in 1949 and founded the PRC, the ROC's Chinese Nationalist government, which still held Taiwan, continued to claim legitimacy as the government of all of China. Under former President Lee Teng-hui, Additional Articles were appended to the ROC constitution in 1991 so that it applied effectively only to the Taiwan Area prior to national unification.^[4] However, current ROC President Ma Ying-jeou has re-asserted claims on mainland China as recently as October 8, 2008.^[5]

History[link]

Territory controlled by the People's Republic of China (purple) and the Republic of China (orange). The size of minor islands have been exaggerated in this map for ease of identification.

Before the early 17th century Taiwan was inhabited by aborigines and Han Chinese migrants resulting from successive waves of migration in antiquity. Taiwan was first brought under the control of Zheng Chenggong, a Ming-loyalist, in 1662, before being incorporated by the Qing Dynasty in 1683.

It was also briefly ruled by Dutch (1624–1662) and the Spanish (1626–1642, Northern Taiwan only). The Japanese ruled Taiwan for half a century (1895–1945), while France briefly held sway over Northern Taiwan in 1884-85.^[6]

It was an outlying prefecture of Fujian Province under the Manchu Qing government of China from 1683 until 1887, when it was officially made a separate province. Taiwan remained a province for 8 years until it was ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895.^[7][8]

Following the Oct. 1945 Japanese surrender ceremonies in Taipei, the Republic of China, under the Kuomintang (KMT) became the governing polity on Taiwan during the period of military occupation.^{[9][10][11][12]} In 1949, after losing control of mainland China following the Chinese civil war, and before the post-war peace treaties had come into effect, the ROC government under the KMT withdrew to occupied Taiwan (which was still Japanese territory), thus becoming a government in exile,^{[13][14][15][16]} and Chiang Kai-shek declared martial law. Japan formally renounced all territorial rights to Taiwan in 1952 in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but neither in that treaty nor in the peace treaty signed between Japan and China was the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan awarded to the Republic of China.^[17] This government still governs Taiwan but transformed into a democracy in the 1990s following decades of martial law. During this period, the legal and political status of Taiwan has become more controversial, with the expression of Taiwan independence sentiments in Taiwan which were formerly outlawed.

Viewpoints within Taiwan[link]

Within Taiwan, there is a distinction between the positions of the Kuomintang (KMT) : the Kuomintang also believes in the "One China Principle" and maintains its claim that under the ROC Constitution (passed by the Kuomintang government in 1947 in Nanjing) the ROC has sovereignty over most of China (including by their interpretation both mainland China and Taiwan) and, according to some interpretations of that constitution, Mongolia.

The Democratic Progressive Party does not agree with the "One China principle" as defined by the KMT or Two Chinas. Instead, it has a different interpretation of this principle and believes "China" only refers to People's Republic of China and states that Taiwan and China are two separate countries, therefore there is One Country on Each Side and "one China, one Taiwan". The DPP's position is that the people of Taiwan have the right to self-determination without outside coercion ^[18]

Legal positions[link]

Neither the ROC nor the PRC government recognizes the other as a legitimate national government. The legal position in each jurisdiction is as follows.

People's Republic of China (PRC)[link]

• Preamble of the Constitution:

"Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. It is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland."^[19]

• Anti-Secession Law:

Article 2:

There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.

Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means.^[20]

Article 5:

Upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of the country.

To reunify the country through peaceful means best serves the fundamental interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. The state shall do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification.

After the country is reunified peacefully, Taiwan may practice systems different from those on the mainland and enjoy a high degree of autonomy.^[20]

Republic of China (ROC)[link]

• Article 4 of the Constitution:

"The territory of the Republic of China according to its existing national boundaries shall not be altered except by resolution of the National Assembly." (Effective 1948 to 2000.)

• Article 4 of the 6th Additional Articles of the Constitution:

"The territory of the Republic of China, defined by its existing national boundaries, shall not be altered unless initiated upon the proposal of one-fourth of all members of the Legislative Yuan, passed by three-fourths of the members of the Legislative Yuan present at a meeting requiring a quorum of three-fourths of all the members, and approved by three-fourths of the delegates to the National Assembly present at a meeting requiring a quorum of two-thirds of all the delegates." (Effective 2000 to 2005)

• Article 4 of the 7th Additional Articles of the Constitution:

"The territory of the Republic of China, defined by its existing national boundaries, shall not be altered unless initiated upon the proposal of one-fourth of the total members of the Legislative Yuan, passed by at least three-fourths of the members present at a meeting attended by at least three-fourths of the total members of the Legislative Yuan, and sanctioned by electors in the free area of the Republic of China at a referendum held upon expiration of a six-month period of public announcement of the proposal, wherein the number of valid votes in favor exceeds one-half of the total number of electors." (Effective 2005 to present)

In accordance with this legal position, legislation passed by the Legislative Yuan is signed by the President of the ROC. Only voters residing in the free area are eligible to vote and be elected in ROC elections. The ROC's constitution still raises claims of sovereignty over Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau – territories that today constitute the PRC – but, according to some interpretations, also over Mongolia, Tuva (Russia), and other, minor areas which today are part of Afghanistan, Myanmar, India and Japan.^{[citation needed]}

Evolution of the policy[link]

One interpretation, which was adopted during the Cold War, is that either the PRC or the ROC is the sole rightful government of all China and that the other government is illegitimate. While much of the western bloc maintained relations with the ROC until the 1970s under this policy, much of the eastern bloc maintained relations with the PRC. While the government of the ROC considered itself the remaining holdout of the legitimate government of a country overrun by what it thought of as Communist rebels, the PRC claimed to have succeeded the ROC in the Chinese Civil War. Though the ROC no longer portrays itself as the sole legitimate government of China, the position of the PRC remained unchanged until the early 2000s, when the PRC began to soften its position on this issue to promote Chinese reunification.

