Nguyen Khanh

Name	Nguyễn Khánh
Birth date	November 08, 1927
Birth place	Trà Vinh, Vietnam
Allegiance	State of Vietnam,Republic of Vietnam
Rank	General (Đại tướng)
Commands	11th Mobile Group (1953–1954)Vietnam Air Force (1955)1st Infantry Division (1956–1957)II Corps (1962–1963)I Corps (1963–1964)
Battles	First Indochina WarVietnam War
Laterwork	Prime Minister (1964)Head-of-State (1964)
Awards	}}

Nguyễn Khánh (born November 8, 1927) is a former general in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam who variously served as chief of state and Prime minister of South Vietnam while at the head of a military junta from January 1964 until February 1965. He was involved in or against many coup attempts, failed and successful, from 1960 until his defeat and exile from South Vietnam in 1965.

The son of a wealthy Mekong Delta landlord, Khánh joined Hồ Chí Minh’s communist-dominated Việt Minh in 1945 after finishing his schooling, as the nationalist fervour for independence from France swept across Vietnam. He left the Việt Minh after a year, claiming that he had not previously known about their communist ideology. It was the first of many notable changes of allegiance during his military career, and critics claimed that Khánh switched to the French-backed State of Vietnam and Vietnamese National Army because he was a careerist. In any case, he trained as an officer and commanded paratroopers against the Việt Minh in the First Indochina War. After the partition, and the formation of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), Khánh became the first commander of the Vietnam Air Force after a crash course in flying. By the age of 33 he was already a general and the Chief of Staff of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. In November 1960, he helped President Ngô Đình Diệm defeat a coup attempt by paratroopers, but he was accused of waiting until Diệm gained the upper hand before backing him. In 1963, after Diệm was captured and executed after a successful coup, Khánh was posted to the far north of the country as the ruling generals deemed him to be untrustworthy.

The ambitious Khánh responded by launching a successful coup in January 1964, with the help of General Trần Thiện Khiêm against General Dương Văn Minh’s junta. Although he kept the popular Minh on as a figurehead head of state, Khánh maintained controlled the junta and named himself Prime Minister. He also staged a show trial against some of Minh’s close colleagues, having falsely accused them of supporting neutralism in order to justify his coup. However, he was unable to produce evidence of this and later disbarred them from command on grounds of "lax morality". During his time as leader, Khánh faced many challenges to his power and this led to a series of factional changes to maintain himself in power. After initially appearing to be allied to several Roman Catholic pro-Diệm generals, Khánh was faced by mass demonstrations by the Buddhist majority, and then tried to win them over by removing some generals associated with Diệm. This led to some Catholic generals, such as Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and his coup partner Khiêm becoming hostile to him. Khánh eventually had Minh and Khiêm sent overseas, along with Khiêm’s ally, Phạm Ngọc Thảo, an undetected communist agent bent of maximizing infighting. Despite this, the Catholic Generals Lâm Văn Phát and Dương Văn Đức, who had been demoted due to Buddhist pressure launched a coup attempt in September 1964. Khánh was eventually saved by the pro-Buddhist General Nguyễn Chánh Thi, and the Vietnam Air Force Chief Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, increasing their influence over him.

Khánh’s strong anti-communist rhetoric had drawn strong support from the Americans, but they later came to view him as unreliable, and they were particularly angered when the generals dismissed the High National Council, an advisory body designed to give the veneer of civilian government. A civilian president and prime minister were also installed under military supervision, but were quickly removed. One private discussion with US Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor and the junta generals over these issues resulted in an angry threat to expel Taylor, which was followed by a threat to cut off aid, and a public denunciation of the Americans by Khánh. Khánh decided that he could no longer rely on American support, and decided to try to contact the Việt Cộng to reach a truce. The Americans found out and began to try to organize Khánh’s removal. In February, Phát and Thảo launched a coup against Khánh, but were defeated by Thi and Kỳ despite initially taking the upper hand. Khánh was then ousted by his junta colleagues and forced into exile, and Thi and Kỳ became the leading powers. During Khánh’s rule, the Việt Cộng made substantial inroads, aided by the infighting within the ARVN. Since 2005, he has been the Chief of State of the self-proclaimed Government of Free Vietnam, an American-based overseas Vietnamese anti-communist organization that seeks to overthrow the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam. The organization is not recognized by any country.

