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Lebanese Civil War
The Martyr's Square statue in Beirut, 1982, during the civil war
Date 13 April 1975 – 13 October 1990 Location Lebanon Result Taif Agreement Christian 6:5 ascendancy replaced by 1:1 representation Muslim prime-ministerial powers strengthened PLO expulsion from Lebanon Syrian occupation of most of Lebanon Israeli occupation of South Lebanon
Belligerents
LF SLA (from 1976)  Israel (from 1978; See Operation Litani and 1982 Lebanon War) 22 px Free Tigers (until 1980) Marada Brigades (left LF in 1978; aligned with Syria)	LNM (until 1982) LNRF (from 1982) PLO Amal Movement Hezbollah (from 1982) Islamic Unification Movement (from 1982)	LAF Arab Deterrent Force (1976–1983) UNIFIL (from 1978) Multinational Force in Lebanon (1982–1984) Syria (from 1983; See Syrian occupation of Lebanon)
Commanders and leaders
Bachir Gemayel † Amine Gemayel William Hawi † Samir Geagea Michel Aoun Etienne Saqr Georges Adwan Saad Haddad † Antoine Lahad Menachem Begin Ariel Sharon 22 px Dany Chamoun † Tony Frangieh † Suleiman Frangieh	Kamal Jumblatt † Walid Jumblatt Inaam Raad George Hawi Elias Atallah Muhsin Ibrahim Ibrahim Kulaylat Ali Eid Yasser Arafat George Habash Nabih Berri Abbas al-Musawi Said Shaaban	Emmanuel A. Erskine William O'Callaghan Gustav Hägglund Timothy J. Geraghty Hafiz al-Assad Mustafa Tlass
Casualties and losses
130,000–250,000+ people killed 1,000,000 wounded (half of whom lifetime disability)

The Lebanese Civil War (Arabic: الحرب الأهلية اللبنانية‎) was a multifaceted civil war in Lebanon. The war lasted from 1975 to 1990 and resulted in an estimated 150,000 to 230,000^{[citation needed]} fatalities. Another one million people (a quarter of the population) were wounded,^{[citation needed]} and today approximately 350,000 people remain displaced within Lebanon.^{[citation needed]} There was also a mass exodus of almost one million people from Lebanon.

It has been argued that the antecedents of the war can be traced back to the conflicts and political compromises reached after the end of Lebanon's administration by the Ottoman Empire. The Cold War had a powerful disintegrative effect on Lebanon, which was closely linked to the polarization that preceded the 1958 political crisis. The establishment of the state of Israel and the displacement of a hundred thousand Palestinian refugees to Lebanon (around 10% of the total population of the country) changed the demographics of Lebanon and provided a foundation for the long-term involvement of Lebanon in regional conflicts. By 1975, the presence of a foreign armed force in the form of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) guerrillas, who exercised a veto on Lebanese politics, had a serious effect on Lebanon. The militarization of the Palestinian refugee population, with the arrival of the PLO guerrilla forces, sparked an arms race amongst the different Lebanese political factions.

After a short break in the fighting in 1976, due to Arab League mediation and Syrian intervention, Palestinian–Lebanese strife continued, with fighting primarily focused in south Lebanon, which had been occupied by the PLO since 1969,^{[citation needed]} in contravention of the Cairo accords signed with the Lebanese government. During the course of the fighting, alliances shifted rapidly and unpredictably: by the end of the war, nearly every party had allied with and subsequently betrayed every other party at least once. The 1980s were especially bleak: much of Beirut lay in ruins, as a result of the 1976 Karantina massacre carried out by the Lebanese Front (LF), the Syrian Army shelling of Christian neighborhoods in 1978 and 1981, and the Israeli invasion that evicted the PLO from the country.

The Taif Agreement of 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the fighting. In January of that year, a committee appointed by the Arab League, chaired by Kuwait and including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, began to formulate solutions to the conflict. However, on January 31, 1990, Lebanese Army forces clashed again with the LF. This brought fierce fighting to East Beirut, and although the LF made initial advances, the intra-Christian warfare eventually sapped the militia of most of its fighting strength. In August 1990, the Lebanese Parliament, which didn't heed Michel Aoun's order to dissolve, and the new president agreed on constitutional amendments embodying some of the political reforms envisioned at Taif. On October 13, 1990, Syria launched its last major operation involving its army, air force and Lebanese allies (mainly the Lebanese Army, led by General Émile Lahoud) against Aoun's stronghold around the presidential palace, where hundreds of Aoun supporters were killed. It then cleared out the last Aounist pockets, cementing its hold on the capital. Aoun fled to the French Embassy in Beirut, and later into exile in Paris.

On March 1991, parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment. In May 1991, the militias (with the important exception of Hezbollah) were dissolved, and the Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild themselves as Lebanon's only major non-sectarian institution. Some violence still occurred. In late December 1991 a car bomb (estimated to carry 220 pounds of TNT) exploded in the Muslim neighborhood of Basta. At least thirty people were killed, and 120 wounded, including former Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan, who was riding in a bulletproof car. The Post-war occupation of the country by Syria was particularly politically disadvantageous to the Christian population as most of their leadership was driven into exile, or had been assassinated or jailed.^[1]

Background[link]

History of Lebanon
This article is part of a series
Ancient History
Phoenicia
Arab rule
Ottoman rule
French Rule
Modern Lebanon
1958 Lebanon crisis
Lebanese Civil War
Cedar Revolution
2006 Lebanon War
Lebanon Portal v t e

Colonial rule[link]

In 1860 foreign interests transformed sociopolitical struggles into bitter religious conflicts. A civil war between Druze and Christians erupted in the Ottoman province of Mount Lebanon and resulted in the death of about 10,000 people. The commission members agreed that the partition of Mount Lebanon in 1842 between the Druze and the Christians had been responsible for the massacre.

Soldiers in Mount Lebanon during the mutasarrif period

In 1918 the Ottoman rule in Lebanon and Syria ended. These were hard times for the Lebanese; while the rest of the world was occupied with the World War, the people in Lebanon were suffering from a famine that would last nearly 4 years. The outbreak of World War I in August 1914 brought Lebanon further problems, as the Ottoman Empire allied itself with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Ottoman government abolished Lebanon's semi-autonomous status and appointed Djemal Pasha, then minister of the navy, as the commander in chief of the Turkish forces in Syria, with discretionary powers. Known for his harshness, he militarily occupied Lebanon and replaced the Armenian mutasarrif, Ohannes Pasha, with a Turk, Munif Pasha.

In February 1915, frustrated by his unsuccessful attack on the British forces protecting the Suez Canal, Jamal Pasha initiated a blockade of the entire eastern Mediterranean coast to prevent supplies from reaching his enemies; this indirectly caused thousands of deaths from widespread famine and plagues. Lebanon suffered as much as, or more than, any other Ottoman province. The blockade deprived the country of its tourists and summer visitors, and remittances from relatives and friends were lost or delayed for months. The Turkish army cut down trees for wood to fuel trains or for military purposes. In 1916 Turkish authorities publicly executed twenty-one Syrians and Lebanese in Damascus and Beirut, respectively, for alleged anti-Turkish activities (see: Arab Revolt). The date, 6 May, is commemorated annually in both countries as Martyrs' Day, and the site in Beirut has come to be known as Martyrs' Square.^[2]

In 1926, Lebanon was declared a republic, and a constitution was adopted. However, the constitution was suspended in 1932 due to upheaval: some factions demanded unity with Syria, whilst a larger number demanded independence from the French.^[3] In 1934, the country's first (and only to date) census was conducted.

In 1936 the Christian Phalange party was founded by Pierre Gemayel.

Independence[link]

Lebanon was promised independence and on 22 November 1943 it was achieved. French troops, who had invaded Lebanon in 1941 to rid Beirut of the Vichy forces, left the country in 1946. The Christians assumed power over the country and economy. A confessional parliament was created, where Muslims and Christians were given quotas of seats in parliament. As well, the President was to be a Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of Parliament a Shia Muslim.

During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War an exodus of Palestinian refugees who fled the fighting or were expelled from their homes, arrived in Lebanon. Palestinians came to play a very important role in future Lebanese civil conflicts, whilst the establishment of Israel radically changed the local environment in which Lebanon found itself.

U.S. Marine sits in a foxhole outside Beirut, 1958

In July 1958, Lebanon was threatened by a civil war between Maronite Christians and Muslims. President Camille Chamoun had attempted to break the stranglehold on Lebanese politics exercised by traditional political families in Lebanon. These families maintained their electoral appeal by cultivating strong client-patron relations with their local communities. But this prevented the emergence of an educated political class into the parliament. Although he succeeded in sponsoring alternative political candidates to enter the elections in 1957, causing the traditional families to lose their positions, these families then embarked upon a war with Chamoun, referred to as the War of the Pashas. However, as always and due to Lebanon's open media and political society, regional tensions were used as an excuse to mount the insurrection by the excluded political bosses.

In previous years, tensions with Egypt had escalated in 1956 when the non-aligned President, Camille Chamoun, did not break off diplomatic relations with the Western powers that attacked Egypt during the Suez Crisis, angering Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Chamoun has often been called pro-Western, yet he had signed several trade deals with the Soviet union (see Gendzier). However Nasser had attacked Chamoun because of his suspected support for the US led Baghdad Pact. Nasser felt that the pro-western Baghdad Pact posed a threat to Arab Nationalism. Lebanon however historically had a small cosmetic army that was never effective in defending Lebanon's territorial integrity, and this is why in later years the PLO guerrilla factions had found it easy to enter Lebanon and set up bases, as well as takeover army barracks on the border with Israel as early as 1968. Yezid Sayigh documents the early skirmishes which saw the army not only lose control over its barracks to the occupying PLO but also lost many soldiers. However prior to this, aware of the country's vulnerability to outside forces, president Chamoun looked to regional pacts to ensure protection from foreign armies.

But his Lebanese Sunni Muslim Prime Minister Rashid Karami supported Nasser in 1956 and 1958. Lebanese Muslims pushed the government to join the newly created United Arab Republic, a country formed out of the unification of Syria and Egypt, while the majority of Lebanese and especially the Christians wanted to keep Lebanon as an independent nation with its own independent parliament. President Camille feared the toppling of his government and asked for U.S intervention. At the time the U.S was engaged in the Cold War. Chamoun asked for assistance proclaiming that communism was going to overthrow his government. Chamoun however was not only responding to the revolt of former political bosses, but also to the fact that both Egypt and Syria had taken the opportunity to deploy proxies into the Lebanese conflict. Thus the Arab National Movement (ANM), led by George Habash and later to become the Progressive Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)and a faction of the PLO, were deployed to Lebanon by Nasser. The ANM were a clandestine militia implicated in attempted coups against both the Jordanian monarchy and the Iraqi president throughout the 1950s at Nasser's bidding. The founding members of Fatah, including Yasser Arafat and Khalil Wazir also flew to Lebanon to use the insurrection as a means by which a war could be fomented towards Israel. They participated in the fighting by directing armed forces against the government security in the city of Tripoli according to Yezid Sayigh's work.

