Utilitarianism is an ethical theory holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes the overall "good" of the society. It is thus a form of consequentialism, meaning that the moral worth of an action is determined by its resulting outcome. The most influential contributors to this theory are considered to be Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

Utilitarianism was described by Bentham as "the ''greatest happiness'' or ''greatest felicity'' principle".

Utilitarianism can be characterised as a quantitative and reductionist approach to ethics. It is a type of naturalism. It can be contrasted with deontological ethics (which do not regard the consequences of an act as a determinant of its moral worth), pragmatic ethics, and virtue ethics (which focuses on character), as well as with other varieties of consequentialism.

Types of utilitarianism

Act ''vs'' rule

Act utilitarianism states that, when faced with a choice, we must first consider the likely consequences of potential actions and, from that, choose to do what we believe will generate the most pleasure. The rule utilitarian, on the other hand, begins by looking at potential rules of action. To determine whether a rule should be followed, he or she looks at what would happen if it were constantly followed. If adherence to the rule produces more happiness than otherwise, it is a rule that morally must be followed at all times. The distinction between act and rule utilitarianism is therefore based on a difference about the proper object of consequential calculation — specific to a case or generalized to rules. '''Also to achieve the greater good for the most amount of people.'''

Rule utilitarianism has been criticized for advocating general rules that, in some specific circumstances, clearly decrease happiness if followed. Never to kill another human being may seem to be a good rule, but it could make self-defense against malevolent aggressors very difficult. Rule utilitarians add, however, that there are general exception rules that allow the breaking of other rules if such rule-breaking increases happiness, one example being self-defense. Critics argue that this reduces rule utilitarianism to act utilitarianism and makes rules meaningless. Rule utilitarians retort that rules in the legal system (i.e., laws) that regulate such situations are not meaningless. Self-defense is legally justified, while murder is not.

However, within rule utilitarianism there is a distinction between the strictness and absolutism of this particular branch of utilitarianism. ''Strong Rule'' Utilitarianism is an absolutist theory, which frames strict rules that apply for all people and all time and may never be broken. John Stuart Mill proposed ''Weak Rule'' utilitarianism, which posits that, although rules should be framed on previous examples that benefit society, it is possible, under specific circumstances, to do what produces the greatest happiness and break that rule. An example would be the Gestapo asking where your Jewish neighbours were; a strong rule utilitarian might say the "Do not lie" rule must never be broken, whereas a weak rule utilitarian would argue that to lie would produce the most happiness.

Rule utilitarianism should not be confused with heuristics (rules of thumb), but many act utilitarians agree that it makes sense to formulate certain rules of thumb to follow if they find themselves in a situation whose consequences are difficult, costly or time-consuming to calculate exactly. If the consequences can be calculated relatively clearly and without much doubt, however, the rules of thumb can be ignored.

Collapse of rule utilitarianism into act utilitarianism

It has been argued that rule utilitarianism collapses into act utilitarianism, because for any given rule, in the case where breaking the rule produces more utility, the rule can be sophisticated by the addition of a sub-rule that handles cases like the exception. This process holds for all cases of exceptions, and so the ‘rules’ have as many ‘sub-rules’ as there are exceptional cases, which, in the end, makes an agent seek out whatever outcome produces the maximum utility.

Two-level

Two-level utilitarianism states that one should normally use 'intuitive' moral thinking, in the form of rule utilitarianism, because it usually maximizes happiness. However there are some times when we must ascend to a higher 'critical' level of reflection in order to decide what to do, and must think as an act utilitarian would. Richard Hare supported this theory with his concept of the Archangel, which holds that if we were all 'archangels' we could be act utilitarians all the time as we would be able to perfectly predict consequences. However we are closer to 'proles' in that we are frequently biased and unable to foresee all possible consequence of our actions, and thus we require moral guidelines. When these principles clash we must attempt to think like an archangel to choose the right course of action.

Motive

Motive utilitarianism, first developed by Robert Adams (Journal of Philosophy, 1976), can be viewed either as a hybrid between act and rule or as a unique approach all on its own terms. The motive approach attempts to deal realistically with how human beings actually function psychologically. We are indeed passionate, emotional creatures, we do much better with positive goals than with negative prohibitions, we long to be taken seriously, and so on and so forth. Motive utilitarianism proposes that our initial moral task be to inculcate within ourselves and others the skills, inclinations, and mental focuses that are likely to be most useful (or in less perfectionist terms, merely highly useful) across the spectrum of real-world situations we are likely to face, rather than the hypothetical situations seemingly so common in philosophical publications. Indeed, motive utilitarianism can even be seen as a response to this unofficial rule against textured real-world examples. For example, similar to the 80-20 rule in business and entrepreneurship, we might be able to most improve the future prospects of all sentient creatures if we do a large number of activities in open partnerships with others, rather than a few perfect things done sneakily.Two examples of motive utilitarianism in practice might be a gay person coming out of the closet and a politician publicly breaking with a war. In both cases, there is likely to be an initial surge of power and confidence, as well as a transitional period in which one is likely to be losing old friends before making new friends, and unpredictably so on both counts. Another example might be a doctor who is a skilled diagnostician. Such a physician is likely to spend most of their serious study time or continuing education time on current research, direct skills for running a successful practice, etc., and only occasionally return to first principles—that is, only occasionally do something as an interesting study in biochemistry, and then as much as a hobby as anything else.

Negative

Most utilitarian theories deal with producing the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people. Negative utilitarianism (NU) requires us to promote the least amount of evil or harm, or to prevent the greatest amount of suffering for the greatest number. Proponents like Karl Popper, Christoph Fehige and Clark Wolf argue that this is a more effective ethical formula, since, they contend, the greatest harms are more consequential than the greatest goods. Karl Popper also referred to an epistemological argument: “It adds to clarity in the fields of ethics, if we formulate our demands negatively, i.e., if we demand the elimination of suffering rather than the promotion of happiness.”. In the practical implementation of this idea the following versions can be distinguished:

1. R.N.Smart, an advocate of the utilitarian principle, was quick to suggest that the ultimate aim of NU would be to engender the quickest and least painful method of killing the entirety of humanity, as this ultimately would effectively minimize suffering. NU would seem to call for the destruction of the world even if only to avoid the pain of a pinprick.

2. Negative ''preference'' utilitarianism avoids the problem of moral killing, but still demands a justification for the creation of new lives. Optimistic negative utilitarians believe that, in time, the worst cases of suffering are defeated and a world of minor suffering can be realized. The principal agents of this direction can be found in the environment of abolitionism (bioethics). Pessimistic negative utiliarians tend to remain childless.

3. Finally there are theoreticians who see NU as a branch within classical utilitarianism, which assigns a higher weight to the avoidance of suffering than to the promotion of happiness. However, a theory which increases the moral weight of suffering relative to happiness (without giving it an ''absolute'' priority) can better be characterized by the term prioritarianism.

Average ''vs'' total

Total utilitarianism advocates measuring the utility of a population based on the total utility of its members. According to Derek Parfit, this type of utilitarianism falls victim to the Repugnant Conclusion, whereby large numbers of people with very low but non-negative utility values can be seen as a better goal than a population of a less extreme size living in comfort. In other words, according to the theory, it is a moral good to breed more people on the world for as long as total happiness rises.

Average utilitarianism, on the other hand, advocates measuring the utility of a population based on the average utility of that population. It avoids Parfit's repugnant conclusion, but causes other problems like the mere addition paradox. For example, bringing a moderately happy person into a very happy world would be seen as an immoral act; aside from this, the theory implies that it would be a moral good to eliminate all people whose happiness is below average, as this would raise the average happiness. Most utilitarians consider this type of argument as flawed or merely hypothetical, however, since a real-world society allowing the non-consensual elimination of people would inevitably create severe amounts of suffering and unhappiness.

Other species

Peter Singer, along with many animal rights activists, has argued that the well-being of all sentient beings ought to be seriously considered. Singer suggests that rights are conferred according to the level of a creature's self-awareness, regardless of their species. He adds that humans tend to be speciesist (disciminatory against non-humans) in ethical matters. Bentham made a similar argument, writing "the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?".

In his 1990 edition of ''Animal Liberation'', Peter Singer said that he no longer ate oysters and mussels, because although the creatures might not suffer, they might, it’s not really known, and it’s easy enough to avoid eating them in any case (and this aspect of seeking better alternatives is a prominent part of utilitarianism).

All the same, this view still might be contrasted with deep ecology, which holds that an intrinsic value is attached to all forms of life and nature, whether sentient or not. According to utilitarianism, most forms of life (i.e. non-animals) are unable to experience anything akin to either enjoyment or discomfort, and are therefore denied moral status. Thus, the moral value of one-celled organisms, as well as some multi-cellular organisms, and natural entities like a river, is only in the benefit they provide to sentient beings. Similarly, utilitarianism places no direct intrinsic value on biodiversity, although as far as indirect, contingent value, it most probably does.

Combinations with other ethical schools

To overcome perceived shortcomings of both systems, several attempts have been made to reconcile utilitarianism with Kant's categorical imperative. James Cornman proposes that, in any given situation, we should treat as "means" as few people as possible and as "ends" as many as are consistent with those "means". He refers to this as the "utilitarian Kantian principle". In ''How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time: Solving the Riddle of Right and Wrong'' (2008), Iain King develops a ''quasi-utilitarian'' system compatible with consequence, virtue and act based accounts of ethics.

Other consequentialists may consider happiness an important consequence but argue in addition that consequences such as justice or equality should also be valued, regardless of whether or not they increase happiness.

Biological explanation

It has been suggested that sociobiology, the study of the evolution of human society, provides support for the utilitarian point of view. For example, in ''The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology'', the utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer argues that fundamentally utilitarian ethical reasoning has existed from the time primitive foraging bands had to cooperate, compromise, and make group decisions to survive. He elaborates: "In a dispute between members of a cohesive group of reasoning beings, the demand for a reason is a demand for a justification that can be accepted by the group as a whole." Thus, consideration of others' interests has long been a necessary part of the human experience. Singer believes that reason now compels the equal consideration of all people's interests:

:

This conclusion that everybody's interests should be considered equally when making decisions is a core tenet of utilitarianism.

Singer elaborates that viewing oneself as equal to others in one's society and at the same time viewing one's society as fundamentally superior to other societies may cause an uncomfortable cognitive dissonance. This is the sense in which he means that reason may push people to accept a broader utilitarian stance. Critics (e.g., Binmore 2005) point out that this cognitive dissonance is apparently not very strong, since people often knowingly ignore the interests of faraway societies quite similar to their own. They also note that the "ought" of the quoted paragraph applies only to someone who has already accepted the premise that all societies are equally important. Singer has responded that his argument in ''Expanding the Circle'' wasn't intended to provide a complete philosophical justification for a utilitarian categorical imperative, but merely to provide a plausible explanation for how some people come to accept utilitarianism.

Criticism

Lack of convincing proof

One possible criticism of utilitarianism is that it is not "proven" to be the correct ethical system by either science or logic. Utilitarians claim that this is common to all ethical schools and even formal logic itself. As anyone attempts to justify a claim (e.g. "we ought to maximize the pleasure of conscious creatures") they must appeal to other facts, which themselves must be justified. Eventually one is forced to justify their system of justification. This is called the regress argument and philosophers have attempted to address it in various ways.

In light of the regress argument, some philosophers make a sort of appeal to common sense or practicality. In that vein, during discussions on philosophy of law, H.L.A. Hart mentions that foundational philosophical definitions are not "true" but rather agreed upon; for example, discussions cannot reasonably begin unless all parties simply accept basic laws of thought. This may be the case for discussions of morality; a philosopher does not discover and share the true nature of morality, but rather invites other philosophers to define words like "good" (in the case of ethics) a certain way. Philosophy, and moral systems, thus involve a sort of scientific process of operationalization.

It might instead be argued that almost all political arguments about a future society use an unspoken utilitarian principle, all sides claiming that their proposed solution is the one that increases human happiness the most.

Mill's own argument for utilitarianism holds that pleasure is the only thing desired and that, therefore, pleasure is the only thing desirable. Critics counter argue that Mill is neglecting things that are "morally desirable" even though humans may not desire them. Indeed, there may be things that humans cannot desire that are "morally desirable". This criticism, however, reads the word "desirable" as "able to be desired" rather than "worth being desired". That is, the utilitarian may contend that only pleasure can be meaningfully said to be "desirable".

The is-ought problem may remain yet another barrier to proving any ethical system, although ethical naturalists reject this problem.

Aggregating utility

John Rawls gives a critique of utilitarianism in ''A Theory of Justice'' that rejects the idea that the happiness of two distinct persons could be meaningfully counted together. He argues that this entails treating a group of many as if it were a single sentient entity, mistakenly ignoring the separation of consciousness. Animal rights advocate Richard Ryder calls this the ‘boundary of the individual’, through which neither pain nor pleasure may pass. Thus the aggregation of utility becomes futile as both pain and happiness are intrinsic to and inseparable from the consciousness in which they are felt, rendering impossible the task of adding up the various pleasures of multiple individuals.

However, it should be noted that the apparent separation and consistency of individual consciousness, which is both a strong human intuition and an implicit premise in this critique, is itself a subject of debate and criticism in the philosophy of mind. One defense of Rawl’s criticism can be made by asking the simple question: who must figure out the exact sum of all individuals' happiness? No objectively calculated measure of aggregate happiness is necessary nor useful in this case. To doubt the ability (for someone) to add up individuals’ feelings, is to suggest that there necessarily is someone (a person, a bunch of persons, or computers) whose job is to figure out that sum, before a related social decision can be made. If there were such "someone", the situation would be analogous to a centrally-planned economy, where a few socialist bureaucrats constantly struggle to figure out what and how much goods to produce for the people.

Advocates of an ethically naturalistic utilitarianism might contest Rawl’s claim that the happiness of multiple entities cannot be meaningfully counted. Sam Harris muses that, although our intuitions may be correct, we can use science to find the moral truth about a question like, "Which of the two groups of sentient beings are happier: the one group involved in a bloody civil war or the other group at peace?" Indeed, Harris describes how a science of morality could add a neurological context to such a question.

