Coordinates: 26°50′N 106°50′E / 26.833°N 106.833°E / 26.833; 106.833

Guizhou Province
Chinese : 贵州省 Guìzhōu Shěng
Abbreviations: 黔 or 贵/貴  (pinyin: Qián or Guì)
Origin of name	贵 guì - Gui Mountains 州 zhōu - zhou (prefecture)
Administration type	Province
Capital (and largest city)	Guiyang
CPC Ctte Secretary	Shi Zongyuan
Governor	Zhao Kezhi
Area	176,100 km2 (68,000 sq mi) (16th)
- Latitude	24° 37' to 29° 13' N
- Longitude	103° 36' to 109° 33' E
Population (2010)  - Density	34,746,468 (19th) 198 /km2 (510 /sq mi) (18th)
GDP (2011)  - per capita	CNY 570.1 billion US$ 90.5 billion (26th) CNY 13,119 US$ 1,938 (31st)
HDI (2008)	0.690 (medium) (30th)
Ethnic composition	Han - 62% Miao - 12% Buyei - 8% Dong - 5% Tujia - 4% Yi - 2% Undistinguished - 2% Gelao - 2% Sui - 1%
Languages and dialects	Southwestern Mandarin
Prefectural level	9 divisions
County level	88 divisions
Township level*	1539 divisions
ISO 3166-2	CN-52
Official website http://www.gzgov.gov.cn (Simplified Chinese)
Source for population and GDP data: 《中国统计年鉴—2005》 China Statistical Yearbook 2005 ISBN 7503747382 Source for nationalities data: 《2000年人口普查中国民族人口资料》 Tabulation on nationalities of 2000 population census of China ISBN 7105054255 *As at December 31, 2004
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 Guizhou (help·info) (simplified Chinese: 贵州; traditional Chinese: 貴州; pinyin: Guìzhōu; Wade–Giles: Kuei-chou; Postal map spelling: Kweichow) is a province of the People's Republic of China located in the southwestern part of the country. Its provincial capital city is Guiyang.

History[link]

During the Chinese Han Dynasty from about the third to the first centuries BCE, Guizhou was home to the powerful and independent Yelang polity, which covered parts of modern day Guizhou, Hunan, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces.

During the 8th and 9th centuries in the Tang Dynasty, Chinese soldiers moved into Guizhou (Kweichow) and married native women, their descendants are known as Lao-han-jen (original Chinese), in contrast to new Chinese who colonized Guizhou at later times. They still speak an archaic dialect.^[1] Many immigrants to Guizhou were descended from these soldiers in garrisons who married non Chinese women.^[2]

It was not until the Ming Dynasty^{[citation needed]}that it came under heavy Chinese settlement and domination during which it was made a province. This prompted mass migration from Sichuan, Hunan and its surrounding provinces into Guizhou. The Miao revolted several times against Ming during the Miao Rebellions (Ming Dynasty).

During the Qing Dynasty, Han Chinese soldiers moved into the Taijiang region of Guozhou, married Miao women, and the children were brought up as Miao.^[3][4]

Many rebellions by its native Miao people occurred throughout the Qing Dynasty like the rebellion in 1735, the uprising of 1795-1806^[5] and the longest being the revolt of 1854–1873. It was said in the Qing Dynasty that every thirty years there would be minor revolts, while every sixty years there would be major rebellions. All the revolts would be violently suppressed by the government.^[6]

Geography[link]

Bouyei minority Shitou village, west Guizhou (near Longgong caves), China.

Guizhou adjoins Sichuan Province and Chongqing Municipality to the north, Yunnan Province to the west, Guangxi Province to the south and Hunan Province to the east. Overall Guizhou is a mountainous province however it is more hilly in the west while the eastern and southern portions are relatively flat. The western part of the province forms part of the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau.

Other cities include: Anshun, Kaili, Zunyi, Duyun, Liupanshui and Qingzhen.

Guizhou has a subtropical humid climate. There are few seasonal changes. Its annual average temperature is roughly 10 to 20 °C, with January temperatures ranging from 1 to 10°C and July temperatures ranging from 17 to 28 °C.

Like in China's other southwest provinces, rural areas of Guizhou suffered severe drought during spring 2010. One of China's poorest provinces, Guizhou is experiencing serious environmental problems, such as desertification and persistent water shortages. On 3–5 April 2010, China's Premier Wen Jiabao went on a three days inspection tour in the southwest drought-affected province of Guizhou, where he met villagers and called on agricultural scientists to develop drought-resistant technologies for the area.^[7]

Politics[link]

The politics of Guizhou is structured in a dual party-government system like all other governing institutions in mainland China.

The Governor of Guizhou is the highest ranking official in the People's Government of Guizhou. However, in the province's dual party-government governing system, the Governor has less power than the Guizhou Communist Party of China Provincial Committee Secretary, colloquially termed the "Guizhou CPC Party Chief".

Administrative divisions[link]

Guizhou is made up of 9 prefecture-level divisions, 88 county-level divisions, and 1543 township-level divisions.

The nine prefecture-level divisions are:

Map	#	Name	Administrative Seat	Hanzi Hanyu Pinyin	Population (2010)
	— Prefecture-level city —
	6	Guiyang	Yunyan District	贵阳市 Guìyáng Shì	4,324,561
	1	Bijie	Qixingguan District	毕节市 Bìjíe Shì	6,536,370
	2	Zunyi	Honghuagang District	遵义市 Zūnyì Shì	6,127,009
	3	Tongren	Bijiang District	铜仁市 Tóngrén Shì	3,092,365
	4	Liupanshui	Zhongshan District	六盘水市 Liùpánshuǐ Shì	2,851,180
	5	Anshun	Xixiu District	安顺市 Ānshùn Shì	2,297,339
	— Autonomous prefecture —
	7	Qianxinan (for Buyei & Miao)	Xingyi	黔西南布依族苗族自治州 Qiánxī'nán Bùyīzú Miáozú Zìzhìzhōu	2,805,857
	8	Qiannan (for Buyei & Miao)	Duyun	黔南布依族苗族自治州 Qiánnán Bùyīzú Miáozú Zìzhìzhōu	3,231,161
	9	Qiandongnan (for Miao & Dong)	Kaili	黔东南苗族侗族自治州 Qiándōngnán Miáozú Dòngzú Zìzhìzhōu	3,480,626

Economy[link]

Guizhou is a relatively poor and economically undeveloped province, but rich in natural, cultural and environmental resources. Its nominal GDP for 2011 was 570.18 billion yuan (90.5 billion USD). Its per capita GDP of 10,258 RMB (1,502 USD) ranks last in all of the PRC.

Its natural industry includes timber and forestry.^[8] Guizhou is also the third largest producer of tobacco in China, and home to the well-known brand Guizhou Tobacco.^[9] Other important industries in the province include energy (electricity generation) - a large portion of which is exported to Guangdong and other provinces^[9] - and mining, especially in coal, limestone, arsenic, gypsum, and oil shale.^[8] Guizhou's total output of coal was 118 million tons in 2008, a 7% growth from the previous year.^[10] Guizhou's export of power to Guangdong equaled 12% of Guangdong's total power consumption. Over the next 5 years Guizhou hopes to increase this by as much as 50%.^[11]

Economic and Technological Development Zones[link]

• Guiyang Economic & Technological Development Area
• Guiyang National New & Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone

Transportation[link]

The Beipanjiang River Railway Bridge on the Liupanshui–Baiguo Railway in western Guizhou is the highest railway bridge in the world.

Rail[link]

The main trucklines of Guizhou's rail network are the Shanghai–Kunming, Sichuan–Guizhou and Guizhou–Guangxi Railways, which form a cross centered at Guiyang. The Chongqing–Huaihua Railway cuts across the northeast corner of the province at Tongren, the Neijiang–Kunming Railway skirts the northwest corner of the province at Weining and the Nanning–Kunming Railway passes through Xingyi in the southwest corner. The Weishe–Hongguo, Pan County West and Liupanshui–Baiguo Railways in western Guizhou are used to transport coal mined in the region.

Demographics[link]

The long-horn tribe, one of the small branches of Miao living in the twelve villages near Zhijing (织金) County, Guizhou Province. The wooden horns remain daily attire for most women.

Guizhou is demographically one of China's most diverse provinces. Minority groups account for more than 37% of the population and they include Miao (including Gha-Mu and A-Hmao), Yao, Yi, Qiang, Dong, Zhuang, Buyei, Bai, Tujia, Gelao and Sui. 55.5% of the province area is designated as autonomous regions for ethnic minorities. Guizhou is the province with the highest fertility rate in China, standing at 2.19. (Urban-1.31, Rural-2.42)^[12]

Food and drink[link]

Guizhou is the home of the famous wine, Maotai Liquor.^[13]

Guizhou cuisine is similar to Szechuan and Hunan cuisine.