In that year, President Chamoun was unable to convince the Christian army commander, Fuad Chehab to use the armed forces against Muslim demonstrators, fearing that getting involved in internal politics would split his small and weak multi-confessional force. The Phalange militia came to the presidents aid instead to bring a final end to the road blockades which were crippling the major cities. Encouraged by its efforts during this conflict, later that year, principally through violence and the success of general strikes in Beirut, the Phalange achieved what journalists dubbed the "counterrevolution." By their actions the Phalangists brought down the government of Prime Minister Karami and secured for their leader, Pierre Gemayel, a position in the four-man cabinet that was subsequently formed.

However estimates of the Phalange's membership by Yezid Sayigh and other academic sources put them at a few thousand. Non-academic sources tend to inflate the Phalanges membership. What should be kept in mind was that this insurrection was met with widespread disapproval by many Lebanese who wanted no part in the regional politics and many young men aided the Phalange in their suppression of the insurrection, especially as many of the demonstrators were little more than proxy forces hired by groups such as the ANM and Fatah founders as well as being hired by the defeated parliamentary bosses.

Demographic tensions[link]

During the 1960s Lebanon was relatively calm, but this would soon change. Fatah and other Palestinian Liberation Organization factions had long been active among the 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanese camps. Throughout the 1960s, the center for armed Palestinian activities had been in Jordan, but they were forced to relocate after being evicted by King Hussein during the Black September in Jordan. Fatah and other Palestinians groups had attempted to mount a coup in Jordan by incentivizing a split in the Jordanian army, something that the ANM had attempted to do a decade earlier by Nasser's bidding. Jordan however responded and expelled the forces into Lebanon. When they arrived they created a "a State within the State". This action wasn't welcomed by the Lebanese government and this shook Lebanon's fragile sectarian climate.

Solidarity to the Palestinians was expressed through the Lebanese Sunni Muslims but with the aim to change the political system from one of consensus amongst different sects, towards one where their power share would increase. Certain groups in the Lebanese National Movement wished to bring about a more secular and democratic order, but as this group increasingly included Islamist groups, encouraged to join by the PLO, the more progressive demands of the initial agenda was dropped by January 1976. Islamists did not support a secular order in Lebanon and wished to bring about rule by Muslim clerics. Yezid Sayigh documents these events, especially the role of Fatah and the Tripoli Islamist movement known as Tawhid, in changing the agenda being pursued by many groups, including Communists. This rag-tag coalition has often been referred to as left-wing, but many participants were actually very conservative religious elements that did not share any broader ideological agenda; rather, they were brought together by the short term goal of overthrowing the established political order, each motivated by their own grievances.

These forces enabled the PLO / Fatah (Fatah constituted 80% of the membership of the PLO and Fatah guerrillas controlled most of its institutions now) to transform the Western Part of Beirut into its stronghold. The PLO had taken over the heart of Sidon and Tyre in the early 1970s, it controlled great swathes of south Lebanon, in which the indigenous Shiite population had to suffer the humiliation of passing though PLO checkpoints and now they had worked their way by force into Beirut. The PLO did this with the assistance of so-called volunteers from Libya and Algeria shipped in through the ports it controlled, as well as a number of Sunni Lebanese groups who had been trained and armed by PLO/ Fatah and encouraged to declare themselves as separate militias. However as Rex Brynen makes clear in his publication on the PLO, these militias were nothing more than "shop-fronts" or in Arabic "Dakakin" for Fatah, armed gangs with no ideological foundation and no organic reason for their existence save the fact their individual members were put on PLO/ Fatah payroll.

The strike of fishermen at Sidon in February 1975 could also be considered the first important episode that set off the outbreak of hostilities. That event involved a specific issue: the attempt of former President Camille Chamoun (also head of the Maronite-oriented National Liberal Party) to monopolize fishing along the coast of Lebanon. The injustices perceived by the fishermen evoked sympathy from many Lebanese and reinforced the resentment and antipathy that were widely felt against the state and the economic monopolies. The demonstrations against the fishing company were quickly transformed into a political action supported by the political left and their allies in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The state tried to suppress the demonstrators, and a sniper reportedly killed a popular figure in the city, the former Mayor of Sidon, Maroof Saad. He was buried in a Palestinian flag, and in the media, the Sidon riots became somehow fused with the Palestinian war with Israel in the minds of media watchers. However the event appeared to have been hi-jacked by the Palestinians because Saad was on bad terms with the PLO. Fatah controlled the heart of Sidon and the port and had attempted to fund the electoral campaigns of competing candidates which eventually saw Saad lose both his bid for a parliamentary seat and then in 1973, lose the mayor-ship. This meant that the Fatah sponsored rival had not only won Sidon, but was now representing Fatah's wishes in the Lebanese parliament! When Saad died, there was bitter enmity between him and the PLO/ Fatah .

Many non-academic sources claim a government sniper killed Saad, however there is no evidence to support such a claim, and it appears that whoever had killed him had intended for what began as a small and quiet demonstration to evolve into something more. The sniper targeted Saad right at the end of the demonstration as it was dissipating. Farid Khazen, sourcing the local histories of Sidon academics and eye-witnesses, gives a run-down of the puzzling events of the day that based on their research. Other interesting facts that Khazen reveals, based on the Sidon academic's work including that Saad was not in dispute with the fishing consortium made up of Yugoslav nationals. In fact, the Yugoslavian representatives in Lebanon had negotiated with the fisherman's union to make the fisherman shareholders in the company; the company offered to modernize the Fisherman's equipment and buy their catch, give their fisherman's a union and annual subsidy. Saad, as a union representative (and not the mayor of Sidon at the time as many erroneous sources claim), was offered a place on the company's board too. There has been some speculation that Saad's attempts to narrow the differences between the fishermen and the consortium, and his acceptance of a place on the board made him a target of attack by the conspirator who sought a full conflagration around the small protest. The events in Sidon were not contained for long. The government began to lose control of the situation in 1975.

Founding of militias[link]

Most militias claimed that they were non-sectarian forces, but in fact they recruited mainly from the community or region of their chiefs. The two main alliances were the Lebanese Front, consisting of nationalist Maronites who were against Palestinian militancy in Lebanon, and the Lebanese National Movement, which consisted of pro-Palestinian Leftists. The LNM dissolved after the Israeli invasion of 1982 and was replaced by the Lebanese National Resistance Front, known as Jammoul in Arabic.

Throughout the war most or all militias operated with little regard for human rights, and the sectarian character of some battles, made non-combatant civilians a frequent target. As the war dragged on, the militias deteriorated ever further into mafia-style organizations with many commanders turning to crime as their main occupation rather than fighting. Finances for the war effort were obtained in one or all of three ways:

Outside support: Generally from one of the rival Arab governments, Iran or Israel. Alliances would shift frequently.

Preying on the population: Extortion, theft, bank robberies and random checkpoints at which "customs" would be collected, were commonplace on all sides. During cease-fires, most militias operated in their home areas as virtual mafia organizations.

Smuggling: During the civil war, Lebanon turned into one of the world's largest narcotics producers, with much of the hashish production centered in the Bekaa valley. But much else was also smuggled, such as guns and supplies, all kinds of stolen goods, and regular trade - war or no war, Lebanon would not give up its role as the middleman in European-Arab business. Many battles were fought over Lebanon's ports, to gain smugglers access to the sea routes.

Maronites[link]

Logo of the Kataeb, or Phalangist party

Maronite Christian militias acquired arms from Romania and Bulgaria as well as from West Germany, Belgium and Israel,^[4] and drew supporters from the larger Christian population in the north of the country. They were generally right-wing in their political outlook, and all the major Christian militias were Maronite-dominated, and other Christian sects played a secondary role.

The most powerful of the Christian militias was the Kataeb Regulatory Forces, the military wing of the Kataeb Party or Phalangists, which remained under the leadership of the charismatic William Hawi until his death during the final push against Tel el Zaatar Camp. After the fall of Palestinian camps in East Beirut, the Phalange militia, now under the command of Bachir Gemayel, merged with several minor groups (Al-Tanzim, Guardians of the Cedars, Lebanese Youth Movement, etc.) and formed a professional army called the Lebanese Forces (LF). With the help of Israel, the LF established itself in Christian-dominated strongholds and rapidly transformed from an unorganized and poorly equipped militia into a fearsome army that had now its own armor, artillery,commando units (SADM), a small Navy, and a highly advanced Intelligence branch. Meanwhile, in the north, the Marada Brigades served as the private militia of the Franjieh family and Zgharta.

Another mainly Christian Militia was the South Lebanon Army which was controlled by Saad Haddad. This militia was installed in South Lebanon by the Israelis. Their goal was to be a bulwark against PLO raids and attacks into the Galilee

Also, another notable militia; the Tigers Militia was the military wing of the National Liberal Party (NLP/ AHRAR) during the Lebanese Civil War. The Tigers formed in Saadiyat in 1968, as Noumour Al Ahrar (Tigers of the Liberals, نمور الأحرار ), under the leadership of Camille Chamoun. The group took its name from his middle name, Nemr - "Tiger". Trained by Naim Berdkan, the unit was led by Chamoun's son Dany Chamoun. After the start Civil War in 1975, the Tigers, strong of 3,500 militiamen fought the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and its Palestinian allies.

Shi'a Muslims[link]

Flag of the Amal Movement

The Shi'a militias were slow to form and join in the fighting. Initially, many Shi'a had sympathy for the Palestinians and a few had been drawn to the Lebanese Communist Party, but after 1970s Black September, there was a sudden influx of armed Palestinians to the Shi'a areas. South Lebanon's population is mainly Shi'a and the Palestinians soon set up base there for their attacks against the Israelis. The Palestinian movement quickly squandered its influence with the Shi'ite, as radical factions ruled by the gun in much of Shi'ite-inhabited southern Lebanon, where the refugee camps happened to be concentrated, and the mainstream PLO proved either unwilling or unable to rein them in.

The Palestinian radicals' secularism and behaviour had alienated the traditionalist Shi'ite community; the Shi'a did not want to pay the price for the PLO's rocket attacks from Southern Lebanon. The PLO created a state within a state in South Lebanon and this instigated a fury among Lebanon's Shi'a, who feared a retaliation from the Israelis to their native land in the South. The Shiʿa predominated in the area of southern Lebanon that in the 1960s became an arena for Israel-Palestinian conflict. The state of Lebanon, which always avoided provoking Israel, simply abandoned southern Lebanon. Many of the people there migrated to the suburbs of Beirut, which are known as "poverty belts". The young Shi'a migrants, who had not participated in the prosperity of prewar Beirut, joined many Lebanese and some Palestinian organizations. After many years without their own independent political organizations, there suddenly arose Musa Sadr's Amal Movement in 1974–75. Its Islamist ideology immediately attracted the unrepresented people, and Amal's armed ranks grew rapidly. Amal fought against the PLO in the early days. Later a hard line faction would break away to join with Shi'a groups fighting Israel to form the organization Hezbollah, also known as the National Resistance, who to this day remains the most powerful and organised force of Lebanon and the Middle East. Hezbollah was created as a faction split from Amal Movement, and an Islamist organization which deemed Amal to be too secular. Hezbollah's original aims included the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon.

