The South China Sea is a marginal sea that is part of the Pacific Ocean, encompassing an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan of around . The area's importance largely results from one-third of the world's shipping transiting through its waters, and that it is believed to hold huge oil and gas reserves beneath its seabed.

It is located

south of mainland China and the island of Taiwan,

west of the Philippines,

north west of Sabah (Malaysia), Sarawak (Malaysia) and Brunei,

north of Indonesia,

north east of the Malay peninsula (Malaysia) and Singapore, and

east of Vietnam.

The minute South China Sea Islands, collectively an archipelago, number in the hundreds. The sea and its mostly uninhabited islands are subject to competing claims of sovereignty by several countries. These claims are also reflected in the variety of names used for the islands and the sea.

Names

''South China Sea'' is the dominant term used in English for the sea, and the name in most European languages is equivalent, but it is sometimes called by different names in neighboring countries, often reflecting historical claims to hegemony over the sea.

The English name is a result of early European interest in the sea as a route from Europe and South Asia to the trading opportunities of China. In the sixteenth century Portuguese sailors called it the China Sea (''Mar da China''); later needs to differentiate it from nearby bodies of water led to calling it the South China Sea. The International Hydrographic Organization refers to the sea as "South China Sea (Nan Hai)".

In Southeast Asia it was once called the ''Champa Sea'' ''Sea of Cham'', after the maritime kingdom of Champa that flourished there before the sixteenth century. The majority of the sea came under Japanese naval control during World War II following the military acquisition of many surrounding South East Asian territories in 1941. Japan calls the sea ''Minami Shina Kai'' "South China Sea". This was written 南支那海 until 2004, when the Japanese Foreign Ministry and other departments switched the spelling 南シナ海, which has become the standard usage in Japan.

In China, it is called the "South Sea", 南海 ''Nánhǎi'', and in Vietnam the "East Sea", ''Biển Đông''. In the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia it was long called the "South China Sea" (''Dagat Timog Tsina'' in Tagalog, ''Laut China Selatan'' in Malay), with the part within Philippine territorial waters often called the "Luzon Sea", ''Dagat Luzon'', by the Philippines. However, following an escalation of the Spratly Islands dispute in 2011, various Philippine government agencies started using the neologism "West Philippine Sea". A Pagasa spokesperson said that the sea to the east of the Philippines will continue to be called the Philippine Sea.

Geography

States and territories with borders on the sea (clockwise from north) include: the People's Republic of China (including Macau and Hong Kong), the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

Major rivers that flow into the South China Sea include the Pearl, Min, Jiulong, Red, Mekong, Rajang, Pahang, Pampanga, and Pasig Rivers.

Extent

The International Hydrographic Organization defines the limits of the South China Sea as follows:

''On the South.'' The Eastern and Southern limits of Singapore and Malacca Straits [A line joining Tanjong Datok, the Southeast point of Johore () through Horsburgh Reef to Pulo Koko, the Northeastern extreme of Bintan Island (). The Northeastern coast of Sumatra] as far West as Tanjong Kedabu () down the East coast of Sumatra to Lucipara Point () thence to Tanjong Nanka, the Southwest extremity of Banka Island, through this island to Tanjong Berikat the Eastern point (), on to Tanjong Djemang () in Billiton, along the North coast of this island to Tanjong Boeroeng Mandi () and thence a line to Tanjong Sambar () the Southwest extreme of Borneo.

''On the East.'' From Tanjong Sambar through the West coast of Borneo to Tanjong Sampanmangio, the North point, thence a line to West points of Balabac and Secam Reefs, on to the West point of Bancalan Island and to Cape Buliluyan, the Southwest point of Palawan, through this island to Cabuli Point, the Northern point thereof, thence to the Northwest point of Busuanga and to Cape Calavite in the island of Mindoro, to the Northwest point of Lubang Island and to Point Fuego (14°08'N) in Luzon Island, through this island to Cape Engano, the Northeast point of Luzon, along a line joining this cape with the East point of Balintang Island (20°N) and to the East point of Y'Ami Island (21°05'N) thence to Garan Bi, the Southern point of Taiwan (Formosa), through this island to Santyo (25°N) its North Eastern Point.

''On the North.'' From Fuki Kaku the North point of Formosa to Kiushan Tao (Turnabout Island) on to the South point of Haitan Tao (25°25'N) and thence Westward on the parallel of 25°24' North to the coast of Fukien.

''On the West.'' The Mainland, the Southern limit of the Gulf of Thailand and the East coast of the Malay Peninsula.

Geology

The sea lies above a drowned continental shelf; during recent ice ages global sea level was hundreds of metres lower, and Borneo was part of the Asian mainland.

The South China Sea opened after around 45 million years ago when the Dangerous Grounds (Reed Tablemount) were rifted away from southern China. Extension culminated in seafloor spreading around 30 million years ago, a process that propagated to the SW resulting in the V-shaped basin we see today. Extension ceased around 17 million years ago. Arguments have continued about the role of tectonic extrusion in forming the basin. Paul Tapponnier and colleagues have argued that as India collides with Asia it pushes Indochina to the SE. The relative shear between Indochina and China caused the South China Sea to open. This view is disputed by geologists who do not consider Indochina to have moved far relative to mainland Asia. Recent marine geophysical studies by Peter Clift has shown that the Red River Fault was active and causing basin formation at least by 37 million years ago in the NW South China Sea, consistent with extrusion playing a part in the formation of the sea. Since opening the South China Sea has been the repository of large sediment volumes delivered by the Mekong River, Red River and Pearl River. Several of these deltas are rich in oil and gas deposits.

Islands and seamounts

The South China Sea contains over 250 small islands, atolls, cays, shoals, reefs, and sandbars, most of which have no indigenous people, many of which are naturally under water at high tide, and some of which are permanently submerged. The features are grouped into three archipelagos (listed by area size), Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal:

The Spratly Islands

The Paracel Islands

The Pratas Islands

The Macclesfield Bank

The Scarborough Shoal

The Spratly Islands spread over an 810 by 900 km area covering some 175 identified insular features, the largest being Taiping Island (Itu Aba) at just over 1.3 km long and with its highest elevation at 3.8 metres.

The largest singular feature in the area of the Spratly Islands is a 100 km wide seamount called Reed Tablemount, also known as Reed Bank, in the northeast of the group, separated from Palawan Island of the Philippines by the Palawan Trench. Now completely submerged, with a depth of 20 m, it was an island until it sank about 7,000 years ago due to the increasing sea level after the last ice age. With an area of 8,866 km², it is one of the largest submerged atoll structures of the world.

Resources

It is an extremely significant body of water in a geopolitical sense. It is the second most used sea lane in the world, while in terms of world annual merchant fleet tonnage, over 50% passes through the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait, and the Lombok Strait. Over 1.6 million m³ (10 million barrels) of crude oil a day are shipped through the Strait of Malacca, where there are regular reports of piracy, but much less frequently than before the mid-20th century.

The region has proven oil reserves of around 1.2 km³ (7.7 billion barrels), with an estimate of 4.5 km³ (28 billion barrels) in total. Natural gas reserves are estimated to total around 7,500 km³ (266 trillion cubic feet).

According to studies made by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Philippines, this body of water holds one third of the entire world's marine biodiversity, thereby making it a very important area for the ecosystem.

Territorial claims

Several countries have made competing territorial claims over the South China Sea. Such disputes have been regarded as Asia's most potentially dangerous point of conflict. Both People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) claim almost the entire body as their own, demarking their claims within what is known as the nine-dotted line, which claims overlap with virtually every other country in the region. Competing claims include:

Indonesia, China, and Taiwan over waters NE of the Natuna Islands

The Philippines, China, and Taiwan over the Malampaya and Camago gas fields.

The Philippines, China, and Taiwan over Scarborough Shoal.

Vietnam, China, and Taiwan over waters west of the Spratly Islands. Some or all of the islands themselves are also disputed between Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

The Paracel Islands are disputed between the PRC/ROC and Vietnam.

Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam over areas in the Gulf of Thailand.

Singapore and Malaysia along the Strait of Johore and the Strait of Singapore.

China and Vietnam have both been vigorous in prosecuting their claims. The People's Republic of China and South Vietnam each controlled part of the Paracel Islands before 1974. A brief conflict in 1974 resulted in 18 soldiers being killed, and China has controlled the whole of Paracel since then. The Spratly Islands have been the site of a naval clash, in which over seventy Vietnamese sailors were killed just south of Chigua Reef in March 1988. Disputing claimants regularly report clashes between naval vessels.

ASEAN in general, and Malaysia in particular, has been keen to ensure that the territorial disputes within the South China Sea do not escalate into armed conflict. As such, Joint Development Authorities have been set up in areas of overlapping claims to jointly develop the area and dividing the profits equally without settling the issue of sovereignty over the area. This is true, particularly in the Gulf of Thailand. Generally, China has preferred to resolve competing claims bi-laterally, while ASEAN countries prefer multi-lateral talks, believing that they are disadvantaged in bi-lateral negotiations with the much larger China and that because many countries claim the same territory only multilateral talks could effectively resolve the competing claims.

The overlapping claims over Pedra Branca or Pulau Batu Putih including neighboring Middle Rocks by both Singapore and Malaysia were settled in 2008 by the International Court of Justice, awarding Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh to Singapore and Middle Rocks to Malaysia.

In July 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for the Peoples Republic of China to resolve the territorial dispute. China responded by demanding the US keep out of the issue. This came at a time when both countries have been engaging in naval exercises in a show of force to the opposing side, which increased tensions in the region. The US Military released a statement on August 18 where it opposed the use of force to resolve the dispute, and accused China of assertive behaviour.

South China Sea in astronomy

South China Sea is associated with the star Xi Serpentis in asterism ''Left Wall'', Heavenly Market enclosure (see Chinese constellation).

See also

East China Sea

South China Sea shipwrecks

Territorial disputes in South China Sea

References

Further reading

Clive Schofield et al., From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia (July 2011)

C.Michael Hogan (2011) ''South China Sea'' Topic ed. P.Saundry. Ed.-in-chief C.J.Cleveland. Encyclopedia of Earth. National Council for Science and the Environment. Washington DC

UNEP (2007). ''Review of the Legal Aspects of Environmental Management in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand''. UNEP/GEF/SCS Technical Publication No. 9.

Keyan Zou (2005). ''Law of the sea in East Asia: issues and prospects''. London/New York: Rutledge Curzon. ISBN 0-415-35074-3

External links

Rising Tensions in the South China Sea, June 2011 Q&A; with Ian J. Storey

News collections on The South China Sea on China Digital Times

The South China Sea on Google Earth - featured on Google Earth's Official Blog

South China Sea Virtual Library - online resource for students, scholars and policy-makers interested in South China Sea regional development, environment, and security issues.

Energy Information Administration - The South China Sea

Tropical Research and Conservation Centre - The South China Sea

Weekly Piracy Report

Reversing Environmental Degradation Trends in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand

UNEP/GEF South China Sea Knowledge Documents

Category:Territorial disputes of the Philippines Category:Territorial disputes of the People's Republic of China Category:Territorial disputes of Malaysia Category:Territorial disputes of Vietnam Category:Territorial disputes of the Republic of China Category:Marginal seas of the Pacific Ocean Category:Disputed territories in Southeast Asia

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Coordinates	40°26′30″N80°00′00″N
name	Bo Xilai 薄熙来
order3	Minister of Commerce of the PRC
term start3	February 2004
term end3	December 2007
premier3	Wen Jiabao
predecessor3	Lü Fuyuan
successor3	Chen Deming
order2	CPC Chongqing Committee Secretary
term start2	2007
predecessor2	Wang Yang
deputy2	Wang Hongju (Mayor)
birth date	July
birth place	Beijing
alma mater	Peking UniversityChinese Academy of Social Sciences
relations	Bo Yibo (father)
party	Communist Party of China
spouse	Gu Kailai (谷开来)
children	Bo Guagua (薄瓜瓜)
religion	}}

Bo Xilai (; born July 1949) is the current CPC Chongqing Committee Secretary, first-in-charge of the Western interior municipality and a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China. Between 2004 and November 2007 he was Minister of Commerce of the People's Republic of China.