Predicting consequences

Daniel Dennett uses the case of the Three Mile Island accident as an example of the difficulty in calculating happiness. Was the near-meltdown that occurred at this nuclear power plant a good or a bad thing (according to utilitarianism)? He points out that its long-term effects on nuclear policy would be considered beneficial by many and might outweigh the negative consequences. His conclusion is that it is still too early, years after the event, for utilitarianism to weigh all the evidence and reach a definite conclusion. Utilitarians note that utilitarianism seems to be the unspoken principle used by both advocates and critics of nuclear power. That something cannot be determined at the moment is common in science and frequently resolved with later advancements.

Utilitarians, however, are not required to have perfect knowledge; indeed, certain knowledge of consequences is impossible because consequences are in the unexperienced future. Utilitarians simply try their best to maximise happiness (or other forms of utility) and, to do this, make their best estimates of the consequences. If the consequences of a decision are particularly unclear, it may make sense to follow an ethical rule that promoted the most utility in the past. Utilitarians also note that people trying to further their own interests frequently run into situations in which the consequences of their decisions are very unclear. This does not mean, however, that they are unable to make a decision; much the same applies to utilitarianism.

Anthony Kenny argues against utilitarianism using the "standard argument" against free will. The argument supposes that determinism is either true or false: if it is true, we have no choice over our actions; but if it is false, the consequences of our actions are unpredictable, not least because they depend upon the actions of others whom we cannot predict. This may render incoherent claims about moral responsibility. On the other hand, a hard determinist utilitarian see no problem for moral responsibility. They suggest that certain notions of "retributive justice" for its own sake may now be incoherent, but there remain other, more reasonable purposes for punishment.

Importance of intentions

Utilitarianism has been accused of looking only at the results of actions, and disregarding the desires or intentions that motivate them. Intentions seem somehow important: it seems undesirable to call an action intended to cause harm but that inadvertently causes good "overall good".

Many utilitarians argue that utilitarianism, although it is consequentalist, is not so simply restricted. While the results of a hatefully motivated action may indeed be "good", this does not suggest that the motivation of "hate" should be normatively advocated in society. Put simply, when using utilitarianism to decide which practices or even values to promote in a society, one might consider whether "hate" normally leads to "good" or "bad" outcomes. This may allow utilitarianism to become a much more complex and rich moral theory, and may align far more closely with our moral intuitions. In this sense, intentions are important to utilitarians, in as much as they tend to lead to certain actions, which themselves lead to certain outcomes. One classic philosopher to take this view is Henry Sidgwick, in his main work ''The Methods of Ethics'' (1874).

Human rights

Utilitarians argue that justification of slavery, torture or mass murder would require unrealistically large benefits to outweigh the direct and extreme suffering to victims. Utilitarianism would also require the indirect impact of social acceptance of inhumane policies to be taken into consideration, and general anxiety and fear could increase for all if human rights are commonly ignored.

Act and rule utilitarians differ in how they treat human rights themselves. Under rule utilitarianism, a human right can easily be considered a moral rule. Act utilitarians, on the other hand, do not accept human rights as moral principles in and of themselves, but that does not mean that they reject them altogether: first, most act utilitarians, as explained above, would agree that acts such as enslavement and genocide always cause great unhappiness and very little happiness; second, human rights could be considered rules of thumb so that, although torture might be acceptable under some circumstances, as a rule it is immoral; and, finally, act utilitarians often support human rights in a legal sense because utilitarians support laws that cause more good than harm.

Individual interests ''vs'' a greater sum of lesser interests

A reason for an egoist to become a utilitarian was proposed by Peter Singer in ''Practical Ethics''. He presents the paradox of hedonism, which holds that, if your only goal in life is personal happiness, you will never be happy: you need something to be happy about. One goal that Singer feels is likely to bring about personal happiness is the desire to improve the lives of others; that is, to make others happy. This argument is similar to the one for virtue ethics.

Karl Marx's criticisms

Karl Marx, in ''Das Kapital'', writes:

Marx's accusation is twofold. In the first place, he says that the theory of utility is true by definition and thus does not really add anything meaningful. For Marx, a productive inquiry had to investigate what sorts of things are good for people—that is, what our nature, alienated under capitalism, really is. Second, he says that Bentham fails to take account of the ''changing'' character of people, and hence the changing character of what is good for them. This criticism is especially important for Marx, because he believed that all important statements were contingent upon particular historical conditions.

Marx argues that human nature is dynamic, so the concept of a single utility for all humans is one-dimensional and not useful. When he decries Bentham's application of the 'yard measure' of now to 'the past, present and future', he decries the implication that society, and people, have always been, and will always be, as they are now; that is, he criticizes essentialism. As he sees it, this implication is conservatively used to reinforce institutions he regarded as reactionary. Just because in this moment religion has some positive consequences, says Marx, doesn't mean that viewed historically it isn't a regressive institution that should be abolished.

Marx's criticism is more a criticism of Bentham's views (or similar views) of utility, than utilitarianism itself. Utilitarians do not deny that different things make different people happy, and that what promotes happiness changes over time. Neither would utilitarians deny the importance of investigations into what promotes utility.

The Wittgensteinian Critique

Contemporary philosophers such as Matthew Ostrow have critiqued utilitarianism from a distinctly Wittgensteinian perspective. According to these philosophers, utilitarians have expanded the very meaning of pleasure to the point of linguistic incoherence. The utilitarian groundlessly places pleasure as his or her first principle, and in doing so subordinates the value of asceticism, self-sacrifice or any other "secondary" desire. The utilitarian denies that this is a problem, either by claiming that "secondary" desires amount to different paths to achieving the first desire of pleasure or that any practice of asceticism that does not create pleasure either for the ascetic or for others is valueless.

Such an argument may seem tautological ("What is it that people want? Pleasure. But what is pleasure? What people want.") The utilitarian therefore has no ultimate justification for why we ''ought'' to primarily value pleasure. If this is the case, utilitarianism would be reduced to a form of dishonest ethical intuitionism, unable to recognize or acknowledge its own groundlessness. This is unlikely. For the ethically naturalistic utilitarian, operationalization easily terminates processes of circular defining ("What is it that people want? Pleasure. And what is ''that''? Pleasure is X neural correlates).

Criticism of other schools

A criticism of Kantianism is levelled by R. M. Hare in ''Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?'' Hare argues that a number of different ethical positions could fit with Kant's description of his categorical imperative.

See also

Prioritarianism

Appeal to consequences

Altruism (ethical doctrine)

Classical liberalism

Eudaimonism

Greedy reductionism

Gross national happiness

List of utilitarians

''Social Choice and Individual Values''

Rule according to higher law

Utilitarian bioethics

Utility monster

Charity International

Utility theory

Decision theory

Decision analysis

Probabilistic reasoning

Uncertainty

Bounded rationality

Relative utilitarianism

Notes

References and further reading

Cornman, James, et al. ''Philosophical Problems and Arguments - An Introduction'', 4th edition Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1992.

Glover, Jonathan, ''Causing Death and Saving Lives'', Penguin Books, 1977. A good example of a broadly utilitarian approach. See esp. the last two chapters on war and moral distance.

Harwood, Sterling, "Eleven Objections to Utilitarianism," in Louis P. Pojman, ed., Moral Philosophy: A Reader, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 2003), and in Sterling Harwood, ed., Business as Ethical and Business as Usual, Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996, Chapter 7.

Lyons, David, "Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism". Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Martin, Michael, "A Utilitarian Kantian Principle," Philosophical Studies, (with H. Ruf), 21, 1970, pp. 90–91.

Rosen, Frederick (2003). Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill. Routledge, p. 28. ISBN 0-415-22094-7

Silverstein, Harry S. ''A Defence of Cornman’s Utilitarian Kantian Principle'', Philosophical Studies (Dordrecht u.a.) 23, 212–215. 1972

Singer, Peter. ''The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology'', New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1981. [ISBN 0-374-15112-1]

Singer, Peter. ''Practical Ethics'', 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. [ISBN 0-521-43971-X]

Smart, J. J. C. “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism”, ''The Philosophical Quarterly'', Oct., 1956, pages 344-354. Smart later stated that he made mistakes in this essay (for example, that probably maximizing benefit is not the same thing as maximizing probable benefit). However, perhaps because of that, perhaps because he did not fixate on being overly precise, Smart also lays out a good clear presentation of act utilitarianism.

Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, Bernard. Utilitarianism; For & Against , Cambridge University Press, 1973.

Stokes, Eric. ''The English Utilitarians and India'', Clarendon Press, 1963. [ASIN B0026QQ5GE]

Sumner, L. Wayne, Abortion: A Third Way, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

External links

''Wiki Felicifia'', the collaboratively edited encyclopaedia for utilitarians

utilitarian.org FAQ A FAQ on utilitarianism by a Web Site affiliated to David Pearce.

A Utilitiarian FAQ A FAQ on utilitarianism by Ian Montgomerie.

''The English Utilitarians'', Volume l by Sir Leslie Stephen

''The English Utilitarians'', Volume ll by Sir Leslie Stephen

Utilitarian Philosophers Large compendium of writings by and about the major utilitarian philosophers, both classic and contemporary.

Utilitarianism A summary of classical utilitarianism, and modern alternatives, with application to ethical issues and criticisms

Utilitarian Resources Collection of definitions, articles and links.

Primer on the Elements and Forms of Utilitarianism A convenient summary of the major points of utilitarianism.

Consequentialism From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

International Website for Utilitarianism and Utilitarian Scholar's Conferences and Research

Utilitarianism as Secondary Ethic A concise review of Utilitarianism, its proponents and critics.

Essays on Reducing Suffering

Category:Classical liberalism Category:Ethical theories Category:Social philosophy Category:Hedonism Category:Consequentialism

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{{infobox philosopher |region

Western Philosophy |era 19th-century philosophy, Classical economics |color #B0C4DE |image John Stuart Mill by John Watkins, 1865.jpg |caption John Stuart Mill in 1865 |name John Stuart Mill |birth_date May 20, 1806 |birth_place Pentonville, London, England |death_date May 08, 1873 |death_place Avignon, France |school_tradition Empiricism, utilitarianism, liberalism |main_interests Political philosophy, ethics, economics, inductive logic |influences Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Francis Place, James Mill, Harriet Taylor Mill, Smith, Ricardo, Tocqueville, von Humboldt, Goethe, Coleridge, Bain, Comte Saint-Simon (Utopian Socialists) |influenced William James, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, Ronald Dworkin, H.L.A. Hart, Peter Singer, Wilhelm Dilthey, Paul Feyerabend, Zechariah Chafee, John Maynard Keynes, Will Kymlicka, Carlos Vaz Ferreira, Paul Krugman, Norman Finkelstein, Christopher Hitchens |notable_ideas Public/private sphere, hierarchy of pleasures in Utilitarianism, liberalism, early liberal feminism, harm principle, Mill's Methods }}

John Stuart Mill (20 May 1806 – 8 May 1873) was a British philosopher, economist and civil servant. An influential contributor to social theory, political theory, and political economy, his conception of liberty justified the freedom of the individual in opposition to unlimited state control. He was a proponent of utilitarianism, an ethical theory developed by Jeremy Bentham, although his conception of it was very different from Bentham's. Hoping to remedy the problems found in an inductive approach to science, such as confirmation bias, he clearly set forth the premises of falsification as the key component in the scientific method. Mill was also a Member of Parliament and an important figure in liberal political philosophy.

Biography

John Stuart Mill was born on Rodney Street in the Pentonville area of London, the eldest son of the Scottish philosopher, historian and economist James Mill, and Harriet Burrow. John Stuart was educated by his father, with the advice and assistance of Jeremy Bentham and Francis Place. He was given an extremely rigorous upbringing, and was deliberately shielded from association with children his own age other than his siblings. His father, a follower of Bentham and an adherent of associationism, had as his explicit aim to create a genius intellect that would carry on the cause of utilitarianism and its implementation after he and Bentham had died.

Mill was a notably precocious child. He describes his education in his autobiography. At the age of three he was taught Greek. By the age of eight he had read ''Aesop's Fables'', Xenophon's ''Anabasis,'' the whole of Herodotus, and was acquainted with Lucian, Diogenes Laërtius, Isocrates and six dialogues of Plato. He had also read a great deal of history in English and had been taught arithmetic.

At the age of eight he began learning Latin, Euclid, and algebra, and was appointed schoolmaster to the younger children of the family. His main reading was still history, but he went through all the commonly taught Latin and Greek authors and by the age of ten could read Plato and Demosthenes with ease. His father also thought that it was important for Mill to study and compose poetry. One of Mill's earliest poetry compositions was a continuation of the Iliad. In his spare time, he also enjoyed reading about natural sciences and popular novels, such as ''Don Quixote'' and ''Robinson Crusoe''.

His father's work, ''The History of British India'' was published in 1818; immediately thereafter, about the age of twelve, Mill began a thorough study of the scholastic logic, at the same time reading Aristotle's logical treatises in the original language. In the following year he was introduced to political economy and studied Adam Smith and David Ricardo with his father, ultimately completing their classical economic view of factors of production. Mill's ''comptes rendus'' of his daily economy lessons helped his father in writing ''Elements of Political Economy'' in 1821, as textbook to promote the ideas of Ricardian economics, however the book lacked popular support. Ricardo, who was a close friend of his father, used to invite the young Mill to his house for a walk in order to talk about political economy.

At age fourteen, Mill stayed a year in France with the family of Sir Samuel Bentham, brother of Jeremy Bentham. The mountain scenery he saw led to a lifelong taste for mountain landscapes. The lively and friendly way of life of the French also left a deep impression on him. In Montpellier, he attended the winter courses on chemistry, zoology, logic of the ''Faculté des Sciences'', as well as taking a course of the higher mathematics. While coming and going from France, he stayed in Paris for a few days in the house of the renowned economist Jean-Baptiste Say, a friend of Mill's father. There he met many leaders of the Liberal party, as well as other notable Parisians, including Henri Saint-Simon.

This intensive study however had injurious effects on Mill's mental health, and state of mind. At the age of twenty he suffered a nervous breakdown. In chapter V of his ''Autobiography'', he claims that this was caused by the great physical and mental arduousness of his studies which had suppressed any feelings he might have developed normally in childhood. Nevertheless, this depression eventually began to dissipate, as he began to find solace in the ''Mémoires'' of Jean-François Marmontel and the poetry of William Wordsworth.

