Bo Xilai 薄熙来
CPC Chongqing Committee Secretary
In office November 2007 – March 2012
Deputy (Mayor)	Wang Hongju (2007-2009) Huang Qifan (2009-)
Preceded by	Wang Yang
Succeeded by	Zhang Dejiang
Minister of Commerce of the PRC
In office February 2004 – December 2007
Premier	Wen Jiabao
Preceded by	Lü Fuyuan
Succeeded by	Chen Deming
Personal details
Born	(1949-07-03) 3 July 1949 (age 62) Beijing, Republic Of China
Political party	Communist Party of China
Spouse(s)	Li Danyu (divorced) Gu Kailai
Relations	Bo Yibo (father)
Children	Li Wangzhi Bo Guagua
Alma mater	Peking University Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Bo Xilai (born 3 July 1949) is a Chinese politician. He came to prominence through his tenures as the mayor of the coastal economic hub of Dalian and then governor of Liaoning province. From 2004 to November 2007, he served as Minister of Commerce and in 2007 he was appointed head of the Communist Party's Chongqing branch. He was removed as Chongqing party chief in March 2012.

The son of Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Elders of the Communist Party of China, Bo Xilai is identified as one of the "princelings" in Chinese politics. He cultivated a casual and charismatic image in the media—a departure from the normally staid nature of Chinese politics.

In Chongqing Bo became known for heavy-handed populism. He initiated a campaign against organized crime, increased spending on welfare programs, maintained consistent double-digit percentage GDP growth, and campaigned to revive Cultural Revolution-era "red culture." Bo's promotion of egalitarian values and the achievements of his "Chongqing model" made him the champion of the Chinese New Left, composed of both Maoists and social democrats disillusioned with the country's market-based economic reforms and increasing economic inequality.^[1] However, the perceived lawlessness of Bo's anti-corruption campaigns, coupled with concerns about his outsized personality, made him a controversial figure.

Bo was considered a likely candidate for promotion to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee in 2012. His political fortunes came to an abrupt end in large part because of the Wang Lijun incident, in which his top lieutenant and police chief sought asylum at the American consulate in Chengdu and revealed details of Bo's possible involvement in a homicide plot. In the fallout, Bo was removed as Chongqing party chief in March 2012 and suspended from the politburo the following month. Bo's dismissal received widespread international media coverage, and was notable for exposing disunity within Communist Party ranks shortly before a once-per-decade leadership transition.

Early life[link]

Bo Xilai was the fourth child of prominent Communist Party member, Bo Yibo, who served as Minister of Finance in the early years of the People's Republic of China but who fell from favor in 1965 for supporting open trade with the West. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Bo Yibo was labeled a "rightist" and a "counterrevolutionary" and purged from the party.^[2] He spent the ensuing twelve years in prison, where he was reportedly tortured. His wife, Hu Ming, was abducted by Red Guard in Guangzhou, and was either beaten to death or committed suicide.^[3]

Bo Xilai was 17 years old when the Cultural Revolution began, and at the time attended the prestigious No. 4 High School in Beijing — one of the best in the country.^[3][4] In the early years of the Cultural Revolution, Bo is reported to have been an active member of the liandong Red Guard organization^[4][5] and may have at one point denounced his father.^[6]

As the political winds of the Cultural Revolution shifted, Bo and his siblings were either imprisoned or sent to the countryside, and Bo Xilai was locked up for five years.^[7] After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the members of the Gang of Four were officially blamed for the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and Bo's family was released. Bo Yibo was politically rehabilitated, and in 1979 became vice premier.^[2]

After his release, Bo Xilai worked at the Hardware Repair Factory for the Beijing Second Light Industry Bureau. He was admitted to the Peking University by public examination in 1977. Unlike many of his contemporaries in the Chinese leadership who studied engineering, Bo majored in world history.^[8] In his sophomore year, Bo enlisted in a Master's program in international journalism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,^[4] graduating with a Master's degree in 1982.^[9] He joined the Communist Party in October 1980.^[9]