There was great support by Iran during the Lebanese Civil War for Shi'ite factions, Amal Movement and Hezbollah. Hezbollah and its leaders were inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution and therefore in 1982 emerged as a faction set on resisting the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, and its forces were trained and organized by a contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Support was greatly met by both military training and funding support.

The Lebanese Alawites, followers of a sect of Shia Islam, were represented by the Red Knights Militia of the Arab Democratic Party, which was pro-Syrian due to the Alawites being dominant in Syria, and mainly acted in Northern Lebanon around Tripoli.^[5]

Sunni Muslims[link]

Some Sunni factions received support from Libya and Iraq, and a number of minor militias existed, the more prominent with secular Nasserist or otherwise pan-Arab and Arab nationalist leanings, but also a few Islamist ones, such as the Tawhid Movement. The main Sunni-led organization was the al-Murabitun a major west-Beirut based force. Al-Murabitoun, led by Ibrahim Kulaylat, fought with the Palestinians against the Israelis during the invasion of 1982. The Sixth of February Movement was another pro-Palestinian Nasserist militia, and sided with the PLO in the War of the Camps.

Druze[link]

The small Druze sect, strategically and dangerously seated on the Chouf in central Lebanon, had no natural allies, and so were compelled to put much effort into building alliances. Under the leadership of the Jumblatt family, first Kamal Jumblatt (the LNM leader) and then his son Walid, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) served as an effective Druze militia, building excellent ties to the Soviet Union mainly, and with Syria upon the withdrawal of Israel to the south of the country. However, many Druze in Lebanon at the time were members of the non-religious party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Under Kamal Jumblatt's leadership, the PSP was a major element in the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) which supported Lebanon's Arab identity and sympathized with the Palestinians. It built a powerful private army, which proved to be one of the strongest in the Lebanese Civil War of 1975 to 1990. It conquered much of Mount Lebanon and the Chouf District. Its main adversaries were the Maronite Christian Phalangist militia, and later the Lebanese Forces militia (which absorbed the Phalangists). The PSP suffered a major setback in 1977, when Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated. His son Walid succeeded him as leader of the party. From the Israeli withdrawal from the Chouf in 1983 to the end of the civil war, the PSP ran a highly effective civil administration, the Civil Administration of the Mountain, in the area under its control. Tolls levied at PSP militia checkpoints provided a major source of income for the administration.

The PSP played an important role in the so-called "Mountain War" under the lead of Walid Jumblatt: after the Israeli Army retreated from the Lebanese Mountain, important battles took place between the PSP and Christian militias. PSP armed members were accused of several massacres that took place during that war (31 August 1983: 36 civilians in Bmarian, 7 September 1983: 200 Christian civilians killed in Bhamdoun, 10 September 1983: 64 in Bireh, 10 September 1983: 30 in Ras el-Matn, 11 September 1983: 15 in Maasser Beit ed-Dine, 11 September 1983: 36 in Chartoun, 13 September 1983: 84 in Maasser el-Chouf, and many others...).

The Progressive Socialist Party (or PSP) (Arabic: الحزب التقدمي الاشتراكي‎, al-hizb al-taqadummi al-ishtiraki) is a political party in Lebanon. Its current leader is Walid Jumblatt. It is in practice led and supported mostly by followers of the Druze faith.

Secular groups[link]

Flag of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party

Although several Lebanese militias claimed to be secular, most were little more than vehicles for sectarian interests. Still, there existed a number of non-religious groups, primarily but not exclusively of the left and/or Pan-Arab right.

Examples of this was the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and the more radical and independent Communist Action Organization (COA). Another notable example was the pan-Syrian Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), which promoted the concept of Greater Syria, in contrast to Pan-Arab or Lebanese nationalism. The SSNP was generally aligned with the Syrian government, although it did not ideologically approve of the Ba'thist regime (however this has changed recently, under Bashar Al-Assad, the SSNP having been allowed to exert political activity in Syria as well). The multi-confessional SSNP was led by Inaam Raad,a Catholic and Abdallah Saadeh, a Greek Orthodox. It was active in North Lebanon (Koura and Akkar), West Beirut (around Hamra Street), in Mount Lebanon (High Metn, Baabda, Aley and Chouf), in South Lebanon (Zahrani, Nabatieh, Marjayoun and Hasbaya) and the Beqqa Valley (Baalbeck, Hermel and Rashaya).

Two competing Baath party factions were also involved in the early stages of the war: a nationalist one known as "pro-Iraqi" headed by Dr. 'Abdul-Majeed Al-Rafei (Sunni) and Nicola Y. Ferzli (Greek Orthodox Christian), and a Marxist one known as "pro-Syrian" headed by Assem Qanso (Shiite). The pro-Syrian Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party of Lebanon currently has two seats in parliament.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party at the time had training camps in Lebanon, where they received support from the Syrians and the PLO. During the Israeli invasion all PKK units were ordered to fight the Israeli forces. A total of 11 PKK fighters died in the conflict. Mahsum Korkmaz was the commander of all PKK forces in Lebanon.^[6][7][8]

The Armenian Marxist-Leninist militia ASALA was founded in PLO-controlled territory of West Beirut in 1975. This militia was led by revolutionary fighter Monte Melkonian and group-founder Hagop Hagopian. Closely alinged with the Palestinians, ASALA fought many battles on the side of the Lebanese National Movement and the PLO, most prominently against Israeli forces and their right-wing allies during the 1982 phase of the war. Melkonian was field commander during these battles, and assisted the PLO in its defense of West Beirut.^[9][10]

Palestinians[link]

Fedayeen from Fatah in Beirut, Lebanon, 1979

The Palestinian movement relocated most of its fighting strength to Lebanon at the end of 1970 after being expelled from Jordan in the events known as Black September. The umbrella organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—by itself undoubtedly Lebanon's most potent fighting force at the time—was little more than a loose confederation, but its leader, Yassir Arafat, controlled all factions by buying their loyalties. Arafat allowed little oversight to be exercised over PLO finances an he was the ultimate source for all decisions made in directing financial matters. Rex Brynen provides a detailed account of how this worked. Arafat's control of funds, channeled directly to him by the oil producing countries like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Libya meant that he had little real functional opposition to his leadership and although ostensibly rival factions in the PLO existed, this masked a stable loyalty towards Arafat so long as he was able to dispense financial rewards to his followers and members of the PLO guerrilla factions. Unlike the Lebanese people, the Palestinians were not sectarian. Christian Palestinians supported Arab Nationalism during the civil war in Lebanon and fought against the Christian Lebanese militias.

The PLO mainstream was represented by Arafat's powerful Fatah, which waged guerrilla warfare but did not have a strong core ideology, except the claim to seek the liberation of Palestine. As a result, they gained broad appeal with a refugee population with conservative Islamic values (who resisted secular ideologies). The more ideological factions however included Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and its splinter, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Fatah was actually instrumental in splitting the DF from the PFLP in the early days of the PFLPs formation so as to diminish the appeal and competition the PFLP posed to Fatah. Lesser roles were played by the fractious Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) and another split-off from the PFLP, the Syrian-aligned Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC). To complicate things, the Ba'thist systems of Syria and Iraq both set up Palestinian puppet organizations within the PLO. The as-Sa'iqa was a Syrian-controlled militia, paralleled by the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) under Iraqi command. The Syrian government could also count on the Syrian brigades of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), formally but not functionally the PLO's regular army. Some PLA units sent by Egypt were under Arafat's command.

First phase 1975–1977[link]

Sectarian violence and massacres[link]

Throughout the spring of 1975, minor clashes in Lebanon had been building up towards all-out conflict, with the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) pitted against the Phalange, and the ever-weaker national government wavering between the need to maintain order and cater to its constituency. On the morning of 13 April 1975, unidentified gunmen in a speeding car fired on a church in the Christian East Beirut suburb of Ain El Rummaneh, killing four people including two Maronite Phalangists. Hours later, Phalangists led by the Gemayels killed 30 Palestinians traveling in Ain El Rummaneh. Citywide clashes erupted in response to this "Bus Massacre". The Battle of the Hotels began in October 1975, and lasted until March in 1976.

On December 6, 1975, a day later known as Black Saturday, the killings of four Phalange members led Phalange to quickly and temporarily set up roadblocks throughout Beirut at which identification cards were inspected for religious affiliation. Many Palestinians or Lebanese Muslims passing through the roadblocks were killed immediately. Additionally, Phalange members took hostages and attacked Muslims in East Beirut. Muslim and Palestinian militias retaliated with force, increasing the total death count to between 200 and 600 civilians and militiamen. After this point, all-out fighting began between the militias.

In a vicious spiral of sectarian violence, civilians were an easy target. On January 18, 1976 about 1,000 people were killed by Christian forces in the Karantina Massacre, immediately followed by a retaliatory strike on Damour by Palestinian militias. These two massacres prompted a mass exodus of Muslims and Christians, as people fearing retribution fled to areas under the control of their own sect. The ethnic and religious layout of the residential areas of the capital encouraged this process, and East and West Beirut were increasingly transformed into what was in effect Christian and Muslim Beirut. Also, the number of Christian leftists who had allied with the LNM, and Muslim conservatives with the government, dropped sharply, as the war revealed itself as an utterly sectarian conflict. Another effect of the massacres was to bring in Yassir Arafat's well-armed Fatah and thereby the Palestine Liberation Organisation on the side of the LNM, as Palestinian sentiment was by now completely hostile to the Lebanese Christian forces.

Syrian intervention[link]

Map showing power balance in Lebanon, 1976: Dark green - controlled by Syria, purple - controlled by Christian militias, light green - controlled by Palestinian militias

In June, 1976, with fighting throughout the country and the Maronites on the verge of defeat, President Suleiman Frangieh called for Syria intervention in Lebanon, on the grounds that the port of Beirut would be closed and that is how Syria received a large portion of their goods. Christian fears had been greatly exacerbated by the Damour massacre, and both sides felt the stakes had been raised above mere political power. Syria responded by ending its prior affiliation with the Palestinian Rejectionist Front and began supporting the Maronite-dominated government. This technically put Syria on the same side as Israel, as Israel had already begun to supply Maronite forces with arms, tanks, and military advisers in May 1976.^[11] Syria had its own political and territorial interests in Lebanon, which harbored cells of the Islamists and anti-Ba'thist Muslim Brotherhood, and was also a possible route of attack for Israel.

At the President's request, Syrian troops entered Lebanon, occupying Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley, easily brushing aside the LNM and Palestinian defenses. A cease-fire was imposed,^[12] but it ultimately failed to stop the conflict, so Syria added to the pressure. With Damascus supplying arms, Christian forces managed to break through the defenses of the Tel al-Zaatar refugee camp in East Beirut, which had long been under siege. A massacre of about 2,000 Palestinians followed, which unleashed heavy criticism against Syria from the Arab world.

