Not to be confused with Neo-Confucianism, an earlier movement in Imperial China.

New Confucianism (Chinese: 新儒家; pinyin: xīn rú jiā; literally "New Confucianism") is an intellectual movement of Confucianism that began in the early 20th century in Republican China, and revived in post-Mao era contemporary China. It is deeply influenced by, but not identical with, the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties. It is a neo-conservative movement of various Chinese traditions and has been regarded to contain religious overtones; it advocates for certain Confucianist elements of society - such social, ecological, and political harmony - to be applied in a contemporary context in synthesis with Western philosophies such as rationalism and humanism.^[1] Its philosophies have emerged as a focal point of discussion between Confucian scholars in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States.

History[link]

The first generation of New Confucians (1921–1949) came about as a response to the May Fourth movement and its iconoclastic stance against Confucianism. Confucianism was attacked as unscientific and contrary to the progress of a modern China. One notable figure during this time was Xiong Shili, who studied Buddhism in depth in his youth but later sought for a reformation of the Confucian philosophical framework. Borrowing from the school of Wang Yangming, Xiong developed a metaphysical system for the New Confucian movement and believed Chinese learning was superior to Western learning. Another figure, Feng Youlan, following the Neo-Confucian school of Zhu Xi, sought a revival of Chinese philosophy based on modern Western philosophy.

With the start of the communist regime in China in 1949, many of the leading intellectuals left the mainland to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States. Notable figures of this second generation (1950–1979) include individuals like Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan, all three students of Xiong Shili. Mou Zongsan, in particular, was well-versed in the ancient Chinese philosophical traditions and argued that Kant was, in many ways, a Western Confucius. These three, together with Zhang Junmai, issued in 1958 the New Confucian Manifesto consolidating their beliefs and drawing attention to their philosophical movement.

In the last few decades, the most vocal representatives of the New Confucian movement have been the students of Mou Zongsan. Perhaps one of the most prominent, Tu Wei-ming, has promoted the idea that Confucianism saw three epochs: the classical Han Confucianism, Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, and New Confucianism. This third generation has been instrumental in grounding Confucianism in non-Asian contexts, as can be seen through Boston Confucianism and other Western Confucians like Wm. Theodore de Bary.^[2]

Terminology[link]

Whereas the English rendering of the movement is generally New Confucianism, there is a variety of translations in the Chinese. Many Taiwan-based writers will tend to use the term Contemporary New Confucianism (simplified Chinese: 当代新儒家; traditional Chinese: 當代新儒家; pinyin: dāng dài xīn rú jiā or simplified Chinese: 当代新儒学; traditional Chinese: 當代新儒學; pinyin: dāng dài xīn rú xué) to emphasize the movement's continuity with the Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism. However, many within Mainland China prefer the term Modern New Confucianism (simplified Chinese: 现代新儒家; traditional Chinese: 現代新儒家; pinyin: xiàn dài xīn rú jiā or simplified Chinese: 现代新儒学; traditional Chinese: 現代新儒學; pinyin: xiàn dài xīn rú xué) with an emphasis on the period of modernization after May Fourth.^[1]

Philosophy[link]

New Confucianism is a school of Chinese philosophy influenced by Confucianism. After the events of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, in which Confucianism was blamed for China’s weakness and decline in the face of Western aggression, a major Chinese philosopher of the time, Xiong Shili (1885-1968), established and re-constructed Confucianism as a response.^[3] New Confucianism is a political, ethical, and social philosophy using metaphysical ideas from both Western Philosophy and Eastern. It is categorized into three generations, starting with Xiong Shili and Feng Youlan as the first generation philosophers who set the basis. The second generation consists of Xiong's students, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Xu Fuguan. The third generation is not determined via figures unlike previous generation but New Confucianism from 1980. Xiong and his follower's attempts to reconstruct Confucianism gave New Confucianism its Chinese name, xīn rú jiā.