Early political career[link]

During the 1980s, the Bo family regained its political influence with Bo Yibo serving as vice premier. Yibo came to be known as one of the “eight elders” (sometimes referred to as the “eight immortals”) of the Communist Party and was instrumental in the implementation of market reforms in the 1980s. Although he favored more liberal economic policy, the elder Bo was also politically conservative, and endorsed the use of military force against demonstrators in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests.^[2] After the 1989 crackdown, Yibo helped ensure the ascent of Jiang Zemin to succeed Deng Xiaoping as the leader of the Communist Party and helped Jiang consolidate power in the 1990s^[8] Bo Yibo remained a prominent figure in the party until his death in 2007^[2] and was influential in shaping his son's career.^[10]

After graduating from university, Bo was assigned to Zhongnanhai ^[8] – the headquarters of the Communist Party – where he worked with the research office of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat and CPC Central Committee General Office.^[4] He soon requested a transfer to the provinces, and in 1984 was appointed deputy party secretary of Jin County, near Dalian in the northeastern province of Liaoning.^[8][9] In an interview with the People’s Daily, Bo said that his family name created career obstacles. “For quite a long time people had reservations about me,” he said.^[10] Bo subsequently became deputy secretary and then secretary of the party committee of the Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone and secretary of the Jinzhou party committee.^[9]

Rising again in rank within the party, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Dalian Municipal CPC Committee, the city's top decision-making body, and became the Vice-mayor of Dalian in 1990.^[9] In 1993, Bo became deputy Party secretary and mayor of Dalian.^[8]

Liaoning[link]

Mayor of Dalian[link]

Bo became acting mayor of Dalian in 1992 and formally assumed the same post in 1993. He remained mayor until 2000. Bo served as Dalian's deputy party secretary from 1995.^[9] Bo was promoted to party chief in 1999 and served in that position until 2000.

Bo's tenure in Dalian was marked by the city's phenomenal transformation from a drab port city to a modern metropolis, a 'showcase' of China's rapid economic growth.^[11] In the early 1990s, Bo took some credit for the construction of the Shenyang-Dalian Expressway, China's first controlled-access freeway, winning accolades for the rapid expansion of infrastructure and for environmental work.^[12] Since Bo's time in office, Dalian has become known as one of the cleanest cities in China, having won the UN Habitat Scroll of Honour Award in 1999. In addition, Bo was known to be an advocate for free enterprise and small businesses, and successfully courted foreign investment from South Korea, Japan, and Western countries.^[11] He held press conferences at Chinese New Year, and developed a reputation among foreign investors for 'getting things done'.^[12]

Bo spent seventeen years in the city of Dalian, a lengthy term in comparison to his colleagues. Despite the accompanying economic growth and rise in living standards, Bo's tenure in Dalian has sometimes been criticized as having been too focused on aesthetic development projects such as expansive boulevards, monuments, and large public parks.^[12] To make way for his large-scale projects, Bo's administration moved large numbers of local residents from downtown areas into new homes in the city's outskirts. Dalian's greenery was dubbed "Xilai Grass".^[13] He also reputedly had a remote control in the Mayor's office for the fountains on the city's main square.^[14] In addition, he spearheaded the construction of a huabiao in the city.^[15] In 2000, Bo was frontrunner for the post of Mayor of Shenzhen, based on his success in making Dalian the "Hong Kong of the North". However it was suggested that Bo was too independent and outspoken for the post. A local man, Yu Youjun, head of Guangdong Publicity Department, was appointed.^[16]

15th Party Congress[link]

During the 15th Party Congress in 1997, Bo Xilai’s family launched an unsuccessful campaign to secure his promotion to become a member of the Central Committee of the CCP. Although nepotism was generally frowned upon in China, Bo Yibo’s ambitions for his son were well known.^[13] Bo Yibo advanced the idea that revolutionary elders should 'nominate' their children to become high officials, and Bo Xilai was selected as his family’s 'representative' over his older brother Bo Xicheng,^[13] ostensibly because of Xilai’s superior educational credentials, which included attendance at the elite Peking University and a master’s degree.