On October 19, 1976, the Battle of Aishiya took place, when a combined force of PLO and a Communist militia attacked Aishiya, an isolated Christian village in a mostly Muslim area. The Artillery Corps of the Israel Defence Forces fired 24 shells (66 kilograms of TNT each) from US-made 175-millimeter field artillery units at the attackers, repelling their first attempt. However, the PLO and Communists returned at night, when low visibility made Israeli artillery far less effective. The Christian population of the village fled. They returned in 1982.

In October 1976, Syria accepted the proposal of the Arab League summit in Riyadh. This gave Syria a mandate to keep 40,000 troops in Lebanon as the bulk of an Arab Deterrent Force charged with disentangling the combatants and restoring calm. Other Arab nations were also part of the ADF, but they lost interest relatively soon, and Syria was again left in sole control, now with the ADF as a diplomatic shield against international criticism. The Civil War was officially ended at this point, and an uneasy quiet settled over Beirut and most of the rest of Lebanon. In the south, however, the climate began to deteriorate as a consequence of the gradual return of PLO combatants, who had been required to vacate central Lebanon under the terms of the Riyadh Accords.

Uneasy quiet[link]

The Green Line that separated west and east Beirut, 1982

The nation was now effectively divided, with southern Lebanon and the western half of Beirut becoming bases for the PLO and Muslim-based militias, and the Christians in control of East Beirut and the Christian section of Mount Lebanon. The main confrontation line in divided Beirut was known as the Green Line.

In East Beirut, in 1976, Christian leaders of the National Liberal Party (NLP), the Kataeb Party and the Lebanese Renewal Party joined in the Lebanese Front, a political counterpoint to the LNM. Their militias - the Tigers, Kataeb Regulatory Forces (KRF) and Guardians of the Cedars - entered a loose coalition known as the Lebanese Forces, to form a military wing for the Lebanese Front. From the very beginning, the Kataeb and its Regulatory Forces' militia, under the leadership of Bashir Gemayel, dominated the LF. In 1977-80, through absorbing or destroying smaller militias, he both consolidated control and strengthened the LF into the dominant Christian force.

In March the same year, Lebanese National Movement leader Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated. The murder was widely blamed on the Syrian government. While Jumblatt's role as leader of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party was filled surprisingly smoothly by his son, Walid Jumblatt, the LNM disintegrated after his death. Although the anti-government pact of leftists, Shi'a, Sunni, Palestinians and Druze would stick together for some time more, their wildly divergent interests tore at opposition unity. Sensing the opportunity, Hafez al-Assad immediately began splitting up both the Christian and Muslim coalitions in a game of divide and conquer.

Second phase 1977–1982[link]

The Hundred Days War[link]

The Hundred Days War was a subconflict within the Lebanese Civil War, which occurred at the Lebanese Capital Beirut between February and April 1978. It was fought between the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) militia, under the command of the Kataeb Party's President Bashir Gemayel, and the Syrian troops of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF). The conflict resulted in Syrian Army's expulsion from East Beirut, the end of Arab Deterrent Force's task in Lebanon and the breaking of alliance between Syria and the Lebanese Front. The conflict resulted in 160 dead and 400 injured.

Israel intervenes in South Lebanon, 1978[link]

UNIFIL base, 1981

PLO attacks from Lebanon into Israel in 1977 and 1978 escalated tensions between the countries. On 11 March 1978, eleven Fatah fighters landed on a beach in northern Israel and proceeded to hijack two buses full of passengers on the Haifa - Tel-Aviv road, shooting at passing vehicles in what became known as the Coastal Road massacre. They killed 37 and wounded 76 Israelis before being killed in a firefight with Israeli forces.^[13] Israel invaded Lebanon four days later in Operation Litani. The Israeli Army occupied most of the area south of the Litani River. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal and creating the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), charged with attempting to establish peace.

Security Zone[link]

Map showing the Blue Line demarcation line between Lebanon and Israel, established by the UN after the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 1978

Israeli forces withdrew later in 1978, but retained control of the southern region by managing a 12-mile (19 km) wide "security zone" along the border. These positions were held by an Israeli ally, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a Christian-Shi'a militia under the leadership of Major Saad Haddad. Israel supplied the SLA with arms and resources, and posted "advisers" to assist the militia. The Israeli Prime Minister, Likud's Menachem Begin, compared the plight of the Christian minority in southern Lebanon (then about 5% of the population in SLA territory) to that of European Jews during World War II.^[14]

Violent exchanges resumed between the PLO and the Israeli/SLA alliance. The PLO attacked the SLA while it continued its efforts to consolidate power along the Lebanese-Israeli border. The PLO also continued to fire rockets into northern Israeli towns, while Israel retaliated with air raids against PLO positions.

The PLO routinely attacked Israel during the period of the cease-fire, with over 270 documented attacks.^{[citation needed]} People in Galilee regularly had to leave their homes during these shellings. Documents captured in PLO headquarters after the invasion showed they had come from Lebanon.^[15]

In addition, Arafat refused to condemn attacks occurring outside of Lebanon, on the grounds that the cease-fire was only relevant to the Lebanese theater.^[16] Arafat's interpretation underscored the fact that the cease-fire agreement did nothing to address ongoing violence between the PLO and Israel in other theaters. Israel thus continued to weather PLO attacks throughout the cease-fire period. On 17 July 1981, Israeli aircraft bombed multi-story apartment buildings in Beirut that contained offices of PLO associated groups. The Lebanese delegate to the United Nations Security Council reported that 300 civilians had been killed, and 800 wounded. The bombing led to worldwide condemnation, and a temporary embargo on the export of U.S. aircraft to Israel.^[17]

In August 1981, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin was re-elected, and in September, Begin and his defense minister Ariel Sharon began to lay plans for a second invasion of Lebanon for the purpose of driving out the PLO. Sharon's intention was to "destroy the PLO military infrastructure and, if possible, the PLO leadership itself; this would mean attacking West Beirut, where the PLO headquarters and command bunkers were located".^[18]

Sharon also wanted to ensure the presidency of Bashir Gemayel in Lebanon.^{[citation needed]} In return for Israeli assistance, Sharon expected Gemayel, once installed as president, to sign a peace treaty with Israel, presumably stabilizing Israel's northern border.^{[citation needed]} Begin brought Sharon's plan before the Knesset in December 1981; however, after strong objections were raised, Begin felt compelled to set the plan aside. But Sharon continued to press the issue. In January 1982, Sharon met with Gemayel on an Israeli vessel off the coast of Lebanon and discussed a plan "that would bring Israeli forces as far north as the edge of Beirut International Airport".^{[citation needed]} In February, with Begin's input, Yehoshua Seguy, the chief of military intelligence, was sent to Washington to discuss the issue of Lebanon with Secretary of State Alexander Haig.^{[citation needed]} In the meeting, Haig "stressed that there could be no assault without a major provocation from Lebanon".^[19]

Day of the Long Knives[link]

The Safra massacre, known as the Day of the Long Knives, occurred in the coastal town Safra (north to Beirut) on July 7, 1980, during the Lebanese civil war, as part of Bashir Gemayel's effort to consolidate all the Christian fighters under his leadership in the Lebanese Forces. The Phalangist forces launched a surprise attack on the Tigers, a 500-man militia that was the armed force of the National Liberal Party of ex-Lebanese President Camille Chamoun. The attack claimed the lives of roughly 83 people.

Zahleh campaign[link]

The Zahleh campaign took place between December 1980 and June 1981. During the seven month period, the city of Zahle endured a handful of political and military setbacks. The opposing key players were on the one side, the LF (Lebanese Forces) aided by Zahlawi townspeople, and on the other side, the Syrian Army Forces also known as ADF Arab Deterrent Force, aided by some PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) factions.^[20]

Demographically, Zahleh is one the largest predominantly Christian towns in Lebanon.^[21] Adjacent to the town's outskirts, the Bekaa valley, spanning the length of the Syrian borders. Given Zahle's close proximity to the Bekaa Valley, the Syrian Army Forces feared a potential alliance between Israel and the LF in Zahle. This potential alliance would not only threaten the Syrian military presence in the Bekaa valley, but was regarded as a national security threat from the Syrians' point of view, given the close proximity between Zahle and the Damascus highway.^[20]

Consequently, as a clamp down strategy, the Syrian forces controlled major roads leading in and out of the city and fortified the entire Valley. Around December 1980, tensions increased between Zahlawi Lebanese Forces and Syrian backed Leftist militants. From April to June 1981, throughout the four month period, a handful of LF members, aided by Zahlawi Local Resistance, confronted the Syrian military and defended the city from Syrian intrusion and potential invasion. Nearly 1,100 people were killed on both sides during the conflict. This campaign paved the way for Bachir to reach the presidency in 1982.^{[citation needed]}

Third phase 1982–1983[link]

Israeli invasion of Lebanon[link]

Map showing power balance in Lebanon, 1983: Green - controlled by Syria, purple - controlled by Christian groups, yellow - controlled by Israel, blue - controlled by the United Nations

On 3 June 1982, the Abu Nidal Organization, a splinter group of Fatah, attempted to assassinate Israeli ambassador Shlomo Argov in London. As a result, Ariel Sharon and Menachem Begin ordered a retaliatory aerial attack on PLO and PFLP targets in West Beirut that led to over 100 casualties.^[19] The PLO responded by launching a counterattack from Lebanon, without consulting the Lebanese government, with rockets and artillery, which also constituted a clear violation of the cease-fire. This was the immediate excuse of Israel's subsequent decision to invade.

Meanwhile, on 5 June, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 508 calling for "all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and no later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June 1982."^[22]

Israeli troops in South Lebanon, June, 1982

Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee on 6 June 1982, attacking PLO bases in Lebanon. Israeli forces quickly drove 25 miles (40 km) into Lebanon, moving into East Beirut with the tacit support of Maronite leaders and militia. When the Israeli cabinet convened to authorize the invasion, Sharon described it as a plan to advance 40 kilometers into Lebanon, demolish PLO strongholds, and establish an expanded security zone that would put northern Israel out of range of PLO rockets. In fact, Israeli chief of staff Rafael Eitan and Sharon had already ordered the invading forces to head straight for Beirut, in accord with Sharon's blueprint dating to September 1981. After the invasion had begun, the UN Security Council passed a further resolution on 6 June 1982, Resolution 509, which reaffirms UNSCR 508 and "demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon".^[23] Thus far the US had not used its veto. However, on 8 June 1982, the US vetoed a proposed resolution that "reiterates [the] demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon",^[24] thereby giving implicit assent to the Israeli invasion.

Siege of Beirut[link]

An aerial view of the stadium used as an ammunition supply site for the PLO after Israeli airstrikes in 1982

By 15 June 1982, Israeli units were entrenched outside Beirut. The United States called for PLO withdrawal from Lebanon, and Sharon began to order bombing raids of West Beirut, targeting some 16,000 PLO fedayeen who had retreated into fortified positions. Meanwhile, Arafat attempted through negotiations to salvage politically what was clearly a disaster for the PLO, an attempt which eventually succeeded once the multinational force arrived to evacuate the PLO.