Bo Xilai is the son of Bo Yibo, a Communist revolutionary elder, and his rise to fame came from his tenures as the Mayor of the coastal economic hub of Dalian and subsequently the Governor of Liaoning. Bo is a representative figure for China's new generation of leaders who are casual in front of the media, a shift away from the deeply serious focus of Chinese politics. In Chongqing, Bo was known for leading a protracted campaign against organized crime, as well as reinstating egalitarian welfare programs for the city's working class. During his tenure, Bo's "Chongqing Model" has won accolades from Beijing. He is believed to be one of the emerging leaders of China's 5th Generation of Leadership.

Early life

Bo Xilai was born in Beijing, the son of Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Elders of Communist Party of China. Bo joined the Communist Party of China (CPC) in October 1980.

In 1966, shortly after the Cultural Revolution was called, Bo and his family were imprisoned for five years, after which they were placed in a labour camp for another five years. After the death of Mao Zedong, in 1976, the members of the Gang of Four were officially blamed for the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and Bo's family was released. During the ten years of their detainment Bo's father was tortured and his mother was beaten to death. According to Hong Kong based media STNN (Chinese: 星岛环球网), Bo was one of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.

After his release Bo worked at the Hardware Repair Factory for the Beijing Second Light Industry Bureau before he was admitted to the Peking University Department of History, majoring in world history, in 1977. He later graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree. In 1982, Bo graduated from the Postgraduate Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences with a Master's degree.

Work in Liaoning

Achievements

Bo then successively worked with the Research Office of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat and CPC Central Committee General Office. Given Bo's father's authoritative position in the party, he decided to avoid allegations of nepotism by transferring to one of the most underdeveloped counties in China and starting at the very bottom of the political hierarchy. Bo thus became Deputy Secretary and Secretary of the Jinxian County Party Committee in Liaoning. Then Deputy Secretary and Secretary of the Party Committee of the Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone, and Secretary of the Jinzhou Prefectural Party Committee in Liaoning, rising through the ranks to become a member of the Standing Committee of the Dalian Municipal CPC Committee, the city's decision making body. He became the Vice-mayor of Dalian in 1990, and deputy secretary of Dalian Municipal Party Committee.

He took up the post of acting Mayor of Dalian in 1992 and then Mayor of Dalian in 1993. The modern city was built upon the colony of Port Arthur during the late Qing Dynasty. He was elected as deputy secretary of CPC Dalian Municipal Committee in June 1995, the city's second-in-charge. In January 1998, he was re-elected mayor of Dalian. And in September 1999, he served as secretary of the CPC Dalian Municipal Committee, the city's number one figure. His term in Dalian was marked by the city's phenomenal growth into a modern metropolis representative of China's economic growth. The Shenyang-Dalian Expressway was built in the early 1990s, becoming China's first expressway. Dalian has since then been known as one of the cleanest cities in China, having won the United Nations Habitat Award, and has a very good overall reputation. However, despite the economic growth and significant improvements on GDP per capita, Bo's tenure in Dalian has sometimes been accused of being too focused on aesthetic development projects.

Bo spent seventeen years in the city of Dalian, thus serving the longest time in a single region among the officials of China. Although his popularity with the people was well-known, he was denied promotion by then President Jiang Zemin. In January 2001, under the pressure of strong public opinion, Bo was transferred to the province as the vice governor, which happened to be equal rank to his municipal position. In the aftermath of the Liaoning 'Mu & Ma' corruption scandal, a major reshuffle of the Liaoning provincial government took place, and Bo was appointed the Acting Governor of Liaoning Province. In January 2003, Bo was elected as Governor of Liaoning at the first session of the tenth Liaoning People's Congress. However, during the same year Bo was denied by the Communist Party Central Committee members a seat in the party's central leadership.

Bo oversaw Liaoning's development into one of the most economically strong provinces in China, and unlike his predecessors, was clean in terms of moving public funds and other allegations of corruption. Some accused Bo, however, of being fake, a "talker" rather than a "doer".

Corruption Allegations

A major political corruption scandal occurred in Liaoning in 2000. In that year a journalist in Liaoning, Jiang Weiping, somehow came into the possession of government documents detailing and proving widespread corruption in that province. Jiang then used these documents to write a number of very critical articles on the subject for the Hong Kong magazine "Frontline".

According to these documents, one official in Liaoning was using state money to provide allowances and apartments for 29 of his mistresses. Another official lost $3.6 million of state funds at a Macao casino; he was later executed for this. According to these documents, Bo Xilai was not himself corrupt per se, but was actively covering up the corruption of his friends and relatives.

In 2001 Jiang was arrested for publishing his allegations and for possessing the documents that supported them. In 2002 he was sentenced to six years in prison. Jiang was released after only five years for good behaviour. He and his wife and child later emigrated to Canada as refugees.

Minister of Commerce

Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin in the presidency in late 2003, and ended Bo's 20 years service as a local official. Bo was appointed Minister of Commerce in Wen Jiabao's cabinet, replacing Lü Fuyuan, who had health problems and was unable to fulfill his duties. Bo concurrently served as a member of the 16th CPC Central Committee, in reality China's central decision making body.

Known for his good looks, articulate speech, open-minded work ethic, and a generally liberal outlook, Bo's phenomenal rise from a municipal official to the Central government has been of great media attention and has since elevated his status to that of a political star. The archetype of a politician Bo presents is seldom seen with a generally serious and conservative leadership in Beijing. He has a reputation of a Kennedy-esque figure, his charisma known to media from the Mainland, Hong Kong, and even abroad.

Bo's term as Minister of Commerce saw the general trend of attracting foreign investment continue. His daily schedule was dominated with receiving foreign guests and dignitaries. By the time that he held the position of Minister of Commerce, he spoke relatively fluent English. In May 2004 Bo was one of the few hand-picked Ministers to accompany Premier Wen Jiabao on a five-country trip in Europe. The trade policy of the United States toward China also sparked significant controversy, during which Bo kept a cool head as he attended talks in Washington.

Bo also oversaw the restructuring of the Ministry, whose formation was the result of the amalgamation of the National Economics and Commerce Bureau and the Department of International Trade. Bo sought to balance the amount of attention given to foreign investors and domestic commercial institutions. He began tackling the imbalance from the retail sector, whose recent success was largely owing to foreign companies. He drew out various plans to protect Chinese industries so they would not lose their place inside the Chinese market.

Chongqing

It was widely speculated following the 17th Party Congress in 2007 that Bo would take over as party chief in Chongqing. Bo took over the position on November 30, replacing Wang Yang, who was transferred to Guangdong. Bo was also elevated to the Politburo of the Communist Party of China. His move from the Northeast to the Southwest was another dramatic change for Bo in his political career.

Organized Crime

Bo's tenure in Chongqing was dominated by a protracted war against the city's organized crime scene. Since June 2009, some 2,000 people were detained in a sweeping campaign against gangsters in the city. In marked departure from other anti-mafia campaigns in China, Bo cracked down on the government officials who served as political back-up to gangsters, not just the gangsters themselves - some of the detained were officials in Bo's own administration, others were from the city's police force. Wen Qiang (), one of the most prominent figures implicated in the trials, had been at the top echelons of municipal power since the days of party secretaries He Guoqiang and Wang Yang. Reports from the Jamestown Foundation suggest that the final decision for such a large-scale crackdown originated from the central authorities and President Hu Jintao, and Bo has been careful to not make the case look as though Chongqing is "trying to set an example" for the rest of the country so he could benefit from the success politically.

Bo's anti-crime measures were criticized for neglecting due process and for the alleged use of torture to extract confessions, but Bo's apparent willingness to combat crime in a city often seen as center for organized crime earned Bo national recognition. The apparent success of Bo's campaign has led to Bo's "rock star status", and have led to calls from the public for an anti-crime campaign on the model of Bo's anti-crime campaign in Chongqing. Lawyers in Chongqing became afraid to defend those accused of crimes after one lawyer, Li Zhuang, was sentenced to eighteen months in jail for perjury after representing a triad boss who testified that he was tortured by police. Some observers in Beijing have interpreted Bo's anti-mafia campaign as an insult to Bo's predecessors in Chongqing, Wang Yang, who can now be criticized for his tolerance towards organized crime. In order to reform the local police service, whose police chief was arrested for mafia connections, Bo brought in a police chief that he had employed as governor of Liaoning, Wang Lijun. The appointment of a police chief seen as a Bo loyalist led to rumors that Bo was intent on importing more of his old colleagues from Liaoning to run Chongqing.

"Red Songs"

Prior to the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China celebrations, Bo sent out "red text messages" () to the city's 13 million cellphone users. According to Xinhua News Agency, Bo's text messages are usually quotes from Mao's Little Red Book, and include phrases such as "I like how Chairman Mao puts it: The world is ours, we will all have to work together", and "responsibility and seriousness can conquer the world, and the Chinese Communist Party members represent these qualities." Bo and his team of municipal administrators also raised new Mao statues in Chongqing, while providing 'social security apartments' to the city's needy. Willy Lam of the Jamestown Foundation characterized this as an example of the revival of Maoism in the Chinese Communist ethos.

In 2011, Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai and the city's Media Department initiated a 'Red Songs campaign' that demanded every district, government departments and commercial corporations, universities and schools, state radio and TV stations to begin singing "red songs", praising the achievements of the Communist Party of China and PRC. Bo said the aim was "to reinvigorate the city with the Marxist ideals of his father's comrade-in-arms Mao Zedong"; although academic Ding Xueliang of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology suspected the campaign's aim was to further his political standing within the country's leadership.

Political future

Bo has made no secret of his desire to enter the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee during the next Party Congress, in 2012. At the Party Congress in 2012, current President Hu Jintao is expected to be replaced by Xi Jinping, and Premier Wen Jiabao will likely be replaced by Vice Premier Li Keqiang. As many as seven of the current nine members of the Standing Committee are expected to retire, and the shift in power will leave plenty of room for the ambitious Bo to re-enter a position inside the central government in Beijing. At the Congress, Bo's ability to gain a seat in the Standing Committee is expected to be based largely on how other high-ranking members of the CCP interpret Bo's Maoist enthusiasm, and the crime-fighting credentials that Bo has gained while serving as the Mayor of Chongqing.

Challenges to Bo's ambitions include the prominent difference between Bo's charismatic populism and the leadership style of more traditional CCP politicians best represented by Hu Jintao, "a paragon of competent, bureaucratic dullness." In spite of Bo's popularity among the public, and the "fawning" attention of the international media, China's top leaders have been reluctant to acknowledge Bo publicly, perhaps due to a discomfort over Bo's leadership style. Wary of the potential for social chaos similar to that created during the Cultural Revolution, attributed partially to Mao's personality cult, the public images of modern Chinese leaders tend towards stoic reserve.

Bo's success in combating crime has been observed as making more senior CCP politicians look bad for not achieving equally ambitious results. Politicians who may feel that Bo's efforts weaken their own political achievements by comparison include Bo's predecessors, He Guoqiang (now himself a member of the Standing Committee) and Wang Yang (now the Party leader in the high-profile province of Guangdong), who may now be criticized for tolerating the mafia-related corruption of the police and judiciary of Chongqing. Some observers believe that Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao may also be criticized at some level for not implementing a similar anti-corruption campaign at the national level. Bo's ability to advance within the Party hierarchy may be challenged to the degree that other senior members of the CCP interpret Bo's ambitions as being potentially threatening to their own.

Personal life

Bo married Gu Kailai in 1986, a prominent lawyer who was the first Chinese lawyer to have won a public case in the United States. Her father, Gu Jingsheng, a Communist revolutionary and General who led the 12.9 Movement that propelled China to unite against Japanese invasion of Manchuria in World War II. She is also a descendant of the renowned Song Dynasty Prime Minister and Poet Fan Zhongyan.