Early years

Khánh was born in Trà Vinh in the Mekong Delta region in the far south of Vietnam. His mother ran a nightclub in the central highlands resort town of Đà Lạt that was popular with French colonial personnel, and lived away from the family home in the deep south. Khánh’s father was a wealthy landlord who lived in the Mekong Delta with a mistress, a popular Vietnamese actress and singer. Khánh was brought up by his de facto stepmother. Trà Vinh is a border town near Cambodia and the family moved between both countries. Khánh started his education in Cambodia and when he grew up, he moved to Saigon to study at an elite French school, boarding with wealthy relatives who had married into French colonial families. They started with only pieces of bamboo and had to capture or steal their weapons. Another account says that Khánh’s unit was relieved by a larger and stronger unit that was better trained and indoctrinated in communist ideology, and that Khánh’s band were “too tired” after their tour of duty and did not have the “proper discipline”. Khánh claimed that they were removed because they were nationalists rather than communists.

Vietnamese National Army and early years in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam

Khánh then joined the Vietnamese National Army (VNA) of the French-backed State of Vietnam under the leadership of former Emperor Bảo Đại. The State of Vietnam was an associated state of the French Union and fought in the First Indochina War alongside French forces against the Việt Minh.

Khánh was part of the first batch of Vietnamese officers trained by the French in the country. Of the 17 students who started the course, only 11 passed.

In 1949–52, he was a Lieutenant and commanded the first airborne unit in the VNA after being sent to France for training. In 1957, he was chosen to attend the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas,

Anti-coup loyalist in 1960

In November 1960, mutinous paratroopers attempted to depose Diệm, and laid siege to Gia Long Palace. Khánh arrived on the scene and climbed over the palace wall to reach Diệm during the siege.

During the standoff, Khánh met with rebel officers to keep abreast of their demands that Diệm share power. He then advised Diệm to resign due to the demands of the rebel forces and protestors outside the palace, but the president refused. Diệm advised Khánh to continue to negotiating, and a ceasefire was organised. Diệm promised reforms,

Khánh’s action gained him a reputation of having helped the president, but he was later criticised for having a foot in both camps. Critics claimed that Khánh had been on good terms with the rebels and decided against rebelling when it was clear that Diệm would win. Khánh was later dispatched to the central highlands as the commander of the II Corps. His American advisers were impressed with him and regarded him as an effective force against the Việt Cộng. Khánh also tried to win over the indigenous Montagnard tribesmen, trying to learn their languages. In mid-December he was moved from the II Corps in the central highlands to the command of the I Corps of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, based around Huế and Đà Nẵng in the far north of the Republic of Vietnam. This, it was speculated, was to keep him as far away from Saigon as possible, as he was regarded by the others as being untrustworthy.

This was contrary to Khánh’s request for a transfer to the IV Corps in the Mekong Delta close to Saigon, where most of the unconventional fighting was taking place. In an interview with journalist Robert Shaplen, Khánh made no attempt to hide his annoyance at not being given a more important job. With respect to the 1963 coup, he cryptically commented, “It is too soon yet to tell the whole story, but someday I will tell it to you”. He claimed that he had built up intelligence infrastructure to weed out the Việt Cộng under Diệm’s rule, but that the other generals had disbanded it and released communist prisoners. All twelve generals in the MRC had equal power and the power of veto. The press strongly attacked Thơ, accusing his government of being “tools” of the MRC. Minh was criticised for being lethargic and disinterested in running the country, while communist attacks increased and the military situation deteriorated.

At the end of December, Khánh was approached by General Ðỗ Mậu, one of the principal tacticians in the removal of Diệm. Mậu had been the head of military security under Diệm and had a deep understanding of most of the senior officers and their strengths and weaknesses. Khiêm, Khánh and Mậu kept in touch surreptitiously on a regular basis, supplementing their forces with an assortment of Marine, Air Force and Special Forces officers.

Another notable recruit was the chief of the Civil Guard, Duong Ngoc Lam. He was under investigation by the junta for swindling military funds and was readily converted. Another was General Dương Văn Đức, who had recently returned from exile in Paris.

