{{infobox president| name	Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦
nationality	Chinese
order	6th General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
term start	1982
term end	1987
president	Li Xiannian
premier	Zhao Ziyang
Leader	Deng Xiaoping
predecessor	Vacant, last held by Zhang Wentian (1935-1943)
successor	Zhao Ziyang
order1	3rd Chairman of the Communist Party of China
term start1	1981
term end1	1982
deputy1	Ye Jianying
leader1	Deng Xiaoping
predecessor1	Hua Guofeng
successor1	Himself (as General Secretary)
office2	Member of theNational People's Congress
constituency2	Shandong At-large (54-59)Sichuan At-large (59-83,88-89)Beijing At-large (83-88)
term start2	15 September 1954
term end2	15 April 1989
order3	General Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat
term start3	1980
term end3	1982
1blankname3	Chairman
1namedata3	Hua GuofengHimself
predecessor3	Deng Xiaoping (in 1967)
successor3	Post abolished
birth date	November 20, 1915
birth place	Liuyang, Hunan, China
death date	April 15, 1989
death place	Beijing, People's Republic of China
spouse	Li Zhao
relations	Hu Deping (eldest son)Hu Liu (second son)Hu Dehua (third son)Li Heng (daughter)
party	Communist Party of China
signature	}}

|p=Hú Yàobāng|w=Hu Yao-pang|j=Wu4 Jiu6bong1|poj=Hô Iāu-pang}}

Hu Yaobang (20 November 1915 – 15 April 1989) was a leader of the People's Republic of China who served as both Chairman and Party General Secretary. Hu joined the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s, and rose to prominence as a comrade of Deng Xiaoping. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Hu was purged, recalled, and purged again, following the political career of Deng.

After Deng rose to power, following the death of Mao Zedong, Deng promoted Hu to a series of high political positions. Throughout the 1980s Hu pursued a series of economic and political reforms under the direction of Deng. Hu's political and economic reforms made him the enemy of several powerful Party elders, who opposed free market reforms and attempts to make China's government more transparent. When a series of widespread student protests occurred across China in 1987, Hu's political opponents successfully blamed Hu for the disruptions, claiming that Hu's "laxness" and "bourgeois liberalization" had either led to, or worsened, the protests. Hu was forced to resign as Party General Secretary, but was allowed to retain a seat in the Politburo.

Hu's position as Party General Secretary was taken by Zhao Ziyang, who continued many of Hu's economic and political reforms. A day after Hu's death, in 1989, a small-scale demonstration commemorated him and demanded that the government reassess his legacy. A week later, the day before Hu's funeral, some 100,000 students marched on Tiananmen Square, leading to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.

Early years[link]

Young revolutionary[link]

Hu Yaobang's ancestors were from Jiangxi, but migrated into Hunan (where Hu was born) during the Ming Dynasty. Hu Yaobang was born into a poor peasant family, and received little formal education. As a child he never attended school, and he taught himself to read. Hu participated in his first rebellion when he was twelve, left his family to join the Chinese Communist Party when he was only fourteen, and became a full member of the Party in 1933. During the factional struggles that polarized the CCP during the 1930s, Hu supported Mao Zedong and opposed the 28 Bolsheviks.

Hu was one of the youngest veterans of the Long March. Once Mao was removed from power, shortly before the beginning of the Fourth Encirclement Campaign, Mao's supporters were persecuted, and Hu Yaobang was sentenced to death. Just before the beginning of the Long March, he and others were on their way to be beheaded. However, a powerful local communist commander named Tan Yubao (谭余保, 1899 - 10 January 1980) intervened at the last minute, saving Hu's life. Because of Hu's support of Mao, he was deemed unreliable and ordered to join the Long March so that he could be placed under surveillance.

Hu Yaobang was seriously wounded in the battle of Mount Lu, near Zunyi, close to the area where Mao Zedong rose back to power via the Zunyi Conference. After Hu was wounded the communist field medic teams chose not to help Hu, and left him in the battlefield to die on the side of the road. Hu was rescued by a childhood friend of his, a Chinese Red Army commander, who happened to pass by. Hu called out his friend's nickname to ask for help, and the friend helped him catch up with the retreating main force of the Chinese Red Army and get treatment for his wounds.

In 1936, Hu joined an expeditionary force led by Zhang Guotao. The objective of Zhang's 21,800+ strong force, was to cross the Yellow River, to expand the communist base west of Shaanxi, and to link up with forces from the Soviet Union or with the Xinjiang warlord Sheng Shicai, who was an ally of the communists and the Soviet Union. Zhang Guotao's forces were soundly defeated by the local Nationalist warlords, the Ma clique. Hu Yaobang, along with Qin Jiwei, became two of the thousands of prisoners-of-war captured by Ma clique's forces. Hu was one of only 1,500 prisoners-of-war whom Ma Bufang decided to use as forced labor rather than execute.

As Chiang Kai-shek pressured Ma Bufang to contribute more of his troops to fight Japanese invaders, Ma Bufang decided that, instead of using his own troops, he would instead send the 1,500 Chinese Red Army prisoners-of-war as conscripts. Since the marching route had to pass the border of the communist base in Shaanxi, Hu Yaobang and Qin Jiwei decided to return to the communists, and secretly organized an escape. The escape took place as planned and was a success: out of the total 1,500 POWs, more than 1,300 successfully returned to Yan'an. Mao personally welcomed these returning communists, and Hu Yaobang returned to communist forces, where he would remain for rest of his life.

After Hu arrived in Yan'an, he attended the Anti-Japanese Military School. While studying in Yan'an, Hu met and married his wife, Li Zhao, who was also a student in Yan'an. After his training, Hu worked in the political department, and was assigned to work as a member of Peng Dehuai's Third Front Army.

Hu befriended and worked closely with Deng Xiaoping in the 1930s. In the 1940s, Hu worked under Deng as the a political commissar in the Second Field Army. In the final stages of the Chinese Civil War, Hu accompanied Deng to Sichuan, and communist forces successfully took control of the province from Nationalist forces in 1949.

Early PRC politician[link]

In 1949, the CCP successfully defeated Nationalist forces on mainland China, and the communists founded the People's Republic. In 1952, Hu accompanied Deng to Beijing, and Hu became the leader of the Communist Youth League from 1952-1966. Hu rose rapidly up the Communist Party hierarchy, until Mao sent Hu to work as First Party Secretary of Shaanxi in 1964, saying: "He needs some practical training". Hu may have been assigned to work outside of Beijing because he was judged as being not sufficiently enthusiastic about Maoism. Unlike many of his colleagues, Hu was able to keep his membership within the Party Central Committee until the 9th Party Congress in April, 1969.

During the Cultural Revolution, Hu was purged twice and rehabilitated twice, mirroring the political career of Hu's mentor, Deng Xiaoping. In 1969, Hu was recalled to Beijing to be persecuted. Hu became "number one" among the "Three Hus", whose names were vilified and who were paraded through Beijing wearing heavy wooden collars around their necks. The other two "Hus" were Hu Keshi, who was the second most senior member of the Communist Youth League, and Hu Qili, who was third most senior in the Communist Youth League and who had also become a close associate of Deng Xiaoping. After being publicly humiliated, Hu was sent to an isolated work camp to participate in "reformation through labour" under strict security. While in political exile Hu was forced to work hauling large boulders by hand.

When Deng was temporarily recalled to Beijing, from 1973–1976, he also recalled Hu; but, when Deng was purged again, in 1976, Hu was also purged. After his second purge, Hu was sent to herd cattle. Hu was recalled and rehabilitated a second time in 1977, shortly after Mao's death. After Hu was recalled, he was promoted to directing the Party's organizational department, and later directed Party propaganda through a department of the Politburo. Hu was one of the main leaders responsible for re-assessing the fates of people who had been persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. According to the Chinese government, Hu was personally responsible for exonerating over three million people. Hu tacitly supported the 1978 Democracy Wall protesters, and invited two of the activists to his home in Beijing. Hu opposed Hua Guofeng's "Two Whatevers" policy, and was an important supporter of Deng Xiaoping's ascent to power.

Reformer[link]

Public policies[link]

Hu Yaobang's rise to power was engineered by Deng Xiaoping, and Hu rose to the highest levels of the Party after Deng displaced Hua Guofeng as China's "paramount leader". In 1980 Hu became Party General Secretary, and was elected to the powerful Politburo Standing Committee. In 1981, Hu became Party Chairman, but helped abolish the position of Party Chairman in 1982, as part of a broader effort to distance China from Maoist politics. Deng's displacement of Hua Guofeng marked the Party leadership's consensus that China should abandon strict Maoist economics in favor of more pragmatic policies, and Hu directed many of Deng's attempts to reform the Chinese economy. By 1982 Hu's position made him the second most powerful person in China, after Deng Xiaoping. Throughout the last decade of Hu's career, he promoted the role of intellectuals as being fundamental to China's achievement of the Four Modernizations.

During the early 1980s, Deng referred to Hu and Zhao Ziyang as his "left and right hands". After advancing to the position of General Secretary, Hu promoted a number of political reforms, often collaborating with Zhao. The ultimate goals of Hu's reforms were sometimes vaguely defined. Hu attempted to reform China's political system by: requiring candidates to be directly elected in order to enter the Politburo; holding more elections with more than one candidate; increasing government transparency; increasing public consultation before determining Party policy; and, increasing the degree that government officials could be held directly responsible for their mistakes.

During his time in office, Hu tried to rehabilitate the people who were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. Many Chinese people think that this was his most important achievement. He was also in favor of a pragmatic policy in Tibet after realising the mistakes of previous policies. He ordered the withdrawal of thousands of Chinese Han cadres from the Tibet Autonomous Region following a May 1980 visit to the region, believing that Tibetans should be empowered to administer their own affairs. Han Chinese who remained were required to learn Tibetan. He set out six requirements to improve 'existing conditions', including the increase of state funds to the Autonomous Region, improvements in education, and "efforts to revive Tibetan culture". At the same time, Hu stated that "anything that is not suited to Tibet's conditions should be rejected or modified". Hu made a point of explicitly apologizing to Tibetans for China's misrule of the region during this trip.

Hu traveled widely throughout his time as General Secretary, visiting 1500 individual districts and villiages in order to inspect the work of local officials and to keep in touch with the common people. When he was sixty-five, Hu retraced the route of the Long March, and took the opportunity to visit and inspect remote military bases located in Tibet, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Qinghai, and Inner Mongolia.

Controversial political opinions[link]

Hu was notable for his liberalism and the frank expression of his opinions, which sometimes agitated other senior Chinese leaders. On a trip to Inner Mongolia in 1984, Hu publicly suggested that Chinese people might start eating in a Western way (with forks and knives, on individual plates) in order to prevent communicable diseases. He was one of the first Chinese officials to abandon wearing a Mao suit in favor of Western business suits. When asked which of Mao Zedong's theories were desirable for modern China, he replied "I think, none".

Hu was not prepared to abandon Marxism completely, but frankly expressed the opinion that Communism could not solve "all of mankind's problems". Hu encouraged intellectuals to raise controversial subjects in the media, including democracy, human rights, and the possibility of introducing legal limits to the Communist Party's influence within the Chinese government. Many Party elders mistrusted Hu from the start, and eventually grew to fear his influence.

Hu made sincere efforts to repair Sino-Japanese relations, but was criticized for the scope of his efforts. In 1984, when Beijing recognized the twelfth anniversary of Japan's diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic, Hu invited 3,000 Japanese youth to Beijing, and arranged for them to tour Shanghai. Hangzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, and Xi'an. Many senior officials considered Hu's efforts extravagant, since Japan had only invited 500 youth to Japan the previous year. Hu was criticized internally for the lavish gifts that he gave to visiting Japanese officials, and for allowing his daughter to privately accompany Japanese prime minister Nakasone's son when they visited Beijing. Hu defended his actions by citing the importance of strong Sino-Japanese relations, and his belief that the atrocities committed by Japan in China during World War II were the actions of military warlords, and not ordinary citizens.

Hu alienated potential allies within the People's Liberation Army when he suggested for two consecutive years that the Chinese defense budget should be reduced, and senior military leaders began to criticize him. Military officials accused Hu of making poor choices when purchasing military hardware from Australia in 1985. When Hu visited Britain, military officials criticized him for drinking soup too loudly during a banquet hosted by Queen Elizabeth II.

Zhao and Hu began a large-scale anti-corruption programme, and permitted the investigations of the children of high-ranking Party elders, who had grown up protected by their parents' influence. Hu's investigation of Party officials belonging to this "Crown Prince Party" made Hu unpopular with many powerful Party officials. After Deng refused to support some of Hu's reforms, Hu made private comments critical of Deng Xiaoping for his indecisiveness and "old-fashioned" way of thinking, opinions which Deng eventually became aware of.

"Resignation"[link]

In December 1986, a group of students organized public protests across over a dozen cities in support of political and economic liberalization. The protests began in the University of Science and Technology in Hefei, Anhui, where they were led by the controversial astrophysicist, Fang Lizhi, who was then Vice Chancellor of the university. Fang talked openly about introducing political reforms which would end the influence of the Communist Party within the Chinese government. The protests were also led by two other "radical intellectuals", Wang Ruowang and Liu Binyan.

Deng Xiaoping disliked all three leaders, and directed Hu to dismiss them from the Party in order to silence them, but Hu refused. In January 1987, after two weeks of student protests demanding greater Western-style freedoms, a clique of Party elders and senior military officials forced Hu to resign on the grounds that he had been too lenient with student protesters and for moving too quickly towards free market-style economics.

After Hu's dismissal, Deng promoted Zhao Ziyang to replace Hu as Party General Secretary, putting Zhao in a position to succeed Deng as "paramount leader". Hu officially resigned as Party General Secretary on January 16, but retained his seat in the Politburo Standing Committee. When Hu "resigned", the Party forced him to issue a humiliating "self-criticism of his mistakes on major issues of political principles in violation of the party's principle of collective leadership." After 1987 Hu became more reclusive and less active in Chinese politics, studying revolutionary history and practicing his calligraphy in his spare time, and taking long walks for exercise. Hu was generally viewed as having no real power after 1987, and he was resigned to largely ceremonial roles.

Hu's "resignation" harmed the credibility of the CCP while improving Hu's own. Among Chinese intellectuals, Hu became an example of a man who refused to compromise his convictions in the face of political resistance, and who had paid the price as a result. The promotion of a conservative, Li Peng, to the position of Premier after Hu's departure from executive-level positions made the government less enthusiastic to pursue reform, and upset plans of an orderly succession of power from Deng Xiaoping to Hu.

Death, protests, and burial[link]

Death and public reactions[link]

In October 1987 Hu retained his membership of CCP's Central Committee at the 13th Party Congress, and was subsequently elected a member of the new Politburo by the first plenary session of the Central Committee. In April 8, 1989, Hu suffered a heart attack while attending a Politburo meeting in Zhongnanhai to discuss education reform. Hu was rushed to the hospital, accompanied by his wife. Hu died several days later, on April 15. He was 73 years old. Hu's last words were that he should be buried simply, without extravagance, in his hometown.

In his official obituary, Hu was described as "a long-tested and staunch communist warrior, a great proletarian revolutionist and statesman, an outstanding political leader for the Chinese army". Western reporters observed that Hu's obituary was intentionally "glowing" in order to divert suspicion that the Party had mistreated him. At the memorial service, Hu's widow Li Zhao blamed Hu's death on how harshly the party treated him, telling Deng Xiaoping "It's all because of you people."

Although he had become a semi-retired official by the time of his death, and had been removed positions of real power for his "mistakes", public pressure forced the Chinese government to give him a state funeral, attended by Party leaders. The eulogy at Hu's funeral praised his work in restoring political normality and promoting economic development after the Cultural Revolution. Public mourners at Hu's funeral lined up ten miles long, a reaction which surprised China's leaders. Shortly after Hu's funeral, students in Beijing began petitioning the government to officially reverse the verdict that had led to Hu's "resignation", and to provide a more elaborate public funeral. The government then held a public memorial service for Hu in the Great Hall of the People.

On April 22, 1989, 50,000 students marched to Tiananmen Square to participate in Hu's memorial service, and to deliver a letter of petition to Premier Li Peng. Many people were dissatisfied with the party's slow response and relatively subdued funerary arrangements. Public mourning began on the streets of Beijing and elsewhere. In Beijing this was centred on the Monument to the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square. The mourning became a public conduit for anger against perceived nepotism in the government, the unfair dismissal and early death of Hu, and the behind-the-scenes role of the "old men", officially retired leaders who nevertheless maintained quasi-legal power, such as Deng Xiaoping. The protests eventually escalated into the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Hu's promotion of the ideas on freedom of speech and freedom of press greatly influenced the students participating in the protests.

Hu Yaobang's tomb[link]

After Hu's funeral, his body was cremated, and his remains were buried in Babaoshan, a graveyard in Beijing reserved for senior Party officials. Hu's wife, Li Zhao, was unhappy with the location of Hu's grave, and successfully petitioned the government to move Hu's remains to a more suitable site. Eventually Hu's remains were moved to a large mausoleum in Gongqing, Jiangxi, a city that Hu had helped found in 1955. Hu's mausoleum is arguably the most impressive tomb of any senior CCP leader.

Li Zhao collected money for the construction of Hu's tomb from both private and public sources; and, with the help of her son, they selected an appropriate location in Gongqing. The tomb was constructed in the shape of a pyramid, on the top of a hill. On December 5, 1990 Hu's ashes were flown to Gongqing, carried by his son, Hu Deping. The ceremony was attended by Wen Jiabao, numerous Jiangxi public officials, and 2,000 members of the Communist Youth League. Gongqing's factories and schools were closed for the day, allowing 7,000 Gongqing citizens to attend. At the ceremony, Li Zhao made a speech expressing her gratitude towards the government and for the people who attended.