They have one son, Bo Guagua. He was the first student from mainland China to attend Harrow School for boys in the UK. Guagua was later accepted to Balliol College, Oxford, where in 2006 he started studying for a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics.

Reference

External links

News about Bo Xilai at China Digital Times.

Biography and recent career data at ''China Vitae'', an online biographical database of Chinese VIPs

Article on Bo Xilai at Peking University's online forum Alibaba details Bo's charisma

Bo Xilai in TIME Magazine's 2010 Top 100 Influential People.

Category:1949 births Category:Living people Category:Mayors of Dalian Category:Peking University alumni Category:People from Beijing Category:Politicians of the People's Republic of China Category:Crown Prince Party Category:Red Guards Category:Bo Xilai Category:Chinese communists

da:Bo Xilai de:Bo Xilai eu:Bo Xilai fr:Bo Xilai ko:보시라이 ja:薄熙来 no:Bo Xilai sv:Bo Xilai zh-yue:薄熙來 zh:薄熙来

Coordinates	40°26′30″N80°00′00″N
name	Kim Jong-un김정은金正恩
office2	Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission of WPK
leader2	Kim Jong-il
alongside2	Ri Yong-ho
term start2	28 September 2010
birth date	January 8, 1983 or 1984 (age 27-28)
birth place	Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
nationality	North Korean
party	Workers' Party of Korea
relations	Kim Jong-il (father)Ko Young-hee (mother)Kim Il-sung (grandfather)Kim Sul-Song (sister)Kim Jong-nam (brother)Kim Jong-chul (brother)
residence	Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
alma mater	Kim Il-sung UniversityInternational School of Berne
profession	Military GeneralPolitician
religion	None
allegiance	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
serviceyears	2010
rank	General
awards	}}

Context	north
Hangul	김정은
Hanja	金正恩
Rr	Gim Jeong-eun
Mr	Kim Chŏng'ŭn }}

Kim Jong-un (Korean: 김정은, Hanja: 金正恩,) also known as Kim Jong-eun or Kim Jung-eun, formerly Kim Jong-woon or Kim Jung-woon (born 1983 or early 1984), is the third and youngest son of Kim Jong-il with his late consort Ko Young-hee.

He is a Daejang, the equivalent to an American four-star general, in the Korean People's Army. Recent actions, symbolic and overt, taken in late 2010 by current head of state and "Dear Leader" of North Korea (officially, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), Kim Jong-il, strongly indicated that Kim Jong-un is now the heir presumptive to the leadership of the nation upon Kim Jong-il's death, incapacity, or deliberate abdication. It has been claimed that he studied computer science privately in Korea.

==Early life== Kim's birth date is not known for certain, but he is thought to have been born in 1983 or early 1984. The North Korean officials formerly gave his date of birth as 8 January 1983, but from late 2009 gave 1982 as his birth year, possibly as part of preparations for his anointment as successor to his father, as the adjustment would make him 30 in 2012, which is significant for the regime.

He attended the English-language International School of Berne, Switzerland until 1998 under a pseudonym. Former classmates have asserted that he attended Gümlingen International School or Liebefeld public school. His pseudonym at Gümlingen was "Pak Chol" and he pretended to be the son of a driver, although in Liebefeld, the teacher told the class that he was from North Korea. An older student chaperoned him all the time. In Liebefeld, he told his friend Joao Micaelo that he was the son of the heir to the North Korea leader, though Micaelo said he didn't believe him at the time. He was described as a shy child who was uncommunicative with unfamiliar people and was only distinguished for his competitive nature, particularly in sports and had a fascination with the NBA and Michael Jordan. Allegedly, one friend claimed that he had met and even took pictures with Kobe Bryant and Toni Kukoc, but was unsure where they were taken. He reportedly stayed in Switzerland until late 1999 or early 2000 when former classmates claimed he "disappeared." The ambassador of North Korea in Switzerland, Ri Tcheul, had a close relationship with him and acted as a mentor while there. Switzerland has always stayed neutral between the North and South Korea conflicts. The Kim clan is said to organise family meetings at Lake Geneva and Interlaken.

For many years, only one confirmed photograph of him existed, apparently taken in the mid-1990s, when he was eleven. Occasional other supposed images of him surfaced but were often disputed. It was only in June 2010, shortly before he was given official posts and publicly introduced to the North Korean people, that more pictures were released of Kim, taken when he was attending school in Switzerland. The first official image of him as an adult was a group photograph released on 30 September 2010 at the end of the party conference that effectively anointed him, in which he is seated in the front row, two places from his father. This was followed by newsreel footage of him attending the conference.

Succession

Kim Jong-un is expected to become leader of the country after his father. His eldest half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, had been the favorite to succeed, but reportedly fell out of favour after 2001, when he was caught attempting to enter Japan on a fake passport to visit Tokyo Disneyland.

Kim Jong-il's former personal chef, Kenji Fujimoto, revealed details regarding Kim Jong-un, with whom he shared a good relationship, stating that he is favored to be his father's successor. Fujimoto also claimed that Jong-un is favored by his father over his elder brother, Jong-chul, reasoning that Jong-chul is too feminine in character, while Jong-un is "exactly like his father." Furthermore Fujimoto stated that "If power is to be handed over then Jong-un is the best for it. He has superb physical gifts, is a big drinker and never admits defeat." When Jong-un was 18, Fujimoto described an episode where Jong-un questioned his lavish lifestyle and asked, "We are here, playing basketball, riding horses, riding Jet Skis, having fun together. But what of the lives of the average people?" On 15 January 2009 the South Korean news agency, Yonhap, reported that Kim Jong-il appointed Kim Jong-un to be his successor.

On 8 March 2009, the BBC reported rumors that Kim Jong-un appeared on the ballot for elections to the Supreme People's Assembly, the rubber stamp parliament of North Korea. Subsequent reports indicate that his name did not appear on the list of lawmakers, however he was later elevated to a mid-level position in the National Defense Commission, which is a branch of the North Korean Military. Reports have also suggested that he is a diabetic and suffers from hypertension.

From 2009, it was understood by foreign diplomatic services that Kim was to succeed his father Kim Jong-il as the head of the Korean Workers' Party and de-facto head of state of North Korea. He has been named "Yŏngmyŏng-han Tongji" (영명한 동지) which loosely translates to "Brilliant Comrade." His father had also asked embassy staff abroad to pledge loyalty to his son. There have also been reports that citizens in North Korea have been encouraged to sing a newly composed "song of praise" to Kim Jong-un, in a similar fashion to that of praise songs relating to Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung. Later in June, Kim was reported to have visited China secretly to "present himself" to the Chinese leadership, who later warned against North Korea conducting another nuclear test. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has strongly denied that this visit occurred.

North Korea was later reported to have backed the succession plan, after Kim Jong-il suspended a propaganda campaign to promote his youngest son. His birthday has since become a national holiday, celebrated on 1 January, according to a report by a South Korean website. He was expected to be named on 28 September 2010 as successor to his father as leader of North Korea.

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited China in early September 2010, and discussed the issue of North Korean leadership succession with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. According to Carter, Wen told Carter that Kim Jong-il had said to Wen that Kim Jong-un's prospective promotion to paramount leader of North Korea was "a false rumor from the West."

Kim Jong-un was made a Daejang, the equivalent to an American Four-Star General, on 27 September 2010, a day ahead of a rare Workers' Party of Korea conference in Pyongyang, the first time North Korean media had mentioned him by name and despite his having no previous military experience. Despite the promotion, no further details, including verifiable portraits of Jong-un were released. On 28 September 2010 he was named vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and appointed to the Central Committee of the Workers' Party, in an apparent nod to become the successor to Kim Jong-il.

On 10 October 2010, alongside his father the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un attended the ruling Workers' Party's 65th anniversary celebration. This was seen as fully confirming his position as the next leader of the Workers' Party. Unprecedented international press access was granted to the event, further indicating the importance of Kim Jong-un's presence.

Some analysts believe that upon Kim Jong-il's death, Jong-un's uncle Chang Sung-taek will act as regent, as Jong-un is presently too inexperienced to immediately lead the country.

Name

His name was first reported as 김정운 (), possibly an error in transliterating the name from Japanese to Korean, as the Japanese language does not distinguish between 운 (un) and 은 (eun). The initial source of his name was Kim Jong-il's former personal chef, known by the pen name Kenji Fujimoto, who was among the few who had access to information about Kim's household from inside the secretive regime.

Ancestry

See also

Politics of North Korea

References

External links

People in DPRK news

North Korea's Young Leader on Show - video report by ''The New York Times''

Category:Living people Category:North Korean generals Category:People from Pyongyang Category:Workers' Party of Korea politicians Category:Year of birth uncertain Category:Year of birth unknown Category:1983 births Category:Kim Il-sung family

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Coordinates	40°26′30″N80°00′00″N
name	Steve Jobs
birth name	Steven Paul Jobs
birth date	February 24, 1955
birth place
death date	October 05, 2011
death place	Palo Alto, California, U.S.
nationality	American
occupation	Co-founder, Chairman and CEO, Apple Inc., Co-founder and CEO, Pixar, Co-founder and CEO, NeXT Inc.
alma mater	Reed College (dropped out)
years active	1974–2011
boards	The Walt Disney Company, Apple Inc.
religion	Zen Buddhism
spouse	Laurene Powell(1991–2011, his death)
children	4 – Lisa Brennan-Jobs, Reed, Erin, Eve
relatives	Mona Simpson (sister)
signature	Steve Jobs signature.svg
signature size	120px }}

Steven Paul Jobs (; February 24, 1955 – October 5, 2011) was an American businessman, designer and inventor. He is best known as the co-founder, chairman, and chief executive officer of Apple Inc. Through Apple, he was widely recognized as a charismatic pioneer of the personal computer revolution and for his influential career in the computer and consumer electronics fields. Jobs also co-founded and served as chief executive of Pixar Animation Studios; he became a member of the board of directors of The Walt Disney Company in 2006, when Disney acquired Pixar.

In the late 1970s, Apple co-founder Steve Wozniak engineered one of the first commercially successful lines of personal computers, the Apple II series. Jobs was among the first to see the commercial potential of Xerox PARC's mouse-driven graphical user interface, which led to the creation of the Apple Lisa and, one year later, the Macintosh. During this period he also led efforts that would begin the desktop publishing revolution, notably through the introduction of the LaserWriter and the associated PageMaker software.

After losing a power struggle with the board of directors in 1985, Jobs left Apple and founded NeXT, a computer platform development company specializing in the higher-education and business markets. In 1986, he acquired the computer graphics division of Lucasfilm, which was spun off as Pixar. He was credited in ''Toy Story'' (1995) as an executive producer. He remained CEO and majority shareholder at 50.1 percent until its acquisition by The Walt Disney Company in 2006, making Jobs Disney's largest individual shareholder at seven percent and a member of Disney's Board of Directors.

After difficulties developing a new Mac OS, Apple purchased NeXT in 1996 in order to use NeXTSTEP as the basis for what became Mac OS X. As part of the deal Jobs was named Apple advisor. As Apple floundered, Jobs took control of the company and was named "interim CEO" in 1997, or as he jokingly referred to it, "iCEO". Facing near bankruptcy at the time of his return, Jobs quickly improved the company's fortunes and returned it to profitability in 1998. Over the next decade, Jobs oversaw the development of the iMac, iTunes, iPod, iPhone, and iPad and on the services side, the company's Apple Retail Stores, iTunes Store and the App Store. The enormous success of these products and services, providing years of stable financial returns, propelled Apple to become the world's most valuable company in 2011. The reinvigoration of the company is regarded as one of the greatest business turnaround stories in history.

In 2003, Jobs was diagnosed with a pancreas neuroendocrine tumor. Though it was initially treated, he reported a hormone imbalance, underwent a liver transplant in 2009, and appeared progressively thinner as his health declined. On medical leave for most of 2011, Jobs resigned as Apple CEO in August that year and was elected Chairman of the Board. He died of respiratory arrest related to his metastatic tumor on October 5, 2011. He continues to receive honors and public recognition for his influence in the technology and music industries.

