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STALINISM AND KIMILSUNGISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY AND POWER*

Seong-Chang Cheong

Since the 1970s, North Korean leaders have denied and even tried to eradicate any traces of Stalinist influence in the North Korean political system. Thus, today it is difficult to bring to light the role Stalinism played in the formation of North Korean politics. However, in order to understand fully the present nature of the DPRK socialist system, its indispensable Stalinist roots cannot be ignored. This arti - cle examines the ties between Stalinism, defined as a "radical variant of Leninism," and Kimilsungism, defined as the ideology and system of power instituted by Kim Il Sung. In doing so, the article analyzes the establishment of a monolithic ideological system; the rehabilitation of state and nation; the interrelations between Stalinism, Maoism, and the idea of juche; personal power; suppression of oligarchy; and the political culture of terror.

Introduction

Since the 1970's, Pyongyang's leaders have denied and even tried to eradicate any traces of Stalinist influence in the formation of the North Korean political system. Thus, today it is diffi-

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cult to discern the role Stalin's regime played in the Kim Il Sung regime. Due to certain difficulties related to the lack of available materials that can shed light on this question, research on the peculiarities of the Stalinist system suffers from both quantitative and qualitative shortcomings. A comparative study of the Stalinist and Kim Il Sung systems is tied directly to the origins and characteristic features of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and therefore seems to be a very useful method to better comprehend the North Korean system.

The phenomenon of Stalinism, a complex and controversial topic, is difficult to describe. It was Stalin who invented the term "Leninism." At the same time, he neither used nor allowed his followers to use the term "Stalinism," even though the "teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin" were widely and officially promoted in the USSR while he was alive. Therefore, political scientists should question whether the unique phenomenon called "Stalinism" has ever existed. My approach to this problem will be to start with the assumption that Stalinism as a system definitely existed and is a "radical variant of Leninism."[1]

Most communists who agreed with Nikita Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin insisted that "Stalin distorted Lenin's teachings," and tried to indoctrinate people with his interpretations. "Therefore, it is necessary to return to Lenin" to understand the true sprit of socialism. However, such unconditional endorsement of Lenin, as well as the absolute downgrading of Stalin, also distorts history. Stalin did, to some degree, revise the ideas of Lenin, but at the same time, he always revered Lenin as his spiritual leader and tried earnestly to turn Lenin's theory into practice. An interesting conclusion given by Professor Volkogonov on the issue of continuity between Leninism and Stalinism can be found in his book, *The Kremlin Leaders:*

> If Lenin lived a few years longer and was more active, Stalin might not have become the number-one person. But even if this were the case it would not have been enough to change the whole system. Perhaps the system itself would have found its own Stalin.[2]

Kimilsungism

In order to attempt a practical comparison between the regimes of Stalin and Kim Il Sung, I opt to use, along with the term "Stalinism," the term "Kimilsungism." This will facilitate comparative analysis by placing them in the same dimension. The meaning of "Kimilsungism" here is very different from the North Korean communists' use of the term, which is to elevate the status of Kim Il Sung's doctrine to the level of "Marxism-Leninism." In fact, beginning in the early 1970's, the term was even used in North Korea to demonstrate the superiority of Kimilsungism over any other doctrine, including Marxism-Leninism.[3] This notion of "Kimilsungism," which was embraced by Kim Jong Il and theoreticians of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), is not suitable here because it excludes such phenomena as the cult of personality—excessive eulogy of the Leader; dynasty-like succession of power; political terror; militarization of society; and some other essential attributes of the North Korean system.

In this paper I define "Kimilsungism" as the ideology of Kim Il Sung that is connected with North Korea's socialist revolution and state construction; it is also a system of power that dominated the period of his rule over North Korea.[4] Through such a definition, I attempt to analyze the relations and interconnections between the North Korean ideology and its political system. In order to attempt a comparative analysis of Stalinism and Kimilsungism, I shall examine the ideas, political rhetoric, and the power systems of Stalin and Kim Il Sung from their ascendancy to power to the moment of their deaths.

The process of the formation of Kimilsungism can be roughly divided into three stages. The first period is the 1930s, when Kim Il Sung, together with other Korean and Chinese communists, undertook his anti-Japanese armed struggle in Manchuria, and through his interactions with the Chinese Communist Party, acquired some knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. The second period is Kim Il Sung's sojourn to the USSR-from late 1940 to the liberation of Korea in 1945—where he was trained in military and political affairs by Soviet officers.[5] During that time, he systematically learned the basics of Stalinist communism and the theory of modern warfare. Kim acquired a practical knowledge of the Soviet socialist system, and after liberation Stalin appointed him the "supreme leader" of North Korea. Kim also established

friendly relations with many powerful Soviet officers. Kim's experience during this period became very useful for his intellectual maturity and ability to consolidate his power in liberated North Korea. The third period is between 1945 and 1953 when Kim Il Sung actively sought Stalinist influence through the Soviet Military Administration and the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, as well as through the Soviet-born and trained Koreans.[6]

It is necessary to keep in mind that during the anti-Japanese struggle of the 1930's in Manchuria, Kim Il Sung was also strongly influenced by Maoism. However, it is assumed that after liberation and especially during the Sino-Soviet conflict, it was Kim Il Sung's Stalinist influence that induced him to pursue a line independent of Maoism. The influence of Stalinism on Kimilsungism, their consequent similarities, but also the differences that resulted from their dissimilar historical environments will be analyzed in respective order.

Ruling Ideology

From the outset, when Kimilsungism advocated a "creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the unique conditions of Korea," it signified the consolidation of Kim Il Sung's power and the appearance of the new ideological and political elements underpinning it. Kimilsungism today has an ideological system that appears to be very different from any other Marxist-Leninist system. What are the common features and essential divergences of Stalinism and Kimilsungism? This section will examine the establishment of a monolithic ideological system, analyze the rehabilitation of state and nation, and review the existing interrelations among the ideologies of *juche* (*chuch'e*), Stalinism, and Maoism.

The Establishment of the Monolithic Ideological System

At the Second Congress of Soviets (January 26, 1924), which was held just five days after Lenin's demise, Stalin solemnly pledged to fulfill Lenin's "testament."[7] From that moment on, under the banner of Lenin and Leninism, Stalin slowly began imposing his own ideas on the whole CPSU (the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union). At the Communist University in Moscow in April 1924, Stalin gave a series of lectures titled "The Foundations of Leninism." At these lectures, which in retrospect were the "baptism" for the orthodoxy of Stalinism, the necessity of consolidation and discipline in the party, the role of the party as a mass leader, the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasants' support, as well as many other important issues were discussed.