Mill had been engaged in a pen-friendship with Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism and sociology, since the two were both young men in the early 1820s. Comte's ''sociologie'' was more an early philosophy of science than we perhaps know it today, and the ''positive'' philosophy aided in Mill's broad rejection of Benthianism.

Mill refused to study at the University of Oxford or the University of Cambridge, because he refused to take Anglican orders. Instead he followed his father to work for the East India Company until 1858. He was elected a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1856.

In 1851, Mill married Harriet Taylor after 21 years of an intimate friendship. Taylor was married when they met, and their relationship was close but generally believed to be chaste during the years before her first husband died. Brilliant in her own right, Taylor was a significant influence on Mill's work and ideas during both friendship and marriage. His relationship with Harriet Taylor reinforced Mill's advocacy of women's rights. He cites her influence in his final revision of ''On Liberty'', which was published shortly after her death. Taylor died in 1858 after developing severe lung congestion, only seven years into their marriage.

Between the years 1865–1868 Mill served as Lord Rector of the University of St. Andrews. During the same period, 1865-8, he was a Member of Parliament for City and Westminster, and was often associated with the Liberal Party. During his time as an MP, Mill advocated easing the burdens on Ireland, and in 1866 became the first person in Parliament to call for women to be given the right to vote. Mill became a strong advocate of women's rights and such social reforms as labour unions and farm cooperatives. In ''Considerations on Representative Government'', Mill called for various reforms of Parliament and voting, especially proportional representation, the Single Transferable Vote, and the extension of suffrage. He was godfather to Bertrand Russell.

He died in Avignon, France, in 1873, where he is buried alongside his wife.

Works

Theory of liberty

Mill's ''On Liberty'' addresses the nature and limits of the power that can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. One argument that Mill develops further than any previous philosopher is the harm principle. The harm principle holds that each individual has the right to act as he wants, so long as these actions do not harm others. If the action is self-regarding, that is, if it only directly affects the person undertaking the action, then society has no right to intervene, even if it feels the actor is harming himself. He does argue, however, that individuals are prevented from doing lasting, serious harm to themselves or their property by the harm principle. Because no-one exists in isolation, harm done to oneself also harms others, and destroying property deprives the community as well as oneself. Mill excuses those who are "incapable of self-government" from this principle, such as young children or those living in "backward states of society".

Mill argues that despotism is an acceptable form of government for those societies that are "backward", as long as the despot has the best interests of the people at heart, because of the barriers to spontaneous progress. Though this principle seems clear, there are a number of complications. For example, Mill explicitly states that "harms" may include acts of omission as well as acts of commission. Thus, failing to rescue a drowning child counts as a harmful act, as does failing to pay taxes, or failing to appear as a witness in court. All such harmful omissions may be regulated, according to Mill. By contrast, it does not count as harming someone if – without force or fraud – the affected individual consents to assume the risk: thus one may permissibly offer unsafe employment to others, provided there is no deception involved. (Mill does, however, recognise one limit to consent: society should not permit people to sell themselves into slavery). In these and other cases, it is important to keep in mind that the arguments in ''On Liberty'' are grounded on the principle of Utility, and not on appeals to natural rights.

The question of what counts as a self-regarding action and what actions, whether of omission or commission, constitute harmful actions subject to regulation, continues to exercise interpreters of Mill. It is important to emphasise that Mill did not consider giving offence to constitute "harm"; an action could not be restricted because it violated the conventions or morals of a given society.

''On Liberty'' involves an impassioned defence of free speech. Mill argues that free discourse is a necessary condition for intellectual and social progress. We can never be sure, he contends, that a silenced opinion does not contain some element of the truth. He also argues that allowing people to air false opinions is productive for two reasons. First, individuals are more likely to abandon erroneous beliefs if they are engaged in an open exchange of ideas. Second, by forcing other individuals to re-examine and re-affirm their beliefs in the process of debate, these beliefs are kept from declining into mere dogma. It is not enough for Mill that one simply has an unexamined belief that happens to be true; one must understand why the belief in question is the true one.

Mill's view on social liberty and tyranny of majority

Mill believed that “the struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history.” For him, liberty in antiquity was a “contest... between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government." Mill defined "social liberty" as protection from "the tyranny of political rulers." He introduced a number of different tyrannies, including social tyranny, and also the tyranny of the majority.

Social liberty for Mill meant putting limits on the ruler’s power so that he would not be able to use his power on his own wishes and make decisions which could harm society; in other words, people should have the right to have a say in the government’s decisions. He said that social liberty was “the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual”. It was attempted in two ways: first, by obtaining recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights; second, by establishment of a system of "constitutional checks".

However, in Mill's view, limiting the power of government was not enough. He stated, "Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.”

View on liberty

John Stuart Mill’s view on liberty, which was influenced by Joseph Priestley and Josiah Warren, is that the individual ought to be free to do as he wishes unless he harms others. Individuals are rational enough to make decisions about their good being and choose any religion they want to. Government should interfere when it is for the protection of society. Mill explains,

“The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right...The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns him, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”

Views on freedom of speech

An influential advocate of freedom of speech, Mill objected to censorship. He says: "I choose, by preference the cases which are least favourable to me – In which the argument against freedom of opinion, both on truth and that of utility, is considered the strongest. Let the opinions impugned be the belief of God and in a future state, or any of the commonly received doctrines of morality... But I must be permitted to observe that it is not the feeling sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which I call an assumption of infallibility. It is the undertaking to decide that question ''for others'', without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side. And I denounce and reprobate this pretension not the less if it is put forth on the side of my most solemn convictions. However positive anyone's persuasion may be, not only of the faculty but of the pernicious consequences, but (to adopt expressions which I altogether condemn) the immorality and impiety of opinion. – yet if, in pursuance of that private judgement, though backed by the public judgement of his country or contemporaries, he prevents the opinion from being heard in its defence, he assumes infallibility. And so far from the assumption being less objectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called immoral or impious, this is the case of all others in which it is most fatal.”

Mills outlines the benefits of 'searching for and discovering the truth' as a way to further knowledge. He argued that even if an opinion is false, the truth can be better understood by refuting the error. And as most opinions are neither completely true nor completely false, he points out that allowing free expression allows the airing of competing views as a way to preserve partial truth in various opinions. Worried about minority views being suppressed, Mills also argued in support of freedom of speech on political grounds, stating that it is a critical component for a representative government to have in order to empower debate over public policy. Mill also eloquently argued that freedom of expression allows for personal growth and self-realization. He said that freedom of speech was a vital way to develop talents and realise a person's potential and creativity. He repeatedly said that eccentricity was preferable to uniformity and stagnation.

Human rights and slavery

In 1850, Mill sent an anonymous letter (which came to be known under the title "The Negro Question"), in rebuttal to Thomas Carlyle's anonymous letter to ''Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country''. Carlyle had defended slavery on grounds of genetic inferiority and claimed that the West Indies development was due to British ingenuity alone and dismissed any notion that there was a debtedness to imported slaves for building the economy there. Mill's rebuttal and references to the ongoing debate in the U.S. at the time regarding slavery were emphatic and eloquent. The full text, as well as a link to the Carlyle letter which prompted it, is available online.

Connection to feminism

Mill saw women’s issues as important and began to write in favour of greater rights for women. With this, Mill can be considered among the earliest feminists. In his article, “The Subjection of Women” (1861, published 1869), Mill attempts to prove that the legal subjugation of women is wrong and that it should give way to perfect equality. He talks about the role of women in marriage and how he felt it needed to be changed. There, Mill comments on three major facets of women’s lives that he felt are hindering them: society and gender construction, education, and marriage. Mill is also famous for being one of the earliest and strongest supporters of ever greater rights for women. His book ''The Subjection of Women'' is one of the earliest written on this subject by a male author. He felt that the oppression of women was one of the few remaining relics from ancient times, a set of prejudices that severely impeded the progress of humanity.

Mill's ideas were opposed by Ernest Belfort Bax in his treatise, 'The Legal Subjugation of Men'.

Utilitarianism

The canonical statement of Mill's utilitarianism can be found in ''Utilitarianism.'' This philosophy has a long tradition, although Mill's account is primarily influenced by Jeremy Bentham and Mill's father James Mill.

Mill's famous formulation of utilitarianism is known as the "greatest-happiness principle". It holds that one must always act so as to produce the greatest aggregate happiness among all sentient beings, within reason. Mill's major contribution to utilitarianism is his argument for the qualitative separation of pleasures. Bentham treats all forms of happiness as equal, whereas Mill argues that intellectual and moral pleasures are superior to more physical forms of pleasure. Mill distinguishes between happiness and contentment, claiming that the former is of higher value than the latter, a belief wittily encapsulated in the statement that "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question."

Mill defines the difference between higher and lower forms of happiness with the principle that those who have experienced both tend to prefer one over the other. This is, perhaps, in direct contrast with Bentham's statement that "Quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry", that, if a simple child's game like hopscotch causes more pleasure to more people than a night at the opera house, it is more imperative upon a society to devote more resources to propagating hopscotch than running opera houses. Mill's argument is that the "simple pleasures" tend to be preferred by people who have no experience with high art, and are therefore not in a proper position to judge. Mill supported legislation that would have granted extra voting power to university graduates on the grounds that they were in a better position to judge what would be best for society. It should be noted that, in this example, Mill did not intend to devalue uneducated people and would certainly have advocated sending the poor but talented to universities: he believed that education, and not the intrinsic nature of the educated, qualified them to have more influence in government.

The qualitative account of happiness that Mill advocates thus sheds light on his account presented in ''On Liberty''. As Mill suggests in that text, utility is to be conceived in relation to humanity "as a progressive being", which includes the development and exercise of rational capacities as we strive to achieve a "higher mode of existence". The rejection of censorship and paternalism is intended to provide the necessary social conditions for the achievement of knowledge and the greatest ability for the greatest number to develop and exercise their deliberative and rational capacities.

Economic philosophy

Mill's early economic philosophy was one of free markets. However, he accepted interventions in the economy, such as a tax on alcohol, if there were sufficient utilitarian grounds. He also accepted the principle of legislative intervention for the purpose of animal welfare. Mill originally believed that "equality of taxation" meant "equality of sacrifice" and that progressive taxation penalised those who worked harder and saved more and was therefore "a mild form of robbery".

Given a tax break to the rich, Mill agreed that inheritance should be taxed. A utilitarian society would agree that everyone should be equal one way or another. Therefore receiving inheritance would put one ahead of society unless taxed on the inheritance. Those who donate should consider and choose carefully where their money goes—some charities are more deserving than others. Considering public charities boards such as a government will disperse the money equally. However a private charity board like a church would disperse the monies fairly to those who are in more need than others.

Later he altered his views toward a more socialist bent, adding chapters to his Principles of Political Economy in defence of a socialist outlook, and defending some socialist causes. Within this revised work he also made the radical proposal that the whole wage system be abolished in favour of a co-operative wage system. Nonetheless, some of his views on the idea of flat taxation remained, albeit in a slightly toned down form.

Mill's ''Principles of Political Economy'', first published in 1848, was one of the most widely read of all books on economics in the period. As Adam Smith's ''Wealth of Nations'' had during an earlier period, Mill's ''Principles'' dominated economics teaching. In the case of Oxford University it was the standard text until 1919. The text that replaced it was written by Cambridge's Alfred Marshall.

Economic democracy

Mill promoted economic democracy in the capitalist economy whereby labourers would elect members of management. Mill believed that this was necessary to end what he deemed to be dictatorial management of capitalist firms and to establish liberty and equality in the capitalist economy. in which Mill recognised wealth beyond the material, and argued that the logical conclusion of unlimited growth was destruction of the environment and a reduced quality of life. He concluded that a stationary state could be preferable to neverending economic growth:

I cannot, therefore, regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with the unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political economists of the old school.

If the earth must lose that great portion of its pleasantness which it owes to things that the unlimited increase of wealth and population would extirpate from it, for the mere purpose of enabling it to support a larger, but not a better or a happier population, I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that they will be content to be stationary, long before necessity compel them to it.

Mill's Theory of Economic Development

Mill regarded economic development as a function of land, labour and capital. While land and labour are the to original factors of production,capital is "a stock, previously accumulated of the products of former labour ." Increase in wealth is possible only if land and capital help to increase production faster than the labour force. It is productive labour that is productive of wealth and capital accumulation. "The rate of capital accumulation is the function of the propotion of the labour force employed ' productively. Profits earned by employing unproductive labours are merely transfers of income; unproductive labour does not generate wealth or income" . It is productive labourers who do productive consumption. Productive consumption is that "which maintains and increase the productive capacity of the community". It implies that productive consumption is an input necessary to maintain productive labourers .

Control of Population Growth

Mill believed in malthasiun theory of population. By population he meant the number of the working class only. He was therefore worried about the growth in number of labourers who worked for hire. He believed that population control was essential for improving the condition of the working class so that they might enjoy the fruits of the technological progresss and capital accumulation . He propagated birth control as againstmoral restraint.

Wage Fund

According to Mill, the elasticity of supply is very high in response to high in wages . Wages generally exceed the minimum subsistence level. Wages are paid out of capital. Hence they are limited by existing fund of capital meant for paying wages . Thus wage per head can be derived at by dividing the total circulating capital by working population. Wages can increase by an increase in the aggregate fund of capital employed in hiring labour or by decrease in in the number of the worker. If wages rise, supply of labour will be high. Competition among workers will not only bring down wages but also keep some labourers out of employment . This is based on Mill's notion that" Demand for commodities is not demand for labourers ". It means income invested as advances of wages to labour creates employment and not income spent on consumer goods.nAn increase in consumption will mean a decline in investment . So increase in investment leads to increase in the wage fund and economic progress.

Rate of Capital Accumulation

Acccording to Mill the rate of capital accumulation depends upon: (1) " the amount of fund from which saving can be made" or" the size of the net produce of the industry "and (2) " the strength of disposition to save ".Capital is the result of savings, and the savings come from the "abstinence from present consumption for the sake of future goods". Although capital is the result of saving , it is neverthless consumed. This means savings is spending. Since saving depends on the net produce of the industry , they increase with an increase in profits and rent which goes into making the net produce. On the other hand the strength of the diposition to save depends upon (1) the rate of profit and (2)the desire to save or what Mill called" effective desire of acccumulation ". For Mill, profits depends on cost of labour , So rate of profits is the ratio of profits to wages . When profits rise or wages fall , the the rate of profits increases which in turn increases the rate of capital accumulation. Similarly , it is the desire to save which tends to increase the rate of capital accumulation.