The fighting in Beirut killed more than 6,700 people of whom the vast majority were civilians. Combatants killed included 500 PLO, more than 400 Lebanese, over 100 Syrians and 88 Israelis. Fierce artillery duels between the IDF and the PLO, and PLO shelling of Christian neighborhoods of East Beirut at the outset gave way to escalating aerial IDF bombardment beginning on 21 July 1982.^[25] It is commonly estimated that during the entire campaign, approximately 20,000 were killed on all sides, including many civilians, and 30,000 were wounded^{[citation needed]}.

Negotiations for a cease-fire[link]

On 26 June, a UN Security Council resolution was proposed that "demands the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces engaged round Beirut, to a distance of 10 kilometers from the periphery of that city, as a first step towards the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and the simultaneous withdrawal of the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut, which shall retire to the existing camps";^[26] the United States vetoed the resolution because it was "a transparent attempt to preserve the PLO as a viable political force",^[27] However, President Reagan made an impassioned plea to Prime Minister Begin to end the siege. Begin called back within minutes informing the President that he had given the order to end the attack.^[28]

Finally, amid escalating violence and civilian casualties, Philip Habib was once again sent to restore order, which he accomplished on 12 August on the heels of IDF's intensive, day-long bombardment of West Beirut. The Habib-negotiated truce called for the withdrawal of both Israeli and PLO elements, as well as a multinational force composed of U.S. Marines along with French and Italian units that would ensure the departure of the PLO and protect defenseless civilians.

International intervention[link]

US Navy Amphibian arriving in Beirut, 1982

The first troops of a multinational force landed in Beirut on 21 August 1982 to oversee the PLO withdrawal from Lebanon and U.S. mediation resulted in the evacuation of Syrian troops and PLO fighters from Beirut. The agreement also provided for the deployment of a multinational force composed of U.S. Marines along with French, Italian and British units. However, Israel reported that some 2,000 PLO militants were hiding in Palestinian refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut.

Bachir Gemayel was elected president under Israeli military control on 23 August. Many, especially in the Muslim circles, feared his relationship with Israel. He was assassinated on 14 September, however, by the Maronite Christian Habib Tanious Shartouni.

Sabra and Shatila Massacre[link]

The Kahan Commission was set up by the Israeli government to investigate the circumstances of the massacre, in which about 3500 Muslim civilians were killed by the Lebanese Christian forces under the full knowledge and help of the Israeli authorities . The Defence Minister, Ariel Sharon, was found to bear personal responsibility^[29] "for ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge" and "not taking appropriate measures to prevent bloodshed". Sharon's negligence in protecting the civilian population of Beirut, which had come under Israeli control amounted to a non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defence Minister was charged. The Commission arrived to similar conclusions with respect to Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Rafael Eitan, finding his actions were tantamount to a breach of duty that was incumbent upon the Chief of Staff. The Commission recommended that Sharon resign his post as Defense Minister, which he did, though he remained in the government as an influential Minister without Portfolio.^[30]

Amin Gemayel's Inauguration, Beirut 1982

The massacres made the headlines all over the world, and calls were heard for the international community to assume responsibility for stabilizing Lebanon. As a result, the multinational forces that had begun exiting Lebanon after the PLO's evacuation returned as peace keepers. With U.S. backing, Amine Gemayel was chosen by the Lebanese parliament to succeed his brother as President and focused anew on securing the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces.

17 May Agreement[link]

On 17 May 1983, Lebanon's Amine Gemayel, Israel, and the United States signed an agreement^[31] text on Israeli withdrawal that was conditioned on the departure of Syrian troops; reportedly after the US and Israel exerted severe pressure on Gemayel. The agreement stated that "the state of war between Israel and Lebanon has been terminated and no longer exists." Thus, the agreement in effect amounted to a peace agreement with Israel, and was additionally seen by many Lebanese Muslims as an attempt for Israel to gain a permanent hold on the Lebanese South.^[32] The 17 May Agreement was widely portrayed in the Arab world as an imposed surrender, and Amine Gemayel was accused of acting as a Quisling President; tensions in Lebanon hardened considerably. Syria strongly opposed the agreement and declined to discuss the withdrawal of its troops, effectively stalemating further progress.

In August 1983, Israel withdrew from the Chouf District (southeast of Beirut), thus removing the buffer between the Druze and the Christian militias and triggering another round of brutal fighting, the Mountain War (Lebanon). By September, the Druze had gained control over most of the Chouf, and Israeli forces had pulled out from all but the southern security zone. The IDF would remain in this zone until 2000.

Resurging violence[link]

Picture of the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing

The virtual collapse of the Lebanese Army in February 1984, following the defection of many Muslim and Druze units to militias, was a major blow to the government. With the U.S. Marines looking ready to withdraw, Syria and Muslim groups stepped up pressure on Gemayel. On 5 March the Lebanese Government canceled the 17 May Agreement, and the Marines departed a few weeks later.

This period of chaos witnessed the beginning of attacks against U.S. and Western interests, such as the 18 April 1983 suicide attack at the U.S. Embassy in West Beirut, which killed 63. Following the bombing, the Reagan White House "ordered naval bombardments of Druze positions, which resulted in numerous casualties, mostly non-combatant," and the "reply to the American bombardments" was the suicide attack.^[33] Then, on 23 October 1983, a devastating suicide bombing in Beirut targeted the headquarters of the U.S. and French forces, killing 241 American and 58 French servicemen.^[34] On 18 January 1984, American University of Beirut President Malcolm Kerr was murdered. After US forces withdrew in February 1984, anti-US attacks continued, including a second bombing of the U.S. embassy annex in East Beirut on 20 September 1984, which killed 9, including 2 U.S. servicemen. The situation became serious enough to compel the U.S. State Department to invalidate US passports for travel to Lebanon in 1987, a travel ban that was only lifted 10 years later in 1997.

During these years, Hezbollah emerged from a loose coalition of Shi'a groups resisting the Israeli occupation, and splintered from the main Shi'a movement, Nabih Berri's Amal Movement. The group found inspiration for its revolutionary Islamism in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, With Iranian assistance and a large pool of disaffected Shi'a refugees from which to draw support, Hezbollah quickly grew into a strong fighting force.

Fourth phase 1984–1990[link]

Worsening conflict and political crisis[link]

USS New Jersey fires a salvo against anti-government forces in the Shouf, January 9, 1984

Between 1985 and 1989, sectarian conflict worsened as various efforts at national reconciliation failed. Heavy fighting took place in the War of the Camps of 1985-86 as a Syrian-backed coalition headed by the Amal militia sought to rout the PLO from their Lebanese strongholds. Many Palestinians died, and the Sabra, Shatila, and Bourj el-Barajneh refugee camps were largely destroyed.^[35]

Major combat returned to Beirut in 1987, when Palestinians, leftists, and Druze fighters allied against Amal, eventually drawing further Syrian intervention. Violent confrontation flared up again in Beirut in 1988 between Amal and Hezbollah. Hezbollah swiftly seized command of several Amal-held parts of the city, and for the first time emerged as a strong force in the capital.

Aoun government[link]

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Rashid Karami, head of a government of national unity set up after the failed peace efforts of 1984, was assassinated on June 1, 1987. The assassination was accused upon Samir Geagea in coordination with the Lebanese army, but would not be proven. President Gemayel's term of office expired in September 1988. Before stepping down, he appointed another Maronite Christian, Lebanese Armed Forces Commanding General Michel Aoun, as acting Prime Minister, contravening the National Pact. Conflict in this period was also exacerbated by increasing Iraqi involvement, as Saddam Hussein searched for proxy battlefields for the Iran–Iraq War. To counter Iran's influence through Amal and Hezbollah, Iraq backed Christian groups; Saddam Hussein helped Aoun and the Lebanese Forces led by samir Geagea between 1988-1990.^[36]

Muslim groups rejected the violation of the National Pact and pledged support to Selim al-Hoss, a Sunni who had succeeded Karami. Lebanon was thus divided between a Christian military government in East Beirut and a civilian government in West Beirut.

On March 14, 1989, Aoun launched what he termed a "war of liberation" against the Syrians and their Lebanese militia allies. As a result, Syrian pressure on his Lebanese Army and militia pockets in East Beirut grew. Still, Aoun persisted in the "war of liberation", denouncing the regime of Hafez al-Assad and claiming that he fought for Lebanon's independence. While he seems to have had significant Christian support for this, he was still perceived as a sectarian leader among others by the Muslim population, who distrusted his agenda. He was also plagued by the challenge to his legitimacy put forth by the Syrian-backed West Beirut government of Selim al-Hoss. Militarily, this war did not achieve its goal. Instead, it caused considerable damages to East Beirut and provoked massive emigration among the Christian population.

Taif Agreement[link]

An estimate of the distribution of Lebanon's main religious groups, 1991, based on a map by GlobalSecurity.org

The Taif Agreement of 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the fighting. In January of that year, a committee appointed by the Arab League, chaired by Kuwait and including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, began to formulate solutions to the conflict. This led to a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, where they agreed to the national reconciliation accord in October. The agreement provided a large role for Syria in Lebanese affairs. Returning to Lebanon, they ratified the agreement on November 4 and elected Rene Mouawad as President the following day. Military leader Michel Aoun in East Beirut refused to accept Mouawad, and denounced the Taif Agreement.

Mouawad was assassinated 16 days later in a car bombing in Beirut on 22 November as his motorcade returned from Lebanese independence day ceremonies. He was succeeded by Elias Hrawi (who remained in office until 1998). Aoun again refused to accept the election, and dissolved Parliament.

Infighting in East Beirut[link]

On January 16, 1990, General Aoun ordered all Lebanese media to cease using terms like "President" or "Minister" to describe Hrawi and other participants in the Taif government. The Lebanese Forces, which had grown into a rival power broker in the Christian parts of the capital, protested by suspending all its broadcasts. Tension with the LF grew, as Aoun feared that the militia was planning to link up with the Hrawi administration.

On January 31, 1990, Lebanese Army forces clashed with the LF, after Aoun had stated that it was in the national interest for the government to "unify the weapons" (i.e. that the LF must submit to his authority as acting head of state). This brought fierce fighting to East Beirut, and although the LF made initial advances, the intra-Christian warfare eventually sapped the militia of most of its fighting strength.

In August 1990, the Lebanese Parliament, which didn't heed Aoun's order to dissolve, and the new president agreed on constitutional amendments embodying some of the political reforms envisioned at Taif. The National Assembly expanded to 128 seats and was for the first time divided equally between Christians and Muslims.

As Saddam Hussein focused his attention on Kuwait, Iraqi supplies to Aoun dwindled.

On October 13, Syria launched a major operation involving its army, air force (for the first time since Zahle's siege in 1981) and Lebanese allies (mainly the Lebanese Army led by General Émile Lahoud) against Aoun's stronghold around the presidential palace, where hundreds of Aoun supporters were killed. It then cleared out the last Aounist pockets, cementing its hold on the capital. Aoun fled to the French Embassy in Beirut, and later into exile in Paris. He was not able to return until May 2005.