The revised position of the PRC was made clear in the Anti-Secession Law of 2005, which although stating that there is one China whose sovereignty is indivisible, does not explicitly identify this China with the PRC. (Almost all PRC laws have a suffix (prefix in Chinese grammar) "of the People's Republic of China" in their official names, but the Anti-Secession Law is an exception.) Beijing has made no major statements after 2004 which identify one China with the PRC and has shifted its definition of one China slightly to encompass a concept called the '1992 Consensus': both sides of the Taiwan strait recognise there is only one China — both mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China, but agree to differ on the definition of that one China.

One interpretation of one China is that there exist only three^{[clarification needed]} geographical regions of China, which were split between two Chinese governments by the Chinese Civil War. This is largely the position of current supporters of Chinese reunification in Mainland China who believe that this "one China" should eventually reunite under a single government. Starting in 2005, this position has become close enough to the positions of the PRC to allow for high-level dialogue between the Communist Party of China and the Pan-Blue Coalition of the ROC.

Policy position in the PRC[link]

In practice, official sources and state-controlled media never refer to the "ROC government", and seldom to the "government of Taiwan". Instead, the government in Taiwan is referred to as the "Taiwan authorities". The PRC does not accept or stamp Republic of China passports. Instead, a Taiwan resident visiting Mainland China, Hong Kong or Macau must use a Taiwan Compatriot Entry Permit.^{[citation needed]}

Policy position in the ROC[link]

The only official statement of the ROC on its interpretation of the One-China Principle dates back to 1 August 1992. At that time, the National Unification Council of the ROC expressed the ROC's interpretation of the principle as:^[21]

1. The two sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning of "one China." To Beijing, "one China" means "the People's Republic of China (PRC)," with Taiwan to become a "Special Administrative Region" after unification. Taipei, on the other hand, considers "one China" to mean the Republic of China (ROC), founded in 1912 and with de jure sovereignty over all of China. The ROC, however, currently has jurisdiction only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. Taiwan is part of China, and the Chinese mainland is part of China as well.
2. Since 1949, China has been temporarily divided, and each side of the Taiwan Strait is administered by a separate political entity. This is an objective reality that no proposal for China's unification can overlook.
3. In February 1991, the government of the Republic of China, resolutely seeking to establish consensus and start the process of unification, adopted the "Guidelines for National Unification". This was done to enhance the progress and well-being of the people, and the prosperity of the nation. The ROC government sincerely hopes that the mainland authorities will adopt a pragmatic attitude, set aside prejudices, and cooperate in contributing its wisdom and energies toward the building of a free, democratic and prosperous China.

However, political consensus and public opinion in Taiwan has evolved since 1992. There is significant difference between each faction's recognition for and understanding of the One China principle. The Pan-Blue Coalition parties, consisting of the Kuomintang, the People's First Party, and the New Party, accept the One China principle. In particular, the current President of the Republic of China, Ma Ying-Jeou, stated in 2006 when he was the Kuomintang chairman that "One China is the Republic of China". Until the 1990s, the government actively stated that the ROC is the only legitimate "One China" while the PRC is illegitimate.

The Pan-Green Coalition parties, consisting of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union, are more hostile to the policy, as they view Taiwan as a country separate from China. The former ROC President, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, regards acceptance of the "One China" principle as capitulation to the PRC, and prefers to view it as nothing more than a topic for discussion, in opposition to the PRC's insistence that the "One China" principle is a prerequisite for any negotiation.

When the Republic of China established diplomatic relations with Kiribati in 2003 the ROC officially declared that Kiribati could continue to have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Despite the declaration, however, all countries maintaining official ties with Taipei continue to recognize the ROC as the sole legitimate government of China.^[1]

In accordance with the One China principle, the ROC does not recognize or stamp PRC passports. Instead, mainland Chinese residents visiting Taiwan and other territory under ROC jurisdiction must use a mainland China resident pass issued by the ROC authorities.

One-China policy and diplomatic relations[link]

The One-China Principle is also a requirement for any political entity to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The PRC has traditionally attempted to get nations to recognize that "the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China... and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China." However, many nations are unwilling to make this particular statement and there was often a protracted effort to find language regarding one China that is acceptable to both sides. Some countries use terms like "acknowledge", "understand", "take note of", while others explicitly use the term "support" or "recognize" for Beijing's position on the status of Taiwan.

The name "Chinese Taipei" is used in some international arenas since "Taiwan" suggests that Taiwan is a separate country and "Republic of China" suggests that there are two Chinas, and thus both violate the One-China Principle. Taiwan could also be used as shorthand for the Customs Union between Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. For example, in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Declaration on the March 2007 elections, issued on behalf of the European Union and with support of 37 countries, express mention is made of "Taiwan."

Most countries that recognize Beijing circumvent the diplomatic language by establishing "Trade Offices" that represent their interests on Taiwanese soil, while the ROC government represents its interests abroad with TECRO, Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office. The United States (and any other nation having diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China) does not have formal diplomatic relations with the ROC. Instead, external relations are handled via nominally private organizations such as the American Institute in Taiwan or the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei.

In the case of the United States, the One-China Policy was first stated in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972: "the United States acknowledges that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position." The United States has not expressed an explicitly immutable statement regarding whether it believes Taiwan is independent or not. Instead, Washington simply states that they understand the PRC's claims on Taiwan as its own. In fact, many scholars agree that US One-China Policy was not intended to please the PRC government, but as a way for Washington to conduct international relations in the region, which Beijing fails to state.