Rate of Profit

According to Mill. the ultimate tendency is an economy is for the rate of profit to decline due to diminishing returnsin agriculture and increase in populationat a Malthasian rate.

Major publications

+ Sortable table
scope="col"	Title	Date	Source
"Two Letters on the Measure of Value"	1822	"The Traveller"
"Questions of Population"	1823
"War Expenditure"	1824
"Quarterly Review – Political Economy"	1825
"Review of Miss Martineau's Tales"	1830
"The Spirit of the Age"	1831
"Use and Abuse of Political Terms"	1832
"What is Poetry"	1833, 1859
"Rationale of Representation"	1835
"De Tocqueville on Democracy in America [i]"	1835
"State of Society In America"	1836
"Civilization"	1836
"Essay on Bentham"	1838
"Essay on Coleridge"	1840
"Essays On Government"	1840
"De Tocqueville on Democracy in America [ii]"	1840
''A System of Logic''	1843
''Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy''	1844
"Claims of Labour"	1845
''The Principles of Political Economy: with some of their applications to social philosophy	1848
"The Negro Question"	1850
"Reform of the Civil Service"	1854
''Dissertations and Discussions''	1859
''A Few Words on Non-intervention''	1859
''On Liberty	1859
'Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform''	1859
''Considerations on Representative Government''	1861
"Centralisation"	1862
"The Contest in America"	1862
''Utilitarianism (book)	Utilitarianism	1863
''An Examination of Sir Sir William Hamilton, 9th Baronet	William Hamilton's Philosophy''	1865
''Auguste Comte and Positivism''	1865
''Inaugural Address at St. Andrews'' – Rectorial Inaugural Address at the University of St. Andrews, concerning the value of culture	1867
"Speech In Favor of Capital Punishment"	1868
''England and Ireland''	1868
"Thornton on Labor and its Claims"	1869
''The Subjection of Women	1869
''Chapters and Speeches on the Irish Land Question''	1870
''On Nature''	1874
''Autobiography of John Stuart Mill''	1873
''Three Essays on Religion''	1874
''On Social Freedom: or the Necessary Limits of Individual Freedom Arising Out of the Conditions of Our Social Life''	1907
"Notes on N.W. Senior's Political Economy"	1945

See also

List of liberal theorists

Mill's Methods

Women's suffrage in the United Kingdom

Notes

References

Clifford G. Christians and John C. Merrill (eds.) Ethical Communication: Five Moral Stances in Human Dialogue (Columbia, MO.: University of Missouri Press, 2009)

Mark Philip Strasser, "Moral Philosophy of John Stuart Mill," Longwood Academic (1991). Wakefield, New Hampshire. ISBN 0-89341-681-9

Michael St. John Packe, ''The Life of John Stuart Mill'', Macmillan (1952).

David O. Brink, "Mill's Deliberative Utilitarianism," in ''Philosophy and Public Affairs'' 21 (1992), 67–103.

Sterling Harwood, "Eleven Objections to Utilitarianism," in Louis P. Pojman, ed., ''Moral Philosophy: A Reader'' (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998), and in Sterling Harwood, ed., ''Business as Ethical and Business as Usual'' (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996), Chapter 7, and in www.sterlingharwood.com.

Richard Reeves, ''John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand'', Atlantic Books (2007), paperback 2008. ISBN 978-1-84354-644-3

Robinson, Dave & Groves, Judy (2003). ''Introducing Political Philosophy''. Icon Books. ISBN 1-84046-450-X.

Frederick Rosen, ''Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill'' (Routledge Studies in Ethics & Moral Theory), 2003. ISBN 0-415-22094-7

Samuel Hollander, ''The Economics of John Stuart Mill'' (University of Toronto Press, 1985)

Mill, John Stuart, ''A System of Logic'', University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2002, ISBN 1-4102-0252-6

Chin Liew Ten, ''Mill on Liberty'', Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, full-text online at Contents Victorianweb.org (National University of Singapore)

"Right Again, The passions of John Stuart Mill," by Adam Gopnik. The New Yorker, 6 October 2008.

"Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: John Stuart Mill"

Kolmar, Wendy, and Frances Bartowski. Feminist Theory. 2nd ed. New York: Mc Graw Hill, 2005. Print.

External links

Mill's works

Collected Works of John Stuart Mill Definitive Edition in 33 volumes, plus separate titles, on the Online Library of Liberty

Works by John Stuart Mill in free audio format from LibriVox

The Online Books Page lists works on various sites

Vintage Mill, works in HTML

Works, readable and downloadable

Primary and secondary works

More easily readable versions of On Liberty, Utilitarianism, Three Essays on Religion, and The Subjection of Women

''Of the Composition of Causes'', Chapter VI of ''System of Logic'' (1859)

Secondary works

John Stuart Mill in the ''Concise Encyclopedia of Economics'' on Econlib

John Stuart Mill in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

A podcast interview of Richard Reeves on Mill's ''On Liberty''

Mill On Liberty, by Chin Liew Ten (C.L. Ten), Clarendon Press, 1980 (full-text online)

''Utilitarianism as Secondary Ethic'' An overview of utilitarianism with summary of its critiques.

''How far did JS Mill let liberalism down? Did he prefer Socialism to Liberalism?'' by David McDonagh

Mill-fest: The Bicentennial Edition'' by the blog Catallarchy

"Organic Conservatism, Administrative Realism, and the Imperialist Ethos in the 'Indian Career' of John Stuart Mill, by Vinay Lal (review of "John Stuart Mill and India" by Lynn Zastoupil, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1994.)

"On John Stuart Mill" in ''Some Reflections on Ethics'' by Dr.Ramendra, Mill

''Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy'' (Ashley ed.) [1848]. See original text in The Online Library of Liberty.

''The Subjection of Women'' (1878 ed.). See original text in The Online Library of Liberty.

Further information

John Stuart Mill. Extensive collection of links to writings by and about J.S. Mill.

EpistemeLinks

The Victorian Web Mill section

Links to works and resources

Biography, works and quotes of John Stuart Mill

Catalogue of Mill's correspondence and papers held at the Archives Division of the London School of Economics. View the Archives Catalogue of the contents of this important holding, which also includes letters of James Mill and Helen Taylor.

Category:1806 births Category:1873 deaths Category:19th-century philosophers Category:Consequentialists Category:English agnostics Category:English economists Category:English logicians Category:Economic methodology Category:English people of Scottish descent Category:English philosophers Category:English political philosophers Category:English political writers Category:Classical economists Category:Classical liberals Category:Philosophers of language Category:Philosophers of science Category:Political theorists Category:Feminist writers Category:Male feminists Category:Voting theorists Category:English autobiographers Category:People from Pentonville Category:Anglo-Scots Category:Rectors of the University of St Andrews Category:Utilitarians Category:Members of the United Kingdom Parliament for English constituencies Category:UK MPs 1865–1868 Category:Fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

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Coordinates	9°1′48″N38°44′24″N
name	Napalm Death
landscape	Yes
background	group_or_band
origin	Birmingham, England, United Kingdom
genre	Grindcore, death metal, deathgrind
years active	1981–present
label	Century Media, Spitfire, Earache
associated acts	Benediction, Blood from the Soul, Brujeria, Carcass, Cathedral, Defecation, Doom, Meathook Seed, Extreme Noise Terror, Godflesh, Lock Up, Scorn, Terrorizer, Unseen Terror, Venomous Concept
website	www.napalmdeath.org
current members	Mark "Barney" GreenwayShane EmburyMitch HarrisDanny Herrera
past members	(see below) }}

Napalm Death are a grindcore band formed in Birmingham, England in 1981. While none of its original members remain in the group, the lineup of vocalist Mark "Barney" Greenway, bassist Shane Embury, guitarist Mitch Harris and drummer Danny Herrera has remained consistent for most of the band's career.

Napalm Death are credited with defining the grindcore genre by incorporating elements of hardcore punk and death metal, short songs, fast tempos, deep guttural vocals and sociopolitical lyrics. The band's debut album ''Scum'', released in 1987 by Earache Records, proved substantially influential throughout the global metal community.

Napalm Death released fourteen studio albums and are listed by Nielsen SoundScan as the seventh best-selling death metal band in the United States.

Biography

Early history 1981–1986

Napalm Death were formed in the village of Meriden near Birmingham, in the United Kingdom, in May 1981 by Nic Bullen and Miles Ratledge while the duo were still in their early teenage years. The duo had been playing in amateur bands since 1980 as an extension of their fanzine writing, and went through a number of names (including "Civil Defence", "The Mess", "Evasion" and "Undead Hatred") before choosing Napalm Death in mid 1981.

The band were initially inspired by the early wave of punk bands, particularly the anarcho-punk movement (a sub-genre of punk music focused on anarchist politics), and associated groups such as Crass.

The first stable line-up of the group consisted of Nicholas Bullen on vocals and bass, Simon Oppenheimer on guitar, and Miles Ratledge on drums, and lasted from December 1981 to January 1982. Graham Robertson joined on bass in January 1982. Simon Oppenheimer left the group in August 1982 and was replaced by Darryl Fedeski who left the group in October 1982: at this point, Graham Robertson began to play guitar and Finbarr Quinn (ex-Curfew) joined on bass and backing vocals.

The group played concerts throughout 1982 (playing their first concert on July 25, 1982 at Atherstone Miners Club) and 1983 (sharing billing with anarcho-punk groups such as Amebix, The Apostles and Antisect), and made 4 demo recordings in 1982 and 1983, one of which contributed their first released recording to the ''Bullshit Detector Volume 3'' compilation released by Crass Records in 1984.

The band entered a period of hiatus from the end of 1983 onwards, playing only one concert in 1984 (a benefit for striking mine workers) with additional vocalist Marian Williams (ex-Relevant POS, and sister of the drummer of the group Human Cabbages from Coventry, UK). During this period, Nic Bullen met Justin Broadrick, a guitarist from Birmingham with whom he shared an interest in the music of bands such as Killing Joke, Throbbing Gristle, Crass, Amebix, Swans, and the developing power electronics scene. Bullen joined Broadrick's Final project for a period in 1983.

In July 1985, Napalm Death briefly reformed in order to appear at a concert at the Mermaid in Birmingham which was also notable as the last concert by Final. The group consisted of a 4-piece line-up of Miles Ratledge - drums, Bullen - vocals, bass and guitar, Graham Robertson - guitar and bass, and Damien Errington - guitar.

After this concert, Miles Ratledge and Bullen asked Broadrick to join Napalm Death as guitarist, with Bullen as vocalist and bass player. The band began to develop a musical style which blended elements of post-punk (particularly Killing Joke and Amebix), heavy punk in the vein of Discharge, and thrash metal (with particular reference to Possessed and Celtic Frost).

The group played their first concert as a trio on 31 August 1985 (playing 2 concerts on the same day: Telford with Chumbawamba and Blyth Power, and Birmingham with We've Got a Fuzzbox and We're Gonna Use It), and began to play regularly in the Birmingham area (particularly at The Mermaid public house in the Sparkhill area of Birmingham) with a wide range of musicians including Icons of Filth, Concrete Sox, The Varukers, Decadence Within, and The Groundhogs.

In September 1985, Peter Shaw (ex-Autism) joined on bass. The 4-piece line-up recorded ''Hatred Surge'' (the band's 5th demo recording) on 23 October 1985 which the band made available at their concerts and by mail.

Following the recording of the demo, Bullen and Broadrick wished to extend their exploration of a more extreme musical style which created a split in the group with Ratledge: as a result, the group splintered and Mick Harris (a local fan) was asked to join as drummer in December 1985.

The trio - Bullen on vocals and bass, Broadrick on guitar and Harris on drums - made their first performance on 15 December 1985 and went on to play many concerts in 1986, predominantly in the Birmingham area, with musicians such as Amebix, Antisect, Chaos UK, Varukers, Disorder and Dirge.

The group recorded a 6th demo, ''From Enslavement to Obliteration'', on 15 March 1986, which the group made available at their concerts and through mail, before making a 7th recording later that year, ''Scum'', which was provisionally intended to form part of a split LP with the English hardcore band Atavistic on Manic Ears records. This recording later became the first side of the band's debut album ''Scum'' in 1987.

The band then faced a number of line-up changes. Nic Bullen was becoming frustrated with the musical direction of the group, and began to lose interest as a whole: as a result, Jim Whiteley was asked to join as bass player. The band played a number of concerts as a four-piece before Justin Broadrick left the group to play the drums for local band Head of David. The group attempted to find a new guitarist by asking Shane Embury (ex-Unseen Terror and a fan of the group) to join and giving a trial period to Frank Healy (ex-Annihilator, later of Cerebral Fix and Sacrilege). After Broadrick's departure, Nic Bullen's dissatisfaction with the musical direction of the group led him to leave the group in December 1986 (in order to focus on his studies in English Literature and Philosophy at university).

1987–1989

With the departure of Broadrick and Bullen, the band had to look for new members. Guitarist Bill Steer played in a band based in Liverpool, called Carcass and given the affinity between the bands, he joined Napalm Death while still playing an active role in Carcass. The band asked a friend (Lee Dorrian) to join as vocalist due to his good relationship with the band (he had organised a number of concerts for the band), even though he had never been in a band before. This line-up recorded the B side of the ''Scum'' LP at Rich Bitch studios in May 1987, and the album was released through Earache Records.

The band promptly lost another member just before they undertook a short tour after the release of ''Scum''. Jim Whiteley left the group (to join Ripcord) and Shane Embury (former drummer of Unseen Terror) moved to bass. The band then appeared on two compilation records ('North Atlantic Noise Attack' and the 'Pathological Compilation'), recorded two Peel sessions and a split 7" with Japanese band S.O.B. They also returned to Rich Bitch studio once more and recorded their second album: ''From Enslavement to Obliteration''.

A follow-up release to "Enslavement.." came in the form of the six song 12" EP "Mentally Murdered", which was to be the last recording with the Harris/Steer/Dorian/Embury line-up. This EP was recorded at the Slaughterhouse Studios and took on a slightly different sound, blending grindcore with death metal. Following the release, Napalm Death were featured on national television in the United Kingdom in a heavy metal special by Arena (BBC 2).