William Harris claims that the Syrian operation could not take place until Syria had reached an agreement with the United States, that in exchange for support against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, it would convince Israel not to attack Syrian aircraft approaching Beirut. Aoun claimed in 1990 that the United States "has sold Lebanon to Syria".^[37]

End of the War[link]

In March 1991, parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment. The amnesty was not extended to crimes perpetrated against foreign diplomats or certain crimes referred by the cabinet to the Higher Judicial Council. In May 1991, the militias (with the important exception of Hezbollah) were dissolved, and the Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild themselves as Lebanon's only major non-sectarian institution.

Some violence still occurred. In late December 1991 a car bomb (estimated to carry 220 pounds of TNT) exploded in the Muslim neighborhood of Basta. At least thirty people were killed, and 120 wounded, including former Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan, who was riding in a bulletproof car.

The Post-war occupation of the country by Syria was particularly politically disadvantageous to the Christian population as most of their leadership was driven into exile, or had been assassinated or jailed.^[1]

Aftermath[link]

War-damaged buildings still standing in Beirut, 2006

Since the end of the war, the Lebanese have conducted several elections, most of the militias have been weakened or disbanded, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have extended central government authority over about two-thirds of the country. Following the cease-fire which ended the 12 July 2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict, the army has for the first time in over three decades moved to occupy and control the southern areas of Lebanon.

Lebanon still bears deep scars from the civil war. In all, it is estimated that more than 100,000 people were killed, and another 100,000 permanently handicapped by injuries. Approximately 900,000 people, representing one-fifth of the pre-war population, were displaced from their homes. Perhaps a quarter of a million emigrated permanently. Thousands of land mines remain buried in the previously contested areas. Some Western hostages kidnapped during the mid-1980s were held until June 1992.^[38] Lebanese victims of kidnapping and wartime "disappeared" number in the tens of thousands^{[citation needed]}.

Car bombs became a favored weapon of violent groups worldwide, following their frequent, and often effective, use during the war. In the 15 years of strife, there were at least 3,641 car bombs, which left 4,386 people dead and thousands more injured.^[39] Other favorite weapons were the AK-47 and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

Cultural works[link]

Literature[link]

• Memory for Forgetfulness by Mahmoud Darwish
• In the Presence of Absence by Mahmoud Darwish
• The Stone of Laugher by Hoda Barakat
• Beirut 75 by Ghada Samman
• Beirut Nightmares by Ghada Samman
• Beirut Blues by Hanan al-Shaykh
• Story of Zahra by Hanan al-Shaykh
• Dear Mr. Kawabat by Rashid al-Daif

Cinema[link]

• Die Fälschung (English title: Circle of Deceit), Germany, 1981, was set during the Lebanese Civil War, being based on a 1979 novel of the same name by Nicolas Born
• Beyroutou el lika by Borhane Alaouié, 1981, was screened at the 32nd Berlin International Film Festival
• Little Wars (film) by Maroun Baghdadi, 1982 was screened at the 1982 Cannes Film Festival
• Out of Life by Maroun Baghdadi, 1991, was awarded the Jury Prize at the 1991 Cannes Film Festival.^[40]
• Lebanese movie drama Beyrout al Gharbyya (English title: West Beirut, French title: À l'abri les enfants) from 1998 is a story of two Muslim boys and orphaned Christian girl set in divided Beirut of 1975.
• Civilisés by Randa Chahal was in the 1999 Venice Film Festival selection.
• Danielle Arbid's In the Battlefields was premiered in the 2004 Cannes Film Festival.
• The Lebanese-Swedish film Zozo, 2005, is about a boy whose parents are killed during the civil war, and who subsequently moves to Sweden.
• The animated drama Waltz With Bashir, 2008 explored a soldier's flashbacks of the war.
• The Canadian Oscar nominated Incendies, 2010, by Denis Villeneuve after a play by Wajdi Mouawad focuses on the tragedy of this and all wars and has many scenes set at various times throughout the entire course of the war.

Visual Arts[link]

In 2009, Saleh Barakat curated "The Road to Peace" exhibition at Beirut Art Center.^[41] The exhibition featured paintings, photographs, drawings, prints and sculptures by Lebanese artists during the war. Its title comes from a series of prints by Aref Rayess that depict Lebanese survivors of war.^[42] The Road to Peace featured Rafic Charaf, Fouad Elkoury, Paul Guiragossian, Hassan Jouni, Samir Khaddage, Seta Manoukian, Saloua Raouda Choucair, Mohammad Rawas, Aref Rayess and others.

See also[link]

Lebanon portal

• Syrian occupation of Lebanon

References[link]

Further reading[link]

• Jean-Marc Aractingi,La Politique à mes trousses( Politics at my heels), Editions l'Harmattan, Paris, 2006, Lebanon Chapter (ISBN 978-2-296-00469-6).
• Al-Baath wa-Lubnân [Arabic only] ("The Baath and Lebanon"), NY Firzli, Beirut, Dar-al-Tali'a Books, 1973.
• The Iraq-Iran Conflict, NY Firzli, Paris, EMA, 1981. ISBN 2-86584-002-6
• Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-28716-2
• Bregman, Ahron and El-Tahri, Jihan (1998). The Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs. London: BBC Books. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14-026827-8
• The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976 Khazen Farid El (2000) (ISBN 0-674-08105-6)
• The Bullet Collection, a book by Patricia Sarrafian Ward, is an excellent account of human experience during the Lebanese Civil War.
• Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92 O'Ballance Edgar (1998) (ISBN 0-312-21593-2)
• Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 Salibi Kamal S. (1976) (ISBN 0-88206-010-4)
• Death of a country: The civil war in Lebanon. Bulloch John (1977) (ISBN 0-297-77288-0)
• Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions (Princeton Series on the Middle East) Harris William W (1997) (ISBN 1-55876-115-2)
• The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians Noam Chomsky (1983, 1999) (ISBN 0-89608-601-1)
• History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine, Vol. 2 Hitti Philip K. (2002) (ISBN 1-931956-61-8)
• Lebanon: A Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon, Revised Edition Picard, Elizabeth (2002) (ISBN 0-8419-1415-X)
• Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East) Haley P. Edward, Snider Lewis W. (1979) (ISBN 0-8156-2210-4)
• Lebanon: Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War by Hiro, Dilip (1993) (ISBN 0-312-09724-7)
• Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War Fisk, Robert (2001) (ISBN 0-19-280130-9)
• Syria and the Lebanese Crisis Dawisha A. I. (1980) (ISBN 0-312-78203-9)
• Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process Deeb Marius (2003) (ISBN 1-4039-6248-0)
• The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 Rabinovich Itamar (1985) (ISBN 0-8014-9313-7)
• Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, fourth edition, Charles D. Smith (2001) (ISBN 0-312-20828-6) (paperback)
• Les otages libanais dans les prisons syriennes, jusqu'à quand? by Lina Murr Nehme

External links[link]

• Center for Lebanese Study-Oxford University
• Lebanon's Forgotten Civil War-Washington Post Foreign Service 20 December 1999
• Pictures of Battle Scared Beirut-Travel Adventures.

Primary sources

• Lebanese civil war from 13 April 1975 to 13 October 1990 & War on Lebanon 2006 Full of pictures
• “Another Battle of Beirut ” (Time Magazine, 14 May 1973)
• “The Palestinian Fedayeen” (Declassified CIA Report, 1971)
• The Lebanese civil war and the Taef agreement
• Full Lebanese War Photo System
• A 15-episode documentary about the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990

Aftermath of the Battle of Gettysburg, American Civil War, 1863

A civil war is a war between organized groups within the same nation state or republic,^[1] or, less commonly, between two countries created from a formerly united nation state.^[2] The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve independence for a region, or to change government policies.^[1] The term is a calque of the Latin bellum civile which was used to refer to the various civil wars of the Roman Republic in the 1st century BC.

A civil war is a high-intensity conflict, often involving regular armed forces, that is sustained, organized and large-scale. Civil wars may result in large numbers of casualties and the consumption of significant resources.^[3]

Civil wars since the end of World War II have lasted on average just over four years, a dramatic rise from the one-and-a-half year average of the 1900-1944 period. While the rate of emergence of new civil wars has been relatively steady since the mid-19th century, the increasing length of those wars resulted in increasing numbers of wars ongoing at any one time. For example, there were no more than five civil wars underway simultaneously in the first half of the 20th century, while over 20 concurrent civil wars were occurring at the end of the Cold War, before a significant decrease as conflicts strongly associated with the superpower rivalry came to an end. Since 1945, civil wars have resulted in the deaths of over 25 million people, as well as the forced displacement of millions more. Civil wars have further resulted in economic collapse; Burma (Myanmar), Uganda and Angola are examples of nations that were considered to have promising futures before being engulfed in civil wars.^[4]

Definition[link]

Remains of a T-62 tank after rebels enter Addis Ababa at the end of the Ethiopian Civil War, 1991

James Fearon, a scholar of civil wars at Stanford University, defines a civil war as "a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies".^[1] Ann Hironaka further specifies that one side of a civil war is the state.^[3] The intensity at which a civil disturbance becomes a civil war is contested by academics. Some political scientists define a civil war as having more than 1000 casualties,^[1] while others further specify that at least 100 must come from each side.^[5] The Correlates of War, a dataset widely used by scholars of conflict, classifies civil wars as having over 1000 war-related casualties per year of conflict. This rate is a small fraction of the millions killed in the Second Sudanese Civil War and Cambodian Civil War, for example, but excludes several highly publicized conflicts, such as The Troubles of Northern Ireland and the struggle of the African National Congress in Apartheid-era South Africa.^[3]

Based on the 1000 casualties per year criterion, there were 213 civil wars from 1816 to 1997, 104 of which occurred from 1944 to 1997.^[3] If one uses the less-stringent 1000 casualties total criterion, there were over 90 civil wars between 1945 and 2007, with 20 ongoing civil wars as of 2007.^[1]

Further definitions[link]

Battle of Tewkesbury (1471) of the Wars of the Roses in England

The Geneva Conventions do not specifically define the term "civil war". They do, however, describe the criteria for acts qualifying as "armed conflict not of an international character", which includes civil wars. Among the conditions listed are four requirements:^[6][7]

• The party in revolt must be in possession of a part of the national territory.
• The insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto authority over the population within the determinate portion of the national territory.
• The insurgents must have some amount of recognition as a belligerent.
• The legal Government is "obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military."