When President Jimmy Carter in 1979 broke off relations with the ROC in order to establish relations with the PRC, Congress responded by passing the Taiwan Relations Act that maintained relations, but stopped short of full recognition of the ROC. In 1982 President Ronald Reagan also saw that the Six Assurances were adopted, the fifth being that the United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. Still, United States policy has remained ambiguous. In the House International Relations Committee on April 21 of 2004, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James A. Kelly, was asked by Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA) whether America’s commitment to Taiwan’s democracy conflicted with the so-called One-China Policy. He admitted the difficulty of defining the U.S.'s position: "I didn’t really define it, and I’m not sure I very easily could define it." He added, "I can tell you what it is not. It is not the One-China principle that Beijing suggests." [1]

The position of the United States, as clarified in the China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy report of the Congressional Research Service (date: July 9, 2007) is summed up in five points:

1. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three US-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982.
2. The United States "acknowledged" the "One China" position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
3. US policy has not recognized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan;
4. US policy has not recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country; and
5. US policy has considered Taiwan's status as undetermined.

In an interview with Chinese students on November 16, 2009, President Barack Obama reconfirmed that the United States supports the One China Policy.^[22]

For any country that wants to establish a diplomatic relationship with the PRC, it must first discontinue any formal relationship with the ROC by the request of the PRC government.^{[citation needed]} In order to compete for other countries' recognition, each Chinese government has given money to a certain few small countries. Both the PRC and ROC governments have accused each other of monetary diplomacy. Several small African and Caribbean countries have established and discontinued diplomatic relationships with both sides several times in exchange for huge financial support from each side.^{[citation needed]}

Of the 192 members of the United Nations, only Bhutan has chosen to recognize neither the People's Republic of China nor the Republic of China. All remaining governments have recognized one or the other, recognizing that government as the sole legitimate government of all China.^{[citation needed]}

One-China policy and cross-strait relations[link]

The acknowledgment of the One China Principle is also a prerequisite by the People's Republic of China government for any cross-strait dialogue be held with groups from Taiwan. The PRC's One-China policy rejects formulas which call for "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" ^[23] and has stated that efforts to divide the sovereignty of China could be met with military force.

The PRC has explicitly stated that it is flexible about the meaning "one China," and that "one China" may not necessarily be synonymous with the PRC, and has offered to talk with parties on Taiwan and the government on Taiwan on the basis of the Consensus of 1992 which states that there is one China, but that there are different interpretations of that one China. For example, in Premier Zhu Rongji's statements prior to the 2000 Presidential Election in Taiwan, he stated that as long as any ruling power in Taiwan accepts the One China Principle, they can negotiate and discuss anything freely. However, the One-China Principle would apparently require that Taiwan formally give up any possibility of Taiwan independence, and would preclude any "one nation, two states" formula similar to ones used in German Ostpolitik or in Korean reunification. Chen Shui-bian, president of the Republic of China between 2000 and 2008 repeatedly rejected the demands to accept the One China Principle and instead called for talks to discuss One China itself. With the January and March 2008 elections in Taiwan, and the election of Ma Ying-jeou as the President of the ROC, who was inaugurated on May 20, a new era of better relations between both sides of the Taiwan Strait was established.^[24] KMT officials visited Mainland China, and the Chinese ARATS met in Beijing with its Taiwanese counterpart, the Straits Exchange Foundation. Direct charter flights were therefore established.

One China was the formulation held by the ROC government before the 1990s, but it was asserted that the one China was the Republic of China rather than PRC. However, in 1991, President Lee Teng-hui indicated that he would not challenge the Communist authorities to rule mainland China. This is a significant point in the history of Cross Straits relations in that a president no longer claims administrative authority over mainland China. Henceforth, Taiwan independence movement gained a political boost, and under Lee's administration the issue is no longer who rules mainland China, but who claims legitimacy over Taiwan and the surrounding islands. Over the course of the 1990s, President Lee appeared to drift away from the One-China formulation, leading many to believe that he was actually sympathetic to Taiwan independence. In 1999, Lee proposed a Special state-to-state relations for mainland China-Taiwan relations which was received angrily by Beijing, which ended semi-official dialogue until June 2008, when ARATS and SEF met, and in which President Ma Ying-jeou reiterated the 1992 Consensus and the different interpretation on "One China".

After the election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000, the policy of the ROC government was to propose negotiations without preconditions. While Chen did not explicitly reject Lee's two states theory, he did not explicitly endorse it either. Throughout 2001, there were unsuccessful attempts to find an acceptable formula for both sides, such as agreeing to "abide by the 1992 consensus." Chen, after assuming the Democratic Progressive Party chairmanship in July 2002, moved to a somewhat less ambiguous policy, and stated in early August 2002 that "it is clear that both sides of the straits are separate countries." This statement was strongly criticized by opposition Pan-Blue Coalition parties on Taiwan, which support a One-China Principle, but oppose defining this "One China" as the PRC.

The One China policy became an issue during the 2004 ROC Presidential election. Chen Shui-bian abandoned his earlier ambiguity and publicly rejected the One-China Principle claiming it would imply that Taiwan is part of the PRC. His opponent Lien Chan publicly supported a policy of "one China, different interpretations," as done in 1992. At the end of the 2004 election, Lien Chan and his running mate, James Soong, later announced that they would not put ultimate unification as the goal for their cross-strait policy and would not exclude the possibility of an independent Taiwan in the future. In an interview with Time Asia bureau prior to the 2004 presidential elections, Chen used the model of Germany and the European Union as examples of how countries may come together, and the Soviet Union as illustrating how a country may fragment.