At the time, there was innuendo that the MRC would become neutralist and stop fighting the communists, and that they were plotting with French President Charles de Gaulle, who supported such a solution in order to remove the US presence. Khánh’s allies concocted documents purporting to show that Generals Minh, Lê Văn Kim and Trần Văn Đôn were making neutralist moves, and the papers were leaked to some senior American officials. Khánh sometimes plotted while in Saigon on military affairs, and told various American officials that Đôn, Kim and General Mai Hữu Xuân, along with Minh, were “pro-French and pro-neutralist” and part of de Gaulle’s plan. Khánh claimed that the fact that Đôn had invited two members of the French National Assembly—both from de Gaulle’s party—to dinner with him, Kim and Minh as proof.

On January 28, Khánh flew from Huế to Saigon in civilian clothes, ostensibly for a dental appointment.

Before dawn on January 30, Khánh surrounded the military headquarters at Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base. Meanwhile, Khiêm had overslept when he was supposed to seal off the homes of the junta members. Despite this, by daybreak, Khánh had taken over the government without a shot having been fired.

US officials in Washington were caught off guard by the coup. Although Khánh had already told CIA agent Lucien Conein (who helped to plan the coup against Diệm) in December 1963 that he intended to hold a coup, it was filed away among the many political rumour documents that were received by the American representatives. Following the coup, he was promoted by the Americans as South Vietnam’s new hope.

Setting up the junta

Khánh used de Gaulle’s policy plans to enact retribution against Generals Đôn and Kim. Khánh had them arrested on grounds of neutralism. Khánh noted that they had served in the French-backed VNA, although he did as well. The generals were flown to My Khe beach, near Đà Nẵng, along with Generals Tôn Thất Đính and Mai Hữu Xuân, the interior minister and police chief, respectively, of the MRC.

Khánh proclaimed himself as the new head of state and chairman of the MRC, replacing Minh. Khánh later managed to persuade Minh to remain as a figurehead head of state due to American pressure. They reasoned that the popular Minh would be a unifying and stabilising factor in the new régime and provide continuity. However, Khánh soon came to dominate the MRC. Khánh turned out to be far more politically astute and vigorous that his predecessors, seeking out veteran Vietnamese politicians and technicians to create a new government. A week after coming to power, Khánh summoned Nguyễn Tôn Hoàn, a Roman Catholic who was one of the former leaders of the southern branch of the Đại Việt Quốc Dân Dảng (Greater Vietnam Nationalist Party). Hoàn had been exiled in Paris during the Diệm era, but remained active, publishing a magazine and keeping up to speed with developments in Vietnam.

Khánh selected a cabinet of thirteen ministers and two Secretaries of State at Cabinet level and chose new provincial and district chiefs. He originally tried to include members of a variety of political and religious groups including representatives of the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo. The Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo still had remnants of their private armies intact after their dismantling by Diệm in 1955. Although Khánh insisted that he had no party affiliation, the orientation of his government was toward the Đại Việt, who held many key posts. This provoked bitterness from other anti-communist nationalists and groups that were banned under the Diệm period and were seeking a greater role in the public life of South Vietnam, as well as from younger citizens who felt that the established nationalist parties were responsible for divisions in the country.

Khánh promised that the village elections that were abolished under Diệm would be held as soon as feasible and that a new National Assembly would be elected within a year. He started by abolishing the Council of Notables, and advisory body. Many Vietnamese and American observers considered this rash and premature, as promises of elections been frequently broken and that the council had at least been an effective forum for dissent in the absence of parliamentary representation.

However, Khánh received little assistance from Minh, who resented his deposal by a younger officer whom he viewed as an unscrupulous upstart. Minh was also upset with the detention of his colleagues and around 30 of his junior officers. The latter were set free when Minh demanded that Khánh release them as a condition for his cooperation. Khánh attempted to avoid the issue of substantiating the alleged plot as long as he could, The tribunal then “congratulated” the generals, but found that they were of “lax morality”, unqualified to command due to a “lack of a clear political concept”. Khánh’s actions left divisions among the officer corps of the ARVN. When Khánh was himself deposed in 1965, he handed over dossiers proving that the generals were innocent. Shaplen said that “the case … continued to be one of Khanh’s biggest embarrassments”.

The activist Buddhist leader Thích Trí Quang continued to criticise Khánh and accused him of jailing Buddhists. to death. This occurred over the private objections of US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who thought that it was best for Khánh to take a mild line to dampen any religious tension. Cẩn was executed by firing squad on May 9. Still, Thích Trí Quang remained critical of what he saw as a lack of vigour on the part of Khánh in removing Diệmists from positions of authority.

