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Jiang Zemin 江泽民
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
In office 24 June 1989 – 15 November 2002 (&1000000000000001300000013 years, &10000000000000144000000144 days)
Deputy	Li Peng Zhu Rongji Li Ruihuan Hu Jintao
Preceded by	Zhao Ziyang
Succeeded by	Hu Jintao
President of the People's Republic of China
In office 27 March 1993 – 15 March 2003 (9 years 353 days)
Premier	Li Peng Zhu Rongji
Vice President	Rong Yiren Hu Jintao
Preceded by	Yang Shangkun
Succeeded by	Hu Jintao
Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission
In office 9 November 1989 – 19 September 2004
Preceded by	Deng Xiaoping
Succeeded by	Hu Jintao
Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission
In office 19 March 1990 – 8 March 2005
Preceded by	Deng Xiaoping
Succeeded by	Hu Jintao
Member of the 13,14,15 th CPC Politburo Standing Committee
In office 24 June 1989 – 15 November 2002
General Secretary	Himself
Member of the National People's Congress
In office 25 March 1988 – 5 March 2008
Constituency	Shanghai At-large
Personal details
Born	(1926-08-17) 17 August 1926 (age 85) Yangzhou, Jiangsu
Nationality	Chinese
Political party	Communist Party of China
Spouse(s)	Wang Yeping
Alma mater	Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Profession	Electrical engineer
Signature

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Jiang Zemin (born 17 August 1926) is a former Chinese politician, who served as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China from 1989 to 2002, as President of the People's Republic of China from 1993 to 2003, and as Chairman of the Central Military Commission from 1989 to 2005. His long career and political prominence have led to him being described as the "core of the third generation" of Communist Party leaders.

Jiang Zemin came to power following Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, replacing Zhao Ziyang as CPC General Secretary. With the waning influence of Deng Xiaoping and the other members of Eight Elders due to old age,and with the help of old and powerful party and state leaders, former President Li Xiannian and Chen Yun Jiang effectively became the "Paramount Leader" in the 1990s. Under his leadership, China experienced substantial developmental growth with reforms, saw the peaceful return of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom and Macau from Portugal, and improved its relations with the outside world while the Communist Party maintained its tight control over the government. Jiang has been criticized for being too concerned about his personal image at home, and too conciliatory towards Russia and the United States abroad.^[1]

Background and ascendancy[link]

Jiang was born in the city of Yangzhou, Jiangsu. His ancestral home was the Jiangwan Village (江湾村), Wuyuan County (婺源县) of the old Huizhou (徽州) in northern Jiangxi Province. This was also the hometown of a number of prominent figures in Chinese academic and intellectual establishments. Jiang grew up during the years of Japanese occupation. His uncle, Jiang Shangqing, had died fighting the Japanese in World War II and was considered to be a national hero. Jiang attended the Department of Electrical Engineering at the National Central University in Japanese-occupied Nanjing before being transferred to Shanghai Jiao Tong University. He graduated there in 1947 with a Bachelor's degree in electrical engineering.

Jiang married^[when?] Wang Yeping (Chinese: 王冶坪; pinyin: Wáng Yěpíng, born 1928), a native of Yangzhou, China. She graduated from Shanghai International Studies University.^[2] They have two sons, Jiang Mianheng and Jiang Miankang.^[2]

He claimed that he joined the Communist Party of China when he was in college^{[citation needed]}. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Jiang received his training at the Stalin Automobile Works in Moscow in the 1950s. He also worked for Changchun's First Automobile Works. He eventually got transferred to government services, where he began to rise in prominence and rank, eventually becoming a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Minister of Electronic Industries in 1983.

In 1985 he became Mayor of Shanghai, and subsequently the Party Chief of Shanghai. Jiang received mixed reviews as mayor. Many of his critics dismissed him as a "flower vase", a Chinese term used to describe a decorative but useless person.^[3] Many credited Shanghai's growth during the period to Zhu Rongji^{[citation needed]}. Jiang was an ardent believer, during this period, in Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms. In an attempt of curbing student discontent in 1986, Jiang recited the Gettysburg Address in English in front of a group of student protesters.^[4][5]

Jiang was described as having a passable command of several foreign languages,^[6] including Romanian, Russian, and English. One of his favorite activities was to engage foreign visitors in small talks on art and literature in their native language, in addition to singing foreign songs in the original language.^[6] He became friends with Allen Broussard, the African American judge who visited Shanghai in 1987 and Brazilian actress Lucelia Santos^{[citation needed]}.

Jiang was elevated to national politics in 1987, automatically becoming a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee because it is customarily dictated that the Party Chief of Shanghai would also have a seat in the Politburo. In 1989, China was in crisis over the Tiananmen Square protest, and the Central Government was in conflict on how to handle the protesters. (The opening policy, brought out by Deng Xiaoping, has been proved as a crucial and brilliant turning point in China's modern history, causing the economy to grow at an astonishing rate during the past decades.) In June, Deng Xiaoping dismissed liberal Zhao Ziyang, who was considered too conciliatory to student protestors. Jiang, at the time, was the Shanghai Party Chief, the top figure in China's new economic center. In an incident with the World Economic Herald, Jiang closed down the newspaper, deeming it harmful. The handling of the crisis in Shanghai was noticed by Beijing, and then paramount Leader Deng Xiaoping. As the protests escalated and then Party-chief Zhao Ziyang was removed from office, Jiang was selected by the Party leaders as a compromise candidate over Tianjin's Li Ruihuan, Premier Li Peng, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and the retired elders to become the new General Secretary. At the time he was considered to be an unlikely candidate^{[citation needed]}. Within three years Deng had transferred most power in the state, party and military to Jiang.

Early leadership[link]

Jiang was elevated to the country's top job in 1989 with a fairly small power base inside the party, and thus, very little actual power^{[citation needed]}.His most reliable allies were the powerful party elders - Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. He was believed as simply a transitional figure until a more stable successor government to Deng could be put in place. Other prominent Party and military figures like Yang Shangkun and brother Yang Baibing were believed to be planning a coup. Jiang used Deng Xiaoping as a back-up to his leadership in the first few years. Jiang, who was believed^{[citation needed]} to have a neo-conservative slant, warned against "bourgeois liberalization". Deng's belief, however, stipulated that the only solution to keeping the legitimacy of Communist rule over China was to continue the drive for modernization and economic reform, and therefore placed himself at odds with Jiang.

At the first meeting of the new Standing Committee of the Politburo, after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, Jiang criticized the previous period as "hard on the economy, soft on politics" and advocated increasing political thought work.^[7] Anne-Marie Brady writes that "Jiang Zemin was a long time political cadre with a nose for ideological work and its importance. This meeting marked the beginning of a new era in propaganda and political thought work in China." Soon after, the Central Propaganda Department was given more resources and power, "including the power to go in to the propaganda-related work units and cleanse the ranks of those who had been supportive of the democracy movement."^[7]

Deng grew critical of Jiang's leadership in 1992. During Deng's southern tours, he subtly suggested that the pace of reform was not fast enough, and the "central leadership" (i.e. Jiang) had most responsibility. Jiang grew ever more cautious, and rallied behind Deng's reforms completely. In 1993, Jiang coined the new term "socialist market economy" to move China's centrally-planned socialist economy into essentially a government-regulated capitalist market economy. It was a huge step to take in the realization of Deng's "Socialism with Chinese characteristics". At the same time, Jiang elevated many of his supporters from Shanghai to high government positions, after regaining Deng's confidence. He abolished the outdated Central Advisory Committee, an advisory body composed of revolutionary party elders. He became Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1989, followed by his election to the Presidency in March 1993.

Secretaryship and Presidency[link]

Deng Xiaoping died in early 1997, and China, emerging gradually out of the Deng-era reforms and the relative stability of the early 1990s, faced a myriad of economic and social problems. At Deng's funeral, Jiang delivered his eulogy. He had inherited a China rampant with government corruption, and regional economies growing too rapidly for the stability of the entire country. Deng's idea that "some areas can get rich before others" gave rise to an opening wealth gap between coastal regions and the hinterlands. The unprecedented economic growth had inevitably led to the closing of many state-owned enterprises (SOE's), and a staggering unemployment rate that hit 40% in some urban areas. Stock markets fluctuated greatly. The scale of rural migration into urban areas was unprecedented anywhere in the world^{[citation needed]}, and little was being done to address an ever-increasing urban-rural wealth gap. Official reports put the figure on the percentage of China's GDP being moved and abused by corrupt officials at 10%.^{[citation needed]} A chaotic environment of illegal bonds issued from civil and military officials resulted in much of the corrupted wealth to end up in foreign countries. Corruption levels had replicated, if not exceeded that of the Republican era in the 1940s. A surge in crime rates and the re-emergence of organized crime began to plague cities. A careless stance on the destruction of the environment furthered concerns voiced by intellectuals. Jiang's biggest aim in the economy was stability, and he believed that a stable government with highly centralised power would be a prerequisite, choosing to postpone political reform, which in many facets of governance exacerbated the on-going problems.^[3] Jiang continued pouring funds to develop the Special Economic Zones and coastal regions.

Jiang is believed to be the first Chinese leader to truly manipulate the medium of television to enhance his own image, gaining a reputation for charisma.^{[citation needed]} Beginning in 1996, Jiang began a series of reforms in the state-controlled media aimed at promoting the "core of leadership" under himself, and at the same time crushing some of his political opponents. The personality enhancements in the media were largely frowned upon during the Deng era, and had not been seen since Mao and Hua Guofeng's time in office in the late 1970s. The People's Daily and CCTV-1's 7 pm national news each had Jiang-related events as the front-page or top stories, a fact that remained until Hu Jintao's media administrative changes in 2006. He appeared casual in front of Western media, and gave an unprecedented interview with Mike Wallace of CBS in 2000 at Beidaihe. He would often use foreign languages in front of the camera, albeit not always comprehensible. In an encounter with a Hong Kong reporter in 2000 regarding the central government's apparent "imperial order" of supporting Tung Chee-hwa to seek a second term as Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Jiang branded the Hong Kong journalists as "too simple, sometimes naive" in English.^[8] The event was shown on Hong Kong television that night, an event regarded to be in poor taste outside China.

Among the main features of Jiang’s domestic policy was his campaign against the Falun Gong spiritual practice, which once had tens of millions of followers in China. On 25 April 1999 upwards of 10,000 Falun Gong adherents protested outside the Zhongnanhai government compound to request official recognition.^[9][10] In response, Jiang declared Falun Gong to be an unprecedented threat, and declared it must be defeated.^[9][11] According to Human Rights Watch, Communist Party leaders and ruling elite were far from unified in their support for the crackdown.^[12] In June 1999, Jiang established an extralegal 6-10 Office to oversee the suppression of Falun Gong,^[13] which began in earnest on July 20 with the arrest and abduction of hundreds of Falun Gong adherents.^[12] The campaign that followed was characterized by Amnesty International as a "massive propaganda campaign" intended to discredit Falun Gong, as well as arbitrary imprisonment and coercive reeducation of adherents, sometimes resulting in death.^[14][15] Under Jiang's leadership, the crackdown on Falun Gong became part of the Chinese political ethos of "upholding stability" – much the same rhetoric employed by the party during Tiananmen in 1989.^[12] The scope and intensity of the campaign has been described as "unrivaled" in recent history,^[16] and as being reminiscent of the extremes of the Cultural Revolution.^[17][18] Falun Gong Practitioners outside China have filed dozens of largely symbolic lawsuits against Jiang Zemin and other Chinese officials alleging genocide and crimes against humanity.^[17][19] In many instances, courts have refused to adjudicate the cases on the grounds of sovereign immunity. In late 2009, separate courts in Spain and Argentina indicted Jiang and other officials on the charge of torture and genocide, and asked for their arrest, although the ruling is acknowledged to be largely symbolic and unlikely to be carried out.^[20][21]

Foreign policy[link]

Jiang Zemin with Bill Clinton in 1999.

