"But the voters must not think, like Clegg, that they can wash their hands of responsibility for their actions on Thursday if they fail to vote against the Tories."

Jon Trickett, Labourlist, today

Titular reference is to this.

Chris Lennie hired me to work for the Labour party, 12 long years ago.  Today is his last day working for the Labour party, and I wanted to say thank you.

Back then, Chris was the Director of Labour North, which meant he had responsibility for the Labour party in the North-East of England (and a part of Cumbria). While Labour North was the smallest English region of the Labour party, it was also solidly, consistently Labour. Of the 34 parliamentary seats we were responsible for, 31 were Labour held, and a large number of our MPs were political heavyweights. There was also the small matter of the Prime Minister being the Member of Parliament for Sedgefield. 

On top of that, Labour ran nearly every council in the region. Easy life, right? Wrong. With great power comes great infighting.  We had Labour groups at war with each other, or with their MPs, people positioning themselves for selection, or maneuvering others, or seeking to impress.

On top of that, Chris had me as the regional press officer. I like to think I was a pretty good press officer, but even those who love me best would not claim that a fanatical approach to detail and planning is the hallmark of my career. This must have been agony for Chris, but he seemed to think that there was something worthwhile in my work despite that. Though he did start suggesting that he come to pick me up from home to go to the office if we absolutely had to start the working day on time because the PM was visiting, or some such trifle.

What's more, dealing with people who had known almost every senior figure in the Labour party since they were fresh faced tyro's and who have been in power for a decade or more locally has it's own challenges. If a council leader is about to make a terrible, catastrophic error, it's relatively hard to tell them not to. Or at least, it was hard to tell them in a way that meant they listened.

Chris handled all of this with consummate ease, and as a result ended up being appointed Assistant General Secretary after the 2001 Election.  For the next decade, Chris was variously Assistant, Deputy and Acting General Secretary of the Labour party under five different General Secretaries (David Triesman, Matt Carter, Peter Watt, Ray Collins and Iain McNicol).

I used to feel that Chris got something of a hard deal out of his long time as Labour's No 2 manager. Part of it was that he tended to get a lot of the unglamorous, difficult, managerial jobs in the Labour party. While others were in charge of policy, or campaigns, or media, Chris always seemed to be the manager responsible for personnel – which in the Labour party mostly means telling people they can't have the staff they need and then getting rid of large numbers of staff after a General Election,  which never tends to make you popular, especially if you can't do a job without radiating enthusiasm, as Chris always did.

Chris also often seemed to be responsible for things like disciplinary inquiries and party suspensions, which is also an area where you make enemies both if you make a misstep and if you succeed.  I used to joke with him that the answer to the question "who'd do the dirty work under Socialism?" was "Chris Lennie". Even on the (two, three?) occasions Chris was Acting General Secretary, it was usually because some financial or political disaster had befallen us, and so everything had to be devoted to sorting it out, while many of those involved were worried, fearful and understandably concerned that they would be on the way out.

What's more, Chris was never particularly keen on the sort of internal politics that often defines success in party HQ. After I stopped working for the Labour party, I'd often try and get Chris to be a bit disloyal about someone, or something in the Labour party who was, I'd heard, being particularly difficult, or causing him problems, or just being a bit of a Prima Donna. He never once rose to the bait. The most I'd ever get out of him would be a slight pause before he mounted a defence of who-ever it was I thought was driving him up the wall.

Perhaps as a result of that, I wondered if Chris never quite got the respect he was owed in Labour's London HQ among junior staffers, who associated him mostly with P45s.  Because he was willing to energetically subsume himself in the hard, difficult, boring, rations and supplies work, maybe people outside the North-East aren't quite aware of how sharp his political antennae are. Because he was faultlessly loyal, perhaps others didn't quite see how he wanted the Labour party to change. Maybe this is why he didn't get the General Secretary job the last time it came up, though I suspect the answer to that is much more political, and also that the other candidate was pretty good, too.

Though again, it says something about Chris that he's been utterly loyal to Iain McNicol since the NEC chose Iain, much more so than some people who were heavily backing Iain for the job.

There's a lesson there, maybe. Some people deserve trust, and earn it, and you admire them the more you know them. Others, not so much. 

Certainly, in the more than a decade since I started to work for Chris, my respect, trust and admiration for him has only ever grown. That's true of very, very few people I've worked with. I've been lucky in that two of them have been my bosses.

Although this is Chris's last day officially as a member of Party Staff, I'm sure he'll be campaigning and working for the Labour party for a long while yet.

Personally, I'd love the party to give Chris an official role, so that free of the burdens of being a loyal paid servant of the party, people who haven't been lucky enough to work for Chris will get to see why so many of us who have have done, become not just ex-colleagues, but good friends.

Until then – salut!

(Also, I'm convinced the tan is real. Real, and a thing of wonder!)

In my earlier post, I made the argument that the roots of the Conservative party's current travails lie in the failure of the leadership to really confront the big strategic questions of what they want to do with their government, and instead, replace them with a series of tactical decisions based on securing short term political advantage. It's my basic thesis that this tendency has both stored up problems for the government, and, as it is still being applied today is causing fresh problems at an increasing rate.

In a way, this links to argument that both Steve Richards and Iain Martin have made: that a politics of the short term and provisional is unsuited both to the pressures of government, and, especially, to the challenges of the next few years.

Think of it like this. The decade of general prosperity we have been through allowed politicians to apply a spoonful of sugar to any and all difficult decisions they had to make. Now there is no spoonful of sugar, so strategies reliant on them are left badly exposed. Now, I'd argue that the Labour government used the spoonful of sugar rather well: on public service reform, on education, on keeping overall tax rates low and tax credits, on infrastructure spend and so on.