Official censorship and rehabilitation[link]

Media censorship[link]

The Tiananmen protests eventually ended in the violent suppression of protesters on June 4, 1989, in which hundreds or perhaps thousands of civilians were killed. Because the protests had been sparked by the death of Hu Yaobang, the government determined that any public discussion of Hu and his legacy could destabilize China by renewing debate about the political reforms that Hu supported. Because of the public association with Hu and the "Tianamnen Massacre", Hu's name became taboo on the mainland, and the Chinese government censored any mention of him in the media. In one example of government censorship, printed media which commemorated the anniversary of his death in 1994 were withdrawn from publication.

Official rehabilitation[link]

Hu Jintao announced plans to rehabilitate Hu Yaobang in August 2005, with events organised for November 20, the 90th anniversary of Hu's birth. Ceremonies were planned in Beijing, where Hu died, in Hunan, where Hu was born, and in Jiangxi, where Hu was buried. Western observers noted that the move to rehabilitate Hu Yaobang may have been part of a broader political effort by Hu Jintao to gain support from reform-minded colleagues, who had always respected Hu Yaobang.

Some political analysts have argued that the current administration under General Secretary Hu Jintao wishes to associate itself with the popular Hu Yaobang. Both rose to power through the Communist Youth League, and have been described as part of the same "Youth League Clique". Hu Yaobang's support was partially responsible for Hu Jintao's rapid promotion during the 1980s.

Some observers noted that Hu Yaobang's rehabilitation made it more likely that the Party would be willing to re-evaluate the 1989 Tiananmen protests, but other observers expressed skepticism. Memorials with the purpose of recognizing the date of someone's birth or death are often signs of political trends within China, with some pointing to the prospect of further reform. Skeptics noted that Hu Jintao made a statement praising the governments of Cuba and North Korea (in spite of their economic "flaws") shortly after announcing Hu Yaobang's public commemoration, implying that it would be unlikely that the party would pursue a dramatic programme of political reform in the near future.

On 18 November 2005, The Communist Party officially celebrated the 90th anniversary of Hu Yaobang's birth with activities at the People's Hall (the date was changed to two days before it was officially scheduled). Around 350 people attended, including premier Wen Jiabao, vice president Zeng Qinghong, and numerous other Party officials, celebrities, and members of Hu Yaobang's family. It was rumored that Hu Jintao wanted to attend, but was prevented from doing so by other senior members of the Party who still disliked Hu Yaobang. Wen was not given the opportunity to talk, and Zeng Qinghong was the most senior Party member to speak. In his speech, Zeng's said that members should learn from Hu's merits, especially his frankness and genuine concern for the Chinese people. Zeng stated that Hu had "contributed all his life and built immortal merits for the liberation and happiness of the Chinese people... His historic achievements and moral character will always be remembered by the Party and our people."

In the media after 2005[link]

An official three-volume biography and a collection of Hu's writings were slated for release in China. The project was originally begun by a group of Hu's former aides, led by Zhang Liqun (who died in 2003). After the government learned of the project, it insisted on taking control of it. One of the main issues that government censors identified was the concern that details of Hu's relationship with Deng Xiaoping (especially details of Hu's removal from power after resisting orders to crack down on student demonstrators in 1987) would reflect poorly on Deng's legacy. The authors of Hu's biography subsequently rejected offers from the government to released a censored version. Only one volume (dealing with events up to the end of the Cultural Revolution) of the biography written by Hu's former aides was eventually published, with the other two volumes held by the government and remaining unpublished.

Although magazines publishing commemorative articles were initially stopped from being released, the ban was lifted in 2005 and these magazines were publicly issued. ''Yanhuang Chunqiu'', a reform-minded magazine, was allowed to publish a series of articles in 2005 commemorating the birthday of Hu Yaobang, but the government acted to limit the availability of the magazine. The issue commemorating Hu sold 50,000 copies, but the remaining 5,000 copies were destroyed by propaganda officials. This was the first time since his death that Hu's name appeared publicly.

On 15 April 2010 (the 21st anniversary of Hu's death), Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao wrote an article in the ''People's Daily'' titled "Recalling Hu Yaobang when I return to Xingyi". Presented as an essay, it recollected an investigation of ordinary people's lives by Hu Yaobang and Wen Jiabao in Xingyi County, Guizhou, in 1986. Wen, who worked with Hu from 1985 to 1987, praised Hu's "superior working style of being totally devoted to the suffering of the masses", and his "lofty morality and openness [of character]". Wen's essay elicited an enthusiastic reaction in the cyberspace, generating over 20,000 responses on Sina.com on the day the article appeared. The article was interpreted by observers familiar with the Chinese political system as a confirmation by Wen that he was a protege of Hu, rather than Zhao Ziyang.

See also[link]

Politics of the People's Republic of China

History of the People's Republic of China

Hu Deping, son of Hu Yaobang

Zhang Zhixin

References[link]

Bibliography[link]

"China Braces for Tiananmen Square Massacre Anniversary". ''The Australian''. April 13, 2009.

Bass, Catriona. ''Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice Since 1950''. Zed Books. 1998. ISBN 978-1-85649-674-2

Becker, Jasper. "Zhao Ziyang: Chinese Leader Who 'Came too Late' to Tiananmen Square". ''The Independent''. January 18, 2005. Retrieved October 20, 2011.

Brook, Timothy. ''Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement''. Stanford University Press. 1998. ISBN 978-0-8047-3638-1

"Hu Yaobang". ''Encyclopedia Britannica Online''. 2011. Retrieved October 21, 2011.

Fan, Maureen. "In China, Media Make Small Strides". ''Washington Post''. December 28, 2008. Retrieved October 23, 2011.

Forney, Matthew. "Speed Read: Hu Yaobang", ''TIME Magazine''. November 20, 2005. Retrieved October 23, 2011.

Kristof, Nicholas D. "Hu Yaobang, Ex-Party Chief in China, Dies at 73" (Obituary), ''New York Times'', 16 April 1989. Retrieved October 23, 2011.

Lam, Willy. "Chinese Leaders Revive Marxist Orthodoxy". ''Asia Times Online''. May 1, 2010. Retrieved October 23, 2011.

Lee, Khoon Choy. ''Pioneers of Modern China: Understanding the Inscrutable Chinese''. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. 2005. ISBN 981-256-464-0.

MacFarquhar, Roderick. "Foreword". In Zhao Ziyang, ''Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang''. New York, NY: Simon and Shuster. 2009. ISBN 1-4391-4938-0.

Pan, Philip P. "China Plans to Honor a Reformer". ''Washington Post''. September 9, 2005. Retrieved October 22, 2011.

"Glorious Life of Hu Yaobang Marked". ''People's Daily''. November 19, 2005. Retrieved October 22, 2011.

Nathan, Andrew James, & Gilley, Bruce. "China's New Rulers: The Secret Files". ''New York Review of Books''. 2003. ISBN 978-1-59017-072-4

Tilly, Charles. ''The Politics of Collective Violence''. Cambridge University Press. 2003. ISBN 978-0-521-53145-0

Vogel, Ezra F. ''Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China''. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. September 26, 2011.

Wen Jiabao. "Recalling Hu Yaobang When I Return to Xingyi". [Chinese: 再回兴义忆耀邦]. ''People's Daily''. April 15, 2010. Retrieved October 23, 2011.

Wu Zhong. "Hu, Wen, and Why". ''Asia Times Online''. April 21, 2010. Retrieved October 26, 2011.

"Birth Anniversary Marked for Late Leader Hu Yaobang". ''Xinhua''. November 18, 2005. Retrieved October 23, 2011.

Further reading[link]

Pang, Pang. ''The Death of Hu Yaobang''. Center for Chinese Studies, School of Hawaiian, Asian, and Pacific Studies. University of Hawai'i. University of Michigan. 1998.

Sina.com: Over 30,000 comments on Wen Jiabao's article on Hu Yaobang.

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Category:1915 births Category:1989 deaths Category:People from Changsha Category:Chinese Hakka people Category:Chinese people Category:Leaders of the Communist Party of China Category:Deaths from myocardial infarction

da:Hu Yaobang de:Hu Yaobang es:Hu Yaobang eo:Hu Yaobang fa:هو یائوبانگ fr:Hu Yaobang ko:후야오방 id:Hu Yaobang it:Hu Yaobang nl:Hu Yaobang ja:胡耀邦 no:Hu Yaobang pl:Hu Yaobang pt:Hu Yaobang ru:Ху Яобан sl:Hu Yaobang fi:Hu Yaobang sv:Hu Yaobang tr:Hu Yaobang vi:Hồ Diệu Bang zh-yue:胡耀邦 zh:胡耀邦

Media of the People's Republic of China (alternatively Media of China, Chinese Media) primarily consists of television, newspapers, radio, and magazines. Since 2000, the Internet has also emerged as an important communications medium.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and until the 1980s, almost all media in China were state-run. Independent media only began to emerge at the onset of economic reforms, although state-run media outlets such as ''Xinhua'', CCTV, and ''People's Daily'' continue to hold significant market share. Independent media that operate within the PRC (excluding Hong Kong and Macao, which have separate media regulatory bodies) are no longer required to strictly follow journalistic guidelines set by the government. However, regulatory agencies, such as the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) and the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), continue to set strict regulations on subjects considered taboo by the government, including but not limited to the legitimacy of the Communist Party, government policies in Tibet and Xinjiang, pornography, and the banned spiritual group Falun Gong.

In spite of heavy government monitoring, however, Chinese media has become increasingly commercialized, with growing competition, diversified content, and an increase in investigative reporting. Areas such as sports, finance, and an increasingly lucrative entertainment industry face little regulation from the government. Media controls were most relaxed during the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping, until they were tightened in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests. They were relaxed again under Jiang Zemin in the late 1990s, but the growing influence of the Internet and its potential to encourage dissent led to heavier regulations again under the government of Hu Jintao. Reporters Without Borders consistently ranks China very poorly on media freedoms in their annual releases of the Press Freedom Index, calling the Chinese government as having "the sorry distinction of leading the world in repression of the Internet". For 2010, China ranked 168 out of 178 nations.

History [link]

The government is heavily involved in the media in the PRC, and the largest media organizations (namely CCTV, the People's Daily, and Xinhua) are agencies of the Party-State. Media taboos include topics such as the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China, the governance of Tibet, and Falun Gong. Within those restrictions there is a diversity of the media and fairly open discussion of social issues and policy options within the parameters set by the Party.

The diversity in mainland Chinese media is partly because most state media outlets are no longer heavily subsidized by the government, and are expected to pay for themselves through commercial advertising. They can no longer merely serve as mouthpieces of the government, but also need to attract advertising through programming that people find attractive. While the government issues directives defining what can be published, it does not prevent, and in fact encourages outlets to compete for viewers and advertising. Financial incentives are also used to control journalists' behavior.

Government control of information can be ineffective in other ways. Despite government restrictions, much information is gathered either at the local level or from foreign sources and passed on through personal conversations and text messaging. The withdrawal of government media subsidies has caused many newspapers (including some owned by the Communist Party) in tabloids to take bold editorial stands critical of the government, as the necessity to attract readers and avoid bankruptcy has been a more pressing fear than government repression.

In addition, the traditional means of media control have proven extremely ineffective against newer forms of communication, most notably text messaging.

Although the government can and does use laws against state secrets to censor press reports about social and political conditions, these laws have not prevented the press from all discussion of Chinese social issues. As a result even papers which are nominally owned by the Communist Party are sometimes very bold at reporting social issues. However both commercial pressures and government restrictions have tended to cause newspapers to focus on lurid scandals often involving local officials who have relatively little political cover, and Chinese newspapers tend to lack depth in analysis of political events, as this tends to be more politically sensitive.

Among social issues first reported in the press of mainland China include the AIDS epidemic in Henan province, the unsafe state of mines in mainland China. In addition, the SARS coverup was first revealed by a fax to CCTV which was forwarded to Western news media.

Television [link]

In 1978, the PRC had less than one television receiver per 100 people, and fewer than ten million Chinese had access to a television set. According to a World Bank report in 2003, there are about 35 TVs for every 100 people. Roughly a billion Chinese have access to television. Similarly, in 1965 there were 12 television and 93 radio stations in mainland China; today there are approximately 700 conventional television stations—plus about 3,000 cable channels—and 1,000 radio stations.

Television broadcasting is controlled by China Central Television (CCTV), which, with its 16 program channels, is the country's only national network. CCTV, which employs about 10,000 people and has an annual income of ¥1,120mln yuan (2004,=$138mln), falls under the dual supervision of the Propaganda Department, responsible ultimately for media content, and the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, which oversees operations. A Vice Minister in the latter ministry serves as chairman of CCTV. The network's principal directors and other officers are appointed by the State. So are the top officials at local conventional television stations in mainland China—nearly all of which are restricted to broadcasting within their own province or municipality—that receive CCTV broadcasts.

CCTV produces its own news broadcasts three times a day and is the country's most powerful and prolific television program producer. It also has a monopoly on purchases of programming from overseas. All local stations are required to carry CCTV's 7 pm main news broadcast; an internal CCTV survey indicates that nearly 500 million people countrywide regularly watch this program.

Even if CCTV is the most powerful network of mainland China, it has only about 30% of audience share all over the national territory. The fact shows how the Chinese viewers are biased in favour of local TV programs, that are more likely to represent the differences of an audience that is the largest in the world, more than the national or even international programs, that can hardly attend the needs of such a wide public.

Since September 1, 2006, the Chinese government has banned foreign-produced animation between the hours of 5:00 to 8:00 pm on state-run television to protect struggling Chinese animation studios that have been affected by the popularity of such cartoons.

Newspapers and journals [link]

The number of newspapers in mainland China has increased from 42—virtually all Communist Party papers—in 1968 to 382 in 1980 and more than 2,200 today. By one official estimate, there are now more than 7,000 magazines and journals in the country. The number of copies of daily and weekly newspapers and magazines in circulation grew fourfold between the mid-1960s and the mid-to-late 1980s, reaching 310 million by 1987. (2)

These figures, moreover, underreport actual circulation, because many publishers use their own distribution networks rather than official dissemination channels and also deliberately understate figures to avoid taxes. (3) In addition, some 25,000 printing houses and hundreds of individual bookstores produce and sell nonofficial material—mostly romance literature and pornography but also political and intellectual journals.

China has many newspapers but the front runners are all State-run: the People's Daily, Beijing Daily, Guangming Daily and the Liberation Daily. The two major news agencies in China are Xinhua News Agency and the China News Service. Xinhua was given power to censor and edit the news of the foreign agencies in 2007. Some saw the power of Xinhua as making the press freedom weak and it allowed Xinhua to control the news market fully.

Much of the information collected by the Chinese mainstream media is published in neicans (internal, limited circulation reports prepared for the high-ranking government officials), not in the public outlets.

Regulators [link]

The media and communications industry in mainland China is administered by various government agencies and regulators. The principal mechanism for forcing media organizations to comply with CCP wishes is the vertically organized ''nomenklatura'' system of cadre appointments, and includes those in charge of the media industry.

State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television – administers and overseer the administration of state-owned enterprises involved in the radio, television and broadcasting industry.

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology – administers the physical communications infrastructure and the Internet service providers.

General Administration of Press and Publication – administers the newspaper, periodical, video and audio media and news industry.

Ministry of Public Security's Cyber Police force – agency for regulating online content and investigation of Internet fraud, scams and pornography.

Media reform [link]

The media in mainland China also are becoming more autonomous and more diverse. Since Mao Zedong's death in 1976 and the subsequent emergence of Deng Xiaoping (who died in February 1997) as the country's paramount leader, an overall climate of economic and social reform in mainland China has been reflected in media content.

A prime example of the liberalisation has been the party's flagship newspaper, People's Daily, which had been rigidly controlled under Mao, used against his enemies, and copied verbatim by every other newspaper in the country during the Cultural Revolution. This leading daily was reformed and enlivened in the late 1970s and early-to-middle 1980s by then editor-in-chief Hu Jiwei. Hu expanded the paper's size and coverage, encouraged public criticism through letters to the editor, called for promulgation of a press law to spell out journalists' rights, and introduced a sprightlier writing style.

Nevertheless, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that China "continues to be the world's leading jailer of journalists," with 42 imprisoned journalists at the end of 2004, and accuses private companies, both foreign and domestic, of having been complacent toward or complicit with government censorship. Also, in their ''Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2007 '', Reporters Without Borders ranked China 163rd (or 7th from bottom) in terms of press freedom. Freedom House issued a report in 2006 claiming that the Internet is still closely monitored by the state, with access to websites and publications critical of the government being restricted, as well as foreign satellite television and radio broadcasts being censored.

In preparation of the 17th National Party Congress in 2007, new restrictions were placed on all sectors of the press, Internet-users, bloggers, website managers, foreign journalist, more than 30 of which have been arrested since the start of the year. In addition, a thousand discussion forums and websites have been shut down, and "a score of dissidents" have been imprisoned since July 2007.

In efforts to stem growing unrest in China, the propaganda chief of the State Council, Hua Qing, announced in the People's Daily that the government was drafting a new press law that would lessen government involvement in the news media. In the editorial, CPC General secretary, President Hu Jintao was said to have visited the People's Daily offices and said that large scale public incidents should be "accurately, objectively and uniformly reported, with no tardiness, deception, incompleteness or distortion". Recent reports by Chinese media indicate a gradual release from party control. For example, the detention of anti-government petitioners placed in mental institutions was reported in a state newspaper, later criticised in an editoral by the English language China Daily. Scholars and journalists believe that such reports are a small sign of opening up in the media.