Jiang went on a groundbreaking state visit to the United States in 1997, drawing various crowds in protest from the Tibet Independence Movement to the supporters of chinese democracy movement. He made a speech at Harvard University, part of it in passable English, but could not escape questions on democracy and freedom. In the official summit meeting with US President Bill Clinton, the tone was relaxed as Jiang and Clinton sought common ground while largely ignoring areas of disagreement. Clinton would visit China in June 1998, and vowed that China and the United States were partners in the world, and not adversaries. When American-led NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, Jiang seemed to have put up a harsh stance for show at home, but in reality only performed symbolic gestures of protest, and no solid action. Much of Jiang's foreign policy was focused on international trade and economic integration. A personal friend of former Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien,^[22] Jiang strengthened China's economic stature abroad, attempting to establish cordial relations with countries whose trade is largely confined to the American economic sphere.

Economic development[link]

Jiang did not specialize in economics, and in 1997 handed a most of the economic governance of the country to Zhu Rongji, who became Premier, and remained in office through the Asian financial crisis^{[citation needed]}. Under their joint leadership, Mainland China has sustained an average of 8% GDP growth annually, achieving the highest rate of per capita economic growth in major world economies, raising eyebrows around the world with its astonishing speed. This was mostly achieved by continuing the process of a transition to a market economy^{[citation needed]}. Strong party control over China was cemented by the PRC's successful bid to join the World Trade Organization and Beijing winning the bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympics.

Entrenching Three Represents[link]

Before he transferred power to a younger generation of leaders, Jiang had his theory of Three Represents written into the Party's constitution, alongside Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory at the 16th CPC Congress in 2002. Although contradictory to Marxism and Maoism in many facets^[which?], it was also written into China's Constitution. Critics^[who?] believe this is just another piece added to Jiang's cult of personality, others have seen practical applications of the theory as a guiding ideology in the future direction of the CPC. Largely speculated to step down from all positions by international media, rival Li Ruihuan's resignation in 2002 prompted analysts to rethink the man. The theory of Three Represents was believed by many political analysts to be Jiang's effort at extending his vision to Marxist–Leninist principles, and therefore elevating himself alongside previous Chinese Marxist philosophers Mao and Deng.

Gradual retirement[link]

Jiang Zemin with wife Wang Yeping and George W. Bush with wife Laura Bush in Crawford, Texas in 2002.

In 2002, Jiang stepped down from the powerful CPC Politburo Standing Committee and CPC General Secretary to make way for a "fourth generation" of leadership headed by Hu Jintao, marking the beginning of a transition of power that would last several years. Hu assumed Jiang's title as party chief, becoming the new general secretary of the Communist Party. Six out of the nine new members of Standing Committee at the time were considered part of Jiang's so-called "Shanghai Clique", the most prominent being Vice President Zeng Qinghong and First Vice Premier Huang Ju.

Although Jiang retained the chairmanship of the powerful Central Military Commission, most members of the commission are professional military men. Liberation Army Daily, a publication thought to represent the views of the CMC majority, printed an article on 11 March 2003 which quotes two army delegates as saying, "Having one center is called 'loyalty', while having two centers will result in 'problems.'"^[23] This was widely interpreted as a criticism of Jiang's attempt to exercise dual leadership with Hu on the model of Deng Xiaoping.

Hu succeeded Jiang as President of the People's Republic of China on 15 March 2003. To the surprise of many observers, evidence of Jiang's continuing influence on public policy abruptly disappeared from the official media. Jiang was conspicuously silent during the SARS crisis, especially when compared to the very public profile of Hu and Wen Jiabao. It has been argued that the institutional arrangements created by the 16th Congress have left Jiang in a position where he cannot exercise much influence.^{[citation needed]} Although many of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee are associated with him, the Standing Committee does not have command authority over the civilian bureaucracy.^{[citation needed]}

On 19 September 2004, after a four-day meeting of the 198-member Central Committee, Jiang resigned as chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, his last party post. Six months later he resigned his last significant post, chairman of the State CMC. This followed weeks of speculation that Hu Jintao's supporters in the Communist Party leadership were pressing Jiang to step aside. Jiang's term was supposed to have lasted until 2007. Hu also succeeded Jiang as the CMC chairman, but, in an apparent political defeat for Jiang, Xu Caihou, and not Zeng Qinghong was appointed to succeed Hu as vice chairman. This power transition officially marks the end of Jiang's era in China, which roughly lasted from 1993^{[citation needed]} to 2004.

Although Jiang has been seldom seen in public since giving up his last official title in 2004, he was with Hu Jintao on stage at a ceremony celebrating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army,^[24] and toured the Military Museum of the Chinese Peoples Revolution with Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, and other former senior officials.^[25] On 8 August 2008, Jiang appeared at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics Games. He also stood beside Hu Jintao during 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China mass parade in October 2009.

In 2011, Jiang has been subject to internet rumors of his death,^[26] as he was absent from public events such as the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party. As a response, Chinese censors to block searches for the words "Jiang Zemin", or even simply "Jiang". On July 6 Hong Kong media carried headlines that Jiang was "critically ill", while TV station ATV reported that Jiang had died in Beijing.^[27] State news agency Xinhua, quoting "authoritative sources", declared that overseas media reports of Jiang's death were "pure rumor".^[28][29]

On 9 October 2011, Jiang made his first public appearance since his premature obituary in Beijing at a celebration to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution.^[30]

Legacy[link]

Historians and biographers have disputed what can be accounted into "Jiang Zemin's legacy". Jiang himself had wanted his Three Represents theory, called an "important thought" on the mainland, to become his ideological legacy. Although the theory has been codified into both the State and Party constitutions alongside Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, its actual effect has yet to be assessed, and it seems to be losing ground to Hu Jintao's Scientific Development Concept and Harmonious Society ideologies within the party. Jiang has come under quiet criticism from within the Communist Party of China for focusing on economic growth at all costs while ignoring the resulting environmental damage of the growth, the widening gap between rich and poor in China and the social costs absorbed by those whom economic reform has left behind.^{[citation needed]} By contrast, the policies of his successors, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have widely been seen as efforts to address these imbalances and move away from a sole focus on economic growth toward a broader view of development which incorporates non economic factors such as health and the environment.^[31]

Domestically, Jiang's legacy and reputation is mixed. While some^{[citation needed]} people attributed the period of relative stability and growth in the 1990s to Jiang's term, others argue that Jiang did little to correct mistakes resulting from Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, leaving the next administration facing innumerable problems, some of which it is too late to solve.^{[citation needed]} The fact he arose to power as the direct beneficiary of the turmoils of 4 June has not been forgotten by many in China. Indeed, he is in many circles regarded as a political opportunist; the very model of a new breed of party members directly associated with the widespread corruption and cronyism that flourished during his tenure. His interference with high profile corruption investigations since stepping down from power, such as those involving Shanghai tycoon Zhou Zhengyi, has only served to reinforce this perception.

Jiang's obsession with image has also spurred a trend of face projects around the country, with local governments lending enormous funds to large and mostly unnecessary construction projects^{[citation needed]}. While his showy nature has often been considered charming and even charismatic by the west,^[32] in the relatively more conservative Chinese society it is often perceived as frivolous, pompous and lacking in character and substance. Jiang's Theory of Three Represents justified the incorporation of the new capitalist business class into the party, and changed the founding ideology of the CPC from protection of the peasantry and workers to that of the "overwhelming majority of the people", a euphemism aimed at including the growing entrepreneurial class. Conservative critics within the party have quietly denounced this as betrayal of the communist ideology, while reformers have praised Jiang as a visionary.^{[citation needed]} Such a move, however, increasingly justified a newly found correlation between the business and ruling elites, thus significantly linking bureaucracy and financial gain, which critics argued fosters more corruption. Some have suggested this is the part of Jiang's legacy that will last, at least in name, as long as the communists remain in power.^{[citation needed]}

Many biographers of Jiang have noted his government resembled an oligarchy as opposed to an autocratic dictatorship.^[33] Many of his policies have been attributed to others in government^{[citation needed]}, notably Premier Zhu Rongji, whose tense relationship with Jiang caused widespread speculation, especially following Jiang's decision to suppress the Falun Gong movement.^{[citation needed]} Jiang is often credited with the improvement in foreign relations during his term,^[34] but at the same time many Chinese have criticized him for being too conciliatory towards the United States and Russia. The issue of Chinese reunification between the mainland and Taiwan gained ground during Jiang's term,^{[citation needed]} as Cross-Strait talks led to the eventual Three Links after Jiang stepped down as Party general secretary. The construction of the Qinghai-Tibet railway began under Jiang.

See also[link]

• Politics of the People's Republic of China
• History of the People's Republic of China (1989–2002)
• Song Zuying, Famous folk singer and former mistress
• The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin, Jiang's controversial biography by Robert Lawrence Kuhn

References[link]

Further reading[link]

• Gilley, Bruce. "Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite." Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 395pp. This was the first biography of Jiang to appear in the West. A comprehensive and highly readable journalistic account of Jiang's early years, his ascendancy within the Party bureaucracy, and his ultimate rise to power as Deng Xiaoping's successor in the wake of Tiananmen.
• Kuhn, Robert Lawrence = The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin, Random House (English edition) 2005. Century Publishing Group, Shanghai (Chinese edition) 2005. The book is a general biography of Jiang with a more favorable stance towards him.
  • China Daily = English language review of biography by Dr. Kuhn.
• Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. "The Era of Jiang Zemin"; Prentice Hall, Singapore: 1999. General Jiang-era background information and analysis, not comprehensive biography.

External links[link]

Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Jiang Zemin

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Jiang Zemin

• Swedes to sue ex Chinese president The Local Europe AB
• China rejects Spain's 'genocide' claims Posted by Independent Minds
• China warns Spain over Tibet lawsuit The New York Times
• Biography at China Vitae, the web's largest online database of China VIPs
• Falun Gong accuse Chinese leaders of genocide Expatica Communications
• ...investigation to proceed against China's ex-president, Jiang Zemin, and Luo Gan... The American Society of International Law
• Landmark Genocide Lawsuit Against Jiang Zemin on Firm Ground Friends of Falun Gong USA January 2004

v t e Leaders of the People's Republic of China Mao Hua Deng Jiang Hu

v t e Leaders of the Communist Party of China Leaders Chen Duxiu Xiang Zhongfa Li Lisan Xiang Zhongfa Wang Ming Bo Gu Zhang Wentian Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao General Secretaries Chen Duxiu vacant (1922–25) Chen Duxiu Xiang Zhongfa Bo Gu Zhang Wentian vacant (1943–82) Hu Yaobang Zhao Ziyang Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Chairmen Chen Duxiu vacant (1925–43) Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Hu Yaobang abolished from 1982 CMC Chairmen Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao

v t e Presidents of the People's Republic of China Common Program (1949–1954) Chairman of the Central People's Government Mao 1954 Constitution (1954–1975) Chairman Mao Liu Song and Dong (acting) Dong (acting) 1975 Constitution (1975–1978) NPCSC Chairman Zhu Song (acting) Ye 1978 Constitution (1978–1982) NPCSC Chairman Ye Song (honorary president) 1982 Constitution (1982–present) President Li Yang Jiang Hu List of Presidents of the People's Republic of China

v t e Chairmen of the Central Military Commission Party CMC Chairmen Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao State CMC Chairmen Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao

v t e Members of the 15th Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China General Secretary 1. Jiang Zemin Other members 2. Li Peng 3. Zhu Rongji 4. Li Ruihuan 5. Hu Jintao 6. Wei Jianxing 7. Li Lanqing

v t e Members of the 14th Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China General Secretary 1. Jiang Zemin Other members 2. Li Peng 3. Qiao Shi 4. Li Ruihuan 5. Zhu Rongji 6. Liu Huaqing 7. Hu Jintao

Bo Xilai 薄熙来
CPC Chongqing Committee Secretary
In office November 2007 – March 2012
Deputy (Mayor)	Wang Hongju (2007–2009) Huang Qifan (2009–)
Preceded by	Wang Yang
Succeeded by	Zhang Dejiang
Minister of Commerce of the PRC
In office February 2004 – December 2007
Premier	Wen Jiabao
Preceded by	Lü Fuyuan
Succeeded by	Chen Deming
Personal details
Born	(1949-07-03) 3 July 1949 (age 62) Beijing, Republic Of China
Political party	Communist Party of China
Spouse(s)	Li Danyu (divorced) Gu Kailai
Relations	Bo Yibo (father)
Children	Li Wangzhi Bo Guagua
Alma mater	Peking University Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Bo Xilai (born 3 July 1949) is a Chinese politician. He came to prominence through his tenures as the mayor of the coastal economic hub of Dalian and then governor of Liaoning province. From 2004 to November 2007, he served as Minister of Commerce. Between 2007 and 2012 he served as a member of the Politburo and head of the Communist Party's Chongqing branch.