First Generation[link]

Xiong Shili[link]

Main Article: Xiong Shili

Xiong Shili (1885-1968) is widely regarded as the thinker who laid down the basis for the revival of Confucianism as New Confucianism in the twentieth century. ^[3] Much of the basis of New Confucianism comes from Xiong's New Doctrine. Deeply educated initially in Buddhism ^[3], Xiong argued that classics of Eastern Philosophy such as Buddhism must be integrated in contemporary Chinese philosophy for more solidity. ^[3] Xiong recognized Buddhism's dark view of the human nature, but also recognized that there are brighter sides to the human nature. For this very reason, he rejected the Buddhist learning of "daily decrease" which dictated that the practice to suppress one's dark nature was necessary. ^[3] He arrived to such conclusion after his examination of Classic Confucianism. While Confucianism also examines the negative aspect of human nature, thus the necessity to habituate oneself with ritual, the purpose of the practice of ritual and attainment of ren is not focused on restricting the darker aspects of human nature but developing the "fundamental goodness", i.e., the duan of human beings that Mencius writes of.

In order to incorporate Buddhism with Confucianism as a part of his contemporary Chinese philosophy encompassing various Eastern philosophies, Xiong proposed a correction of Buddhist learning of daily decrease. Xiong understood the basis behind "daily decrease" to be Buddhism's metaphysical belief of the "unbridgeable split between an absolute unchanging reality (Dharma-nature or fa-xing), and a constantly changing and conditional phenomenal world (Dharma-characters or fa-xing) (Xiong, 1994, pp. 69-77, 84-5, 111-12).^[3] Jiyuan Yu, in his examination of Xiong, describes this as the "Separation theory." Meanwhile, Xiong's theory behind correcting the "daily decrease" rested heavily upon what Yu describes as the "Sameness Thesis." ^[3] Xiong, in his New Doctrine, calls this Dharma-nature ti and Dharma-characters yong. Xiong argues that unlike how Buddhism perceives these two worlds, these two worlds are a unity. Xiong's reasoning is shown in his 1985 version of New Doctrine.

"If they are separable, function will differ from original reality and exist independently, and in that way function will have its own original reality. We should not seek for some entity outside function and name it original reality. Furthermore, if original reality exists independent of function, it is a useless reality. In that case, if it is not a dead thing, it must be a dispensable thing. Thinking back and forth, I believe that original reality and function are not separable. This should be beyond doubt." (Xiong, 1985, p. 434)

His view on this unity can be seen in his earlier works such as New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness. In New Treatise, he argues that the Reality is equal to the Mind. This Mind does not refer to one's individual mind but the universal presence in which there is a universality of mind amongst all beings, thus being the reality. Xiong incorporates the Confucian and Buddhist concept of self-mastery of one's desires, by arguing that failing to control one's desires and individual mind, one will be "a heap of dead matter". Xiong's view is that one should perceive objects of the world internally, since what is external is ultimately also internal and that they are one as both Mind and Reality.

Second Generation[link]

Mou Zongsan[link]

Main Article: Mou Zongsan

Mou Zongsan is considered to be one of the more influential second generation philosophers. Mou's general philosophy on metaphysics stays in line with Xiong's. However, he embellishes upon Xiong's theories on Mind and Reality to apply it to a more socio-political aspect. Mou claims universality exists in all philosophical truth. Which suggests that political and social theories of the world can be connected in essence. Mou argues in his lectures that particularity exists because of the different systems that are established in different cultures. However, these different systems, after a series of philosophical reasoning and interpretation, arrive at a same philosophical truth. He believes that our physical limitations, i.e., our physical being, create these different systems and different cultures. However, being that our mind, i.e., form, is still manifested and exists within this physical world, we should not let these limitations prevent us from practicing philosophical reasoning.

Mou's political philosophy is more clearly showed as he discusses the historical necessity that follows the particularity of human beings. Different nations and different systems' existence can be explained mainly because of this historical necessity. Mou asserts that historical necessity exists neither because of logical necessity or metaphysical necessity but because of what he calls a development of the spirit, what he also labels as dialectical necessity. He claims that history however should be perceived and interpreted as something that has both historical necessity i.e., also dialectical necessity, and moral necessity. For there are two types of judgment: moral and historical. Mou states, that Greek or Chinese, these basic necessities behind history and fundamental human character are the same, and therefore universality in philosophical truth exists even behind politics and history.