The band continued to tour, but as soon as they came back home from Japan, in July 1989, Steer and Dorrian left the band: Steer decided to dedicate himself full-time to Carcass, while Dorrian formed the doom metal group Cathedral. The group recruited Jesse Pintado (ex-Terrorizer) on guitar and Mark "Barney" Greenway (ex-Benediction) as vocalist. This line-up took part in the Grindcrusher tour organised by Earache Records and featuring fellow label-mates Carcass, Bolt Thrower and Morbid Angel. The group recruited Mitch Harris (ex-Righteous Pigs) as second guitarist after the tour.

1990–1994

In Florida, they started working on their next album, ''Harmony Corruption''. While writing ''Harmony Corruption'' they changed their style a little, from grindcore, to a mix of blast beats and some slower, more rhythmic parts. In addition, death metal was a major influence on ''Harmony Corruption'', more so than their previous records. After releasing the new record, they went on touring around the world and from the material filmed at those concerts they released a home-video, ''Live Corruption''. Directed by noted metal director Steve Payne.

The band caught considerable flack from longtime fans in respect to the "death metal" sound and production of ''Harmony Corruption''. Smarting from the accusations of selling-out by the British underground "elites", Napalm entered Eddie Van Dale's Violent Noise Experience Club in March of '91 to record six new tracks. These new songs, the "Mass Appeal Madness" 12" LP, had a much more raw grind quality to them, finding instant favour with fans. This recording, along with the "Mentally Murdered" 12", the spit 7" with S.O.B. and live tracks from ''Live Corruption'', found a home on the ''Death by Manipulation'' CD.

Drummer Mick Harris - the only remaining member of the line-up that had played on the band's first album, ''Scum'' - eventually left Napalm Death because of conflicts regarding their musical style. Danny Herrera, a close friend to Jesse Pintado, was brought in to replace Mick. The addition of Herrera would be the last major line-up change of the band, save for Jesse Pintado's future absence, which has yet to be filled (and vocalist Phil Vane never recorded with the band). Napalm Death released a new record, ''Utopia Banished''. Now working with producer Colin Richardson. This release was a kind of "return to the roots" - grindcore. After recording ''The World Keeps Turning'' EP, the band toured Europe with Dismember and Obituary on the "Campaign for Musical Destruction" tour. They then toured the US with Sepultura, Sacred Reich and Sick Of It All. The proceeds of Napalm Death's 1993 EP ''Nazi Punks Fuck Off'' were donated to anti-fascist organisations.

The band remixed the track "Mind Of A Razor" by London based hip hop crew Gunshot. The remixed version of the track appeared on the EP of the same name in 1992. Thereafter, they went to the studio and recorded ''Fear, Emptiness, Despair''. Although it was still as heavy and aggressive as previous releases, the new record took a different direction and sounded more experimental; they added more rhythmic riffs, an industrial-like structure, and then added grindcore blast beats. Live concerts with Entombed, Obituary and Machine Head showed the audience how violent and aggressive the new Napalm Death sound was. They continued with the experimentation through the rest of the 1990s.

1995–2004

The ''Greed Killing'' EP was the next release from the band, through Earache. After the preview with the EP, ''Diatribes'', a full-length album was released. Although things seemed to be going smoothly from outside, they were going through problems. Misunderstanding rose between the members and singer Greenway was expelled from the band in late/mid 1996. Greenway went to record with Extreme Noise Terror (the ENT release ''Damage 381'' features Barney on lead vocals) and ENT's main singer Phil Vane went to fill vocals slot in Napalm Death. Things did not go as well as they were supposed to, and Vane was kicked out of the band just before they got into the studio to record the new album. And so Greenway returned to Napalm Death.

The next albums ''Inside the Torn Apart'' and ''Words from the Exit Wound'' continued with the experimentation but displayed more signs of grindcore, notably faster tempos than the last two albums. This return was completed with the release of ''Enemy of the Music Business''. It shows their anger with the music industry and especially with Earache. ''Order of the Leech'' continued where their previous album ended and can be seen as even more faster and aggressive.

In 2004, they recorded a covers album called ''Leaders Not Followers: Part 2'', the sequel to their earlier covers EP. It contains covers of old hardcore punk and heavy metal bands, including Cryptic Slaughter, Massacre, Kreator, Sepultura, Siege and Discharge. Due to personal problems, Jesse Pintado did not play on either ''Order of the Leech'' or ''Leaders Not Followers: Part 2'', and left the band in early 2004. Nevertheless Pintado stated that he left because he grew tired of Napalm Death and wanted to start something new. The two guitars that you hear is Mitch over-dubbing.

2005 onwards

In April 2005, their next album ''The Code Is Red...Long Live the Code'' was released. It features guest appearances from Jeffrey Walker (formerly of Carcass), Jamey Jasta (Hatebreed vocalist) and Jello Biafra (formerly of Dead Kennedys, and Lard among many other bands). The album continued the band's progressive approach to their brutal brand of extreme metal, with their trademark grindcore sound retained.

Napalm Death finished recording their follow-up album titled ''Smear Campaign'' in June 2006; released on September 15, 2006 to very strong reviews from fans and critics alike. The main lyrical focus is criticism of the United States Government and other governments who are strongly religious. The album features a guest appearance by Anneke van Giersbergen, vocalist for the Dutch rock band The Gathering. There is a limited edition digipak version of ''Smear Campaign'', which has two new songs, "Call That an Option?" and "Atheist Runt".

In early 2006 Napalm Death headlined a tour with Kreator, A Perfect Murder, and Undying. On August 27, 2006, Jesse Pintado died in a hospital in the Netherlands due to liver failure, prompting Mitch Harris to express his sadness at the loss of someone he thought of as "a brother" on the band's official website. After the Smear Campaign tour, the band did a 2007 "World Domination Tour". Bassist Shane Embury is currently working on a project with Mick Kenney of Anaal Nathrakh, their work together will be released on FETO Records at the end of 2007.

In November 2008, Napalm Death's fourteenth studio album, entitled ''Time Waits For No Slave'', leaked onto the internet; it was officially released on January 23, 2009. Similar to ''Smear Campaign'', ''Time Waits For No Slave'' also had a digipak version containing two extra songs ("Suppressed Hunger" and "Omnipresent Knife In Your Back").

In February 2011, Napalm Death appeared in an episode of Channel 4's "Skins". Napalm Death entered Parlour Studio in Kettering, U.K with producer Russ Russell to begin working on a new album. Also in 2011, they recorded the single "Legacy Was Yesterday". Napalm Death recently finished recording a new album, but according to Shane Embury, it will not be released until February 2012.

Discography

''Scum'' (1987)

''From Enslavement to Obliteration'' (1988)

''Harmony Corruption'' (1990)

''Utopia Banished'' (1992)

''Fear, Emptiness, Despair'' (1994)

''Diatribes'' (1996)

''Inside the Torn Apart'' (1997)

''Words from the Exit Wound'' (1998)

''Enemy of the Music Business'' (2000)

''Order of the Leech'' (2002)

''Leaders Not Followers: Part 2'' (2004)

''The Code Is Red...Long Live the Code'' (2005)

''Smear Campaign'' (2006)

''Time Waits for No Slave'' (2009)

Members

Current lineup

Mark Greenway – vocals (1989–1996, 1997–present)

Shane Embury – bass guitar (1987–present)

Mitch Harris – guitars, backing vocals (1990–present)

Danny Herrera – drums (1991–present)

Past members

;Vocals

Nik Napalm (Nicholas Bullen) (1981–1986)

Marian Williams (1984)

Lee Dorrian (1987–1989)

Phil Vane (1996–1997) (deceased)

;Bass guitar

Nik Napalm (Nicholas Bullen) (1981, 1985–1986)

Grayhard (Graham "Robbo" Robertson) (1982)

Fin (Finbar Quinn) (1983–1984)

P-Nut (Peter Shaw) (1985)

James (Jim) Whiteley (1986–1987)

;Guitar

Si O (Simon Oppenheimer) (1981–1982)

Daz F (Daryl "Sid" Fedeski) (1982)

Grayhard (Graham "Robbo" Robertson) (1983–1985)

Damien Errington (1985)

Justin Broadrick (1985–1986)

Frank Healy (1987)

Bill Steer (1987–1989)

Jesse Pintado (1989–2004) (deceased)

;Drums

Rat (Miles Ratledge) (1981–1985)

Mick Harris (1985–1991)

Associated acts

Members of Napalm Death have moved on to form bands such as Carcass, Godflesh, Cathedral, Scorn, Jesu, and Black Galaxy. Additionally, band members have formed numerous side projects, including Lull, Painkiller, Brujeria, Lock Up, Meathook Seed, Defecation, Teeth of Lions Rule the Divine, and Venomous Concept.

Notes

References

Barcinski, André & Gomes, Silvio (1999). ''Sepultura: Toda a História.'' São Paulo: Ed. 34. ISBN 85-7326156-0

Mudrian, Albert (2004). ''Choosing Death: the Improbable History of Death Metal and Grindcore''. Los Angeles, CA: Feral House.

External links

Official MySpace

Category:English grindcore musical groups Category:English death metal musical groups Category:English heavy metal musical groups Category:Deathgrind musical groups Category:Crust and d-beat groups Category:Musical groups from Birmingham, West Midlands Category:Musical groups established in 1981 Category:Musical quartets Category:Musical quintets Category:Kerrang! Awards winners Category:Earache Records artists Category:Century Media Records artists Category:English atheists

cs:Napalm Death da:Napalm Death de:Napalm Death es:Napalm Death fa:ناپالم دث fr:Napalm Death gl:Napalm Death ko:네이팜 데스 id:Napalm Death it:Napalm Death he:נפלם דת' lv:Napalm Death lt:Napalm Death hu:Napalm Death nl:Napalm Death ja:ナパーム・デス no:Napalm Death pl:Napalm Death pt:Napalm Death ro:Napalm Death ru:Napalm Death sco:Napalm Death simple:Napalm Death sl:Napalm Death fi:Napalm Death sv:Napalm Death tr:Napalm Death

Coordinates	9°1′48″N38°44′24″N
Region	Western philosophy
Era	20th century philosophy
Color	#B0C4DE
Name	Karl PopperCH FRS FBA
Birth date	28 July 1902
Birth place	Vienna, Austria
Death date	September 17, 1994
Death place	London, England
School tradition	Critical rationalismLiberalism
Main interests	EpistemologyRationalityPhilosophy of scienceLogicSocial and political philosophy Philosophy of mindPhilosophy of artOrigin of lifeInterpretation of Quantum mechanics
Notable ideas	Critical empiricismUniversal evolutionary trial and error model of life and knowledgePropensity interpretationOpen societyCosmological pluralismModified EssentialismAxiomatic formalization of probabilitySpearhead model of evolutionTruthlikenessObjective Hermeneutics
Influences	SocratesLycophronAristotleKant Schopenhauer Hegel Einstein Kierkegaard WittgensteinVienna Circle HayekTarski SelzRussell Campbell Burke Mill Wächtershäuser
Influenced	Virtually all philosophy of science since 1930s Hayek FriedmanLakatos Feyerabend SorosMiller Agassi Bartley GombrichJarvie Dahrendorf Levinson Schmidt MunzMagee Lorenz ShearmurMedawar Dimitrakos Albert Gellner Soroush Taleb }}

Sir Karl Raimund Popper, CH FRS FBA (28 July 1902 – 17 September 1994) was an Austro-British philosopher and a professor at the London School of Economics. He is regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of science of the 20th century; he also wrote extensively on social and political philosophy.

Popper is known for his attempt to repudiate the classical observationalist / inductivist form of scientific method in favour of empirical falsification. He is also known for his opposition to the classical justificationist account of knowledge which he replaced with critical rationalism, "the first ''non justificational philosophy of criticism'' in the history of philosophy". As well, he is known for his vigorous defense of liberal democracy and the principles of social criticism that he came to believe made a flourishing "open society" possible.

Life

Karl Popper was born in Vienna (then in Austria-Hungary) in 1902, to upper middle-class parents. All of Karl Popper's grandparents were Jewish, but the Popper family converted to Lutheranism before Karl was born. Karl's father Simon Siegmund Carl Popper was a lawyer from Bohemia, and mother Jenny Schiff was of Silesian and Hungarian descent. After establishing themselves in Vienna, the Poppers made a rapid social climb in Viennese society: Simon Siegmund Carl became a legal partner of Vienna's liberal mayor Raimond Grübl and, after his death in 1898, took over the firm (Karl received his middle name from the mayor).

Popper received a Lutheran upbringing and was educated at the University of Vienna. His father was a doctor of law at the Vienna University and a bibliophile who had 12,000–14,000 volumes in his personal library. Popper inherited both the library and the disposition from him.

In 1919, Popper became attracted by Marxism and subsequently joined the Association of Socialist School Students. He also became a member of the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Austria, which was at that time a party that fully adopted the Marxist ideology. After the June 15, 1919 street battle in the Hörlgasse, when police shot eight of his unarmed party comrades, he became disillusioned by what he saw to be the pseudo-scientific historical materialism of Marx, abandoned the ideology and remained a supporter of social liberalism throughout his life.

In 1928, he earned a doctorate in Psychology, under the supervision of Karl Bühler. His dissertation was titled "Die Methodenfrage der Denkpsychologie" (The question of method in cognitive psychology). Then, from 1930 to 1936, he taught secondary school. Popper published his first book, ''Logik der Forschung'' (''The Logic of Scientific Discovery''), in 1934. Here, he criticised psychologism, naturalism, inductionism, and logical positivism, and put forth his theory of potential falsifiability as the criterion demarcating science from non-science.

In 1937, the rise of Nazism and the threat of the Anschluss led Popper to emigrate to New Zealand, where he became lecturer in philosophy at Canterbury University College New Zealand (at Christchurch). It was here that he wrote his influential work "The Open Society and its Enemies". In 1946, he moved to England to become reader in logic and scientific method at the London School of Economics. Three years later, he was appointed as professor of logic and scientific method at the University of London in 1949. Popper was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1958 to 1959. He was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1965, and was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1976. He retired from academic life in 1969, though he remained intellectually active for the rest of his life. He was invested with the Insignia of a Companion of Honour in 1982. Popper was a member of the Academy of Humanism and described himself as an agnostic, showing respect for the moral teachings of Judaism and Christianity.