The son of Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Elders of the Communist Party of China, Bo Xilai is identified as one of the "princelings" of Chinese politics. He cultivated a casual and charismatic image in the media that marked a departure from the normally staid nature of Chinese politics.

In Chongqing, Bo became known for heavy-handed populism. He initiated a campaign against organized crime, increased spending on welfare programs, maintained consistent double-digit percentage GDP growth, and campaigned to revive Cultural Revolution-era "red culture." Bo's promotion of egalitarian values and the achievements of his "Chongqing model" made him the champion of the Chinese New Left, composed of both Maoists and social democrats disillusioned with the country's market-based economic reforms and increasing economic inequality.^[1] However, the perceived lawlessness of Bo's anti-corruption campaigns, coupled with concerns about his outsized personality, made him a controversial figure.

Bo was considered a likely candidate for promotion to the elite Politburo Standing Committee in CPC 18th National Congress in 2012. His political fortunes came to an abrupt end following the Wang Lijun incident, in which his top lieutenant and police chief sought asylum at the American consulate in Chengdu and revealed details of Bo's alleged involvement in a homicide plot. In the fallout, Bo was removed as Chongqing party chief in March 2012 and suspended from the politburo the following month. Bo's dismissal was notable for exposing disunity within Communist Party ranks shortly before a leadership transition.

Early life[link]

Bo Xilai was the fourth child of prominent Communist Party leader Bo Yibo, who served as Minister of Finance in the early years of the People's Republic of China but who fell from favor in 1965 for supporting more open trade relations with the West^{[citation needed]}. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Bo Yibo was labeled a "rightist" and a "counterrevolutionary" and purged from his posts.^[2] He spent the ensuing twelve years in prison, where he was reportedly tortured. His wife, Hu Ming, was abducted by Red Guard in Guangzhou, and was either beaten to death or committed suicide.^[3]

Bo Xilai was 17 years old when the Cultural Revolution began, and at the time attended the prestigious No. 4 High School in Beijing — one of the best in the country.^[3][4] In the early years of the Cultural Revolution, Bo is reported to have been an active member of the liandong Red Guard organization^[4][5] and may have at one point denounced his father.^[6]

As the political winds of the Cultural Revolution shifted, Bo and his siblings were either imprisoned or sent to the countryside, and Bo Xilai was locked up for five years.^[7] After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the members of the Gang of Four were officially blamed for the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and Bo's family was released. Bo Yibo was politically rehabilitated, and in 1979 became vice premier.^[2]

After his release, Bo Xilai worked at the Hardware Repair Factory for the Beijing Second Light Industry Bureau.^[8] He was admitted to the Peking University by public examination in 1977. Unlike many of his contemporaries in the Chinese leadership who studied engineering, Bo majored in world history.^[9] In his sophomore year, Bo enlisted in a Master's program in international journalism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,^[4] graduating with a Master's degree in 1982.^[10] He joined the Communist Party in October 1980.^[10]

Early political career[link]

During the 1980s, the Bo family regained its political influence. Bo Yibo served successively as vice premier and vice-chairman of the Central Advisory Commission. The elder Bo came to be known as one of the “eight elders” (sometimes referred to as the “eight immortals”) of the Communist Party and was instrumental in the implementation of market reforms in the 1980s. Although he favored more liberal economic policies, the elder Bo was politically conservative, and endorsed the use of military force against demonstrators during the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests.^[2] After the 1989 crackdown, Bo Yibo helped ensure the ascent of Jiang Zemin to succeed Deng Xiaoping as the leader of the Party and helped Jiang consolidate power in the 1990s.^[9] Bo Yibo remained a prominent figure in the party until his death in 2007^[2] and was influential in shaping his son's career.^[11]

After graduating from university, Bo was assigned to Zhongnanhai^[9] – the headquarters of the Communist Party – where he worked with the research office of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat and CPC Central Committee General Office.^[4] He soon requested a transfer to the provinces, and in 1984 was appointed deputy party secretary of Jin County, near Dalian in the northeastern province of Liaoning.^[9][10] In an interview with People’s Daily, Bo said that his family name created career obstacles. "For quite a long time people had reservations about me," he said.^[11] Bo subsequently became deputy secretary and then secretary of the party committee of the Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone and secretary of the Jinzhou party committee.^[10]

Rising again in rank within the party, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Dalian Municipal CPC Committee, the city's top decision-making body, and became the Vice-mayor of Dalian in 1990.^[10] In 1993, Bo became deputy Party secretary and mayor of Dalian.^[9]

Liaoning[link]

Mayor of Dalian[link]

Dalian saw significant development under Bo's leadership.

Bo became acting mayor of Dalian in 1992 and formally assumed the post in 1993. He remained mayor until 2000. Bo served as Dalian's deputy party secretary from 1995.^[10] Bo was promoted to party chief in 1999 and served in that position until 2000.

Bo's tenure in Dalian was marked by the city's phenomenal transformation from a drab port city to a modern metropolis, a 'showcase' of China's rapid economic growth.^[12] In the early 1990s, Bo took some credit for the construction of the Shenyang-Dalian Expressway, China's first controlled-access freeway, winning accolades for the rapid expansion of infrastructure and for environmental work.^[13] Since Bo's time in office, Dalian became known as one of the cleanest cities in China, having won the UN Habitat Scroll of Honour Award in 1999. In addition, Bo was an advocate for free enterprise and small businesses, and successfully courted foreign investment from South Korea, Japan, and Western countries.^[12] In contrast to his colleagues, he held press conferences at Chinese New Year, and developed a reputation among foreign investors for 'getting things done'.^[13]

Bo spent seventeen years in the city of Dalian, a lengthy term in comparison to colleagues of the same rank, who are often transferred to different locales throughout their careers. Despite the accompanying economic growth and rise in living standards, Bo's tenure in Dalian has sometimes been criticized as having been too focused on aesthetic development projects such as expansive boulevards, monuments, and large public parks.^[13] To make way for his large-scale projects, Bo's administration moved large numbers of local residents from downtown areas into new homes in the city's outskirts. Dalian's greenery was dubbed "Xilai Grass".^[14] He also reputedly had a remote control in the Mayor's office for the fountains on the city's main square.^[15] In addition, he spearheaded the construction of a huabiao in the city.^[16] In 2000, Bo was frontrunner for the post of Mayor of Shenzhen, based on his success in making Dalian the "Hong Kong of the North". However it was suggested that Bo was too independent and outspoken for the post. The post went to Yu Youjun instead.^[17]

15th Party Congress[link]

During the 15th Party Congress in 1997, Bo Xilai’s family launched an unsuccessful campaign to secure his promotion to become a member of the Central Committee of the CCP. Although nepotism was generally frowned upon in China, Bo Yibo’s ambitions for his son were well-known.^[14] Bo Yibo advanced the idea that revolutionary elders should 'nominate' their children to become high officials, and Bo Xilai was selected as his family’s 'representative' over his older brother Bo Xicheng,^[14] ostensibly because of Xilai’s superior academic credentials, which included attendance at the elite Peking University and a master’s degree.

In order to secure Bo Xilai’s selection for promotion during the 15th Party Congress, the family launched a nationwide campaign to publicize his son’s "achievements" as mayor of Dalian.^[14] They commissioned author Chen Zufeng to pen a report portraying Bo as a man who is "as statesman-like as Henry Kissinger, as environmentally conscious as Al Gore, and almost as beloved by the public as Princess Diana."^[14] Despite the publicity campaign, Bo Xilai failed even to gain a seat in the Liaoning provincial delegation to the Party Congress. Ultimately, Bo Yibo helped him gain a seat with the Shanxi delegation, but the younger Bo was unable to secure a promotion.^[14]

In addition, Bo placed second-last in the confirmation vote for membership in the 15th Central Committee. As he placed in the bottom 5% of candidates, Bo was denied entry into the elite council, suffering a major political embarrassment.^[4] Bo's failure to get elected was attributed to a general opposition to nepotism within the Party.^[14] Moreover, during his tenure in Dalian, Bo caused resentment for the amount of 'special favours' that he procured for the coastal city at the expense of the rest of the province.^[14] His perceived partisan interests locked Bo's kin in a factional struggle against Li Tieying, one of China's central leadership figures, who may have created obstacles to his promotion.^[14]

Provincial Governor[link]

In 2001, a corruption scandal involving former Liaoning governor Zhang Guoguang provided an opportunity for Bo's advancement.^[13] Prior to the 15th Party Congress, Bo Yibo and Bo Xilai assisted then-President Jiang Zemin in preparing to force political rival Qiao Shi into retirement. The Bo family also supported Jiang's lacklustre "Three Stresses" (San Jiang) campaign in 1997.^[9] Such unwavering support for Jiang was said to have worked in Bo Xilai's favour when the vacancy for Governor of Liaoning opened. Bo became acting Governor in 2001 after the dismissal and arrest of Zhang Guoguang,^[9] and was officially confirmed as Governor in 2003.^[10] In his position as governor, which he held until 2004, Bo gained membership to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.^[4]

During his tenure in Liaoning, Bo played a critical role in the promotion of the Northeast Area Revitalization Plan. Adopted in 2003 by party authorities, the policy aimed to strengthen economic development in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. Bo Xilai was particularly enthusiastic about the policy, stating his desire to see the northeast become "China's fourth economic engine" (the others being the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and the Bohai Economic Region).^[4]

The northeast region was at one time known as the "cradle of industrialization" of China. In 1980, industrial output for Liaoning province alone was twice that of the southern Guangdong province. However, the northeast was left behind amidst market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, while regions like Guangdong prospered. Its economy—still largely tied to state-owned enterprises—stagnated relative to other regions, with high unemployment rates.^[4] The revitalisation plan aimed to address this by reviving the region’s traditional industries, strengthening trade ties with and encouraging investment from South Korea and Japan, and experimenting with free trade zones in select cities.^[18] In 2004, official media reported that foreign direct investment in Liaoning had nearly doubled since the launch in 2003 of the northeastern rejuvenation strategy.^[19]

Although Bo established a reputation as a comparatively clean politician during his tenures in Dalian and as governor of Liaoning,^[20] he was not immune to corruption allegations. In particular, Bo was the subject of critical investigative reports by Liaoning journalist Jiang Weiping,^[21] the whistleblower in the Mu and Ma corruption case in Liaoning – a scandal that Bo benefited from politically. While Bo was not directly involved in the scandal, Jiang accused Bo of providing political cover for his friends and relatives.^[21] Jiang was initially sentenced to eight years in prison on trumped-up charges, for which Bo was criticized, but was released after five years under international pressure.^[13][22] Yang Rong, the former chief executive of Brilliance China Automotive who fled to the United States after getting embroiled in a dispute against state property authorities, accused Bo of interfering in his judicial proceedings in Beijing.^[13] In addition, Bo openly clashed with Wen Shizhen, then-party secretary in Liaoning who was technically Bo's superior.^[4][13] Wen reportedly criticized Bo for "developing China's cities like Europe and its countryside like Africa," and even held a party to celebrate Bo's departure from Liaoning in 2004.^[23]