New Confucian Manifesto[link]

Main Article: A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture

The term itself was first used as early as 1963 (in two articles in the Hong Kong journal Rensheng). However, it did not come into common use until the late 1970s. New Confucianism is often associated with the essay, "A Manifesto on Chinese Culture to the World," which was published in 1958 by Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan and Zhang Junmai. This work is often referred to as the "New Confucian Manifesto," although that phrase never occurs in it. The Manifesto presents a vision of Chinese culture as having a fundamental unity throughout history, of which Confucianism is the highest expression. The particular interpretation of Confucianism given by the Manifesto is deeply influenced by Neo-Confucianism, and in particular the version of Neo-Confucianism most associated with Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming (as opposed to that associated with Zhu Xi). In addition, the Manifesto argues that while China must learn from the West modern science and democracy, the West must learn from China (and the Confucian tradition in particular) "a more all-encompassing wisdom."^[2]

References[link]

• Cheng, Chung-Ying; Bunnin, Nicholas, eds. (2002). Contemporary Chinese Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-21725-1. 

Confucius Institutes are non-profit public institutions aligned with the Government of the People's Republic of China that aim to promote Chinese language and culture, support local Chinese teaching internationally, and facilitate cultural exchanges.

Confucius Institutes are sometimes compared to language and culture promotion organizations such as France's Alliance Française and Germany's Goethe-Institut. Unlike these organizations, however, Confucius Institutes do not claim to be independent from their government and operate within established universities, colleges, and secondary schools around the world, providing funding, teachers and educational materials. This has raised concerns over their influence on academic freedom and the possibility of industrial espionage,^[1] as well as its role in advancing China's soft power and cultural influence internationally.^[2]

Confucius Institute (CI) headquarters are located in Beijing, and the program is overseen by the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban), a non-profit organization affiliated with the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China and the United Front Work Department.^[3][4][5] The institutes operate in co-operation with local affiliate colleges and universities around the world, and financing is shared between Hanban and the host institutions. The related Confucius Classroom program partners with local secondary schools or school districts to provide teachers and instructional materials.^[6][7]

History[link]

After establishing a pilot institute in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in June 2004, the first Confucius Institute opened on 21 November 2004 in Seoul, South Korea. Hundreds more have since opened in dozens of countries around the world with the highest concentration of Institutes in the United States, Japan, and South Korea.^[8] In April 2007 the first research-based Confucius Institute opened at Waseda University, in Japan. In partnership with Peking University the program promotes the research activities of graduate students studying China.^[9] As of October 2010, there were 322 Confucius Institutes and 337 Confucius Classrooms in 94 countries and regions.^[10] The Ministry of Education estimates 100 million people overseas may be learning Chinese by 2010 and the program is continuing rapid expansion to keep pace.^[11] Hanban aims to establish 1,000 Confucius Institutes by 2020.^[12] Chinese state media suggests that the quick expansion of the institutes testifies to the irresistible influence of China in a world "begging for the opening of Confucius Institutes," but according to Anne-Marie Brady, a scholar of Chinese propaganda, many CIs remain mostly empty shells.^[13]

Name[link]

The well-known Chinese philosopher, Confucius (551–479 BCE) is the namesake for the Institutes. Communist leaders throughout the 20th century have criticized and denounced the philosopher as the personification of China's "feudal" traditions, with anti-Confucianism ranging from the 1912 New Culture Movement to the 1973 Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign during the Cultural Revolution.^[14] In recent decades, interest in pre-modern Chinese culture has grown in the People's Republic of China, and Confucius in particular has seen a resurgence in popularity.^[15] Abroad Confucius is a universally recognizable symbol of Chinese Culture, free of the controversy surrounding other prominent Chinese figures such as Mao Zedong.^[16]