Causes of civil war in the Collier-Hoeffler Model[link]

Scholars investigating the cause of civil war are attracted by two opposing theories, greed versus grievance. Roughly stated: are conflicts caused by who people are, whether that be defined in terms of ethnicity, religion or other social affiliation, or do conflicts begin because it is in the economic best interests of individuals and groups to start them? Scholarly analysis supports the conclusion that economic and structural factors are more important than those of identity in predicting occurrences of civil war.^[8]

A comprehensive studies of civil war was carried out by a team from the World Bank in the early 21st century. The study framework, which came to be called the Collier-Hoeffler Model, examined 78 five-year increments when civil war occurred from 1960 to 1999, as well as 1,167 five-year increments of "no civil war" for comparison, and subjected the data set to regression analysis to see the effect of various factors. The factors that were shown to have a statistically significant effect on the chance that a civil war would occur in any given five-year period were:^[9]

Availability of finance

An economic dependence on commodities, such as diamonds being mined by these children in Sierra Leone, is correlated with an increased risk of civil war. (See also blood diamond.)

A high proportion of primary commodities in national exports significantly increases the risk of a conflict. A country at "peak danger", with commodities comprising 32% of gross domestic product, has a 22% risk of falling into civil war in a given five-year period, while a country with no primary commodity exports has a 1% risk. When disaggregated, only petroleum and non-petroleum groupings showed different results: a country with relatively low levels of dependence on petroleum exports is at slightly less risk, while a high-level of dependence on oil as an export results in slightly more risk of a civil war than national dependence on another primary commodity. The authors of the study interpreted this as being the result of the ease by which primary commodities may be extorted or captured compared to other forms of wealth, for example, it is easy to capture and control the output of a gold mine or oil field compared to a sector of garment manufacturing or hospitality services.^[10]

A second source of finance is national diasporas, which can fund rebellions and insurgencies from abroad. The study found that statistically switching the size of a country's diaspora from the smallest found in the study to the largest resulted in a sixfold increase in the chance of a civil war.^[10]

Armed Arab volunteers during the 1947-1948 civil war in the British Mandate of Palestine

Opportunity cost of rebellion

Higher male secondary school enrollment, per capita income and economic growth rate all had significant effects on reducing the chance of civil war. Specifically, a male secondary school enrollment 10% above the average reduced the chance of a conflict by about 3%, while a growth rate 1% higher than the study average resulted in a decline in the chance of a civil war of about 1%. The study interpreted these three factors as proxies for earnings foregone by rebellion, and therefore that lower foregone earnings encourages rebellion.^[10] Phrased another way: young males (who make up the vast majority of combatants in civil wars) are less likely to join a rebellion if they are getting an education and/or have a comfortable salary, and can reasonably assume that they will prosper in the future.

Low per capita income has been proposed as a cause for grievance, prompting armed rebellion. However, for this to be true, one would expect economic inequality to also be a significant factor in rebellions, which it is not. The study therefore concluded that the economic model of opportunity cost better explained the findings.^[9]

Military advantage

Communist soldiers during the Battle of Siping, Chinese Civil War, 1946

High levels of population dispersion and, to a lesser extent, the presence of mountainous terrain increased the chance of conflict. Both of these factors favor rebels, as a population dispersed outward toward the borders is harder to control than one concentrated in a central region, while mountains offer terrain where rebels can seek sanctuary.^[10]

Grievance

Most proxies for "grievance" - the theory that civil wars begin because of issues of identity, rather than economics - were statistically insignificant, including economic equality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious fractionalization. Only ethnic dominance, the case where the largest ethnic group comprises a majority of the population, increased the risk of civil war. A country characterized by ethnic dominance has nearly twice the chance of a civil war. However, the combined effects of ethnic and religious fractionalization, i.e. the more chance that any two randomly chosen people will be from separate ethnic or religious groups the less chance of a civil war, were also significant and positive, as long as the country avoided ethnic dominance. The study interpreted this as stating that minority groups are more likely to rebel if they feel that they are being dominated, but that rebellions are more likely to occur the more homogeneous the population and thus more cohesive the rebels. These two factors may thus be seen as mitigating each other in many cases.^[11]

Population size

The various factors contributing to the risk of civil war rise increase with population size. The risk of a civil war rises approximately proportionately with the size of a country's population.^[9]

Time

The more time that has elapsed since the last civil war, the less likely it is that a conflict will recur. The study had two possible explanations for this: one opportunity-based and the other grievance-based. The elapsed time may represent the depreciation of whatever capital the rebellion was fought over and thus increase the opportunity cost of restarting the conflict. Alternatively, elapsed time may represent the gradual process of healing of old hatreds. The study found that the presence of diaspora substantially reduced the positive effect of time, as the funding from diasporas offsets the depreciation of rebellion-specific capital.^[11]

Other causes[link]

Evolutionary psychologist Satoshi Kanazawa has argued that an important cause of intergroup conflict may be the relative availability of women of reproductive age. He found that polygyny greatly increased the frequency of civil wars but not interstate wars.^[12] Gleditsch et al. did not find a relationship between ethnic groups with polygyny and increased frequency of civil wars but nations having legal polygamy may have more civil wars. They argued that misogyny is a better explanation than polygyny. They found that increased women's rights were are associated with less civil wars and that legal polygamy had no effect after women’s rights were controlled for.^[13]

Duration of civil wars[link]

Ann Hironaka, author of Neverending Wars, divides the modern history of civil wars into the pre-19th century, 19th century to early 20th century, and late 20th century. In 19th century Europe, the length of civil wars fell significantly, largely due to the nature of the conflicts as battles for the power center of the state, the strength of centralized governments, and the normally quick and decisive intervention by other states to support the government. Following World War II the duration of civil wars grew past the norm of the pre-19th century, largely due to weakness of the many postcolonial states and the intervention by major powers on both sides of conflict. The most obvious commonality to civil wars are that they occur in fragile states.^[14]

Civil wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries[link]

An artillery school set up by the anti-socialist "Whites" during the Finnish Civil War, 1918

Civil wars through the 19th century to early 20th century tended to be short; the average length of a civil war between 1900 and 1944 was one and half years.^[15] The state itself was the obvious center of authority in the majority of cases, and the civil wars were thus fought for control of the state. This meant that whoever had control of the capital and the military could normally crush resistance. If a rebellion failed to quickly seize the capital and control of the military for itself, it was normally doomed to a quick destruction. For example, the fighting associated with the 1871 Paris Commune occurred almost entirely in Paris, and ended quickly once the military sided with the government.^[16]

The power of non-state actors resulted in a lower value placed on sovereignty in the 18th and 19th centuries, which further reduced the number of civil wars. For example, the pirates of the Barbary Coast were recognized as de facto states because of their military power. The Barbary pirates thus had no need to rebel against the Ottoman Empire, who were their nominal state government, to gain recognition for their sovereignty. Conversely, states such as Virginia and Massachusetts in the United States of America did not have sovereign status, but had significant political and economic independence coupled with weak federal control, reducing the incentive to secede.^[17]

The two major global ideologies, monarchism and democracy, led to several civil wars. However, a bi-polar world, divided between the two ideologies, did not develop, largely due the dominance of monarchists through most of the period. The monarchists would thus normally intervene in other countries to stop democratic movements taking control and forming democratic governments, which were seen by monarchists as being both dangerous and unpredictable. The Great Powers, defined in the 1815 Congress of Vienna as the United Kingdom, Habsburg Austria, Prussia, France, and Russia, would frequently coordinate interventions in other nations' civil wars, nearly always on the side of the incumbent government. Given the military strength of the Great Powers, these interventions were nearly always decisive and quickly ended the civil wars.^[18]

There were several exceptions from the general rule of quick civil wars during this period. The American Civil War (1861–1865) was unusual for at least two reasons: it was fought around regional identities, rather than political ideologies, and it was ended through a war of attrition, rather than over a decisive battle over control of the capital, as was the norm. The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) was exceptional because both sides of the war received support from intervening great powers: Germany, Italy, and Portugal supported opposition leader Francisco Franco, while France and Russia supported the government^[19] (see proxy war).

Civil wars since 1945[link]

In the 1990s, about twenty civil wars were occurring concurrently during an average year, a rate about ten times the historical average since the 19th century. However, the rate of new civil wars had not increased appreciably; the drastic rise in the number of ongoing wars after World War II was a result of the tripling of the average duration of civil wars to over four years.^[20] This increase was a result of the increased number of states, the fragility of states formed after 1945, the decline in interstate war, and the Cold War rivalry.^[21]

Following World War II, the major European powers divested themselves of their colonies at an increasing rate: the number of ex-colonial states jumped from about 30 to almost 120 after the war. The rate of state formation leveled off in the 1980s, at which point few colonies remained.^[22] More states also meant more states in which to have long civil wars. Hironaka statistically measures the impact of the increased number of ex-colonial states as increasing the post-WWII incidence of civil wars by +165% over the pre-1945 number.^[23]

While the new ex-colonial states appeared to follow the blueprint of the idealized state - centralized government, territory enclosed by defined borders, and citizenry with defined rights -, as well as accessories such as a national flag, an anthem, a seat at the United Nations and an official economic policy, they were in actuality far weaker than the Western states they were modeled after.^[24] In Western states, the structure of governments closely matched states' actual capabilities, which had been arduously developed over centuries. The development of strong administrative structures, in particular those related to extraction of taxes, is closely associated with the intense warfare between predatory European states in the 17th and 18th centuries, or in Charles Tilly's famous formulation: "War made the state and the state made war".^[25] For example, the formation of the modern states of Germany and Italy in the 19th century is closely associated with the wars of expansion and consolidation led by Prussia and Sardinia, respectively.^[25] The Western process of forming effective and impersonal bureaucracies, developing efficient tax systems, and integrating national territory continued into the 20th century; as late as World War I, some French military conscripts from rural regions were unable to name the country they were fighting for.^[26] Nevertheless, Western states that survived into the latter half of the 20th century were considered "strong" by simple reason that they had managed to develop the institutional structures and military capability required to survive predation by their fellow states.

A band of Ogaden National Liberation Front rebels in Ethiopia, 2006

In sharp contrast, decolonization was an entirely different process of state formation. Most imperial powers had not foreseen a need to prepare their colonies for independence; for example, Britain had given limited self-rule to India and Sri Lanka, while treating British Somaliland as little more than a trading post, while all major decisions for French colonies were made in Paris and Belgium prohibited any self-government up until it suddenly granted independence to its colonies in 1960. Like Western states of previous centuries, the new ex-colonies lacked autonomous bureaucracies, which would make decisions based on the benefit to society as a whole, rather than respond to corruption and nepotism to favor a particular interest group. In such a situation, factions manipulate the state to benefit themselves or, alternatively, state leaders use the bureaucracy to further their own self-interest. The lack of credible governance was compounded by the fact that most colonies were economic loss-makers at independence, lacking both a productive economic base and a taxation system to effectively extract resources from economic activity. Among the rare states profitable at decolonization was India, to which scholars credibly argue that Uganda, Malaysia and Angola may be included. Neither did imperial powers make territorial integration a priority, and may have discouraged nascent nationalism as a danger to their rule. Many newly independent states thus found themselves impoverished, with minimal administrative capacity in a fragmented society, while faced with the expectation of immediately meeting the demands of a modern state.^[27] Such states are considered "weak" or "fragile". The "strong"-"weak" categorization is not the same as "Western"-"non-Western", as some Latin American states like Argentina and Brazil and Middle Eastern states like Egypt and Israel are considered to have "strong" administrative structures and economic infrastructure.^[28]

A checkpoint manned by the Lebanese army and US Marines, 1982. The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) was characterized by multiple foreign interventions.