In March 2005, the PRC passed an Anti-Secession Law which authorized the use of force to prevent a "serious incident" that breaks the One China policy, but which at the same time did not identify one China with the People's Republic and offered to pursue political solutions. At the same session of the PRC Congress, a large increase in military spending was also passed, leading blue team members to interpret those measures as forcing the ROC to adhere to the One China Policy or else the PRC would attack.

In April and May 2005, Lien Chan and James Soong made separate trips to Mainland China,^[25] during which both explicitly supported the Consensus of 1992 and the concept of one China and in which both explicitly stated their parties' opposition to Taiwan independence. Although President Chen at one point supported the trips of Lien and Soong for defusing cross-strait tensions^[26]., he also attacked them for working with the "enemy" PRC^{[citation needed]}. On April 28, 2008, Honorary Chairman Lien Chan of the then opposition Kuomintang visited Beijing and met with Hu Jintao for the fourth time since their historic encounter on April 29, 2005 in their respective capacity as party leaders of both the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT. Lien also met Chen Yunlin, director of the PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council.^[27]

On May 28, 2008, Kuomintang Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung made a landmark visit to Beijing^[28]., and met and shook hands with the Communist General Secretary Hu Jintao, at the Great Hall of the People. He also visited the mausoleum of Sun Yat-Sen. Hu Jintao called for resuming exchanges and talks, based on the 1992 Consensus, between mainland China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation, as early as possible, and practically solving problems concerning the two sides through talks on equal footing. Once the ARATS-SEF dialogue is resumed, priority should be given to issues including cross-Strait weekend chartered flights and approval for mainland China residents traveling to Taiwan, which are of the biggest concern to people on both sides of the Strait. "The KMT has won two important elections in Taiwan recently," Wu said, "which showed that the mainstream opinion of the Taiwan people identified with what the KMT stood for, and most of the Taiwan people agree that the two sides on the strait can achieve peaceful development and a win-win situation.".^[29] Wu also told reporters that he had stressed to Hu that Taiwan needed an international presence. "The Taiwanese people need a sense of security, respect and a place in the international community," Wu said. Hu was also quoted as having promised to discuss feasible measures for Taiwan to take part in international activities, particularly its participation in World Health Organization activities.^[30]

See also[link]

• Chinese political parties
• Chinese reunification
• Cross-Strait relations
• Desinicization
• Exclusive Mandate
• Legal status of Taiwan
• Political status of Taiwan
• Politics of the People's Republic of China
• Politics of the Republic of China

References[link]

External links[link]

• US-PRC Joint Communique, August 17, 1982
• Washington Post's Interview with Taiwan's Leader, March 13, 2006
• America and Taiwan, 1943-2004

Links to related articles v t e Cross-Strait relations Participants People's Republic of China Republic of China Organisations Taiwan Affairs Office Mainland Affairs Council Straits Exchange Foundation Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits Kuomintang Communist Party of China National Unification Council Cross-Straits Economic Trade and Culture Forum People Hu Jintao Ma Ying-jeou Chen Yunlin Chiang Pin-kung Jiang Zemin Chen Shui-bien Wang Daohan Koo Chen-fu Lee Teng-hui Lai Shin-Yuan Wang Yi Events Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) Retrocession of Taiwan (1945) 228 Incident (1947) Chinese Civil War (1946–1950) First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–1955) Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958) PRC entry to the United Nations (1971) Wang-Koo summit (1993) Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995–1996) Overseas Chinese World Conference (2000-current) Anti-Secession Law (2005) Pan-Blue visits to mainland China (2005) Cross-strait charter (2005-2008) Chen-Chiang summit (2008-current) Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (2010) Concepts Political status of Taiwan Legal status of Taiwan Chinese reunification Taiwan independence 1992 Consensus Three Links One China policy Two Chinas One Country on Each Side Three Noes Six Assurances Special state-to-state relations Four Noes and One Without Zhonghua Minzu Special non-state-to-state relations Cross-strait Economic Zone v t e Politics of the People's Republic of China Constitution of the People's Republic of China Parties Parties Communist Party Central Committee General Secretary Central Politburo Politburo Standing Committee Central Secretariat Discipline Inspection Commission State organs National People's Congress Standing Committee Chairman President Vice President State Council Premier Vice Premier Central Military Commission Chairman People's Liberation Army People's Political Consultative Conference National Committee Chairman Politics of province-level divisions Municipalities Beijing Chongqing Shanghai Tianjin 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Albert Allen Bartlett (born 1923 in Shanghai)^[1] is an emeritus Professor of Physics at the University of Colorado at Boulder, USA. As of July 2001^[update] Professor Bartlett had lectured over 1,600 times since September, 1969 on Arithmetic, Population, and Energy.^[2][3] Bartlett regards the word combination "sustainable growth" as an oxymoron, since even modest annual percentage population increases will inevitably equate to huge exponential growth over sustained periods of time. He therefore regards human overpopulation as "The Greatest Challenge" facing humanity.

Career[link]

Bartlett joined the faculty of the University of Colorado in Boulder in September 1950. He has a B.A. degree in physics from Colgate University (1944), and M.A. (1948) and Ph.D. (1951) degrees in physics from Harvard University. In 1978 he was national president of the American Association of Physics Teachers. He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. In 1969 and 1970 he served two terms as the elected Chair of the four-campus Faculty Council of the University of Colorado.