Until his death, Stalin enjoyed absolute power in the USSR, not only because he managed to control the core institutions of power such as the party, state, and police, but also because he paid homage to Lenin and established a monolithic ideological system inside the party. Even before Lenin died, Stalin had established himself as the "upholder of Leninism" and a "unique expounder of Lenin's ideas." When a power struggle began, Stalin was already well-protected by the impenetrable shield of "ideological immunity." Stalin always insisted that he was a disciple of Lenin and successor to his great deeds. His close supporters dared not forget to point out that Stalin was the "best disciple" and the "most dedicated successor" of Lenin.[8] For example, Anastas Mikoyan, one of Stalin's old associates, in his essay entitled, "Stalin is the Lenin of Our Days," praised him in this manner:[9]

> Comrade Stalin, Lenin's orthodox disciple, has not merely proved that all his thoughts and activities are strongly implanted in the soil of Marxism, but also better demonstrated the brilliance of Marxism-Leninism and elevated its theoretical tenets to an unprecedented level.[10]

Having justified himself as an upholder of Leninism, Stalin forced the party and the country to accept his own ideas too. Although there was no potential force that challenged Stalin's power base during his time, it was at Stalin's fiftieth birthday anniversary (December 21, 1929) that the vigorous cult of personality campaign was launched. The General Secretary was extolled as a superb leader—a literary, scientific, and artistic genius. The first attempt theoretically to justify the individual role of the Leader was undertaken in the early 1930s.[11]

All this enabled the CPSU and Stalin to control every aspect of intellectual life in the country. The party established a communist ideology that provided no margin for even the slightest

deviation. It prevented the questioning of philosophy or law, placed every writer and artist under strict control, and rewrote the country's history. The institutionalization of the supreme leader's ideas enabled him to control the party, and by extension, the whole society. This ideology proved to be very successful in the restoration of order after the revolution; but it openly denigrated the intellectual level of the Soviet people and their opportunities for creative development.

The ideas of Stalin were not confined to the borders of the USSR. They exerted a decisive influence on countries "liberated" by the Red Army from German fascism and Japanese imperialism after World War II. The fact that the Stalinist version of Marxism-Leninism played an important role in the formation of the North Korean ideological system was confirmed by Kim Il Sung in his speech delivered on the occasion of Stalin's death in March 1953:

> Stalin has passed way. The passionate heart of the supreme leader of all progressive people has stopped beating. Such sad news spread around our country with lightning-fast speed and caused thunderous blows to millions of hearts in Korea. . . The Korean Workers' Party, which creatively applies the experience of the great Party of Lenin-Stalin, has formed a Democratic United Front for the Fatherland Unification to unite all Koreans under its banner. The Korean Workers' Party, on the basis of the brilliant works of Lenin and Stalin, has been able promptly to create its own armed forces, equip them with new military technology, employ progressive Soviet military experience, train them, and give to every detachment Stalinist political education. . . The Korean people cannot but overcome. It is because they are being led by the glorious Korean Worker's Party, a Lenin-Stalin-type party, a party based on the teachings of the geniuses Lenin and Stalin.[12]

Nevertheless, after December 1955 when Kim Il Sung delivered a speech entitled "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing *Juche* in Ideological Work," it became clear that the party and the state in North Korea were going to pursue an independent course to create a unique ideology.[13] After Stalin's death, this trend was accelerated by the de-Stalinization policy of the USSR, which was initiated by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956.[14] Many North Korean leaders considered Stalinism the only and unique orthodox

Marxist-Leninist line, while especially close associates of Kim Il Sung, who enjoyed absolute power in the country, believed Stalin to be their ideological "father." The idea of *juche*, which insists on a "creative" application of Stalin's version of Marxism-Leninism in the Korean context, took shape in the mid-1960s. After 1967, through the movement for the establishment of a monolithic ideological system, uniquely Korean in character, *juche* began acquiring independent albeit superficial features that distinguished it from the imported Stalinism. Before 1972, the "revolutionary ideas" of Kim Il Sung were called "the Marxism-Leninism of today" and Kim himself was claimed to be "the great Marxist-Leninist of our time."[15]

However, in 1976, Kim Jong Il's description of Kimilsungism went even further, stating that it was "a unique ideology, the contents and structure of which cannot be described simply as Marxist-Leninist."[16] In the process of such change in attitude toward Kim Il Sung's ideas, Kim Jong Il's "Ten Great Principles of the Establishment of the Unique Ideological System in the Party" (April 1974) played a very important role in instilling a monolithic ideology upon the whole North Korean society. This document also stipulated that "although our life is one, we wish to live for the Great Leader and willingly dedicate our youth and life to the Great Leader. In any adverse situation, our hearts will be loyal to the Great Leader." He called on North Koreans "to unconditionally accept the instructions of the Great Leader, and to act in full accordance with his will." Kim also demanded from party members that they "fight to the end to protect to the death the authority of the 'party center' [Kim Jong Il]."[17] Through the establishment of a monolithic ideological system in North Korea, it also became possible to achieve ideological uniformity inside the KWP. All this was especially important for enhancing the stability of Kim Il Sung's regime.

Rehabilitation of State and Nation

Marx and Engels did not clearly distinguish between the nation-state and law. Thought to be attributes of societies with hostile classes, these two institutions were to naturally "vanish" after the proletariat ascended to power and the exploiters were swept away. In the 1920s, such opinion was widespread among

Soviet theoreticians. Starting from the late 1920s, this view was refuted and the necessity to support the State began to be emphasized.

In April 1929, at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Inspection Committee of the CPSU, Stalin vehemently criticized Bukharin's position regarding the question of the state. Bukharin's belief that the "proletariat is hostile to any type of state including the proletarian state" was contrasted by Stalin with Lenin's opinion that "socialists in their struggle for liberation of the working class should support the modern state and its institutions because the state is necessary for a special period of transition from capitalism to socialism." According to Stalin, the Soviet Union had not yet reached the stage when the state was ready to "wither away" but, on the contrary, was approaching the phase when class struggle was exacerbated.[18] The following year at the Sixteenth Party Congress, Stalin, alluding to orthodox Marxist theory, stated that in order to reach conditions forcing the state to "vanish," the utmost development of the state must be achieved first.[19]

In 1936, the new Soviet constitution symbolized the restoration of the state and justified Stalin's view on the necessity to "encircle capitalism" and protect the achievements of socialism. In March 1939, a fundamental revision of Engels' "Theory of State Decline" clarified Stalin's passionate support for the state. Stalin assumed that if the encirclement of capitalism failed or socialism found itself encircled, the state would have to be preserved even at its communist stage of development.[20] Following this logic, Stalin not only defended the preservation of the state; he even argued for its reinforcement. Arguing that the Soviet state had passed "two important stages" in its development, Stalin attributed to the state such functions as "organization of economic activities" and "harmonization of culture and education," and characterized its oppressive functions as aimed only at the "external enemy."[21]

Compared to Stalin, Kim Il Sung demonstrated even less flexibility in regard to the problems of the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat. In May 1967, he candidly stated that abolition of the suppressive function of the state should be postponed until the victory of "world revolution" had been completed.[22] According to Kim Il Sung, if capitalism and imperi-

alism continued to exist and the world revolution was not completed, the dictatorship of the proletariat had to be preserved and the state should not "vanish" even at the advanced stage of communism. Even if communism was victorious in one country or region, according to this view, North Korean society still could not avoid the "menace of capitalist restoration" or the "resistance of internal enemy."[23]

The rehabilitation of the nation was another essential feature of Stalinism. Since the early 1930s, despite initial statements promulgating that the Soviet system was based on class and not on nation, the term nation was once again restored. The Communist International (Comintern) and its congresses' standpoint of revolutionary internationalism gradually gave way to the less exalted standpoint of national volition and national interests. Instead of a Marxist view of history that was anti-nation, Stalin appealed to the collective memory of the Soviet people and supported a vision of history that was helpful for rulers wanting to strengthen their regime. However, this version of Soviet history was onesidedly focused on Russia and its influence on others. The czarist government, which throughout the 1920s was vilified as backward and exploitative, unexpectedly gained popular approval. Historical figures famous for their resistance to Russian expansion were promptly stigmatized as agents of imperialism.[24]