Obviously, all of this was accompanied by a tactical, political dance, which now distracts columnists and political types from what went on beneath. If I say Damian or Alistair, you probably know who I mean. If I say Conor and Paul C, you probably don't. Fundamentally, the task of the New Labour press team was to identify sore spots, and either prevent further self inflicted wounds or apply the cooling unguent of money. (Read Damian's excellent account of the Budget process, and imagine how much less well such a process works if overall tax takes were plummeting)

So I'd argue that not only are the Tories reliant on a strategy that is unsuited to the current times, but the accumulated errors of their past strategy mean they cannot even deliver that strategy reasonably competently.

Not only are Cameron and Osborne reading the wrong script, as Iain Martin puts it, they are reading it so badly.

The big mistake

Up to 2008/09 the Conservatives were following a reasonably effective political narrative. They hadn't really confronted the big policy divisions in the Conservative party, but by effectively matching Labour's spending plans, they were able to effectively promise prizes for all. He wasn't always successful in this – even in 2005 Tim Montgomerie was using the "And" theory of conservatism to demand a little more red meat for the Tory right. Rather than being shrugged off, such an ambiguous position was repeatedly embraced.

We saw this process on grammar schools, on welfare policy, on the NHS. It was possible, the Leadership argued, to support radical public service reform, a limited state and progressive goals all at once, because there was going to be the money to pay for it all. As a result by 2010, even a Tory critic like Montgomerie was arguing that "The manifesto is much more the latest installment of Cameron's simultaneous attempt to persuade the left that he is different from Thatcher, and to persuade the right that he remains rooted in historic, Burkean conservatism." .

That strategy, though riddled with internal contradictions likely to be exposed in office, was politically workable. However, it stopped being politically workable in 2008, when suddenly the easy decade came to a definitive stop. Labour's strategy was the most obviously exposed by this, but the Conservative leadership found themselves in an equally awkward position. Having gambled on detoxifying the Tory brand through moving close to New Labour positions, they were confronted by the apparent collapse of the New Labour political and economic model. George Osborne was under political pressure, with some calling for him to be moved from the Shadow Chancellor job.

In response, they entirely abandoned their strategy.  

At the time, this looked masterful. The Labour government were struggling, the economy was tanking, and the Tories were now free to attack them with everything they had. The only consequence was that the Tories were now committed to a policy of deeper spending cuts in government, no matter what Labour's chancellor actually proposed. this was, I submit, a colossal strategic error. Labour were caught on the horns of a dilemma. To get out of recession, Labour needed to spend. It was also clear that in the medium term, this would mean balancing cuts. Labour really did not want to disclose what those cuts might mean.

If the Tories had chosen to match Labour spending plans, they could have run on a mantle of trust, honesty and competency, arguing that spending cuts were needed, and that only they would deliver the tough medicine well. Labour would then both had to define it's own cuts agenda, which would have been extremely painful, and also been unable to attack the Conservatives for damaging the economy. In effect, David Cameron could have run a Tory version of the campaign Nick Clegg ran, thanks to Vince Cable.

Despite failing to win the election, the Tories were lucky in their rivals. Labour ran a truly dreadful campaign, and only managed to land a few effective punches in the final days, while Nick Clegg had a collapsed souffle of an election, and then failed to make any sort of case for his economic policy in the coalition negotiations. The Conservatives were in government, their economic policy intact.

Unfortunately, this economic policy locked them in to two or three years of sustained bad news. Budgets would have to be cut. Resources reduced. Living standards would have to fall. Growth would likely be anemic. Oddly, there was a moment in which the case for this could be made. It's needed, the coalition argued. We have to take the tough decisions. We have to do the right thing. The public listened, and broadly, agreed.

Yet here again, the preference for tactics and short term political advantage, the desire to manage the Conservative party rather than confront it caused problems for the leadership. The right wanted tax cuts, and deregulation. So the Conservatives leadership hinted their assent. Then, as the economy struggled, they could not fall back on a "stick with it" argument. They couldn't argue that these hard yards were essential. Instead, they had to try to find a solution to their party's desire for the sort of  distinctively conservative policies they had hinted they favoured. Nor could they tell the Tory right to wait, because by not winning the election (by not confronting the Tory right) they had not earned the power to do so.

Further, and even more inexplicably, when the times were good for their position, the leadership went out of their way to denigrate those they had cosseted in opposition, making it clear how much more congenial the Liberal Democrats were to the mouth-breathers of the Tory right.  Again, this sense of short term advantage, and political solutions over policy fights comes to the fore.

Making common cause with the LibDems makes a huge amount of sense politically. I've said before that a Conservative-LibDem permanent alliance is a great fear of mine. But to make it work, the Conservative party had to be entirely bought on board, either be persuasion or by the clear winning of an argument. Instead, the leadership briefed, hinted, and insinuated and in doing so, aggravated.

That might have even made sense if the Leadership had taken on the right and won in opposition, but the Carswells, the Bone's, the Dorries', the Redwood's could all remember times when they had been prayed in aid, and now without victory, their leadership was blatantly preferring their coalition partners.

Such behaviour created resentment, and that resentment had to be bought off, when, predictably, times got harder for a government implementing austerity.

So George Osborne found himself standing up as an economy stagnated, and announcing a tax cut for the rich that he insisted was actually a tax increase for the rich, alongside various tax cuts of small and provisional types, paid for by the sort of stealth taxes he had decried so often in opposition.

This then, entirely predictably, fell apart. By apparently cutting taxes, Osborne was overturning the "Hard yards" argument.  But he didn't have the money to pay for such tax cuts, and he couldn't back out of his deficit reduction plans, so he had to try and squeeze in bits and pieces, each of which caused an individual pip to squeak.

Nor would the Tory right come to fight for him, because they could see it wasn't really a dash for growth through tax cuts, while the LibDems were perfectly happy to see their coalition partners being stuck in the clarts for once.

At each turn, the Conservative leadership have chosen tactics over strategy. they've chosen political management over political argument. this didn't really work as politics, but relied on the failure of the government. Even with such a failure, it then provided only an incoherent and self-contradictory path for government. 