Tourism[link]

Huangguoshu Waterfall, the largest in China.

Drum tower in the Dong village of Zhaoxing, southern Guizhou.

The province has many covered bridges, called Wind and Rain Bridges. These were built by the Dong minority people.

The southeastern corner of the province is known for its unique Dong minority culture. Towns such as Rongjiang, Liping, Diping and Zhaoxing are scattered amongst the hills along the border with Guangxi.

The rich population of minorities in Guizhou allow for a great many ethnic festivals throughout the lunar calendar. During the first lunar month (usually February), the early festival in Kaili (east of Guiyang) celebrates local culture with acts of bullfighting, horse racing, pipe playing, and comedy works.

Colleges and universities[link]

• Guizhou University (Guiyang)
• Guizhou Normal University (Guiyang)
• Zunyi Medical College (Zunyi)
• Guiyang Medical University (Guiyang)
• Guizhou Nationalities University (Guiyang)

Media[link]

• Guizhou Daily

References[link]

External links[link]

• (Chinese (PRC))Guizhou government website
• (English)Guiyang Government website
• (English)Arts and culture of southwest China
• (English)Guizhou Sister Rice Festival
• (English) Guizhou travel guide from Wikitravel

	Sichuan	Chongqing
	Yunnan		Hunan
		Guizhou    East
		Guangxi

v t e Provincial level divisions of the People's Republic of China Provinces Anhui Fujian Gansu Guangdong Guizhou Hainan Hebei Heilongjiang Henan Hubei Hunan Jiangsu Jiangxi Jilin Liaoning Qinghai Shaanxi Shandong Shanxi Sichuan Yunnan Zhejiang Autonomous regions Guangxi Inner Mongolia (Nei Mongol) Ningxia Tibet (Xizang) Xinjiang Municipalities Beijing Chongqing Shanghai Tianjin Special administrative regions Hong Kong Macau Territorial disputes Paracel, Spratly, Zhongsha Islands (see Paracels, Spratlys, & Zhongsha Iss. Authority) Pratas Islands Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands) South Tibet Taiwan, Quemoy & Matsu (see Legal status of Taiwan)

Hmong people

Flower Hmong in traditional dress at the market in Bắc Hà, Vietnam
Total population
4 to 5 million[1]
Regions with significant populations
People's Republic of China 3 million  Vietnam 787,604 (1999)  Laos 460,000 (2005)  United States 221,948 (2008)[2]  Thailand 151,080 (2002)  France 15,000  Australia 2,190[3]  French Guiana 1,500  Canada 600  Argentina 600  Germany 500
Languages
Hmong and Mong
Religion
Shamanism, Buddhism, Christianity, others

The Hmong (RPA: Hmoob/Moob, IPA: [m̥ɔ̃ŋ]), are an Asian ethnic group from the mountainous regions of China, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Hmong are also one of the sub-groups of the Miao ethnicity (苗族) in southern China. Hmong groups began a gradual southward migration in the 18th century due to political unrest and to find more arable land.

A number of Hmong people fought against the communist Pathet Lao during the Laotian Civil War. Hmong people were singled out for retribution when the Pathet Lao took over the Laotian government in 1975, and tens of thousands fled to Thailand seeking political asylum. Thousands of these refugees have resettled in Western countries since the late 1970s, mostly the United States but also in Australia, France, French Guiana, Canada, and South America. Others have been returned to Laos under United Nations-sponsored repatriation programs. Around 8,000 Hmong refugees remain in Thailand.^[4]

Nomenclature[link]

Hmong people have their own terms for their subcultural divisions, Hmong Der (aka "White Hmong") and Mong Leng (aka Mong Njua or "Green Mong") being the terms for two of the largest groups in America and Southeast Asia. In the Romanized Popular Alphabet, developed in the 1950s in Laos, these terms are written Hmoob Dawb/Moob Dlawb (White Hmong) and Moob Leeg/Hmoob Ntsuab (Mong Leng). The doubled vowels indicate nasalization, and the final consonants indicate with which of the eight lexical tones the word is pronounced. White Hmong and Mong Leng people speak mutually intelligible dialects of the Hmong language with some differences in pronunciation and vocabulary. One of the most obvious differences is the use of the aspirated /m/ in White Hmong by the sound of "H", which is used when it is written in Romanized Popular Alphabet. In Mong Leng dialect the sound of "H" is not in used. Hmong groups are often named after the dominant colors, patterns of their traditional clothing, head-dress, and the provinces they came from. The Hmong groups in Laos, from the 18 century to the present day, are known as Black Hmong (Hmoog Dub/Moob Dlub), Striped Hmong (Hmoob Txaij/Moob Txaij), White Hmong (Hmoob Dawb/Moob Dlawb), and Green Hmong (Hmoob Ntsuab/Moob Leej). In other places in Asia groups are also known as Black Hmong (Hmoob Dub/Moob Dlub or Hmong Den), Striped Hmong (Hmoob Txaij or Hmoob Quas Npab), Hmong Shi, Hmong Pe, Hmong Pua, and Hmong Xau, Hmong Xanh (Green Hmong), Hmong Do (Red Hmong), Na Mieo and various other subgroups.^[5] These include the Flower Hmong or the Variegated Hmong (Hmong Lenh or Hmong Hoa), so named because of the bright colorful embroidery (called pa ndau, literally "flower cloth").^[6] Vietnamese Hmong women continuing to wear 'traditional' clothing tend to source much of their clothing as 'ready to wear' cotton (as against traditional hemp) from markets, though some add embroidery as a personal touch. In SaPa, now with a 'standardised' clothing look, Black Hmong sub-groups have differentiated themselves by adopting different headwear; those with a large comb embedded in their long hair (but without a hat) call themselves Tao, those with a pillbox hat name themselves Giay, and those with a checked headscarf are Yao. For many, such as Flower Hmong, the heavily beaded skirts and jackets are manufactured in China.

Since 1949, Miao has been an official term for one of the 55 official minority groups recognized by the government of the People's Republic of China. The Miao live mainly in southern China, in the provinces of Guizhou, Hunan, Yunnan, Sichuan, Guangxi, Hainan, Guangdong, Hubei, and elsewhere in China. According to the 2000 censuses, the number of 'Miao' in China was estimated to be about 9.6 million. The Miao nationality includes Hmong people as well as other culturally and linguistically related ethnic groups who do not call themselves Hmong. These include the Hmu, Kho (Qho) Xiong, and A Hmao. The White Miao (Bai Miao) and Green Miao (Qing Miao) are Hmong groups.

Usage of the term "Miao" in Chinese documents dates back to the Shi Ji (1st century BC) and the Zhan Guo Ce (late Western Han Dynasty). During this time, it was generally applied to people of the southern regions thought to be descendants of the San Miao kingdom (dated to around the 3rd millennium BC.) The term does not appear again until the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), by which time it had taken on the connotation of "barbarian." Interchangeable with "man" and "yi," it was used to refer to the indigenous people of the south-western frontier who refused to submit to imperial rule. During this time, references to Raw (Sheng) and Cooked (Shu) Miao appear, referring to level of assimilation and political cooperation of the two groups. Not until the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) do more finely grained distinctions appear in writing. Even then, discerning which ethnic groups are included in various classifications can be problematic.^[7] This inconsistent usage of "Miao" makes it difficult to say for sure if Hmong and Mong people are always included in these historical writings. Linguistic evidence, however, places Hmong and Mong people in the same regions of southern China that they inhabit today for at least the past 2,000 years.^[8] By the mid-18th century, classifications become specific enough that it is easier to identify references to Hmong and Mong people.

In Southeast Asia, Hmong people are referred to by other names, including: Vietnamese: Mèo or H'Mông; Lao: ແມ້ວ (Maew) or ມົ້ງ (Mong); Thai: แม้ว (Maew) or ม้ง (Mong); Burmese: mun lu-myo (မံုလူမ်ိဳး). "Mèo", or variants thereof, is considered highly derogatory by many Hmong people and is infrequently used today outside of Southeast Asia.^[9]

Because the Hmong lived mainly in the highland areas of Southeast Asia and China, the French occupiers of Southeast Asia gave them the name Montagnards or "mountain people", but this should not be confused with the Degar people of Vietnam, who were also referred to as Montagnards.