Early life and education

Steven Paul Jobs was born in San Francisco on 24 February 1955, to two university students, Joanne Carole Schieble and Syrian born Abdulfattah "John" Jandali (), who were both unmarried at the time. Jandali who was teaching in Wisconsin when Steve was born in 1955, said he had no choice but to put the baby up for adoption because his girlfriend's family objected to their relationship. He was adopted at birth by Paul Reinhold Jobs (1922–1993) and Clara Jobs (1924–1986). Clara's maiden name was Hagopian. When asked about his "adoptive parents," Jobs replied emphatically that Paul and Clara Jobs "were my parents." He later stated in his authorized biography that they "were my parents 1,000%." His biological parents subsequently married (December 1955), had a second child Mona Simpson in 1957, and divorced in 1962.

The Jobs family moved from San Francisco to Mountain View, California when Steve was five years old. Paul and Clara later adopted a daughter, Patti. Paul Jobs, a machinist for a company that made lasers, taught his son rudimentary electronics and how to work with his hands. Clara was an accountant who taught him to read before he went to school. Clara Jobs had been a payroll clerk for Varian Associates, one of the first high-tech firms in what became known as Silicon Valley.

Jobs attended Monta Loma Elementary, Mountain View, Cupertino Junior High and Homestead High School in Cupertino, California. He frequented after-school lectures at the Hewlett-Packard Company in Palo Alto, California, and was later hired there, working with Steve Wozniak as a summer employee. Following high school graduation in 1972, Jobs enrolled at Reed College in Portland, Oregon. Although he dropped out after only one semester, he continued auditing classes at Reed, while sleeping on the floor in friends' rooms, returning Coke bottles for food money, and getting weekly free meals at the local Hare Krishna temple. Jobs later said, "If I had never dropped in on that single calligraphy course in college, the Mac would have never had multiple typefaces or proportionally spaced fonts."

Early career

In 1974, Jobs took a job as a technician at Atari, Inc. in Los Gatos, California. He traveled to India in mid-1974 to visit Neem Karoli Baba at his Kainchi Ashram with a Reed College friend (and, later, an early Apple employee), Daniel Kottke, in search of spiritual enlightenment. When they got to the Neem Karoli ashram, it was almost deserted as Neem Karoli Baba had died in September 1973. Then they made a long trek up a dry riverbed to an ashram of Hariakhan Baba. In India, they spent a lot of time on bus rides from Delhi to Uttar Pradesh and back, then up to Himachal Pradesh and back.

Jobs left India after staying for seven months and returned to the US ahead of Daniel Kottke, with his head shaved and wearing traditional Indian clothing. During this time, Jobs experimented with psychedelics, calling his LSD experiences "one of the two or three most important things [he had] done in [his] life". He also became a serious practitioner of Zen Buddhism, engaged in lengthy meditation retreats at the Tassajara Zen Mountain Center, the oldest Sōtō Zen monastery in the US, considered taking up monastic residence, and maintained a lifelong appreciation for Zen. He later said that people around him who did not share his countercultural roots could not fully relate to his thinking.

Jobs returned to Atari and was assigned to create a circuit board for the game ''Breakout''. According to Atari co-founder Nolan Bushnell, Atari offered $100 for each chip that was eliminated in the machine. Jobs had little interest in or knowledge of circuit board design and made a deal with Wozniak to split the fee evenly between them if Wozniak could minimize the number of chips. Much to the amazement of Atari, Wozniak reduced the number of chips by 50, a design so tight that it was impossible to reproduce on an assembly line. According to Wozniak, Jobs told Wozniak that Atari gave them only $700 (instead of the offered $5,000) and that Wozniak's share was thus $350. Wozniak did not learn about the bonus until ten years later, but said that had Jobs told him about it and said he needed the money, Wozniak would have given it to him.

Jobs began attending meetings of the Homebrew Computer Club with Wozniak in 1975. He greatly admired Edwin H. Land, the inventor of instant photography and founder of Polaroid Corporation, and explicitly modeled his own career after that of Land's.

The revised, second-generation NeXTcube was released in 1990, also. Jobs touted it as the first "interpersonal" computer that would replace the personal computer. With its innovative NeXTMail multimedia email system, NeXTcube could share voice, image, graphics, and video in email for the first time. "Interpersonal computing is going to revolutionize human communications and groupwork", Jobs told reporters. Jobs ran NeXT with an obsession for aesthetic perfection, as evidenced by the development of and attention to NeXTcube's magnesium case. This put considerable strain on NeXT's hardware division, and in 1993, after having sold only 50,000 machines, NeXT transitioned fully to software development with the release of NeXTSTEP/Intel. The company reported its first profit of $1.03 million in 1994. In 1996, NeXT Software, Inc. released WebObjects, a framework for Web application development. After NeXT was acquired by Apple Inc. in 1997, WebObjects was used to build and run the Apple Store, MobileMe services, and the iTunes Store.

Pixar and Disney

In 1986, Jobs bought The Graphics Group (later renamed Pixar) from Lucasfilm's computer graphics division for the price of $10 million, $5 million of which was given to the company as capital.

The first film produced by the partnership, ''Toy Story'', with Jobs credited as executive producer, brought fame and critical acclaim to the studio when it was released in 1995. Over the next 15 years, under Pixar's creative chief John Lasseter, the company produced box-office hits ''A Bug's Life'' (1998); ''Toy Story 2'' (1999); ''Monsters, Inc.'' (2001); ''Finding Nemo'' (2003); ''The Incredibles'' (2004); ''Cars'' (2006); ''Ratatouille'' (2007); ''WALL-E'' (2008); ''Up'' (2009); and ''Toy Story 3'' (2010). ''Finding Nemo'', ''The Incredibles'', ''Ratatouille'', ''WALL-E'', ''Up'' and ''Toy Story 3'' each received the Academy Award for Best Animated Feature, an award introduced in 2001.

In the years 2003 and 2004, as Pixar's contract with Disney was running out, Jobs and Disney chief executive Michael Eisner tried but failed to negotiate a new partnership, and in early 2004, Jobs announced that Pixar would seek a new partner to distribute its films after its contract with Disney expired.

In October 2005, Bob Iger replaced Eisner at Disney, and Iger quickly worked to patch up relations with Jobs and Pixar. On January 24, 2006, Jobs and Iger announced that Disney had agreed to purchase Pixar in an all-stock transaction worth $7.4 billion. When the deal closed, Jobs became The Walt Disney Company's largest single shareholder with approximately seven percent of the company's stock. Jobs's holdings in Disney far exceeded those of Eisner, who holds 1.7 percent, and of Disney family member Roy E. Disney, who until his 2009 death held about one percent of the company's stock and whose criticisms of Eisner — especially that he soured Disney's relationship with Pixar — accelerated Eisner's ousting. Jobs joined the company's board of directors upon completion of the merger and also helped oversee Disney and Pixar's combined animation businesses from a seat on a special six-person steering committee. Upon Jobs's death his shares in Disney were transferred to the Steven P. Jobs Trust led by Laurene Jobs.

Return to Apple

In 1996, Apple announced that it would buy NeXT for $427 million. The deal was finalized in late 1996, bringing Jobs back to the company he co-founded. Jobs became ''de facto'' chief after then-CEO Gil Amelio was ousted in July 1997. He was formally named interim chief executive in September. In March 1998, to concentrate Apple's efforts on returning to profitability, Jobs terminated a number of projects, such as Newton, Cyberdog, and OpenDoc. In the coming months, many employees developed a fear of encountering Jobs while riding in the elevator, "afraid that they might not have a job when the doors opened. The reality was that Jobs's summary executions were rare, but a handful of victims was enough to terrorize a whole company." Jobs also changed the licensing program for Macintosh clones, making it too costly for the manufacturers to continue making machines.

With the purchase of NeXT, much of the company's technology found its way into Apple products, most notably NeXTSTEP, which evolved into Mac OS X. Under Jobs's guidance, the company increased sales significantly with the introduction of the iMac and other new products; since then, appealing designs and powerful branding have worked well for Apple. At the 2000 Macworld Expo, Jobs officially dropped the "interim" modifier from his title at Apple and became permanent CEO. Jobs quipped at the time that he would be using the title "iCEO".

Inventions and designs

His design sense was greatly influenced by the Buddhism which he experienced in India while on a seven-month spiritual journey. His sense of intuition was also influenced by the spiritual people with whom he studied.

, Jobs is listed as either primary inventor or co-inventor in 342 United States patents or patent applications related to a range of technologies from actual computer and portable devices to user interfaces (including touch-based), speakers, keyboards, power adapters, staircases, clasps, sleeves, lanyards and packages. Most of these are design patents (specific product designs) as opposed to utility patents (inventions). He has 43 issued US patents on inventions. The patent on the Mac OS X Dock user interface with "magnification" feature was issued the day before he died.

Philanthropy

Arik Hesseldahl of ''BusinessWeek'' magazine stated that "Jobs isn't widely known for his association with philanthropic causes", compared to Bill Gates's efforts. Jobs said (in 1985) that he does charitable acts privately. After resuming control of Apple in 1997, Jobs eliminated all corporate philanthropy programs initially. Later, under Jobs, Apple signed to participate in Product Red program, producing red versions of devices to give profits from sales to charity. Apple has gone on to become the single largest contributor to the charity since its initial involvement with it. The chief of the Product Red project, singer Bono cited Jobs saying there was "nothing better than the chance to save lives," when he initially approached Apple with the invitation to participate in the program.

Personal life

Jobs's birth parents met at the University of Wisconsin. Abdulfattah "John" Jandali, a Syrian Muslim, taught there. Joanne Carole Schieble was his student; they were the same age because Jandali had "gotten his PhD really young." In December 1955, ten months after giving up their baby boy, Schieble and Jandali married. In 1957, they had a daughter Mona together. They divorced in 1962, and Jandali lost touch with his daughter. Her mother remarried and had Mona take the surname of her stepfather, so she became known as Mona Simpson.

In the 1980s, Jobs found his birth mother, Joanne Schieble Simpson, who told him he had a biological sister, Mona Simpson. They met for the first time in 1985 and became close friends. The siblings kept their relationship secret until 1986, when Mona introduced him at a party for her first book.

After deciding to search for their father, Simpson found Jandali managing a coffee shop. Without knowing who his son had become, Jandali told Mona that he had previously managed a popular restaurant in the Silicon Valley where "Even Steve Jobs used to eat there. Yeah, he was a great tipper." In a taped interview with his biographer Walter Isaacson, aired on ''60 Minutes'', Jobs said: "When I was looking for my biological mother, obviously, you know, I was looking for my biological father at the same time, and I learned a little bit about him and I didn't like what I learned. I asked her to not tell him that we ever met...not tell him anything about me." Jobs was in occasional touch with his mother Joanne Simpson, who lives in a nursing home in Los Angeles. When speaking about his biological parents, Jobs stated: "They were my sperm and egg bank. That's not harsh, it's just the way it was, a sperm bank thing, nothing more." Jandali stated in an interview with the ''The Sun'' in August 2011, that his efforts to contact Jobs were unsuccessful. Jandali mailed in his medical history after Jobs's pancreatic disorder was made public that year.

In her eulogy to Jobs at his memorial service, Mona Simpson stated: :I grew up as an only child, with a single mother. Because we were poor and because I knew my father had emigrated from Syria, I imagined he looked like Omar Sharif. I hoped he would be rich and kind and would come into our lives (and our not yet furnished apartment) and help us. Later, after I'd met my father, I tried to believe he'd changed his number and left no forwarding address because he was an idealistic revolutionary, plotting a new world for the Arab people. Even as a feminist, my whole life I'd been waiting for a man to love, who could love me. For decades, I'd thought that man would be my father. When I was 25, I met that man and he was my brother.

Jobs's first child, Lisa Brennan-Jobs, was born in 1978, the daughter of his longtime partner Chris Ann Brennan, a Bay Area painter. For two years, she raised their daughter on welfare while Jobs denied paternity by claiming he was sterile; he later acknowledged Lisa as his daughter. Jobs later married Laurene Powell on March 18, 1991, in a ceremony at the Ahwahnee Hotel in Yosemite National Park. Presiding over the wedding was Kobun Chino Otogawa, a Zen Buddhist monk. Their son, Reed, was born September 1991, followed by daughters Erin in August 1995, and Eve in 1998. The family lives in Palo Alto, California.