Diversified content [link]

The media's growing autonomy has been reflected in their increasingly diversified content. Since the late 1970s, despite periodic reversals, media in mainland China have frequently criticized party cadres and have published debates on such fundamental issues as the rule of law, freedom of the press, and universal human rights. They also have reported on a myriad of previously untouched social and lifestyle subjects. The only inviolable restrictions appear to be an unwritten ban on challenges to the party's right to rule and to the legitimacy and decision-making authority of top party leaders.

Talk radio [link]

Talk radio in mainland China allows a much freer exchange of views than other media formats. In effect, talk radio has shifted the paradigm from authorities addressing the people to people addressing the authorities.

Magazines and journals [link]

Magazines and journals published in mainland China also have become much less inhibited in their coverage. These publications appear to enjoy more freedom than newspapers, which in turn have more leeway than radio (other than talk radio) and television. Magazines now print internal police reports on jailings of religious leaders and other dissidents. The State is unwilling to shut down such publications because it worries about public reaction, is anxious to avoid drawing more popular attention to the magazines, and knows that its own resources are already stretched thin.

Chinese journalists in Hong Kong on occasion have written politically controversial articles for mainland intellectual journals without encountering problems. Such opportunities have abounded because of the range of publications on the Chinese mainland and because party officials there are too busy with weightier matters to review such journals systematically.

Greater prosperity and literacy [link]

Mainland China's rapid economic development, as well as educational advances leading to greater literacy, have been important reasons for the dramatic expansion of the media and the diversification of coverage.

Per capita gross domestic product, as measured in 1990 yuan, has increased fourfold since 1980. Rising disposable incomes have freed many Chinese from worrying about the basics of survival and provided them the wherewithal to purchase more television sets, newspaper and magazine subscriptions, and, more recently, satellite dishes and computers.

Rising literacy rates have produced tens of millions of additional readers in the past decade, creating ever-expanding markets for the print media. According to UN statistics, Mainland China's adult literacy rate rose from 65.5 percent in 1982 to 81.5 percent in 1995.

Ideological and political trends [link]

Other overarching factors that are helping to make the mainland Chinese media more autonomous and diverse include a general decline in the influence of political ideologies and systems of belief; growing Chinese popular skepticism toward authority; increased contact with the West; greater competition in the media market; ebbing government resources; improved professional training for journalists; and new communication technologies.

Weakening of ideological shackles [link]

The waning influence of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought has weakened the State's ability to use the media to shape public attitudes and has made it harder for the authorities to penalize the media for publishing material that is not strictly consistent with Marxist theory. Although Marxism remains the official doctrine of the PRC, the de-emphasis of ideology has strengthened the media's hand in two fundamental ways: it has helped undercut government efforts to indoctrinate the public and micromanage the content of political and social reporting in the media, and it has opened the door for the media to pursue capitalist marketing practices that respond to customer wants and bring increasing financial independence from the State.

Other practices that are emerging in mainland China, such as decision making based on verifiable data and stronger quality controls on information, also have helped dilute the impact of ideology. In a change driven by the dual need for scientists to have reliable data with which to work and for the business sector to use in making investment and commercial decisions, the State Statistical Board since the mid-1980s has gained increased power to acquire and disseminate data for media and business use, reducing or eliminating the hither to common practice in which each sector used "its own" data.

Skepticism toward authority [link]

Although difficult to quantify, growing skepticism toward authority in mainland China appears to be spurring public support for media criticism (often indirect and carefully couched) of the State and slowly diluting the legitimacy of the party . This rise in skepticism is reported by informed observers to be occurring all across East Asia. Such observers point to increased publicity given to cases of official corruption, malfeasance, and ineptness—along with broader declines in social values such as civility and respect—as at least partly responsible for greater media and popular doubts about elected and appointed officials as compared to the past. At the same time, public skepticism of authority can and often does include skepticism toward the media themselves. Journalists, like individuals in other sectors of the mainland Chinese society, are far less willing than in the past to submit blindly to authority. Journalists were active participants in the 1989 demonstrations that culminated in the events at Tiananmen Square. The Tiananmen episode made it all but impossible to reconcile the growing desire of mainland Chinese journalists for control over their own profession with the party's interest in not letting that happen. There have even been occasional acts of open, outright defiance of the party, though these acts remain rare.

Contact with the West [link]

Closer and more varied contact with the West appears to be increasingly influencing educated urban opinion in mainland China on concepts such as a free press, freedom of speech, and political pluralism . This phenomenon is consistent with trends elsewhere in East Asia, where principles such as freedom of expression and legal guarantees of individual rights are playing a growing role. Perhaps most interestingly, many mainland Chinese journalists trained or educated in the West appear to have an outlook that is much closer to Western ideals of media freedom than to the attitudes of other Chinese, although a gap persists between mainland China and the West in professionalism and in grasping the principles of objective journalism.

Virtually all foreign reporters in mainland China operate under restrictions that are considerably more severe than in most Asian countries. One result is that Western media influence on mainland Chinese media organizations as a whole is generally limited. Nonetheless, the contacts that do occur are having an impact on individual mainland Chinese journalists, according to people interviewed for this study. In particular, one observer noted that younger reporters who have measurable, if cautious, contact with the West generally show minimal trust in official sources of information, are inclined to discount propaganda, and are determined to be comprehensive in their reporting.

Communist Party officials have poor contacts with both foreign and domestic media, which hampers the PRC's ability to make it's case effectively in the press.

Market competition [link]

Intense competition for the media market is among the most important factors behind the emergence of more diverse and autonomous media in China. As indicated earlier in this study, efforts by the Chinese media to respond to an increasingly demanding print and broadcast market have created an expanding spectrum of media products ranging from serious news journalism to purely entertainment stories. Monetary rewards for meeting such demands continue to grow, resulting in greater financial autonomy for the growing numbers of Chinese media firms that win sizable market shares. As a result, these companies are able to hire and retain more and better journalists, further boosting their capacity to compete. Commercialization thus has been a major liberating force for the media in China. The regime is far less able than before to wield financial leverage over the media, which have increasingly become self-supporting through advertising revenues and circulation. According to one estimate, advertising in all media forms increased 35-fold between 1981 and 1992. Print ad revenues jumped ten times between 1990 and 1995—from 1.5 billion yuan to 15 billion yuan.

Television revenues also are growing dramatically: they totaled about $2 billion in 1995 and are expected to rise above $6 billion by 2005. In 1995, China Central Television earned nearly $150 million in advertising revenue, covering almost 90 percent of its total costs. In the past, radio and television tended to run well behind the print press in their news coverage. More recently, television has come under market pressure to be as timely, informative, and responsive as the print media.

Competition from outside mainland China has further impelled domestic media organizations to become more diverse, assertive, and skeptical of official authority. For example, in order to compete against Hong Kong radio stations that could be heard in Guangdong Province, Guangdong radio managers created Pearl River Economic Radio (PRER) in 1986. PRER, copying Hong Kong radio's approach, began to emphasize daily life, entertainment, "celebrity" deejays, and caller phone-in segments, while eliminating ideological, preachy formats that included little information beyond what was provided by government sources. By 1987, PRER had obtained 55 percent of the Guangdong market; previously, Hong Kong radio stations had held 90 percent of this market. Local party cadre in southern China reportedly are unhappy about PRER, mainly because some of the station's commentators, as well as its talk radio programs, highlight party failures and the misdeeds of individual party members in the region.

The top national Chinese Communist Party papers (People's Daily, Guangming Daily, and Economic Daily)—which mostly feature party speeches, announcements, propaganda, and policy viewpoints—are steadily losing circulation and much-sought advertising revenues to evening municipal papers that have far more diverse content. For example, People's Daily's circulation fell from 3.1 million copies a day in 1990 to 2.2 million in 1995; the paper's 1994 advertising revenues were down as well. Moreover, its subscriptions consist overwhelmingly of mandatory ones by party and government organizations. Similarly, the Liberation Army Daily has become almost entirely dependent on State subsidies. Its circulation has fallen from 1.7 million in 1981 to fewer than 500,000 at present.

By contrast, the circulation of the Xinmin Evening News, operated by the Shanghai Municipal Government, has risen from 1.3 million to 1.7 million over the same time period. The Guangzhou Daily, owned by the Guangzhou Municipal Government, doubled its circulation in six years to 600,000 in 1994, and its ad revenues also were up.

Improvements in personnel [link]

The media also have attracted and are retaining more competent people than before. Journalism is widely seen as a more promising career field than in the past, while government work has lost much of its allure as other opportunities open up. At the same time, the explosion of business and entrepreneurial opportunities in recent years has complicated efforts by both the media and the government to attract good people. Journalism and government both face stiff competition from the relatively high salaries and profits available in the business sector. But the rising popularity and profitability of metropolitan evening newspapers offer the prospect that higher quality, better paid jobs in journalism will expand in the years ahead.

Improved training, more education, and higher professional standards are bolstering the skills and confidence of journalists across East Asia, better positioning media organizations to gain positions of influence in their societies. Although mainland Chinese journalists only recently have begun to participate in these opportunities, there is some evidence that such training is having an effect. Many of the young mainland Chinese journalists being trained at US and other universities and professional programs in the West have been characterized by their trainers as "smart," "aware," and devoted to the profession.

Beginning in the 1980s, it became necessary in most cases for reporters to have a college education, and often a university degree, to get good jobs with the top party newspapers. The highly profitable evening papers, sponsored in the main by municipal governments, usually also require a college education.

Cable television [link]

Residents of the Chinese mainland now receive more than 20 outside television channels by satellite, including Chinese-language services of CNN, Star TV, and the United States Information Agency. In the southern province of Guangdong, 97 percent of the households have television sets, and all—except those in a few parts of the city of Guangzhou, where reception is poor—have access to Hong Kong television through cable networks. Some local stations even intercept the signals and insert their own commercials. Beijing is unable to effectively monitor, let alone control, the illicit cable operators who have sprung up since the early 1990s. As of 1995, about 1,000 of the 3,000 cable stations in mainland China, linked to perhaps 50 million homes, were unlicensed.

Satellite dishes [link]

The administration of satellite receivers falls under the jurisdiction of the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television, which stipulates that foreign satellite televisions channels may only be received at high-end hotels and the homes and workplaces of foreigners. Foreign satellite televisions channels may seek approval to broadcast, but must be "friendly toward China." Foreign television news channels are, in principle, ineligible for distribution in China.

Home satellite dishes are officially proscribed. Black market satellite dishes are nonetheless prolific, numbering well into the tens of millions. Chinese authorities engage in regular crackdowns to confiscate and dismantle illicit dishes, expressing concerns both over the potential for copyright infringements and over their ability receive "reactionary propaganda."

Internet [link]

Widening Chinese use of the Internet is also undercutting government efforts to control the flow of information. According to CNNIC's 22nd Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China, more than 250 million people in mainland China now have Internet access.

Since the beginning of 1996, the State has suspended all new applications from Internet service providers seeking to commence operations in the PRC; moved to put all existing Internet services under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the Ministry of Electronics Industry, and the State Education Commission; and attempted—without much success—to establish firewalls, limit the contents of home pages, and block access to certain Internet sites through routing filters. Although much of the Internet access in China is subjugate to the so-called "Great Firewall of China", which blacklists certain websites and even blocks chat sessions, it has proven relatively ineffective: there are logistical problems with a firewall over such a large network, and in most instances its effects can be negated with a simple proxy. Government officials are worried that, as the number of Chinese homes with telephone lines grows from the present level of less than 4%, the State will become totally unable to monitor Internet access at residences.

Weakening of party controls [link]

Over the last decade, the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party does its business—especially the introduction of reforms aimed at decentralizing power—have spurred greater media autonomy in several ways:

The growth of "peripheral"—local and some regional—media. This trend has decentralized and dampened party oversight. In general, the farther reporters and media organizations are from Beijing and important provincial capitals, the greater their leeway.

A shift toward administrative and legal regulation of the media and away from more fluid and personal oversight. Party efforts to rely on regulations rather than whim to try to control the media—as evidenced by the dozens of directives set forth when the State Press and Publications Administration was created in 1987, and by new regulations in 1990 and 1994—probably were intended to tighten party control, making it a matter of law rather than personal relationships. In fact, however, these regulations came at a time when official resources were being stretched more thinly and individual officials were becoming less willing—and less able—to enforce regulations.

Vicissitudes of media acceptability. Since the early 1990s, the types of media coverage deemed acceptable by the regime have risen sharply. Growing uncertainties about what is allowable and what is out of bounds sometimes work in the media's favor. Often, however, these uncertainties encourage greater self-censorship among Chinese journalists and work to the benefit of the party's media control apparatus.

Provincial broadcasters increasingly are trying to identify subjects on which the party will allow them more autonomy. Recent demands—unmet thus far—by such broadcasters include seeking authority to carry international news, to contract out television and radio programming to nongovernment organizations, and to explore possibilities for quasi-private media ownership.

As State resources have become stretched more thinly, the media have found it far easier than before to print and broadcast material that falls within vaguely defined grey areas, though again, this uncertainty can also work to the advantage of the party. Officials are too few, too busy, and often too incompetent to be able to micromanage the media as in the past. Prior to the 1990s, it was common for party and government officials to participate in the actual drafting of newspaper editorials. Now, for the most part, these officials merely discuss editorial policies with newspaper managers.

In the past, prime-time news on Chinese Central Television was routinely examined, prior to airing, by the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television. Since 1994, however, the Ministry has ceased to prescreen CCTV news programs; now the programs are examined after they have aired. The diversity and quantity of material, moreover, have compelled officials to prioritize their reviews of broadcasts; the 7:00 pm news broadcasts, for instance, receive far more attention from the authorities than does the midnight news. In another manifestation of weakening government controls, recently launched news programs such as CCTV's Focal Report and Beijing Television's Express News include moderate criticisms of the party and government and explore some controversial public topics in an effort to make programs relevant to—and more popular with—viewers.

Evidently recognizing the limits on their ability to maintain tight control over an industry that has been expanding rapidly, party leaders during the last decade have publicly acknowledged the need to establish priorities. In particular, they have spoken of the high priority attached to maintaining control over the "big media"—national party papers and central and provincial TV and radio stations.

Many PRC officials appear anxious to avoid confronting the media because they are afraid they will be accused of transgressions in newspapers, in magazines, or on television or radio. As media autonomy has expanded, print and broadcast organs have tried to flex their independence, albeit cautiously, in their coverage of State activities. Such coverage often focuses on specific government officials suspected of illegal actions and corruption.

Although the media's leverage stems mostly from officials' worries that rival insiders will use such publicity against them, it also appears to reflect growing respect within Chinese officialdom for the emerging influence of public opinion. A case in point is the Beijing Youth Daily. This paper has been punished for criticizing government actions and policies, but the authorities have stopped short of shutting it down.

Party resistance to media autonomy [link]

Although the trend in mainland China clearly is toward greater media autonomy and diversity and away from government control and intimidation, crosscurrents of resistance persist. Powerful domestic institutions like the Central Propaganda Department and the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television still constrain efforts by the media to become more autonomous and politically diverse.

Efforts to reinforce party controls [link]

Beijing still tries to compel the media to report favorably on government activities and to limit negative coverage of official policies and actions. Neither the PRC Constitution—promulgated in 1982—nor the Communist Party-directed judiciary provides the media with meaningful legal protection from the State. Although Article 35 of the Constitution guarantees the citizens the rights of free speech, press, and assembly, in reality citizens do not have such rights. The authorities in Beijing continue to give precedence to the principles enunciated in the Constitution's preamble—including upholding Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought and the party's leadership role.

The lack of an independent judiciary further hamstrings efforts by the media to mount court challenges against restrictions on media activities. The party appoints judges, and the position of the courts is merely equal to—not above—that of the bureaucracy. Media outrage over nationally publicized criminal cases can also bring pressure on members of the judiciary to act in ways that might be contrary to their initial desires and to the best interests of the defendants.

The government uses a variety of approaches to retain some control over the media:

It requires that newspapers be registered and attached to a government ministry, institute, research facility, labor group, or other State-sanctioned organization. Entrepreneurs cannot establish newspapers or magazines under their own names, although they reportedly have had some success in setting up research institutes and then creating publications attached to those bodies.

It still occasionally jails or fines journalists for unfavorable reporting.

It imposes other punishments when it deems that criticism has gone too far. For example, it shut down the magazine Future and Development in 1993 for publishing two articles calling for greater democracy in mainland China, and it forced the firing of the Beijing Youth Daily's editor for aggressively covering misdeeds and acts of poor judgment by party cadre.

It continues to make clear that criticism of certain fundamental policies—such as those on PRC sovereignty over territories under Republic of China administration and Tibet and on Hong Kong's future in the wake of the transfer of Hong Kong sovereignty on July 1, 1997 —are off limits.

It has set up numerous official journalists' associations—the largest is the All-China Journalist Federation, with more than 400,000 members—so that no single organization can develop major autonomous power.

It holds weekly meetings with top newspaper editors to direct them as to what news items they want focused upon and which stories they want to go unreported. The controversial closure of the Freezing Point journal was generally unreported in mainland China due to government orders.

It has maintained a system of uncertainty surrounding the boundaries of acceptable reporting, encouraging self-censorship. One media researcher has written that "it is the very arbitrariness of this control regime that cows most journalists into more conservative coverage."

The government also exploits a longstanding hierarchical relationship among Chinese print and broadcast entities in seeking to maintain some control over the media. It appoints the leaders of the most powerful media institutions, and then uses these organizations to try to dominate the rest of the media countrywide.

Structure of media in mainland China [link]

Mainland China's media network [link]

Xinhua (the New China News Agency) and People's Daily, the two most important print media, have status as separate government ministries; their directors sit on the party's Central Committee. Just below, hierarchically, are the two national newspapers under the control of the Propaganda Department – the Guangming Daily and the English-language'' China Daily''. These entities have the rank of vice ministries, as does the State Council-controlled Economic Daily. The National Propaganda Department appoints publishers, chief editors, and other key officials of the above-mentioned newspapers—plus a few others—while provincial and local party leaders make similar appointments for party papers in their jurisdictions.