Views on population growth[link]

Thomas Malthus, pioneer of the study of demographics.

Human population curve showing the power of exponential growth

Chart showing change in oil prices since the 19th century. The top curve is inflation-adjusted

World population from 1800 to 2100, based on UN 2004 projections (red, orange, green) and US Census Bureau historical estimates (black).

Professor Bartlett often explains how sustainable growth is a contradiction. His view is based on the fact that a modest percentage growth can equate to huge escalations over relatively short periods of time.^[4]

Bartlett argues that, over time, compound growth can yield enormous increases. For example, an investor earning a constant annual 7% return on their investment would find their capital doubling within 10 years. But the same exponential power, so advantageous to patient investors, may be potentially calamitous when applied to human population. A population of 10,000 individuals, if it were to grow at a constant rate of 7% per annum, would reach a population size of 10 million after 100 years.^[5]

Bartlett regards overpopulation as "The Greatest Challenge" facing humanity, and promotes sustainable living. He opposes the cornucopian school of thought (as advocated by people such as Julian Lincoln Simon), and refers to it as "The New Flat Earth Society"^[6]

J. B. Calvert (1999) has proposed that Bartlett's law ^[7] will result in the exhaustion of petrochemical resources due to the exponential growth of the world population (in line with the Malthusian Growth Model).

Bartlett has made two notable statements relating to sustainability:

"The greatest shortcoming of the human race is our inability to understand the exponential function."

and his Great Challenge:

"Can you think of any problem in any area of human endeavor on any scale, from microscopic to global, whose long-term solution is in any demonstrable way aided, assisted, or advanced by further increases in population, locally, nationally, or globally?"

Books[link]

• The Essential Exponential For the Future of Our Planet a collection of essays by Professor Bartlett (2004). Center for Science, Mathematics and Computer Education, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. ISBN 0-9758973-0-6 ^[8]

See also[link]

• Exponential growth
• Thomas Robert Malthus - the originator of the Malthusian catastrophe argument
• Peak oil
• M. King Hubbert, author of the Hubbert Curve.

Notes[link]

References[link]

• Professor talks at an exponential rate Energy Bulletin article by Todd Neff. Retrieved July 2011

External links[link]

• Professor Bartlett's website contains background, articles, book "The Essential Exponential", and links to his talk, "Arithmetic, Population, and Energy". Retrieved July 2011
• Professor Bartlett's page at Colorado University Retrieved July 2011
• Biography of Dr Bartlett Retrieved July 2011
• "Arithmetic, Population, and Energy" by Professor Albert Bartlett Free audio and video 57 minute lecture. Retrieved July 2011
• "Arithmetic, Population, and Energy" by Professor Albert Bartlett Text of lecture (extracts). Retrieved July 2011
• Analysis of Bartlett's "Arithmetic, Population, and Energy" presentation - Exponentialist website. Retrieved July 2011
• Is There a Population Problem? Ecofuture website. Retrieved July 2011
• The Massive Movement to Marginalise the Modern Malthusian Message article by Professor Bartlett. Retrieved July 2011
• Thoughts on Long-term Energy Supplies - Scientists and the Silent Lie article on energy and population in Physics Today (2004). Retrieved July 2011
• Clean Coal Technology Speech by Andrew McNamara MP on clean coal and report by Professor Bartlett
• Arithmetic, Population & Energy, Part I @YouTube.com (Part 1 of 8), (parts 2-4 are linked). Retrieved July 2011
• Arithmetic, Population & Energy, Part II @YouTube.com (Part 5 of 8), (parts 6-8 are linked). Retrieved July 2011
• Arithmetic, Population & Energy @Google (entire video). Retrieved July 2011
• Lecture by Professor Bartlett about the exponential function @Vimeo. Retrieved July 2011
• BLIND SPOT, Documentary, Population & Energy. Retrieved July 2011

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Chen Guangcheng
Chen Guangcheng at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing on 1 May 2012.
Born	(1971-11-12) 12 November 1971 (age 40)
Nationality	People's Republic of China
Education	Nanjing University Medical School (1998–2001)
Occupation	Civil rights activist
Known for	activism on behalf of rural poor
Home town	Dongshigu, Shandong Province, China
Spouse	Yuan Weijing
Awards	Time 100 (2006) Ramon Magsaysay Award (2007)

Chen Guangcheng (born 12 November 1971) is a Chinese civil rights activist who worked on human rights issues in rural areas of the People's Republic of China. As of May 30, 2012 he is a special student at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute at the New York University School of Law.^[1] Blind from an early age and self-taught in the law, Chen is frequently described as a "barefoot lawyer" who advocates women's rights and the welfare of the poor. He is best known for exposing alleged abuses in official family-planning policy, often involving claims of violence and forced abortions.

In 2005, he became internationally known for organising a class-action lawsuit against the city of Linyi in Shandong for what was claimed to be excessive enforcement of the one-child policy. As a result of this lawsuit, Chen was placed under house arrest from September 2005 to March 2006, with a formal arrest in June 2006.^[2][3] During his trial, Chen's attorneys were forbidden access to the court, leaving him without a proper defender. On 24 August 2006, Chen was sentenced to four years and three months for "damaging property and organising a mob to disturb traffic".