In North Korea, "restoration of the nation" was launched with Kim Il Sung's speech "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing *Juche* in Ideological Work" (December 1955). In this speech Kim Il Sung emphasized:

> What we are doing now is not a revolution in some foreign country but our Korean revolution. Therefore, every ideological action must benefit the Korean revolution. To fulfill the Korean revolution, one should be perfectly cognizant of the history of our national struggle, of Korea's geography, and our customs.[25]

After that, North Korean leaders stressed the role of "revolutionary tradition" and the cultural tradition of the Korean nation in its education of workers and party members. They also promoted extensively the role of national prestige and self-confidence, and called for the further promotion of national heritage and the revival of national tradition.[26]

In April 1965, speaking in Indonesia, Kim Il Sung stated that

if communists neglected individuality and sovereignty, they were likely to fall victim to the evils of "dogmatism" and "revisionism." He also stressed that in the past some "dogmatists," subscribing to "national nihilism by praising all things foreign and vilifying all things national," tried to "forcibly impose and mechanically follow foreign experience." In the same speech, Kim Il Sung stressed that "our party consistently sticks to self-reliance in ideology, sovereignty in politics, independence in economy, and self-protection in national defense."

Kim Il Sung had by then established the core principles of the *juche* ideology.[27] The concept of *juche*, which was presented by Kim in 1965, resisted modernism and demanded an end to Chinese and Soviet interference. The *juche* idea's distinctive characteristic was as a developmental strategy for the socialist construction of North Korea. However, beginning in the 1970s, this initial strategy was substituted by the system of "fundamental principles for realization of sovereignty." *Juche*, which by then was emerging as North Korea's "leading fundamental principle," had already had come in conflict with the dogma of Marxist-Leninist ideology.[28]

In the turmoil of the Sino-Soviet dispute that coincided with the formation of the *juche* ideological system, the hammering out of an independent line for North Korean socialism intersected with its strengthening of nationalistic trends. At that time, many North Korean theoreticians were still influenced by the Stalinist version of Marxism-Leninism, and therefore retained a negative attitude toward the increasing reference to the word "nationalism." Nevertheless, changes in domestic and international policies gradually forced Kim Il Sung and the KWP ideologists to revise their attitude toward "nation" and "nationalism." Until the early 1960s, North Korean leaders, supporting Stalin's definition of a "nation"—"a stable, historically formed community of people based on common language, territory, economic life, and culture"—had insisted that all four elements were essential.[29] However, beginning in the mid-1960s, the first amendment to the official definition was made. "Shared bloodline" was added into the list of elements that constitute a "nation."[30] Stalin's definition, applied to North Korea, one of the most homogenous nations in the world, was obviously deficient. In the 1980s, the concept of "nation" was again revised in North

Korea. The importance of "shared blood-line" was stressed more strongly, while the phrase "shared economic life" was excluded from the list of attributes that make up a "nation."[31] The reality of a Korean nation that had been divided into two economically separate states predetermined any change in perception regardless of what had been determined in the mid-1960s.

The concept of "nationalism" was to undergo even more changes. In North Korea the understanding of "nationalism" was influenced for a long time by the Stalinist Marxist-Leninist belief that it was nothing but the "ideology and policy of the reactionary bourgeoisie designed to embellish bourgeois exploitation, suppress other nations, and, in the name of so-called national interests, sow national hatred among workers."[32] However, the necessity of strengthening the tactics of a united front for unification, incorporation of the fast-growing dissident elements in South Korea in the 1980s, and the shocking collapse of the socialist bloc and the USSR forced North Korean leaders to reexamine the basics of its Stalinist concept of "nationalism."

On August 1, 1991, addressing North Korean members of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland and the Pan-Korean Federation for Reunification of the Fatherland, Kim Il Sung insisted that "nationalism initially appeared as a progressive idea which was to support national interests." Separating "nationalism" from "genuine nationalism," Kim Il Sung maintained that the former was an ideological tool of the bourgeoisie to protect its interests while the latter was an idea of true support for national interests. "True nationalism is similar to patriotism. Only a genuine patriot can become a devoted and true internationalist. In this sense, when I say communist, at the same time, I mean nationalist and internationalist," concluded Kim Il Sung.[33] Such an official, albeit unprecedented, rehabilitation of "nationalism" contrasted with the pre-1991 perception widespread among North Korean leader's of conflict between "nationalism" and "internationalism."[34]

Stalinism, Maoism, and the Idea of Juche

From 1945 until now, North Korea in principle has never tried to achieve "de-Stalinization." When Stalin was criticized

by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, Kim Il Sung agreed to rectify the tradition of Stalin's cult of personality and, to some degree, accepted the principles of "democracy in the party" and "collective leadership." However, in August of the same year, he purged the Yan'an and Soviet factions in the KWP and took a course of strengthening his personal power. Moreover, Kim followed the example of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which demonstrated its reserved attitude toward Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin. Kim also continued to adhere to those political and economic patterns that were established in North Korea while Stalin was alive. This situation was reflected in an article in the 1985 edition of *Dictionary of Philosophy* published in Pyongyang. Contrary to the attitude that became common in other socialist states, where Stalin was depicted as having distorted Lenin's ideas, the North Korean authors of the *Dictionary* described him as

> a faithful successor of Lenin, dedicated Marxist-Leninist, prominent activist of international communist and workers' movements, leader of the Soviet State . . . He was a communist, a dedicated revolutionary famous for his iron will, fortitude, and uncompromising struggle against all types of class enemies and revisionists. He made unlimited self-sacrifice for revolutionary tasks of the working class, and showed unlimited loyalty to the leader. He instigated the beginning of and contributed to the international communist and workers' movements. Stalin made an enormous contribution to the development of fraternal relationships between the Korean and Soviet peoples, and sincerely encouraged great achievements of our nation.[35]

In the late 1950s, Mao Zedong's unfolding of the "Great Leap Forward" campaign offered a uniquely "Chinese way" of socialist construction as opposed to the "Soviet way." Although Mao acknowledged the positive influence of Stalinism on Chinese communism, he criticized some of Stalin's ideas. Unlike Mao, Kim Il Sung never publicly criticized Stalin. In November 1958, Mao Zedong scrutinized Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR"[36] in which the author, talking about the social superstructure, disregarded the "human role" of workers in socialist construction and discussed only the economic side of the issues without any consideration for the politics involved.