Cameron and Osborne are failing now. They may yet be rescued by the global economy, or by fear of the alternative, or by the hard work and entrepreneurial and social spirit of the British people. Either way, they should provide an object lesson to the Labour party in how not to prepare for government in tough times.

Any reccession is terrible news for the economy, and more importantly for the families and businesses struggling in tough times. God, that sounds like a piece to camera, doesn't it? Sorry. Hard habit to break. Still true, mind.

This recession is worse, because it was avoidable. 

Unfortunately, the more the government fails today, the tougher the fiscal challenge gets tomorrow.

The deficit will be stickier now, harder to reduce in the short term. That means the next Labour government will face even more fiscal pressure as it attempts to deliver our social justice agenda.

Now before I talk about the future, what about the past? How did we get here? Short answer. We got here because the government have screwed up.

Some commentators, notably Owen Jones, (there expressing the friendly comradeship the left is famous for), apparently believe that "In the Black Labour" advocacy of fiscal conservatism represented an endorsement of Tory economic policy. So I thought a few reminders that we've been saying since we started that the governent strategy would fail might be worthwhile.

As Anthony Painter and I said when we wrote in the Guardian on launching "In the Black Labour":

"The chancellor's autumn statement showed conclusively that George Osborne has messed up. His model of recovery – that export-led growth and private investment would step in as the state withdrew – was wrong. And he failed to allow enough flexibility should things not go as planned. The result is a faint but worrying reflection of the European periphery, where new austerity is piled on existing austerity in a desperate scrabble to hold on to fiscal targets."

and I underlined the point here in point three back in November:

"The government messed up because they got the short term economy wrong. We saw on Tuesday how we're all paying the price for that. In a demand crisis, you need to take action, and do so dramatically and boldly. To do otherwise isn't being fiscally conservative, it's just being stupid."

So, no question about that. The government got it wrong.

Yet that's not the end of the story for Labour.

If the government fails, this creates an increased pressure for the next government. The lower growth is projected in this parliament, the less likely it is we see deficits reduced, the higher the costs of failure and the bigger the challenge for a centre left government coming to power with a stagnant economy, high deficits and high social costs. 

It's worth pointing out that we're pretty clearly now on the downside of the OBR projection for the economy. Here's what that OBR say will likely result from this state of affairs continuing. (they regard it as an Euro area issue, but the same point appplies for a domestic slump.)

"weak nominal GDP growth leads to significantly lower tax receipts, due to lower consumption, labour income and company profits. Taxes on assets are significantly weaker, due to lower equity prices and housing transactions;

unemployment-related spending rises, but lower inflation dampens benefits upratings and debt interest payments on index-linked gilts.

Spending, which is fixed in nominal terms over the current Spending Review period, increases as a share of national income. Growth in spending beyond the Spending Review period rises more slowly, as it is linked to
general economy inflation;

and

much of the additional borrowing compared to our central forecast is cyclical, but nevertheless, because of our assumption of slower potential growth, the CACB is no longer in surplus in 2016-17;

and
higher borrowing (both structural and cyclical) leads to public sector net debt rising significantly over the forecast period." (OBR March forecast Para 5.41, pp174-5)

Some in the Labour party may feel it's politically sufficient for the Labour party to simply point out that the government has failed and ignore the question of what such a failure will mean for a Labour government.

I profoundly disagree.

Ultimately, the next election will be about the future, and if Labour isn't clear about it's approach, we will be exposed, even by a failed Chancellor. Even now, with the government's credibility ratings tumbling, we are seeing "a plague on all your houses" attitude among the electorate.

The last ComRes poll said that while just 25% of voters trusted Cameron and Osborne on the Economy, only 19% trusted Miliband and Balls.

I don't want to be pessimistic. This poll represents a significant improvement for Labour compared to the Tories, and one that is reflected in all polls, but the fact that both parties score so badly should concern us.  It suggests that the many in the electorate think that both major parties have done little to earn trust. My belief is that it is here the Labour party needs to focus, and it is not at all to soon to do so.

I feel so strongly about this because the truth is that the next Labour government will not have easy answers, and we need to prepare the ground for that now, if we want to achieve anything worthwhile in government.

I also feel, (and I have no evidence for this, only gut instinct) that people will actually appreciate a party levelling with them now. This is no longer the Nice decade, and so we no longer need nice politics.

Actually, when it comes to the challenge  feel I was sort of vaguely prophetic here, in the Independent back in September:

"Plan B may be essential, but a return to growth will only ease eventual fiscal consolidation, not remove the need for it. Worse, if George Osborne sticks to his plans but fails either to grow the economy or cut the structural deficit significantly, that just means an even harder task falls to the next government.

Either way, our plans for the future will involve a programme of more taxes and less spending when the economy is growing. This is hardly an attractive left-of-centre position, but when stable deficit reduction becomes necessary, surely it's our duty to get the finances into the black in a way that matches left-wing aims.

It would be stupid to pretend a fiscal path back to black won't hurt. To cut the deficit and invest in industrial growth, we'd need a public restraint that would be painful for many. That pain might still be worthwhile if we could use fiscal stability to generate a better spread of jobs and wealth"

I want to continue with my argument that the roots of the current Conservative travails lie with the Tory leadership's choice to address the tactical and branding elements of Conservative modernisation, and not in a meaningful way engage with the policy agenda to deliver such.

Mind you, I suspect that the revelations at the Leveson inquiry about the contacts between the Culture Secretary and News Corporation will make discussion of of the budget fairly redundant for a little while.

A few quick points on this: First – the belief that the Conservative party needed to impress News Corp was a strong one. But why? Ironically, the argument was that Murdoch had been unimpressed by Cameron's political lightness and policy-light approach to politics. Murdoch didn't feel the Cameron reform agenda was particularly meaningful. Indeed, given the traumas the Labour government was going through, it was pretty remarkable that the Sun only threw it's support behind the Conservative party in September 2009.