Popper won many awards and honours in his field, including the Lippincott Award of the American Political Science Association, the Sonning Prize, and fellowships in the Royal Society, British Academy, London School of Economics, King's College London, Darwin College Cambridge, and Charles University, Prague. Austria awarded him the Grand Decoration for Services to the Republic of Austria in Gold.

Popper died in Croydon, UK at the age of 92 on 17 September 1994. After cremation, his ashes were taken to Vienna and buried at Lainzer cemetery adjacent to the ORF Centre, where his wife Josefine Anna Henninger, who had died in Austria several years before, had already been buried.

Popper's philosophy

Philosophy of science

Popper coined the term ''critical rationalism'' to describe his philosophy. The term indicates his rejection of classical empiricism, and of ''the classical observationalist-inductivist account of science'' that had grown out of it. Popper argued strongly against the latter, holding that scientific theories are abstract in nature, and can be tested only indirectly, by reference to their implications. He also held that scientific theory, and human knowledge generally, is irreducibly conjectural or hypothetical, and is generated by the creative imagination in order to solve problems that have arisen in specific historio-cultural settings. Logically, no number of positive outcomes at the level of experimental testing can confirm a scientific theory, but a single counterexample is logically decisive: it shows the theory, from which the implication is derived, to be false. The term "falsifiable" does not mean something is made false, but rather that, if it is false, it can be shown by observation or experiment. Popper's account of the logical asymmetry between verification and falsifiability lies at the heart of his philosophy of science. It also inspired him to take falsifiability as his criterion of demarcation between what is and is not genuinely scientific: a theory should be considered scientific if and only if it is falsifiable. This led him to attack the claims of both psychoanalysis and contemporary Marxism to scientific status, on the basis that their theories are not falsifiable. Popper also wrote extensively against the famous Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. He strongly disagreed with Niels Bohr's instrumentalism and supported Albert Einstein's realist approach to scientific theories about the universe. Popper's falsifiability resembles Charles Peirce's nineteenth century fallibilism. In ''Of Clocks and Clouds'' (1966), Popper remarked that he wished he had known of Peirce's work earlier.

In ''All Life is Problem Solving'', Popper sought to explain the apparent progress of scientific knowledge—how it is that our understanding of the universe seems to improve over time. This problem arises from his position that the truth content of our theories, even the best of them, cannot be verified by scientific testing, but can only be falsified. Again, in this context the word 'falsified' does not refer to something being 'fake'; rather, that something can be (i.e., is ''capable'' of being) shown to be false by observation or experiment. Some things simply do not lend themselves to being shown to be false, and therefore are not falsifiable. If so, then how is it that the growth of science appears to result in a growth in knowledge? In Popper's view, the advance of scientific knowledge is an ''evolutionary'' process characterized by his formula:

: $PS\_1\; \backslash rightarrow\; TT\_1\; \backslash rightarrow\; EE\_1\; \backslash rightarrow\; PS\_2.\; \backslash ,$

In response to a given problem situation ($PS\_1$), a number of competing conjectures, or tentative theories ($TT$), are systematically subjected to the most rigorous attempts at falsification possible. This process, error elimination ($EE$), performs a similar function for science that natural selection performs for biological evolution. Theories that better survive the process of refutation are not more true, but rather, more "fit"—in other words, more applicable to the problem situation at hand ($PS\_1$). Consequently, just as a species' biological fitness does not ensure continued survival, neither does rigorous testing protect a scientific theory from refutation in the future. Yet, as it appears that the engine of biological evolution has produced, over time, adaptive traits equipped to deal with more and more complex problems of survival, likewise, the evolution of theories through the scientific method may, in Popper's view, reflect a certain type of progress: toward more and more ''interesting problems'' ($PS\_2$). For Popper, it is in the interplay between the tentative theories (conjectures) and error elimination (refutation) that scientific knowledge advances toward greater and greater problems; in a process very much akin to the interplay between genetic variation and natural selection.

Where does "truth" fit into all this? As early as 1934 Popper wrote of the search for truth as "''one of the strongest motives for scientific discovery.''" Still, he describes in ''Objective Knowledge'' (1972) early concerns about the much-criticized notion of truth as correspondence. Then came the semantic theory of truth formulated by the logician Alfred Tarski and published in 1933. Popper writes of learning in 1935 of the consequences of Tarski's theory, to his intense joy. The theory met critical objections to truth as correspondence and thereby rehabilitated it. The theory also seemed, in Popper's eyes, to support metaphysical realism and the ''regulative'' idea of a search for truth.

According to this theory, the conditions for the truth of a sentence as well as the sentences themselves are part of a metalanguage. So, for example, the sentence "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. Although many philosophers have interpreted, and continue to interpret, Tarski's theory as a deflationary theory, Popper refers to it as a theory in which "is true" is replaced with "corresponds to the facts". He bases this interpretation on the fact that examples such as the one described above refer to two things: assertions and ''the facts'' to which they refer. He identifies Tarski's formulation of the truth conditions of sentences as the introduction of a "metalinguistic predicate" and distinguishes the following cases:

# "John called" is true. # "It is true that John called."

The first case belongs to the metalanguage whereas the second is more likely to belong to the object language. Hence, "it is true that" possesses the logical status of a redundancy. "Is true", on the other hand, is a predicate necessary for making general observations such as "John was telling the truth about Phillip."

Upon this basis, along with that of the logical content of assertions (where logical content is inversely proportional to probability), Popper went on to develop his important notion of verisimilitude or "truthlikeness".

The intuitive idea behind verisimilitude is that the assertions or hypotheses of scientific theories can be objectively measured with respect to the amount of truth and falsity that they imply. And, in this way, one theory can be evaluated as more or less true than another on a quantitative basis which, Popper emphasizes forcefully, has nothing to do with "subjective probabilities" or other merely "epistemic" considerations.

The simplest mathematical formulation that Popper gives of this concept can be found in the tenth chapter of ''Conjectures and Refutations''. Here he defines it as:

: $Vs(a)=CT\_v(a)-CT\_f(a)\; \backslash ,$

where $Vs(a)$ is the verisimilitude of ''a'', $CT\_v(a)$ is a measure of the content of truth of ''a'', and $CT\_f(a)$ is a measure of the content of the falsity of ''a''.

Knowledge, for Popper, was ''objective'', both in the sense that it is objectively true (or truthlike), and also in the sense that knowledge has an ontological status (i.e., knowledge as object) independent of the knowing subject (''Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach'', 1972). He proposed three worlds (see Popperian cosmology): World One, being the physical world, or physical states; World Two, being the world of mind, or mental states, ideas, and perceptions; and World Three, being the body of human knowledge expressed in its manifold forms, or the products of the second world made manifest in the materials of the first world (i.e.–books, papers, paintings, symphonies, and all the products of the human mind). World Three, he argued, was the product of individual human beings in exactly the same sense that an animal path is the product of individual animals, and that, as such, has an existence and evolution independent of any individual knowing subjects. The influence of World Three, in his view, on the individual human mind (World Two) is at least as strong as the influence of World One. In other words, the knowledge held by a given individual mind owes at least as much to the total accumulated wealth of human knowledge, made manifest, as to the world of direct experience. As such, the growth of human knowledge could be said to be a function of the independent evolution of World Three. Many contemporary philosophers have not embraced Popper's Three World conjecture, due mostly, it seems, to its resemblance to Cartesian dualism.

Philosophy of arithmetic

Popper's principle of falsifiability runs into ''prima facie'' difficulties when the epistemological status of mathematics is considered. It is difficult to conceive how simple statements of arithmetic, such as 2 + 2 = 4, could ever be shown to be false. If they are not open to falsification they can not be scientific. If they are not scientific, it needs to be explained how they can be informative about real world objects and events.

Popper's solution was an original contribution in the philosophy of mathematics. His idea was that a number statement such as "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples" can be taken in two senses. In one sense it is irrefutable and logically true, in the second sense it is factually true and falsifiable. Concisely, the pure mathematics "2 + 2 = 4" is always true, but, when the formula is applied to real world apples, it is open to falsification.

Political philosophy

In ''The Open Society and Its Enemies'' and ''The Poverty of Historicism'', Popper developed a critique of historicism and a defence of the 'Open Society'. Popper considered historicism to be the theory that history develops inexorably and necessarily according to knowable general laws towards a determinate end. He argued that this view is the principal theoretical presupposition underpinning most forms of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. He argued that historicism is founded upon mistaken assumptions regarding the nature of scientific law and prediction. Since the growth of human knowledge is a causal factor in the evolution of human history, and since "no society can predict, scientifically, its own future states of knowledge", it follows, he argued, that there can be no predictive science of human history. For Popper, metaphysical and historical indeterminism go hand in hand. In ''After The Open Society'', which was published posthumously, a large collection of his previously unpublished and uncollected essays on social and political topics was assembled. In this, one can trace his ideas from material that pre-dated ''The Open Society and Its Enemies'' to something that was completed just as he died.

In a 1992 lecture, Popper explained the connection between his political philosophy and his philosophy of science. As he stated, he was in his early years impressed by communism and also active in the Austrian Communist party. What had a profound effect on him was an event that happened in 1918: during a riot, caused by the Communists, the police shot several people, including some of Popper's friends. When Popper later told the leaders of the Communist party about this, they responded by stating that this loss of life was necessary in working towards the inevitable workers' revolution. This statement did not convince Popper and he started to think about what kind of reasoning would justify such a statement. He later concluded that there could not be any justification for it, and this was the start of his later criticism of historicism.

In 1947, Popper founded with Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, Ludwig von Mises and others the Mont Pelerin Society to defend classical liberalism, in the spirit of the Open Society.

The paradox of tolerance

Although Popper was an advocate of toleration, he opined that even a tolerant person cannot always accept another's intolerance. For, if tolerance allowed intolerance to succeed completely, tolerance itself would be threatened. In ''The Open Society and Its Enemies: The Spell of Plato'', he argued that:

Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.

The utterance of intolerant philosophies should not always be suppressed, "as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion." However,

we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols.

Furthermore, in support of human rights legislation in the second half of the 20th century, he stated:

We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal.

Problem of induction

Among his contributions to philosophy is his attempt to answer the philosophical problem of induction as emphasized strongly by David Hume. The problem, in basic terms, can be understood by example: given that the sun has risen every day for as long as anyone can remember, what is the rational proof that it will rise tomorrow? How can one rationally prove that past events will continue to repeat in the future, just because they have repeated in the past?

Popper claims to have found a solution to the problem of induction. His reply is characteristic, and ties in with his criterion of falsifiability. He states that while there is no way to prove that the sun will rise, it is possible to formulate the theory that every day the sun will rise—if it does not rise on some particular day, the theory will be falsified and will have to be replaced by a different one. Until that day, there is no need to reject the assumption that the theory is true. Neither is it rational according to Popper to instead make the more complex assumption that the sun will rise until a given day, but will stop doing so the day after, or similar statements with additional conditions.

Such a theory would be true with higher probability, because it cannot be attacked so easily: To falsify the first one, it is sufficient to find that sun has stopped rising; to falsify the second one, one additionally needs the assumption that the given day has not yet been reached. Popper held that it is the least likely, or most easily falsifiable, or simplest theory (attributes which he identified as all the same thing) that explains known facts that one should rationally prefer. His opposition to positivism, which held that it is the theory most likely to be true that one should prefer, here becomes very apparent. It is impossible, Popper argues, to ensure a theory to be true (but not fatal, since even false theories may have true consequence); it is more important that they can be eliminated and corrected as easily as possible if false.

Popper and Hume agreed that there is often a psychological belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, but both denied that there is logical justification for the supposition that it will, simply because it always has in the past. Popper writes:

"I approached the problem of induction through Hume. Hume, I felt, was perfectly right in pointing out that induction cannot be logically justified." (''Conjectures and Refutations'', p. 55)

To Popper, who was an anti-justificationist, traditional philosophy is misled by the false principle of sufficient reason. He thinks that no assumption can ever be or needs ever to be justified, so a lack of justification is not a justification for doubt. Instead, theories should be tested and scrutinized. It is not the goal to bless theories with claims of certainty or justification, but to eliminate errors in them:

"there ''are'' no such things as good positive reasons; nor do we need such things [...] But [philosophers] obviously cannot quite bring [themselves] to believe that this is my opinion, let alone that it is right" (''The Philosophy of Karl Popper'', p. 1043)

Free will

Popper and John Eccles speculated on the problem of free will for many years generally agreeing on an interactionist dualist theory of mind. However, although Popper was a body-mind dualist, he did not think that the mind is a substance separate from the body: he thought that mental or psychological properties or aspects of people are distinct from physical ones.

When he gave the first Arthur Holly Compton Memorial Lecture in 1955, Popper revisited the idea of quantum indeterminacy as a source of human freedom. Eccles had suggested that "critically poised neurons" might be influenced by the mind to assist in a decision. Popper criticized Compton's idea of amplified quantum events affecting the decision. He wrote

"The idea that the only alternative to determinism is just sheer chance was taken over by Schlick, together with many of his views on the subject, from Hume, who asserted that 'the removal' of what he called 'physical necessity' must always result in

'the same thing with chance. As objects must either be conjoin'd or not, . . . 'tis impossible to admit of any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity'.

"I shall later argue against this important doctrine according to which the alternative to determinism is sheer chance. Yet I must admit that the doctrine seems to hold good for the quantum-theoretical models which have been designed to explain, or at least to illustrate, the possibility of human freedom. This seems to be the reason why these models are so very unsatisfactory.

"Hume's and Schlick's ontological thesis that there cannot exist anything intermediate between chance and determinism seems to me not only highly dogmatic (not to say doctrinaire) but clearly absurd; and it is understandable only on the assumption that they believed in a complete determinism in which chance has no status except as a symptom of our ignorance."

Popper called not for something ''between'' chance and necessity but for a combination of randomness and control to explain freedom, though not yet explicitly in two stages with random chance before the controlled decision.

"freedom is not just chance but, rather, the result of a subtle interplay between something almost random or haphazard, and something like a restrictive or selective control."