Historically, the international community would have targeted weak states for territorial absorption or colonial domination or, alternatively, such states would fragment into pieces small enough to be effectively administered and secured by a local power. However, international norms towards sovereignty changed in the wake of WWII in ways that support and maintain the existence of weak states. Weak states are given de jure sovereignty equal to that of other states, even when they do not have de facto sovereignty or control of their own territory, including the privileges of international diplomatic recognition and an equal vote in the United Nations. Further, the international community offers development aid to weak states, which helps maintain the facade of a functioning modern state by giving the appearance that the state is capable of fulfilling its implied responsibilities of control and order.^[29] The formation of a strong international law regime and norms against territorial aggression is strongly associated with the dramatic drop in the number of interstate wars, though it has also been attributed to the effect of the Cold War or to the changing nature of economic development. Consequently, military aggression that results in territorial annexation became increasingly likely to prompt international condemnation, diplomatic censure, a reduction in international aid or the introduction of economic sanction, or, as in the case of 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, international military intervention to reverse the territorial aggression.^[30] Similarly, the international community has largely refused to recognize secessionist regions, while keeping some states such as Cyprus and Taiwan in diplomatic recognition limbo. While there is not a large body of academic work examining the relationship, Hironaka's statistical study found a correlation that suggests that every major international anti-secessionist declaration increased the number of ongoing civil wars by +10%, or a total +114% from 1945 to 1997.^[31] The diplomatic and legal protection given by the international community, as well as economic support to weak governments and discouragement of secession, thus had the unintended effect of encouraging civil wars.

A fast attack boat of the rebel LTTE in Sri Lanka in 2003 passes the hulk of an LTTE supply ship that had been sunk by government aircraft, Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009)

There has been an enormous amount of international intervention in civil wars since 1945 that served to extend wars. While intervention has been practiced since the international system has existed, its nature changed substantially. It became common for both the state and opposition group to receive foreign support, allowing wars to continue well past the point when domestic resources had been exhausted. Superpowers, such as the European great powers, had always felt no compunction in intervening in civil wars that affected their interests, while distant regional powers such as the United States could declare the interventionist Monroe Doctrine of 1821 for events in its Central American "backyard". However, the large population of weak states after 1945 allowed intervention by former colonial powers, regional powers and neighboring states who themselves often had scarce resources. On average, a civil war with interstate intervention was 300% longer than those without. When disaggregated, a civil war with intervention on only one side is 156% longer, while intervention on both sides lengthens the average civil war by an addition 92%. If one of the intervening states was a superpower, a civil war is extended a further 72%; a conflict such as the Angolan Civil War, in which there is two-sided foreign intervention, including by a superpower (actually, two superpowers in the case of Angola), would be 538% longer on average than a civil war without any international intervention.^[32]

Effect of the Cold War[link]

The Cold War (1945–1989) provided a global network of material and ideological support that perpetuated civil wars, which were mainly fought in weak ex-colonial states, rather than the relatively strong states that were aligned with the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In some cases, superpowers would superimpose Cold War ideology onto local conflicts, while in others local actors using Cold War ideology would attract the attention of a superpower to obtain support. Using a separate statistical evaluation than used above for interventions, civil wars that included pro- or anti-communist forces lasted 141% longer than the average non-Cold War conflict, while a Cold War civil war that attracted superpower intervention resulted in wars typically lasting over three times as long as other civil wars. Conversely, the end of the Cold War marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 resulted in a reduction in the duration of Cold War civil wars of 92% or, phrased another way, a roughly ten-fold increase in the rate of resolution of Cold War civil wars. Lengthy Cold War-associated civil conflicts that ground to a halt include the wars of Guatemala (1960–1996), El Salvador (1979–1991) and Nicaragua (1970–1990).^[33]

See also[link]

• The Logic of Violence in Civil War
• War of Independence (disambiguation)
• Wars of national liberation

References[link]

Bibliography[link]

• Ali, Taisier Mohamed Ahmed and Robert O. Matthews, eds. Civil Wars in Africa: roots and resolution (1999), 322 pages
• Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Lynne Rienner, 2000).
• Paul Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap: civil war and development policy World Bank (2003) - 320 pages
• Collier, Paul; Sambanis, Nicholas, eds. (2005). Understanding Civil War:Evidence and Analysis. 1: Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. ISBN 978-0-8213-6047-7. http://books.google.com/books?id=OnGQQVuIBjgC&pg=PP1&dq=Understanding+Civil+War:Evidence+and+Analysis&cd=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false. 
• Collier, Paul; Sambanis, Nicholas, eds. (2005). Understanding Civil War:Evidence and Analysis. 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions. Washington, DC: The World Bank. ISBN 978-0-8213-6049-1. http://books.google.com/books?id=yNTQ-BDLPxIC&pg=PP1&dq=Understanding+Civil+War:Evidence+and+Analysis&cd=2#v=onepage&q=&f=false. 
• Stathis Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?" World Politics 54, no. 1 (2001): 99-118.
• David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds. The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton University Press, 1996).
• Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945--1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (summer 1995): pp 681–690.
• Andrew Mack, "Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community," Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 (2002): pp. 515–525.
• David T. Mason and Patrick 3. Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 4 (fall 1996): 546-568.
• Patrick M. Regan. Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict (2000) 172 pages
• Stephen John and others., eds. Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (2002), 729 pages
• Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). ISBN 0-691-12383-7.
• Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton University Press, 2002),
• Elisabeth Jean Wood; "Civil Wars: What We Don't Know," Global Governance, Vol. 9, 2003 pp 247+ online version

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Civil wars

• Royal Air Force Doctrine - The Nature of War and Armed Conflict
• "What makes a civil war?", BBC News, 20 April 2006

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Ziad Rahbani (also Ziyad al-Rahbany Arabic: زياد الرحباني‎, born 1956) is a Lebanese composer, pianist, performer, playwright, and political commentator. His compositions are well-known throughout the Arab world. Many of his musicals satirize Lebanese politics both during and after the civil war, and are often strongly critical of the traditional political establishment.

Personal life[link]

Ziad Rahbani is the son of the Lebanese famous composer Assi Rahbani and Nouhad Haddad, the famous Lebanese female singer known as Fairuz. Rahbani was married to Dalal Karam, with whom he has a boy named "Assi" but was later found out not to be his biological son. Their relationship later ended in divorce, prompting Karam to write a series of articles for the gossip magazine Ashabaka about their marriage. Rahbani composed a number of songs about their relationship, including "Marba el Dalal" and "Bisaraha".

On Friday April 3, 2009, the Lebanese press reported that Rahbani filed a lawsuit with the Lebanese courts, asking to disown his son, Assi Rahbani Jr., and stripping him of the Rahbani name on all official records, and voiding any legal obligation towards him as a father, after DNA tests proved that Assi Jr. is not his son.^[1] Rahbani has also had a well-publicized relationship with actress Carmen Lebbos, which lasted for 15 years before the couple agreed to separate.

Politically, Ziad Rahbani has a long standing relationship with Lebanese leftist movements, and is a self-declared communist and atheist.^[2] Coming from a Greek Orthodox family, his politics and atheistic view point have meant that he has been at odds with some of his ex-coreligionists^{[citation needed]}. During the Lebanese civil war, Rahbani resided in mainly Muslim West Beirut.

Career[link]

Rahbani's first known artistic work was "Sadiqi Allah" (My Friend God), a collection of writings between the years 1967 and 1968 when he was in his teens. In 1973, at 17, Rahbani composed his first music for Fairuz, his mother. Assi Rahbani, his father, was hospitalized and his mother Fairuz was to play the leading role in Al Mahatta by the Rahbani brothers. Mansour Rahbani, his uncle, who had written the lyrics of a song about Assi Rahbani's forced absence, gave Ziad Rahbani the task of composing its music. The song "Saalouni El Nass" (The People Asked Me) gained Rahbani recognition in the music world.

Career in Theater[link]

Rahbani appeared for the first time on stage in Al Mahatta where he played the role of the detective. He also appeared later on in the Rahbani Brothers' Mays el Rim in the role of one of the policemen. Rahbani's first step into theatre was with the Bkennaya Theater in Sahriyyeh. He followed that with highly politicized string of plays.

Collaborations with other artists[link]

Before, during and after the war, Rahbani released and co-released several albums like: Bi hal shakel, Abou Ali, Halleluja, Shareet Ghayr Houdoudi, Houdou Nesbi, Ana Mouch Kafer, Hakaya al Atfal, Bema Enno, Monodose (with singer Salma Mosfi) and Maaloumat Akidi (with singer Latifa).

He has also written the music for singles performed by others such as "Rafi2i Sobhi El Gizz", "Kifak", "Iza baddik" "Abban 3an Jidd".

He has done some orchestrations for songs like "Madih el Zoll el Ali", "Ahmad el Zaatar" and "Moussakafoun noun". Rahbani has also mixed several albums such as Al ra2i el 3aam and Moussakafoun noun.

He has held concerts like the Oriental Jazz Concert in the BUC Irwin Hall, the Las Salinas Concert, the Forum de Beirut Concert, the Picadilly Concert, and "Mniha Concert" in Mont La Salle Ain Saadeh, the latter with his cousin Ghassan Rahbani.

He also performs live occasionally in pubs like "Medusa", "Mon Général" and the "Téatro".

Political works[link]

Rahbani has also done many political shows on the radio like Ba3dna Taybeen Oulou Allah and El Akl Zeeneh and some music related shows. Since 2006, he has written a column for the Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar.

Discography[link]

Solo Albums[link]

• Belly Dance (1972)
• Bil Afrah (1972)
• Sahrieh - Songs (1973)
• Abou Ali (1979)
• Ana Mosh Kafer (1985)
• Hodou' Nisbi (1985)
• Bema Enno (1996)
• Amrak Seedna (2000)
• Bnisba la boukra shou
• Monodose (2001)
• Live at Damascus Citadel (2009)

Music for Fairuz[link]

• Wahdon (1979)
• Maarefti Fik (1987)
• Kifak Inta (1991)
• Ila Assi (1995) a reorchestration of Rahbani brothers' songs
• Mich Kayen hayk Tkoun (1999)
• Beiteddine Concert 2000 (2001)
• Wala Kif (2002)
• Eh, Fi Amal (2010)

Theatre[link]

• Sahriyyeh (1973)
• Nazl el sourour (1974)
• Bennesbe La Boukra Shou? (1978)
• Film Ameriki Taweel (1980)
• Shi fashel (1983)
• Bikhsous el Karameh wel Shaab el aaneed (1993)
• Lawla Fos'hat el Amal (1994).
• Lfasel L2khar (1996)

References[link]

External links[link]

• A compilation of press articles and interviews with Ziad Rahbani, in arabic.
• FairuzFan - contains information of Ziad's works with Fairuz his mother