Second, the endorsement came a long two years after the hiring of Andy Coulson as Cameron's comms director. It must have been extremely frustrating for the Conservatives not to have the support of the Sun while the Labour government was on life support. As Jeremy Hunt was Shadow Culture and Media Secretary throughout this period, he would surely have been acquainted with the stance his leader took in opposition on Newscorp issues. (and would also have been very aware of the fact that most of the senior figures in NewsCorp were close to his leader in both personal and political terms). That desire to "work towards the leader" would undoubtedly have continued in office.

(This is part of the reason Labour should not be too triumphal about the government's current difficulties. Does anyone believe that there were no contacts between No 10 and NewsCorp between June 2007 and September 2009 in order to retain the possibility of support? I find that hard to imagine. )

Finally, while there is no evidence to support a causal link between a positive stance on the BSkyB bid and the Sun's endorsement, it might be hinted that Cameron's inability to impress Murdoch in his first years as leader meant that he subsequently had to go further than he might have liked to show that Murdoch should support the Tories.

If I'm right, and Cameron and Osborne are primarily tactical and transactional politicians, this might have involved a willingness to consider ownership issues as points of leverage. Consider the reverse: while Blair went out of his way to impress Murdoch, he also held several clear red lines – He never wavered in his pro-Europeanism, for example, nor did Brown accept Murdoch attitudes to regulation and tax. There certainly seems to have been a sense at NewsCorp that a Labour government would have followed a lengthy process of referral and ajudication on any bid, something they had a commercial interest in avoiding, if possible.

To me, this storm again looks like eveidence of the dangers of putting short term tactical/political advantage ahead of making the key strategic choices that would force others to define themselves in relation to the fundamental position you've taken. On this reading the answer to the question "Why did the government stance on the competition commission matter so much?" is because that was the terms of trade between two sets of trasactional, tactical operators.

I stress though, that I doubt this will end up redounding to any great credit to my own party. While I doubt Labour would have courted NewsCorp on the same grounds the tories did, we would have been foolish to not try and find a working relationship with their editors, reporters and managers of a major media player. Nor, personally, do I think that is behaviour that a politician should be particularly embarrassed by. Politics and policy, though not public process, are fair game for debates between the media and politicians.

I confess I am utterly intrigued by the current politics of the Conservative party. While strong political positions are often tossed aside lightly, it is rare that they are thrown away with such great force.

The phrase du jour is apparently Omnishambles. I think this is wrong. An omnishambles implies a lack of causation, an inevitability of buffoonery. We all have Omnishamble moments. A more appropriate, though more tired, metaphor is the seven car pile up. Like all such the current Tory smash up is a spectacle, albeit a gruesome one, which attracts crowds. Some are there to mourn and others -me included- are simply marveling at the strange contortions of the various wrecks visible at the scene and wondering how each came to be in their twisted state.

In addition, like a car crash, the current Tory crisis has causes. Sure, the Qatada deportation is the sort of unfortunate snafu that affects all governments, but everything else, from Pasties to Nadine Dorries outbursts to the IMF disquiet is the result of deliberate choices made by the Conservative leadership.

Some go back years, others are more recent. Yet each can be traced back to tactical choices which seemed worthwhile to gain power, or secure political advantage, but have since returned to damage the entire Conservative modernisation project.

1. History: How the missed battle with the Tory right (and the arrogance of coalition) is haunting the Tories today

The biggest problem the Conservatives have results, I think from the circumstances of David Cameron's leadership bid itself. It may seem strange now, but back in 2005, David Davis was preparing to don the mantle of Neil Kinnock. Quietly, he and his team were briefing people that although he was going to win the leadership election on the strength of his position on the right of the party and his appeal as a "Bootstraps" Tory, his policy agenda would be markedly centrist.

We forget now, but back when David Davis started his leadership campaign he stood on the "Modern Conservative" brand and said:

"I want to build a new consensus for change, using modern conservative ideas to achieve the goal of social justice which for too long have been claimed by the left:
- opportunity for the many and not just the privileged few.
- public services as good as those of our European neighbours.
- a strong economy and a better society"

Gosh. Sounds familiar, doesn't it? Of course it does.

Who introduced Davis at that event? Why, reformist Tory David Willets. Other supporters included current modernisers like Andrew Mitchell, Nick Herbert and the famous Polly Toynbee fan, Greg Clark. The problem was that for all "DD's" campaign claimed to be that of a "Modern Conservative", Davis himself appeared a terribly unmodern Conservative. He looked old school. He posed for embarrassing photos with nubile women in tight t-shirts. He gave interviews in which he described himself as a male chauvinist pig. Against this fresh, relaxed, charming, even charismatic David Cameron could easily steal the image of modernism.

The resulting problem was that Cameron didn't really need to steal the reform policy agenda. In fact, to win the leadership he had to find alternative sources of support. So, the phrases were modernising, but the actual battles were ducked.  Indeed, in the crucial early phases, Cameron discovered that he needed to lock up the votes of the Tory eurosceptic MPs. Davis, confident of victory, had refused to indulge the hard core eurosceptics with promises of leaving the European People's Party. Cameron was prepared to play to the right wing gallery, and use a combination of modern image and policy vagueness to ensure the "reformer" label fell into his lap without ever having to win a policy fight on centrist grounds. Instead, Cameron was able to present himself as a "right-moderniser" supportive of conservative solutions.

This wasn't just about Europe. Remember George Osborne advocating a flat tax? Trust me, the Tory right do. After all, current City AM editor Allister Heath literally wrote the book on the topic.

One of the noticeable things about the whole Cameronian project in opposition was that it proceeded by identifying relatively small political issues (Environment, Overseas Aid, candidate selection) to brand Cameron as a different kind of Tory, while fights on issues of substance, from Europe to tax to Grammar schools were repeatedly fudged, often with a wink and a nod to the Tory right (Remember a grammar stream in every school?). Even on the NHS, the opposition Conservative position was essentially a "leave it in aspic' position, with "No hospital closures" the campaign emphasis. Even the green agenda, of course, seemed more photo-op than policy.

