Infield shift

Originally called the "Boudreau" or "Williams" shift, it was used during the 1946 World Series between the Red Sox and the Cardinals as a defensive gimmick by St. Louis manager Eddie Dyer to psych out and hopefully contain Boston slugger Ted Williams. It was devised by Cleveland Indians manager Lou Boudreau on a blackboard between games of a doubleheader in July 1946 to halt Williams' hot hitting. "I always considered The Boudreau Shift a psychological, rather than a tactical victory," wrote Lou Boudreau in his book, Player-Manager. The shift has been employed since then to thwart extreme pull hitters (mostly lefties), such as Barry Bonds, Ryan Howard, Jason Giambi, or David Ortiz.

Canonically, the third baseman moves to shallow left field, shadowed by the left fielder; the shortstop plays to the right of second; the second baseman plays between first and second; the center fielder plays right-center; and the first baseman and right fielder hug the foul line. While this is the most common type of defensive shift seen in baseball, there are numerous variations that can be implemented according to the hitting ability of the batter. For example, an effective defensive shift against Joe Mauer would have the infield shifted for a pull-happy left hander, and the outfield shifted for a pull-happy right hander, due to Mauer's uncommon tendency to pull nearly all of his groundballs, and hit nearly all of his flyballs to the opposite field.

Infield shifts have become more common in recent years, and the tactic's drawbacks have become more apparent. For example, in the 2009 World Series, Johnny Damon of the New York Yankees stole two bases on one pitch against the Philadelphia Phillies due to an infield shift: Damon stole second, and, after the third baseman covered second and was pulled away from the base, immediately headed for the uncovered third base.

In the 1970s, Willie McCovey of the San Francisco Giants bunted hard down the third base line when the shift was on. Willie Mays, on first at the time, came all the way around to score, while McCovey reached second for a double. Despite this obvious flaw in the defensive shift, in which all the hitter would need to do to reach base is hit a bunt down the third base line that gets past the pitcher, this tactic is rarely done, even though repeated success with the play would likely cause the defense to abandon the shift, giving the hitter a much better chance of achieving a base hit when hitting normally.

References