Falun Gong practitioners and their supporters have accused Bo of leading an especially severe crackdown on the group during his tenure in Liaoning.^[24][25] They have filed lawsuits against Bo in over ten countries, alleging torture and crimes against humanity.^[26][27] In 2007 Bo was found liable for the torture of a Falun Gong practitioner in an uncontested civil suit in Australia.^[28]

16th Party Congress[link]

At the 16th Party Congress in 2002, Bo's age, regional tenures, and patronage links fit the profile for a potential candidate to be groomed for the "5th generation of leaders" that would assume power in 2012. His chief competitors were seen as Xi Jinping, then party chief in the coastal province of Zhejiang, and Li Keqiang, a populist Tuanpai candidate who was the Governor of the central province of Henan.^[9] As with the 15th Party Congress five years earlier, the elder Bo lobbied for his son's promotion.^[9] The Bo family enjoyed the patronage of Jiang Zemin. However, Bo Xilai's unequivocal support for Jiang strengthened the reluctance of his political opponents to support his nomination. Ultimately, although Bo remained a top contender for higher promotion, Xi and Li remained the main candidates to succeed Hu Jintao as Paramount leader.^[9]

Minister of Commerce[link]

Commerce Minister Bo meets his American counterpart, Carlos Gutierrez, during a visit to the United States in 2007

When Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as General Secretary in late 2002, Bo's career as a local official ended with his appointment to Minister of Commerce in Wen Jiabao's cabinet to replace Lü Fuyuan, who retired for health reasons. Bo concurrently served as a member of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Bo's stint as Minister of Commerce significantly raised his international profile and generated media attention both in China and abroad. Described as good-looking, articulate and open-minded in his approach to problems,^[29] Bo's rise from a municipal official to the central government generated great media fanfare and elevated his status to something of a 'political star.' Bo's political persona was considered a departure from the generally serious and conservative leadership in Beijing. With his youthful vigour, populism, and purported popularity with female reporters, Bo's political rise had been compared to that of John F. Kennedy.^[30]

Bo presided over a continued rise in foreign investment in China as Minister of Commerce. His daily schedule was dominated by receiving foreign guests and dignitaries. By the time that he became Minister, he spoke relatively fluent and colloquial English. During a meeting with American officials, Bo reputedly told a struggling interpreter to stop translating because the Chinese officials could understand English and it was wasting time. In May 2004 Bo was one of the few ministers hand-picked to accompany Premier Wen Jiabao on a five-country trip to Europe.^[30] The trade policy of the United States toward China also sparked significant controversy. Bo maintained a conciliatory but assertive attitude as he attended talks in Washington.^[30] On his trips to the United States, he conducted substantive discussions with his American counterparts and signed agreements on intellectual property, the services sector, agricultural products, food safety, and consumer protection.^[30]

Bo also oversaw the restructuring of the Ministry, formed from the amalgamation of the National Economics and Commerce Bureau and the Department of International Trade. Bo sought to balance the amount of attention given to foreign investors and domestic commercial institutions. He began tackling the imbalance from the retail sector, whose success up to that point was largely dependent on foreign companies.^[30] He drew up plans to protect Chinese industries' competitive position within a domestic market that was quickly being crowded out by foreign competition.^[31]

17th Party Congress[link]

At the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, Bo gained a seat on the 25-member Politburo, effectively China's ruling council. He was then tipped to leave the Ministry of Commerce and take over as party chief in the southwestern megalopolis of Chongqing. Bo’s predecessor, political rival Wang Yang, was reassigned as party chief of Guangdong province.

At the time, Chongqing was reeling from problems such as air and water pollution, unemployment, poor public health, and complications from the Three Gorges Dam.^[6] According to analysts, Hu wanted to transfer his ally Wang Yang out of Chongqing before these problems intensified.^[6] Bo was initially reluctant to go to Chongqing and was reportedly unhappy with his new assignment. He had hoped to become vice-premier instead,^[32] but Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice-premier Wu Yi argued against Bo's promotion to vice-premiership. In particular, Wu was critical of Bo’s penchant for self-promotion,^[23] and Wen cited international lawsuits against Bo by Falun Gong adherents as a barrier to his holding higher office.^[6]

Bo took up the Chongqing post on 30 November, a month following the conclusion of the Congress, even though Wang Yang had vacated the position on 13 November.^[32] Whilst some saw this transfer as a 'banishment' from the central government to the hinterlands to keep Bo's perceived arrogance and high-profile antics out of Beijing's view,^[6] others considered it a promotion since being the party chief in one of the four direct-controlled municipalities came with an ex officio seat on the Politburo.^[32][33]

Chongqing[link]

The Chongqing model[link]

Although Bo was initially unhappy about his re-assignment in Chongqing, he soon resolved to use his new position as a staging ground for a return to higher national office.^[34] Bo made no secret of his desire to enter the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) during the 18th Party Congress in autumn 2012,^[35] all but two of the PSC members—including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao—were expected to retire.^[29] The transition would be an opportunity for Bo to join the highest echelon of national leadership, likely as a replacement for ally Zhou Yongkang, secretary of the Central Political and Legislative Committee, serving as the head of the party's security apparatus.^[35][36]

In Chongqing, Bo pioneered a new style of governance dubbed the "Chongqing Model” — a set of social and economic policies intended to address diverse challenges facing modern China following economic reforms.^[37][38]

The Chonqging model was characterized in part by increased state control and the promotion of a neo-leftist ideology. Along with his police chief Wang Lijun, Bo launched a sweeping campaign against organized crime, and increased the security and police presence in the city. Critics noted these policies were accompanied by the erosion of the rule of law, and allegations surfaced of political and personal rivals being victimized amidst Bo’s anti-corruption drive. As a means of addressing declining public morality, Bo launched a “red culture” movement to promote Maoist-era socialist ethics. On the economic front, he actively courted foreign investment—much as he had done in Liaoning province. The Chongqing model was also characterized by massive public works programs, subsidized housing for the poor, and social policies intended to make it easier for rural citizens to move to the city, thus reaping the benefits of urban status.^[37] Some have compared Bo's governing style to Russian president Vladimir Putin.^[39]

The Chongqing model provided an 'alternate' comprehensive roadmap for development that diverged from the policies favored by the reformist faction dominated by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.^[37] Bo’s leadership in Chongqing dramatically raised his profile, both nationally and internationally. In 2010, he was named as one of the 'World's 100 Most Influential People in 2010' by Time.^[40] Observers noted that, in China's non-electoral political system, Bo's high-profile presence and bold political maneuvers effectively amounted to a public campaign for the top leadership.^[41] However, he drew the ire of some of the country’s leaders; President Hu and Premier Wen were reluctant to acknowledge Bo publicly, ostensibly due to a discomfort over his leadership style.^[41]

Organized crime[link]

Bo's tenure in Chongqing was dominated by a protracted war against organized crime and corruption known as dahei ("striking black"). Between 2009 and 2011, an estimated 5,700 people were arrested in the sweeping campaign that ensnared not only criminals, but also businessmen, members of the police force, judges, government officials, and political adversaries.^[42][43] The campaign was overseen by Wang Lijun, whom Bo had worked with previously in Liaoning province.^[29]

Wen Qiang, one of the most prominent figures implicated in the trials, had been a prominent municipal official since the days of party chiefs He Guoqiang and Wang Yang. China observer Willy Lam suggested that the such a large-scale crackdown was given 'go-ahead' from central authorities and general secretary, president Hu Jintao, and Bo was careful to not look as though Chongqing was trying to 'set an example' for the rest of the country so he could benefit from the success politically.^[44]

The dahei campaign earned Bo national recognition and widespread popularity in Chongqing—all the more because of the city’s historical reputation as a center for criminal activity.^[35] In contrast to often colorless and orthodox politicians, Bo gained the reputation as a party boss that "got things done."^[45] The apparent success of the campaign gave Bo a 'rock star status', and resulted in calls for a nation-wide campaign modeled on Chongqing. Through the campaign, Bo gained the support of a number of powerful members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping and Zhou Yongkang, all of whom visited Chongqing or praised Bo's achievements sometime between 2010 and 2011.^[38]

However, Bo's campaign was criticized for running roughshod over judicial due process and eroding the rule of law.^[42] Individuals targeted in the campaign were arbitrarily detained by the authorities, with an estimated 1,000 being sent to forced labor.^[46] Lawyers for the accused were intimidated and harassed, and in at least one case, sentenced to 18 months in prison.^[45] Allegations also surfaced over the use of torture to extract confessions.^[45] Moreover, assets seized during the campaign were allegedly redirected to help pay for Bo’s popular social housing programs.^[47] The Wall Street Journal reported that the $11 billion went into government coffers through the campaign.^[42] Li Jun, a fugitive businessman, asserted that he became a target of Bo anti-corruption drive as a result of a land dispute with the government. When he refused government demands to give up the land, he claims that he was abducted and tortured, and that the $700 million worth of assets in his business were seized.^[48][49]

Red culture movement[link]

During his time in Chongqing, Bo initiated a series of Maoist-style campaigns to revive 'red culture' and improve public morale. The initiative included the promotion of Maoist quotes, 'red' songs, revolutionary television programing and operas, and initiatives to encourage students to work in the countryside, akin to the way students were required to do during the Down to the Countryside Movement of the Cultural Revolution.^[50] As part of the movement, Bo and the city's Media Department initiated a "Red Songs campaign" that demanded every district, government department, commercial enterprise, educational institution, state radio and TV station begin singing 'red songs' praising the achievements of the Communist Party of China. Bo pledged to reinvigorate the city with the Marxist ideals reminiscent of the Mao era.^{[51][52][53][54]}

Prior to the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China celebrations, for instance, Bo sent out 'red text messages' to the city's 13 million cellphone users.^[55] According to Xinhua, Bo's text messages are usually quotes from Mao's Little Red Book, and include phrases such as "I like how Chairman Mao puts it: The world is ours, we will all have to work together,"^[56] and "responsibility and seriousness can conquer the world, and the Chinese Communist Party members represent these qualities."^[35] Bo and his team of municipal administrators also raised new Mao statues in Chongqing, while providing 'social security apartments' to the city's less well-off.^[57] Some scholars have characterized this as an example of the revival of Maoism in the Chinese Communist ethos.^[57]

Reactions to the red culture movement were divided. Bo’s revival of Mao-era culture and accompanying social welfare programs were popular within much of the middle to lower income strata of Chongqing society, and made Bo a star with both conventional Marxists and neo-leftists. Bo won praise for returning the city to what some called China's 'true socialist heritage' by de-emphasizing material wealth, and evoked nostalgia to the social equality that existed during Mao's time.^[58] Some retirees said they wanted to pass on "revolutionary spirit" to their children, while others participated as a means to praise the Communist Party for the country’s economic progress.^[59]

The campaign also had many detractors. Some intellectuals and reformers criticized the campaign for being regressive, akin to "being drowned in a red sea", and bringing back painful memories from the Cultural Revolution.^[58][60] Several mid-level officials in the city committed suicide due to overwhelming pressure to organize events for the red songs campaign.^[60] Bo’s critics derisively referred to him as "little Mao".^[61]

Social policies[link]

A cornerstone of Bo’s Chongqing model involved a series of egalitarian social policies aimed to lessen the gap between rich and poor, and ease the rural-urban divide. Bo promoted the notion of pursuing “red GDP”—an economic model embodying communist egalitarianism—and suggested that, if economic development were analogous to 'baking a cake', then the primary task should be to divide the cake fairly rather than building a larger cake.^[62]

To that end, the city reportedly spent $15.8 billion on public apartment complexes for use by recent college graduates, migrant workers and low-income residents.^[38] In 2007, the cities of Chongqing and Chengdu were selected to run pilot projects intended to mitigate the rural-urban divide and ease integration of rural residents into the cities. Under China’s hukou registration system, citizens are classified as either rural or urban—a distinction that determines nor only where they may live, but also affects educational opportunities, taxation, property rights, and so on. Of Chongqing’s 32 million residents, only 27% held urban hukous as of 2007.^[63] The 2007 project made it easier for rural residents to obtain urban status, a policy intended not only to help balance inequality, but also to enable the government to develop underused rural land. Under Bo’s leadership, Chongqing established “land exchanges” where rural villages could earn credits for maximizing farmland.^[64]

Bo's approach to social policy was demonstrated during the November 2008 taxi strikes, which saw over 8,000 taxi drivers take to the streets for two days in protests over high fees, unregulated competition and rising fuel charges. Similar protests in China are frequently suppressed—sometimes forcefully—with official media sometimes blaming labor unrest on criminal instigation.^[65] Bo's government instead held a televised roundtable dialogues with the protesters and citizens, and agreed to allow the formation of a trade union. His handling of situation earned him praise as a comparatively restrained and progressive leader.^[66][67]

Economic policies[link]

Another major component of Bo’s Chongqing model concerned the city’s economic policies. Just as he had done in Liaoning province, Bo ambitiously pursued foreign investment in the city, lowering corporate income tax rates (15% compared to the 25% national average), and sought to stimulate rapid urbanization and industrialization.^[63] He also carried on with policies initiated by his predecessors which focused on domestic consumption, rather than export-led growth.