Further, as Labour imploded, the political need to redefine the Conservative party on big issues receded. Even in the one big area where Cameron and Osborne had made a change, Conservative strategy was reversed in the wake of the financial crisis, The Conservatives moved from matching Labour spending plans to establishing clear blue water through austerity. Why decontaminate yourselves when your opponent is a political Chernobyl? I maintain this was a disastrous political mistake for the Tory party.  Apart from anything else, it signalled to the Tory party that the leadership felt that a right wing agenda could take them to victory.

It didn't.

Yet in failing to win the General Election, Cameron took the chance to define himself as beyond and above his party. By forming the coalition, he happily gave up a lot of the baggage he'd been carrying with him from the Tory right since his election as leader. There were bound to be rumblings about this eventually, but as long as the Tories had a strong political position, they would never trouble Cameron.

What was odd though was the way in which Cameron subsequently went out of his way to humiliate those who had bought his right-reformist flannel.

Douglas Carswell was being praised by Cameron as late as 2010 for his direct democracy pamphlet "the plan". Little wonder these people now feel they have been sold a pig in a poke. The same applies to the flat taxers and the deregulators. Equally, the Eurosceptics were never going to be entirely satisfied with withdrawal from the EPP, but Cameron never really clarified what he would and wouldn't do in office, and so now they suspect he suckered them into a traditional Tory Majorist approach to Europe.  All of these must see a pattern – warm words, followed by inaction, followed by contempt.

Carswell and his ilk were bound to be disappointed eventually, as the realities of government intruded. But as Cameron had never taken them on, he'd never defeated them. They can feel, with some justification, that Cameron is in Number Ten through their forbearance and support, and that he should repay in kind, with at lest a modicum of respect. Cameron clearly doesn't feel the same way, and thinks they should be happy with all he's doing. The trouble is, since Cameron can't ever claim to have defined what his agenda is in a way serrate to all these right-philosophical strands, nor defeated them in policy combat, nor won a general election, he is standing on some pretty slippery terrain. If he really thought they were rubbish ideas, or impractical, why didn't he never say so in opposition? If his current stance is so essential to ensuring a Conservative government is elected, why did he not pursue in opposition, only doing so when forced to by a lack of a majority.

They suspect that the policy position is defined by self interest, tactical priorities and love of power. They might not be wrong in that.

So the struggles in the modern Conservative party have deep roots.

In the next post, we shall look at how these roots were pulled to the surface by a combination of Tory internal politics and a entirely self-defeating and unnecessary search for positive publicity.

Boris Johnson is an intriguing political figure for those of us on the left.

Boris plays up to a certain high Tory image (Public School, littering of Latin into eveyday conversation, appears to be a bounder and/or cad) which combined with a tendency to indulge in "epater les gauche bourgeoisie" table talk for fun and profit, produces in us the sort of emotional reaction usually seen in angry cats. We fluff up our tails, screech and become rather unpleasant to be around.

Yet as a politician, Johnson is much more conventional than he seems.

Sure, he has held down Council tax, but in this he is aided mostly by a disinterest in doing much new, and a preference for raising transport funding through fare increases not general taxation. There was a bit of hoo-ha about bendy busses and the Western extension zone for the congestion charge, but beyond this, there is really little to get worked up about*.

Even Boris's interventions to enflame the passions of the Tory right seem more designed to cause angst in Downing Street than to impact overall policy. Boris's right rhetoric on national politics rarely seems to inteface with what he does on the ground.

Of course, Boris is a Mayor, so can get away with this sort of stunt.

Defining yourself in opposition to central government is fun for an elected Mayors and comes with little political cost (Is Boris Johnson copping much flack for advocating a cut in the top rate of tax? Not likely. He's far from the scene of that political crime, whistling cheerfully).

The Parliamentary Tory Party has no such room for manoeuvere.

So it is a mystery to me that so many look at Johnson, and attribute his relative political success to stridently talking right about things he has no control over, rather than quietly tacking to the centre where he actually impacts Londoner's lives.

Perhaps they are taken in by the 'Look ma, no hands' approach Boris appears to favour to his mayoral administration, and attribute the dull centrism to various London tory machine politicians who actually keep the show on the road.

Perhaps, like those of us on the left who are so outraged by the showmanship we pay little attention to the administration, they are watching the hand-waving so are missing the deck being stacked.

If I were a Tory, and examining the latest YouGov poll in the London election, I'd pay attention to the voters perceptions of Mayor Johnson, not of Boris.

For example, 39% of current Labour voters and 43% of 2010 Labour voters think Johnson has done well, or very well, as Mayor. Among those who are voting Labour, but are backing Boris (small sample) this rises to 67%.

For comparison, only 20% of current Conservatives and 22% of 2010 Conservatives, think Ken did very or fairly well as Mayor. Mayor Johnson has made himself a significantly less polarising figure than his rival**.

Whether he wins or loses in May, Boris has, in essence, detoxified himself in the eyes of many Londoners, even those who intend to vote Labour.

Why? In my view, it's because that for Boris's right wing hoo-ha and Toynbee baiting, for all the rhetoric about waste and cutting taxes, Mayor Johnson's fundamental Mayoral stance has been centrist and inoffensive, to the point of tepid.

This is, exactly where the Conservative party in government should be.

It mystifies me that so many Tories don't see this.

Naturally, this is something for which I am profoundly thankful.

*One major exception – Johnson's housing policies have been rather retrogade. I attribute this more to disinterest than political passion, but this may be wrong. it is the one area where the influence of the Tory Boroughs may be at play, and have a deeper political and social agenda than I am aware of.

**Oddly, I'd argue the same was probably true of Ken in his last three elections, where Red Ken seemed to be replaced by competent Ken and Cuddly Ken, in voters minds.)  