Mao insisted that to achieve success in the construction of socialism, a class system, a principle of evaluation, as well as other "bourgeois principles and laws," should all be consistently eliminated. Mao proudly stated that in contrast to the CPSU's practice, CCP cadres were being sent to work in farms and factories, and emphatically asserted that such actions were aimed at one of the most important objectives of the Great Leap Forward, namely, the reformation of the "class system."[37] Nevertheless, the North Korean communists maintained that the Stalinist Soviet Union served as an example of a stable and successful socialist model, while the failure of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution in Maoist China led to instability and unpredictable consequences. The path of Mao Zedong in the Cultural Revolution, due to its unrealistic and utopian character, superfluous voluntarism, and political adventurism, was critically appraised by Kim Il Sung, who stigmatized it as "dogmatism" and "left opportunism."[38]

While Stalin pursued the transformation of the so-called "production relations" by developing "productive forces," Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution put major emphasis on the formation of a "new socialist man" who could create communist production relations. In 1973, Kim Il Sung called for the "Three Revolutions Movement" where he combined the positions of Stalin and Mao. Kim Il Sung promulgated the idea that the construction of socialism requires a simultaneous change in people's thinking and in the creation of their material basis.[39] This middle-of-the-road approach provides the best answer to the question how North Korea managed to avoid following such a catastrophic example as the Cultural Revolution in China. North Korean leaders are still reluctant to admit, however, that they have been more moderate in comparison with China. On March 31, 1982, Kim Jong Il, in his work *On the Idea of Juche*, presented an opinion very similar to Mao Zedong's in saying that "it does not matter how developed the productive forces are or how sufficient the material basis is. Unless people—the masters of society—transform themselves into communist-type human beings, it won't be possible to claim that the construction of communism is accomplished."[40]

In the same work, Kim Jong Il further insisted that the *juche* idea was based on the following philosophical and "socio-histori-

cal" principles: "the human being is the master of the universe, . . . the masses are the subject of history, . . . and human history is the history of people's struggle for sovereignty." However, such a high regard for the "human being" and "the masses" was addressed not to the individual, but to a group of leaders that brought certain limitations into the perception of the state and excluded the very idea of a self-regulating "civil society." The "working class and the masses can change nature and society, carry on the complicated business of revolutionary struggle, achieve national and class liberation, and successfully accomplish the construction of socialism and communism only under the correct leadership of the party and the leader," argued Kim Jong Il.[41] According to this logic, the only genuine subjects of North Korean politics were the party and the leader, while the masses merely represented the object of their politics. In other words, the "philosophical and socio-historical principles" of *juche* can be understood as a proposal addressed to the "popular masses" to "spontaneously" participate in the campaigns set up by the party and the leader. This can then be taken as a fundamental substitution of the dictatorship of the proletariat for the dictatorship of the party, and of the Leninist party dictatorship for the dictatorship of the leader. Such distinctive features of the *juche* idea demonstrate their similarity with Stalinism.

System of Power

One of the most peculiar features of the North Korean system is the supreme authority of the "leader" in every domain, such as ideology, law, administration, and regulations. In this way, the North Korean political system is often called "*suryeongje*" (a system dominated by the supreme leader)[42] or "*yuil cheje*" (a monolithic system).[43] However, such perceptions have a tendency to endow the North Korean phenomenon with extraordinary characteristics and easily overlook those features that are similar to other socialist states. Moreover, notions such as *suryeongje* or *yuil cheje* assume the "voluntary" submission of the people to the leader and often neglect essential components of the North Korean system such as concentration camps and the use of terror. On the other hand, some assumptions that tend to equate

the North Korean system with that of Stalinism usually underestimate their differences. Such views understand the submission of the masses to the leader to be the result of repression and often neglect the influence of ideological indoctrination and political culture.[44]

Among the above-mentioned views on the North Korean system, both have their strong and weak points. The main problem with the notions of *suryeongje* or *yuil cheje* lies in its underestimation of "comparison." The main problem with the "Stalinist system" supporters is their neglect of "historical" or "cultural" factors. Although there are plenty of ways to evaluate the Stalinist system of power, the Kimilsungist system should be examined against the phenomena of personal power, suppression of oligarchy, and political culture of terror.[45]

Personal Power

Lenin equated the dictatorship of the Bolshevik party with the idea of "dictatorship of the proletariat." Although he excluded any other political parties from the ruling body, he allowed some room for discussion inside the party. The dictatorship of the party, which was part of the Stalinist system of consolidating power, turned into the dictatorship of one person over the party, the state, police, and other institutions essential for the preservation of power.[46]

Stalin's personal power can be examined from various angles: governing power; influence, foundation, and mode of legitimization; unlimited ruling power; thirst for the absolute authority in science, philosophy, linguistics, literature, arts and other human activities; and the diversification of methods of power. In their demand for absolute knowledge in professional areas and individual skills, Stalin's and Kim Il Sung's power systems demonstrated shocking similarity. Adopted directly from Stalin's cult of personality, the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung began reaching new heights after the purging incident of the *Kapsan* faction in 1967. Before that, the North Korean media used to call Kim Il Sung merely a "leader of the Korean people," but after 1967, he became known as the "leader of all international progressive movements and forces." At the same time, the first serious effort was undertaken by the North Korean authori-

ties to "export" the *juche* idea to the West and to third world countries. With the political rise of Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung's cult of personality ascended onto yet another level. He began to be called "the Great Leader of mankind."[47] (As we have seen, in the past such a title was used by Kim Il Sung and other North Korean communists when talking about Stalin). The development of the cult of personality in North Korea was not only stronger than Stalin's cult in the USSR; it actually had a new feature, since it included the Great Leader's whole family.[48]

In North Korea, the absolutism of Kim Il Sung's power became official in 1972 when the amended DPRK constitution introduced the institution of the presidency. According to the 1948 constitution, the prime minister headed the cabinet while the Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly headed the state. Introduction of the position of President in the 1972 constitution completely eradicated the collective system of North Korea's power organization. The President's role was to serve as "head of state and a deputy of the DPRK sovereign power," to supervise the work of the Central People's Committee, which is the supreme institution of state power, and, if necessary, to convene members of the Political Committee. Besides that, the President "assumes commanding of all military forces and acts as Commander in Chief of the Republic and Chairman of the National Defense Committee." Moreover, the President proclaims laws issued by the Supreme People's Assembly, administers directives of the Central People's Committee, and passes decisions by the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly. The President also has the prerogative to grant mercy; in other words, the President enjoys unlimited power in the state.[49]

Such an extreme concentration of power in the hands of the leader was not simply the fruit of Stalinist influence but was also a reflection of changes in the North Korean economic system. Beginning in the late 1920s, while sacrificing the interests of the peasantry, Stalin pushed forward the strategy of primary development of heavy industry by pointing to the advantages of a planned economy. Such a fundamental change in economic policy unavoidably strengthened the suppressive functions of the social control system and led to the centralization of power. In the 1950s, North Korea achieved a noteworthy record in economic growth that was based on a strategy of mobilizing the work

force under the banner of "extensive expansion of production." By the 1960s, however, North Korea had failed to realize its planned transition to an "intensive expansion of production"; instead, it was the beginning of serious economic stagnation.[50] Since the first seven-year economic plan (1961-1967) was not fulfilled in time, a three-year extension was required.