In order to secure Bo Xilai’s selection for promotion during the 15th Party Congress, the family launched a nationwide campaign to publicize his son’s "achievements" as mayor of Dalian.^[13] They commissioned author Chen Zufeng to pen a report portraying Bo as a man who is "as statesman-like as Henry Kissinger, as environmentally conscious as Al Gore, and almost as beloved by the public as Princess Diana."^[13] Despite the publicity campaign, Bo Xilai failed even to gain a seat in the Liaoning provincial delegation to the Party Congress. Ultimately, Bo Yibo helped Xilai gain a seat with the Shanxi delegation, but the younger Bo was unable to secure a promotion.^[13]

In addition, Bo placed second-last in the confirmation vote for membership in the 15th Central Committee. As he placed in the bottom 5% of candidates, Bo was denied entry into the elite council, suffering a major political embarrassment.^[4] Bo's failure to get elected was attributed to a general opposition to nepotism within the Party.^[13] Moreover, during his tenure in Dalian, Bo caused resentment for the amount of 'special favours' that he procured for the coastal city at the expense of the rest of the province.^[13] His perceived partisan interests locked Bo's kin in a factional struggle against Li Tieying, one of China's central leadership figures, who may have created obstacles to his promotion.^[13]

Provincial Governor[link]

In 2001, a corruption scandal involving former Liaoning governor Zhang Guoguang provided an opportunity for Bo's advancement.^[12] Prior to the 15th Party Congress, Bo Yibo and Bo Xilai assisted then-President Jiang Zemin in preparing to force political rival Qiao Shi into retirement. The Bo family also supported Jiang's lacklustre "Three Stresses" (San Jiang) campaign in 1997.^[8] Such unwavering support for Jiang was said to have worked in Bo Xilai's favour when the vacancy for Governor of Liaoning opened. Bo became acting Governor in 2001 after the dismissal and arrest of Zhang Guoguang,^[8] and was officially confirmed as Governor in 2003.^[9] In his position as governor, which he held until 2004, Bo gained membership to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.^[4]

During his tenure in Liaoning, Bo played a critical role in the promotion of the Northeast Area Revitalization Plan. Adopted in 2003 by party authorities, the policy aimed to strengthen economic development in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. Bo Xilai was particularly enthusiastic about the policy, stating his desire to see the northeast become "China's fourth economic engine" (the others being the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and the Bohai Economic Region).^[4]

The northeast region was at one time known as the "cradle of industrialization" of China. In 1980, industrial output for Liaoning province alone was twice that of the southern Guangdong province. However, the northeast was left behind amidst market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, while regions like Guangdong prospered. Its economy—still largely tied to state-owned enterprises—stagnated relative to other region, with high unemployment rates.^[4] The revitalisation plan aimed to correct this by revitalizing the region’s traditional industries, strengthening trade ties with and encouraging investment from South Korea and Japan, and experimenting with free trade zones in select cities.^[17] In 2004, official media reported that foreign direct investment in Liaoning had nearly doubled since the launch in 2003 of the northeastern rejuvenation strategy.^[18]

Although Bo established a reputation as a comparatively clean politician during his tenures in Dalian and as governor of Liaoning,^[19] has was not immune to corruption allegations. In particular, Bo was the subject of critical investigative reports by Liaoning journalist Jiang Weiping,^[20] the whistleblower in the Mu and Ma corruption case in Liaoning – a scandal that Bo benefited from politically. While Bo was not directly involved in the scandal, Jiang accused Bo of providing political cover for his friends and relatives.^[20] Jiang was initially sentenced to eight years in prison on trumped-up charges, for which Bo was criticized, but was released after five years under international pressure.^[12][21] Moreover, Yang Rong, the former chief executive of Brilliance China Automotive who fled to the United States after getting embroiled in a dispute against state property authorities, accused Bo of interfering in his judicial proceedings in Beijing.^[12] In addition, Bo openly clashed with Wen Shizhen, then-party secretary in Liaoning who was technically Bo's superior.^[4][12] Wen reportedly criticized Bo for "developing China's cities like Europe and its countryside like Africa."