There are reasons to allow major sporting events to look away from political repression, even of the most inhumane and degrading kind. 

We remember the 1936 Olympics today, not as a celebration of the Nazi ethos, but for Jesse Owens living refutation of racial discrimination, running for one prejudiced, discriminatory nation in an event intended to glorify a regime based entirely on hatred of the racially "inferior".

The Moscow Olympics of 1980 took place in a Soviet Union still employing the tools of political repression, not just in the Soviet Union but across the Eastern Bloc.

While the Afghan war was the reason for the US Boycott of the Games, the Soviet Union was still imprisoning those who dared to believe in way not approved by the State, and were preparing to repress those who dared to oppose their satellite regimes in the prison-states of the Eastern Bloc. During the Beijing Olympics, China was hold Tibet's chains as tight as ever, and the political control of the Chinese Communist party was not loosened. 

Yet the fact that both the Soviet Union and China sought to be part of a global sporting event mattered.

Yes, they had their own purposes for doing so, but the symbolism of the sporting itself could not help but transmit messages other than state sanctioned ones. 

Witness the Chinese regime relaxing, even a little, reporting restrictions so to earn the approval of the foreign media. In such openings, in such crevices there is greater meaning than perhaps we know. It is possible for a sporting event to be both used by a regime for their purposes, and at the same time, expose the tension and insecurities that such regimes are most eager to hide.

Why is this worth mentioning?

Because Sport can serve a purpose higher than itself.

When Sohn Kee-Chung won the 1936 Marathon as a Japanese athlete, and stood on the podium with his fellow Korean, both with their heads bowed in protest, Sohn using his winner's wreath to obscure the Japanese flag on his jacket, it meant something.

Today, when North Korea sportsmen and women walk alongside their South Korean rivals under the same flag it means something.

So there can be a justification for sport amid repression.

There can be a worth in allowing the worst of regimes a place in the greatest of sporting celebrations.

Perhaps this is because sport can be a way to express what cannot be expressed, as once was said of Bruegel's paintings.

It's why repressive states use sport as a tool for propaganda and as a sign of their power, but time and again, sport is also used to subvert that propaganda.

Sport is also important for those who seek to control others, and those who chafe under that control, because sporting encounters can appeal to our sense of myth, whether of national glory, or our need to find a clear story, to identify sides to support and oppose.

Sport gives us heroes, villains. It gives us outrages and redemption. It gives us a way to tell a story about ourselves, about what we believe in. 

Remember, such stories can tell half truths, even in telling important stories.

The pictures above are from the 1967 Boston marathon, where Katherine Switzer became one of the first women to run Boston. The angry man, Jock Semple, one of the race's officials, always claimed that his intent was not to prevent Switzer from running, but simply to remove her race number, as USAA rules insisted women not run more than a mile and a half.

Semple claimed he didn't mind women running, and indeed Bobbi Gibb had successfully run without a number the year before. So was Semple being prejudiced, just playing by the rules, or both? A few years later, he stood on the start line with Switzer, and perhaps by way of apology, gave her a very public hug and kiss.

Perhaps the picture misleads, perhaps it does not. But the story it tells of women being repressed -and running on – posesses its own power.

Similarly, many of the most powerful sporting stories against repression are strange mixtures of reality, myth and propaganda, So much so that it it had to know from a distance, where each ends and begins.

All of which is to say that when thinking about the disturbing presence of Formula One in Bahrain this weekend, we should perhaps ask not should sport be present in such a place, but what purpose is there to this sport, at this time?

What story does this particular event tell us about the sport, about society, about Bahrain, about ourselves as watchers?

I can only think of one.

It says we don't care. That the people of Bahrain, whatever their concerns, their hopes, their demands, are meaningless to us.

We seek a show, we seek spectacle, and as a result, there is money to be made in providing this show to us, and a so cavalcade of justifications are deployed to ensure the show goes on. 

This is, I concede, unfair on those drivers, those teams, who perhaps do care very much. But no-one is entirely in control of their own symbolism.

What Formula one shows us is vastly paid, ultra sponsored drivers and teams, always insulated and protected from the world around them, from the society they are geographically and physically located in, uncomprehending of anything but the world they create around them in various locations across the globe chosen for the maximum income to be generated, the maximum audience to be gained.  I watch Formula One. I am stunned at the engineering prowess, the physical skill, the mental effort that goes into these races.  I have no concern that a racing driver is a multi-multi-millionaire. Why should he not be? It is not down to me to decide what talents are deserving of what financial reward, thank God.

But if you are a multi-millionaire sportsman. If you are a sport that is based on the ultimate literal symbolism of the unity of power, technology, money and competition. If you find yourself in a place where your obligation to compete is being used to support a regime that represses it's citizens, then please. Stop. 

To make the strange nexus of sport and fame and repression worthwhile, you need the space for an Owens. You need a Sohn Kee-Chung.

You need the space for repression to be subverted, a crevice in which freedom and dignity can begin the arduous task of cracking the foundation of the regime built stadiums.

Today, in Bahrain, Formula One offers no such presence, gives no such chance of undermining.

Without that element, sport becomes an obscenity, not a triumph of the human spirit over any and all barriers.

That, ultimately, is why there should be no Formula One in Bahrain tomorrow.

The following landed on my desk today, with a strangely heady, smoky aroma infusing the paper.

——————-

To: Nick Clegg

From: Angela Screwtape, Director of Strategy, Office of the DPM.

Re: Future Strategy

Dear Nick,

It''s a pleasure to be appointed as your new director of strategy. Yes, I know all the puns, but in crisis, opportunity.

If we can find a way to return significant numbers of LibDem MPs at the next election, both you and I will be regarded as political escapatologists of the first order. That's a challenge I relish, and one I think is of the greatest importance for our country.

As requested, I'm sending you my initial thoughts on what our strategy should be for the coming three years.