During his tenure, Chongqing reported annual GDP growth far exceeding the national average. In 2008, for instance, nationwide GDP growth was reported at 8%, while Chongqing reported 14.3%; the same year, foreign trade rose by 28%, and bank loans were up 29%.^[63]

Bo model of economic growth won national and international praise for seamlessly combining foreign investment and state-led growth. However, Bo's critics called the model of “red GDP” – subsidized infrastructure, housing and public works projects – unsustainable and a drain on the city's budget. Some civil servants complained that they were not getting salaries on time.^[60] Chongqing received a disproportionately high share (some $34 billion) of stimulus money from the Beijing in 2008. Political rivals such as Bo’s predecessor Wang Yang also suggested that economic figures in Chongqing were “rigged”—artificially inflated through unnecessary construction and public works projects.^[68]

Leadership style[link]

Although many of Bo’s campaigns earned popular support, especially from the city’s poor, his leadership style has been described as “propagandistic,” “ruthless,” and “arrogant” by subordinates and city officials, academics, journalists, and other professionals.^[23][60] Michael Wines of the New York Times wrote that although Bo was possessed of “prodigious charisma and deep intelligence,” these qualities were offset by a “studied indifference to the wrecked lives that littered his path to power…Mr. Bo’s ruthlessness stood out, even in a system where the absence of formal rules ensures that only the strongest advance.”^[23] Bo placed onerous demands on government officials in the city, requiring them to be available to work all day and all night, seven days a week.^[60] He reportedly called subordinates to late-night meetings, publicly criticized and humiliated those with whom he disagreed, and even hit underlings who failed to meet his demands.^[23] According to a psychologist quoted in the Daily Telegraph, since Bo Xilai assumed power, "depression, burn out and suicides have all risen among officials…Officials now make up the largest share of patients in counselling in the city.”^[60]

In late 2009, a popular investigative television show on China Central Television aired a critical story on Bo’s anti-crime drive, expressing concern over the apparent disregard for the legal process. In response, Bo utilized his connections to have the show’s host temporarily banned from the airwaves, and its producer moved to another program.^[23] Others who opposed Bo’s initiatives were also met with retribution. Li Zhuang, a defense lawyer from Beijing, was sentenced to two and a half years in prison (lated reduced to 18 months) in 2009 for attempting to defend one of the high-profile targets of Bo’s crackdown.^[23][69] Cheng Li, a scholar at the Brookings Institution, remarked that “Nobody really trusts [Bo]: a lot of people are scared of him, including several princelings who are supposed to be his power base.”^[23]

Alleged eavesdropping operations[link]

As part of Bo’s efforts to fight crime and maintain social and political stability in Chongqing, he initiated a major electronic surveillance operation. Wang Lijun, Bo’s police chief, served as the architect of the state-funded project, which was described in official media as a “comprehensive package bugging system covering telecommunications to the Internet.”^[70] The system involved wiretaps, eavesdropping, and monitoring of internet communications, and was designed with the help of cybersecurity expert Fang Binxing, known for his pivotal role in the construction of China’s Great Firewall.^[70]

According the New York Times, the eavesdropping operations did not only target local criminals, but also the communications of top Chinese leaders, including general secretary, president Hu Jintao.^[71] One source connected to the Chinese leadership said that Bo tried to monitor nearly all central leaders who had visited Chongqing.^[70] In August 2011, a phone call between President Hu Jintao and anti-corruption official Ma Wen was found to be wiretapped under Bo’s orders. The revelation about the eavesdropping operation resulted in intense scrutiny from Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and contributed in Bo’s downfall in 2012.^[70]

Death of Neil Heywood[link]

On 14 November 2011, British citizen Neil Heywood was found dead in his Chongqing hotel room. At the time, local authorities declared he had died from alcohol over-consumption, though his family noted that he was not a heavy drinker. The official cause of death was not scrutinized until several months later, when revelations emerged that Heywood’s death was a homicide, and Bo Xilai was implicated.

Heywood served as an intermediary linking western companies to powerful Chinese politicians.^[72] He was a long-time associate of the Bo family: he reportedly shared a close personal relationship with Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, and had helped the couple’s son earn admission to the Harrow School in England.^[73] Heywood also allegedly served as a middleman for the family, helping them clandestinely move large sums of money overseas.^[74]

In October 2011, Heywood reportedly had a business dispute with Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, when he demanded a higher commission for his services. The dispute escalated, with Heywood ultimately threatening to reveal the family’s business dealings and overseas assets, estimated to total in excess of $136 million.^[75][76] Heywood was then allegedly poisoned by Gu and an assistant.^[77]

Downfall[link]

Wang Lijun incident[link]

In early 2012, the party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection bolstered its presence within Chongqing as the city's leaders came under investigation. Much of the attention focused on Bo's police chief, Wang Lijun, who may have been under investigation for his role in a corruption case in Liaoning province. Growing scrutiny over the city's wiretapping operation against senior leaders also likely fell mainly on Wang.^[70] Although details are scarce, several sources have suggested that Wang's resentment against Bo grew amidst the investigations—resentment that was compounded when Wang realized that he and his wife had also been targets of wiretapping under Bo's orders.^[70]

Moreover, Wang was privy to details of Neil Heywood's death, and had reportedly attempted to voice his concerns to Bo about alleged poisoning. Around 16 January, Wang is believed to have confronted Bo over evidence that implicated Bo's wife in the murder. Although Bo initially agreed to allow an inquiry, he then changed course and sought to obstruct investigations.^[78] Wang was abruptly demoted on 2 February to the far less prestigious position of Vice-mayor overseeing education, science, and environmental affairs.^[79] Bo placed Wang under surveillance, and several of his close associates were reportedly taken into custody. Some reports allege that Bo may have been plotting to have Wang assassinated.^[80]

On 6 February 2012, apparently fearing for his life, Wang traveled to the U.S. consulate in the nearby city of Chengdu, bringing evidence implicating Bo and his family in the Neil Heywood murder. According to reports, Wang sought and was denied asylum in the United States.^[81] He remained in the consulate for approximately 24 hours before leaving "of his own volition" and being taken into the custody of state security officials dispatched from Beijing.^[82][83][84] Local media in Chongqing announced that he was on a mental health-related sick leave.^[85]

A day after Wang's leave, several overseas Chinese-language news websites posted an open letter allegedly penned by Wang, which sharply criticized Bo as a "hypocrite" and "the greatest gangster in China" and accused Bo of corruption.^[86] Without knowing what incriminating material Wang may have held against Bo, even Bo's supporters in China's top leadership were reluctant to vouch for him.^[87] Bo responded in an unusually open press conference during the 2012 National People's Congress, acknowledging "negligent supervision" of his subordinates, saying he may have "relied upon the wrong person".^[88]

Removal from posts[link]

On 15 March, Bo was dismissed as Chongqing party chief and its related municipal posts, while temporarily retaining a seat on the Politburo. Due to the potentially destructive effects Bo's dismissal would have on party unity, party elders were consulted on the matter.^[89] The decision was reportedly made at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on 7 March, during which security tsar Zhou Yongkang cast a lone dissenting vote.^[89] On 14 March, Bo was reprimanded by Premier Wen Jiabao during the Premier's annual press conference.^[90][91] Wen called the achievements of Chongqing "significant," but the result of "multiple administrations," i.e., not just Bo himself. Wen also made numerous allusions to the damage wrought by the Cultural Revolution, an indirect rebuke of Bo's efforts to revive "red culture".^[32][91] Addressing high-level political changes by a Premier to an open public forum was unprecedented. Political observers believe that Wen's remarks and Bo's downfall represented a consensus within the central leadership that Bo not only needed to shoulder the responsibility for the Wang Lijun scandal, but also marked a significant victory for liberal reformers.^[92][93]

On 10 April, Bo was suspended from the party's Central Committee and its Politburo, pending investigation for "serious disciplinary violations." Bo's wife, Gu Kailai, was now a prime suspect in the inquiry into the death of British businessman Neil Heywood.^[94] The announcements, carrying criminal implications, likely marked the end of Bo's political career.^[95][96]

Aftermath[link]

Bo's downfall elicited strong reactions among the Chinese public and with commentators across the political spectrum.^[97] Leftist websites such as Utopia, Red China, and Maoflag were full of angry commentary over Bo's dismissal. These websites were shut down for a period of "maintenance" shortly after.^[97][98] Leftist commentators voiced support for Bo: Kong Qingdong called Bo's dismissal 'a plot by enemies of the state'; Sima Nan said associating Bo with the Cultural Revolution was a 'smear campaign';^[99] Sima's pro-Bo microblogs were censored.^[98] Large numbers of sympathetic posts for Bo appeared in microblogs from Chongqing, and Dalian, where Bo was once mayor.^[97][100] The Global Times also wrote a sympathetic editorial. Liberal media reacted positively, criticizing Bo's style of 'personality-based rule' as dangerous and regressive.^[101] Right-leaning commentators said Bo's downfall signified a 'correct orientation' to China's future development.^[101] Southern Media Group editor Yan Lieshan remarked that Bo correctly identified China's problems but prescribed the wrong solution.^[101] Businesspeople whose assets were seized by Bo's administration in Chongqing also reacted positively.^[97]

Bo's dismissal caused political shockwaves unseen since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989,^[95][102] and exposing internal conflicts within Communist Party. In the weeks following 15 March, party authorities deliberated on Bo's case.^[103] In the absence of official reports of the proceedings, microblogs churned out a flood of speculation, including rumours of a coup.^[104] In response, the authorities instructed newspapers and websites to strictly report only official releases, and arrested six people accused of 'rumourmongering'.^[103]

Aware of its potentially divisive impact, authorities carefully controlled media coverage of Bo's removal from office. State media reported 'pledges of loyalty' to the party's decision to disgrace Bo, including statements from the new Chongqing party authorities, Beijing municipal organs, and grassroots party members rallying to the party line. The party's mouthpiece People's Daily issued a front-page editorial calling for unity behind the "correct decision".^[103][96] The military held 'political education' sessions on short notice, stressing unity and loyalty to the Party under the leadership of Hu Jintao.^[105] Bo's downfall also affected his ally Zhou Yongkang, who had reportedly relinquished his operational control over Chinese security institutions and lost the right to influence who would succeed him at the 18th Party Congress.^[106]

Political alignment and affiliations[link]

In the course of his career, Bo Xilai was the beneficiary of considerable patronage from former Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin.^[107] He is thus associated with Jiang’s faction,^[68] sometimes referred to as the “elitists,” that is generally known to favor a model that emphasizes free trade, economic development in the coastal regions, and export-led growth. It is a coalition composed largely of “princelings” (the children of high-ranking former party leaders), business people, leaders of coastal cities, and members of the erstwhile "Shanghai clique."^[108] By contrast, the “populist” coalition of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao advocates more balanced economic development and improvements to China’s social safety net.^[68] The populist faction is generally associated with the "left," and comprised rural leaders, socialist intellectuals, and several leaders who rose to prominence through their connections with the Communist Youth League.^[108]

Although Bo is identified with the elitist bloc for his time in Liaoning and as Minister of Commerce, during his tenure in the interior city of Chongqing, he adopted a number of populist policies more typically associated with the left. Namely, he implemented social housing programs, gave residency status (and therefore the associated social welfare benefits) to rural migrant workers, and emphasized a need for a more balanced distribution of wealth.^[109] Although Bo relentlessly pursued technology, capital, and business opportunities, he also spearheaded a large number of government programs to help the working class and disadvantaged groups.^[38] Bo’s campaigns against corruption also allegedly seized the assets of private entrepreneurs, in turn funneling these funds into state projects and welfare programs, effectively re-asserting state control over wealth.^[47] He also sought to promote “red culture,” and mandated the revival of Mao-era slogans and songs, evoking a time of an egalitarian society.