Bo has been subject to accusations of torture by Falun Gong practitioners and their supporters,^[22] and some party members were reportedly disappointed by the readiness with which Bo carried out the suppression of the group while he was governor of Liaoning.^[23] Falun Gong adherents have filed lawsuits against Bo in Spain, the United Kingdom, Australia, and other countries.^[24][25][26]

16th Party Congress[link]

At the 16th Party Congress in 2002, Bo's age, regional tenures, and patronage links fit the profile for a potential candidate to be groomed for the "5th generation of leaders" that would assume power in 2012. His chief 'competitors' were seen as Xi Jinping, then party chief in the coastal province of Zhejiang, and Li Keqiang, a populist Tuanpai candidate who was the Governor of the central province of Henan.^[8] As with the 15th Party Congress five years earlier, the elder Bo lobbied for his son's promotion.^[8] The Bo family enjoyed the patronage of Jiang Zemin, whose power both Bos had helped consolidate in the 1990s. However, Bo Xilai's unequivocal support for Jiang strengthened the reluctance of his political opponents to support his nomination. Ultimately, although Bo remained a top contender for higher promotion, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang remained the main candidates to succeed Hu Jintao as paramount leader.^[8]

Minister of Commerce[link]

Commerce Minister Bo meets his American counterpart, Carlos Gutierrez, during a visit to the United States in 2007

When Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as President in late 2003, Bo's career as a local official ended with his appointment to Minister of Commerce in Wen's cabinet to replace Lü Fuyuan, who retired for health reasons. Bo concurrently served as a member of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Described as good-looking, articulate and open-minded in his approach to problems,^[27] Bo's rise from a municipal official to the central government generated great media fanfare and elevated his status to something of a 'political star.' Bo's political persona was considered a departure from the generally serious and conservative leadership in Beijing. With his youthful vigour, populism, and purported popularity with female reporters, Bo's political rise had been compared to that of John F. Kennedy. He became a darling of the media both in China and abroad.^[28]

Bo presided over a continued rise in foreign investment in China as Minister of Commerce. His daily schedule was dominated by receiving foreign guests and dignitaries. By the time that he became Minister of Commerce, he spoke relatively fluent and colloquial English. During a meeting with American officials, Bo reputedly told a struggling interpreter to stop translating because the Chinese officials could understand English and it was wasting time. In May 2004 Bo was one of the few ministers hand-picked to accompany Premier Wen Jiabao on a five-country trip to Europe. The trade policy of the United States toward China also sparked significant controversy, during which Bo kept a cool head as he attended talks in Washington.^{[ambiguous][28]} On his trips to the United States, he conducted substantive discussions with his American counterparts and signed agreements on intellectual property, the services sector, agricultural products, food safety, and consumer protection.^[28]

Bo also oversaw the restructuring of the Ministry, which was the result of the amalgamation of the National Economics and Commerce Bureau and the Department of International Trade. Bo sought to balance the amount of attention given to foreign investors and domestic commercial institutions. He began tackling the imbalance from the retail sector, whose success up to that point was largely dependent on foreign companies.^[28] He drew up plans to protect Chinese industries' competitive position within the Chinese market.^[29]

Chongqing[link]

17th Party Congress[link]