In the unauthorized biography, ''The Second Coming of Steve Jobs,'' author Alan Deutschman reports that Jobs once dated Joan Baez. Deutschman quotes Elizabeth Holmes, a friend of Jobs from his time at Reed College, as saying she "believed that Steve became the lover of Joan Baez in large measure because Baez had been the lover of Bob Dylan" (Dylan was the Apple icon's favorite musician). In another unauthorized biography, ''iCon: Steve Jobs'' by Jeffrey S. Young & William L. Simon, the authors suggest that Jobs might have married Baez, but her age at the time (41) meant it was unlikely the couple could have children.

Jobs was also a fan of The Beatles. He referred to them on multiple occasions at Keynotes and also was interviewed on a showing of a Paul McCartney concert. When asked about his business model on ''60 Minutes'', he replied:

My model for business is The Beatles: They were four guys that kept each other's negative tendencies in check; they balanced each other. And the total was greater than the sum of the parts. Great things in business are never done by one person, they are done by a team of people. Jobs told Walter Isaacson "...he came to like the idea of having a uniform for himself, both because of its daily convenience (the rationale he claimed) and its ability to convey a signature style." He was a pescetarian.

Jobs's car was a silver 2008 Mercedes-Benz SL 55 AMG, which does not display its license plates, as he took advantage of a California law which gives a maximum of six months for new vehicles to receive plates; Jobs leased a new identical SL every six months.

In a 2011 interview with biographer Walter Isaacson, Jobs revealed at one point he met with U.S. President Barack Obama, complained of the nation's shortage of software engineers, and told Mr. Obama that he was "headed for a one-term presidency." Jobs proposed that any foreign student who got an engineering degree at a U.S. university should automatically be offered a green card. After the meeting, Jobs commented, "The president is very smart, but he kept explaining to us reasons why things can't get done.... It infuriates me."

Jobs contributed to a number of political candidates and causes during his life, giving $209,000 to Democrats, $19,000 to associated special interests and $1,000 to a Republican.

Health issues

In October 2003, Jobs was diagnosed with cancer, and in mid-2004, he announced to his employees that he had a cancerous tumor in his pancreas. The prognosis for pancreatic cancer is usually very poor; Jobs stated that he had a rare, far less aggressive type known as islet cell neuroendocrine tumor. Despite his diagnosis, Jobs resisted his doctors' recommendations for mainstream medical intervention for nine months, instead consuming a special alternative medicine diet in an attempt to thwart the disease. According to Harvard researcher Dr. Ramzi Amir, his choice of alternative treatment "led to an unnecessarily early death". According to Jobs's biographer, Walter Isaacson, "for nine months he refused to undergo surgery for his pancreatic cancer – a decision he later regretted as his health declined." "Instead, he tried a vegan diet, acupuncture, herbal remedies and other treatments he found online, and even consulted a psychic. He also was influenced by a doctor who ran a clinic that advised juice fasts, bowel cleansings and other unproven approaches, before finally having surgery in July 2004." He eventually underwent a pancreaticoduodenectomy (or "Whipple procedure") in July 2004, that appeared to successfully remove the tumor.

Death

Jobs died at his California home around 3 p.m. on October 5, 2011, due to complications from a relapse of his previously treated islet-cell neuroendocrine pancreatic cancer, He had lost consciousness the day before, and died with his wife, children and sister at his side.

His death was announced by Apple in a statement which read:

Jobs is survived by Laurene, his wife of 20 years, their three children, and Lisa Brennan-Jobs, his daughter from a previous relationship. His family released a statement saying that he "died peacefully".

For two weeks following his death, Apple's corporate Web site displayed a simple page, showing Jobs's name and lifespan next to his grayscale portrait. Clicking on the image led to an obituary, which read:

Also dedicating its homepage to Jobs was Pixar, with a photo of Jobs, John Lasseter and Edwin Catmull, and the eulogy they wrote:

An email address was also posted for the public to share their memories, condolences, and thoughts. Over a million tributes were sent, which are now displayed on the Steve Jobs memorial page.

Shortly after his death was announced, ABC, CBS, and NBC interrupted scheduled programming to broadcast this news. Numerous newspapers around the world carried news of his death on their front pages the next day. Several notable people, including US President Barack Obama, British Prime Minister David Cameron, Microsoft founder Bill Gates, and The Walt Disney Company's Bob Iger commented on the death of Jobs. ''Wired News'' collected reactions and posted them in tribute on their homepage.

A small private funeral was held on October 7, 2011, of which details were not revealed out of respect to Jobs's family. Apple announced on the same day that they had no plans for a public service, but were encouraging "well-wishers" to send their remembrance messages to an email address created to receive such messages. Sunday, October 16, 2011, was declared "Steve Jobs Day" by Governor Jerry Brown of California. On that day, an invitation-only memorial was held at Stanford University. Those in attendance include Apple and other tech company executives, members of the media, celebrities, close friends of Jobs, and politicians, along with Jobs's family. Bono, Yo Yo Ma, and Joan Baez performed at the service, which lasted longer than an hour. The service was highly secured, with guards at all of the university's gates, and a helicopter flying overhead from an area news station.

Both Apple and Microsoft flew their flags at half-staff throughout their respective headquarters and campuses. Bob Iger ordered all Disney properties, including Walt Disney World and Disneyland, to fly their flags at half-staff, from October 6 to 12, 2011.

A private memorial service for Apple employees was held on October 19, 2011, on the Apple Campus in Cupertino. Present were Cook, Bill Campbell, Norah Jones, Al Gore, and Coldplay, and Jobs's widow, Laurene, was in attendance. Some of Apple's retail stores closed briefly so employees could attend the memorial. A video of the service is available on Apple's website.

Jobs is buried at Alta Mesa Memorial Park, the only non-denominational cemetery in Palo Alto.

Major media published commemorative works. ''Time'' published a commemorative issue for Jobs on October 8, 2011. The issues cover featured a portrait of Jobs, taken by Norman Seeff, in which he is sitting in the lotus position holding the original Macintosh computer, first published in ''Rolling Stone'' in January 1984. The issue marked the eighth time Jobs has been featured on the cover of ''Time''. The issue included a photographic essay by Diana Walker, a retrospective on Apple by Harry McCracken and Lev Grossman, and a six-page essay by Walter Isaacson. Isaacson's essay served as a preview of his biography, ''Steve Jobs''.

''Bloomberg Businessweek'' also published a commemorative issue. The cover of the magazine features Apple-style simplicity, with a black-and-white, up-close photo of Jobs and his years of birth and death. The issue was published without advertisements. It featured extensive essays by Steve Jurvetson, John Sculley, Sean Wisely, William Gibson, and Walter Isaacson.

Free software pioneer Richard Stallman dissented from the prevailing hagiographic views of Jobs to draw attention to the tight corporate control Apple exercised over consumer computers and handheld devices, how Apple restricted news reporters, and persistently violated privacy: "Steve Jobs, the pioneer of the computer as a jail made cool, designed to sever fools from their freedom, has died". Malcolm Gladwell in The New Yorker asserted that "Jobs's sensibility was editorial, not inventive. His gift lay in taking what was in front of him ... and ruthlessly refining it."

Although reporters wrote glowing elegies after Jobs died, ''Los Angeles Times'' media critic James Rainey reported that they "came courtesy of reporters who—after deadline and off the record—would tell stories about a company obsessed with secrecy to the point of paranoia. They remind us how Apple shut down a youthful fanboy blogger, punished a publisher that dared to print an unauthorized Jobs biography and repeatedly ran afoul of the most basic tenets of a free press."

Apple "has taken stances that, in my opinion, are outright hostile to the practice of journalism," said longtime Silicon Valley reporter Dan Gillmor. Under Jobs, Apple sued three "small fry" bloggers who reported tips about the company and its unreleased products and tried to use the courts to force them to reveal their sources. Under Jobs, Apple even sued a teenager, Nicholas Ciarelli, who wrote enthusiastic speculation about Apple products beginning at age 13. His popular blog, ThinkSecret, was a play on Apple's slogan "Think Different." Rainey wrote that Apple wanted to kill ThinkSecret as "It thought any leaks, even favorable ones, diluted the punch of its highly choreographed product launches with Jobs, in his iconic jeans and mock turtleneck outfit, as the star."

Honors and public recognition

After Apple's founding, Jobs became a symbol of his company and industry. When ''Time'' named the computer as the 1982 "Machine of the Year", the magazine published a long profile of Jobs as "the most famous maestro of the micro".

Jobs was awarded the National Medal of Technology by President Ronald Reagan in 1985, with Steve Wozniak (among the first people to ever receive the honor), and a Jefferson Award for Public Service in the category "Greatest Public Service by an Individual 35 Years or Under" (also known as the ''Samuel S. Beard Award'') in 1987. On November 27, 2007, Jobs was named the most powerful person in business by ''Fortune'' magazine. On December 5, 2007, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and First Lady Maria Shriver inducted Jobs into the California Hall of Fame, located at The California Museum for History, Women and the Arts.

In August 2009, Jobs was selected as the most admired entrepreneur among teenagers in a survey by Junior Achievement, having previously been named Entrepreneur of the Decade 20 years earlier in 1989, by ''Inc. magazine''. On November 5, 2009, Jobs was named the CEO of the decade by ''Fortune'' magazine.

In November 2010, Jobs was ranked No.17 on ''Forbes'': The World's Most Powerful People. In December 2010, the ''Financial Times'' named Jobs its person of the year for 2010, ending its essay by stating, "In his autobiography, John Sculley, the former PepsiCo executive who once ran Apple, said this of the ambitions of the man he had pushed out: 'Apple was supposed to become a wonderful consumer products company. This was a lunatic plan. High-tech could not be designed and sold as a consumer product.'". The Financial Times closed by rhetorically asking of this quote, "How wrong can you be."

At the time of his resignation, and again after his death, Jobs was widely described as a visionary, pioneer and genius

Reality distortion field

Apple's Bud Tribble coined the term "reality distortion field" in 1981, to describe Jobs' charisma and its effects on the developers working on the Macintosh project. Tribble claimed that the term came from ''Star Trek''. Since then the term has also been used to refer to perceptions of Jobs' keynote speeches.

The RDF was said by Andy Hertzfeld to be Steve Jobs' ability to convince himself and others to believe almost anything, using a mix of charm, charisma, bravado, hyperbole, marketing, appeasement, and persistence. Although the subject of criticism, Jobs' so-called reality distortion field was also recognized as creating a sense that the impossible was possible. Once the term became widely known, it was often used in the technology press to describe Jobs' sway over the public, particuarly regarding new product announcements.

Portrayals and coverage in books, film, and theater

Books

''The Little Kingdom'' (1984) by Michael Moritz, documenting the founding of (then) Apple Computer.

''The Second Coming of Steve Jobs'' (2001), by Alan Deutschman

''iCon: Steve Jobs'' (2005), by Jeffrey S. Young & William L. Simon

''Steve Jobs'' (2011), an authorized biography written by Walter Isaacson.

''Inside Apple'' (2012), a book by Adam Lashinsky that reveals the secret systems, tactics, and leadership strategies that allowed Steve Jobs and his company to work.

Documentaries

''The Machine That Changed the World'' Part 3 of this 1992 five-part documentary, called ''The Paperback Computer'', prominently featured Jobs and his role in the early days of Apple. ''Triumph of the Nerds'' a 1996 three-part documentary for PBS, about the rise of the home computer/personal computer. ''Nerds 2.0.1'' a 1998 three-part documentary for PBS, (and sequel to ''Triumph of the Nerds'') which chronicles the development of the Internet. ''iGenius: How Steve Jobs Changed the World'' a 2011 Discovery Channel documentary hosted by Adam Savage and Jamie Hyneman. ''Steve Jobs: One Last Thing'' a 2011 PBS documentary produced by Pioneer Productions. A slightly shortened and localized version of the show was broadcast in the United Kingdom the following day titled, ''Steve Jobs: iChanged the World'' on Channel 4. In February 2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation released a 191-page file on Steve Jobs. The report was compiled during a 1991 background investigation of Jobs by the FBI after former president George H. W. Bush recommended his appointment to the President's Export Council. It consists of interviews with co-workers, friends, family members and even neighbors of Jobs.