Diệm had no prior political experience and turned to Lodge for advice. The US Ambassador advised him to pursue a policy of inclusion of the various groups in Vietnamese society, and Khánh followed this counsel. During this time, Khánh’s régime suffered several military setbacks, such as the Battle of Long Dinh. In March, Khánh began privately advocating the Americans to attack jungle areas in Laos and North Vietnam near the border with South Vietnam to stop communist infiltration, saying that it was pointless to keep fighting defensive within the country without taking the initiative to stop incoming forces. Khánh also made a plan with conservative Laotian General Phoumi Nosovan for anti-communist incursions into eastern Laos, but the Americans stopped him and also leaked false reports to the media that he was reluctant to attack. He then led the demonstrators in shouting, “To the North” repeatedly. In a meeting with Ambassador Taylor, Khánh assured the American envoy that his was a political gesture that should be seen as a show. However, it spread to the government-moderated press, and some generals expressed similar sentiments. Khánh then told Taylor that he had to allow Southerners to express their aspirations to unify Vietnam on their own terms and that plans were being explored. Khánh publicly called on the Americans to strike back in order to project a strong image and avoid resembling a “paper tiger”.

US President Lyndon Johnson was given more military powers as a result of the incident, Khánh saw the tense situation as an opportunity to concentrate more power in his hands. He declared a state of emergency on 7 August, empowered the police to ban protests, search properties under any circumstances and arbitrarily jail “elements considered as dangerous to national security”. which would have augmented his personal power and hamstrung Minh of what authority he had left. However, this only served to weaken Khánh as large demonstrations and riots in the cities broke out, with the Buddhists prominent, calling for an end to the state of emergency and the new constitution. Information Ministry buildings and radio stations were set on fire.

During one protest in which thousands of people were chanting “down with military dictatorship”, Khánh confronted the crowd and joined the opposition in their shouting, claiming that he was not what they claimed him to be, rather than cracking down on them.

Fearing that the he could be toppled by the momentum of the protests, Khánh asked Thích Trí Quang, Thich Tam Chau and Thich Thien Minh to hold talks with him at Vũng Tàu on August 24. They refused and Khánh had to go to Saigon to try and get them to stop protesting against him, demonstrating his weakness. They asked him to repeal the new constitution, reinstate civilian rule, and remove Cần Lao members from power.

Needing support to stay afloat, Khánh released a communiqué after the meeting, promising to revise the constitution, liberalise the press, permit protests and start special courts to look into past grievances.

This prompted more protests by activists and Khánh responded with wider concessions, which he convinced the Military Revolutionary Council to assent to. Under this plan, the new constitution would be repealed, and the MRC would dissolve itself. He then paid US$300,000 to Buddhist groups in return for their public endorsement, which Khánh publicly used to highlight his support. In return, Khánh promised to create a National Assembly within a year.

Junta infighting

Khánh’s concessions sparked opposition from the Roman Catholic Khiem and Thiệu. They then tried to remove him in favour of Minh, and they recruited many officers into their plot. Khiem and Thiệu sought out Taylor and sought a private endorsement for a coup against Khanh, but the US ambassador did not want any more changes in leadership, fearing a corrosive effect on the government. This deterred Khiem's group from staging a coup.

The division among the generals came to a head at a meeting of the MRC on August 26–27. Khanh claimed that the government instability was due to troublemaking by Dai Viet members, who he accused of putting partisan plotting ahead of the national interest and the struggle against the communists. Khiem blamed Khanh's weakness in dealing with Buddhist activists as the reason for the demonstrations in the cities and the rural losses against the communists. Thieu and the Catholic General Nguyen Huu Co called for the replacement of Khanh with Minh, but the latter refused.

Attempted coup by Generals Phat and Duc and further instability

In September 1964, Khanh dismissed General Lam Van Phat as Interior Minister, while General Duong Van Duc was about to be removed as IV Corps commander. Disgruntled, the pair launched a coup attempt before dawn on September 13, using ten army battalions that they had recruited. They took over the city without any firing, and used the national radio station to proclaim the deposal of Khanh's junta. Phat said that he would use the ideology and legacy of Diem to lay the foundation for his new junta. There was little reaction from most of the military commanders.

On September 20, the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor and their 300,000 members staged a general strike for two days, causing electricity in the cities to be cut for two days. This prompted Khanh to make concessions to laborers.

This was followed by other protests and riots in some cities, the largest being in the southern coastal town of Qui Nhon where the public service stopped functioning for a short period.