At the 17th Party Congress, Bo took up a seat on the Politburo, effectively China's ruling council. It was widely speculated following the Congress in October 2007 that Bo would end his term as Minister of Commerce and take over as party chief in the southwestern interior municipality of Chongqing, to replace Wang Yang, who was moved to Guangdong. At the time, Chongqing was reeling from problems such as air and water pollution, unemployment, poor public health, and complications from the Three Gorges Dam upstream.^[6] According to analysts, Hu had wanted to transfer his ally Wang Yang out of Chongqing before these problems intensified.^[6] Bo was initially reluctant to go to Chongqing and was unhappy with his new assignment – reportedly preferring to become Vice-Premier instead,^[30] but Premier Wen Jiabao argued against Bo's holding the vice-premiership, citing his negative international exposure and the lawsuits against him by Falun Gong.^[6] Bo only took up the Chongqing post on 30 November, a month following the conclusion of the Congress, despite Wang Yang's effective departure from Chongqing on 13 November.^[30] Whilst some saw is transfer as a 'banishment' from the central government to the hinterlands to keep Bo's perceived arrogance and high-profile antics out of Beijing's view,^[6] others saw it as a promotion since being the party chief in one of the four direct-controlled municipalities came with an ex officio seat on the Politburo.^[30][31]

Organized crime[link]

Bo's tenure in Chongqing was dominated by a protracted war against the city's organized crime scene. Since June 2009, some 2,000 people were detained in a sweeping campaign against gangsters in the city.^[32] In marked departure from other anti-mafia campaigns in China, Bo cracked down on the government officials who served as political back-up to gangsters, not just the gangsters themselves – some of the detained were officials in Bo's own administration, others were from the city's police force.^[32] Wen Qiang (文强), one of the most prominent figures implicated in the trials, had been at the top echelons of municipal power since the days of party secretaries He Guoqiang and Wang Yang. Reports from the Jamestown Foundation suggest that the such a large-scale crackdown was given 'go-ahead' from central authorities and President Hu Jintao, and Bo has been careful to not make the case look as though Chongqing is trying to 'set an example' for the rest of the country so he could benefit from the success politically.^[33]

Bo's anti-crime measures were criticized for neglecting due process and for the alleged use of torture to extract confessions, but Bo's apparent willingness to combat crime in a city often seen as center for organized crime earned him national recognition and widespread popularity in Chongqing.^[34] The apparent success of Bo's campaign has led to Bo's 'rock star status', and has resulted in calls for an anti-crime campaign nationwide based on Bo's experiences in Chongqing. Lawyers in Chongqing became afraid to defend those accused of crimes after one lawyer, Li Zhuang, was sentenced to eighteen months in jail for perjury after representing a gang leader who testified that he was tortured by police.^[27] Indeed, although Bo's efforts to combat crime has been interpreted as an implicit attack against his predecessors,^[35][36] he gained the support of a number of powerful members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including Wu Bangguo, Xi Jinping, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun and Zhou Yongkang, all of whom visited Chongqing or praised Bo's achievements sometime between 2010 and 2011.^[37]

In order to reform the local police service, whose police chief was arrested for mafia connections, Bo brought in a police chief that he had employed while governor of Liaoning, Wang Lijun. The appointment of a police chief seen as a Bo loyalist led to rumors that Bo was intent on importing more of his old colleagues from Liaoning to run Chongqing.^[27]

Red culture movement[link]

During his time in Chongqing, Bo initiated a series of Maoist-style campaigns to revive 'red culture', including the promotion of Maoist quotes, 'red' songs, revolutionary television programing, and initiatives to encourage students to work in the countryside, akin to the way students were required to do during the Down to the Countryside Movement of the Cultural Revolution.^[38]

Prior to the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China celebrations, Bo sent out 'red text messages' to the city's 13 million cellphone users.^[39] According to Xinhua, Bo's text messages are usually quotes from Mao's Little Red Book, and include phrases such as "I like how Chairman Mao puts it: The world is ours, we will all have to work together,"^[40] and "responsibility and seriousness can conquer the world, and the Chinese Communist Party members represent these qualities."^[34] Bo and his team of municipal administrators also raised new Mao statues in Chongqing, while providing 'social security apartments' to the city's less well-off.^[41] Some scholars have characterized this as an example of the revival of Maoism in the Chinese Communist ethos.^[41]