Films

''Pirates of Silicon Valley'' a 1999 TNT film which chronicles the rise of Apple and Microsoft from the early 1970s to 1997. Jobs is portrayed by Noah Wyle.

Theater

''The Agony and Ecstasy of Steve Jobs'' - The Public Theater, New York City, 2012, starring Mike Daisey.

References

Further reading

Bantam Doubleday Dell. ISBN 0-385-48684-7. Chapter 28

External links

"Thoughts on Flash" by Steve Jobs, April, 2010.

Bloomberg Game Changers: Steve Jobs A 48 minute video on Steve Jobs by Bloomberg

Steve Jobs Profile at ''Forbes''

Steve Jobs remembrance notes from the community. The only remaining tribute on the Apple website..

Federal Bureau of Investigation dossier on Steven Paul Jobs.

Articles

Interviews

Steve Jobs in 1994: The Rolling Stone Interview, ''Rolling Stone'' 1994, republished January 17, 2011. Archived URL April 20, 1995. The Seed of Apple's Innovation, ''BusinessWeek'' October 12, 2004. How Big Can Apple Get?, ''Fortune'' February 21, 2005. ''Newsweek'', October 15, 2006.

Bill Gates and Steve Jobs (video and transcript of on stage interview), AllThingsD, May 30, 2007.

Videotaped Deposition of Steven P. Jobs in front of the Securities and Exchange Commission, March 18, 2008

Interview with Abdulfattah "John" Jandali, Jobs's biological father, by Mohannad Al-Haj Ali, published in ''Al Hayat'' and reprinted by Ya Libnan, February 28, 2011

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Media of the People's Republic of China (alternatively Media of China, Chinese Media) primarily consists of television, newspapers, radio, and magazines. Since 2000, the Internet has also emerged as an important communications medium.

Since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 and until the 1980s, almost all media in China were state-run. Independent media only began to emerge at the onset of economic reforms, although state-run media outlets such as ''Xinhua'', CCTV, and ''People's Daily'' continue to hold significant market share. Independent media that operate within the PRC (excluding Hong Kong and Macao, which have separate media regulatory bodies) are no longer required to strictly follow journalistic guidelines set by the government. However, regulatory agencies, such as the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) and the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), continue to set strict regulations on subjects considered taboo by the government, including but not limited to the legitimacy of the Communist Party, government policies in Tibet and Xinjiang, pornography, and the banned spiritual group Falun Gong.

In spite of heavy government monitoring, however, Chinese media has become increasingly commercialized, with growing competition, diversified content, and an increase in investigative reporting. Areas such as sports, finance, and an increasingly lucrative entertainment industry face little regulation from the government. Media controls were most relaxed during the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping, until they were tightened in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests. They were relaxed again under Jiang Zemin in the late 1990s, but the growing influence of the Internet and its potential to encourage dissent led to heavier regulations again under the government of Hu Jintao. Reporters Without Borders consistently ranks China very poorly on media freedoms in their annual releases of the Press Freedom Index, calling the Chinese government as having "the sorry distinction of leading the world in repression of the Internet". For 2010, China ranked 168 out of 178 nations.

History

The government is heavily involved in the media in the PRC, and the largest media organizations (namely CCTV, the People's Daily, and Xinhua) are agencies of the Party-State. Media taboos include topics such as the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China, the governance of Tibet, and Falun Gong. Within those restrictions there is a diversity of the media and fairly open discussion of social issues and policy options within the parameters set by the Party.

The diversity in mainland Chinese media is partly because most state media outlets are no longer heavily subsidized by the government, and are expected to pay for themselves through commercial advertising. They can no longer merely serve as mouthpieces of the government, but also need to attract advertising through programming that people find attractive. While the government issuse directives defining what can be published, it does not prevent, and in fact encourages outlets to compete for viewers and advertising. Financial incentives are also used to control journalists' behavior.

Government control of information can be ineffective in other ways. Despite government restrictions, much information is gathered either at the local level or from foreign sources and passed on through personal conversations and text messaging. The withdrawal of government media subsidies has caused many newspapers (including some owned by the Communist Party) in tabloids to take bold editorial stands critical of the government, as the necessity to attract readers and avoid bankruptcy has been a more pressing fear than government repression.

In addition, the traditional means of media control have proven extremely ineffective against newer forms of communication, most notably text messaging.

Although the government can and does use laws against state secrets to censor press reports about social and political conditions, these laws have not prevented the press from all discussion of Chinese social issues. As a result even papers which are nominally owned by the Communist Party are sometimes very bold at reporting social issues. However both commercial pressures and government restrictions have tended to cause newspapers to focus on lurid scandals often involving local officials who have relatively little political cover, and Chinese newspapers tend to lack depth in analysis of political events, as this tends to be more politically sensitive.

Among social issues first reported in the press of mainland China include the AIDS epidemic in Henan province, the unsafe state of mines in mainland China. In addition, the SARS coverup was first revealed by a fax to CCTV which was forwarded to Western news media.

Television

In 1978, the PRC had less than one television receiver per 100 people, and fewer than ten million Chinese had access to a television set. According to a World Bank report in 2003, there are about 35 TVs for every 100 people. Roughly a billion Chinese have access to television. Similarly, in 1965 there were 12 television and 93 radio stations in mainland China; today there are approximately 700 conventional television stations—plus about 3,000 cable channels—and 1,000 radio stations.

Television broadcasting is controlled by China Central Television (CCTV), which, with its 16 program channels, is the country's only national network. CCTV, which employs about 10,000 people and has an annual income of ¥1,120mln yuan (2004,=$138mln), falls under the dual supervision of the Propaganda Department, responsible ultimately for media content, and the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, which oversees operations. A Vice Minister in the latter ministry serves as chairman of CCTV. The network's principal directors and other officers are appointed by the State. So are the top officials at local conventional television stations in mainland China—nearly all of which are restricted to broadcasting within their own province or municipality—that receive CCTV broadcasts.

CCTV produces its own news broadcasts three times a day and is the country's most powerful and prolific television program producer. It also has a monopoly on purchases of programming from overseas. All local stations are required to carry CCTV's 7 p.m. main news broadcast; an internal CCTV survey indicates that nearly 500 million people countrywide regularly watch this program.

Even if CCTV is the most powerful network of mainland China, it has only about 30% of audience share all over the national territory. The fact shows how the Chinese viewers are biased in favour of local TV programs, that are more likely to represent the differences of an audience that is the largest in the world, more than the national or even international programs, that can hardly attend the needs of such a wide public.

Since September 1, 2006, the Chinese government has banned foreign-produced animation between the hours of 5:00 to 8:00 P.M. on state-run television to protect struggling Chinese animation studios that have been affected by the popularity of such cartoons.

Newspapers and journals

The number of newspapers in mainland China has increased from 42—virtually all Communist Party papers—in 1968 to 382 in 1980 and more than 2,200 today. By one official estimate, there are now more than 7,000 magazines and journals in the country. The number of copies of daily and weekly newspapers and magazines in circulation grew fourfold between the mid-1960s and the mid-to-late 1980s, reaching 310 million by 1987. (2)

These figures, moreover, underreport actual circulation, because many publishers use their own distribution networks rather than official dissemination channels and also deliberately understate figures to avoid taxes. (3) In addition, some 25,000 printing houses and hundreds of individual bookstores produce and sell nonofficial material—mostly romance literature and pornography but also political and intellectual journals.

China has many newspapers but the front runners are all State-run: the People's Daily, Beijing Daily, Guangming Daily and the Liberation Daily. The two major news agencies in China are Xinhua News Agency and the China News Service. Xinhua was given power to censor and edit the news of the foreign agencies in 2007. Some saw the power of Xinhua as making the press freedom weak and it allowed Xinhua to control the news market fully.

Much of the information collected by the Chinese mainstream media is published in neicans (internal, limited circulation reports prepared for the high-ranking government officials), not in the public outlets.

Regulators

The media and communications industry in mainland China is administered by various government agencies and regulators. The principal mechanism for forcing media organizations to comply with CCP wishes is the vertically organized ''nomenklatura'' system of cadre appointments, and includes those in charge of the media industry.

State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television - administers and overseer the administration of state-owned enterprises involved in the radio, television and broadcasting industry.

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology - administers the physical communications infrastructure and the Internet service providers.

General Administration of Press and Publication - administers the newspaper, periodical, video and audio media and news industry.

Ministry of Public Security's Cyber Police force - agency for regulating online content and investigation of Internet fraud, scams and pornography.

Media reform

The media in mainland China also are becoming more autonomous and more diverse. Since Mao Zedong's death in 1976 and the subsequent emergence of Deng Xiaoping (who died in February 1997) as the country's paramount leader, an overall climate of economic and social reform in mainland China has been reflected in media content.

A prime example of the liberalisation has been the party's flagship newspaper, People's Daily, which had been rigidly controlled under Mao, used against his enemies, and copied verbatim by every other newspaper in the country during the Cultural Revolution. This leading daily was reformed and enlivened in the late 1970s and early-to-middle 1980s by then editor-in-chief Hu Jiwei. Hu expanded the paper's size and coverage, encouraged public criticism through letters to the editor, called for promulgation of a press law to spell out journalists' rights, and introduced a sprightlier writing style.

Nevertheless, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that China "continues to be the world's leading jailer of journalists," with 42 imprisoned journalists at the end of 2004, and accuses private companies, both foreign and domestic, of having been complacent toward or complicit with government censorship. Also, in their ''Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2007 '', Reporters Without Borders ranked China 163rd (or 7th from bottom) in terms of press freedom. Freedom House issued a report in 2006 claiming that the Internet is still closely monitored by the state, with access to websites and publications critical of the government being restricted, as well as foreign satellite television and radio broadcasts being censored.

In preparation of the 17th National Party Congress in 2007, new restrictions were placed on all sectors of the press, Internet-users, bloggers, website managers, foreign journalist, more than 30 of which have been arrested since the start of the year. In addition, a thousand discussion forums and websites have been shut down, and "a score of dissidents" have been imprisoned since July 2007.

In efforts to stem growing unrest in China, the propaganda chief of the State Council, Hua Qing, announced in the People's Daily that the government was drafting a new press law that would lessen government involvement in the news media. In the editorial, President Hu Jintao was said to have visited the People's Daily offices and said that large scale public incidents should be "accurately, objectively and uniformly reported, with no tardiness, deception, incompleteness or distortion". Recent reports by Chinese media indicate a gradual release from party control. For example, the detention of anti-government petitioners placed in mental institutions was reported in a state newspaper, later criticised in an editoral by the English language China Daily. Scholars and journalists believe that such reports are a small sign of opening up in the media.

Diversified content

The media's growing autonomy has been reflected in their increasingly diversified content. Since the late 1970s, despite periodic reversals, media in mainland China have frequently criticized party cadres and have published debates on such fundamental issues as the rule of law, freedom of the press, and universal human rights. They also have reported on a myriad of previously untouched social and lifestyle subjects. The only inviolable restrictions appear to be an unwritten ban on challenges to the party's right to rule and to the legitimacy and decision-making authority of top party leaders.

Talk radio

Talk radio in mainland China allows a much freer exchange of views than other media formats. In effect, talk radio has shifted the paradigm from authorities addressing the people to people addressing the authorities.

Magazines and journals

Magazines and journals published in mainland China also have become much less inhibited in their coverage. These publications appear to enjoy more freedom than newspapers, which in turn have more leeway than radio (other than talk radio) and television. Magazines now print internal police reports on jailings of religious leaders and other dissidents. The State is unwilling to shut down such publications because it worries about public reaction, is anxious to avoid drawing more popular attention to the magazines, and knows that its own resources are already stretched thin.