In many ways, Xinhua is the fuel propelling mainland China's print media. Perhaps unique in the world because of its role, size, and reach, Xinhua reports directly to the party's Propaganda Department; employs more than 10,000 people—as compared to about 1,300 for the UK's Reuters, for example; has 107 bureaus worldwide both collecting information on other countries and dispensing information about mainland China; and maintains 31 bureaus in China—one for each province plus a military bureau. In as much as most of the newspapers in mainland China cannot afford to station correspondents abroad—or even in every province in mainland China—they rely on Xinhua feeds to fill their pages. People's Daily, for example, uses Xinhua material for approximately 25 percent of its stories.(b) Xinhua is a publisher as well as a news agency—it owns more than 20 newspapers and a dozen magazines, and it prints in Chinese, English, and four other languages.

Like other government entities, Xinhua is feeling the pinch of reduced State financial subsidies. Beijing has been cutting funding to the news agency by an average of seven percent per year over the past three years, and State funds currently cover only about 40 percent of Xinhua's costs. As a result, the agency is raising revenues through involvement in public relations, construction, and information service businesses.

In the past, Xinhua was able to attract the top young journalists emerging from the universities or otherwise newly entering the field, but it can no longer do so as easily because of the appeal and resources of other newspapers and periodicals and the greater glamour of television and radio jobs. For example, midlevel reporters for the Xinmin Evening News often are given an apartment, whereas at Xinhua and People's Daily this benefit is reserved for the most senior journalists.

Like many other media organizations, Xinhua struggled to find the "right line" to use in covering the Tiananmen Square events of April–June 1989. Although more cautious than People's Daily in its treatment of sensitive topics during that period—such as how to commemorate reformist Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang's April 1989 death, the then ongoing demonstrations in Beijing and elsewhere, and basic questions of press freedom and individual rights—Xinhua gave some favorable coverage to demonstrators and intellectuals who were questioning top party leaders. Even so, many Xinhua reporters were angry with top editors for not going far enough and for suppressing stories about the Tiananmen Square crackdown. For several days after the violence on June 4, almost no one at Xinhua did any work, and journalists demonstrated inside the Agency's Beijing compound.

The role of the PRC internal media [link]

The mainland Chinese media's internal publication system, in which certain journals are published exclusively for government and party officials, provides information and analysis not generally available to the public. The State values these internal reports because they contain much of mainland China's most sensitive, controversial, and high-quality investigative journalism.

Xinhua and many other media organizations produce reports for the "internal" journals (neicans). Informed observers note that journalists generally like to write for the internal publications—typically, only the most senior or most capable print and broadcast reporters are given such opportunities—because they can write less polemical and more comprehensive stories without having to omit unwelcome details as is commonly done in the print media directed to the general public. A Chinese historian has claimed, as an example of such self-censorship, that only a minority of China's population are aware 30 million people starved to death in the early 1960s, because the Party has never allowed the subject to be openly explored in the media. At the time, one of the Top Secret information channels through which news of what was really happening reached a select readership of high-level decision-makers was the Ministry of Public Security's Public Security Work Bulletin.

The PRC internal media publication system follows a strict hierarchical pattern designed to facilitate party control. A publication called Reference Information (Cankao Ziliao)—which includes translated articles from abroad as well as news and commentary by senior Xinhua reporters—is delivered by Xinhua personnel, rather than by the national mail system, to officials at the working level and above. A three-to-ten-page report called Internal Reference (Neibu Cankao) is distributed to officials at the ministerial level and higher. The most highly classified Xinhua internal reports, known as "redhead reference" (Hong Tou Cankao) reports, are issued occasionally to the top dozen or so party and government officials.

He Qinglian documents in chapter four of ''Media Control in China'', There are many grades and types of internal documents [neibu wenjian 内部文件]. Many are restricted to a certain level of official – such as county level, provincial level or down to a certain level of official in a ministry. Some Chinese journalists, including Xinhua correspondents in foreign countries, write for both the mass media and the internal media. The level of classification is tied to the administrative levels of Party and government in China. The higher the administrative level of the issuing office, generally the more secret the document is. In local government the issuing grades are province [sheng 省], region (or city directly subordinate to a province) [diqu 地区or shengzhixiashi 省直辖市] and county [xian 县]; grades within government organs are ministry [bu 部], bureau [ju 局] and office [chu 处]; in the military corps ([jun 军], division [shi 师], and regiment [tuan 团]. The most authoritative documents are drafted by the Central Committee to convey instructions from CCP leaders. Documents with Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Document [Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian 中共中央文件] at the top in red letters are the most authoritative.

There are signs the PRC internal media publication system is breaking down as more information becomes widely available in mainland China. A Hong Kong-based political journal circulated on the Chinese mainland has questioned the need for such a system in light of mainland China's modern telecommunications and expanding contacts with the outside world. Internal publications are becoming less exclusive; some are now being sold illegally on the street and are increasingly available to anyone with money.

Some of the internal publications have changed substantially in an effort to avoid becoming obsolete. For example, the publication News Front—started in 1957 as a weekly tool for the Communist Party to instruct journalists on what to write—no longer was limited to that function when it reappeared after the Cultural Revolution. It continued to change gradually and is now a monthly publication that serves as a professional rather than political guide for journalists.

Hong Kong [link]

Despite the diverse and independent press which has previously existed, and the assurances of one country, two systems, apprehensions have grown among Hong Kong journalists, since Hong Kong returned to PRC sovereignty in July, 1997, that Beijing would curtail their freedom to write articles on mainland China not to its liking. At the launch of a joint report published by the Hong Kong Journalists Association and Article 19 in July 2001, the Chairman of the Association said: "More and more newspapers self-censor themselves because they are controlled by either a businessman with close ties to Beijing, or part of a large enterprise, which has financial interests over the border."

Overseas Chinese press [link]

In 2001 the Jamestown Foundation reported that China was buying into Chinese-language media in the U.S., offering free content, and leveraging advertising dollars—all to manipulate coverage.

See also[link]

References [link]

External links [link]

The China Times – English-language newspaper covers Chinese social, business and economic topics.

Shanghai Daily – English-language newspaper in Shanghai.

"Information Control and Self-Censorship in the PRC and the Spread of SARS" – by a report from the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China

China Media Project a website that generates research on China's media development

Media of the People's Republic of China|

no:Media i Kina zh:中華人民共和國媒體

name	Bo Xilai
order3	Minister of Commerce of the PRC
term start3	February 2004
term end3	December 2007
premier3	Wen Jiabao
predecessor3	Lü Fuyuan
successor3	Chen Deming
order2	CPC Chongqing Committee Secretary
term start2	November 2007
term end2	March 2012
predecessor2	Wang Yang
successor2	Zhang Dejiang
1blankname2	Deputy (Mayor)
1namedata2	Wang Hongju (2007-2009) Huang Qifan (2009-)
birth date	July 03, 1949
birth place	Beijing, Republic Of China
alma mater	Peking UniversityChinese Academy of Social Sciences
relations	Bo Yibo (father)
party	Communist Party of China
spouse	Li Danyu (divorced) Gu Kailai
children	Li Wangzhi Bo Guagua
religion	}}

|order=st}} Bo Xilai (born 3 July 1949) is a Chinese politician. He came to prominence through his tenures as the mayor of the coastal economic hub of Dalian and then governor of Liaoning province. From 2004 to November 2007, he served as Minister of Commerce and in 2007 he was appointed head of the Communist Party's Chongqing branch. He was removed as Chongqing party chief in March 2012.

The son of Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Elders of the Communist Party of China, Bo Xilai is identified as one of the "princelings" in Chinese politics. He cultivated a casual and charismatic image in the media—a departure from the normally staid nature of Chinese politics.

In Chongqing Bo became known for heavy-handed populism. He initiated a campaign against organized crime, increased spending on welfare programs, maintained consistent double-digit percentage GDP growth, and campaigned to revive Cultural Revolution-era "red culture." Bo's promotion of egalitarian values and the achievements of his "Chongqing model" made him the champion of the Chinese New Left, composed of both Maoists and social democrats disillusioned with the country's market-based economic reforms and increasing economic inequality. However, the perceived lawlessness of Bo's anti-corruption campaigns, coupled with concerns about his outsized personality, made him a controversial figure.

Bo was considered a likely candidate for promotion to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee in 2012. His political fortunes came to an abrupt end in large part because of the Wang Lijun incident, in which his top lieutenant and police chief sought asylum at the American consulate in Chengdu and revealed details of Bo's possible involvement in a homicide plot. In the fallout, Bo was removed as Chongqing party chief in March 2012 and suspended from the politburo the following month. Bo's dismissal received widespread international media coverage, and was notable for exposing disunity within Communist Party ranks shortly before a once-per-decade leadership transition.

Early life[link]

Bo Xilai was the fourth child of prominent Communist Party member, Bo Yibo, who served as Minister of Finance in the early years of the People's Republic of China but who fell from favor in 1965 for supporting open trade with the West. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Bo Yibo was labeled a "rightist" and a "counterrevolutionary" and purged from the party. He spent the ensuing twelve years in prison, where he was reportedly tortured. His wife, Hu Ming, was abducted by Red Guard in Guangzhou, and was either beaten to death or committed suicide.

Bo Xilai was 17 years old when the Cultural Revolution began, and at the time attended the prestigious No. 4 High School in Beijing — one of the best in the country. In the early years of the Cultural Revolution, Bo is reported to have been an active member of the ''liandong'' Red Guard organization and may have at one point denounced his father.

As the political winds of the Cultural Revolution shifted, Bo and his siblings were either imprisoned or sent to the countryside, and Bo Xilai was locked up for five years. After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the members of the Gang of Four were officially blamed for the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and Bo's family was released. Bo Yibo was politically rehabilitated, and in 1979 became vice premier.

After his release, Bo Xilai worked at the Hardware Repair Factory for the Beijing Second Light Industry Bureau. He was admitted to the Peking University by public examination in 1977. Unlike many of his contemporaries in the Chinese leadership who studied engineering, Bo majored in world history. In his sophomore year, Bo enlisted in a Master's program in international journalism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, graduating with a Master's degree in 1982. He joined the Communist Party in October 1980.

Early political career[link]

During the 1980s, the Bo family regained its political influence with Bo Yibo serving as vice premier. Yibo came to be known as one of the “eight elders” (sometimes referred to as the “eight immortals”) of the Communist Party and was instrumental in the implementation of market reforms in the 1980s. Although he favored more liberal economic policy, the elder Bo was also politically conservative, and endorsed the use of military force against demonstrators in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests. After the 1989 crackdown, Yibo helped ensure the ascent of Jiang Zemin to succeed Deng Xiaoping as the leader of the Communist Party and helped Jiang consolidate power in the 1990s Bo Yibo remained a prominent figure in the party until his death in 2007 and was influential in shaping his son's career.

After graduating from university, Bo was assigned to Zhongnanhai – the headquarters of the Communist Party – where he worked with the research office of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat and CPC Central Committee General Office. He soon requested a transfer to the provinces, and in 1984 was appointed deputy party secretary of Jin County, near Dalian in the northeastern province of Liaoning. In an interview with the ''People’s Daily'', Bo said that his family name created career obstacles. “For quite a long time people had reservations about me,” he said. Bo subsequently became deputy secretary and then secretary of the party committee of the Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone and secretary of the Jinzhou party committee.

Rising again in rank within the party, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Dalian Municipal CPC Committee, the city's top decision-making body, and became the Vice-mayor of Dalian in 1990. In 1993, Bo became deputy Party secretary and mayor of Dalian.

Liaoning[link]

Mayor of Dalian[link]

Bo became acting mayor of Dalian in 1992 and formally assumed the same post in 1993. He remained mayor until 2000. Bo served as Dalian's deputy party secretary from 1995. Bo was promoted to party chief in 1999 and served in that position until 2000.

Bo's tenure in Dalian was marked by the city's phenomenal transformation from a drab port city to a modern metropolis, a 'showcase' of China's rapid economic growth. In the early 1990s, Bo took some credit for the construction of the Shenyang-Dalian Expressway, China's first controlled-access freeway, winning accolades for the rapid expansion of infrastructure and for environmental work. Since Bo's time in office, Dalian has become known as one of the cleanest cities in China, having won the UN Habitat Scroll of Honour Award in 1999. In addition, Bo was known to be an advocate for free enterprise and small businesses, and successfully courted foreign investment from South Korea, Japan, and Western countries. He held press conferences at Chinese New Year, and developed a reputation among foreign investors for 'getting things done'.

Bo spent seventeen years in the city of Dalian, a lengthy term in comparison to his colleagues. Despite the accompanying economic growth and rise in living standards, Bo's tenure in Dalian has sometimes been criticized as having been too focused on aesthetic development projects such as expansive boulevards, monuments, and large public parks. To make way for his large-scale projects, Bo's administration moved large numbers of local residents from downtown areas into new homes in the city's outskirts. Dalian's greenery was dubbed "Xilai Grass". He also reputedly had a remote control in the Mayor's office for the fountains on the city's main square. In addition, he spearheaded the construction of a ''huabiao'' in the city. In 2000, Bo was frontrunner for the post of Mayor of Shenzhen, based on his success in making Dalian the "Hong Kong of the North". However it was suggested that Bo was too independent and outspoken for the post. A local man, Yu Youjun, head of Guangdong Publicity Department, was appointed.

15th Party Congress[link]

During the 15th Party Congress in 1997, Bo Xilai’s family launched an unsuccessful campaign to secure his promotion to become a member of the Central Committee of the CCP. Although nepotism was generally frowned upon in China, Bo Yibo’s ambitions for his son were well known. Bo Yibo advanced the idea that revolutionary elders should 'nominate' their children to become high officials, and Bo Xilai was selected as his family’s 'representative' over his older brother Bo Xicheng, ostensibly because of Xilai’s superior educational credentials, which included attendance at the elite Peking University and a master’s degree.

In order to secure Bo Xilai’s selection for promotion during the 15th Party Congress, the family launched a nationwide campaign to publicize his son’s "achievements" as mayor of Dalian. They commissioned author Chen Zufeng to pen a report portraying Bo as a man who is "as statesman-like as Henry Kissinger, as environmentally conscious as Al Gore, and almost as beloved by the public as Princess Diana." Despite the publicity campaign, Bo Xilai failed even to gain a seat in the Liaoning provincial delegation to the Party Congress. Ultimately, Bo Yibo helped Xilai gain a seat with the Shanxi delegation, but the younger Bo was unable to secure a promotion.

In addition, Bo placed second-last in the confirmation vote for membership in the 15th Central Committee. As he placed in the bottom 5% of candidates, Bo was denied entry into the elite council, suffering a major political embarrassment. Bo's failure to get elected was attributed to a general opposition to nepotism within the Party. Moreover, during his tenure in Dalian, Bo caused resentment for the amount of 'special favours' that he procured for the coastal city at the expense of the rest of the province. His perceived partisan interests locked Bo's kin in a factional struggle against Li Tieying, one of China's central leadership figures, who may have created obstacles to his promotion.

Provincial Governor[link]

In 2001, a corruption scandal involving former Liaoning governor Zhang Guoguang provided an opportunity for Bo's advancement. Prior to the 15th Party Congress, Bo Yibo and Bo Xilai assisted then-President Jiang Zemin in preparing to force political rival Qiao Shi into retirement. The Bo family also supported Jiang's lacklustre "Three Stresses" (''San Jiang'') campaign in 1997. Such unwavering support for Jiang was said to have worked in Bo Xilai's favour when the vacancy for Governor of Liaoning opened. Bo became acting Governor in 2001 after the dismissal and arrest of Zhang Guoguang, and was officially confirmed as Governor in 2003. In his position as governor, which he held until 2004, Bo gained membership to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

During his tenure in Liaoning, Bo played a critical role in the promotion of the Northeast Area Revitalization Plan. Adopted in 2003 by party authorities, the policy aimed to strengthen economic development in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. Bo Xilai was particularly enthusiastic about the policy, stating his desire to see the northeast become "China's fourth economic engine" (the others being the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and the Bohai Economic Region).

The northeast region was at one time known as the "cradle of industrialization" of China. In 1980, industrial output for Liaoning province alone was twice that of the southern Guangdong province. However, the northeast was left behind amidst market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, while regions like Guangdong prospered. Its economy—still largely tied to state-owned enterprises—stagnated relative to other region, with high unemployment rates. The revitalisation plan aimed to correct this by revitalizing the region’s traditional industries, strengthening trade ties with and encouraging investment from South Korea and Japan, and experimenting with free trade zones in select cities. In 2004, official media reported that foreign direct investment in Liaoning had nearly doubled since the launch in 2003 of the northeastern rejuvenation strategy.

Although Bo established a reputation as a comparatively clean politician during his tenures in Dalian and as governor of Liaoning, has was not immune to corruption allegations. In particular, Bo was the subject of critical investigative reports by Liaoning journalist Jiang Weiping, the whistleblower in the ''Mu and Ma'' corruption case in Liaoning – a scandal that Bo benefited from politically. While Bo was not directly involved in the scandal, Jiang accused Bo of providing political cover for his friends and relatives. Jiang was initially sentenced to eight years in prison on trumped-up charges, for which Bo was criticized, but was released after five years under international pressure. Moreover, Yang Rong, the former chief executive of Brilliance China Automotive who fled to the United States after getting embroiled in a dispute against state property authorities, accused Bo of interfering in his judicial proceedings in Beijing. In addition, Bo openly clashed with Wen Shizhen, then-party secretary in Liaoning who was technically Bo's superior. Wen reportedly criticized Bo for "developing China's cities like Europe and its countryside like Africa."