A Flower Hmong woman in Vietnam

A typical rammed earth house building technique of flower Hmong in Vietnam

Controversy over nomenclature[link]

Hmong and Mong[link]

When Western authors came in contact with Hmong people, beginning in the 18th century, they referred to them in writing by ethnonyms assigned by the Chinese (i.e., Miao, or variants).^{[citation needed]} This practice continued into the 20th century. Even ethnographers studying the Hmong people in Southeast Asia often referred to them as Meo, a corruption of Miao applied by Thai and Lao people to the Hmong. Although "Meo" was an official term, it was often used as an insult against Hmong people and it is considered to be highly derogatory.^[10] In the middle of the 20th century, a concerted effort was made to refer to Hmong by their own ethnonyms in scholarly literature.^{[citation needed]} By the 1970s, it became standard to refer to the entire ethnic group as "Hmong."^{[citation needed]} This was reinforced during the influx of Hmong immigrants to the United States after 1975. Research proliferated, much of it being directed toward the American Hmong Der community.^{[citation needed]} Several states with Hmong populations issued official translations only in the Hmong Der dialect. At the same time, some Mong Leng people voiced concerns that the supposed inclusive term "Hmong" only served to exclude them from the national discourse.

The issue came to a head during the passage of California State Assembly Bill (AB) 78, in the 2003–2004 season.^[11] Introduced by Doua Vu and Assembly Member Sarah Reyes, District 31 (Fresno), the bill encouraged changes in secondary education curriculum to include information about the Secret War and the role of Hmong people in the war. Furthermore, the bill called for the use of oral histories and first hand accounts from Hmong people who had participated in the war and who were caught up in the aftermath. Originally, the language of the bill mentioned only "Hmong" people, intending to include the entire community. A number of Mong Leng activists, led by Dr. Paoze Thao (Professor of Linguistics and Education at California State University, Monterey Bay), drew attention to the problems associated with omitting "Mong" from the language of the bill. They noted that despite nearly equal numbers of Hmong Der and Mong Leng in the United States, resources are disproportionately directed toward the Hmong Der community. This includes not only scholarly research, but also the translation of materials, potentially including curriculum proposed by the bill.^[12] Despite these arguments, "Mong" was not added to the bill. In the version that passed the assembly, "Hmong" was replaced by "Southeast Asians", a more broadly inclusive term.

Dr. Paoze Thao and some others feel strongly that "Hmong" can refer only to Hmong Der people and does not include Mong Leng people. He feels that the usage of "Hmong" in reference to both groups perpetuates the marginalization of Mong Leng language and culture. Thus, he advocates the usage of both "Hmong" and "Mong" when referring to the entire ethnic group.^[13] Other scholars, including anthropologist Dr. Gary Yia Lee (a Hmong Der person), suggest that "Hmong" has been used for the past 30 years to refer to the entire community and that the inclusion of Mong Leng people is understood.^[14] Some argue that such distinctions create unnecessary divisions within the global community and will only confuse non-Hmong and Mong people trying to learn more about Hmong and Mong history and culture.^[15]

As a compromise alternative, the ethnologist Jacques Lemoine has begun to use the term (H)mong when referring to the entirety of the Hmong and Mong community.^[1]

Hmong, Mong, and Miao[link]

Some non-Chinese Hmong advocate that the term Hmong be used not only for designating their dialect group, but also for the other Miao groups living in China. They generally claim that the word "Miao" or "Meo" is a derogatory term, with connotations of barbarism, that probably should not be used at all. The term was later adapted by Tai-speaking groups in Southeast Asia where it took on especially insulting associations for Hmong people despite its official status.^[16] In modern China, the term "Miao" does not carry these negative associations and people of the various sub-groups that constitute this officially recognized nationality freely identify themselves as Miao or Chinese, typically reserving more specific ethnonyms for intra-ethnic communication. During the struggle for political recognition after 1949, it was actually members of these ethnic minorities who campaigned for identification under the umbrella term "Miao"—taking advantage of its familiarity and associations of historical political oppression.^[17]

Contemporary transnational interactions between Hmong in the West and Miao groups in China, following the 1975 Hmong diaspora, have led to the development of a global Hmong identity that includes linguistically and culturally related minorities in China that previously had no ethnic affiliation.^[18] Scholarly and commercial exchanges, increasingly communicated via the Internet, have also resulted in an exchange of terminology, including Hmu and A Hmao people identifying as Hmong and, to a lesser extent, Hmong people accepting the designation "Miao," within the context of China. Such realignments of identity, while largely the concern of economically elite community leaders, reflect a trend towards the interchangeability of the terms "Hmong" and "Miao."^[19]

History[link]

The early history of the Hmong has proven difficult to trace. According to Ratliff, there is linguistic evidence to suggest that they have occupied the same areas of southern China for at least the past 2,000 years.^[20] Evidence from mitochondrial DNA in Hmong–Mien / Miao–Yao–speaking populations supports the southern origins of maternal lineages even further back in time, although Hmong/Miao-speaking populations show more contact with northeast Asians (i.e., northern Han) than Mien/Yao populations.^[21] Historical Chinese documents describe that area being inhabited by 'Miao' people, a group with whom Hmong people are often identified.

A scene depicting the Chinese Empire (Qing Dynasty)'s campaign against the Miao people at Lancaoping in 1795.

Yet, the history of the 'Miao' cannot be equated with the history of the Hmong. Although the term 'Miao' is used today by the Chinese government to denote a group of linguistically and culturally related people (including the Hmong, Hmu, Kho Xiong, and A Hmao), it has been used inconsistently in the past. Throughout the written history of China, it was applied to a variety of peoples considered to be marginal to Han society, including many who are unrelated to contemporary Hmong and Mong people. Christian Culas and Jean Michaud note: "In all these early accounts, then, until roughly the middle of the 19th century, there is perpetual confusion about the exact identity of the population groups designated by the term Miao. We should therefore be cautious with respect to the historical value of any early associations."^[22]

Conflict between Miao groups and newly arrived settlers increased during the 18th century under repressive economic and cultural reforms imposed by the Qing Dynasty. This led to armed conflict and large-scale migrations continuing into the late 19th century, the period during which most Hmong people emigrated to Southeast Asia. The process began as early as the late-17th century, before the time of major social unrest, when small groups went in search of better agricultural opportunities.^[23]

From July 1919 to March 1921 the Hmong of French Indochina revolted against the colonial authorities in what the French called the War of the Insane (La Guerre du Fou) and what the Hmongs call Rog Paj Cai (named after the leader Paj Cai, but literally means The War of the flowering of the Law).

Geography[link]

Roughly 95% of the Hmong live in Asia. Linguistic data show that the Hmong of the Peninsula stem from the Miao of southern China as one among a set of ethnic groups belonging to the Miao–Yao (also called Hmong–Mien) linguage family.^[24] China does not recognise officially the ethnonym Hmong and instead, clusters that group with an official and wider group: the Miao (8,940,116 in 2000). This explains why there is no precise census data on the Hmong in China. Linguistically and culturally speaking, the Hmong and the other sub-groups of the Miao have little in common.^[25]

A few centuries ago the lowland Chinese started moving into the mountain ranges of China's southwest. This migration combined with major social unrest in southern China in the 18th and 19th century to cause some minorities of Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan, where the majority of the Hmong in China (estimated at around 3 millions) still live today, to migrate south. A number of Hmong thus settled in the ranges of the Indochina Peninsula to practise subsistence agriculture.

Vietnam, where their presence is attested from the late 18th century onwards, is likely to be the first Indochinese country into which the Hmong migrated.^[26] During the colonization of 'Tonkin' (north Vietnam) between 1883 and 1954, a number of Hmong decided to join the Vietnamese Nationalists and Communists, while many Christianized Hmong sided with the French. After the Viet Minh victory, numerous pro-French Hmong had to fall back to Laos and South Vietnam.^[27]

Red Hmong in Vietnam

At the 2009 national census, there were 1,068,189 Hmong living in Vietnam, the vast majority of them in the north of the country. The traditional trade in coffin wood with China and the cultivation of the opium poppy – both prohibited only in 1993 in Vietnam – long guaranteed a regular cash income. Today, converting to cash cropping is the main economic activity. As in China and Laos, there is a certain degree of participation of Hmong in the local and regional administration.^[28] In the late 1990s, several thousands of Hmong have started moving to the Central Highlands and some have crossed the border into Cambodia, constituting the first attested presence of Hmong settlers in that country.