Then in his 1977 book with John Eccles, ''The Self and its Brain'', Popper finally formulates the two-stage model in a temporal sequence. And he compares free will to Darwinian evolution and natural selection,

"New ideas have a striking similarity to genetic mutations. Now, let us look for a moment at genetic mutations. Mutations are, it seems, brought about by quantum theoretical indeterminacy (including radiation effects). Accordingly, they are also probabilistic and not in themselves originally selected or adequate, but on them there subsequently operates natural selection which eliminates inappropriate mutations. Now we could conceive of a similar process with respect to new ideas and to free-will decisions, and similar things.

"That is to say, a range of possibilities is brought about by a probabilistic and quantum mechanically characterized set of proposals, as it were - of possibilities brought forward by the brain. On these there then operates a kind of selective procedure which eliminates those proposals and those possibilities which are not acceptable to the mind."

Other thinkers who have formulated a two-stage model for free will include William James, Henri Poincaré, Arthur Compton, Henry Margenau, and Daniel Dennett.

Issue of Darwinism

In the creation–evolution controversy, a political debate that is mainly fought between conservative creationists and liberal naturalists (some methodological naturalists, others ontological naturalists), it is an important issue what can legitimately be called science and what cannot be legitimately called science. This is so because US law says that only science may be taught in public school classes. Thus, said controversy raises the issue whether, on the one hand, creationistic ideas, or at least some of them, or at least in some form, may be legitimately called science, and, on the other hand, whether evolution itself may be legitimately called science. For deciding what may legitimately be called science, both sides of the discussion, and even courts in their decisions, have frequently invoked Popper's criterion of falsifiability, and claimed that it presents the distinctive feature of legitimate science.

In this context, passages written by Popper are frequently quoted in which he speaks about such issues himself. For example, he famously stated "Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program." He continued: He also noted that theism presented as explaining adaptation "was worse than an open admission of failure, for it created the impression that an ultimate explanation had been reached." He later said

He explained that the difficulty of testing had led some people to describe natural selection as a tautology, and that he too had in the past described the theory as 'almost tautological', and had tried to explain how the theory could be untestable (as is a tautology) and yet of great scientific interest. Popper summarized his new view as follows:

These frequently quoted passages are only a very small part of what Popper wrote on the issue of evolution, however, and give the wrong impression that he mainly discussed questions of its falsifiability. Popper never invented this criterion to give justifiable use of words like science. This would be a kind of justificationism, a view harshly rejected by Popper. In fact, Popper says at the very beginning of his ''Logic of Scientific Discovery'' that it is not his plan to define science, and that science can, in fact, be defined quite arbitrarily.

Popper had his very own sophisticated views on evolution that go much beyond what the frequently quoted passages say. In effect, Popper agreed with some of the points of both creationists and naturalists, but, on the other hand, also disagreed with both views on crucial aspects. Popper understood the universe as a creative entity that invents new things, including life, but without the necessity of something like a god, especially not one who is pulling strings from behind the curtain. Still, he accepted the creationistic criticism that an explanation is needed for all the purpose in the world, and that this can hardly be explained by purely naturalistic evolution. He said that evolution must be, as the creationists say, work in a goal-directed way, but he disagreed with their view that it must necessarily be the hand of god that imposes these goals onto the stage of live. Instead, he invented the such-called spearhead theory of evolution, a version of genetic pluralism. This theory says that the living organisms themselves have goals, and act according to these goals, each guided by a central control (in its most sophisticated form, this is the brain of humans, but controls also exist in much less sophisticated ways for species of lower complexity, such as the amoeba). These goals bring the purpose into the world. Mutations in the genes that determine the structure of the control may then cause drastic changes in behaviour, preferences and goals, without having an impact on the organism's phenotype. Popper postulates that such purely behavioral changes are less likely to be lethal for the organism compared to drastic changes of the phenotype. Popper contrasts his views with the notion of the "hopeful monster" that has large phenotype mutations and calls it the "hopeful behavioral monster". After behavior has changed radically, small but quick changes of the phenotype follow to make the organism fitter to its changed goals. This way it looks ''as if'' the phenotype were changing guided by some invisible hand, while it is merely natural selection working in combination with the new behaviour. For example, according to this hypothesis, the eating habits of the giraffe must have changed before its elongated neck evolved. Popper contrasted this view as evolution from within (the organism actively trying to discover new ways of life and being on a quest for conquering new ecological niches), with the naturalistic evolution from without (which has the picture of a hostile environment only trying to kill the mostly passive organism, or perhaps segregate some of its groups).

Influence

Popper played a vital role in establishing the philosophy of science as a vigorous, autonomous discipline within analytic philosophy, through his own prolific and influential works, and also through his influence on his own contemporaries and students. Popper founded in 1946 the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics and there lectured and influenced both Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, two of the foremost philosophers of science in the next generation of philosophy of science. (Lakatos significantly modified Popper's position, and Feyerabend repudiated it entirely, but the work of both is deeply influenced by Popper and engaged with many of the problems that Popper set.)

While there is some dispute as to the matter of influence, Popper had a long-standing and close friendship with economist Friedrich Hayek, who was also brought to the London School of Economics from Vienna. Each found support and similarities in each other's work, citing each other often, though not without qualification. In a letter to Hayek in 1944, Popper stated, "I think I have learnt more from you than from any other living thinker, except perhaps Alfred Tarski." Popper dedicated his ''Conjectures and Refutations'' to Hayek. For his part, Hayek dedicated a collection of papers, ''Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics'', to Popper, and in 1982 said, "...ever since his ''Logik der Forschung'' first came out in 1934, I have been a complete adherent to his general theory of methodology."

Popper also had long and mutually influential friendships with art historian Ernst Gombrich, biologist Peter Medawar, and neuro-scientist John Carew Eccles.

Popper's influence, both through his work in philosophy of science and through his political philosophy, has also extended beyond the academy. Among Popper's students and advocates at the London School of Economics is the billionaire investor George Soros, who says his investment strategies are modelled on Popper's understanding of the advancement of knowledge through the distinctly Hegelian idea of falsification. Among Soros's philanthropic foundations is the Open Society Institute, a think-tank named in honour of Popper's ''The Open Society and Its Enemies'', which Soros founded to advance the Popperian defense of the open society against authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

Popperian philosophy also inspired the creation of Taking Children Seriously, a libertarian movement which noticed that Popper's general theory of knowledge creation does not differentiate between adults and children.

Criticism

Criticism of his philosophy of science

Most criticisms of Popper's philosophy are of the falsification, or error elimination, element in his account of problem solving. In interpreting these, it is important to bear in mind the aims of his idea. It is intended as an ideal, practical method of effective human problem solving; as such, the current conclusions of science are stronger than pseudo-sciences or non-sciences, insofar as they have survived this particularly vigorous selection method. He does not argue that any such conclusions are therefore true, or that this describes the actual methods of any particular scientist.

Rather, it is a recommended ideal method that, if enacted by a system or community, will over time lead to slow but steady progress of a sort (relative to how well the system or community enacts the method). It has been suggested that Popper's ideas are often mistaken for a hard logical account of truth because of the historical co-incidence of their appearing at the same time as logical positivism, the followers of which mistook his aims for their own.

The Quine-Duhem thesis argues that it's impossible to test a single hypothesis on its own, since each one comes as part of an environment of theories. Thus we can only say that the whole package of relevant theories has been collectively falsified, but cannot conclusively say which element of the package must be replaced. An example of this is given by the discovery of the planet Neptune: when the motion of Uranus was found not to match the predictions of Newton's laws, the theory "There are seven planets in the solar system" was rejected, and not Newton's laws themselves. Popper discussed this critique of naïve falsificationism in Chapters 3 & 4 of ''The Logic of Scientific Discovery''. For Popper, theories are accepted or rejected via a sort of selection process. Theories that say more about the way things appear are to be preferred over those that do not; the more generally applicable a theory is, the greater its value. Thus Newton’s laws, with their wide general application, are to be preferred over the much more specific “the solar system has seven planets”.

Thomas Kuhn’s influential book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' argued that scientists work in a series of paradigms, and that falsificationist methodologies would make science impossible. |}} Popper's student Imre Lakatos attempted to reconcile Kuhn’s work with falsificationism by arguing that science progresses by the falsification of ''research programs'' rather than the more specific universal statements of naïve falsificationism. Another of Popper’s students Paul Feyerabend ultimately rejected any prescriptive methodology, and argued that the only universal method characterizing scientific progress was ''anything goes''.

Popper claimed to have recognized already in the 1934 version of his ''Logic of Discovery'' a fact later stressed by Kuhn, "that scientists necessarily develop their ideas within a definite theoretical framework", and to that extent to have anticipated Kuhn's central point about 'normal science'. (But Popper criticised what he saw as Kuhn's relativism.) Also, in his collection ''Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge'' (Harper & Row, 1963), Popper writes, "Science must begin with myths, and with the criticism of myths; neither with the collection of observations, nor with the invention of experiments, but with the critical discussion of myths, and of magical techniques and practices. The scientific tradition is distinguished from the pre-scientific tradition in having two layers. Like the latter, it passes on its theories; but it also passes on a critical attitude towards them. The theories are passed on, not as dogmas, but rather with the challenge to discuss them and improve upon them."

Another objection is that it is not always possible to demonstrate falsehood definitively, especially if one is using statistical criteria to evaluate a null hypothesis. More generally it is not always clear, if evidence contradicts a hypothesis, that this is a sign of flaws in the hypothesis rather than of flaws in the evidence. However, this is a misunderstanding of what Popper's philosophy of science sets out to do. Rather than offering a set of instructions that merely need to be followed diligently to achieve science, Popper makes it clear in ''The Logic of Scientific Discovery'' that his belief is that the resolution of conflicts between hypotheses and observations can only be a matter of the collective judgment of scientists, in each individual case.

Popper's falsificationism can be questioned logically: it is not clear how Popper would deal with a statement like "for every metal, there is a temperature at which it will melt." The hypothesis cannot be falsified by any possible observation, for there will always be a higher temperature than tested at which the metal may in fact melt, yet it seems to be a valid scientific hypothesis. These examples were pointed out by Carl Gustav Hempel. Hempel came to acknowledge that Logical Positivism's verificationism was untenable, but argued that falsificationism was equally untenable on logical grounds alone. The simplest response to this is that, because Popper describes how theories attain, maintain and lose scientific status, individual consequences of currently accepted scientific theories are scientific in the sense of being part of tentative scientific knowledge, and both of Hempel's examples fall under this category. For instance, atomic theory implies that all metals melt at some temperature.

An early adversary of so-called critical rationalism, Karl-Otto Apel attempted a comprehensive refutation of Popper's philosophy. In ''Transformation der Philosophie'' (1973), Apel charged Popper with being guilty of, amongst other things, a pragmatic contradiction.

Other criticism

It has been argued that Popper's student Imre Lakatos transformed Popper's philosophy using historicism and updated Hegelian historiographic ideas.

Ludwig Wittgenstein was accused of brandishing a poker at Popper during a meeting of the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club, when they argued about whether issues in philosophy were real or just linguistic puzzles. Wittgenstein's friends say he was merely handling a poker, but Popper used the situation to make a joke at Wittgenstein's expense.

Charles Taylor accuses Popper of exploiting his worldwide fame as an epistemologist to diminish the importance of philosophers of the 20th century continental tradition. According to Taylor, Popper's criticisms are completely baseless, but they are received with an attention and respect that Popper's "intrinsic worth hardly merits". William W. Bartley defended Popper against such allegations: "Sir Karl Popper is not really a participant in the contemporary professional philosophical dialogue; quite the contrary, he has ruined that dialogue. If he is on the right track, then the majority of professional philosophers the world over has wasted or is wasting their intellectual careers. The gulf between Popper's way of doing philosophy and that of the bulk of professional philosophers is as great as that between astronomy and astrology."

In 2004, philosopher and psychologist Michel ter Hark (Groningen, The Netherlands) published a book, called ''Popper, Otto Selz and the rise of evolutionary epistemology'', ISBN 0-521-83074-5, in which he claimed that Popper took some of his ideas from his tutor, the German psychologist Otto Selz. Selz himself never published his ideas, partly because of the rise of Nazism which forced him to quit his work in 1933, and the prohibition of referring to Selz' work. Popper, the historian of ideas and his scholarship, is criticized in some academic quarters, for his rejection of Plato, Hegel and Marx.

According to Karl Popper, a theory is scientific only in so far as it is falsifiable, and should be given up as soon as it is falsified. By applying Popper's account of scientific method, John N. Gray's ''Straw Dogs'' states that this would have killed the theories of Darwin and Einstein at birth. When they were first advanced, each of them was at odds with some available evidence; only later did evidence become available that gave them crucial support.