Bo has been subject to accusations of torture by Falun Gong practitioners and their supporters, and some party members were reportedly disappointed by the readiness with which Bo carried out the suppression of the group while he was governor of Liaoning. Falun Gong adherents have filed lawsuits against Bo in Spain, the United Kingdom, Australia, and other countries.

16th Party Congress[link]

At the 16th Party Congress in 2002, Bo's age, regional tenures, and patronage links fit the profile for a potential candidate to be groomed for the "5th generation of leaders" that would assume power in 2012. His chief 'competitors' were seen as Xi Jinping, then party chief in the coastal province of Zhejiang, and Li Keqiang, a populist ''Tuanpai'' candidate who was the Governor of the central province of Henan. As with the 15th Party Congress five years earlier, the elder Bo lobbied for his son's promotion. The Bo family enjoyed the patronage of Jiang Zemin, whose power both Bos had helped consolidate in the 1990s. However, Bo Xilai's unequivocal support for Jiang strengthened the reluctance of his political opponents to support his nomination. Ultimately, although Bo remained a top contender for higher promotion, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang remained the main candidates to succeed Hu Jintao as paramount leader.

Minister of Commerce[link]

When Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as President in late 2003, Bo's career as a local official ended with his appointment to Minister of Commerce in Wen's cabinet to replace Lü Fuyuan, who retired for health reasons. Bo concurrently served as a member of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Described as good-looking, articulate and open-minded in his approach to problems, Bo's rise from a municipal official to the central government generated great media fanfare and elevated his status to something of a 'political star.' Bo's political persona was considered a departure from the generally serious and conservative leadership in Beijing. With his youthful vigour, populism, and purported popularity with female reporters, Bo's political rise had been compared to that of John F. Kennedy. He became a darling of the media both in China and abroad.

Bo presided over a continued rise in foreign investment in China as Minister of Commerce. His daily schedule was dominated by receiving foreign guests and dignitaries. By the time that he became Minister of Commerce, he spoke relatively fluent and colloquial English. During a meeting with American officials, Bo reputedly told a struggling interpreter to stop translating because the Chinese officials could understand English and it was wasting time. In May 2004 Bo was one of the few ministers hand-picked to accompany Premier Wen Jiabao on a five-country trip to Europe. The trade policy of the United States toward China also sparked significant controversy, during which Bo kept a cool head as he attended talks in Washington. On his trips to the United States, he conducted substantive discussions with his American counterparts and signed agreements on intellectual property, the services sector, agricultural products, food safety, and consumer protection.

Bo also oversaw the restructuring of the Ministry, which was the result of the amalgamation of the National Economics and Commerce Bureau and the Department of International Trade. Bo sought to balance the amount of attention given to foreign investors and domestic commercial institutions. He began tackling the imbalance from the retail sector, whose success up to that point was largely dependent on foreign companies. He drew up plans to protect Chinese industries' competitive position within the Chinese market.

Chongqing [link]

17th Party Congress[link]

At the 17th Party Congress, Bo took up a seat on the Politburo, effectively China's ruling council. It was widely speculated following the Congress in October 2007 that Bo would end his term as Minister of Commerce and take over as party chief in the southwestern interior municipality of Chongqing, to replace Wang Yang, who was moved to Guangdong. At the time, Chongqing was reeling from problems such as air and water pollution, unemployment, poor public health, and complications from the Three Gorges Dam upstream. According to analysts, Hu had wanted to transfer his ally Wang Yang out of Chongqing before these problems intensified. Bo was initially reluctant to go to Chongqing and was unhappy with his new assignment – reportedly preferring to become Vice-Premier instead, but Premier Wen Jiabao argued against Bo's holding the vice-premiership, citing his negative international exposure and the lawsuits against him by Falun Gong. Bo only took up the Chongqing post on 30 November, a month following the conclusion of the Congress, despite Wang Yang's effective departure from Chongqing on 13 November. Whilst some saw is transfer as a 'banishment' from the central government to the hinterlands to keep Bo's perceived arrogance and high-profile antics out of Beijing's view, others saw it as a promotion since being the party chief in one of the four direct-controlled municipalities came with an ''ex officio'' seat on the Politburo.

Organized crime[link]

Bo's tenure in Chongqing was dominated by a protracted war against the city's organized crime scene. Since June 2009, some 2,000 people were detained in a sweeping campaign against gangsters in the city. In marked departure from other anti-mafia campaigns in China, Bo cracked down on the government officials who served as political back-up to gangsters, not just the gangsters themselves – some of the detained were officials in Bo's own administration, others were from the city's police force. Wen Qiang (), one of the most prominent figures implicated in the trials, had been at the top echelons of municipal power since the days of party secretaries He Guoqiang and Wang Yang. Reports from the Jamestown Foundation suggest that the such a large-scale crackdown was given 'go-ahead' from central authorities and President Hu Jintao, and Bo has been careful to not make the case look as though Chongqing is trying to 'set an example' for the rest of the country so he could benefit from the success politically.

Bo's anti-crime measures were criticized for neglecting due process and for the alleged use of torture to extract confessions, but Bo's apparent willingness to combat crime in a city often seen as center for organized crime earned him national recognition and widespread popularity in Chongqing. The apparent success of Bo's campaign has led to Bo's 'rock star status', and has resulted in calls for an anti-crime campaign nationwide based on Bo's experiences in Chongqing. Lawyers in Chongqing became afraid to defend those accused of crimes after one lawyer, Li Zhuang, was sentenced to eighteen months in jail for perjury after representing a gang leader who testified that he was tortured by police. Indeed, although Bo's efforts to combat crime has been interpreted as an implicit attack against his predecessors, he gained the support of a number of powerful members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including Wu Bangguo, Xi Jinping, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun and Zhou Yongkang, all of whom visited Chongqing or praised Bo's achievements sometime between 2010 and 2011.

In order to reform the local police service, whose police chief was arrested for mafia connections, Bo brought in a police chief that he had employed while governor of Liaoning, Wang Lijun. The appointment of a police chief seen as a Bo loyalist led to rumors that Bo was intent on importing more of his old colleagues from Liaoning to run Chongqing.

Red culture movement[link]

During his time in Chongqing, Bo initiated a series of Maoist-style campaigns to revive 'red culture', including the promotion of Maoist quotes, 'red' songs, revolutionary television programing, and initiatives to encourage students to work in the countryside, akin to the way students were required to do during the Down to the Countryside Movement of the Cultural Revolution.

Prior to the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China celebrations, Bo sent out 'red text messages' to the city's 13 million cellphone users. According to ''Xinhua'', Bo's text messages are usually quotes from Mao's Little Red Book, and include phrases such as "I like how Chairman Mao puts it: The world is ours, we will all have to work together," and "responsibility and seriousness can conquer the world, and the Chinese Communist Party members represent these qualities." Bo and his team of municipal administrators also raised new Mao statues in Chongqing, while providing 'social security apartments' to the city's less well-off. Some scholars have characterized this as an example of the revival of Maoism in the Chinese Communist ethos.

In 2011, Bo and the city's Media Department initiated a "Red Songs campaign" that demanded every district, government department and commercial institution, university and school, state radio and TV station to begin singing 'red songs', praising the achievements of the Communist Party of China. Bo pledged to reinvigorate the city with the Marxist ideals reminiscent of the Mao era; although Ding Xueliang of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology suspected the campaign's aim was to further his political standing within the country's leadership.

Vying for promotion [link]

Bo's political ambitions were underscored by his pioneering of a new style of governance focused on a new brand of statism and populism, dubbed the "Chongqing Model," which commentators have labeled as representative of the modern 'left' of the Chinese political spectrum. Bo publicly remarked that if economic development were analogous to 'baking a cake', then the primary task should be to divide the cake fairly rather than building a larger cake. Bo made no secret of his desire to enter the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) during the 18th Party Congress in autumn 2012, when seven of the nine members of the PSC, including General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, were expected to retire. The transition would be an opportunity for the ambitious Bo to join the highest echelon of national leadership. Observers noted that, in China's non-electoral system of politics, Bo's high-profile presence and bold political maneuvers effectively amounted to a campaign for the top leadership.

For his achievements in Chongqing, Bo was named by ''Time'' as one of 'World's 100 Most Influential People in 2010'.

Wary of the potential for social chaos similar to that created during the Cultural Revolution, attributed partially to Mao's personality cult, the public images of modern Chinese leaders tend towards stoic reserve. In spite of Bo's popularity among the public, and the "fawning" attention of the international media, both President Hu and Premier Wen have been reluctant to acknowledge Bo publicly, perhaps due to a discomfort over Bo's leadership style. Western media described him as a "divisive figure, creating enemies by riding roughshod, at times, over the hierarchy of the party and by his unwavering support for Mr Jiang."

Downfall[link]

On 6 February 2012, Wang Lijun, Bo's lieutenant who presided over the Chongqing gang trials, was unexpectedly reported to be on leave due to a "health concern". In fact, Wang had visited the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu shortly prior, where he reportedly sought political asylum and was attempting to offload evidence of Bo's misconduct during his Chongqing tenure. The US appeared to have denied him asylum, and he could now face the death penalty. A day after Wang's leave, several overseas Chinese-language news websites posted an open letter allegedly penned by Wang, which sharply criticized Bo as a "hypocrite" and "the greatest gangster in China" and accused Bo of corruption. The alleged attempt at defection was unprecedented and caused a major international embarrassment. Without knowing what incriminating material Wang may have held against Bo, even Bo's supporters in China's top leadership were reluctant to vouch for him. Bo responded in an unusually open press conference during the 2012 National People's Congress, acknowledging "negligent supervision" of his subordinates, saying he may have "relied upon the wrong person".

On 15 March, Bo was dismissed as Chongqing party chief and its related municipal posts, while temporarily retaining a seat on the Politburo. Due to the potentially destructive effects Bo's dismissal would have on party unity, party elders were consulted on the matter. The decision was reportedly made at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on 7 March, during which security tsar Zhou Yongkang cast a lone dissenting vote. On 14 March, Bo was reprimanded by Premier Wen Jiabao during the Premier's annual press conference. Wen called the achievements of Chongqing "significant," but the result of "multiple administrations," i.e., not just Bo himself. Wen also made numerous allusions to the Cultural Revolution, an indirect rebuke of Bo's efforts to revive "red culture". Addressing high-level political changes by a Premier to an open public forum was unprecedented. Political observers believe that Wen's remarks and Bo's downfall represented a consensus within the central leadership that Bo not only needed to shoulder the responsibility for the Wang Lijun scandal, but also marked a significant victory for liberal reformers.

Bo's downfall elicited strong reactions among the Chinese public and with commentators across the political spectrum. Leftist websites such as ''Utopia'', ''Red China'', and ''Maoflag'' were full of angry commentary over Bo's dismissal. These websites were shut down for a period of "maintenance" shortly after. Leftist commentators voiced support for Bo: Kong Qingdong called Bo's dismissal 'a plot by enemies of the state'; Sima Nan said associating Bo with the Cultural Revolution was a 'smear campaign'; Sima's pro-Bo microblogs were censored. Large numbers of sympathetic posts for Bo appeared in microblogs from Chongqing, and Dalian, where Bo was once mayor. The ''Global Times'' also wrote a sympathetic editorial. Liberal media reacted positively, criticizing Bo's style of 'personality-based rule' as dangerous and regressive. Right-leaning commentators said Bo's downfall signified a 'correct orientation' to China's future development. Southern Media Group editor Yan Lieshan remarked that Bo correctly identified China's problems but prescribed the wrong solution. Businesspeople whose assets were seized by Bo's administration in Chongqing also reacted positively.

Bo's dismissal caused political shockwaves unseen since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, and exposing internal conflicts within Communist Party. In the weeks following 15 March, party authorities deliberated on Bo's case. In the absence of official reports of the proceedings, microblogs churned out a flood of speculation, including rumours of a coup. In response, the authorities instructed newspapers and websites to strictly report only official releases, and arrested six people accused of 'rumourmongering'.

On 10 April, Bo was suspended from the party's Central Committee and its Politburo, pending investigation for "serious disciplinary violations." Bo's wife, Gu Kailai, was now a prime suspect in the inquiry into the death of British businessman Neil Heywood in late 2011 that was not treated as suspicious at the time. The announcements, carrying criminal implications, are seen by pundits as marking the formal end of Bo's political career. Aware of its potentially divisive impact, authorities carefully controlled media coverage of the announcements. State media reported 'pledges of loyalty' to the party's decision to disgrace Bo, including statements from the new Chongqing party authorities, Beijing municipal organs, and grassroots party members rallying to the party line. The party's mouthpiece ''People's Daily'' issued a front-page editorial calling for unity behind the "correct decision". The military held 'political education' sessions on short notice, stressing unity and loyalty to the Party under the leadership of Hu Jintao.

Political alignment and affiliations[link]

In the course of his career, Bo Xilai was the beneficiary of considerable patronage from former Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin. He is thus associated with Jiang’s faction, sometimes referred to as the “elitists,” that is generally known to favor a model that emphasizes free trade, economic development in the coastal regions, and export-led growth. It is a coalition composed largely of “princelings” (the children of high-ranking former party leaders), business people, leaders of coastal cities, and members of the erstwhile "Shanghai clique." By contrast, the “populist” coalition of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao advocates more balanced economic development and improvements to China’s social safety net. The populist faction is generally associated with the "left," and comprised rural leaders, socialist intellectuals, and several leaders who rose to prominence through their connections with the Communist Youth League.

Although Bo is identified with the elitist bloc for his time in Liaoning and as Minister of Commerce, during his tenure in the interior city of Chongqing, he adopted a number of populist policies more typically associated with the left. Namely, he implemented social housing programs, gave residency status (and therefore the associated social welfare benefits) to rural migrant workers, and emphasized a need for a more balanced distribution of wealth. Although Bo relentlessly pursued technology, capital, and business opportunities, he also spearheaded a large number of government programs to help the working class and disadvantaged groups. Bo’s campaigns against corruption also allegedly seized the assets of private entrepreneurs, in turn funneling these funds into state projects and welfare programs, effectively re-asserting state control over wealth. He also sought to promote “red culture,” and mandated the revival of Mao-era slogans and songs, evoking a time of an egalitarian society.

Bo's policies in Chongqing ultimately made him a prominent figure among neo-Maoists and leftists, and a representative of the conservative wing of the Communist Party. Although Bo did not favor the discontinuation of market economics or a return to Mao-era policies, he was seen to advocate a strong role for the state in peoples' lives. Bo’s anti-corruption campaign, in particular, earned him a reputation for heavy-handedness and authoritarian methods in crime and punishment. Bo’s policies put him in opposition to the more liberal and reform-oriented faction, particularly Premier Wen Jiabao and Guangdong party chief Wang Yang, who favored the strengthening of rule of law and a continuation of political reform. To observers, Bo and Wang's verbal warfare over the future direction of development marked an increasing polarization of Chinese politics into leftist and reformer camps.

Family[link]

Bo's first wife is Li Danyu, the daughter of former Beijing Party First Secretary Li Xuefeng. Their son, Li Wangzhi, graduated from Columbia University in 2001. Li Danyu insisted that her son change his surname to Li following her divorce to Bo Xilai. Li Wangzhi is reportedly low-key and modest, and has a masters degree is media studies. He worked at Citibank and a law firm in Beijing.

Bo married his second wife, Gu Kailai, in 1986. Gu is a prominent lawyer and founder of the Kailai lawfirm in Beijing. Gu’s father, Gu Jingsheng, was a Communist revolutionary. Her mother Fan Chengxiu is a descendant of the renowned Song Dynasty Prime Minister and Poet Fan Zhongyan.

Bo Xilai drew criticism from others in the party for his high-profile courting of media attention and using his family pedigree to further the interests of his wife and her law firm. Bo denied that his wife had profited from his position, saying that his wife had retired her legal practice while the couple lived in Dalian in the 1990s. Bo said that Gu "now basically just stays at home, doing some housework for me." There was speculation that Bo Xilai may have attempted to interfere with a corruption investigation into his wife. Following his dismissal, his wife was reported to have been implicated in the death of British businessman and family friend Neil Heywood.

Bo and Gu have one son, Guagua. He attended Harrow School, and was later admitted to Balliol College, Oxford, where in 2006 he started studying for a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Guagua then went on to study at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Bo Guagua's high-profile and privileged lifestyle has provided tabloid fodder for Chinese-language media. Asked how he could afford his son's tuition fees on his estimated annual salary of $22,000, Bo replied that his son received "full scholarships" from the respective institutions.

Bo Xiyong, Bo Xilai's eldest brother, is a vice-chairman and executive director of Hong Kong-listed China Everbright International, but does so under a pseudonym. Although the name used, according to company filings, is 'Li Xueming', the company declined to confirm if they are one and the same.

See also[link]

Politics of Liaoning

Politics of Chongqing

References[link]

External links[link]

News about Bo Xilai at China Digital Times.