Chen was released from prison on 8 September 2010 after serving his full sentence, but remained under house arrest or "soft detention" at his home in Dongshigu Village.^[4][5] Chen and his wife were reportedly beaten shortly after a human rights group released a video of their home under intense police surveillance on 9 February 2011.^[6]

Chen's case received sustained international attention, with the U.S. State Department, the British Foreign Secretary, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International issuing appeals for his release; the latter group designated him a prisoner of conscience.^[7] Chen is a 2007 laureate of the Ramon Magsaysay Award and in 2006 was named to the Time 100.^[8]

On 22 April 2012, Chen escaped his house arrest and fled to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.^[9][10] After negotiations with the Chinese government, he left the embassy for medical treatment on 2 May 2012,^[11] and it was reported on 4 May 2012 that China would consider allowing him to travel to the United States to study.^[12] The same day, New York University invited him to be a visiting scholar.^[13] On 19 May 2012, Chen, his wife, and his two children were granted U.S. visas and departed Beijing on a commercial flight, arriving the same day in New York City.^[14][15]

Early life[link]

Chen comes from the village of Dongshigu, Yinan County, Shandong Province, approximately 200 km from the city of Jinan. Chen lost his sight at an early age due to a fever. He was illiterate until 1994 when he was enrolled at the Qingdao High School for the Blind, from which he graduated in 1998. In that time, Chen had already begun developing an interest in law, and would often ask his brothers to read legal texts to him.^[16] He then studied in Nanjing University of Chinese Medicine from 1998 to 2001, specializing in acupuncture and massage.^[17] After graduation he returned to his home region and found a job as a masseur in the hospital of Yinan County.^[18] At the same time, he audited law classes, and learned enough to aid his fellow villagers when they sought his assistance.^[19]

Activism[link]

Chen's first recorded instance of petitioning authorities was in 1994, when he traveled to Beijing to appeal against taxes that were being incorrectly levied on his family (disabled persons, such as Chen, are supposed to be exempt from taxation and fees; his family had been taxed, however). The appeal was successful, and Chen then began engaging in similar activities for other individuals with disabilities to avoid taxation that was not provided for under relevant laws.^[16][17] He also began mobilizing villagers to engage in collective action campaigns. In 2000, Chen organized villagers in his hometown and 78 others to petition against a paper mill that had been spewing noxious chemicals into a river, which destroyed crops and harmed wildlife.^[17] The effort was successful, and resulted in the suspension of the mill.^[16]

Chen attracted publicity in 2005 by gathering evidence of local family planning officials from Linyi in Shandong carrying out thousands of what Chen described as forced sterilizations or abortions. Chinese national regulations prohibit such measures. The officials were also accused by Chen of detaining and torturing relatives of people who had escaped from the authorities.^[2]

Chen filed a class-action lawsuit on the behalf of women who claimed to be victims of Linyi officials, and drew attention to the situation of the villagers. He also traveled to Beijing in June 2005 to file a complaint. Although the suit he filed was rejected, the incident was publicized on the Internet and by the Western media Time, which interviewed Chen.^[3] Following this publicity, the National Population and Family Planning Commission launched an investigation in August 2005. A month later, the Commission announced that several Linyi officials were detained.

Detention and trial[link]

Chen met with foreign reporters in Beijing to publicize his lawsuit and the allegations within it that Linyi officials were engaged in compulsory sterilization, and more rarely, forced abortion.^[8] Local officials responded by portraying Chen as working for "foreign anti-China forces", pointing out that he had received foreign funding for his campaign.^[2] After Chen refused negotiations with local officials to cease his activism, Linyi authorities placed him under house arrest from September 2005. He attempted to escape for contacts in Beijing in October, but was beaten and prevented from doing so.^[3]

Chen was removed from his house in March 2006 and was formally detained in June 2006 by Yinan county officials.^[3] He was scheduled to stand trial on 17 July 2006 on charges of destruction of property and assembling a crowd to disrupt traffic,^[2] but this was delayed at the request of the prosecution.^[20] According to Radio Free Asia and Chinese Human Rights Defenders, the prosecution delayed the trial because a crowd of Chen supporters gathered outside the courthouse. With only a few days' notice, authorities rescheduled Chen's trial for 18 August 2006.

On the eve of his trial, all three of his lawyers were detained by Yinan police. Two were released after being questioned and their phones confiscated. Xu Zhiyong of the Yitong Law Firm, perhaps the lawyer with the most knowledge of the forced abortion cases Chen was working on, was detained after authorities accused him of stealing a man's wallet. He was not released until the trial concluded on the 18th. None of Chen's lawyers were allowed in the courtroom for the trial. Only Chen's brothers were allowed inside. Not even Chen's wife was allowed to hear proceedings. Instead, authorities appointed their own public defender for Chen just before the trial began. As a result, the defender had not even read the case report before he walked into the courtroom. The defender did little to help his new client's case and did not raise any objection to the proceedings or to any of the evidence presented, despite Chen's protest in the court. The trial lasted two hours.^[21][22] On 24 August 2006, Chen was sentenced to four years and three months for "damaging property and organising a mob to disturb traffic".^[23] As a result of Chen's trial, British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett selected his case for the cover of the British government's 2006 human rights report, stating concern over "the handling of Chen's case" and calling for the Chinese government "to prove its commitment to building rule of law".^[24][25]

On 30 November 2006, Yinan County court upheld Chen's sentence,^[26] and on 12 January 2007, the Linyi Intermediate Court in Shandong Province rejected his final appeal. The same court had overturned his original conviction in December 2006, citing lack of evidence. However, Chen was convicted in a second trial on identical charges and given an identical sentence by the Yinan court.^[27] Following the trial, Amnesty International declared him to be a prisoner of conscience, "jailed solely for his peaceful activities in defence of human rights".^[7]

House arrest[link]