"Confucius Institute" is a trademarked brand name. Chen Jinyu, Vice-Chairperson of the CI Headquarters, explained, "With regards to the operation of Confucian Institutes, brand name means quality; brand name means returns. Those who enjoy more brand names will enjoy higher popularity, reputation, more social influence, and will therefore be able to generate more support from local communities."^[17] A 2011 crackdown protected "Confucius Institute" from preregistration infringement in Costa Rica.^[18]

Purpose[link]

The proliferation of Confucius Institutes around the world has multiple purposes: the promotion and teaching of Chinese culture and language abroad, the encouraging of trade tries, and the extension of the Chinese Party-State's campaign of "soft power" into the educational sphere in foreign countries.

CIs develop Chinese language courses, train teachers, hold the HSK Examination (Chinese proficiency test), and provide information about contemporary China.^[19] The director of the CI program, Xu Lin, says CIs were started to cater to the sudden uptick in interest in Chinese language around the world; they also provide Chinese language teaching staff from the Mainland. As of 2011 there were 200 such teachers working in the United States.^[20]

Political goals[link]

Confucius Institute also have non-academic goals, according to scholars and journalists. The CI also has the goal of improving China's image abroad and assuaging concerns of a "China threat" in the context of the country's increasingly powerful economy and military^[21][22]

Li Changchun, the 5th-highest ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee, was quoted in The Economist saying that the Confucius Institutes were “an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up”—a statement that has been seized upon by critics as evidence of a politicized mission.^[23]

Many foreign scholars have characterized the CI program as an exercise in soft power, expanding China's economic, cultural, and diplomatic reach through the promotion of Chinese language and culture,^[24] while others have suggested a possible role in intelligence collection.^[25][26]

The Economist notes that China "has been careful not to encourage these language centres to act as overt purveyors of the party’s political viewpoints, and little suggests they are doing so... but officials do say that an important goal is to give the world a “correct” understanding of China." The article notes that one website, supported by the Chinese government, lauded the efforts of unnamed Confucius Institutes in opposing Chinese dissident groups abroad, such as Tibetan independent activists, democracy groups and the Falun Gong.^[27]

According to Peng Ming-min, a Taiwan independence activist and politician, colleges and universities where a Confucius Institute is established have to sign a contract in which they declare their support for Beijing’s “one China” policy. As a result, both Taiwan and Tibet become taboos at the institutes, he claims.^[28] This claim is in dispute, however. Michael Nylan, professor of Chinese history at the University of California at Berkeley, says CIs have become less heavy-handed in their demands, and have learned from "early missteps," such as insisting that universities adopt a policy that Taiwan is part of China. Nylan took an informal survey of faculty and administrators at fifteen universities with Confucius Institutes; "two respondents reported that institutes had exerted pressure to block guest speakers," but both events went ahead anyway.^[29]

Scholars of China's propaganda system see CIs in the context of the Party-State's modernization of its propaganda apparatus.^[30] Other initiatives include Chinese contemporary art exhibitions, television programs, concerts by popular singers, translations of Chinese literature, and the expansion of state-run news channels such as Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television.^[31]

Organization[link]

Hanban states on its website that it is a non-government organization, though it is connected with the Ministry of Education and has close ties to a number of senior Communist Party officials. The current chair of Hanban is Politburo member Liu Yandong,^[32] whose former postings include the head of the United Front Work Department.

The Chinese Government shares the burden of funding Confucius Institutes with host universities, and takes a hands-off approach to management.^[33] The Institutes function independently within the guidelines established by Hanban and the Confucius Institute headquarters. Each Institute is responsible for drawing up and managing their own budget which is subject to approval by the headquarters. Confucius Institute headquarters provides various restrictions on how their funds may be used including earmarking funds for specific purposes.^[34] Institutes in the United States are generally provided with $100,000 annually from Hanban, with the local university required to match funding.^[35]

In addition to their local partner university Confucius Institutes operate in co-operation with a Chinese partner university.^[36] Many Institutes are governed by a board which is composed of several members from the Chinese partner school and the remainder of the members are affiliated with the local partner university.^[37] At most Institutes the director is appointed by the local partner university.^[33]