Bo's policies in Chongqing ultimately made him a prominent figure among neo-Maoists and leftists,^[47] and a representative of the conservative wing of the Communist Party. Although Bo did not favor the discontinuation of market economics or a return to Mao-era policies, he was seen to advocate a strong role for the state in peoples' lives.^[110] Bo’s anti-corruption campaign, in particular, earned him a reputation for heavy-handedness and authoritarian methods in crime and punishment.^[111][112] Bo’s policies put him in opposition to the more liberal and reform-oriented faction, particularly Premier Wen Jiabao and Guangdong party chief Wang Yang, who favored the strengthening of rule of law and a continuation of political reform.^[47][110] To observers, Bo and Wang's verbal warfare over the future direction of development marked an increasing polarization of Chinese politics into leftist and reformer camps.^[113]

Family[link]

Bo's first wife was Li Danyu, the daughter of former Beijing Party First Secretary Li Xuefeng. Their son, Li Wangzhi, graduated from Columbia University in 2001.^[114][115] Li Danyu insisted that her son change his surname to Li following her divorce from Bo Xilai.^[114] Li Wangzhi is reportedly low-key and modest, and has a master's degree in media studies. He worked at Citibank and a law firm in Beijing.^[114]

Bo married his second wife, Gu Kailai, in 1986. Gu was a prominent lawyer and founder of the Kailai lawfirm in Beijing.^[116] Gu’s father, Gu Jingsheng, was a Communist revolutionary. Her mother, Fan Chengxiu, is a descendant of the renowned Song Dynasty Prime Minister and Poet Fan Zhongyan.^[116]

Bo Xilai drew criticism from others in the party for his high-profile courting of media attention and using his family pedigree to further the interests of his wife and her law firm.^[9] Bo denied that his wife had profited from his position, saying that his wife had retired her legal practice while the couple lived in Dalian in the 1990s. Bo said that Gu "now basically just stays at home, doing some housework for me."^[117] Jiang Weiping claimed that Gu served as Bo's "gatekeeper" when Bo was the mayor of Dalian, regularly accepting gifts and bribes from property developers seeking access to him, and from Party officials seeking government appointments.^[118] There was speculation that Bo Xilai may have attempted to interfere with a corruption investigation into his wife.^[119] Following his dismissal, his wife was reported to have been implicated in the death of British businessman and family friend Neil Heywood.^[120]

Bo and Gu have one son, Guagua. He attended Harrow School, and was later admitted to Balliol College, Oxford, where in 2006 he started studying for a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Guagua then went on to study at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.^[121][122] Bo Guagua's high-profile and privileged lifestyle has provided tabloid fodder for Chinese-language media.^[117][121] Asked how he could afford his son's tuition fees on his estimated annual salary of $22,000,^[121] Bo replied that his son received "full scholarships" from the respective institutions.^[117] Maclean's reported that Bo's family associate, Neil Haywood, pulled strings to have Guagua accepted into Harrow shortly after becoming involved with Bo.^[118]

Bo Xiyong, Bo Xilai's eldest brother, is a vice-chairman and executive director of Hong Kong-listed China Everbright International, but does so under a pseudonym. Although the name used, according to company filings, is 'Li Xueming', the company declined to confirm if they are one and the same.^[123]

See also[link]

• Politics of Liaoning
• Politics of Chongqing

References[link]

External links[link]

• News about Bo Xilai at China Digital Times.
• Biography and recent career data at China Vitae, an online biographical database of Chinese VIPs
• The Bo Xilai Crisis: A Curse or a Blessing for China?, Interview with Cheng Li (April 2012)

v t e Bo Xilai Family and friends Bo Yibo · Gu Kailai · Neil Heywood · Bo Guagua Colleagues Huang Qifan · Wang Lijun · Wang Yang · Zhang Dejiang · Zhou Yongkang Related Wang Lijun incident · Cake theory · Chongqing gang trials · Politics of Chongqing · Politics of Liaoning

Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Incumbent Assumed office 15 November 2002 Deputy Wu Bangguo Wen Jiabao Jia Qinglin Li Changchun Preceded by Jiang Zemin President of the People's Republic of China Incumbent Assumed office 15 March 2003 Premier Wen Jiabao Vice President Zeng Qinghong Xi Jinping Preceded by Jiang Zemin Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission Incumbent Assumed office 19 September 2004 Deputy Xi Jinping Guo Boxiong Xu Caihou Preceded by Jiang Zemin Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission Incumbent Assumed office 13 March 2005 Deputy Xi Jinping Guo Boxiong Xu Caihou Preceded by Jiang Zemin First Secretary of the Central Secretariat of the Communist Party of China In office 19 October 1992 – 15 November 2002 General Secretary Jiang Zemin Preceded by Hu Qili Succeeded by Zeng Qinghong Vice President of the People's Republic of China In office 15 March 1998 – 15 March 2003 President Jiang Zemin Preceded by Rong Yiren Succeeded by Zeng Qinghong Personal details Born (1942-12-21) 21 December 1942 (age 69) Taizhou, China Political party Communist Party Spouse(s) Liu Yongqing Children Haifeng Haiqing Residence Zhongnanhai Alma mater Tsinghua University Signature This article contains Chinese text. Without proper rendering support, you may see question marks, boxes, or other symbols instead of Chinese characters. Hu Jintao Simplified Chinese 胡锦涛 Traditional Chinese 胡錦濤 Transcriptions Mandarin - Hanyu Pinyin Hú Jǐntāo Min - Hokkien POJ Hô Kím-tô Cantonese (Yue) - Jyutping wu4 gam2 tou4

Hu Jintao (Pinyin: Hú Jǐntāo, pronounced [xǔ tɕìntʰɑ́ʊ]; born 21 December 1942) is the current Paramount leader of the People's Republic of China. He has held the titles of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China since 2002, President of the People's Republic of China since 2003, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission since 2004, succeeding Jiang Zemin as the chief of the fourth generation of leadership of the Communist Party of China.

Hu has been involved in the Communist party bureaucracy for most of his adult life, notably as Party secretary for Guizhou province and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and then later first Secretary of the CPC Secretariat and Vice-President under former leader Jiang Zemin. Hu is the first leader of the Communist Party without any significant revolutionary credentials. As such, his rise to the presidency represented China's transition of leadership from establishment communists to younger, more pragmatic technocrats.

During his term in office, Hu has reintroduced state control in some sectors of the economy that were relaxed by the previous administration, and has been conservative with political reforms.^[1] Along with his colleague, Premier Wen Jiabao, Hu presided over nearly a decade of consistent economic growth and development that cemented China as a major world power. He sought to improve socio-economic equality domestically through the Scientific Development Concept, which aimed to build a "Harmonious Society" that was prosperous and free of social conflict.^[2] Meanwhile, Hu kept a tight lid on China politically, cracking down on social disturbances, ethnic minority protests, and dissident figures. In foreign policy, Hu advocated for "China's peaceful development", pursuing soft power in international relations and a business-oriented approach to diplomacy. Through Hu's tenure, China's influence in Africa, Latin America, and other developing countries has increased.^[3]

Hu possesses a low-key and reserved leadership style, and is reportedly a firm believer in consensus-based rule.^[4] These traits have made Hu a rather bland figure in the public eye, embodying the focus in Chinese politics on technocratic competence rather than personality.^[5]

Early life[link]

Hu Jintao was born in Taizhou, Jiangsu province on 21 December 1942. He grew up in Taizhou and finished his high school education there. His branch of the family migrated from Jixi County of Anhui province to Jiangyan during his grandfather's generation. His mother was a native of Taixian in Jiangsu.^{[citation needed]}

Though his father owned a small tea trading business in Taizhou, the family was relatively poor. His mother was a teacher and died when he was seven, and he was raised by an aunt. Hu's father was later denounced during the Cultural Revolution, an event that (together with his relatively humble origins) apparently had a deep effect upon Hu, who diligently tried to clear his father's name.^[6]

Hu was a gifted student in Taizhou high school, excelling in activities such as singing and dancing.^{[citation needed]} In 1964, while still a student at Beijing's Tsinghua University, Hu joined the Communist Party of China (CPC), before the Cultural Revolution. He was the chairman of Tsinghua Student Union at that time. He graduated in hydraulic engineering in 1965. At Tsinghua, Hu met a fellow student Liu Yongqing, now his wife. They have a son and a daughter named Hu Haifeng and Hu Haiqing respectively.

In 1968, Hu volunteered for his service in Gansu and worked on the construction of Liujiaxia Hydroelectric Station^[7] while also managing Party affairs for the local branch of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power. From 1969 to 1974, Hu worked for Sinohydro Engineering Bureau, as an engineer.^[8]

Early political career[link]

In 1973, Hu was transferred to the Construction Department of Gansu as a secretary. The next year he was promoted to vice senior chief. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping implemented the "Four Transformations" program, which aimed to produce communist leaders who were "more revolutionary, younger, more knowledgeable, and more specialized." In response to this nation-wide search for young party members, Song Ping, the first secretary of CPC Gansu Committee (Gansu's governor) discovered Hu Jintao and promoted him several ranks to the position of deputy head of the commission.^[9] Another protégé of Song, Wen Jiabao, also became prominent at the same time.

In 1982, Hu was promoted to the position of Communist Youth League Gansu Branch Secretary and was appointed as the director of the All-China Youth Federation.^[10][11] His mentor Song Ping was transferred to Beijing as Minister of Organization of the Communist Party of China, and was in charge of senior cadres' recommendation, candidacy and promotion. With the support of Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping, Hu was assured of a bright future in the party. At Song Ping's suggestion, in 1982 central Party authorities invited Hu to Beijing to study at the Central Party School.^[12] Soon after, he was transferred to Beijing and appointed as secretariat of the Communist Youth League Central Committee ("CY Central"). Two years later Hu was promoted to First Secretary of CY Central, thus its actual leader. During his term in the Youth League, Hu escorted Hu Yaobang, who was General Secretary of CPC then, in visits around the country. Hu Yaobang, himself a veteran coming from the Youth League, could reminiscence his youth through Hu's company.