In 2011, Bo and the city's Media Department initiated a "Red Songs campaign" that demanded every district, government department and commercial institution, university and school, state radio and TV station to begin singing 'red songs', praising the achievements of the Communist Party of China. Bo pledged to reinvigorate the city with the Marxist ideals reminiscent of the Mao era; although Ding Xueliang of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology suspected the campaign's aim was to further his political standing within the country's leadership.^{[42][43][44][45]}

Vying for promotion[link]

Bo's political ambitions were underscored by his pioneering of a new style of governance focused on a new brand of statism and populism, dubbed the "Chongqing Model," which commentators have labeled as representative of the modern 'left' of the Chinese political spectrum.^[37] Bo publicly remarked that if economic development were analogous to 'baking a cake', then the primary task should be to divide the cake fairly rather than building a larger cake.^[46] Bo made no secret of his desire to enter the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) during the 18th Party Congress in autumn 2012,^[34] when seven of the nine members of the PSC, including General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, were expected to retire.^[27] The transition would be an opportunity for the ambitious Bo to join the highest echelon of national leadership.^[34] Observers noted that, in China's non-electoral system of politics, Bo's high-profile presence and bold political maneuvers effectively amounted to a campaign for the top leadership.^[47]

For his achievements in Chongqing, Bo was named by Time as one of 'World's 100 Most Influential People in 2010'.^[48]

Wary of the potential for social chaos similar to that created during the Cultural Revolution, attributed partially to Mao's personality cult, the public images of modern Chinese leaders tend towards stoic reserve.^[27] In spite of Bo's popularity among the public, and the "fawning" attention of the international media, both President Hu and Premier Wen have been reluctant to acknowledge Bo publicly, perhaps due to a discomfort over Bo's leadership style.^[47] Western media described him as a "divisive figure, creating enemies by riding roughshod, at times, over the hierarchy of the party and by his unwavering support for Mr Jiang."^[23][49]

Downfall[link]

On 6 February 2012, Wang Lijun, Bo's lieutenant who presided over the Chongqing gang trials, was unexpectedly reported to be on leave due to a "health concern".^[50][51][52] In fact, Wang had visited the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu shortly prior, where he reportedly sought political asylum and was attempting to offload evidence of Bo's misconduct during his Chongqing tenure.^[53][54] The US appeared to have denied him asylum, and he could now face the death penalty.^[55] A day after Wang's leave, several overseas Chinese-language news websites posted an open letter allegedly penned by Wang, which sharply criticized Bo as a "hypocrite" and "the greatest gangster in China" and accused Bo of corruption.^[56] The alleged attempt at defection was unprecedented and caused a major international embarrassment.^[57] Without knowing what incriminating material Wang may have held against Bo, even Bo's supporters in China's top leadership were reluctant to vouch for him.^[58] Bo responded in an unusually open press conference during the 2012 National People's Congress, acknowledging "negligent supervision" of his subordinates, saying he may have "relied upon the wrong person".^[59]

On 15 March, Bo was dismissed as Chongqing party chief and its related municipal posts, while temporarily retaining a seat on the Politburo. Due to the potentially destructive effects Bo's dismissal would have on party unity, party elders were consulted on the matter.^[60] The decision was reportedly made at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on 7 March, during which security tsar Zhou Yongkang cast a lone dissenting vote.^[60] On 14 March, Bo was reprimanded by Premier Wen Jiabao during the Premier's annual press conference.^[61][62] Wen called the achievements of Chongqing "significant," but the result of "multiple administrations," i.e., not just Bo himself. Wen also made numerous allusions to the Cultural Revolution, an indirect rebuke of Bo's efforts to revive "red culture".^[30][62] Addressing high-level political changes by a Premier to an open public forum was unprecedented. Political observers believe that Wen's remarks and Bo's downfall represented a consensus within the central leadership that Bo not only needed to shoulder the responsibility for the Wang Lijun scandal, but also marked a significant victory for liberal reformers.^[63][64]