In 2005, the Hmong in Laos numbered 460,000. Hmong settlement there is nearly as ancient as in Vietnam. After decades of distant relations with the Lao kingdoms, closer relations between the French military and some Hmong on the Xieng Khouang plateau were set up after World War II. There, a particular rivalry between members of the Lo and Ly clans developed into open enmity, also affecting those connected with them by kinship. Clan leaders took opposite sides and as a consequence, several thousand Hmong participated in the fighting against the Pathet Lao Communists, while perhaps as many were enrolled in the People's Liberation Army. As in Vietnam, numerous Hmong in Laos also genuinely tried to avoid getting involved in the conflict in spite of the extremely difficult material conditions under which they lived during wartime.^[29]

After the 1975 Communist victory, thousands of Hmong from Laos had to seek refuge abroad (see Laos below). Approximately 30 percent of the Hmong left, although the only concrete figure we have is that of 116,000 Hmong from Laos and Vietnam together seeking refuge in Thailand up to 1990.^[30]

In 2002 the Hmong in Thailand numbered 151,080. The presence of Hmong settlements there is documented from the end of the 19th century. Initially, the Siamese paid little attention to them. But in the early 1950s, the state suddenly took a number of initiatives aimed at establishing links. Decolonization and nationalism were gaining momentum in the Peninsula and wars of independence were raging. Armed opposition to the state in northern Thailand, triggered by outside influence, started in 1967 while here again, many Hmong refused to take sides in the conflict. Communist guerrilla warfare stopped by 1982 as a result of an international concurrence of events that rendered it pointless. Priority is since given by the Thai state to sedentarizing the mountain population, introducing commercially viable agricultural techniques and national education, with the aim of integrating these non-Tai animists within the national identity.^[31]

Burma most likely includes a modest number of Hmong (perhaps around 2,500) but no reliable census has been conducted there recently.^[32]

As result of refugee movements in the wake of the Indochina Wars (1946–1975), in particular in Laos, the largest Hmong community to settle outside Asia went to the United States where approximately 100,000 individuals had already arrived by 1990. California became home to half this group, while the remainder went to Minnesota, Wisconsin, Washington, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. By the same date, 10,000 Hmong had migrated to France, including 1,400 in French Guyana. Canada admitted 900 individuals, while another 360 went to Australia, 260 to China, and 250 to Argentina. Over the following years and until the definitive closure of the last refugee camps in Thailand in 1998, additional numbers of Hmong have left Asia, but the definitive figures are still to be produced.^[33]

Outside of Asia, where about 5% of the world Hmong population now lives, the United States is home to the largest Hmong population. The 2008 Census counted 171,316 persons of Hmong Alone Population,and 221,948 persons of Hmong Alone Population or in Any Combination.^[34] Other countries with significant populations include^[35]:

• France: 15,000
• Australia: 2,000
• French Guiana: 1,500
• Canada and Argentina: 600

Within the United States, the Hmong population is centred in the Upper Midwest (Wisconsin, Minnesota) and California.^[36]

Laos[link]

The "Secret War"[link]

In the early 1960s, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Special Activities Division began to recruit, train and lead the indigenous Hmong people in Laos to fight against North Vietnamese Army intruders into Laos during the Vietnam War. It became a Special Guerrilla Unit led by General Vang Pao. About 60% of the Hmong men in Laos were assisted by the CIA to join fighting for the "Secret War" in Laos.^[37][38] The CIA used the Special Guerrilla Unit as the counter attack unit to block the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the main military supply route from the north to the south.

Hmong soldiers served against the NVA and the Pathet Lao, helping block the Hanoi's Ho Chi Minh trail inside Laos and rescuing downed American pilots. As inhabitants of the more mountainous regions of Laos, the Hmong people earned a special place in the hearts of American combat soldiers because of their strong support for the United States in its fight against the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao communist forces. Though their role was generally kept secret in the early stages of the conflict, they made monumental sacrifices to help the U.S., with 18,000 of their soldiers killed in battle before 1969 alone, and more than 100,000 Hmong losing their lives by the time the U.S. made the decision to pull out of Vietnam.^[39]

General Vang Pao led the Region II (MR2) defense against Vietnam People's Army (NVA) incursion from his headquarters in Long Cheng, also known as Lima Site 20 Alternate (LS 20A).^[40] At the height of its activity, Long Cheng became the second largest city in Laos. Long Cheng was a micro-nation operational site with its own bank, airport, school system, officials, and many other facilities and services in addition to its military units. Before the end of the Secret War, Long Cheng would fall in and out of General Vang Pao's control.

The Secret War began about the time the United States became actively involved in the Vietnam War. Two years after the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, the Kingdom of Laos was overthrown by communist troops supported by the North Vietnamese Army. The Hmong people immediately became targets of retaliation and persecution. While some Hmong returned to their villages and attempted to resume life under the new regime, thousands more made the trek across the Mekong River into Thailand, often under attack. This marked the beginning of a mass exodus of Hmong from Laos. Those who reached Thailand were kept in squalid United Nations refugee camps until they could be resettled. Nearly 20 years later, in the 1990s, a major international debate ensued over whether Hmong refugees remaining in Thailand should be forcibly repatriated to Laos, where they were still subject to persecution, or should be allowed to emigrate to the United States and other Western nations.

Hmong Lao resistance[link]

Hmong girls meet possible suitors while playing a ball-throwing game in Laos.

Of those Hmong who did not flee Laos, somewhere between two and three thousand were sent to re-education camps where political prisoners served terms of 3–5 years. Many Hmong died in these camps, after being subjected to hard physical labor and harsh conditions.^[41] Thousands more Hmong people, mainly former soldiers and their families, escaped to remote mountain regions—particularly Phou Bia, the highest (and thus least accessible) mountain peak in Laos. Initially, some Hmong groups staged attacks against Pathet Lao and Vietnamese troops while others remained in hiding to avoid military retaliation and persecution. Spiritual leader Zong Zoua Her rallied his followers in a guerrilla resistance movement called Chao Fa (RPA: Cob Fab, Pahawh Hmong: ^[42]). Initial military successes by these small bands led to military counter-attacks by government forces, including aerial bombing and heavy artillery, as well as the use of defoliants and possibly chemical weapons.^[43] These events led to the yellow rain controversy, when the United States accused the Soviet Union of supplying and using chemical weapons in this conflict.^[44]

Small groups of Hmong people, many of them second or third generation descendants of former CIA soldiers, remain internally displaced in remote parts of Laos, in fear of government reprisals. Faced with continuing military operations against them by the government and a scarcity of food, some groups have begun coming out of hiding, while others have sought asylum in Thailand and other countries.^[45]

Throughout the Vietnam War, and for two decades following it, the U.S. government stated that there was no "Secret War" in Laos and that the U.S. was not engaged in air or ground combat operations in Laos. In the late 1990s, however, several U.S. conservatives, alleging that the Clinton administration was using the denial of this covert war to justify a repatriation of Thailand-based Hmong war veterans to Laos, urged the U.S. government to acknowledge the existence of the Secret War and to honor the Hmong and U.S. veterans from the war. On May 15, 1997, in a total reversal of U.S. policy, the U.S. government acknowledged that it had supported a prolonged air and ground campaign against the NVA and VietCong. It simultaneously dedicated the Laos Memorial on the grounds of Arlington National Cemetery in honor of the Hmong and other combat veterans from the Secret War.

Controversy over repatriation[link]

In 1989, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with the support of the United States government, instituted the Comprehensive Plan of Action, a program to stem the tide of Indochinese refugees from Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Under the plan, the status of the refugees was to be evaluated through a screening process. Recognized asylum seekers were to be given resettlement opportunities, while the remaining refugees were to be repatriated under guarantee of safety.

After talks with the UNHCR and the Thai government, Laos agreed to repatriate the 60,000 Lao refugees living in Thailand, including several thousand Hmong people. Very few of the Lao refugees, however, were willing to return voluntarily.^[46] Pressure to resettle the refugees grew as the Thai government worked to close its remaining refugee camps. While some Hmong people returned to Laos voluntarily, with development assistance from UNHCR, allegations of forced repatriation surfaced.^[47] Of those Hmong who did return to Laos, some quickly escaped back to Thailand, describing discrimination and brutal treatment at the hands of Lao authorities.^[48]

In 1993, Vue Mai, a former Hmong soldier who had been recruited by the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok to return to Laos as proof of the repatriation program's success, disappeared in Vientiane. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, he was arrested by Lao security forces and was never seen again.