Biography and recent career data at ''China Vitae'', an online biographical database of Chinese VIPs

The Bo Xilai Crisis: A Curse or a Blessing for China?, Interview with Cheng Li (April 2012)

Category:1949 births Category:Living people Category:Mayors of Dalian Category:Peking University alumni Category:Politicians from Beijing Category:Politicians of the People's Republic of China Category:Crown Prince Party Category:Red Guards * Category:Chinese communists Category:Government ministers of the People's Republic of China

cs:Po Si-laj da:Bo Xilai de:Bo Xilai es:Bo Xilai eu:Bo Xilai fr:Bo Xilai ko:보시라이 nl:Bo Xilai ja:薄熙来 no:Bo Xilai pl:Bo Xilai ru:Бо Силай sv:Bo Xilai vi:Bạc Hy Lai zh-yue:薄熙來 zh:薄熙来

Birthname	Yuri Irsenovich Kim
Name	Kim Jong-il김정일
Office	Supreme Leader of North Korea
Premier	Hong Song-namPak Pong-juKim Yong-ilChoe Yong-rim
Term start	8 July 1994
Term end	17 December 2011
Predecessor	Kim Il-sung (as President)
Successor	Kim Jong-un
Office2	General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea
Deputy2	Kim Yong-namChoe Yong-rimJo Myong-rokRi Yong-ho
Term start2	8 July 1994
Term end2	17 December 2011(Eternal General Secretary since 11 April 2012)
Predecessor2	Kim Il-sung
Successor2	Kim Jong-un (as First Secretary) (Position abolished as Kim Jong-il was declared as the Eternal General Secretary on 11 April 2012.)
Office4	Chairman of the National Defence Commission of North Korea
Deputy4	Jo Myong-rok
Term start4	9 April 1993
Term end4	17 December 2011(Eternal Chairman of the National Defence Commission since 13 April 2012)
Predecessor4	Position established
Successor4	Kim Jong-un (as First Chairman) (Position abolished as Kim Jong-il was declared as the Eternal Chairman on 13 April 2012)
Office5	Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army
Term start5	24 December 1991
Term end5	17 December 2011
Predecessor5	Kim Il-sung
Successor5	Kim Jong-un
Office6	Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party
Deputy6	Kim Jong-unRi Yong-ho
Term start6	8 October 1997
Term end6	17 December 2011
Predecessor6	Kim Il-sung
Successor6	Kim Jong-un
Birth date	February 16, 1941Vyatskoye, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union (Soviet records)February 16, 1942Baekdu Mountain, Japanese Korea (North Korean biography) Disputed, see section ''Birth''.
Death date	December 17, 2011 (suspected heart attack)
Death place	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Resting place	Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Party	Workers' Party of Korea
Spouse	Kim Young-sook (1974–2011)
Partner	Song Hye-rim (1968–2002)Ko Young-hee (1977–2004)Kim Ok (2004–2011)
Children	Kim Sul-songKim Jong-namKim Jong-chulKim Jong-un
Alma mater	Kim Il-sung UniversityUniversity of Malta
Allegiance
Branch	Korean People's Army
Serviceyears	1991–2011
Rank	Wonsu (Marshal)
Commands	Supreme Commander
Signature	Kim Jong-il Signature.png }}

Context	north
Hangul	김정일
Hanja
Rr	Gim Jeong(-)il
Mr	Kim Chŏngil }}

Kim Jong-il (born Yuri Irsenovich Kim; 16 February 1941; official biography claims 1942 – 17 December 2011) was the supreme leader of North Korea (DPRK) from 1994 to 2011. He succeeded his father and founder of the DPRK Kim Il-sung following the elder Kim's death in 1994. Kim Jong-il was the General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, Chairman of the National Defence Commission of North Korea, and the supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, the fourth-largest standing army in the world.

In April 2009, North Korea's constitution was amended to refer to him as the "supreme leader". He was also referred to as the "Dear Leader", "our Father", and "the General", among others. His son Kim Jong-un was promoted to a senior position in the ruling Workers' Party and is his successor. In 2010, he was ranked 31st in Forbes Magazine's List of The World's Most Powerful People. The North Korean government announced his death on 19 December 2011.

Following his demise, he was succeeded by his third son Kim Jong-un. He was proclaimed the Eternal General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and Eternal Chairman of the National Defence Commission in 2012. His birthday is a public holiday in the country.

Childhood[link]

Birth[link]

Soviet records show that Kim was born in the village of Vyatskoye, near Khabarovsk, in 1941, where his father, Kim Il-sung, commanded the 1st Battalion of the Soviet 88th Brigade, made up of Chinese and Korean exiles. Kim Jong-il's mother, Kim Jong-suk, was Kim Il-sung's first wife.

However, Kim Jong-il's official biography states he was born in a secret military camp on Baekdu Mountain (Korean: 백두산밀영고향집) in Japanese-occupied Korea on 16 February 1942. Official biographers claim that his birth at Baekdu Mountain was foretold by a swallow, and heralded by the appearance of a double rainbow across the sky over the mountain and a new star in the heavens.

In 1945, Kim was four years old when World War II ended and Korea regained independence from Japan. His father returned to Pyongyang that September, and in late November Kim returned to Korea via a Soviet ship, landing at Sonbong (선봉군, also Unggi). The family moved into a former Japanese officer's mansion in Pyongyang, with a garden and pool. Kim Jong-il's brother, "Shura" Kim (the first Kim Pyong-il, but known by his Russian nickname), drowned there in 1948. Unconfirmed reports suggest that five-year-old Kim Jong-il might have caused the accident.

In 1949, his mother died in childbirth. Unconfirmed reports suggest that his mother might have been shot and left to bleed to death.

Education[link]

According to his official biography, Kim completed the course of general education between September 1950 and August 1960. He attended Primary School No. 4 and Middle School No. 1 (Namsan Higher Middle School) in Pyongyang. This is contested by foreign academics, who believe he is more likely to have received his early education in the People's Republic of China as a precaution to ensure his safety during the Korean War.

Throughout his schooling, Kim was involved in politics. He was active in the Children's Union and the Democratic Youth League (DYL), taking part in study groups of Marxist political theory and other literature. In September 1957 he became vice-chairman of his middle school's DYL branch. He pursued a programme of anti-factionalism and attempted to encourage greater ideological education among his classmates.

Kim is also said to have received English language education at the University of Malta in the early 1970s, on his infrequent holidays in Malta as guest of Prime Minister Dom Mintoff.

The elder Kim had meanwhile remarried and had another son, Kim Pyong-il (named after Kim Jong-il's drowned brother). Since 1988, Kim Pyong-il has served in a series of North Korean embassies in Europe and is the North Korean ambassador to Poland. Foreign commentators suspect that Kim Pyong-il was sent to these distant posts by his father in order to avoid a power struggle between his two sons.

Presidium member and party secretary (1980–1994)[link]

By the time of the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980, Kim Jong-il's control of the Party operation was complete. He was given senior posts in the Politburo, the Military Commission and the party Secretariat. When he was made a member of the Seventh Supreme People's Assembly in February 1982, international observers deemed him the heir apparent of North Korea.

At this time Kim assumed the title "Dear Leader" (친애하는 지도자, ''ch'inaehanŭn jidoja'') the government began building a personality cult around him patterned after that of his father, the "Great Leader". Kim Jong-il was regularly hailed by the media as the "fearless leader" and "the great successor to the revolutionary cause". He emerged as the most powerful figure behind his father in North Korea.

On 24 December 1991, Kim was also named supreme commander of the North Korean armed forces. Since the Army is the real foundation of power in North Korea, this was a vital step. Defence Minister Oh Jin-wu, one of Kim Il-sung's most loyal subordinates, engineered Kim Jong-il's acceptance by the Army as the next leader of North Korea, despite his lack of military service. The only other possible leadership candidate, Prime Minister Kim Il (no relation), was removed from his posts in 1976. In 1992, Kim Il-sung publicly stated that his son was in charge of all internal affairs in the Democratic People's Republic.

In 1992, radio broadcasts started referring to him as the "Dear Father", instead of the "Dear Leader", suggesting a promotion. His 50th birthday in February was the occasion for massive celebrations, exceeded only by those for the 80th birthday of Kim Il Sung himself on 15 April that same year.

According to defector Hwang Jang-yop, the North Korean government system became even more centralized and autocratic during the 1980s and 1990s under Kim Jong-il than it had been under his father. In one example explained by Hwang, although Kim Il-sung required his ministers to be loyal to him, he nonetheless and frequently sought their advice during decision-making. In contrast, Kim Jong-il demanded absolute obedience and agreement from his ministers and party officials with no advice or compromise, and he viewed any slight deviation from his thinking as a sign of disloyalty. According to Hwang, Kim Jong-il personally directed even minor details of state affairs, such as the size of houses for party secretaries and the delivery of gifts to his subordinates.

By the 1980s, North Korea began to experience severe economic stagnation. Kim Il-sung's policy of ''juche'' (self-reliance) cut the country off from almost all external trade, even with its traditional partners, the Soviet Union and China.

South Korea accused Kim of ordering the 1983 bombing in Rangoon, Burma (now Yangon, Myanmar), which killed 17 visiting South Korean officials, including four cabinet members, and another in 1987 which killed all 115 on board Korean Air Flight 858. A North Korean agent, Kim Hyon Hui, confessed to planting a bomb in the case of the second, saying the operation was ordered by Kim Jong-il personally.

In 1992, Kim Jong-il's voice was broadcast within North Korea for the first time during a military parade for the KPA's 60th year anniversary in Pyongyang's Kim Il-sung Square, in which Kim Il-sung attended with Kim Jong-il by his side. After Kim Il-sung's speech, and the parade inspection his son approached the microphone at the grandstand in response to the report of the parade inspector and simply said: "Glory to the heroic soldiers of the Korean People's Army!" Everyone in the audience applauded and the parade participants at the square grounds (which included veteran soldiers and officers of the KPA) shouted "ten thousand years" three times after that.

Ruler of North Korea[link]

On 8 July 1994, Kim Jong-il's father, Kim Il-sung, died at the age of 82 from a heart attack. However, it took three years for Kim Jong-il to consolidate his power. On 1 January 1995, Kim Jong Il inspected a unit of the Korean People’s Army, which was his first official action as the supreme leader of the DPRK in the first year after the President died. It was also an official act done amid various conjectures on the future of the DPRK and his political direction. On 10 Oct Kim reviewed a massive military parade and a procession of 1 million people in Pyongyang, marking the 50th anniversary of the founding of the country's ruling Workers' Party of Korea in what was his first major public appearance after his father's death.

He officially took the titles of General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea on 8 October 1997 and Chairman of the National Defence Commission on 9 April 1993. In 1998, his Defence Commission chairmanship was declared to be "the highest post of the state", so Kim may be regarded as North Korea's head of state from that date. Also in 1998, the Supreme People's Assembly wrote the president's post out of the constitution in memory of Kim Il-Sung, who was designated the country's "Eternal President". It can be argued, though, that he became the country's leader when he became leader of the Workers' Party; in most Communist countries the party leader is the most powerful person in the country.

Officially, Kim was part of a triumvirate heading the executive branch of the North Korean government along with Premier Choe Yong-rim and parliament chairman Kim Yong-nam (no relations). Each nominally held powers equivalent to a third of a president's powers in most other presidential systems. Kim Jong-il was commander of the armed forces, Choe Yong-rim headed the government and Kim Yong-nam handled foreign relations. In practice, however, Kim Jong-il exercised absolute control over the government and the country. Although not required to stand for popular election to his key offices, he was unanimously elected to the Supreme People's Assembly every five years, representing a military constituency, due to his concurrent capacities as KPA Supreme Commander and Chairman of the DPRK NDC.

Economic policies[link]

The state-controlled economy of North Korea struggled throughout the 1990s, primarily due to mismanagement. In addition, North Korea experienced severe floods in the mid-1990s, exacerbated by poor land management. This, compounded with only 18% arable land and an inability to import the goods necessary to sustain industry, led to an immense famine and left North Korea in economic shambles. Faced with a country in decay, Kim adopted a "Military-First" policy (선군정치, Sŏn'gun chŏngch'i) to strengthen the country and reinforce the regime. On the national scale, a North Korean spokesman has claimed that this has resulted in a positive growth rate for the country since 1996, with the implementation of "landmark socialist-type market economic practices" in 2002 keeping the North afloat despite a continued dependency on foreign aid for food.

In the wake of the devastation of the 1990s, the government began formally approving some activity of small-scale bartering and trade. As observed by Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at the Stanford University Asia-Pacific Research Center, this flirtation with capitalism was "fairly limited, but — especially compared to the past — there are now remarkable markets that create the semblance of a free market system."

In 2002, Kim Jong-il declared that "money should be capable of measuring the worth of all commodities." These gestures toward economic reform mirror similar actions taken by China's Deng Xiaoping in the late 1980s and early 90s. During a rare visit in 2006, Kim expressed admiration for China's rapid economic progress.

Foreign relations[link]

In 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung implemented the "Sunshine Policy" to improve North-South relations and to allow South Korean companies to start projects in the North. Kim Jong-il announced plans to import and develop new technologies to develop North Korea's fledgling software industry. As a result of the new policy, the Kaesong Industrial Park was constructed in 2003 just north of the de-militarized zone, with the planned participation of 250 South Korean companies, employing 100,000 North Koreans, by 2007. However, by March 2007, the Park contained only 21 companies — employing 12,000 North Korean workers. As of May 2010 the park employs over 40,000 North Korean workers.

In 1994, North Korea and the United States signed an Agreed Framework which was designed to freeze and eventually dismantle the North's nuclear weapons program in exchange for aid in producing two power-generating nuclear reactors. In 2002, Kim Jong-il's government admitted to having produced nuclear weapons since the 1994 agreement. Kim's regime argued the secret production was necessary for security purposes — citing the presence of United States-owned nuclear weapons in South Korea and the new tensions with the United States under President George W. Bush. On 9 October 2006, North Korea's Korean Central News Agency announced that it had successfully conducted an underground nuclear test.

Cult of personality[link]

Kim Jong-il was the centre of an elaborate personality cult inherited from his father and founder of the DPRK, Kim Il-sung. Defectors have been quoted as saying that North Korean schools deify both father and son. He was often the centre of attention throughout ordinary life in the DPRK. On his 60th birthday (based on his official date of birth), mass celebrations occurred throughout the country on the occasion of his Hwangab. Many North Koreans believed that he had the "magical" ability to "control the weather" based on his mood. In 2010, the North Korean media reported that Kim's distinctive clothing had set worldwide fashion trends.

One point of view is that Kim Jong Il's cult of personality was solely out of respect for Kim Il-sung or out of fear of punishment for failure to pay homage. Media and government sources from outside of North Korea generally support this view, while North Korean government sources aver it was a genuine hero worship. The song "No Motherland Without You", sung by the KPA State Merited Choir, was created especially for Kim in 1992 and is frequently broadcast on the radio and from loudspeakers on the streets of Pyongyang.

Human rights record[link]

According to a 2004 Human Rights Watch report, the North Korean government under Kim was "among the world's most repressive governments", having up to 200,000 political prisoners according to U.S. and South Korean officials, and no freedom of the press or religion, political opposition or equal education: "Virtually every aspect of political, social, and economic life is controlled by the government."

2008 health and waning power rumors[link]

In an August 2008 issue of the Japanese newsweekly Shūkan Gendai, Waseda University professor Toshimitsu Shigemura, an authority on the Korean Peninsula, claimed that Kim Jong-il died of diabetes in late 2003 and had been replaced in public appearances by one or more stand-ins previously employed to protect him from assassination attempts. In a subsequent best-selling book, ''The True Character of Kim Jong-il'', Shigemura cited apparently unnamed people close to Kim's family along with Japanese and South Korean intelligence sources, claiming they confirmed Kim's diabetes took a turn for the worse early in 2000 and from then until his supposed death three and a half years later he was using a wheelchair. Shigemura moreover claimed a voiceprint analysis of Kim speaking in 2004 did not match a known earlier recording. It was also noted that Kim Jong-il did not appear in public for the Olympic torch relay in Pyongyang on 28 April 2008. The question had reportedly "baffled foreign intelligence agencies for years."

On 9 September 2008, various sources reported that after he did not show up that day for a military parade celebrating North Korea's 60th anniversary, United States intelligence agencies believed Kim might be "gravely ill" after having suffered a stroke. He had last been seen in public a month earlier.

A former CIA official said earlier reports of a health crisis were likely accurate. North Korean media remained silent on the issue. An Associated Press report said analysts believed Kim had been supporting moderates in the foreign ministry, while North Korea's powerful military was against so-called "Six-Party" negotiations with China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States aimed towards ridding North Korea of nuclear weapons. Some United States officials noted that soon after rumours about Kim's health were publicized a month before, North Korea had taken a "tougher line in nuclear negotiations." In late August North Korea's official news agency reported the government would "consider soon a step to restore the nuclear facilities in Nyongbyon to their original state as strongly requested by its relevant institutions." Analysts said this meant "the military may have taken the upper hand and that Kim might no longer be wielding absolute authority." By 10 September, there were conflicting reports. Unidentified South Korean government officials said Kim had undergone surgery after suffering a minor stroke and had apparently "intended to attend 9 September event in the afternoon but decided not to because of the aftermath of the surgery." High ranking North Korean official Kim Yong-nam said, "While we wanted to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the country with General Secretary Kim Jong-Il, we celebrated on our own." Song Il-Ho, North Korea's ambassador said, "We see such reports as not only worthless, but rather as a conspiracy plot." Seoul's ''Chosun Ilbo'' newspaper reported that "the South Korean embassy in Beijing had received an intelligence report that Kim collapsed on 22 August." ''The New York Times'' reported Kim was "very ill and most likely suffered a stroke a few weeks ago, but United States intelligence authorities do not think his death is imminent." The BBC noted that the North Korean government denied these reports, stating that Kim's health problems were "not serious enough to threaten his life", although they did confirm that he had suffered a stroke on 15 August.

Japan's ''Kyodo News'' agency reported on 14 September, that "Kim collapsed on 14 August due to stroke or a cerebral hemorrhage, and that Beijing dispatched five military doctors at the request of Pyongyang. Kim will require a long period of rest and rehabilitation before he fully recovers and has complete command of his limbs again, as with typical stroke victims." Japan's ''Mainichi Shimbun'' claimed Kim had occasionally lost consciousness since April. Japan's ''Tokyo Shimbun'' on 15 September, added that Kim was staying at the Bongwha State Guest House. He was apparently conscious "but he needs some time to recuperate from the recent stroke, with some parts of his hands and feet paralyzed". It cited Chinese sources which claimed that one cause for the stroke could have been stress brought about by the United States delay to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.