A veneer of civilian rule

Khanh and his generals decided to create a semblance of civilian rule by creating the High National Council, an appointed advisory body. He put Minh in charge of picking the 17 members of the group, and he filled it with figures sympathetic to him. They then made a resolution to recommend a model with a powerful head of state, which would likely be Minh. Khanh did not want his rival taking power, so he and the Americans convinced the HNC to dilute the powers of the position so as to make it unappealing to Minh, who was then sent on an overseas diplomatic goodwill tour.

The HNC, which covered a wide cross-section of different social groups, selected the aging Phan Khac Suu as chief of state, and Suu selected Tran Van Huong as prime minister, a position that had greater power. However, the generals and Khanh retained the real power. At the same time, a group of Catholic officers were trying to replace Khanh with Thieu.

Huong took a firm line against the Buddhists, accusing Thich Tri Quang of being communist, who in turn charged Huong of being a Diemist, and responded with mass protests against the new civilian administration, calling for its removal. Huong used the army to break up the demonstrations, resulting in some violent confrontations.

By the end of the year, Khanh had sidelined Khiem and Minh. He despatched Khiem to Washington as the ambassador with Thao, his main confidant, as his press attaché. In late December 1964, Khanh summoned Thao back to Saigon by Khanh. Thao suspected that Khanh was attempting to have him killed, while Khanh thought that Thao and Khiem were plotting against him. Fearing that he would be arrested upon arrival, Thao attempted to outmanoeuvre Khanh and immediately went underground upon returning to Saigon. In mid-January 1965, the Khanh called for him to report to his superiors in the ARVN, warning that he would be "considered guilty of abandoning his post with all the consequences of such a situation" if he failed to do so.

Khanh and a group of younger officers called the Young Turks led by Ky and Thieu wanted to forcibly retire officers with more than 25 years of service, as they thought them to be lethargic and ineffective.

On of the aims of this was to remove Generals Don, Minh, Kim and Xuan, who Khanh had put under arrest after his January coup but had now released and put into meaningless desk jobs with no work to do, although they were still being paid. According to Khanh and the Young Turks, the group, led by Minh, who had returned from his overseas tour, had been making plots with the Buddhists to regain power. In any case, the HNC had already ceased to function in a meaningful way, as only 9 of the 17 members were still occasionally attending its meetings. Initially Taylor issued a thinly disguised threat to cut aid, releasing a public statement saying that Washington might reconsider its military aid if "the fabric of legal government" was not reinstated.

Khanh's quartet of delegates responded to Taylor by responding in a circumlocutory way. They remained calm and did not resort to direct confrontation. Ky said that the change was necessary, as "the political situation is worse than it ever was under Diem". Ky explained that the situation mandated the dissolution of the council, saying "We know you want stability, but you cannot have stability until you have unity". Thieu said that "I do not see how our action has hurt the Huong government...Huong now has the full support of the Army and has no worries from the High Naitonal Council, which we have eliminated".

The day after the press conference, Taylor met Khanh in a private meeting at the latter's office. He complained about the dissolution of the HNC and said that it did not accord with the values of the alliance and the loyalty that Washington expected of Saigon. Khanh testily replied that Vietnam was not a satellite of Washington and compared the situation to the US support of a coup against Diem, saying that loyalty was meant to be reciprocated. Taylor then bemoaned Khanh, saying that he had lost confidence. Taylor also said that military supplies that were being shipped to Vietnam would be withheld after arriving at Saigon and that American help in planning and advising military operations would be suspended.

Khanh bristled and said that "You should keep to your place as Ambassador...as Ambassador, it is really not appropriate for you to be dealing in this way with the commander-in-chief of the armed forces on a political matter, nor was it appropriate for you to have summoned some of my generals to the Embassy yesterday." However, Khanh later said that he was open to the possibility of going abroad and asked Taylor if he thought this would be good for the country, to which the ambassador replied in the affirmative. Khanh then ended the meeting, saying that he would think about his future. He said it was "better to live poor but proud as free citizens of an independent country rather than in ease and shame as slaves of the foreigners and Communists". Khanh explicitly denounced Taylor in an interview published in the New York Herald Tribune on December 23, Taylor responded by stating that generals had participated in "improper interference" into the purview of civilian government, while embassy staff said that their head had done nothing improper, as did the State Department, effectively again threatening to cut aid.