Following the Vue Mai incident, debate over the Hmong's planned repatriation to Laos intensified greatly, especially in the U.S., where it drew strong opposition from many American conservatives and some human rights advocates. In an October 23, 1995 National Review article, Michael Johns, the former Heritage Foundation foreign policy expert and Republican White House aide, labeled the Hmong's repatriation a Clinton administration "betrayal," describing the Hmong as a people "who have spilled their blood in defense of American geopolitical interests."^[49] Debate on the issue escalated quickly. In an effort to halt the planned repatriation, the Republican-led U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives both appropriated funds for the remaining Thailand-based Hmong to be immediately resettled in the U.S.; Clinton, however, responded by promising a veto of the legislation.

In their opposition of the repatriation plans, Republicans also challenged the Clinton administration's position that the Laotian government was not systematically violating Hmong human rights. U.S. Representative Steve Gunderson (R-WI), for instance, told a Hmong gathering: "I do not enjoy standing up and saying to my government that you are not telling the truth, but if that is necessary to defend truth and justice, I will do that."^[50] Republicans also called several Congressional hearings on alleged persecution of the Hmong in Laos in an apparent attempt to generate further support for their opposition to the Hmong's repatriation to Laos.

Although some accusations of forced repatriation were denied,^[51] thousands of Hmong people refused to return to Laos. In 1996, as the deadline for the closure of Thai refugee camps approached, and under mounting political pressure, the U.S. agreed to resettle Hmong refugees who passed a new screening process.^[52] Around 5,000 Hmong people who were not resettled at the time of the camp closures sought asylum at Wat Tham Krabok, a Buddhist monastery in central Thailand where more than 10,000 Hmong refugees were already living. The Thai government attempted to repatriate these refugees, but the Wat Tham Krabok Hmong refused to leave and the Lao government refused to accept them, claiming they were involved in the illegal drug trade and were of non-Lao origin.^[53]

In 2003, following threats of forcible removal by the Thai government, the U.S., in a significant victory for the Hmong, agreed to accept 15,000 of the refugees.^[54] Several thousand Hmong people, fearing forced repatriation to Laos if they were not accepted for resettlement in the U.S., fled the camp to live elsewhere within Thailand where a sizable Hmong population has been present since the 19th-century.^[55]

In 2004 and 2005, thousands of Hmong fled from the jungles of Laos to a temporary refugee camp in the Thai province of Phetchabun.^[56] These Hmong refugees, many of whom are descendants of the former-CIA Secret Army and their relatives, claim that they have been attacked by both the Lao and Vietnamese military forces operating inside Laos as recently as June 2006. The refugees claim that attacks against them have continued almost unabated since the war officially ended in 1975, and have become more intense in recent years.

Lending further support to earlier claims that the government of Laos was persecuting the Hmong, filmmaker Rebecca Sommer documented first-hand accounts in her documentary, Hunted Like Animals,^[57] and in a comprehensive report which includes summaries of claims made by the refugees and was submitted to the U.N. in May 2006.^[58]

The European Union,^[59] UNHCHR, and international groups have since spoken out about the forced repatriation.^{[60][61][62][59]} The Thai foreign ministry has said that it will halt deportation of Hmong refugees held in Detention Centers Nong Khai, while talks are underway to resettle them in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and the United States.^[63]

For the time being, countries willing to resettle the refugees are hindered to proceed with immigration and settlement procedures because the Thai administration does not grant them access to the refugees. Plans to resettle additional Hmong refugees in the U.S. have been complicated by provisions of President George W. Bush's Patriot Act and Real ID Act, under which Hmong veterans of the Secret War, who fought on the side of the United States, are classified as terrorists because of their historical involvement in armed conflict.^[64]

On December 27, 2009, The New York Times reported that the Thai military was preparing to forcibly return 4,000 Hmong asylum seekers to Laos by the end of the year:^[65] the BBC later reported that repatriations had started.^[66] Both United States and United Nations officials have protested this action. Outside government representatives have not been allowed to interview this group over the last three years. Médecins Sans Frontières has refused to assist the Hmong refugees because of what they have called "increasingly restrictive measures" taken by the Thai military.^[67] The Thai military jammed all cellular phone reception and disallowed any foreign journalists from the Hmong camps.^[66]

Alleged plot to overthrow government of Laos[link]

On June 4, 2007, as part of a lengthy and still ongoing federal investigation labeled "Operation Tarnished Eagle," warrants were issued by U.S. federal courts ordering the arrest of Vang Pao and nine others for plotting to overthrow the government of Laos in violation of the federal Neutrality Acts and for multiple weapons charges.^[68] The federal charges allege that members of the group inspected weapons, including AK-47s, smoke grenades, and Stinger missiles, with the intent of purchasing them and smuggling them into Thailand in June 2007 where they were intended to be used by Hmong resistance forces in Laos. The one non-Hmong person of the nine arrested, Harrison Jack, a 1968 West Point graduate and retired Army infantry officer, allegedly attempted to recruit Special Operations veterans to act as mercenaries.

In an effort to obtain the weapons, Jack allegedly met unknowingly with undercover U.S. federal agents posing as weapons dealers, which prompted the issuance of the warrants as part of a long-running investigation into the activities of the U.S.-based Hmong leadership and its supporters.

On June 15, the defendants were indicted by a grand jury and a warrant was also issued for the arrest of an 11th man, allegedly involved in the plot. Simultaneous raids of the defendants homes and work locations, involving over 200 federal, state and local law enforcement officials, were conducted in approximately 15 cities in Central and Southern California.

The defendants face possible life prison terms for violation of the Neutrality Acts and various weapons charges. They initially were denied bail, with a federal court ruling that they were likely flight risks, given their extensive connections, access to private aircraft, and resources.

Multiple protest rallies in support of the suspects, designed to raise awareness of the treatment of Hmong peoples in the jungles of Laos, have taken place in California, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Alaska, and several of Vang Pao's high-level supporters in the U.S. have criticized the California court that issued the arrest warrants, arguing that Vang is a historically important American ally and a valued leader of U.S. and foreign-based Hmong. However, calls for Californian Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and former President George W. Bush to pardon the defendants have yet to be answered, presumably pending a conclusion of the large and still-ongoing federal investigation.^[69]

On September 18, 2009, the federal government dropped all charges against Vang Pao, announcing in a release that the federal government was permitted to consider "the probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted."^[70] On January 10, 2011, after Vang Pao's death, the federal government dropped all charges against the remaining defendants saying, "Based on the totality of the circumstances in the case, the government believes, as a discretionary matter, that continued prosecution of defendants is no longer warranted," according to court documents.^[71]

The Americas[link]

Many Hmong refugees resettled in the United States after the Vietnam War. Beginning in December 1975, the first Hmong refugees arrived in the U.S., mainly from refugee camps in Thailand; however, only 3,466 were granted asylum at that time under the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975. In May 1976, another 11,000 were allowed to enter the United States, and by 1978 some 30,000 Hmong people had immigrated. This first wave was made up predominantly of men directly associated with General Vang Pao's secret army. It was not until the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 that families were able to enter the U.S., becoming the second wave of Hmong immigrants. Today, 260,073 Hmong people reside in the United States^[72] the majority of whom live in California (91,224), Minnesota (66,181), and Wisconsin (49,240).^[73]

In terms of cities and towns, the largest Hmong-American community is in Saint Paul, Minnesota (29,662), followed by Fresno (24,328), Sacramento (16,676), Milwaukee (10,245), and Minneapolis (7,512).^[74]

There are smaller Hmong communities scattered across the country, including those in Michigan (Detroit and Warren); Anchorage, Alaska; Denver, Colorado; North Carolina; Georgia (Auburn, Duluth, Monroe, Atlanta, and Winder); Wisconsin (Eau Claire, Appleton, Green Bay, La Crosse, Sheboygan, and Wausau); Kansas City, Kansas; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Southwest Missouri; and Northwest Arkansas.^[75]

There is also a small community of several thousand Hmong who migrated to French Guiana in the late 1970s and early 1980s.^[76]

Community leaders[link]

• Minnesota State Representative Cy Thao
• Lieutenant Colonel Hang Sao
• Minnesota State Senator Mee Moua
• Pa Chay Vue
• Pa Kao Her
• Touby Lyfoung
• General Vang Pao (recognized as the leader of U.S.-based Hmong)
• Zong Zoua Her

See also[link]

Asia portal

Notes[link]

References[link]

• Fadiman, Anne (1997). The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down: A Hmong Child, Her American Doctors, and the Collision of Two Cultures.. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 0-374-26781-2. 
• Hillmer, Paul. A People’s History of the Hmong (Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2010) 327 pp. ISBN 978-0-87351-726-3
• [TYPN 1992] The section on nomenclature draws heavily on Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter, Number 17, June 1992, Department of Anthropology, Australian National University. Material from that newsletter may be freely reproduced with due acknowledgment.
• W.R. Geddes. Migrants of the Mountains: The Cultural Ecology of the Blue Miao (Hmong Njua) of Thailand. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976.
• Tapp, N., J.Michaud, C.Culas, G.Y.Lee (Eds) 2004 Hmong/Miao in Asia. Chiang Mai (Thailand): Silkworm, 500p.
• Vang, Chia Youyee. Hmong America: Reconstructing Community in Diaspora (University of Illinois Press; 2011) 200 pages; Combines scholarly and personal perspectives in an ethnographic history of the Hmong refugee experience in the United States.