On 19 October, North Korea reportedly ordered its diplomats to stay near their embassies to await "an important message", according to Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun, setting off renewed speculation about the health of the ailing leader.

By 29 October 2008, reports stated Kim suffered a serious setback and had been taken back to hospital. The New York Times reported that Taro Aso, on 28 October 2008, stated in a parliamentary session that Kim had been hospitalized: "His condition is not so good. However, I don't think he is totally incapable of making decisions." Aso further said a French neurosurgeon was aboard a plane for Beijing, en route to North Korea. Further, Kim Sung-ho, director of South Korea's National Intelligence Service, told lawmakers in a closed parliamentary session in Seoul that "Kim appeared to be recovering quickly enough to start performing his daily duties." ''The Dong-a Ilbo'' newspaper reported "a serious problem" with Kim's health. Japan's Fuji Television network reported that Kim's eldest son, Kim Jong-nam, traveled to Paris to hire a neurosurgeon for his father, and showed footage where the surgeon boarded flight CA121 bound for Pyongyang from Beijing on 24 October. The French weekly ''Le Point'' identified him as Francois-Xavier Roux, neurosurgery director of Paris' Sainte-Anne Hospital, but Roux himself stated he was in Beijing for several days and not North Korea. On 19 December 2011 Roux confirmed that Kim suffered a debilitating stroke in 2008 and was treated by himself and other French doctors at Pyongyang's Red Cross Hospital. Roux said Kim suffered few lasting effects.

On 5 November 2008, the North's Korean Central News Agency published 2 photos showing Kim posing with dozens of Korean People's Army (KPA) soldiers on a visit to military Unit 2200 and sub-unit of Unit 534. Shown with his usual bouffant hairstyle, with his trademark sunglasses and a white winter parka, Kim stood in front of trees with autumn foliage and a red-and-white banner. ''The Times'' questioned the authenticity of at least one of these photos.

In November 2008, Japan's TBS TV network reported that Kim had suffered a second stroke in October, which "affected the movement of his left arm and leg and also his ability to speak." However, South Korea's intelligence agency rejected this report.

In response to the rumors regarding Kim's health and supposed loss of power, in April 2009, North Korea released a video showing Kim visiting factories and other places around the country between November and December 2008. In 2010, documents released by WikiLeaks purportedly attested that Kim suffered from epilepsy.

According to ''The Daily Telegraph'', Kim was a chain-smoker.

Successor[link]

Kim's three sons and his brother-in-law, along with O Kuk-ryol, an army general, had been noted as possible successors, but the North Korean government had for a time been wholly silent on this matter.

Kim Yong Hyun, a political expert at the Institute for North Korean Studies at Seoul's Dongguk University, has said, "Even the North Korean establishment would not advocate a continuation of the family dynasty at this point." Kim's eldest son Kim Jong-nam was earlier believed to be the designated heir but he appears to have fallen out of favor after being arrested at Narita International Airport near Tokyo in 2001 while traveling on a forged passport.

On 2 June 2009, it was reported that Kim Jong-il's youngest son, Kim Jong-un, was to be North Korea's next leader. Like his father and grandfather, he has also been given an official sobriquet, The Brilliant Comrade. Prior to his death, it had been reported that Kim Jong Il was expected to officially designate the son as his successor in 2012. However, there are reports that if leadership passes to one of the sons, Kim Jong Il's brother-in-law, Jang Sung-taek, could attempt to seize power.

Re-election as DPRK leader[link]

On 9 April 2009, Kim was re-elected as chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission, and made an appearance at the Supreme People's Assembly. This was the first time Kim was seen in public since August 2008. He was unanimously re-elected and given a standing ovation.

On 28 September 2010, Kim was re-elected as General secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea.

2010 and 2011 foreign visits[link]

Kim reportedly visited the People's Republic of China in May 2010. He entered the country via his personal train on 3 May, and stayed in a hotel in Dalian. In May 2010, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell told South Korean officials that Kim had only three years to live. Kim travelled to China again in August 2010, this time with his son, fueling speculation that he is ready to hand over power to his son, Kim Jong-un.

He returned to China again in May 2011, marking the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and the DPRK. In late August 2011, he traveled by train to the Russian Far East to meet with President Dmitry Medvedev for unspecified talks.

Personal life[link]

Family[link]

There is no official information available about Kim Jong-il's marital history, but he is believed to have been officially married once and to have had three mistresses. He has four known children:

Kim Jong-nam (son)

Kim Sul-song (daughter)

Kim Jong-chul (son)

Kim Jong-un (son)

Kim's first mistress, Song Hye-rim, was a star of North Korean films. She was already married to another man and with a child when they met; Kim is reported to have forced her husband to divorce her. This relationship, started in 1970, was not officially recognized. They had one son, Kim Jong-nam (born 1971) who is Kim Jong-il's eldest son. Kim kept both the relationship and the child a secret (even from his father Kim Il Sung) until Kim ascended to power in 1994. However, after years of estrangement, Song is believed to have died in Moscow in the Central Clinical Hospital in 2002.

Kim's official wife, Kim Young-sook, was the daughter of a high-ranking military official. His father Kim Il-Sung handpicked her to marry his son.

After Ko's death, Kim lived with Kim Ok, his third mistress, who had served as his personal secretary since the 1980s. She "virtually acts as North Korea's first lady" and frequently accompanied Kim on his visits to military bases and in meetings with visiting foreign dignitaries. She traveled with Kim Jong Il on a secretive trip to China in January 2006, where she was received by Chinese officials as Kim's wife.

He reportedly had a younger sister, Kim Kyong-hui (김경희).

Personality[link]

Like his father, Kim had a pteromerhanophobia (fear of flying), and always traveled by private armored train for state visits to Russia and China. The BBC reported that Konstantin Pulikovsky, a Russian emissary who traveled with Kim across Russia by train, told reporters that Kim had live lobsters air-lifted to the train every day. Kim was said to be a huge film fan, owning a collection of more than 20,000 video tapes and DVDs. His reported favorite movie franchises included ''Friday the 13th'', ''Rambo'', ''Godzilla'', and Hong Kong action cinema, and any movie starring Elizabeth Taylor. He authored ''On the Art of the Cinema''. In 1978, on Kim's orders, South Korean film director Shin Sang-ok and his actress wife Choi Eun-hee were kidnapped in order to build a North Korean film industry. In 2006 he was involved in the production of the Juche-based movie, ''Diary of a Girl Student'', which depicted the life of a young girl whose parents are scientists, with a KCNA news report stating that Kim "improved its script and guided its production".

In a 2011 news story, ''The Sun'' reported, "Kim Jong-il was obsessed with Elvis Presley. His mansion was crammed with his idol's records and his collection of 20,000 Hollywood movies included Presley's titles – along with Rambo and Godzilla. He even copied the King's Vegas-era look of giant shades, jumpsuits and bouffant hairstyle.

Although Kim enjoyed many foreign forms of entertainment, according to former bodyguard Lee Young Kuk, he refused to consume any food or drink not produced in North Korea, with the exception of wine from France. His former chef Kenji Fujimoto, however, has stated that Kim sometimes sent him around the world to purchase a variety of foreign delicacies.

Kim reportedly enjoyed basketball. Former United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright ended her summit with Kim by presenting him with a basketball signed by NBA legend Michael Jordan. Also an apparent golfer, North Korean state media reports that Kim routinely shot three or four holes-in-one per round. His official biography also claims that Kim composed six operas and enjoys staging elaborate musicals. Kim referred to himself as an Internet expert.

United States Special Envoy for the Korean Peace Talks, Charles Kartman, who was involved in the 2000 Madeleine Albright summit with Kim, characterised Kim as a reasonable man in negotiations, to the point, but with a sense of humor and personally attentive to the people he was hosting. However, psychological evaluations conclude that Kim Jong-il's antisocial features, such as his fearlessness in the face of sanctions and punishment, served to make negotiations extraordinarily difficult.

The field of psychology has long been fascinated with the personality assessment of dictators, a notion that resulted in an extensive personality evaluation of Kim Jong-il. The report, compiled by Frederick L. Coolidge and Daniel L. Segal (with the assistance of a South Korean psychiatrist considered an expert on Kim Jong-il's behavior), concluded that the "big six" group of personality disorders shared by dictators Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Saddam Hussein (sadistic, paranoid, antisocial, narcissistic, schizoid and schizotypal) were also shared by Kim Jong-il — coinciding primarily with the profile of Saddam Hussein.

The evaluation found Kim Jong-il appeared to pride himself on North Korea's independence, despite the extreme hardships it appears to place on the North Korean people — an attribute appearing to emanate from his antisocial personality pattern. This notion also encourages other cognitive issues, such as self-deception, as subsidiary components to Kim Jong-il's personality.

Defectors claimed that Kim had 17 different palaces and residences all over North Korea, including a private resort near Baekdu Mountain, a seaside lodge in the city of Wonsan, and a palace complex northeast of Pyongyang surrounded with multiple fence lines, bunkers and anti-aircraft batteries.

Finances[link]

According to the ''Sunday Telegraph'', Kim had US$4 billion on deposit in European banks in case he ever needed to flee North Korea. The ''Sunday Telegraph'' reported that most of the money was in banks in Luxembourg.

Death[link]

Kim Jong-il died of a suspected heart attack on 17 December 2011 at 08:30 while travelling by train to an area outside Pyongyang. He was succeeded by his youngest son Kim Jong-un, who was hailed by the Korean Central News Agency as the "Great Successor". The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) report that during his death, a fierce snowstorm paused and the sky glowed red above the sacred Mount Paektu. The ice on a famous lake also cracked so loud, it seemed to shake the Heavens and the Earth.

Kim Jong-il's funeral took place on 28 December in Pyongyang, with a mourning period lasting until the following day. South Korea's military was immediately put on alert after the announcement and its National Security Council convened for an emergency meeting, out of concern that political jockeying in North Korea could destabilise the region. Asian stock markets fell soon after the announcement, due to similar concerns.

On 12 January 2012 North Korea called Kim Jong-il the "eternal leader" and announced that his body will be preserved and displayed at Pyongyang's Kumsusan Memorial Palace. Officials will also install statues, portraits, and "towers to his immortality" across the country. His birthday of 16 February has been declared "the greatest auspicious holiday of the nation", and has been named the Day of the Shining Star.

Official titles[link]

Party Center of the WPK and Member, Central Committee of the WPK (1970s)

Dear Leader (''Chinaehaneun Jidoja'') (late 1970s–1994)

Member, Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK

Secretary, Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (1974–1997)

Presidium Member of the Politburo, WPK Central Committee (1980–2011)

Supreme Commander, Korean People's Army (25 December 1991 – 17 December 2011)

Marshal of the DPRK (1993–2011)

Chairman, National Defence Commission of North Korea (1993–2011)

Great Leader (''Widehan Ryongdoja'') (July 1994 – December 2011)

General Secretary, Workers' Party of Korea (October 1997 – December 2011)

Chairman, Central Military Commission (DPRK) (October 1997 – December 2011)

Eternal Leader (posthumous) (January 2012  – present)

Grand Marshal of the DPRK (posthumous) (January 2012  – present)

Eternal General Secretary, Worker's Party of Korea (posthumous) (11 April 2012  – present)

Eternal Chairman of the National Defence of Commission (posthumous) (13 April 2012  - present)

See also[link]

Index of Korea-related articles

Sinuiju North Korean Leader's Residence

Notes and references[link]

Further reading[link]

Jasper Becker, "Rogue Regime: Kim John Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea", Oxford University Press (October 2006), Softcover, 328 pages, ISBN 0-19-530891-3

Michael Breen, ''Kim Jong-il: North Korea's Dear Leader'', John Wiley and Sons (January 2004), hardcover, 228 pages, ISBN 0-470-82131-0

Bradley Martin, ''Under The Loving Care Of The Fatherly Leader: North Korea And The Kim Dynasty'', St. Martins (October 2004), hardcover, 868 pages, ISBN 0-312-32221-6

Kim Chol U, ''Army-Centred Politics Of Kim Jong Il'', Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, North Korea, 2002, Softcover, 98 pages

Kim Jong Il Brief History, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, North Korea, 1998, Hardcover, 149 pages

Kim Jong Il Short Biography, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, North Korea, 2001, Hardcover, 215 pages

Pae Kyong Su, Kim Jong Il The Individual Thoughts And Leadership Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, North Korea, 1993, Softcover, 225 pages

Pae Kyong Su, Kim Jong Il The Individual Thoughts And Leadership Vol. 2, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, North Korea, 1995, Softcover, 164 pages

Nada Takashi, Korea In Kim Jong Il's Era, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, North Korea, 2000, Softcover, 163 pages

Li Il Bok, The Great Man Kim Jong Il, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, North Korea, 1989, Softcover, 167 pages

Ri Il Bok, The Great Man Kim Jong Il Vol. 2, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, North Korea, 1995, Softcover, 84 pages

Jo Song Baek, The Leadership Philosophy Of Kim Jong Il, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, North Korea, 1999, Softcover, 261 pages

Guiding Light General Kim Jong Il, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, North Korea, 1997, Softcover, 357 pages

External links[link]

 – Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang DPR Korea (1998)

Born in the USSR – Kim Jong-il's childhood.

The many family secrets of Kim Jong Il

(also includes photos of Kim during his youth)

Kim's family tree

BBC, North Korea's secretive 'first family'

Obituary: Kim Jong-il, BBC News, 19 December 2011

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Category:1940s births Category:2011 deaths Category:Alumni of the University of Malta Category:Deified people Category:Cardiovascular disease deaths in North Korea Category:Children of national leaders Category:Communist rulers Category:Deaths from myocardial infarction Category:Heads of state of North Korea Category:Kim Il-sung family Category:Korean expatriates in the Soviet Union Category:Korean film producers Category:Leaders of political parties in North Korea Category:Members of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea Category:North Korean billionaires Category:Koryo-saram Category:People from Khabarovsk Krai Category:Workers' Party of Korea politicians

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Name	Wen Jiabao温家宝
Office	6th Premier of the People's Republic of China
President	Hu Jintao
Deputy	Huang JuWu Yi (Acting)Li Keqiang
Term start	16 March 2003
Predecessor	Zhu Rongji
Office1	Chief of the General Office of the Communist Party of China
1blankname1
1namedata1	Hu YaobangZhao ZiyangJiang Zemin
Term start1	1986
Term end1	1993
Predecessor1	Wang Zhaoguo
Successor1	Zeng Qinghong
Birth date	September 19, 1942
Birth place	Tianjin, China
Party	Communist Party
Spouse	Zhang Peili
Children	YunsongRuchun
Alma mater	Beijing Institute of Geology
Signature	Wen Jiabao Sign.png }}

Wen Jiabao (born 19 September 1942) is the sixth and current Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, serving as China's head of government and leading its cabinet. In his capacity as Premier, Wen is regarded as the leading figure behind China's economic policy. He also holds membership in the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, the country's ''de facto'' top power organ, where he is ranked third out of nine members.

Wen has a professional background in geology and engineering. He holds a postgraduate degree from the Beijing Institute of Geology, where he graduated in 1968. He was subsequently sent to Gansu province for geological work, and remained in China's hinterland regions during his climb up the bureaucratic ladder. He was transferred to Beijing to work as the Chief of the Party General Office between 1986 and 1993, and accompanied General Secretary Zhao Ziyang to Tiananmen Square during the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests. In 1998, he was promoted to the post of Vice Premier under Zhu Rongji, his mentor, and oversaw the broad portfolios of agriculture and finance.

Since taking office as Premier in 2003, Wen, along with President Hu Jintao, has been a key part of the fourth generation of leadership in the Communist Party of China. Soft-spoken and known for his strong work ethic, Wen has been one of the most visible members of the incumbent Chinese administration, and has been dubbed "the people's premier" by both domestic and foreign media.

Described as having a commoner background and a populist approach to policy, Wen's domestic agenda marked a considerable shift from the previous administration. Instead of concentrating on GDP growth in large cities and rich coastal areas, Wen advocated for a more balanced approach in developing China's hinterland regions, and advancing policies considered more favourable towards farmers and migrant workers. Internationally, Wen played a key role in China's response to the global financial crisis and subsequent stimulus program.

Early life and rise to power[link]

A native of Beichen, Tianjin City, Wen Jiabao went to the Nankai High School from which his predecessor premier Zhou Enlai graduated. He joined the Communist Party of China (CPC) in April 1965 and entered the work force in September 1967.

Wen has a background in engineering and holds a post-graduate degree from the Beijing Institute of Geology. He studied geomechanics in Beijing and began his career in the geology bureau of Gansu province. From 1968–1978, he presided over the Geomechanics Survey Team under the Gansu Provincial Geological Bureau and head of its political section. Wen succeeded in office, rising as chief of the Gansu Provincial Geological Bureau and later as Vice-minister of Geology and Mineral Resources.

Wen was "discovered" by then-General Secretary Hu Yaobang, and joined the ranks of the Central Committee and Politburo. There was some public speculation after 1989 over whether Wen was closer to Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang, but Wen implicitly confirmed that he was a protege of Hu by the release of his 2010 article, "Recalling Hu Yaobang when I return to Xingyi". After Wen was promoted to work in Beijing, he served as director of the Party's General Affairs Office, an organ that oversaw day-to-day operations of the party's leaders. He remained in the post for eight years.

Wen has built a network of patronage during his career. Throughout this period Wen was said to be a strong administrator and technocrat, having earned a reputation for meticulousness, competence, and a focus on tangible results. Outgoing Premier Zhu Rongji showed his esteem for Wen by entrusting him from 1998 with the task of overseeing agricultural, financial and environmental policies in the office of Vice-Premier, considered crucial as China prepared to enter the World Trade Organization. Wen served as Secretary of the Central Financial Work Commission from 1998 to 2002. By the end of the 1990s Wen and Zhang Peili were the main investor and founder of Ping An Insurance, which was established with the help of Hong Kong tycoon Cheng Yu-tung's family through real estate firm New World Development.