Party Committee Secretary of Guizhou[link]

In 1985, Hu Yaobang pushed for Hu Jintao to be transferred to Guizhou as the provincial Committee Secretary of Communist Party of China.^[13] Hu attempted to improve the economy of the backwater province, and reputedly visited all of its eighty-six counties.^[14] While in Guizhou, Hu was careful to follow Beijing's directives and had a reputation of being "airtight"; he rarely would offer his views on policy matters in public.^[14] While Hu was generally seen as an official with integrity and honesty, some locals preferred his predecessor Zhu Houze. In 1987, Hu Jintao handled the local students protest parallel to the Democracy Wall carefully, whereas in Beijing similar protests resulted in Hu Yaobang's forced resignation.

Tenure in Tibet[link]

The exit of his patron Hu Yaobang from the political scene was initially seen as unfavourable towards Hu Jintao. He drew criticism from party elders for failing to criticize the ousted reformer.^[15] In 1988, Hu was transferred to become Party Regional Committee Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the restive area's number-one figure, while also taking on the role of Political Commissar of the local People's Liberation Army units. A number of Tibetans have long been opposed to government policy in the region and unrest and ethnic conflict were brewing, particularly anti-Han Chinese sentiments amongst local Tibetans. Minor clashes had been occurring since 1987, and when the scale of unrest grew, Hu responded with the deployment of some 1,700 People's Armed Police into Lhasa in February 1989 in an attempt to warn against further disturbance.^[16] Increased clashes culminated in serious rioting in Lhasa's core on 5 March 1989, five days before the 30th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising.^[17] What occurred after is a matter of dispute: rioters accused the police of shooting them arbitrarily, and the police claiming that they had acted in self-defense. In addition, there was speculation that Hu delayed his orders to clamp down on the protesters until late into the evening, when the police chief was forced to act because the situation was spiraling out of control. The protesters were suppressed early into the next day, and Hu asked Beijing to declare martial law on 8 March.^[18]

Hu's role in the demonstrations and rioting on March 5 was never made clear. While it is general protocol that Hu must have at least implicitly approved the use of force against protesters, whether he actually gave orders throughout March 5 is a matter of debate.^[19] In addition, John Tkacik cites that Hu had been coordinating with the Chengdu Military Region for troops to be on full alert as the situation progressed.^[16] Some diplomatic analysts linked what they saw as Hu's brutal use of force to the suppression of activists and students at in Tiananmen Square, which took place a mere three months later. Whether Hu provided "inspiration" for the PLA on June 4 is a matter of debate, but it was clear that Hu's actions in Lhasa earned him unprecedented attention in the upper echelons of party power, including paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. When tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square, Hu was one of the first regional leaders to declare his support for the central authorities.^[16] Hu experienced high-altitude sickness in June 1990, and returned to Beijing, but remained in his position for another two years, during which Hu achieved little. But his departure to Beijing was seen as a means to return to the centrefold of Chinese politics, which led to some doubts as to whether or not he was as ill as he had claimed.^[16]

Candidacy[link]

Before the opening of the 14th National Congress of the CPC in 1992, the Party's senior leaders, including Deng and Chen Yun, were to select candidates for the Politburo Standing Committee to ensure a smooth transition of power from the so-called second-generation leaders (Deng, Chen, Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen, etc.) to third-generation Communist Party of China leaders (Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi etc.). Deng also proposed that they should consider another candidate for a further future transition, preferably someone under fifty to represent the next generation of leaders.^[20] Song, as the organization chief, recommended Hu as an ideal candidate for the prospect of a future leader. As a result, shortly before his 50th birthday, Hu Jintao became the youngest member of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, and the second youngest Politburo Standing Committee member ever since the CPC took power in 1949.

In 1993, Hu took charge of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, which oversaw day-to-day operations of the Central Committee, and the Central Party School, which was convenient for him to bring up his own supporters among senior CPC cadres. Hu was also put in charge of the ideological work of the CPC. Although Hu was considered heir apparent to Jiang, he always took great care to ensure that Jiang be at the center of the spotlight. In late 1998, Hu promoted Jiang's unpopular movement of the "Three Stresses" – "stress study, stress politics, and stress healthy trends" – giving speeches to promote it. In 2001, he publicized Jiang's Three Represents theory, which Jiang hoped to place him on the same level as other Marxist theoreticians.^[21] In 1998, Hu became Vice-President of China, and Jiang wanted Hu to play a more active role in foreign affairs. Hu became China's leading voice during the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.^{[citation needed]}

At the helm[link]

Hu Jintao with Leaders of the BRICS countries, from left, Singh, Medvedev, Rousseff and Zuma.

Since taking over as Party General Secretary at the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hu and his premier, Wen Jiabao, proposed to set up a Harmonious Society which aims at lessening the inequality and changing the style of the "GDP first and Welfare Second" policies. They focused on sectors of the Chinese population that have been left behind by the economic reform, and have taken a number of high profile trips to the poorer areas of China with the stated goal of understanding these areas better. Hu and Wen Jiabao have also attempted to move China away from a policy of favouring economic growth at all costs and toward a more balanced view of growth that includes factors in social inequality and environmental damage, including the use of the green gross domestic product in personnel decisions. Jiang's clique, however, maintained control in most developing areas, therefore Hu and Wen's measures of macroeconomic regulation faced great resistance.^{[citation needed]}

SARS crisis[link]

The first crisis of Hu's leadership happened during the outbreak of SARS in 2003. Following strong criticism of China for initially covering up and responding slowly to the crisis, he dismissed several party and government officials, including the health minister, who supported Jiang, and the Mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong, widely perceived as Hu's protégé.^{[citation needed]}

Succession of Jiang Zemin[link]

President Hu with George H. W. Bush and his son George W. Bush in Beijing, August 10, 2008

On 15 November 2002, a new Hu Jintao-led Politburo nominally succeeded Jiang. Although Jiang, then 76, stepped down from the powerful General Secretary and the Politburo Standing Committee to make way for a younger fourth generation of leadership, there was speculation that Jiang would retain significant influence because Hu was not associated with Jiang's influential Shanghai clique, to which six out of the nine members of the all-powerful Standing Committee were believed to be linked. However, later developments show that many of its members have shifted their positions. Zeng Qinghong, for example, moved from a disciple of Jiang to serving as an intermediary between the two factions.^[22] In 2003, Jiang was also re-elected to the post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, a post from which Deng Xiaoping was able to wield power from behind the scenes as 'paramount leader', thus retaining military power.

Western observers^[who?] attribute a sense of caution to Hu's philosophies, citing China's recent history of fallen heirs.^{[citation needed]} Deng Xiaoping appointed three party General Secretaries, all designed to be successors, and was instrumental in the ousting of two of them, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. His third and final selection, Jiang Zemin, won Deng's continued, although ambiguous backing and was the only General Secretary in Communist Chinese history to voluntarily leave his post when his term ended.

Although many^[who?] believe Hu was originally hand-picked by Deng as the youngest member of China's top leadership and a leading candidate to succeed Jiang, he had exercised a great deal of political skills between 1992 and 2002 to consolidate his position, and eventually emerged as Jiang's heir apparent in his own right.^{[citation needed]} Hu also benefited from the slow but progressive institutionalization of power succession within the Party, something his predecessors lacked entirely. Since the early 1980s, the People's Republic of China has been marked by progressive institutionalization and rule by consensus, and moved away from the Maoist authoritarian model. Although a western-style legal institution and rule of law remain to be put in place, Hu's power succession was conducted in a fairly orderly and civil manner, which was unprecedented in Communist China's history. This trend is expected^{[by whom?]} to continue and an institutionalized mechanism of power transition is expected to emerge, first perhaps within the Party.^{[citation needed]} In fact, it has been one of the Party's stated major goals to create an orderly system of succession and mechanism to prevent informal rule and a cult of personality.

President Hu talks with U.S. President Barack Obama at the 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 Summit

The rivalry between Jiang and Hu after Jiang stepped down from his posts was, arguably, an inevitable product of China's tradition of succession. Some analysts argue that although Jiang has consolidated power by the time he retired, his ideological stature within the Communist Party remains shaky at best, thus Jiang had to buy time to ensure that his ideological legacy such as the Three Represents, is enshrined in China's socialism doctrine.^{[citation needed]} Jiang resigned as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in September 2004, his last official post. Since then Hu has officially taken on the three institutions in the People's Republic of China where power lie, the party, the state, as well as the military, thus informally, has become the paramount leader.

Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao inherited a China wrought with internal social, political and environmental problems. One of the biggest challenges Hu faces is the large wealth disparity between the Chinese rich and poor, for which discontent and anger mounted to a degree which wreaked havoc on communist rule. Furthermore, the cronyism and corruption plaguing China's civil service, military, educational, judicial and medical systems sought to destroy the country bit by bit. In the beginning of 2006, however, Hu launched the "8 Honours and 8 Shames" movement in a bid to promote a more selfless and moral outlook amongst the population. China's increasingly fragile environment has caused massive urban pollution, sandstorms and the destruction of vast tracts of habitable land.^{[citation needed]} Hu has been presiding over an unprecedented increase in Chinese nationalist sentiment.^{[citation needed]}

At the 17th CPC National Congress, Hu was re-elected as General Secretary and Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission on 22 October 2007. At the 11th National People's Congress, Hu was re-elected as President on 15 March 2008. He was also re-elected as Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission.^[23]

Newsweek named Hu the second most powerful person in the world referring to him as "the man behind the wheel of the world's most supercharged economy."^[24] Forbes also named him the second most powerful person in the world.^[25] Hu was named the 2010 World's Most Powerful Person by Forbes Magazine.^[26] Hu has been listed four times (2008, 2007, 2005 & 2004) on the Time 100 annual list of most influential people.

Political positions[link]

Scientific Perspective and Harmonious Society[link]

U.S. President George W. Bush meets with Hu Jintao at the White House in Washington DC, April 20, 2006

Political observers indicate that Hu has distinguished himself from his predecessor in both domestic and foreign policy. Hu's political philosophy during his presidency is summarized by three slogans — a "Harmonious Society" domestically and "Peaceful Development" internationally, the former aided by the Scientific Development Concept, which seeks integrated sets of solutions to arrays of economic, environmental and social problems, and recognizes, in inner circles, a need for cautious and gradual political reforms.^[2] The Scientific Development doctrine has been written into the Communist Party and State Constitutions in 2007 and 2008, respectively. The role of the Party has changed, as formulated by Deng Xiaoping and implemented by Jiang Zemin, from a revolutionary party to a ruling party. Hu continues the Party’s modernization, calling for both "Advancement" of the Party and its increasing transparency in governance.

What emerges from these philosophies, in the view of Hu, is a country with systematic approach to national structure and development that combines dynamic economic growth, a free market energized by a vigorous "nonpublic" (i.e., private) sector, heavy-handed political and media control, personal but not political freedoms, concern for the welfare of all citizens, cultural enlightenment, and a synergistic approach to diverse social issues (the Scientific Development Perspective) that lead, in Hu’s vision, to a "Harmonious Society". In the view of the Chinese government, these philosophies, which has created a new "China Model" of governance, serves as a legitimate alternative to the West's "Democracy Model", particularly for developing countries. In Hu’s words, "A harmonious society should feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality."^[2] Such a society, he says, will give full scope to people's talent and creativity, enable all the people to share the social wealth brought by reform and development, and forge an ever closer relationship between the people and government. Hu has even emphasized the potential of religious communities to contribute to economic and social development under the banner of “Building a Harmonious Society.”^[27]

Western criticism of Hu, particularly regarding human rights, exposes his hypersensitivity to social stability but does not lay as much emphasis on his fresh commitment to address China’s multi-faceted social problems.^[2] Hu’s pragmatic, non-ideological agenda has two core values—maintaining social stability to further economic development and sustaining Chinese culture to enrich national sovereignty. In domestic policy, he seems to want more openness to the public on governmental functions and meetings. Recently, China's news agency published many Politburo Standing Committee meeting details. He also cancelled many events that are traditionally seen as communist extravagances, such as the lavish send-off and welcoming-back ceremonies of Chinese leaders when visiting foreign lands. Furthermore the Chinese leadership under Hu has also focused on such problems as the gap between rich and poor and uneven development between the interior and coastal regions. Both party and state seem to have moved away from a definition of development that focuses solely on GDP growth and toward a definition which includes social equality and environment effects.