Earlier books[link]

• Edkins, The Miau-tsi Tribes. Foochow: 1870.
• Henry, Lingnam. London: 1886.
• Bourne, Journey in Southwest China. London: 1888.
• A. H. Keaw, Man: Past and Present. Cambridge: 1900.
•  Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Miaotsze". Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. 
• Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942–1992. Indiana: 1999.

External links[link]

Find more about Hmong people on Wikipedia's sister projects:
	Definitions and translations from Wiktionary
	Images and media from Commons
	Learning resources from Wikiversity
	News stories from Wikinews
	Quotations from Wikiquote
	Source texts from Wikisource
	Textbooks from Wikibooks

• Hmong-related web sites edited by Mark Pfeifer of the Hmong Cultural Center.
• Publications list
• Hmong Studies Internet Resource Center
• Hmong culture studies multimedia educational content
• Hmong history and culture articles by Hmong Australian anthropologist, Dr. Gary Yia Lee
• Hmong Contemporary Issues by Hmong French anthropologist and linguist, Dr. Kao-Ly Yang (English, French, and Hmong languages)
• Being Hmong Means Being Free Wisconsin Public Television

Rayson Tan (Pe̍h-ōe-jī: Tân Thài-bîng) is a Singaporean MediaCorp actor.

Before joining MediaCorp, Tan worked as a flight attendant with Singapore Airlines. ^[1] In 1990, he emerged as the 2nd Runner-Up in Singapore's Star Search talent competition. He has worked on many different roles and hosted many TV programmes, including the role of Singaporean war hero Lim Bo Seng in the 1997 WWII drama series The Price of Peace and the host for PSC Night in 2006.

Tan has also been nominated multiple times in the annual Star Awards, especially for the "Best Supporting Actor" award category. In 1997, Tan was voted as one of the Top 10 Most Popular Male Artistes in Singapore.

He is married to fellow MediaCorp actress Chen Liping and they have a son, Xavier.

In 2003, Rayson Tan was sued by actress Andrea De Cruz in the Slim 10 pills saga. Tan was acquitted of the charges in the lawsuit. ^[2]

Dramas[link]

• 1991
  • 金色珊顿道 Golden Shenton Way
  • 家有恶妻 The Woman I Marry
  • 宜家宜乐 Home Sweet Home

• 1992
  • 霹雳红唇 Ladies In Action
  • 浪漫战场 My Buddies
  • 迷离夜 II Mystery II

• 1993
  • 银海惊涛 Reaching For The Stars
  • 皇朝铁将金粉情 The Invincible Warriors
  • 暴雨狂花 Angel of Vengeance

• 1994
  • 昆仑奴 The Valiant On
  • 鹤啸九天 Web of Deceit
  • 聪明糊涂心 Truly Yours

• 1995
  • 阎罗传奇 King Of Hades
  • 天师钟馗之江山美人 Heavenly Ghostcatcher
  • 天师钟馗之杨贵妃 Heavenly Ghostcatcher
  • 阿雪 Ah Xue

• 1996
  • 妈姐情缘 A Different Life
  • 风雨柴船头 River Of Love
  • 第三类剧场 Tales Of The Third Kind

• 1997
  • 婚姻法庭 Courting Trouble
  • 狮城奇案录之第一个上绞台的女人 Crimes And Tribulations
  • 和平的代价 The Price Of Peace
  • 单身女郎 Roses, Complete With Thorns

• 1998
  • 四个好涩的男人 Men At The Crossroad
  • 七个梦 Dreams
  • 哎哟哟奇妙假期 My Teacher, Aiyoyo!
  • 刑事235 Act 235
  • 陌生人 Riding The Storm
  • 医生档案 From The Medical Files

• 1999
  • 另类佳人 Lost Souls
  • 新方世玉 Heroes Of The Times

• 2000
  • 笑敖江湖 The Legendary Swordsman
  • 流金岁月 The Tax File
  • 陸小鳳之鳳舞九天 Master Swordsman Lu Xiaofeng 2

• 2001
  • 三个半女人 Three Women And A Half
  • 敢敢做个开心人VI Don't Worry, Be Happy VI
  • 大酒店 The Hotel

• 2002
  • 考试家族 No Problem
  • 加东Miss Oh Katong Miss Oh

• 2003
  • 1加1等于3 Romance De Amour

• 2004
  • 喜临门I Double Happiness I
  • 美丽家庭 Love Is Beautiful
  • 喜临门II Double Happiness II
  • 遗情未了 Timeless Gift

• 2005
  • 法医X挡案 II Beyond The Axis of Truth II

• 2006
  • 迷云20天 The Undisclosed
  • 百万宝 A Million Treasures

• 2007
  • 凡间新仙人 Happily Ever After (Guest star)
  • 十三鞭 The Homecoming

• 2008
  • 一房，半厅，一水缸 Just in Singapore
  • 心花朵朵开 Love Blossoms (110 episode long running drama)

• 2009
  • 主妇的假期 Housewives' Holiday

• 2010
  • 最火搭档 Unriddle
  • 走进走出 The Family Court
  • 破天网 Breakout

• 2011
  • 警徽天职 C.L.I.F.
  • 星洲之夜 A Song to Remember

• 2012
  • 双星报喜 Double Bonus

Variety shows[link]

• 2002
  • 城市特务 City Spy
• 2004
  • 走走吃吃看一看 New City Beat
• 2006
  • 普威之夜 PSC Night
• 2007
  • 赢万金游万里 2007 Cash Plus Holiday 2007

Achievements[link]

• 1990
  • 2nd Runner Up, Star Search 1990
• 1997
  • Top 10 Most Popular Male Artiste Award, Star Awards 1997

References[link]

External links[link]

• Rayson Tan at the Internet Movie Database

Railway bridge on the Trans-Siberian across the Kama River near Perm

The Eurasian Land Bridge, sometimes called the New Silk Road, is a term used to describe the rail transport route for moving freight and passengers overland from Pacific seaports in Siberia and China to seaports in Europe. The route, a transcontinental railroad and rail land bridge, currently comprises the Trans-Siberian Railway, which runs through Russia and is sometimes called the Northern East-West Corridor and the New Eurasian Land Bridge or Second Eurasian Continental Bridge, running through China and Kazakhstan. As of November 2007, about 1% of the $600 billion in goods shipped from Asia to Europe each year were delivered by inland transport routes.^[1]

Completed in 1916, the Trans-Siberian connects Moscow with Russian Pacific seaports such as Vladivostok. From the 1960s until the early 1990s the railway served as the primary land bridge between Asia and Europe, until several factors caused the use of the railway for transcontinental freight to dwindle. One factor is that the railways of the former Soviet Union (USSR) use a wider rail gauge than most of the rest of Europe and China. Recently, however, the Trans-Siberian has regained ground as a viable land route between the two continents.

China's rail system had long linked to the Trans-Siberian via northeastern China and Mongolia. In 1990 China added a link between its rail system and the Trans-Siberian via Kazakhstan. China calls its uninterrupted rail link between the Chinese port city of Lianyungang and Kazakhstan the New Eurasian Land Bridge or Second Eurasian Continental Bridge. In addition to Kazakhstan, the railways connect with other countries in Central Asia, including Iran, but do not connect all the way to Europe through south Asia.

Proposed expansion of the Eurasian Land Bridge includes construction of a railway across Kazakhstan that is the same gauge as Chinese railways, rail links to India, Burma, Thailand and Malaysia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, construction of a rail tunnel and highway bridge across the Bering Strait to connect the Trans-Siberian to the North American rail system, and construction of a rail tunnel between Korea and Japan. The United Nations has proposed further expansion of the Eurasian Land Bridge, including the Trans-Asian Railway project.