Bo's downfall elicited strong reactions among the Chinese public and with commentators across the political spectrum.^[65] Leftist websites such as Utopia, Red China, and Maoflag were full of angry commentary over Bo's dismissal. These websites were shut down for a period of "maintenance" shortly after.^[65][66] Leftist commentators voiced support for Bo: Kong Qingdong called Bo's dismissal 'a plot by enemies of the state'; Sima Nan said associating Bo with the Cultural Revolution was a 'smear campaign';^[67] Sima's pro-Bo microblogs were censored.^[66] Large numbers of sympathetic posts for Bo appeared in microblogs from Chongqing, and Dalian, where Bo was once mayor.^[65][68] The Global Times also wrote a sympathetic editorial. Liberal media reacted positively, criticizing Bo's style of 'personality-based rule' as dangerous and regressive.^[69] Right-leaning commentators said Bo's downfall signified a 'correct orientation' to China's future development.^[69] Southern Media Group editor Yan Lieshan remarked that Bo correctly identified China's problems but prescribed the wrong solution.^[69] Businesspeople whose assets were seized by Bo's administration in Chongqing also reacted positively.^[65]

Bo's dismissal caused political shockwaves unseen since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989,^[70][71] and exposing internal conflicts within Communist Party. In the weeks following 15 March, party authorities deliberated on Bo's case.^[72] In the absence of official reports of the proceedings, microblogs churned out a flood of speculation, including rumours of a coup.^[73] In response, the authorities instructed newspapers and websites to strictly report only official releases, and arrested six people accused of 'rumourmongering'.^[72]

On 10 April, Bo was suspended from the party's Central Committee and its Politburo, pending investigation for "serious disciplinary violations." Bo's wife, Gu Kailai, was now a prime suspect in the inquiry into the death of British businessman Neil Heywood in late 2011 that was not treated as suspicious at the time.^[74] The announcements, carrying criminal implications, are seen by pundits as marking the formal end of Bo's political career.^[70][75] Aware of its potentially divisive impact, authorities carefully controlled media coverage of the announcements. State media reported 'pledges of loyalty' to the party's decision to disgrace Bo, including statements from the new Chongqing party authorities, Beijing municipal organs, and grassroots party members rallying to the party line. The party's mouthpiece People's Daily issued a front-page editorial calling for unity behind the "correct decision".^[72][75] The military held 'political education' sessions on short notice, stressing unity and loyalty to the Party under the leadership of Hu Jintao.^[76]

Political alignment and affiliations[link]

In the course of his career, Bo Xilai was the beneficiary of considerable patronage from former Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin.^[77] He is thus associated with Jiang’s faction,^[35] sometimes referred to as the “elitists,” that is generally known to favor a model that emphasizes free trade, economic development in the coastal regions, and export-led growth. It is a coalition composed largely of “princelings” (the children of high-ranking former party leaders), business people, leaders of coastal cities, and members of the erstwhile "Shanghai clique."^[78] By contrast, the “populist” coalition of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao advocates more balanced economic development and improvements to China’s social safety net.^[35] The populist faction is generally associated with the "left," and comprised rural leaders, socialist intellectuals, and several leaders who rose to prominence through their connections with the Communist Youth League.^[78]

Although Bo is identified with the elitist bloc for his time in Liaoning and as Minister of Commerce, during his tenure in the interior city of Chongqing, he adopted a number of populist policies more typically associated with the left. Namely, he implemented social housing programs, gave residency status (and therefore the associated social welfare benefits) to rural migrant workers, and emphasized a need for a more balanced distribution of wealth.^[79] Although Bo relentlessly pursued technology, capital, and business opportunities, he also spearheaded a large number of government programs to help the working class and disadvantaged groups.^[37] Bo’s campaigns against corruption also allegedly seized the assets of private entrepreneurs, in turn funneling these funds into state projects and welfare programs, effectively re-asserting state control over wealth.^[80] He also sought to promote “red culture,” and mandated the revival of Mao-era slogans and songs, evoking a time of an egalitarian society.