In 2004, Hu gave an unprecedented showing and ordered all cadres from the five major power functions to stop the tradition of going to the Beidaihe seaside retreat for their annual summer meeting which, before, was commonly seen as a gathering of ruling elites from both current and elder cadres to decide China's destiny, and also an unnecessary waste of public funds. The move was seen by the Chinese public as symbolic of Hu's attitude towards corruption.

In June 2007, Hu gave an important speech at the Central Party School that was indicative of his position of power and his guiding philosophies. In the speech Hu used a very populist tone to appeal to ordinary Chinese, making serious note of the recent challenges China has been facing, especially with regards to income disparity. In addition, Hu noted the need for "increased democracy" in the country.^{[citation needed]}

Media control[link]

Despite initial expectations that Hu was a "closet liberal", Hu has shown a fairly hard-line approach to liberalisation of the media.

The media has been given greater latitude in reporting many topics of popular concern, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, as well as into malpractices at the local level. The government has also been responsive to criticism of its media policy, for example in response to the SARS epidemic, and in regard to public commemorations of popular, but deposed, former leader Zhao Ziyang.

Hu has been very cautious with regards to the Internet, choosing to censor politically sensitive material to a degree more strict than the Jiang era.^{[citation needed]} In February 2007, Hu embarked on further domestic media controls that restricted primetime TV series to "morally correct" content—he objected to lowbrow programming including some reality shows—on all Chinese TV stations, and listed "20 forbidden areas" of coverage on news reporting.

Taiwan[link]

Early in his presidency, Hu faced an independence-supporting counterpart in then ROC president Chen Shui-bian. Chen called for talks without any preconditions, repudiating the 1992 consensus. Chen Shui-bian and his party had continued to express an ultimate goal of de jure Taiwanese independence, and made statements on the political status of Taiwan that the PRC considers provocative. Hu's initial response was a combination of "soft" and "hard" approaches. On the one hand, Hu expressed a flexibility to negotiate on many issues of concern to Taiwan. On the other hand, he continued to refuse talks without preconditions and remained committed to Chinese reunification as an ultimate goal. While Hu gave some signs of being more flexible with regard to political relationships with Taiwan as in his 17 May Statement, where he offered to address the issue of "international living space" for Taiwan, Hu's government remains firm in its position that the PRC will not tolerate any attempt by the Taiwanese government to declare de jure independence from China.

After the re-election of Chen Shui-bian in 2004, Hu's government changed tactics. Hu's government has conducted a no-contact policy with Taiwan due to Chen Shui-Bian and the DPP's independence leanings and repudiation of the 1992 consensus. The government maintained its military build-up against Taiwan, and pursued a vigorous policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically. In March 2005, the Anti-Secession Law was passed by the National People's Congress, formalising "non-peaceful means" as an option of response to a declaration of independence in Taiwan.

Hu's government increased contacts with the Kuomintang (KMT), its erstwhile foe in the Chinese Civil War, and still a major party in Taiwan. The increased contacts culminated in the 2005 Pan-Blue visits to mainland China, including a historic meeting between Hu and then-KMT chairman Lien Chan in April 2005. This was the first meeting between the leaders of the two parties since the conclusion of World War II.^[28][29]

On 20 March 2008, the Kuomintang under Ma Ying-jeou won the presidency in Taiwan, and a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Thereafter Hu immediately turned to a more 'soft' diplomatic approach and opened the way to a thaw in relations between the two sides.^[30] A series of historic meetings between the CPC and KMT have followed. On 12 April 2008, Hu Jintao met with Taiwan's Vice President-elect Vincent Siew in the latter's role as chairman of the Cross-strait Common Market Foundation during the Boao Forum for Asia. On 28 May 2008, Hu met with KMT chairman Wu Poh-hsiung, the first meeting between the heads of the CPC and the KMT as ruling parties. During this meeting, Hu and Wu agreed that both sides should re-commence official dialogue under the 1992 consensus – that "both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition.". Wu committed the new government in Taiwan against Taiwanese independence; Hu committed his government to addressing the concerns of the Taiwanese people in regard to security, dignity, and "international living space", with a priority given to allowing Taiwan to participate in the World Health Organization.

In addition to the party-to-party dialogue, de facto governmental dialogue took place via the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits in June 2008 on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, with the first meeting held in Beijing. Both Hu and his new counterpart Ma Ying-jeou agreed that the 1992 Consensus is the basis for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan strait. On 26 March 2008, Hu Jintao held a telephone talk with then US President George W. Bush, in which he became the first Chinese leader to officially recognize the 1992 Consensus.^[31] After several months of negotiations, in December 2008, the two sides agreed on the resumption of the Three Links, i.e., a re-opening of mail, trade, and direct air links between the two sides. Relations have been cordial since between the two sides, and trade increased immensely, culminating in the signing of the preferential trade agreement ECFA in 2010.

Moral guidance[link]

In response to the great number of social problems in China, in March 2006, Hu Jintao released the "Eight Honors and Eight Shames" as a set of moral codes to be followed by the Chinese people, and emphasized the need to spread the message to youth.^[32] Alternatively known as the "Eight Honors and Disgraces", it contained eight poetic lines which summarized what a good citizen should regard as an honor and what to regard as a shame. It has been widely regarded as one of Hu Jintao's ideological solutions to the perceived increasing lack of morality in China after Chinese economic reforms brought in a generation of Chinese predominantly concerned with earning money and power in an increasingly frail social fabric.^{[citation needed]}

It has become a norm for Chinese communist leaders to make their own contributions to Marxist theory.^{[citation needed]} Whether this is Hu's contribution to Marxist theory is debatable, but its general reception with the Chinese public has been moderate.^{[citation needed]} Its promotion, however, is visible almost everywhere: in classroom posters, banners on the street, and electronic display boards for the preparation of the 2008 Olympics, and World Expo 2010 in Shanghai. The codes differ from the ideologies of his predecessors, namely, Jiang's Three Represents, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and Mao Zedong Thought in that the focus, for the first time, has been shifted to codifying moral standards as opposed to setting social or economic goals.

Evaluation[link]

Most external observers agree that Hu presided over a decade of consistent economic growth, led China through the storm of the global financial crisis relatively unscathed, and increased China's international stature immensely.^[33] The Hu Administration is also credited with modernizing China's infrastructure, the launch of China's first manned spaceprobe, and the success of two international events: the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai Expo.^[33] In addition, Hu's "soft approach" to Taiwan, coinciding with the election of a Kuomintang government in Taipei, was credited for having improved relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. Trade and contact between the two sides increased significantly during Hu's tenure.

In addition, Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao's populist policies has resulted in the elimination of agricultural taxes for farmers, more flexible policies towards migrant workers living in cities, more balanced development between the coastal regions and the hinterlands, enforcing minimum wage in cities and the promotion of sustainable and affordable housing developments. Generally speaking, these policies have been well-received by the Chinese public.

In foreign policy, Hu's critics say that his government has been overly aggressive in asserting its new power, overestimated its reach, and raised the ire and apprehension of various neighbours, including Southeast Asian countries, India, and Japan. Such policies are also said to be provocative towards the United States.^[34] Domestic critics, including the country's elites, intellectuals, and particularly dissidents, point to various shortcomings of the Hu administration and his failure in implementing his signature "Harmonious Society" policy. They cite, for example, that China's internal security budget has exceeded its military budget during Hu's tenure as protests and other 'mass incidents' continued to increase across the country. China's gini coefficient, for example, has climbed to 0.47 by 2010, indicating a potentially unsustainable wealth gap between the rich and the poor.^[33] Corruption also has not been curbed significantly, with the downfall of Railways Minister Liu Zhijun being emblematic of the endemic level of graft that exists in the highest levels of government. In addition, the Hu Administration's continued insistence on censorship and the curtailing of freedom of speech has drawn many critics from human rights organizations and Western governments,^[33] while artists and writers inside the country chided the Hu Administration's increased restrictions on cultural expressions.

Due to the increasingly consensus-based decision making process of the Chinese leadership, there is debate on how much power Hu held personally to effect change. Some credit Hu for being an effective mediator in a system increasingly affected by special interests and political factionalism.^[33]

Personal life[link]

Hu is married to Liu Yongqing, whom he met at Tsinghua University. They have two children together, Hu Haifeng and Hu Haiqing. Unlike Wen Jiabao, the Premier, he has never granted a public one-on-one interview as of 2007.^[35] He has been noted for his liking for table tennis and ballroom dancing.^{[citation needed]} Hu is also said to possess a photographic memory that became evident in his high school days.^[36][37]

Notes[link]

References[link]

• Nathan, Andrew J.; Gilley, Bruce (March 2003). China's new rulers: the secret files. New York: The New York Review of Books. ISBN I-59017-072-5. 
• "Taiwan." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online School Edition. 12 Aug. 2008. APA style: Taiwan. (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 12 August 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online School Edition

External links[link]

	People's Republic of China portal
	Biography portal
	Politics portal

Wikinews has related news: Hu Jintao

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Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Hu Jintao

• Hu Jintao (ChinaVitae.com)
• Hu Jintao calls for upholding Marxism (Xinhua)
• Hu Jintao's political philosophies and policies by Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn
• China's leader shows his stripes 2005 BBC article arguing Hu more hardline than he initially appeared
• Requiem for Reform? Zhao Ziyang's vision of political change in China dims as Hu Jintao hardens the Party line (Time Asia)

v t e Current leaders of socialist states espousing communism Republic of Cuba Raúl Castro, First Secretary, head of government and head of state People's Republic of China Hu Jintao, General Secretary and head of state Lao People's Democratic Republic Choummaly Sayasone, General Secretary and head of state Socialist Republic of Vietnam Nguyễn Phú Trọng, General Secretary Nguyễn Tấn Dũng, Head of government Trương Tấn Sang, Head of state

v t e Leaders of the People's Republic of China Mao Hua Deng Jiang Hu

v t e Leaders of the Communist Party of China Leaders Chen Duxiu Xiang Zhongfa Li Lisan Xiang Zhongfa Wang Ming Bo Gu Zhang Wentian Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao General Secretaries Chen Duxiu vacant (1922–25) Chen Duxiu Xiang Zhongfa Bo Gu Zhang Wentian vacant (1943–82) Hu Yaobang Zhao Ziyang Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Chairmen Chen Duxiu vacant (1925–43) Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Hu Yaobang abolished from 1982 CMC Chairmen Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao

v t e Members of the 17th Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China General Secretary 1. Hu Jintao Other members 2. Wu Bangguo 3. Wen Jiabao 4. Jia Qinglin 5. Li Changchun 6. Xi Jinping 7. Li Keqiang 8. He Guoqiang 9. Zhou Yongkang

v t e Members of the 16th Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China General Secretary 1. Hu Jintao Other members 2. Wu Bangguo 3. Wen Jiabao 4. Jia Qinglin 5. Zeng Qinghong 6. Huang Ju 7. Wu Guanzheng 8. Li Changchun 9. Luo Gan

v t e Presidents of the People's Republic of China Common Program (1949–1954) Chairman of the Central People's Government Mao 1954 Constitution (1954–1975) Chairman Mao Liu Song and Dong (acting) Dong (acting) 1975 Constitution (1975–1978) NPCSC Chairman Zhu Song (acting) Ye 1978 Constitution (1978–1982) NPCSC Chairman Ye Song (honorary president) 1982 Constitution (1982–present) President Li Yang Jiang Hu List of Presidents of the People's Republic of China