History[link]

Silk Road trading routes during the 1st century CE

Commercial traffic between Europe and Asia took place along the Silk Road from at least the 2nd millennium BCE. The Silk Road was not a specific thoroughfare, but a general route used by traders to travel, much of it by land, between the two continents along the Eurasian Steppes through Central Asia. The 5,000 miles (8,000 km) long route was used to exchange goods, ideas and people primarily between China and India and the Mediterranean and helped create a single-world system of trade between the civilisations of Europe and Asia.^[2]

Exports from Asia transported along the Silk Road included fabrics, carpets, furs, weapons, utensils, metals, farm produce, livestock and slaves. Civilisations active in trading during the road's history included Scythia, Ancient and Byzantine Greece, the Han and Tang dynasties, Parthia, Rouran, Sogdiana, Göktürks, Xiongnu, Yuezhi and the Mongol Empire.^[3]

Beginning in the 5th century CE, new land routes between Asia and Europe developed further to the north, in the Rus'. Many of these routes passed through Yugra and extended to the Baltic region. The Khazars, Volga Bulgaria, and the Rus' Khaganate were active in trading along the northern trade routes.^[3]

Traffic along the southern Silk Road routes greatly diminished with the Fall of Constantinople in the 15th century and development of the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope in the 16th century. By the 18th century, European influence on trade and new national boundaries severely restricted the movement of traders along all land routes between Europe and China, and overland trade between East Asia and Europe virtually disappeared.^[2]

Trans-Siberian Railway[link]

The Trans-Siberian Railway and its various associated branches and supporting lines, completed in 1916, established the first rail connection between Europe and Asia, from Moscow to Vladivostok. The line, at 9,200 kilometres (5,720 mi), is the longest rail line in the world.^[4]

Map of the Trans-Siberian (red) and Baikal-Amur (green) Railways

The Trans-Siberian connects the Russian Pacific ports of Vladivostok and Nakhodka with Moscow. Rail links at Moscow allow passengers and freight to connect to train lines running further west into Europe. By making further transfers, passengers and freight can eventually reach Western European seaports.^[5] The Trans-Siberian also connects with North Korea (e.g. via Dandong in Northeastern China, or directly at Khasan south of Vladivostok).^[6][7]

A fully electrified and double-tracked line, the Trans-Siberian Railway line is capable of transporting around 100 million tons of freight annually. The line can handle up to 200,000 TEU of containerized international transit freight per year.^[8]

A more northerly east-west route across Siberia, parallel to the Trans-Siberian line and known as the Baykal-Amur Mainline was mostly completed in 1989. It terminates at the Pacific ports of Vanino and Sovetskaya Gavan. Although this line is comparatively little used (the management mentions 6 million tons of freight per year, not indicating the year), the management expects the line to be fully used in the foreseeable future for oil and copper ore export, and has plans to double-track it.^[9]

While the Trans-Siberian has always been used by the Czarist, Soviet and modern Russian government to project political power into their territories in Asia, in the 1960s it was opened by the USSR as an international trade route connecting the Western Pacific with Europe. Freight shipments on the Trans-Siberian, however, experienced increasing problems over time with dilapidated rail infrastructures, theft, damaged freight, late trains, inflated freight fees, uncertain scheduling for return of containers and geopolitical tension. As a result, use of the railway for international trade declined to almost zero by the 1990s.^[10]

According to Hofstra University, as of 2001 there was renewed interest in using the Trans-Siberian as a route across Asia to Europe. An advantage of the Trans-Siberian route over the China-Central Asian railway route (detailed below) is that trains must change bogies only once, at the borders of the former USSR.^[11] Also, the Trans-Siberian links directly to railways which ultimately connect, via Finland and Sweden to the year-round ice-free port of Narvik in Norway. At Narvik, freight can be transshipped to ships to cross the Atlantic to North America. Total transit time between Vladivostok and New York using this route is reportedly 10 days.^{[citation needed]} Rail links from Russia also connect to Rotterdam, but may encounter greater congestion along this route with resulting delays. The trade route between the east coast of North America and eastern Russia using the Trans-Siberian is often called the Northern East West Freight Corridor.^[12]

In an effort to attract use of the Trans-Siberian to transport goods from Japan, China, and Korea to Europe, in the mid-1990s Russia lowered tariffs on freight using the railway. As a result, freight volume over the rail line doubled in 1999 and 2000.^[13]

In February and March 2011, Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism sponsored a test of the route by shipping roof tiles to Europe via the Trans-Siberian. The tiles were transported by ship from Hamada, Shimane to Vladivostok, then by the railway to Moscow. The transit time was expected to be 30 days, in comparison with the 50 days on average it takes to ship cargo by ship from Hamada to ports in western Russia. If successful, the ministry would use the results of the test to encourage other Japanese companies to utilize the Trans-Siberian over the sea route.^[14]

China and the land bridge[link]

Direct connections between Russia and China[link]

Manzhouli, China's oldest and busiest rail gate to Russia

The original Moscow-Vladivostok route, completed in 1904, cut across China's northeastern provinces, known in the west as Manchuria; the section of the railway located within China was known as the Chinese Eastern Railway. While the more northerly Trans-Siberian route, located entirely on Russian soil, was completed in 1916, the former Chinese Eastern Railway route continues as an important connector between the two countries' railway networks.^[15]

The western border point (Zabaykalsk/Manchouli) and the line connecting it to the Trans-Siberian main line, are now being upgraded, with the goal of enabling the railway by 2010 to pass 30 freight trains in each direction across the border, each one up to 71 cars long. The cross-border freight volume at this rail crossing is expected to reach 25.5 million tons by 2010.^[16] Besides cargo (principally, Russian oil exported to China), this crossing sees a direct weekly passenger train, Moscow-Beijing, as well as some local passenger trains.^[17] The eastern border point of the former Chinese Eastern Railway, at Suifenhe/Grodekovo, sees significant use as well, with over 8 million tons of freight crossing the border there in 2007,^[18] and regular cross-border passenger service.^[19]

The third, little known and even less used, rail connection between Russia and China two countries was built farther south, between Hunchun and Russian Makhalino (a station on the Ussuriysk-Khasan-North Korean border line, 41 km (25 mi) before Khasan). It began operating in February 2000,^[20] and saw only a minor amount of traffic (678 railcars of lumber) over the next two years. The line was closed in 2002–2003, briefly reopened in 2003, and closed again in September 2004.^[21] On 15 February 2011, the two companies who own the line, Northeast Asia Railway Group, a Chinese company, and JSC Golden Link, a Russian company, signed an agreement to resume operations on the line in May 2011.^[22]

In November 2008, the transport ministries of Russia and the China signed an agreement about creating one more link between the railway systems of the two countries. It will involve a railway bridge between across the Heilongjiang (Amur) River, connecting Tongjiang in China's Jiamusi prefecture with Nizhneleninskoye in Russia's Jewish Autonomous Oblast.^[23][24] On 4 November 2010, the project director, Wang Jin, told Xinhua News Agency that construction on the bridge would begin in January 2011.^[25]

Russia to China via Mongolia[link]

The Trans-Mongolian line, connecting Ulan-Ude on the Trans-Siberian with China's Erenhot via the Mongolian capital Ulan Baator, both serves as landlocked Mongolia's lifeline to the outside world, and the shortest connection between the Trans-Siberian Railway and Beijing. This line's capacity, however, is limited by its being single-track.^[26]

Kazakhstan to China[link]

Terminus of the Lanxin railway at Alataw Pass where the Chinese rail system connects with that of Kazakhstan at Dostyk.