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

You don't need me to tell you how bad things are. We have lost perhaps half of our 2010 support, will suffer significant losses in the the next two sets of local elections, and your personal ratings are, for want of a better word, dire. If we feel less pressure than a year ago, it is simply because the coalition is currently giving us political cover as attention focuses on the failing of the Chancellor and Tory ministers, and so the media focus is on internal conservative divisions. Our biggest political positive is that with the cuts, AV and Tuition fees out of the way, the issues likely to cause division and defection within our party have already been managed.

The bad news is that in doing this we have lost a very great deal of support. Nor should we rely on the usual mid-term LibDem collapse/resurgence cycle In national polling to rescue us. This is normally a function of limited media attention in non-election years. Whatever else we feel, we cannot claim that LibDems are being ignored by the media. When Mark Pack appears on TV more often than Labour Shadow Cabinet ministers you know things have changed for the LibDems.

THE CHALLENGE

I'd assess success in three ways. First. that we ensure the LibDems are a distinctive, unified political force effective in government as a campaigning organisation. Second, that we maximise the number of LibDems MPs returned in the next parliament. Third, that we maximise support in the popular vote.

Defining what success looks like is important. If we were to put popular vote support as more important that returning members of parliament, it would have a significant impact on our political strategy. We would for example, focus on support in the many seats where we are currently a good, but relatively distant, second place to either of the other parties.

Equally, If we simply wanted to maximise popular vote and seats, we should give no value to being in government. However we are in politics for a reason, and delivering our political agenda in government is no small thing, though do note that the scale of the achievements we make in government reduces as the next election nears. The balance of risk and reward for remaining in full coalition is not static.

OPTIONS

There are three broad strategies we could follow that are currently being recommended to you, either consciously or by default:

1. The path to Liberal Unionism:

Under this scenario, we judge that the value of our Coalition to the nation is so great it outweighs our concerns about our own political identity, so in exchange for key influence over the path of a broadly Conservative government, we subsume our unique political identity. This is a well worn path – by Liberal Unionists, advocates of "Fusion" in the Twenties and Liberal Nationals from the thirties right through to the post-Second World War period. 

The internal logic of this position is clear. The risk of an alternative government is so great we need to secure the centre-ground with conservative support. Doing so eventually costs us electoral support, but it makes us acceptable to previously sceptical voters. As a result, a formal or informal deal becomes possible to secure the seats of sitting MPs, retain our place in government and construct a broadly centrist political agenda.

The negatives of this strategy are clear in the historical record. Once a pact is made, it becomes increasingly hard to unmake. If a Conservative government is essential to the successful governance of Britain, then what is truly distinctive about Liberalism as a political force – as opposed to say the moderate Toryism of the Bow Group, or one nation Conservatism. Further, the very act of accepting the political shelter of a long term alliance weakens your overall political independence and freedom. Clearly you seek support because you fear you would lose without such backing. This exposes a fundamental weakness that builds its own momentum. Sustained for long enough, this tends to end in absorption into the dominant party. 

For some, such a relationship would be unacceptable. It is hard to see the present Lib-Dem parliamentary party retaining perfect cohesion should such an arrangement be formalised, though in the past (eg the Lloyd-George-Asquith split) organisational and political links were retained even when very different political strategies were adopted. One could picture a "Social Liberal Democrat group" forming semi-independently of the main party, sitting in opposition, but not organising candidates against MPs from the "Official Liberal Democrats". We have relatively recent experience of this. John Cartwright and Rosie Barnes did not face Liberal Democrat candidates in 1992, for example.

Nor should it be assumed that Liberal Unionism is final. If your assessment is that no conceivable Labour government could be supported by you in government, then all that has to happen is that the Labour party changes sufficiently for that assessment to change. Different people in the party will be at different points on that continuum.

Equally, should the Conservative party win a majority at the next election and decide to form a government alone, then such rifts could be healed relatively easily. The longer such an alliance goes on however, the harder it is to unmake.

2. The search for an early split:

The logic here is that in order to reconstruct our post-Ashdown political alliance of professionals, public sector workers, students and support secured by strong local campaigns and organising, it is essential that we are able to present ourselves as identifiably independent and liberal.

A corollary of this is that our alliance with the Conservatives is fundamentally situational. We support this government only as long as it is dealing with a particular set of challenges. We wish to remove that support as soon as possible in order to deliver a stronger Liberal agenda with  any or all partners, To that end, we wish to end formal coalition as soon as possible, knowing that we wold then be able to publicly critique a minority conservative government, develop a distinctive Lib Dem position on issues.

There are strong arguments for such a position. It would allow us to support the fundamental economic strategy of the government without being tied into every error and policy choice of government. It would place us at the fulcrum of every political debate, and it would likely mean some return of support among voters who felt our decision to enter coalition was a fundamental mistake.

However, there are also strong negatives.

Having entered a full coalition, to depart it early would require a powerful causus belli. It would definitely not be in the interests of the Conservatives to gift us such an opportunity. Second, in departing we would not be able to instantly bring down the government through a vote of no confidence. We would face a fortnight of debate over whether to support the government or not, during which time we would either be offered concessions, or, if the polls were against us and the Conservatives felt they could win an election, simply attacked. Either way, we should ask ourselves if playing out the dilemmas of governance in public, rather than in private, would really be beneficial for us. It is highly probably that out of government, our MPs would split on many divisions and many issues. We may, by departing the harsh discipline of office, actually increase the division we sought to prevent.

The final question is whether the 1992-2010 LD electorate is attainable. A political strategy that seeks to build that electoral combination has to be based on certainty that it is achievable. I am not convinced it is. I think it is highly likely that white collar public sector workers, the metropolitan centre and students are extremely disaffected and would not return to us easily, especially as the Labour party is currently providing an unchallenging and comfortable home for such views.