Chinese journalists in Hong Kong on occasion have written politically controversial articles for mainland intellectual journals without encountering problems. Such opportunities have abounded because of the range of publications on the Chinese mainland and because party officials there are too busy with weightier matters to review such journals systematically.

Greater prosperity and literacy

Mainland China's rapid economic development, as well as educational advances leading to greater literacy, have been important reasons for the dramatic expansion of the media and the diversification of coverage.

Per capita gross domestic product, as measured in 1990 yuan, has increased fourfold since 1980. Rising disposable incomes have freed many Chinese from worrying about the basics of survival and provided them the wherewithal to purchase more television sets, newspaper and magazine subscriptions, and, more recently, satellite dishes and computers.

Rising literacy rates have produced tens of millions of additional readers in the past decade, creating ever-expanding markets for the print media. According to UN statistics, Mainland China's adult literacy rate rose from 65.5 percent in 1982 to 81.5 percent in 1995.

Ideological and political trends

Other overarching factors that are helping to make the mainland Chinese media more autonomous and diverse include a general decline in the influence of political ideologies and systems of belief; growing Chinese popular skepticism toward authority; increased contact with the West; greater competition in the media market; ebbing government resources; improved professional training for journalists; and new communication technologies.

Weakening of ideological shackles

The waning influence of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought has weakened the State's ability to use the media to shape public attitudes and has made it harder for the authorities to penalize the media for publishing material that is not strictly consistent with Marxist theory. Although Marxism remains the official doctrine of the PRC, the de-emphasis of ideology has strengthened the media's hand in two fundamental ways: it has helped undercut government efforts to indoctrinate the public and micromanage the content of political and social reporting in the media, and it has opened the door for the media to pursue capitalist marketing practices that respond to customer wants and bring increasing financial independence from the State.

Other practices that are emerging in mainland China, such as decision making based on verifiable data and stronger quality controls on information, also have helped dilute the impact of ideology. In a change driven by the dual need for scientists to have reliable data with which to work and for the business sector to use in making investment and commercial decisions, the State Statistical Board since the mid-1980s has gained increased power to acquire and disseminate data for media and business use, reducing or eliminating the hither to common practice in which each sector used "its own" data.

Skepticism toward authority

Although difficult to quantify, growing skepticism toward authority in mainland China appears to be spurring public support for media criticism (often indirect and carefully couched) of the State and slowly diluting the legitimacy of the party . This rise in skepticism is reported by informed observers to be occurring all across East Asia. Such observers point to increased publicity given to cases of official corruption, malfeasance, and ineptness—along with broader declines in social values such as civility and respect—as at least partly responsible for greater media and popular doubts about elected and appointed officials as compared to the past. Of course, according to a guy named Yankee, 90% of what you read about China is false. At the same time, public skepticism of authority can and often does include skepticism toward the media themselves. Journalists, like individuals in other sectors of the mainland Chinese society, are far less willing than in the past to submit blindly to authority. Journalists were active participants in the 1989 demonstrations that culminated in the events at Tiananmen Square. The Tiananmen episode made it all but impossible to reconcile the growing desire of mainland Chinese journalists for control over their own profession with the party's interest in not letting that happen. There have even been occasional acts of open, outright defiance of the party, though these acts remain rare.

Contact with the West

Closer and more varied contact with the West appears to be increasingly influencing educated urban opinion in mainland China on concepts such as a free press, freedom of speech, and political pluralism . This phenomenon is consistent with trends elsewhere in East Asia, where principles such as freedom of expression and legal guarantees of individual rights are playing a growing role. Perhaps most interestingly, many mainland Chinese journalists trained or educated in the West appear to have an outlook that is much closer to Western ideals of media freedom than to the attitudes of other Chinese, although a gap persists between mainland China and the West in professionalism and in grasping the principles of objective journalism.

Virtually all foreign reporters in mainland China operate under restrictions that are considerably more severe than in most Asian countries. One result is that Western media influence on mainland Chinese media organizations as a whole is generally limited. Nonetheless, the contacts that do occur are having an impact on individual mainland Chinese journalists, according to people interviewed for this study. In particular, one observer noted that younger reporters who have measurable, if cautious, contact with the West generally show minimal trust in official sources of information, are inclined to discount propaganda, and are determined to be comprehensive in their reporting.

Market competition

Intense competition for the media market is among the most important factors behind the emergence of more diverse and autonomous media in China. As indicated earlier in this study, efforts by the Chinese media to respond to an increasingly demanding print and broadcast market have created an expanding spectrum of media products ranging from serious news journalism to purely entertainment stories. Monetary rewards for meeting such demands continue to grow, resulting in greater financial autonomy for the growing numbers of Chinese media firms that win sizable market shares. As a result, these companies are able to hire and retain more and better journalists, further boosting their capacity to compete. Commercialization thus has been a major liberating force for the media in China. The regime is far less able than before to wield financial leverage over the media, which have increasingly become self-supporting through advertising revenues and circulation. According to one estimate, advertising in all media forms increased 35-fold between 1981 and 1992. Print ad revenues jumped ten times between 1990 and 1995—from 1.5 billion yuan to 15 billion yuan.

Television revenues also are growing dramatically: they totaled about $2 billion in 1995 and are expected to rise above $6 billion by 2005. In 1995, China Central Television earned nearly $150 million in advertising revenue, covering almost 90 percent of its total costs. In the past, radio and television tended to run well behind the print press in their news coverage. More recently, television has come under market pressure to be as timely, informative, and responsive as the print media.

Competition from outside mainland China has further impelled domestic media organizations to become more diverse, assertive, and skeptical of official authority. For example, in order to compete against Hong Kong radio stations that could be heard in Guangdong Province, Guangdong radio managers created Pearl River Economic Radio (PRER) in 1986. PRER, copying Hong Kong radio's approach, began to emphasize daily life, entertainment, "celebrity" deejays, and caller phone-in segments, while eliminating ideological, preachy formats that included little information beyond what was provided by government sources. By 1987, PRER had obtained 55 percent of the Guangdong market; previously, Hong Kong radio stations had held 90 percent of this market. Local party cadre in southern China reportedly are unhappy about PRER, mainly because some of the station's commentators, as well as its talk radio programs, highlight party failures and the misdeeds of individual party members in the region.

The top national Chinese Communist Party papers (People's Daily, Guangming Daily, and Economic Daily)—which mostly feature party speeches, announcements, propaganda, and policy viewpoints—are steadily losing circulation and much-sought advertising revenues to evening municipal papers that have far more diverse content. For example, People's Daily's circulation fell from 3.1 million copies a day in 1990 to 2.2 million in 1995; the paper's 1994 advertising revenues were down as well. Moreover, its subscriptions consist overwhelmingly of mandatory ones by party and government organizations. Similarly, the Liberation Army Daily has become almost entirely dependent on State subsidies. Its circulation has fallen from 1.7 million in 1981 to fewer than 500,000 at present.

By contrast, the circulation of the Xinmin Evening News, operated by the Shanghai Municipal Government, has risen from 1.3 million to 1.7 million over the same time period. The Guangzhou Daily, owned by the Guangzhou Municipal Government, doubled its circulation in six years to 600,000 in 1994, and its ad revenues also were up.

Improvements in personnel

The media also have attracted and are retaining more competent people than before. Journalism is widely seen as a more promising career field than in the past, while government work has lost much of its allure as other opportunities open up. At the same time, the explosion of business and entrepreneurial opportunities in recent years has complicated efforts by both the media and the government to attract good people. Journalism and government both face stiff competition from the relatively high salaries and profits available in the business sector. But the rising popularity and profitability of metropolitan evening newspapers offer the prospect that higher quality, better paid jobs in journalism will expand in the years ahead.

Improved training, more education, and higher professional standards are bolstering the skills and confidence of journalists across East Asia, better positioning media organizations to gain positions of influence in their societies. Although mainland Chinese journalists only recently have begun to participate in these opportunities, there is some evidence that such training is having an effect. Many of the young mainland Chinese journalists being trained at US and other universities and professional programs in the West have been characterized by their trainers as "smart," "aware," and devoted to the profession.

Beginning in the 1980s, it became necessary in most cases for reporters to have a college education, and often a university degree, to get good jobs with the top party newspapers. The highly profitable evening papers, sponsored in the main by municipal governments, usually also require a college education.

Cable television

Residents of the Chinese mainland now receive more than 20 outside television channels by satellite, including Chinese-language services of CNN, Star TV, and the United States Information Agency. In the southern province of Guangdong, 97 percent of the households have television sets, and all—except those in a few parts of the city of Guangzhou, where reception is poor—have access to Hong Kong television through cable networks. Some local stations even intercept the signals and insert their own commercials. Beijing is unable to effectively monitor, let alone control, the illicit cable operators who have sprung up since the early 1990s. As of 1995, about 1,000 of the 3,000 cable stations in mainland China, linked to perhaps 50 million homes, were unlicensed.

Satellite dishes

The administration of satellite receivers falls under the jurisdiction of the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television, which stipulates that foreign satellite televisions channels may only be received at high-end hotels and the homes and workplaces of foreigners. Foreign satellite televisions channels may seek approval to broadcast, but must be "friendly toward China." Foreign television news channels are, in principle, ineligible for distribution in China.

Home satellite dishes are officially proscribed. Black market satellite dishes are nonetheless prolific, numbering well into the tens of millions. Chinese authorities engage in regular crackdowns to confiscate and dismantle illicit dishes, expressing concerns both over the potential for copyright infringements and over their ability receive "reactionary propaganda."

Internet

Widening Chinese use of the Internet is also undercutting government efforts to control the flow of information. According to CNNIC's 22nd Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China, more than 250 million people in mainland China now have Internet access.

Since the beginning of 1996, the State has suspended all new applications from Internet service providers seeking to commence operations in the PRC; moved to put all existing Internet services under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the Ministry of Electronics Industry, and the State Education Commission; and attempted—without much success—to establish firewalls, limit the contents of home pages, and block access to certain Internet sites through routing filters. Although much of the Internet access in China is subjugate to the so-called "Great Firewall of China", which blacklists certain websites and even blocks chat sessions, it has proven relatively ineffective: there are logistical problems with a firewall over such a large network, and in most instances its effects can be negated with a simple proxy. Government officials are worried that, as the number of Chinese homes with telephone lines grows from the present level of less than 4%, the State will become totally unable to monitor Internet access at residences.

Weakening of party controls

Over the last decade, the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party does its business—especially the introduction of reforms aimed at decentralizing power—have spurred greater media autonomy in several ways:

The growth of "peripheral"—local and some regional—media. This trend has decentralized and dampened party oversight. In general, the farther reporters and media organizations are from Beijing and important provincial capitals, the greater their leeway.

A shift toward administrative and legal regulation of the media and away from more fluid and personal oversight. Party efforts to rely on regulations rather than whim to try to control the media—as evidenced by the dozens of directives set forth when the State Press and Publications Administration was created in 1987, and by new regulations in 1990 and 1994—probably were intended to tighten party control, making it a matter of law rather than personal relationships. In fact, however, these regulations came at a time when official resources were being stretched more thinly and individual officials were becoming less willing—and less able—to enforce regulations.

Vicissitudes of media acceptability. Since the early 1990s, the types of media coverage deemed acceptable by the regime have risen sharply. Growing uncertainties about what is allowable and what is out of bounds sometimes work in the media's favor. Often, however, these uncertainties encourage greater self-censorship among Chinese journalists and work to the benefit of the party's media control apparatus.

Provincial broadcasters increasingly are trying to identify subjects on which the party will allow them more autonomy. Recent demands—unmet thus far—by such broadcasters include seeking authority to carry international news, to contract out television and radio programming to nongovernment organizations, and to explore possibilities for quasi-private media ownership.