Under these circumstances, the North Korean authorities decided to solve inherent problems within its "extensive development" scheme by means of ideological indoctrination, an "express battle" campaign, and other extensive methods. However, this new economic policy had no positive effects. On the contrary, "The Unification and Elaboration on the Economic Plan" proposed by the State Planning Committee at the Party Plenary Meeting of September 1965 neglected the close interdependence between economic departments in order to mobilize large numbers of human resources, materials, and funds. The result was numerous distortions and adverse effects on the normal cycle of economic performance. The strategy proved inefficient, but it helped strengthen administrative control and concentrated full power in the hands of the Supreme Leader, who desperately needed a system that could mobilize large numbers of people for short-term projects.[51]

The Kimilsungist system of power demonstrates more stability than that of Stalin's system. Kim Il Sung made it possible to appoint his close relatives to important party and state posts, enhancing cohesion inside the ruling mechanism. He sagaciously nominated his own son as successor, thereby prohibiting any possibility of rivalry among the powerful elite in the future. From Stalin's era, Kim Il Sung inherited the dictatorship of the general secretary of the communist party and even managed to justify ideologically the phenomenon of dynasty-like transition of power in the North Korean socialist state. But actually such a significant change in the concept of communism in North Korea can be attributed to a fusion of the Stalinist theory of absolute personal power and the neo-Confucian tradition of dynastic rule. The latter, until the early twentieth century, had been the customary method of securing political stability for the monarchical system on the Korean peninsula.

Suppression of Oligarchy

The suppression of oligarchy also was an important feature of Stalin's political system. After the death of Lenin, there was a brief period of time when Stalin's position in the party was not stable. Stalin, in conjunction with Zinovyev and Kamenev, quickly moved to create a triumvirate of power, disarming his main rival Trotsky. Later, Stalin used his position in the party apparatus to undermine the power base of Zinovyev and Kamenev in Leningrad and Moscow respectively. In this way, Stalin kept strengthening his own base of power until the ultimate demise of all his opponents. However, still not fully satisfied, Stalin pre-arranged three sets of political trials (1936-1938) where he purged all his potential rivals inside the country. The assassination of Leon Trotsky, who had been in exile in Mexico, entirely eliminated any possibility of the oligarchy's revival for many decades to come.[52]

Stalin always presented his opponents' views of him as exaggerations and distortions and, as if he had a hold on the orthodox truth, usually attached to them contemptuous labels, such as "Trotskyites," "Left-sectarians," and "Right-sectarians." These expressions, when used by Stalin, always carried the implication of anti-Leninism and support for "imperialism." By doing this, Stalin could stigmatize everybody who opposed his views as an enemies of the Soviet state.

Stalin's purges drove the Soviet political elite out and replaced it with a new group of party bureaucrats. This so-called "managing" class was never really secure in its personal position and did not stand a chance in creating its own power base. Purges in the Stalinist system were necessary to keep the managing class in check.[53]

At the time of its creation, the KWP was comprised of various forces such as the Domestic faction (*kuknae-p'a*), the South Korean Workers' Party (*namrodang-p'a*), the *Yan'an* faction (*yonan-p'a*), the Soviet faction (*soryon-p'a*), the *Kapsan* faction (*kapsan-p'a*), and the Manchurian faction (*manju-p'a*). Although Kim Il Sung, with Soviet support, easily attained hegemony within the party, his power was relatively limited by the abovementioned groups until the mid-1950s. Analogous to what Stalin did with his rivals at the political trials of the 1930s, Kim Il Sung launched two sets of political trials in 1953-1955 where his

main political rival, Pak Hon-yong, was charged and convicted of being "an entrenched spy of American imperialism." During the trial, Pak's compromising connections with the *Yan'an* and Soviet groups were also revealed. Although it appears Kim Il Sung had tried to blame Pak Hon-yong for the outcome of the Korean War, the most important reason for Pak's elimination should be analyzed within the theory of absolute power of the Stalinist political system, which did not tolerate any latent rival forces.

The *Yan'an* and Soviet factions, being encouraged by the criticism of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, publicly criticized the personal dictatorship of Kim Il Sung at the August 1956 Plenary Meeting. However, the party apparatus was replete with Kim's supporters, so this incident actually helped him expel members of rival factions from the party, government, the army, and public organizations. When Kim Il Sung purged the only remaining *Kapsan* faction members in 1967, it meant that all party members who did not support Kim's cult of personality had finally been eradicated and the foundation for individual rule was firmly established.[54] After that, party bureaucrats of the Manchurian guerrilla group, who were "tirelessly loyal" to Kim Il Sung, took leadership positions, and thereafter North Korean politics became characteristically stable and firm.

Political Culture of Terror

The development of secret police, legitimization of concentration camps, official pronouncement of mass terror, and other basic elements of Stalin's system of terror were first conceived during Lenin's rule. By dispersing the Constituent Assembly, establishing a censorship system, suspending uncooperative mass media, and outlawing rival political parties, Lenin disregarded public opinion and constantly insisted on justifying his reign of terror. Stalin's terror differed from Lenin's in its massive scale and social scope. However, their main difference is that Stalin exempted neither party members nor the secret police from his reign of terror.[55]

In the late 1930s, three political trials in Moscow delivered a strong blow that was felt by every party worker and particularly caused severe damage to the society's elite; it signified that Stal-

in targeted everyone, not just his immediate political enemies. Among the 139 elected delegates to the party's Seventeenth Plenary Meeting (1934), some 110 were already arrested at least once before the beginning of the Eighteenth Plenary Meeting (1939). In the course of the so-called action for "renewal of party membership cards" (a euphemism for political purges) that occurred in Belorussia between 1934 and 1938, the number of party members was reduced by one-half. Such extreme repression was directed at every leading figure in every field, also striking a detrimental blow to the military. By 1940, when the purge was just about finished, three Marshals out of a total of five, all three First-Grade Chief Commanders, all twelve Second-Grade Chief Commanders, and sixty out of a total of sixty-seven Corps Commanders were imprisoned and subsequently sentenced to death or punishment.

No member of Soviet society was left untouched by these purges, which brought down countless numbers of diplomats, writers, scientists, industrial managers, scholars, and officials of the Comintern. Stalin's political purges seriously alarmed all military officers, industrialists, and researchers in the Soviet Union. If the purges of the 1937-1938 period had continued in maximum tempo for several more years, half of the Soviet population would have been confined to forced labor camps while the other half would have become their overseers. Under these circumstances, Stalin decided to cease his frantic purges but never to forsake his policy of terror. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the secret police consistently retained its power, and from time to time, continued to enforce its power through force. Terror continued to be a part of the system of control, but it was implemented selectively and sporadically.[56]

If this widespread and continuous use of terror is considered as the most outstanding feature of the Stalinist system, the same can be attributed to the Kimilsungist system, which rejected the very idea of de-Stalinization. In North Korea, the violent storm of arrests was directed primarily at the Soviet and *Yan'an* factions, while the period from 1956 to the early 1960s saw more extensive purges, similar to those in the USSR in the late 1930s. From late 1956 to early 1957, the "renewal of party membership cards" procedure was launched in North Korea. In order to root out the "anti-party sectarian elements" from each level of local party

organizations or other institutes of power, a "forceful direction of the Party Central Committee" was established. On May 30, 1957, the Standing Committee of the KWP Central Committee decided to "strengthen the struggle against anti-revolutionary elements" and accelerated repressive measures against the party opposition. In the army, the process gained momentum at the Korean People's Army Plenary Meeting (March 1958) when the Chief Political Commissar, Choe Chong-hak, and hundreds of officers under his command, all members of the Soviet or *Yan'an* factions, were purged as "anti-revolutionary sectarian elements." Between 1956 and 1960, it was predominantly members of the Domestic and *Yan'an* factions that were eliminated. Although Soviet-Koreans retained their USSR citizenship and could have fled to the Soviet Union, the fate of many of them is still unclear.[57] Kang Sang-ho, a Soviet-Korean who served as the DPRK Vice-Minister for Internal Affairs, has given the following testimony:

> In the 1950s, repression began to be directed at party and state officials, army generals, diplomats, writers, artists, and scholars. This purge continued until I left North Korea. I too nearly became a victim of this repression. . . In May 1959, I was unexpectedly summoned to the Head of Political Department of the Korean People's Army. He told me that according to the decision of the Central Committee, I was dismissed from my post but was to receive a new appointment in several days' time. During that period, the persecution of Soviet-Koreans reached its culmination. I was thoroughly observed; for three and a half months I was put under investigation led by three preliminary judges, working in shifts. They would not let me sleep and during interrogation hours always kept me standing straight. They always charged me with things they wanted. For example, I allegedly intended to disarm the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and therefore gave an order to destroy their arms. Frankly speaking, my wife and I were not sure that we could save our lives even when the Soviet Consulate issued our re-entry visas. Tens, if not hundreds, of my friends and colleagues among Soviet-Koreans with their wives and children had been sent to concentration camps or died in prison. . . While I was in North Korea, prisons were already overcrowded, but after I left the country even more rumors were circulating. People would disappear without a trace. Every time I asked North Koreans to send my regards to my Soviet-Korean acquaintances, they would tell me rude things or respond with

absolute silence. To this day, relatives of those Soviet-Koreans have no idea about their whereabouts.[58]

Despite some variance in figures, many research institutes estimate that some 150,000-200,000 political prisoners were confined in the North Korean "dictatorship implementation areas."[59] These people, branded as oppositionists, were sentenced without any judicial procedure and sent to labor reeducation camps for long-term penal servitude. If a trial did take place, the accused had no choice but to appear before court and admit to his crime. The judge then used the confession in order to make a decision. A vast range of minor social offences, including criticism of the "Great Leader" or party policies, fell under the category of political crimes. The accused person was usually forced to endure forced labor in mining or agriculture. People suspected of theft, rape, homicide, idleness, and other serious crimes could be executed for "social educational" purposes.[60]

Besides these severe forms of repression, the North Korean political system developed a specific mechanism of social control and restriction that helped to monitor people's daily lives. The system of "*Inminban*" (people's group), which is usually composed of twenty to fifty households all over the country, serves as an important means of social control by the party, social organizations, and the Ministry of Public Security. Despite the cessation of the cold war, in today's North Korea, as in the former Stalinist Soviet Union, people are trained to report to the *Inminban* officials on every "counter-revolutionary" remark made by their neighbors, friends, or family members. This is demanded in the name of "revolutionary vigilance" in order to disclose and punish the "class enemy." This policy of terror is still being practiced in North Korea as one of the important methods of rule.[61]

Conclusion

In examining distinctive features of the North Korean system, the struggle for power that unfolded in August 1956 acquires a particularly important meaning. Launched by the Yan'an and Soviet factions, criticism of Kim Il Sung at a KWP plenary meeting demonstrated the conflict between two oppos-

ing forces. The Kim Il Sung group supported the Stalinist strategy of development and revolutionary fervor in foreign policy. His opponents supported the anti-Stalinist strategy of development and pragmatic foreign policy. After the meeting, the anti-Kim Il Sung forces were eliminated and the monopoly of power was passed to Kim's supporters. The Stalinist system, having been transplanted onto North Korean ground, soon took deep roots and bore the same fruits. Although the process of Kim Il Sung's strengthening of power brought certain revisions to the existing politico-economic system, these had more to do with the method and ideology of management rather than with its structure.

Maoism significantly contributed to the systematization of *juche* ideology and exerted strong influence on the method of system management. The influence of Maoism on young Kim Il Sung, who under the guidance of the CCP participated in the anti-Japanese armed struggle, was tremendous. In the mid-1950s, Mao helped his North Korean brethren to maintain a line independent of Khrushchev's policy of de-Socialization. Among the most conspicuous traces of this influence were the adherence to guerrilla warfare, the policy of the mass line, the priority attached to ideological work, the priority of political affairs, and self-sufficiency as a path to economic development. In the systematization of *juche* ideology, many other features were also borrowed from Maoism. For instance, the "art of leadership," which is proudly advertised by North Koreans as unique, can be easily found in Mao Zedong's writings during the 1940s. The emphasis on the importance of human beings and the subjective role of the masses in historical development is also rooted in Maoism.[62]

From the mid-1950s onward, the restoration of nationalism brought a new feature to the Stalinist North Korean system. The nationalistic trend was ignited in the Kimilsungist system in August 1956 by the direct intervention of Soviet and Chinese leaders, who wanted to preserve opposition forces that could check Kim Il Sung's power in the KWP. Nationalism was strengthened during the protracted Sino-Soviet dispute, and then became an integral feature of the North Korean system. The rise of this nationalistic inclination within the North Korean leadership was manifested in the pragmatically oriented diplo-

macy of balancing China against the USSR. It also contributed to the formation of a closed system, one that is insensitive to any changes and pressures from the outside world. Despite the collapse of the socialist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe beginning in the late 1980s, North Korea continuously resisted foreign pressure for reforms by effectively using nationalism as a tool.

In analyzing the factors that caused changes in the North Korean system, one should not forget to credit Korean traditional culture, particularly its Confucian culture. From the early 1970s on, in order to justify the dynasty-like succession of power, the traditional ideals of filial piety and loyalty were restored. The Confucian ethics adopted by the North Korean political system represented a mixture of traditional ideas from the Choson dynasty and the ruling culture of the former Japanese colonial regime in Korea. These days, both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are called "Father" by North Koreans.[63] The "politics of loyalty and filial piety" is not only relevant to Kim Il Sung but has also become an essential part of Kim Jong Il's regime. In September 1997, when the movement to elevate Kim Jong Il as the Party General Secretary reached its fervent climax, Cho Du-son, the Vice-Chief of the Medium and Small Power Stations Supervising Office of the Ministry of Electric-Power Industry, publicly announced in the official Nodong Sinmun: "we swear to be extremely obedient and genuinely loyal fighters, to live only for the Great Marshal, and to keep in our hearts the happiness for the privilege to uphold the Beloved Marshal to the highest post in our party."[64] In the current situation of severe famine, breakdown of the social control system, mass defection, and other signs of systemic crisis, there is still no apparent collective resistance by the people. The reason for this phenomenon seems to derive from a mixture of the Stalinist policy of suppression and the Confucian values of loyalty and filial piety.