Khanh's defiance of Taylor saw his approval rise among the fellow generals, as the ambassador's actions were seen as being an insult to the nation.

On the same day, the Vietcong bombed the Brinks Hotel, where US officers were billeted. As a result, there was a suspicion among a minority that Khanh's junta had been behind the attack,

As a result of the tension in late-December, a standoff started between the Americans and the Vietnamese generals. The US hoped that the generals would relent because they could not survive without aid from Washington, and that they would not be able to repel the communists or rival officers without bending to receive support. On the other hand, Khanh hoped that the Americans would become more worried about the communists first and acquiesce to their fait accompli against the HNC. They also agreed that a new appointed civilian body would be created in the meantime and that those arrested in December would be released.

The South Vietnamese won in large part because the Americans had spent so much on the country, and could not afford to abandon it and lose to the communists over the matter of military rule, as it would be a big public relations coup for the Soviet bloc. According to Karnow, for Khanh and his officers, "their weakness was their strength".

Khanh then decided to have the armed forces take over the government, and remove Huong. On the morning of 27 January, Khanh staged a bloodless putsch with the support of Thi and Ky. He promised to leave politics once the situation was stabilized and hand over power to a civilian body. It was believed that some of the officers supported Khanh's return to power so that it would give him an opportunity to fail and be removed permanently. Khanh persisted with the facade of civilian government by retaining Suu and replacing Huong with the economist Nguyen Xuan Oanh. In late-January 1965, Buddhist protests against Prime Minister Huong broke out across South Vietnam, and were at their largest in central Vietnam in I Corps. In Hue, matters degenerated into a riot as 5,000 demonstrators attacked the U.S. Information Service Library and burned 8,000 books. Khanh and Thi, turned a blind eye to the rioting and destruction of property. It was believed that they did so to allow the disorder to ruin the Huong government and allow them to inherit power. Shortly before noon on 19 February, he used tanks and infantry to seize control of the military headquarters at Tan Son Nhut, the post office and the radio station of Saigon. He surrounded Khanh's home, and the residence Suu.

The country was still trying to find stability, with Phan Huy Quat being appointed prime minister just three days earlier. Khanh managed to escape and flee to Vung Tau. His plane lifted off from Tan Son Nhut Air Base just as rebel tanks were rolling in, attempting to block the runway. Thao made a radio announcement stating that the sole objective of his military operation was to get rid of Khanh, whom he described as a "dictator". Thao did this in league with General Lam Van Phat, who was supposed to seize the Bien Hoa Air Base to prevent Ky from mobilising air power against them. At 20:00, Phat and Thao met Ky in a meeting organised by the Americans, and insisted that Khanh be removed from power. The coup collapsed when, around midnight, loyal ARVN forces swept into the city from the south and some loyal to Ky from Bien Hoa in the north. Whether the rebels were genuinely defeated or a deal was struck with Ky to end the revolt in exchange for Khanh's removal is disputed. Before fleeing, Thao broadcast a message stating that the coup had been effective in removing Khanh. This was not the case, but the chaos led the Armed Forces Council to adopt a vote of no confidence in Khanh the next day. This motion was precipitated by Thi, who gained the support of Ky, and the final vote was unanimous. Ky assumed control of a junta that continued with Suu and Quat as a civilian front, although General Tran Van Minh was the nominal head as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Khanh was not present at his ouster, as he was north of Saigon, inspecting a display of captured communist weapons. Khanh finally agreed to leave if he was given a dignified send-off, so the other generals arranged a ceremony at Tan Son Nhut, where military bands serenaded him.

Life in exile

Khanh and his wife Pham Le Tran, had six children, the eldest being a son born in 1953. One of his sons drowned in 1963.

Khanh's favorite hobbies were breeding tropical fish and sea swallows. A chain-smoker, he smoked three or four packets a day while he was in the army. Khanh had a fatalist attitude about his habit, saying "I read all the reports about cancer, but I decided to go on smoking anyway. A soldier must never mind to be dead."

On January 2, 2005, Khánh was selected as Chief of State of the Government of Free Vietnam, an anti-communist organization located in Little Saigon, Westminster, California. The Government of Free Vietnam claims to the be the legitimate government of Vietnam and seeks to overthrow the Vietnamese Communist Party.

Notes

References

External links

A Bag of Earth, A Promise To Keep

JFK and the Diem Coup - Provided by the National Security Archive

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