As State resources have become stretched more thinly, the media have found it far easier than before to print and broadcast material that falls within vaguely defined grey areas, though again, this uncertainty can also work to the advantage of the party. Officials are too few, too busy, and often too incompetent to be able to micromanage the media as in the past. Prior to the 1990s, it was common for party and government officials to participate in the actual drafting of newspaper editorials. Now, for the most part, these officials merely discuss editorial policies with newspaper managers.

In the past, prime-time news on Chinese Central Television was routinely examined, prior to airing, by the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television. Since 1994, however, the Ministry has ceased to prescreen CCTV news programs; now the programs are examined after they have aired. The diversity and quantity of material, moreover, have compelled officials to prioritize their reviews of broadcasts; the 7:00 p.m. news broadcasts, for instance, receive far more attention from the authorities than does the midnight news. In another manifestation of weakening government controls, recently launched news programs such as CCTV's Focal Report and Beijing Television's Express News include moderate criticisms of the party and government and explore some controversial public topics in an effort to make programs relevant to—and more popular with—viewers.

Evidently recognizing the limits on their ability to maintain tight control over an industry that has been expanding rapidly, party leaders during the last decade have publicly acknowledged the need to establish priorities. In particular, they have spoken of the high priority attached to maintaining control over the "big media"—national party papers and central and provincial TV and radio stations.

Many PRC officials appear anxious to avoid confronting the media because they are afraid they will be accused of transgressions in newspapers, in magazines, or on television or radio. As media autonomy has expanded, print and broadcast organs have tried to flex their independence, albeit cautiously, in their coverage of State activities. Such coverage often focuses on specific government officials suspected of illegal actions and corruption.

Although the media's leverage stems mostly from officials' worries that rival insiders will use such publicity against them, it also appears to reflect growing respect within Chinese officialdom for the emerging influence of public opinion. A case in point is the Beijing Youth Daily. This paper has been punished for criticizing government actions and policies, but the authorities have stopped short of shutting it down.

Party resistance to media autonomy

Although the trend in mainland China clearly is toward greater media autonomy and diversity and away from government control and intimidation, crosscurrents of resistance persist. Powerful domestic institutions like the Central Propaganda Department and the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television still constrain efforts by the media to become more autonomous and politically diverse.

Efforts to reinforce party controls

Beijing still tries to compel the media to report favorably on government activities and to limit negative coverage of official policies and actions. Neither the PRC Constitution—promulgated in 1982—nor the Communist Party-directed judiciary provides the media with meaningful legal protection from the State. Although Article 35 of the Constitution guarantees the citizens the rights of free speech, press, and assembly, in reality citizens do not have such rights. The authorities in Beijing continue to give precedence to the principles enunciated in the Constitution's preamble—including upholding Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought and the party's leadership role.

The lack of an independent judiciary further hamstrings efforts by the media to mount court challenges against restrictions on media activities. The party appoints judges, and the position of the courts is merely equal to—not above—that of the bureaucracy. Media outrage over nationally publicized criminal cases can also bring pressure on members of the judiciary to act in ways that might be contrary to their initial desires and to the best interests of the defendants.

The government uses a variety of approaches to retain some control over the media:

It requires that newspapers be registered and attached to a government ministry, institute, research facility, labor group, or other State-sanctioned organization. Entrepreneurs cannot establish newspapers or magazines under their own names, although they reportedly have had some success in setting up research institutes and then creating publications attached to those bodies.

It still occasionally jails or fines journalists for unfavorable reporting.

It imposes other punishments when it deems that criticism has gone too far. For example, it shut down the magazine Future and Development in 1993 for publishing two articles calling for greater democracy in mainland China, and it forced the firing of the Beijing Youth Daily's editor for aggressively covering misdeeds and acts of poor judgment by party cadre.

It continues to make clear that criticism of certain fundamental policies—such as those on PRC sovereignty over territories under Republic of China administration and Tibet and on Hong Kong's future in the wake of the transfer of Hong Kong sovereignty on 1 July 1997 —are off limits.

It has set up numerous official journalists' associations—the largest is the All-China Journalist Federation, with more than 400,000 members—so that no single organization can develop major autonomous power.

It holds weekly meetings with top newspaper editors to direct them as to what news items they want focused upon and which stories they want to go unreported. The controversial closure of the Freezing Point journal was generally unreported in mainland China due to government orders.

It has maintained a system of uncertainty surrounding the boundaries of acceptable reporting, encouraging self-censorship. One media researcher has written that "it is the very arbitrariness of this control regime that cows most journalists into more conservative coverage."

The government also exploits a longstanding hierarchical relationship among Chinese print and broadcast entities in seeking to maintain some control over the media. It appoints the leaders of the most powerful media institutions, and then uses these organizations to try to dominate the rest of the media countrywide.

Structure of media in mainland China

Mainland China's media network

Xinhua (the New China News Agency) and People's Daily, the two most important print media, have status as separate government ministries; their directors sit on the party's Central Committee. Just below, hierarchically, are the two national newspapers under the control of the Propaganda Department — the Guangming Daily and the English-language'' China Daily''. These entities have the rank of vice ministries, as does the State Council-controlled Economic Daily. The National Propaganda Department appoints publishers, chief editors, and other key officials of the above-mentioned newspapers—plus a few others—while provincial and local party leaders make similar appointments for party papers in their jurisdictions.

In many ways, Xinhua is the fuel propelling mainland China's print media. Perhaps unique in the world because of its role, size, and reach, Xinhua reports directly to the party's Propaganda Department; employs more than 10,000 people—as compared to about 1,300 for the UK's Reuters, for example; has 107 bureaus worldwide both collecting information on other countries and dispensing information about mainland China; and maintains 31 bureaus in China—one for each province plus a military bureau. In as much as most of the newspapers in mainland China cannot afford to station correspondents abroad—or even in every province in mainland China—they rely on Xinhua feeds to fill their pages. People's Daily, for example, uses Xinhua material for approximately 25 percent of its stories.(b) Xinhua is a publisher as well as a news agency—it owns more than 20 newspapers and a dozen magazines, and it prints in Chinese, English, and four other languages.

Like other government entities, Xinhua is feeling the pinch of reduced State financial subsidies. Beijing has been cutting funding to the news agency by an average of seven percent per year over the past three years, and State funds currently cover only about 40 percent of Xinhua's costs. As a result, the agency is raising revenues through involvement in public relations, construction, and information service businesses.

In the past, Xinhua was able to attract the top young journalists emerging from the universities or otherwise newly entering the field, but it can no longer do so as easily because of the appeal and resources of other newspapers and periodicals and the greater glamour of television and radio jobs. For example, midlevel reporters for the Xinmin Evening News often are given an apartment, whereas at Xinhua and People's Daily this benefit is reserved for the most senior journalists.

Like many other media organizations, Xinhua struggled to find the "right line" to use in covering the Tiananmen Square events of April-June 1989. Although more cautious than People's Daily in its treatment of sensitive topics during that period—such as how to commemorate reformist Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang's April 1989 death, the then ongoing demonstrations in Beijing and elsewhere, and basic questions of press freedom and individual rights—Xinhua gave some favorable coverage to demonstrators and intellectuals who were questioning top party leaders. Even so, many Xinhua reporters were angry with top editors for not going far enough and for suppressing stories about the Tiananmen Square crackdown. For several days after the violence on 4 June, almost no one at Xinhua did any work, and journalists demonstrated inside the Agency's Beijing compound.

The role of the PRC internal media

The mainland Chinese media's internal publication system, in which certain journals are published exclusively for government and party officials, provides information and analysis not generally available to the public. The State values these internal reports because they contain much of mainland China's most sensitive, controversial, and high-quality investigative journalism.

Xinhua and many other media organizations produce reports for the "internal" journals (neicans). Informed observers note that journalists generally like to write for the internal publications—typically, only the most senior or most capable print and broadcast reporters are given such opportunities—because they can write less polemical and more comprehensive stories without having to omit unwelcome details as is commonly done in the print media directed to the general public. A Chinese historian has claimed, as an example of such self-censorship, that only a minority of China's population are aware 30 million people starved to death in the early 1960s, because the Party has never allowed the subject to be openly explored in the media. At the time, one of the Top Secret information channels through which news of what was really happening reached a select readership of high-level decision-makers was the Ministry of Public Security's Public Security Work Bulletin.

The PRC internal media publication system follows a strict hierarchical pattern designed to facilitate party control. A publication called Reference Information (Cankao Ziliao)—which includes translated articles from abroad as well as news and commentary by senior Xinhua reporters—is delivered by Xinhua personnel, rather than by the national mail system, to officials at the working level and above. A three-to-ten-page report called Internal Reference (Neibu Cankao) is distributed to officials at the ministerial level and higher. The most highly classified Xinhua internal reports, known as "redhead reference" (Hong Tou Cankao) reports, are issued occasionally to the top dozen or so party and government officials.

He Qinglian documents in chapter four of ''Media Control in China'', There are many grades and types of internal documents [neibu wenjian 内部文件]. Many are restricted to a certain level of official – such as county level, provincial level or down to a certain level of official in a ministry. Some Chinese journalists, including Xinhua correspondents in foreign countries, write for both the mass media and the internal media. The level of classification is tied to the administrative levels of Party and government in China. The higher the administrative level of the issuing office, generally the more secret the document is. In local government the issuing grades are province [sheng 省], region (or city directly subordinate to a province) [diqu 地区or shengzhixiashi 省直辖市] and county [xian 县]; grades within government organs are ministry [bu 部], bureau [ju 局] and office [chu 处]; in the military corps ([jun 军], division [shi 师], and regiment [tuan 团]. The most authoritative documents are drafted by the Central Committee to convey instructions from CCP leaders. Documents with Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Document [Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian 中共中央文件] at the top in red letters are the most authoritative.

There are signs the PRC internal media publication system is breaking down as more information becomes widely available in mainland China. A Hong Kong-based political journal circulated on the Chinese mainland has questioned the need for such a system in light of mainland China's modern telecommunications and expanding contacts with the outside world. Internal publications are becoming less exclusive; some are now being sold illegally on the street and are increasingly available to anyone with money.

Some of the internal publications have changed substantially in an effort to avoid becoming obsolete. For example, the publication News Front—started in 1957 as a weekly tool for the Communist Party to instruct journalists on what to write—no longer was limited to that function when it reappeared after the Cultural Revolution. It continued to change gradually and is now a monthly publication that serves as a professional rather than political guide for journalists.

Hong Kong

Despite the diverse and independent press which has previously existed, and the assurances of one country, two systems, apprehensions have grown among Hong Kong journalists, since Hong Kong returned to PRC sovereignty in July, 1997, that Beijing would curtail their freedom to write articles on mainland China not to its liking. At the launch of a joint report published by the Hong Kong Journalists Association and Article 19 in July 2001, the Chairman of the Association said: "More and more newspapers self-censor themselves because they are controlled by either a businessman with close ties to Beijing, or part of a large enterprise, which has financial interests over the border."

Overseas Chinese press

In 2001 the Jamestown Foundation reported that China was buying into Chinese-language media in the U.S., offering free content, and leveraging advertising dollars—all to manipulate coverage.

See also

References

External links

Finding News About China — includes list of links for current media information about China

media.cn — News digest from media.cn

The Chinese Media: More Autonomous and Diverse — Much of the information here seems to be a summary of this monograph

Mass Media Control in Contemporary China — Freedom House article on how the Chinese government controls mass media in China

"Information Control and Self-Censorship in the PRC and the Spread of SARS" — by a report from the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China

Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country Study — from the Open Net Initiative http://www.opennetinitiative.net/

China Media Project a website that generates research on China's media development

danwei.org — a blog about Chinese media and advertising

Pacific Epoch — an English News site covering China's Media industry, updated daily

The Peking Duck — a blog about Chinese politics and media by a former news reporter

EastSouthNorthWest — Hong Kong blogger Roland Soong translates and comments on PRC mass media, often comparing PRC and western media reporting on important PRC domestic developments.

Media Control in China —

Media Control in China revised 2006 Chinese language edition publication notice

Discussion by professor Richard Baum on the shifts in Chinese media.

no:Media i Kina zh:中華人民共和國媒體