While the USSR had long been connected with China via the rail links in Northeastern China and Mongolia, since the 1950s plans existed to connect the two countries' rail networks at the Kazakhstan/Xinjiang border. The Soviets completed their line from Aktogay (a station on the Turksib in eastern Kazakhstan) to their border station Druzhba (now Dostyk), but the construction on the Chinese side stopped because of the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s. In 1985 construction commenced on the Northern Xinjiang Railway to link the Chinese and Russian rail networks via Kazakhstan. The section between Ürümqi and Alashankou was completed on 16 September 1990, linking the railway lines of the two countries at Dostyk. In July 1991 the first goods train traveled along the line from China to Kazakhstan's then-capital of Almaty.^[27] In December 2009, a second rail link from China was built to the Kazakhstan border at Khorgos. The Jinghe-Yining-Horgos Railway forks off of the Northern Xinjiang Railway at Jinghe and approaches Kazakhstan from the Ili River Valley. A rail link on Kazakh side will extend the line to Saryozek by 2013.^[28]

Because Kazakhstan was once a member of the USSR, its rail system connects with and carries the same rail gauge as the Russian rail system, as well as the other Central Asian republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.^[29]

From Kazakhstan, four major north-south railways connect with the Russian rail system. Two connect with the Trans-Siberian Railway (the Turksib and the Shu-Astana-Petropavl meridional line) while the other two (the Trans-Aral Railway, and the connection via Atyrau and Astrakhan Oblast) go directly to European Russia. These links to the Russian rail system are sometimes called the Eurasian Railway.^[30]

Through service between China and Western Europe[link]

In January 2008 China and Germany inaugurated a long distance freight train service between Beijing and Hamburg. Travelling a total of 10,000 kilometres (6,210 mi), the train uses the China Railways and the Trans-Mongolian line to travel from Xiangtan (in Hunan Province) to Ulan Bator, where it then continues north to the Trans-Siberian. After reaching the end of the Trans-Siberian at Moscow the train continues to Germany via rail links in Belarus and Poland. Total transit time is 15 days, as compared with the 30 days average it would take for the freight to make the same journey by ship. The first train of 50 containers, carrying a mixed load of clothes, ceramics and electronics (for the Fujitsu company), travelled on tracks operated by six different railways.^[31][32]

Hartmut Mehdorn, chairman of Deutsche Bahn (DB), stated in March 2008 that regularly scheduled, weekly China-Germany freight services should be in operation by 2010.^[33] In April 2009, however, DB postponed the service indefinitely because of the global economic crisis.^[34]

Another test run, from Chongqing to Duisburg via Alashankou crossing, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, and Poland took place in March–April 2011, covering 10,300 km (6,400 mi) in 16 days. It was again said by DB that if there is enough demand, the service can be made regular already in 2011,^[35][36]

New Eurasian Land Bridge[link]

The New Eurasian Land Bridge, also called the New Eurasian Continental Bridge, is the name given to China's rail link with Central Asia. The route includes China's east-west railways which, in addition to the Beijiang line, are the Longhai Railway and the Lanxin railway. Together, the railways create an uninterrupted rail link between the port city of Lianyungang and Kazakhstan. In 1995 the Chinese and Kazakhstan governments signed an agreement which allows the latter to use Lianyungang as its primary seaport for exports and imports.^[37] China intends for Lianyungang to serve as the designated starting point for the New Eurasian Land Bridge.^[38]

From Almaty in Kazakhstan, the railway extends to Tashkent and Samarkand, Uzbekistan and then to Tejen, Turkmenistan. From Tejen, another line continues to Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan. After Ashgabat, the line ends at Türkmenbaşy, Turkmenistan, a port on the Caspian Sea.^[39]

In 1996 a branch railway from Tejen was constructed across the border with Iran (at Serakhs) and linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran Railways. The link potentially enables rail freight from China to reach ports on the Persian Gulf and via other train lines, to reach into the Caucasus and Turkey.^[40] The central Asian route, however, does not extend all the way into Europe. There is no rail link yet across the Bosphorus though the Marmaray link is being built and is expected to be completed in 2012.^[41] Iranian rail lines use 1,435mm (4 ft 8½ in) gauge, requiring freight cars transiting from China into Iran to change wheel gauges twice. The train ferry across Lake Van is also a capacity restriction.^[39]

Chinese state media claims that the New Eurasian Land/Continental Bridge extends from Lianyungang to Rotterdam, a distance of 11,870 kilometres (7,380 mi). The exact route used to connect the two cities, whether through Mongolia or Kazakhstan, however, is unclear.^[42]

Break of gauge issues[link]

Changing wheelsets at the Sino-Mongolian border

Former countries of the USSR, as well as Mongolia, use a track gauge of 1,520 mm (4 ft 11 ⁵⁄₆ in). The international standard rail gauge used in most of Europe and China is 1,435 mm (4 ft 8 ¹⁄₂ in). As a result, trains cannot run from China or European countries into or out of the former USSR without changing bogies. Large facilities to carry out this procedure exist at most border crossing between the "Russian" and "standard" gauge territories (e.g., at Zabaykalsk^[17] or Erenhot)^[43] Changing the bogies on a rail car takes hours and special, heavy equipment. In many cases (especially, containerized freight), freight is transshipped from one train to another instead of changing the bogies. In the case of liquids, frozen goods and hazardous materials, however, the bogies are usually changed.^[44]

It has been suggested that on some lines variable gauge axles would achieve significant time savings in comparison to bogie exchange. Their implementation however would involve a much higher capital cost, requiring either retrofitting or replacement of existing bogies.^[45]

Proposed development[link]

Expansion projects[link]

On 10 March 2004 the Kazakhstan Railway Company Ltd announced that it was looking for investors to fund the construction of a railway stretching 3,083 kilometres (1,920 mi) from China across Kazakhstan to Caspian Sea that would be the same gauge as Chinese railways. Thus, the railway would allow trains from China to cross Kazakhstan without having to change bogies. The reported construction cost of the new railway was $3.5 billion. Chinese media reported that the railway would complete the link between China and Europe via central Asia, but it is unclear where the actual link to Europe would be. Also unclear is whether construction has yet to begin on the project.^[46]

The governments of India and Burma have proposed building, with China's cooperation, a link to the Eurasian Land Bridge that would start in India or Burma and connect to China's rail system in Yunnan. The route would allow freight from India and Burma to travel overland to Europe. The link would also give rail access for China to the Indian Ocean. One proposed starting point for the route is Kyaukpyu. The governments of Thailand and Malaysia are also studying the feasibility of establishing rail links with China.^[47]

Both Russia and China are seeking to establish a permanent rail link with South Korea by way of North Korea to allow South Korean goods to be shipped to Europe via the Eurasian Land Bridge. According to Choi Yeon-Hye, a professor of marketing and management at the Korea National Railway College, a rail connection from Busan to Rotterdam would cut shipping time from 26 to 16 days and save $800 per container of freight.^[48] As part of its plan to link the Trans-Siberian to North and South Korea, Russia rebuilt its railink from Khasan to Rajin, finishing in October 2011.^[49][50]

The South Korean government announced on 2 December 2009 that it would conduct an economic and technical study on the feasibility of constructing undersea tunnels for transporting goods and people to and from the country directly to Kyushu, Japan and Shandong, China.^[51]

The United Nations Development Programme has advocated greater regional integration along the Eurasian Land Bridge, including development of rail links between the countries of South and Southeast Asia and Central Asia, called the Trans-Asian Railway project.^[52] Chinese leaders have called for the establishment of free trade zones at both ends of the Eurasian Land Bridge to facilitate development.^[53] Said Khalid Malik, United Nations Resident Coordinator in China, "If this comes true, it will enable the continental bridge to play its due role in enhancing co-operation between Asia and Europe, and promoting world peace and development."^[54]

In 2010 and 2011, China announced plans to finance expansion of the rail systems in Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietanam and connect them to China's rail system via Kunming. The plans include construction of a high-speed rail line from Kunming to Vientiane, beginning in April 2011, with a possible future extension to Bangkok.^[55]

On 15 December 2011, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that a rail link was being considered between Sakhalin Island and Japan. The rail line, constructed in an undersea tunnel, would link Japan to the Trans-Siberian.^[56]

Bering Strait link[link]

Possible route of a bridge or tunnel across the Bering Strait.

In April 2007 the Russian government announced that it was considering building a double track broad gauge rail tunnel under the Bering Strait between Chukotka and Alaska. The tunnel, as projected, would be 60 miles (100 km) long and would include oil and gas pipelines, fiber optic cables and power lines.^[57] The tunnel project was estimated to cost $65 billion and take 15–20 years to build. In addition to the Russian government, sponsors of the project apparently include Transneft and RAO United Energy Systems.^[58]

The project, as envisioned, would connect the Trans-Siberian via Komsomolsk-on-Amur/Yakutsk in Siberian Russia with the North American rail network (gauge to be widened) at Fort Nelson, British Columbia, Canada, a distance of 3,700 miles (5,950 km). A significant hurdle for the project is that the nearest major road to the Russian end of the tunnel is 1,000 miles (1,610 km) away. In addition, Alaska has no direct rail link to either Canada or the contiguous United States.^[59] Other leaders, including Wally Hickel, the 14th Dalai Lama, Lyndon LaRouche and Sun Myung Moon have also advocated the construction of a tunnel or bridge across the strait.^[60]

High speed rail[link]

It was reported in the press in March 2007 that China intends to build a high speed rail link between China and Western Europe^{[61][62][63][64]} with the possibility of a high speed rail journey from Beijing to London taking just two days.^[65][66]

In February 2011, the Chinese government announced that it would jointly sponsor the construction of a high-speed rail line between Astana and Almaty in Kazakhstan. The announced completion date was 2015.^[67]

Notes[link]