Hiring policies[link]

The Hanban website stated that Chinese language instructors should be “Aged between 22 to 60, physical and mental healthy, no record of participation in Falun Gong and other illegal organizations, and no criminal record.”^[38]

Human rights lawyers and media commentators in North America have argued that the part of the hiring policy that discriminates against Falun Gong believers is in contravention of anti-discrimination laws and human rights codes.^[39] Marci Hamilton, Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law at Yeshiva University in New York City, commented that the policy is “unethical and illegal in the free world."^[40] In the face of such criticism, directors at some Confucius Institutes said that since teachers come from China, hiring guidelines are the prerogative of Chinese authorities. Yan Yuzhou, associate-director of the Confucius Institute at Pace University in New York, agreed that “the Chinese government has a right to ban them.”^[40]

Curriculum[link]

Confucius Institutes teach simplified Chinese characters，which are standard in Mainland China，rather than the traditional Chinese characters used in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Canada's Globe and Mail stated that this "would help to advance Beijing’s goal of marginalizing Taiwan in the battle for global influence.”^[41]

China Heritage Quarterly describes teaching only simplified characters in the context of Confucius Institutes as "semi-literacy in Chinese".^[42] In 2011 in response to the PRC's moves, the Republic of China announced plans to establish the 'Taiwan Academy' in America, Europe, and Asia as part of its "cultural diplomacy". Taiwan's programme is designed to promote "Taiwanese-favored" Mandarin Chinese, traditional Chinese characters, and Taiwanese topics.^[43]

In response to claims that the curriculum at CIs is determined by political consideration, the CI director for the Chicago Public Schools said that "Confucius Institutes have total autonomy in their course materials and teachers."^[44]

Controversies[link]

In the short time-frame of their rapid expansion the Institutes have been the subject of much controversy. Criticisms of the Institutes have included practical concerns about finance, academic viability, legal issues, and relations with the Chinese partner university, as well as ideological concerns about improper influence over teaching and research, industrial and military espionage, surveillance of Chinese abroad, and undermining Taiwanese influence.^[45] There has also been organized opposition to the establishment of a Confucius Institute at University of Melbourne,^[46] University of Manitoba,^[47] Stockholm University,^[48][49] University of Chicago^[50] and many others. Underlying such opposition, mostly by professors, is a concern that a Confucius Institute would interfere with academic freedom and be able to pressure the university to censor speech on topics the Communist Party of China objects to. An article in The Chronicle of Higher Education writes that here is little evidence of meddling from China although the same article did go on to say the Institutes were "distinct in the degree to which they were financed and managed by a foreign government."^[35] After interviewing China scholars, journalists and CI directors, a writer for The Diplomat also found little support for the concern that CIs would serve as propaganda vehicles, though some of her sources did note that they would face constraints in their curriculum on matters such as Tibet and human rights.^[51] A New York Times article quotes Arthur Waldron, a professor of international relations at the University of Pennsylvania, that the key issue is academic independence. "Once you have a Confucius Institute on campus, you have a second source of opinions and authority that is ultimately answerable to the Chinese Communist Party and which is not subject to scholarly review."^[52]

See also[link]

• Confucius Institute at Khon Kaen University in Thailand
• Goethe-Institut
• Instituto Camões
• Instituto Cervantes
• Confucius Institute at Palacký University in Olomouc, Czech Republic
• China's "Soft power initiative"
• Panda diplomacy

References[link]

External links[link]

• Confucius Institute Online (English) (Chinese)
• China National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language
• Confucius Institute Exam Materials and Study Guide
• List of Confucius Institutes around the world
• Confucius Institute at Portland State University(English) (Chinese)

This article includes a list of references, related reading or external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks inline citations. Please improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (January 2011)

Tu Weiming (Chinese: 杜維明; pinyin: Dù Wéimíng), b.1940, is an ethicist and a New Confucian. He is Lifetime Professor of Philosophy and founding Dean of the Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies at Peking University. He is also Research Professor and Senior Fellow of Asia Center at Harvard University.