Bo's policies in Chongqing ultimately made him a prominent figure among neo-Maoists and leftists,^[80] and a representative of the conservative wing of the Communist Party. Although Bo did not favor the discontinuation of market economics or a return to Mao-era policies, he was seen to advocate a strong role for the state in peoples' lives.^[81] Bo’s anti-corruption campaign, in particular, earned him a reputation for heavy-handedness and authoritarian methods in crime and punishment.^[82][83] Bo’s policies put him in opposition to the more liberal and reform-oriented faction, particularly Premier Wen Jiabao and Guangdong party chief Wang Yang, who favored the strengthening of rule of law and a continuation of political reform.^[80][81] To observers, Bo and Wang's verbal warfare over the future direction of development marked an increasing polarization of Chinese politics into leftist and reformer camps.^[84]

Family[link]

Bo's first wife is Li Danyu, the daughter of former Beijing Party First Secretary Li Xuefeng. Their son, Li Wangzhi, graduated from Columbia University in 2001.^[85][86] Li Danyu insisted that her son change his surname to Li following her divorce to Bo Xilai.^[85] Li Wangzhi is reportedly low-key and modest, and has a masters degree is media studies. He worked at Citibank and a law firm in Beijing.^[85]

Bo married his second wife, Gu Kailai, in 1986. Gu is a prominent lawyer and founder of the Kailai lawfirm in Beijing.^[87] Gu’s father, Gu Jingsheng, was a Communist revolutionary. Her mother Fan Chengxiu is a descendant of the renowned Song Dynasty Prime Minister and Poet Fan Zhongyan.^[87]

Bo Xilai drew criticism from others in the party for his high-profile courting of media attention and using his family pedigree to further the interests of his wife and her law firm.^[8] Bo denied that his wife had profited from his position, saying that his wife had retired her legal practice while the couple lived in Dalian in the 1990s. Bo said that Gu "now basically just stays at home, doing some housework for me."^[88] There was speculation that Bo Xilai may have attempted to interfere with a corruption investigation into his wife.^[49] Following his dismissal, his wife was reported to have been implicated in the death of British businessman and family friend Neil Heywood.^[89]

Bo and Gu have one son, Guagua. He attended Harrow School, and was later admitted to Balliol College, Oxford, where in 2006 he started studying for a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Guagua then went on to study at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.^[90][91] Bo Guagua's high-profile and privileged lifestyle has provided tabloid fodder for Chinese-language media.^[88][90] Asked how he could afford his son's tuition fees on his estimated annual salary of $22,000,^[90] Bo replied that his son received "full scholarships" from the respective institutions.^[88]

Bo Xiyong, Bo Xilai's eldest brother, is a vice-chairman and executive director of Hong Kong-listed China Everbright International, but does so under a pseudonym. Although the name used, according to company filings, is 'Li Xueming', the company declined to confirm if they are one and the same.^[92]

See also[link]

• Politics of Liaoning
• Politics of Chongqing

References[link]

External links[link]

• News about Bo Xilai at China Digital Times.
• Biography and recent career data at China Vitae, an online biographical database of Chinese VIPs
• The Bo Xilai Crisis: A Curse or a Blessing for China?, Interview with Cheng Li (April 2012)

v t e Bo Xilai Family and friends Bo Yibo · Gu Kailai · Neil Heywood · Bo Guagua Colleagues Huang Qifan · Wang Lijun · Wang Yang · Zhang Dejiang · Zhou Yongkang Related Wang Lijun incident · Cake theory · Chongqing gang trials · Politics of Chongqing · Politics of Liaoning

Politics of China may refer to:

• Politics of the People's Republic of China
• Politics of the Republic of China, commonly known as Taiwan

See also [link]

• Cross-Strait relations

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