The political-economic system of North Korea has not changed fundamentally from the days of Stalin's rule. But due to the complex character of the process of system formation, there are some difficulties in identifying Stalinist features in the North Korean regime.[65] Many South Korean conservative scholars consider the dynasty-like power succession in DPRK as a specific feature of the "North Korean phenomenon." Excessively

insisting on the role of traditional culture, they often overlook structural similarities between the North Korean system and other socialist systems. However, it can be argued that the establishment of a monolithic ideology, rehabilitation of state and nation, a Great Leader-centered party and state system, emphasis on personal power, use of an extreme cult of personality, suppression of oligarchy, a political culture of terror, and other elements of the so-called "North Korean phenomenon" are distinctively Stalinist. When it is said that the sustainability of the North Korean system is linked to the ideological solidarity of the North Korean people, one should not overlook the fact that a significant portion of its ideological solidarity originated from ideological indoctrination, from omnipresent agitation and thorough interception of foreign information (all radio receivers must be fixed to approved channels, access to foreign publications is limited, and travel is restricted), as well as from terror and concentration camps. The dedication of North Koreans to *juche* ideology, even if it appears "voluntary," is artificially manufactured by the party's extensive work on "ideological training" and "terror." The same phenomenon can be found in the Stalinist system, where millions of people truly believed that power was in their hands.[66]

NOTES

1. Hélene Carrere d'Encausse, "Le stalinisme," in Youri Afanassiev and Marc Ferro, eds., *50 idées qui ébranlent le monde* (Paris: Payot, 1989), pp. 358-361.
2. Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov, *Kremlinui syryeongdl: Part 1* (The Kremlin Leaders) (Seoul: Hansong, 1996), pp. 197-212.
3. Kim Jong Il, "On the Correct Understanding of the Original Character of Kimilsungism," delivered during a meeting with party ideological workers on October 2, 1976 (Pyongyang: Choseon Nodongdang Ch'ulp'ansa 1984), pp. 1-10. In this meeting Kim Jong Il stated that "Kimilsungism" was defined as "the ideas, theory, methodology, and system of *juche* . . . [or] the ideas of a different historical epoch from that of Marxism-Leninism."
4. Cheong Seong Chang, *Ideologie et système en Corée du Nord* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997), pp. 16, 185.

5. Chong-seok Yi, *Hyeondae Pukhan-ui Ihae: Sasang, Ch'eje, Chidoja* (Seoul: Yeoksa Pip'yeongsa, 1995), pp. 188-194.
6. Kap-ch'eol Kim, *Pukhan Kongsanjuui Iron-gwa Silje* (Theory and Practice of North Korean Communism) (Seoul: Munusa, 1984), pp. 85-89.
7. Volkogonov, *Kremlinui syryeongdl*, pp. 213-214.
8. Roy Medvedev, *Staline et le stalinisme* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979), p. 253.
9. In July 1995, at the Central Memorial Meeting commemorating the first anniversary of Kim Il Sung's death, a number of top North Korean leaders stated that "Kim Jong Il is Kim Il Sung of today" and urged to "uphold Kim Jong Il and accomplish the great achievements of *juche* revolution." Kim Jong Il was equated with his father in exactly the same manner as Stalin was equated with Lenin in the 1930s. See, *Yonhap Yon-gam 1996* (Yearbook of *Yonhap* Agency) (Seoul: Yonhap T'ongsin, 1996), p. 669.
10. Volkogonov, *Kremlinui syryeongdl*, pp. 225-226.
11. Leonard Shapiro, *Soryeon Kongsandangsa* (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) (Seoul: Munhak Yesulsa, 1982), p. 437.
12. Kim Il Sung, "Stalin-un Chagi Chayu-wa Tokrip-ul Kosuhanun Inmin-dul-ui T'ujaeng-ui Komuja" (Stalin is the Benefactor of the People Struggling for Their Freedom and Independence), in Chun-yeop Kim, Ch'ang-sun Kim, Il-seon Yi and Kwan-ok Pak, eds., *Pukhan Yeon-gu charyojip*, vol. 2 (Seoul: Koryeo Taehakkyo Asea Munje Yeon-guso, 1974), pp. 345-350.
13. Kim Il Sung, "Sasang Saeop-eseo Kyojojuui-wa Hyeongsikjuui-rul T'woch'ihago *juche*-rul Hwakrip-hal te Taehayeo" (On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing *Juche* in Ideological Work), in Paektu Yonguso, ed., *Juche Sasang-ui Hyeongseong Kwajeong* (The Process of the Formation of the *Juche* Idea) (Seoul: Paektu, 1988), pp. 42-61.
14. Branko Lazitch, *Le Rapport Khrouchtchev et son histoire* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1976).
15. Hyeong-seop Yang, "Widaehan Suryeong Kim Il Sung Tongji-ui Hyeokmyong Sasang-ul Ch'eoljeohi Ong-hohago Neolli Haesok Seonjeonhagi wihan Sahoekwahak-ui Immu-e Taehayeo" (On the Duty of Social Sciences to Widely Disseminate and Consistently Praise the Revolutionary Ideas of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung), in Paektu Yonguso, *Juche Sasang-ui Hyeongseong Kwajeong*, pp. 211-269.
16. Kim Jong Il, *Kimilsungjuui-ui Tokch'angseong-ul Olk'e Insikhalte Taehayeo*, p. 2.
17. *Tang-ui Yuil Sasang Ch'egye Hwakrip-ui 10-te Wonch'ik* (Ten Great Principles for the Establishment of a Unique Ideological System in the Party) (Pyongyang: Choson Nodong Ch'ulp'ansa, 1983).
18. J. V. Stalin, *Seonjip* (Selected Works), vol. 1 (1905-1931) (Seoul: Cheonjin, 1990), pp. 309-386.
19. Shapiro, *Soryeon Kongsandangsa*, p. 439.
20. J. Staline, *Les questions du leninisme* (Moscou: E.L.E., 1947), p. 628.

21. Ibid., pp. 627-628.
22. Dr. Andrei Lankov, Professor of St. Petersburg (former Leningrad) State University, who studied in the DPRK in 1984-1985, insists that, if compared with contemporary North Korea, "the Stalinist Soviet Union could almost be called an open society." See Andrei Lankov, *Soryeon-ui Charyo-ro Pon Pukhan Hyeondae Cheongch'isa* (Soviet Materials on the Modern Political History of North Korea) (Seoul: Orum, 1995), p. 8.
23. Kim Il Sung, *Oeuvres 21* (Pyongyang: E.L.E., 1985), pp. 248-255.
24. H. Carrere d'Encausse, *Staline—l'ordre par la terreur* (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), pp. 77-78.
25. Kim Il Sung, "Sasang Saeop-eseo Kyojojuui-wa Hyeongsikjuui-rul T'woch'ihago *juche*-rul Hwakrip-hal te Taehayeo," pp. 42-43.
26. Kim Il Sung, *Oeuvres choisies IV* (Pyongyang: E.L.E., 1976), pp. 254-255.
27. Kim Il Sung, "Choseon Minjujui inmin kong-hwaguk-eseo-ui Sahoejuui Keonseol-gwa Namchoseon Hyeokmyeong-e Taehayeo" (On the Construction of Socialism in the DPRK and Revolution in South Korea), in Paektu Yonguso, *Juche Sasang-ui Hyeongseong Kwajeong*, pp. 164-165.
28. Kim Jong Il, "*Juche* Sasang-e Taehayeo" (On the Idea of *Juche*), in *Juch'e Sasang Yeon-gu* (Study of the *Juche* Idea) (Seoul: T'aebaek, 1989), pp. 195-207.
29. J. Staline, *Le communisme et la Russie* (Paris: Denoel, 1968), p. 207; *Tae-jung Cheongch'i Yong-eo Sajeon* (Popular Dictionary of Political Terms) (Pyongyang: Choseon Nodongdang Ch'ulp'ansa, 1957), p. 114.
30. Kim Il Sung, *Oeuvres choisies, IV*, p. 1; *Cheongch'i Sajeon* (Dictionary of Politics) (Pyongyang: Sahoekwahak Ch'ulp'ansa, 1973), p. 423.
31. The Research Institute of Philosophy, North Korean Academy of Social Sciences, ed., *Ch'eol-hak Sajeon* (Dictionary of Philosophy) (Seoul: Him, 1988), pp. 223-224.
32. *Taejung Cheongch'i Yong-eo Sajeon*, pp. 116-117.
33. Kim Il Sung, *Pour une grande union de notre nation* (Pyongyang: E.L.E., 1991), p. 3.
34. Kim Jong Il, "*Juche* Sasang Kyoyang-eseo Chegi-twenun Myotkaji Munje-e Taehayeo" (On Some Problems of Education in the *Juche* Idea), in *Juche Sasang Yongu*, p. 261.
35. The Research Institute of Philosophy, *Dictionary of Philosophy* (North Korean Academy of Social Sciences, 1988), pp. 417-418.
36. J. Staline, *Les problemes economiques du socialisme en U.R.S.S.* (Moscow: E.L.E., 1952).
37. Mao Tse-toung, "*A propos des Problemes economiques du socialisme en URSS* de Staline," in *Mao Tsé-toung et la construction du socialisme* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975), pp. 34-37.
38. Kim Il Sung, *Oeuvres choisies, IV*, p. 385.
39. Kim Il Sung, *Oeuvres 28* (Pyongyang: E.L.E., 1986).
40. Kim Jong Il, "*Juche* Sasang-e Taehayeo," p. 212.
41. Ibid., p.184.
42. Suzuki Masayuki, *Kim Jong Il-kwa suryeongje sahoejuui* (Kim Jong Il and