Biography[link]

Tu was Harvard-Yenching Professor of Chinese History and Philosophy and of Confucian Studies in the Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations at Harvard University (1999–2010). He was Director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute (1996–2008) and Director of the Institute of Culture and Communication at the East-West Center in Hawaii (1990–1991). He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Early life and education[link]

Tu was born in Kunming, Yunnan Province, Mainland China. He obtained his B.A. (1961) in Chinese Studies at Tunghai University in Taiwan and earned his M.A. (1963) in Regional Studies (East Asia) and Ph.D. (1968) in History and East Asian Languages at Harvard University. Tu taught at Princeton University (1968–1971) and the University of California, Berkeley (1971–1981) and has been on the Harvard faculty since 1981. In 1988, Dr Tu was one of many asked by Life Magazine to give their impressions on "The Meaning of Life." http://www.maryellenmark.com/text/magazines/life/905W-000-037.html Tu Wei-ming is the second from the last in this interview. Tu Wei-ming's response could be one of the most accessible about New Confucianism for the layman.

Tu was a visiting professor at Peking University, Taiwan University, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the University of Paris. He holds honorary professorships from Zhejiang University, Renmin University, Zhongshan University, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business and the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. He has been awarded honorary degrees by Lehigh University, Michigan State University at Grand Valley, and Shandong University.

Tu was appointed by Kofi Annan as a member of the United Nations' "Group of Eminent Persons" to facilitate the "Dialogue among Civilizations" in 2001. He gave a presentation on inter-civilizational dialogue to the Executive Board of UNESCO in 2004. He was also one of the eight Confucian intellectuals who were invited by the Singapore Government to develop the "Confucian Ethics" school curriculum.

Personal[link]

Tu has two sons and two daughters: Eugene, Yalun, Marianna, and Rosa. He was featured in A Confucian Life in America (Films for the Humanities and Sciences).

Publications[link]

Tu has written more than 30 books in Chinese and in English, including:

• Tu, Weiming. (1976). Neo-Confucian thought in action: Wang Yang-Ming's youth. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
• Tu, Weiming. (1978). Humanity and self-cultivation: Essays in Confucian thought. Boston, MA: Asian Humanities Press.
• Tu, Weiming. (1984). Confucian ethics today: The Singapore challenge. Singapore: Federal Publications.
• Tu, Weiming. (1985). Confucian thought: Selfhood as creative transformation. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
• Tu, Weiming. (1989). Centrality and commonality: An essay on Confucian religiousness. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
• Tu, Weiming. (1989). Confucianism in historical perspective. Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies.
• Tu, Weiming. (1993). Way, learning, and politics: Essays on the Confucian intellectual. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
• Tu, Weiming. (Ed.). (1994). China in transformation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Tu, Weiming. (Ed.). (1994). The living tree: The changing meaning of being Chinese today. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
• Tu, Weiming. (Ed.). (1996). Confucian traditions in East Asian modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Tu, Weiming, & Tucker, Mary Evelyn. (Eds.). (2003/2004). Confucian spirituality (Vols. 1-2). New York: Crossroad.
• De Barry, William Theodore, & Tu, Weiming. (Eds.). (1998). Confucianism and human rights. New York: Columbia University Press.
• Liu, James T. C., & Tu, Weiming. (Eds.). (1970). Traditional China. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
• Yao, Xinzhong, & Tu, Weiming. (Eds.). (2010). Confucian studies (Vols. 1-4). London: Routledge.

External links[link]

• Tu Weiming's official website
• Asian Values and the Asian Crisis: A Confucian Humanist Perspective
• Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality: The Humanistic Spirit in the 21st Century
• Global Ethics in the Age of Cultural Diversity
• The Confucian World
• The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism: Implications for China and the World
• The Global Significance of Local Knowledge: A New Perspective on Confucian Humanism
• Toward a Dialogical Civilization: Identity, Difference and Harmony