After being released from prison in 2010, Chen was placed under house arrest (what he described as "illegal detention") closely monitored at his home village. He and his wife, however, have attempted to communicate via video tape and written communication. The government responded by beating against Chen and his wife, taking away from them documents and communication devices in their possession, cutting off electric power to their residence, and placing metal sheets over the windows of their house.^[28] Official harassment of Chen's family continued throughout his house arrest, including of Chen's six-year-old daughter, who was briefly banned from attending school and had her toys confiscated by guards, and of Chen's mother, who was harassed while working in the fields.^[29] Authorities reportedly told Chen that they had spent 60 million yuan ($9.5 million) to keep him under house arrest.^[30]

In 2011, The New York Times reported that a number of supporters and admirers had attempted to penetrate the security detail that monitors Chen's home to visit him, but had been turned away. In some instances, his supporters were pummeled, beaten, or robbed by security agents.^[31] Would-be visitors included journalists, European diplomats, lawyers, intellectuals, and a Hollywood actor^[31] U.S. Congressman Chris Smith attempted to visit Chen in November 2011, but was not granted permission.^[32] U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the U.S. government as "alarmed" by Chen's continued detention and called on China "to embrace a different path".^[33] Human Rights Watch described his house arrest as "unlawful" and called on authorities give Chen his freedom.^[34] Later, supporters turned to online campaigns to support Chen.

In December 2011, actor Christian Bale attempted to visit Chen along with a CNN crew, but was punched, shoved, and denied access by Chinese security guards.^[35] Bale wanted to show his solidarity with one of the most prominent human rights activists and support the cause. Bale later stated that he had wanted "to meet the man, shake his hand and say what an inspiration he is".^[36][37] Video footage also showed Bale and the CNN crew having stones thrown at them, and a minivan then chased their car for more than 40 minutes.^[35]

Escape from house arrest[link]

On 22 April 2012, Chen escaped from house arrest where he was being held despite there being no pending charges against him.^[38][39] Fellow dissident Ai Weiwei said a friend told him that Chen waited until night, climbed over his compound walls, and slipped past "multiple cordons of guards".^[40] "You know he's blind, so the night to him is nothing," Ai's friend stated.^[40]

Chen's friend and fellow activist Hu Jia stated that Chen had been planning escape "for a long time", and had previously attempted to dig a tunnel for escape, but failed. In the weeks leading up to his escape, Chen tried to create the impression among his guards that he was ill in bed and had stopped appearing outside the house by day, allowing him multiple days to climb over the walls around his compound before his absence was discovered.^[41][42] With the help of his wife, Chen went over the wall around his house; he broke his foot when he landed on the other side.^[43]

Communicating with a network of activists via a cell phone that had been smuggled to him, he then slipped past the layers of security around his village.^[42] When he encountered the Meng River, which was too wide to cross, he took the risk of crossing a guarded bridge, but was not stopped; he later stated that he believed the guards had been asleep.^[43] Though he was familiar with his immediate surroundings from his childhood explorations, he eventually passed into less familiar territory, telling his supporters that he fell more than 200 times during his escape. Twenty hours after leaving his home, he reached a pre-determined pickup point where He Peirong, an English teacher and activist, was waiting.^[42][44] A chain of human rights activists then smuggled him into Beijing.^[42] Several of the activists reported to be involved were detained or disappeared in the days following the announcement of Chen's escape.^[10] On 25 April, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton approved a request to smuggle Chen into the US Embassy.^[45]

On 27 April, Chen Guangcheng's supporters announced the escape and that Chen was safe in Beijing at an undisclosed location.^[46] Hu stated that Chen was given refuge at the U.S. Embassy, which the Embassy refused to confirm or deny.^[41] According to supporters, Chen was not attempting to leave China, but was hoping to negotiate with authorities "to live like a normal Chinese citizen".^[47] The New York Times described the reports that the U.S. Embassy was sheltering Chen as a "diplomatic quandary" at a time when the U.S. was seeking to improve relations with China and seeks its support with respect to crises in Iran, Sudan, Syria, and North Korea.^[38] Likely Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney called on Barack Obama's administration to "do everything it can" to protect Chen from returning to custody.^[48] Kurt M. Campbell, an assistant secretary of state, arrived in Beijing on 29 April. An atmosphere of secrecy continued with the location of Chen remaining unknown.^[49]

Also on 27 April, Chen posted a video to YouTube, in which he expressed his concern that the authorities would carry out "insane retribution" on his family^[50] and made three demands of Premier Wen Jiabao: 1) that local officials who allegedly assaulted his family be prosecuted; 2) that his family's safety be guaranteed; and 3) that the Chinese government prosecute corruption cases under the law. Chen's brother, Chen Guangfu, and nephew, Chen Kegui, were reportedly both arrested in Dongshigu on suspicions of aiding his escape.^[46] Amnesty International called on China to guarantee the safety of Chen, his family, and his friends, stating, "It is time for this shameful saga to end."^[51]

BBC News described Chen's escape as "an unwelcome time for China's leaders" to face further embarrassment following the incident that resulted in removal of politburo member Bo Xilai amidst a corruption scandal.^[46] Within twenty-four hours, Chen's name as well as the phrases "CGC" and "the blind man" had been blocked by Chinese online censors in an effort to quell Internet discussion of the case.^[52] On the day Chen announced his escape, Chinese state media did not carry "a single line of news" referring to it.^[53] The New York Times wrote that news of the escape "electrified China’s rights activists".^[42]

Negotiations and exit from U.S. embassy[link]

Chen (left) with Gary Locke (center) and Kurt M. Campbell (right) at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing on 1 May 2012