If you wish to consider such a strategy, I'd advise urgent research work among 2010 LD voters to identify the current toxicity of the Lib Dem brand and barriers to voting. It may well be that you yourself are such a barrier and you will wish to understand what such a strategy means for your position.

3. Castles of Liberalism:

This is the strategy we are following at the moment, almost by default.  In this scenario, we identify our currently held seats and centres of support and we seek to maintain them as best we can.

This is ultimately a ground up strategy, focused on the achievable of the re-election of individual MPs and councils, though the construction of fortresses of support where we are one of the two main parties, and thus the national political picture is of little relevance. In such areas the choice becomes LibDem or Conservative, Labour or LibDem. We are therefore able to pose to voters an entirely different challenge to the national campaign narrative. To voters in a Conservative/LibDem seats, the choice is between a Tory and a moderate, centrist LibDem still acceptable to many conservative voters and clearly preferable to those on the left. To voters in a LibDem/Labour seat, the LibDem candidate becomes the de-facto "government" candidate. 

At the moment, I fear we are pursuing this strategy but in the wrong way. The logic of this position is that a LibDem in a "conservative" seat should be running moderately against the government, seeking to unite the "left" and "moderate conservative" vote against the Conservative candidate, while a LibDem in a "Labour" seat should be running moderately with the government, seeking to unite the "right" and "moderate Labour" vote. Instead, we tend to do the reverse.

There is also a bigger risk. In seeking to build such a bottom up strategy, there is a danger of national incoherence. Do we seek the re-election of the current government? Will we be more likely to go with Labour or Conservative? What conditions do we attach? If we allow a diversity of local strategy, there is a danger that we are unable to answer these questions with any particular credibility.

ALL THESE OPTIONS ARE FLAWED

It is my view that none of these strategies are acceptable, either electorally or as a coherent political position. The first likely ends in fusion, the second in defeat and the third in chaos.   None of them are entirely stupid however. Those who recommend them are working from some very intelligent observations, and elements of each strategy make sense.  That said, I would advise opting for none of the above and exploring a fourth option.

4.  Building a new, tighter Lib Dem alliance

There is a potential electoral alliance for the Liberal Democrats.

However, it is both smaller and more focused than the 1992-2010 alliance. It is made up of those white collar professionals in both the private and public sector who accept the need for fiscal responsibility, our rural and small town "Small-c" supporters, those who find the Conservatives unacceptable but Labour unpalatable. It is broadly speaking a suburban and semi-rural constituency of voters. It excludes students and most public-sector professionals. It is both older and less metropolitan than our 2010 support.  It is more free market oriented, less concerned by constitutional and civil liberties issues, though broadly liberal on matters of personal freedom.

To take a deliberate decision to pursue these voters would require an understanding that some seats would effectively be on their own in terms of building a political alliance. This alliance would not win Bermondsey, or Manchester Withington, or Leeds North West. It would mean an effective abandoning of Liverpool and Newcastle's hopes of majority, instead aiming to consolidate and retain a strong second place, at least in the short-to-medium term. It may even be pragmatic to allow candidates is such areas to differentiate themselves from the national leadership, perhaps even officially.

On the other hand, a relentless focus on this new electoral grouping, many of whom would have been Conservative voters at the last election (but by no means "core" conservative voters), might preserve for example, Solihull, or Somerton and Frome, Cornwall North, Mid Dorset and Poole, Chippenham, Berwick, Eastbourne and Torbay, all of which are currently likely to switch to the Conservatives in 2015.*  It might also be enough to hold off the Nationalist surge in many rural Scottish seats, where we would be able to present ourselves as the moderate, widely acceptable face of unionism.

Many of our activists will be unhappy with the political positions needed to pursue such a position (more support for tax cuts, a tougher anti-crime message, a clearly pro-business agenda, a more car-friendly transport strategy, more openness to public sector reform, especially in schools, combined with a strong emphasis on rural issues, a tougher approach on planning and regulation than the Conservatives offer, less enthusiasm for broad house building on green-land.  However, there is political space for such a political party, and it can preserve a significant segment of our political representation.

One final thought.

You have tough choices to make on strategy. You know that  whatever choice you make will involve jettisoning elements of support, losing MPs and being accused of destroying the Liberal tradition. Indeed, your choice may even involve putting the whole future of the Liberal Democrats at stake.

If possible I would be relaxed about this. If the last century teaches us anything, it is that Liberalism in Britain is remarkably resilient. After a century of defeats and absorptions, betrayals, coalition, renamings and defeats we are still here, and what's more, in government. Whatever choice you make, Liberalism will remain, revive and return.  In the mean-time, do what is right for the country and for liberal values as you see them.

 * I am working off the 2010 boundaries here. I urgently need a separate conversation with you about the political impact of introducing the proposed 2015 boundaries. We should put these up for negotiation as part of HoL reform.

There are many reasons to praise the Norwegian reaction to the Utoya massacre.

It's worth remembering though, that in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings, Britain prosecuted three people for aiding and abetting the July 7th bombers, and a jury acquitted them of that charge, while convicting two of them of conspiring to attend a terrorist training camp.

This is, to my mind, as least as good a model for justice as Norway's trial of Breivik. Perhaps it is even better, since Breivik admits his guilt, but in the July 7th trial, the UK judicial system was confronted by a trial that combined significant circumstantial evidence, friendships between the accused and the perpetrators of a horrific attack, but where the charges were vigorously contested and denied, with evidence that was interpretable by a jury.

One final point. Few in Britain today know the names of the trio accused of aiding the 7/7 Bombings, even though two of them were jailed for planning to attend terrorist camps in Pakistan. Nor did they receive great publicity for their ideology. They were simply prosecuted, received a balanced judgement, sentenced for what they had been found guilty of, or released, without provoking either public outrage or retribution.

British justice is not without flaws, many extremely serious. We hear about these every day.

Yet sometimes I get the feeling we see justice done well, only elsewhere, and perhaps more importantly, only on TV. That's far from the case, even in the very hardest cases.