Suryeongje Socialism) (Seoul: Chungang Ilbosa, 1994).
43. Chong-seok Yi, *Hyeondae Pukhan-ui Ihae*.
44. See Hyeong-jung Pak, "Rumania-wa Pukhan: Sahoejuui Chubyonbu-ui Sut'allinjuui Ch'eje-e Taehan Pigyo Yon'gu" (Romania and North Korea: Comparative Studies of Stalinist Systems in the Outskirts of Socialism), in *T'ong-il Munje Yeon-gu*, vol.7, No.1 (Seoul: Pyeonghwa Munje Yeon-guso, 1995), pp. 48-73.
45. H. Carrere d'Encausse, "L'URSS ou le totalitarisme exemplaire," in Madeleine Grawitz and Jean Leca, eds., *Traité de science politique 2* (Paris: P.U.F., 1985), pp. 214-231.
46. Michel Lesage, *Le systeme politique de l'URSS* (Paris: P.U.F., 1987), pp. 79-81; Ibid., p. 213.
47. Kim Jong Il, "*Juche* Sasang-e Taehayeo," p. 262.
48. Romania also demonstrated similarly extreme, organized, and theatrical phenomena. Thus, during the rule of Ceausescu, his wife Elena and son Niku were eulogized, his native village became a sacred place, and his birthday was celebrated as a national holiday. See Pak, "Rumania-wa Pukhan: Sahoejuui Chubyonbu-ui Sut'allinjuui Ch'eje-e Taehan Pigyo Yon'gu," pp. 57-58.
49. Cheong, *Ideologie et systeme en Coree du Nord*, pp. 147-151.
50. According to Marx, investment of capital, which is simply the purchase of new tools and extra employment, leads to an increase of production scale called "the extensive expansion of production." If investment of capital is not aimed at increasing the number of tools but only at increasing efficiency through invention and improvement, such a method is called "intensive expansion of production."
51. Cheong Seong-Chang, "Pukhan-ui Kyeongje Kwanli Pangsik—Ironjeok Silch'eonjeok Munje" (System of Economic Management in North Korea—Problems of Theory and Practice), in *Pukhan Hakpo* (Journal of North Korean Studies), vol.14 (Seoul: Pukhan Yeon-guso Pukhan Hakhoe, 1990), pp. 205-216; See also Pak, "Rumania-wa Pukhan: Sahoejuui Chubyonbu-ui Sut'allinjuui Ch'eje-e Taehan Pigyo Yon'gu," pp. 60-65.
52. Geoffrey Hosking, *A History of the Soviet Union* (London: Fontana Press, 1990), pp. 119-204.
53. Carrere d'Encausse, "L'URSS ou le totalitarisme exemplaire," pp. 229-232.
54. Cheong, *Ideologie et systeme*, pp. 86-146.
55. Medvedev, *Staline et le stalinisme*, pp. 264-266.
56. Hosking, *A History of the Soviet Union*, pp. 183-204.
57. Cheong, *Ideologie et systeme*, pp.108-135; Yi, *Hyeondae Pukhan-ui Ihae*, p. 209; Yeo Cheong, *Pulkke Muldun Taedonggang* (The Red-dyed Taedong River) (Seoul: Dong-a Ilbosa, 1991), pp. 130-217.
58. Constantin Smirnov, "Ivan Afanassievich Changes Profession," *Spoutnik* (September, 1991), pp. 112-115.
59. In-yeong Cheon, "Pukhan-ui Inkwon Silt'ae" (The Realities of Human Rights in North Korea), in Song-ch'ol Choe, ed., *Pukhan Inkwon-ui Ihae*

(Understanding of Human Rights in North Korea) (Seoul: Pukhan Inkwon Kaeseon Undong Ponbu, 1995), pp. 209-210.

60. Ali Lameda, *Recit de l'experience personelle d'un prisonnier d'opinion en République populaire démocratique de Corée* (Paris: Amnesty International, 1979), p. 15; Amnesty International, *Rapport 1985* (Paris: EFAI, 1985), p. 241, *Rapport 1988*, p. 191 and *Rapport 1989*, p. 186.
61. Andrei Lankov, *Pyongyang-ui Chibung Mit'ae—Soryon Leninguradudae Lankop'u Kyosu-ui Pukhan Saenghwal Ch'ehomgi* (Under the Roofs of Pyongyang—Memoirs of Personal Experience of Life in North Korea by Professor Lankov of Leningrad University) (Seoul: Yeonhap T'ongsin, 1991), pp. 68-71.
62. Yi, *Hyeondae Pukhan-ui Ihae*, pp. 90-95.
63. Hak-seong Li, "Widaehan Honyeon Ilch'e" (Great and Perfect Harmony), *Nodong Sinmun* (Labor News) (Pyongyang), September 26, 1997, p. 3.
64. Du-seon Cho, "Ch'amtwon Ch'ungsin, Hyojaga Toegetta" (To Become Really Obedient and Genuinely Loyal), *Nodong Sinmun*, September 26, 1997, p. 3.
65. Cheong Seong-Chang, "Kim Il Sung Ch'eje-ui Inyeomjeok, Munhwajeok Kiwon-gwa Seongkyeok" (Ideological and Cultural Origins and Character of the Kimilsungist System), *Kohwang Cheongch'ihakhoebo* (The Kohwang Political Science Review), vol. 1 (Seoul: Kohwang Cheongch'ihakhoe, 1997), pp. 111-135.
66. Volkogonov, *Kremlinui syryeongdl*, pp. 197-198.