Negotiations between U.S. State Department officials and their counterparts from the Chinese foreign ministry began on 26 April 2012. On 2 May, Chen called Washington Post reporter Keith B. Richburg in a call arranged by U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke. Chen reported that he was safe and was headed to a local hospital with Locke. Chen himself asked to call the reporter. He also placed calls to Clinton and his lawyer.^[54]

According to U.S. State Department officials, Chen had been sheltered by the U.S. embassy on humanitarian grounds where, with the assistance of American diplomats, he successfully negotiated with the Chinese government. On 2 May, he left the embassy, was reunited with his family, and admitted to Beijing's Chaoyang Hospital for medical treatment. According to embassy representatives, the agreement provided that Chen would be freed from soft detention, relocated, and be permitted to finish his legal education at one of several law schools. An embassy representative described the Chinese negotiator as working toward a resolution "intensely and with humanity". It was not immediately clear how Chen's protection would be provided or enforced,^[11] though Chinese officials did reportedly promise to investigate "extra-legal activities" of Shandong province authorities taken against Chen and his family.^[55] According to U.S. officials, Chen never asked for asylum or considered leaving China. His demand was to live as a free man in China.^[11] US officials said under the arrangement agreed to by the United States, China and Chen, he would be relocated to Tianjin where he would be allowed to enroll at a university to pursue his law studies. "He will have several university options," one of the officials said.^[56]

Some initial reports disputed the official U.S. account of the negotiations. After Chen's departure from the U.S. embassy, Zeng Jinyan, a Chinese human rights activist and friend of Chen, cited a phone conversation she had with Chen when she issued several statements on Twitter (confirmed as authentic by The Los Angeles Times) claiming that Chen was coerced into staying in China by threats made to his family by Chinese officials, which were allegedly relayed to Chen by U.S. embassy officials.^[57] These statements contradicted aspects of the account delivered shortly after Chen's departure by U.S. State Department officials, who did not mention such threats, instead reiterating that Chen had repeatedly expressed the desire to stay in China and had made the decision to leave the embassy "of his own freewill."^[58] In a phone call Chen made to the Associated Press on the night of 2 May from his hospital in Beijing, he alleged that U.S. officials had relayed a message to him that Chinese officials had threatened to beat his wife to death if he did not leave the U.S. embassy. He also stated that he now wished to leave China with his family out of fear for their safety.^[59][60][56]

In response to these reports, U.S. negotiators stated that they told Chen while he was in the embassy that Chinese officials had said that if he left China to seek asylum in the United States, his wife and daughter would probably be kept under house arrest in Shandong. However, they maintained that they had not heard of the threats from local officials that his family would be beaten, and that they had not communicated such a message to Chen. Jerome Cohen, an American law professor and friend of Chen Guangcheng who assisted in the negotiations regarding Chen's fate, suggested that Chen probably heard of these threats after leaving the embassy, arriving at the hospital, and speaking with his wife, which "might have made him regret the decision" to leave the embassy.^[61] On 3 May, Chen clarified to the BBC that he had become aware of the threats against his family after leaving the U.S. Embassy, and at that point changed his mind about wishing to stay in the country.^[62]

On 2 May, spokesperson of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Liu Weimin, stated that China demands that the US apologizes for the Chen incident, investigates its acts and never interferes in China's domestic matters in such way again.^[63] In an editorial on 4 May, Beijing Daily described Chen as "a tool and a pawn for American politicians to blacken China".^[64] The daily also accused US Ambassador Gary Locke of stirring up trouble by taking in Chen, and questioned Locke's motives.^[65]

After Chen expressed his desire to leave China, on 4 May Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Liu Weimin indicated that, if Chen wished to study abroad, "he can apply through normal channels to the relevant departments in accordance with the law, just like any other Chinese citizen."^[66] On the same day, he was offered a visiting scholar position at New York University.^[67] On 19 May, Chen, his wife, and his two children had been granted U.S. visas and departed Beijing on a commercial flight for Newark, New Jersey.^[68][69] As of 20 May, 2012, Chen resides at a housing complex in Greenwich Village, Manhattan in New York City with his family. The complex houses faculty and students of New York University.^[70]

International notice[link]

In 2007, Chen Guangcheng was named one of the Time 100, Time's annual list of "100 men and women whose power, talent or moral example is transforming our world". The citation stated, "He may have lost his sight as a child, but Chen Guangcheng's legal vision has helped illuminate the plight of thousands of Chinese villagers."^[8]

Later that year, Chen won the Ramon Magsaysay Award while still in detention.^[71] The award, often called the "Asian Nobel Prize", was bestowed for "his irrepressible passion for justice in leading ordinary Chinese citizens to assert their legitimate rights under the law".^[72] On 24 August 2007, AIDS activist Hu Jia reported that the passport of Chen's wife Yuan Weijing had been revoked and her mobile phone confiscated by Chinese authorities at Beijing Capital International Airport on her way to attend the Magsaysay Award ceremony on her husband's behalf.^[73]

According to The New York Times, shortly before leaving China on 19 May 2012, Chen Guangcheng made remarks expressing concern that his relatives and other activists who had helped him evade capture by security agents in Beijing would be punished by Chinese officials after his departure; and on 24 May 2012, it was reported that his brother, Chen Guangfu, had escaped to Beijing from his guarded village to advocate on behalf of his son, who had been in police custody since he attacked a group of plainclothes officers who had broken into the family home in their search for Chen Guangcheng, as stated by Chen Guangfu's lawyer, Ding Xikui.^[74]

See also[link]

	People's Republic of China portal
	Biography portal

• Fang Lizhi
• Weiquan movement

References[link]