Survival of Tiananmen purge [link]

Wen's most significant political recovery occurred after accompanying Zhao on his visit to students demonstrating in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Unlike Zhao, who was purged from the party days later for "grave insubordination" and lived under house arrest in Beijing until his death in January 2005, Wen survived the political aftermath of the demonstrations. Wen Jiabao is the only Chief of the Party's General Affairs Office to have served under three General Secretaries: Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin.

First-term Premiership[link]

Wen entered the Politburo Standing Committee, China's highest ruling council, in November 2002, ranked third out of nine members. During the transition of authority as Hu Jintao assumed the presidency in March 2003, Wen's nomination as premier was confirmed by the National People's Congress with over 99% of the delegates' vote. After taking over as Premier, Wen oversaw the continuation of China's economic reforms and has been involved in shifting national goals from economic growth at all costs to growth which also emphasizes more egalitarian wealth, along with other social goals, such as public health and education. Wen's broad range of experience and expertise, especially cultivated while presiding over agricultural policies under Zhu Rongji has been important as the "fourth generation" sought to revitalize the rural economy in regions left out by the past two decades of reform. In addition, the Chinese government under Wen has begun to focus on the social costs of economic development, which include damage to the environment and to workers' health. This more comprehensive definition of development was encapsulated into the idea of a ''xiaokang society''.

Initially regarded as quiet and unassuming, Wen is said to be a good communicator and is known as a "man of the people." Wen has appeared to make great efforts to reach out those who seem left out by two decades of stunning economic growth in rural and especially western China. Unlike Jiang Zemin and his protégés on the Politburo Standing Committee, who form the so-called "Shanghai clique", both Wen and Hu hail from, and have cultivated their political bases, in the vast Chinese interior. Many have noted the contrasts between Wen and Hu, "men of the people", and Jiang Zemin, the flamboyant, multilingual, and urbane former mayor of Shanghai, the country's most cosmopolitan city.

Like Hu Jintao, whose purported brilliance and photographic memory have facilitated his meteoric rise to power, Wen is regarded as well-equipped to preside over a vast bureaucracy in the world's most populated and perhaps rapidly changing nation. In March 2003, the usually self-effacing Wen was quoted as saying, "The former Swiss ambassador to China once said that my brain is like a computer", he said. "Indeed, many statistics are stored in my brain."

Mild-tempered and conciliatory, especially compared to his predecessor, the tough, straight-talking Zhu Rongji, Wen's consensual management style has enabled him to generate a great deal of good will, but has also created some opponents who are in support of tougher policy decisions. Notably, Wen was widely known to have clashed with then-Shanghai party chief Chen Liangyu over the central government's policies.

Wen was involved in two major episodes involving public health. In early 2003, he was involved in ending the official inaction over the SARS crisis. On 1 December 2004, he became the first major Chinese official to publicly address the problem of AIDS, which has devastated parts of the provinces of Yunnan and Henan and threatens to be a major burden on Chinese development. Since May 2004, Wen made various visits to communities devastated by AIDS, trips shown prominently on national media. By showing these actions, Wen displayed an effort to reverse years of what many activists have described as a policy of denial and inaction. Furthermore, Wen is concerned about the health and safety of previous drug addicts; since March 2004, Wen had visited several drug addict treatment facilities in southern China and addressed the issue to the patients in person, recognizing that AIDS is more likely to be spread by drug abuse and the reuse of hypodermic syringes than by sexual contact.

Wen was known to conduct visits to relatively poor areas of China's countryside randomly to avoid elaborate preparations to appease officials and hide the real situation, which is done often in China. At committee meetings of the State Council, Wen made it clear that the rural wealth disparity problem must be addressed. Along with General Secretary Hu Jintao, the government focused on the "Three Rural Issues", namely, agriculture, the countryside, and farmers, and emphasized these core areas as requiring further work and development. The Hu-Wen administration abolished the thousand year old agricultural tax entirely in 2005, a bold move that significantly changed the rural economic model. But despite these initiatives, Wen has been criticized for allowing the urban-rural gap to actually increase during his tenure. Like Zhu Rongji, Wen is generally seen as a popular communist official with the Chinese public. His attitude is seemingly sincere and warm, triggering comparisons with former premier Zhou Enlai. Wen spent Chinese New Year in 2005 with a group of coal miners in a Shanxi coal mine. To many, Wen has gained the image of being the "people's premier", a populist, and an ordinary Chinese citizen who knows and understands ordinary people's needs. In an annual meeting of the Chinese Authors Association, Wen spoke for over two hours to the delegates without looking at script. To foreign media, Wen also remains the highest government figure in China to give free press conferences, often facing politically sensitive and difficult questions regarding subjects such as Taiwan Independence, Tibetan independence and human rights.

In December 2003, Wen visited the United States for the first time. During the trip, Wen was able to get President George W. Bush to issue what many saw as a mild rebuke to the then President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Chen Shui-bian. Wen has also been on visits to Canada and Australia, mostly on economic issues. Wen also visited Japan in April 2007 in what was termed the "de-thawing journey", where he characterized the relationship between the Asian powers as for "mutual benefit". He also met with Emperor Akihito and played baseball.

On 15 March 2005, after the anti-secession law was passed, by a majority of 2,896 to nil, with two abstentions by the National People's Congress, Wen said: "We don't wish for foreign intervention, but we are not afraid of it." as an allusion to the United States' stance on Taiwan. That earned him a long round of applause that was rare even by Chinese standards.

On 5 March 2007, Wen announced plans to increase the military budget. By the end of 2007 the military budget rose 17.8 percent from the previous year's 45 billion dollars, creating tension with the United States.

There were rumours about Wen's retirement and reputed clashes with former Shanghai party chief Chen Liangyu before the party's 17th Party Congress. Some sources suggested that Wen would ask to retire due to fatigue. Ultimately, Wen stayed on the Premier job, and was responsible for the drafting of the important speech delivered by President Hu Jintao outlining China's direction in the next five years.

In January 2008, while China was undergoing severe snowstorms, Premier Wen made his way south and visited train stations in Changsha and Guangzhou, addressing the public while calming their mood for long train delays.

Second-term Premiership [link]

Premier Wen Jiabao was appointed to a second five-year term as China's premier on 16 March 2008, leading efforts to cool soaring inflation and showcase the country to the world at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He received fewer votes in favour than he did in 2003, a sign that the premiership can create enemies, even in the mere formalities of China's electoral system. Wen faced grave economic challenges as the world became increasingly affected by the U.S. economic crisis. Social stability and regional activism in China's restive hinterland regions also dominated Wen's policy agenda. On 18 March 2008, during the press conference after the 2008 National People's Congress, Wen toed the government line in blaming supporters of the Dalai Lama for violence in Tibet, and said Chinese security forces exercised restraint in confronting rioting and unrest in the streets of Lhasa. Wen acted as the spokesman of the Chinese government during the 2008 unrest in Tibet and refused to negotiate with the Dalai Lama and his followers, unless they chose to "give up all separatist activities."

Response to 2008 Sichuan Earthquake [link]

Premier Wen Jiabao's popularity was boosted significantly when he went to the disaster area of the Sichuan a mere few hours after the disaster occurred. He declared on national television that survivors are to be rescued as long as there is "a glimmer of hope". He was named the General Commander of the Earthquake Relief Efforts Committee immediately following the disaster. Following his visits to the area, images of the Premier were displayed on national media, numerous videos popped up on Chinese video sites making comparisons with former Premier Zhou Enlai, a largely popular figure who was also dubbed the "People's Premier". While China's leaders are often shown on state television looking rather stiff and sitting motionlessly, Wen's on-site image and candid nature attracted a large popular following of Chinese citizens.

In addition, there was speculation on internet forums as well as foreign media about the availability of the scientific prediction of the 2008 earthquake, and Wen was quoted as the only high-ranking Chinese leader to try to announce the scientific prediction and made it public, but was somehow prevented by other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, China's top power organ.

2009 NPC [link]

Before the 2009 National People's Congress convened, on 28 February, Premier Wen Jiabao went online on video chat to answer queries hosted by China's official government website ''gov.cn'' and the official Xinhua News Agency. During the session Wen openly advocated for transparency of the government and remarked that he was somewhat nervous about the occasion. He received a wide range of questions from large numbers of online Chinese netizens and chose to answer selected questions about prominent economic issues, such as global financial breakdown.

At the Congress Wen also passed on a message of reassurance that China's growth will not dip below 8% in 2009. Wen did not introduce a new stimulus package, and played down speculation that part of the 1.18 trillion RMB central government spending was not going directly into the economy. He also expressed concern about the security of China's holdings in U.S. treasury debt. In a more unusual gesture, Wen also expressed interest in visiting Taiwan, stating he would "crawl there if [he] could not walk".

Foreign policy [link]

Wen Jiabao has played a prominent role advancing China's foreign policy positions and has become increasingly visible on the world stage as China's economic power expanded. He went on an official working visit to North Korea on 4 October 2009, the first time a Chinese Premier has visited North Korea since Li Peng's visit in 1991. He was greeted at the Pyongyang Airport by ailing North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il. Kim rarely greets foreign dignitaries himself upon their arrival at the airport. Reuters believed this to be a show of solidarity from North Korea and that the country was serious in fostering a good relationship with China. Wen also met with European Union leaders at a China-EU conference in late November 2009, where he refused calls for China to revalue its Yuan and re-examine its foreign exchange regime. Wen remarked in Nanjing that "some countries are on the one hand pressuring China to appreciate its currency while on the other hand they are practising trade protectionism against China in many different forms."

In December, in what was seen as a mild rebuke of Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper during the latter's working visit to China, Wen stated, "This is your first trip to China and this is the first meeting between the Chinese Premier and the Canadian Prime Minister in almost five years. Five years is too long a time for China Canada relations." However, the interpretation that Wen rebuked Harper was later disputed in select newspaper editorials. Wen also travelled to the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference, where he met with U.S. President Barack Obama twice to secure an 11th-hour non-binding agreement on emissions cuts.

Political views [link]

Domestic and foreign media have variously described Wen as "populist" and in touch with the needs of ordinary people. On most social issues Wen seems to be moderate, with his brand of policies based around societal harmony as prescribed by the Scientific Development Concept, the leading ideology of the administration.

In the first term of his Premiership Wen's attitudes towards political reform seemed ambivalent. He has remarked that "the socialist system will continue in China for the next 100 years", although later in a Press Conference at the 2007 National People's Congress, he stated that "democracy is one of the basic goals of the socialist system". Furthermore, in an interview in September 2008, Wen acknowledged that the democratic system in China needs to be improved, where the power "truly belongs to the people" through the construction of an independent judicial system and for the government to accept criticism from the people. Wen, seen as a former ally of Premier Zhao Ziyang, is likely supportive of the latter's political rehabilitation. However, Wen has rarely mentioned Zhao publicly during his premiership. When asked by CNN whether or not China will liberalize for free elections in the next 25 years, Wen stated that it would be "hard to predict." On the subject of Taiwan, Wen reputedly believes in gradual negotiations. On the subject of Tibet, Wen toes the party line in condemning the exiled Dalai Lama for inciting "separatist violence".

|Feb. 2007}}

Xinhua published articles in early 2007 on the direction of national development. The authorship of the articles was attributed separately to Wen Jiabao, particularly the 26 February piece "Our Historical Tasks at the Primary Stage of Socialism and Several Issues Concerning China's Foreign Policy". The article advanced Wen's "peace doctrine" in global affairs, as well as what appeared to be inclinations towards fostering social democracy and advocacy of universal values. This was suspected as a sign that Wen has some differing viewpoints to the official party line – that values are relativistic and that "Chinese values" are not necessarily the same as "Western values," and that universal values is thus an empty concept. The debate continues to rage in Chinese political circles today, with neo-leftist thinkers such as Chinese Academy of Social Sciences President Chen Kuiyuan criticizing Wen's advocacy of universal values, saying that it relegates Chinese values and thinking as an inferior alternative to supposedly more "correct" Western norms.

Wen is perceived by some observers as a liberal voice in China's ruling elite. Wen has openly talked about democracy and increased freedoms in his speeches and interviews with foreign correspondents, although much of it was deemed "sensitive" commentary and censored in state media. Wen remarked that "someone who speaks is not a criminal, someone who listens is duly warned" (, ''which alludes to the classical work Shi Jing'') at a internal party conference in 2009, an event reported on Xinhua and other state networks. His remarks triggered debate from netizens, as it seemed to contravene the practices of the Communist Party, particularly in its suppression of dissent. Analysts noted that Wen's message was aimed at party members, and not necessarily the general public because Wen believes freedom of speech has deteriorated since Hu Jintao's accession to power and has negatively affected China's political landscape and international reputation. His comments also ostensibly addressed the pervasive "fake-talking" present in Chinese political circles, in an attempt to curb systemic and institutional woes stemming from officials who are afraid to speak the truth.

Wen has progressively amped up his liberal rhetoric as his Premiership continued, remarking in August 2010 that "Without political reform, China may lose what it has already achieved through economic restructuring". Wen's comments were largely censored in state media, but he gained support from a group of some 23 party elders in October, who denounced the authorities' censorship of Wen's remarks in an open letter to the National People's Congress. In an interview with Fareed Zakaria on CNN's Global Public Square television program aired in October 2010, Wen made the following statement: "I have summed up my political ideals into the following four sentences. To let everyone lead a happy life with dignity. To let everyone feel safe and secure. To let the society be one with equity and justice. And to let everyone have confidence in the future. In spite of the various discussions and views in the society, and in spite of some resistance, I will act in accordance with these ideals unswervingly, and advance within the realm of my capabilities political restructuring. I will like to tell you the following two sentences to reinforce my view on this point. I will not fall in spite of the strong wind and harsh rain, and I will not yield until the last day of my life." At the 2012 National People's Congress, Wen mentioned the word "reform" 70 times. He remarked that China must "press ahead with both economic structural reforms and political structural reforms, in particular reforms on the leadership system of the Party and the country." There is also indication from party insiders that Wen has been pushing the case for the political rehabilitation of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.

Public image and political influence [link]

Wen has been described as a populist by most observers. His quick responses and visits to the scenes of various disasters, including the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, has earned him a considerable reputation as an approachable leader in touch with the experiences of the masses. Wen engages regularly with locals on his trips to various Chinese provinces as well as foreign visits; he played baseball and badminton with Japanese and South Korean citizens during visits to those countries. "Whether taking a stroll or swimming, it puts me at ease both mentally and physically and helps me handle my heavy workload," Wen had remarked.

Wen's public image has been criticized by Chinese dissident Yu Jie, who charged that Wen's rhetoric is insincere and empty. Dissidents such as Yu allege that Wen's parade of appearances on Chinese media is a carefully managed public relations campaign designed to distract people from real issues. They say that through use of Wen's charisma, the government hopes to showcase cosmetic solutions to much larger, systemic issues in order to placate public opinion. They also point out that Wen's words are rarely translated into deeds. On the other hand, Li Datong, a pro-democracy advocate, in an interview with the Associated Press, stated that "among the top Chinese leaders, who else speaks about democracy? Who else speaks about universal values and freedom?... Wen is the only one." Li believes that Wen is genuinely calling for democratic reform but he is powerless to make major decisions on the matter due to internal opposition. Wen's family members have also been subject to gossip and scrutiny outside of mainland China. Taiwanese media zoomed in on his wife's alleged personal fortunes from her jewelry business, while the ''Financial Times'' reported on a private equity firm called New Horizon Capital co-founded by Wen's son Wen Yunsong.

As the head of Chinese Central People's government, Wen Jiabao is considered to be one of the most powerful statesmen in the world. In 2006, he was named to the Time 100 list. In 2009, Wen was named one of ten people and the only non-American in a list compiled by ABC of people who shaped the U.S. economy the most since 2000. Wen also topped a list of "10 leaders to watch" in 2010 released 19 January by Eurasia Group, a global political risk research and consulting firm. Behind that U.S. President Barack Obama came second. In August 2010, Wen was named "The Man of the People" by ''Newsweek''. In October 2010, Wen Jiabao was a person selected on the TIME Magazine's cover that the title was "Wen's World".In 2011, Wen was ranked 14th in Forbes Magazine's List of The World's Most Powerful People.

Personal life [link]

Wen Jiabao is married to Zhang Peili, a jewellery expert and investor, who has rarely appeared with Wen in public. According to a U.S. diplomatic cable posted in Wikileaks, Wen has sought to divorce his wife and is "disgusted" by how she has used his name to extract huge commissions in the diamond trade.. They have a son, Wen Yunsong, who is CEO of Unihub, a Chinese networking company, and a daughter, Wen Ruchun.

Wen is said to have an introverted personality. He has stated that his one regret so far in life was "Never having learned to drive a manual car." Wen is known for his adept use of Chinese poetry to convey political and diplomatic messages, to respond to journalists, or simply to begin a speech.

See also [link]

Politics of the People's Republic of China

History of the People's Republic of China (2002–present)

Hu-Wen Administration

References [link]

External links [link]

"Recalling Hu Yaobang When I Return to Xingyi" [Chinese: 再回兴义忆耀邦]: an essay written by Wen as a eulogy of Hu Yaobang. The article originally appeared in ''The People's Daily'' on 15 April 2010.

Wen Jiabao at Facebook

Wen Jiabao biography @ China Vitae, the web's largest online database of China VIPs

The Age – Who is Wen Jiabao?

How to pronounce Wen Jiabao

Wen says China's reforms irreversible

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Category:1942 births Category:Chinese atheists Category:Chinese geologists Category:Current national leaders Category:Leaders of the Communist Party of China Category:Living people Category:People from Tianjin Category:Premiers of the People's Republic of China

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