See also

Calculus of predispositions

Contributions to liberal theory

Evolutionary epistemology

Liberalism

Liberalism in Austria

Popper's experiment (quantum mechanics)

Popperian cosmology

Predispositioning Theory

References

Bibliography

''The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge'', 1930–33 (as a typescript circulating as ''Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie''; as a German book 1979, as English translation 2008), ISBN 0-415-39431-7

''The Logic of Scientific Discovery'', 1934 (as ''Logik der Forschung'', English translation 1959), ISBN 0-415-27844-9

''The Poverty of Historicism'', 1936 (private reading at a meeting in Brussels, 1944/45 as a series of journal articles in ''Econometrica'', 1957 a book), ISBN 0-415-06569-0

''The Open Society and Its Enemies'', 1945 Vol 1 ISBN 0-415-29063-5, Vol 2 ISBN 0-415-29063-5

''Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics'', 1956/57 (as privately circulated galley proofs; published as a book 1982), ISBN 0-415-09112-8

''The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism'', 1956/57 (as privately circulated galley proofs; published as a book 1982), ISBN 0-415-07865-2

''Realism and the Aim of Science'', 1956/57 (as privately circulated galley proofs; published as a book 1983), ISBN 0-09-151450-9

''Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge'', 1963, ISBN 0-415-04318-2

''Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach'', 1972, Rev. ed., 1979, ISBN 0-19-875024-2

''Unended Quest; An Intellectual Autobiography'', 1976, ISBN 0-415-28590-9

''The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism'' (with Sir John C. Eccles), 1977, ISBN 0-415-05898-8

''In Search of a Better World'', 1984, ISBN 0-415-13548-6

''Die Zukunft ist offen'' (''The Future is Open'') (with Konrad Lorenz), 1985 (in German), ISBN 3-492-00640-X

''A World of Propensities'', 1990, ISBN 1-85506-000-0

''The Lesson of this Century'', (Interviewer: Giancarlo Bosetti, English translation: Patrick Camiller), 1992, ISBN 0-415-12958-3

''All life is Problem Solving'', 1994, ISBN 0-415-24992-9

''The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality'', (Edited by Mark Amadeus Notturno) 1994, ISBN 0-415-13555-9

''Knowledge and the Mind-Body Problem: In Defence of Interaction'', (Edited by Mark Amadeus Notturno) 1994 ISBN 0-415-11504-3

''The World of Parmenides'', Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment, 1998, (Edited by Arne F. Petersen with the assistance of Jørgen Mejer), ISBN 0-415-17301-9

''After The Open Society'', 2008. (Edited by Jeremy Shearmur and Piers Norris Turner, this volume contains a large number of Popper's previously unpublished or uncollected writings on political and social themes.) ISBN 978-0-415-30908-0

''Frühe Schriften'', 2006 (Edited by Troels Eggers Hansen, includes Popper's writings and publications from before the ''Logic'', including his previously unpublished thesis, dissertation and journal articles published that relate to the Wiener Schulreform) ISBN 978-3-16-147632-7

Further reading

[Comprehensive bibliography:] Lube, Manfred: Karl R. Popper. Bibliographie 1925–2004. Wissenschaftstheorie, Sozialphilosophie, Logik, Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, Naturwissenschaften. Frankfurt/Main etc.: Peter Lang, 2005. 576 pp. (Schriftenreihe der Karl Popper Foundation Klagenfurt.3.)- Current edition

Stefano Gattei. ''Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science''. 2009.

David Miller. ''Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence''. 1994.

David Miller (Ed.). ''Popper Selections''.

John W. N. Watkins. ''Science and Skepticism''. 1984.

Bailey, Richard, ''Education in the Open Society: Karl Popper and Schooling''. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate 2000. The only book-length examination of Popper's relevance to education.

Bartley, William Warren III. ''Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth''. La Salle, IL: Open Court Press 1990. A look at Popper and his influence by one of his students.

Berkson, William K., and Wettersten, John. ''Learning from Error: Karl Popper's Psychology of Learning''. La Salle, IL: Open Court 1984

Edmonds, D., Eidinow, J. ''Wittgenstein's Poker''. New York: Ecco 2001. A review of the origin of the conflict between Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein, focused on events leading up to their volatile first encounter at 1946 Cambridge meeting.

Feyerabend, Paul ''Against Method''. London: New Left Books, 1975. A polemical, iconoclastic book by a former colleague of Popper's. Vigorously critical of Popper's rationalist view of science.

Hacohen, M. ''Karl Popper: The Formative Years, 1902–1945''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Hickey, J. Thomas. ''History of the Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science'' Book V, Karl Popper And Falsificationist Criticism. www.philsci.com . 1995* Kadvany, John ''Imre Lakatos and the Guises of Reason''. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8223-2659-0. Explains how Imre Lakatos developed Popper's philosophy into a historicist and critical theory of scientific method.

Keuth, Herbert. ''The Philosophy of Karl Popper''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. An accurate scholarly overview of Popper's philosophy, ideal for students.

Kuhn, Thomas S. ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions''. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Central to contemporary philosophy of science is the debate between the followers of Kuhn and Popper on the nature of scientific enquiry. This is the book in which Kuhn's views received their classical statement.

Lakatos, I & Musgrave, A (eds.) (1970), ''Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge'', Cambridge (Cambridge University Press). ISBN 0-521-07826-1

Levinson, Paul, ed. ''In Pursuit of Truth: Essays on the Philosophy of Karl Popper on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday.'' Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982. A collection of essays on Popper's thought and legacy by a wide range of his followers. Includes an interview with Sir Ernst Gombrich.

Magee, Bryan. ''Popper''. London: Fontana, 1977. An elegant introductory text. Very readable, albeit rather uncritical of its subject, by a former Member of Parliament.

Magee, Bryan. ''Confessions of a Philosopher'', Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997. Magee's philosophical autobiography, with a chapter on his relations with Popper. More critical of Popper than in the previous reference.

Munz, Peter. ''Beyond Wittgenstein's Poker: New Light on Popper and Wittgenstein'' Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2004. ISBN 0-7546-4016-7. Written by the only living student of both Wittgenstein and Popper, an eyewitness to the famous "poker" incident described above (Edmunds & Eidinow). Attempts to synthesize and reconcile the differences between these two philosophers.

Niemann, Hans-Joachim. ''Lexikon des Kritischen Rationalismus'', (Encyclopaedia of Critical Raionalism), Tübingen (Mohr Siebeck) 2004, ISBN 3-16-148395-2. More than a thousand headwords about critical rationalism, the most important arguments of K.R. Popper and H. Albert, quotations of the original wording. Edition for students in 2006, ISBN 3-16-149158-0.

Notturno, Mark Amadeus. "Objectivity, Rationality, and the Third Realm: Justification and the Grounds of Psychologism". Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.

Notturno, Mark Amadeus. ''On Popper''. Wadsworth Philosophers Series. 2003. A very comprehensive book on Popper’s philosophy by an accomplished Popperian.

Notturno, Mark Amadeus. "Science and the Open Society". New York: CEU Press, 2000.

O'Hear, Anthony. ''Karl Popper''. London: Routledge, 1980. A critical account of Popper's thought, viewed from the perspective of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Radnitzky, Gerard, Bartley, W. W., III eds. ''Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge''. La Salle, IL: Open Court Press 1987. ISBN 0-8126-9039-7. A strong collection of essays by Popper, Campbell, Munz, Flew, et al., on Popper's epistemology and critical rationalism. Includes a particularly vigorous answer to Rorty's criticisms.

Richmond, Sheldon. ''Aesthetic Criteria: Gombrich and the Philosophies of Science of Popper and Polanyi''. Rodopi, Amsterdam/Atlanta, 1994, 152 pp. ISBN 90-5183-618-X.

Rowbottom, Darrell P. ''Popper's Critical Rationalism: A Philosophical Investigation''. London: Routledge, 2010. A research monograph on Popper's philosophy of science and epistemology. It critiques and develops critical rationalism in light of more recent advances in mainstream philosophy.

Schilpp, Paul A., ed. ''The Philosophy of Karl Popper'', 2 vols. La Salle, IL: Open Court Press, 1974. One of the better contributions to the Library of Living Philosophers series. Contains Popper's intellectual autobiography, a comprehensive range of critical essays, and Popper's responses to them. ISBN 0-87548-141-8 (vol.I). ISBN 0-87548-142-6 (Vol II)

Schroeder-Heister, P. "Popper, Karl Raimund (1902–94)," ''International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences'', 2001, pp. 11727–11733.Abstract.

Shearmur, Jeremy. ''The Political Thought of Karl Popper''. London and New York: Routledge, 1996. Study of Popper's political thought by a former assistant of Popper's. Makes use of archive sources and studies the development of Popper's political thought and its inter-connections with his epistemology.

Stokes, G. ''Popper: Philosophy, Politics and Scientific Method''. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998. A very comprehensive, balanced study, which focuses largely on the social and political side of Popper's thought.

Stove, D.C., ''Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists''. Oxford: Pergamon. 1982. A vigorous attack, especially on Popper's restricting himself to deductive logic.

Thornton, Stephen. "Karl Popper," ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,'' 2006.

Weimer, W., Palermo, D., eds. ''Cognition and the Symbolic Processes''. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1982. See Hayek's essay, "''The Sensory Order'' after 25 Years", and "Discussion".

External links

Discussion of Popper's Life and Work from Philosophy Talk Radio Program

Stephen Thornton, "Karl Popper", in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

Karl Popper from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Popper, K. R. ‘‘“Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind”’’, 1977.

The Karl Popper Web

Sir Karl Popper Society International Association for the Promotion of Science and Research, in German

University of Canterbury (NZ) brief biography of Popper

Audio recordings of Karl Popper speaking

Influence on Friesian Philosophy

Open Society Institute George Soros foundations network

Sir Karl R. Popper in Prague, May 1994

Synopsis and background of ''The poverty of historicism''

"A Skeptical Look at Karl Popper" by Martin Gardner

"A Sceptical Look at 'A Skeptical Look at Karl Popper'" by J C Lester.

Sir Karl Popper: Science: Conjectures and Refutations

Information on Lakatos/Popper Site maintained by John Kadvany, PhD.

''Discovering Karl Popper'' by Peter Singer The New York Review of Books, vol. 21, no. 7 (2 May 1974)

An interview with Karl Popper. Persian translation by Khosro Naghed

Karl Popper on Information Philosopher

Karl Popper (Il Diogene) (it)

, 8 February 2007. Discussion with John Worrall, Professor of Philosophy of Science at the London School of Economics, Anthony O'Hear, Weston Professor of Philosophy at Buckingham University, Nancy Cartwright, Professor of Philosophy at the LSE and the University of California, hosted by Melvyn Bragg.

''History of Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science'', BOOK V: Karl Popper Site offers free downloads by chapter available for public use.

Karl Popper Archive at LSE British Library This is a microfilm copy of the Stanford University Popper Archive of Popper's papers to whose catalogue a weblink is provided.

Karl Popper Archive at University Library Klagenfurt, consists of Popper's Library and paper copies of the Popper Papers at The Hoover Institution Archive at Stanford, California

Austrian Karl R. Popper Research Association, University of Graz, Austria

Sound recordings from the Sir Karl R. Popper papers at the Hoover Institution Archives.

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Coordinates	9°1′48″N38°44′24″N
Era	18th century19th century
Color	#B0C4eE
Name	Jeremy Bentham
Birth date	February 15, 1748
Birth place	London, England
Death date	June 06, 1832
Death place	London, England
School tradition	Utilitarianism, legal positivism, liberalism
Main interests	Political philosophy, philosophy of law, ethics, economics
Influences	Protagoras Epicurus John Locke David Hume Montesquieu Helvétius Hobbes
Influenced	John Stuart Mill Henry Sidgwick Michel Foucault Peter Singer John Austin Robert Owen David Pearce
Notable ideas	Greatest happiness principle
Signature	Jeremy Bentham signature.jpg }}

Jeremy Bentham ( or ; 15 February 1748 – 6 June 1832) was an English jurist, philosopher, and legal and social reformer. He became a leading theorist in Anglo-American philosophy of law, and a political radical whose ideas influenced the development of welfarism. He is best known for his advocacy of utilitarianism and animal rights, and the idea of the panopticon.

His position included arguments in favour of individual and economic freedom, usury, the separation of church and state, freedom of expression, equal rights for women, the right to divorce, and the decriminalising of homosexual acts. He argued for the abolition of slavery and the death penalty and for the abolition of physical punishment, including that of children. Although strongly in favour of the extension of individual legal rights, he opposed the idea of natural law and natural rights, calling them "nonsense upon stilts."

He became the most influential of the utilitarians, through his own work and that of his students. These included his secretary and collaborator on the utilitarian school of philosophy, James Mill; James Mill's son John Stuart Mill; John Austin, legal philosopher; and several political leaders, including Robert Owen, a founder of modern socialism. He has been described as the "spiritual founder" of University College London (UCL), where he is still greatly revered.

Life

Bentham was born in Houndsditch, London, into a wealthy family that supported the Tories. He was reportedly a child prodigy: he was found as a toddler sitting at his father's desk reading a multi-volume history of England, and he began to study Latin at the age of three. He had one surviving sibling, Samuel Bentham, with whom he shared a close bond.

He attended Westminster School and, in 1760, at age 12, was sent by his father to The Queen's College, Oxford, where he completed his Bachelor's degree in 1763 and his Master's degree in 1766. He trained as a lawyer and, though he never practised, was called to the bar in 1769. He became deeply frustrated with the complexity of the English legal code, which he termed the "Demon of Chicane".

When the American colonies published their Declaration of Independence in July 1776, the British government did not issue any official response but instead secretly commissioned London lawyer and pamphleteer John Lind to publish a rebuttal. His 130-page tract was distributed in the colonies and contained an essay titled "Short Review of the Declaration" authored by Bentham, a friend of Lind's, which attacked and mocked the Americans' political philosophy.

Among his many proposals for legal and social reform was a design for a prison building he called the Panopticon. He spent some sixteen years of his life developing and refining his ideas for the building, and hoped that the government would adopt the plan for a National Penitentiary, and appoint him as contractor-governor. Although the prison was never built, the concept had an important influence on later generations of thinkers. Twentieth-century French philosopher Michel Foucault argued that the Panopticon was paradigmatic of several 19th-century 'disciplinary' institutions.

Bentham became convinced that his plans for the Panopticon had been thwarted by the King and an aristocratic elite acting in their own interests. It was largely because of his brooding sense of injustice that he developed his ideas of 'sinister interest' – that is, of the vested interests of the powerful conspiring against a wider public interest – which underpinned many of his broader arguments for reform.

More successful was his cooperation with Patrick Colquhoun in tackling the corruption in the pool of London which led to the Thames Police Bill of 1798 which was eventually passed in 1800, leading to the formation of the Thames River Police, which was the first preventive police force in the country and was a precedent for Peel's reforms 30 years later.

Bentham was in correspondence with many influential people. Adam Smith, for example, opposed free interest rates before he was made aware of Bentham's arguments on the subject. As a result of his correspondence with Mirabeau and other leaders of the French Revolution, he was declared an honorary citizen of France. Bentham was an outspoken critic of the revolutionary discourse of natural rights and of the violence that arose after the Jacobins took power (1792). Between 1808 and 1810, he held a personal friendship with Latin American Independence Precursor Francisco de Miranda and paid visits to Miranda's Grafton Way house in London.

In 1823, he co-founded the ''Westminster Review'' with James Mill as a journal for the "Philosophical Radicals"–a group of younger disciples through whom Bentham exerted considerable influence in British public life. One such young writer was Edwin Chadwick, who wrote on hygiene, sanitation and policing and was a major contributor to the Poor Law Amendment Act. Bentham employed him as a secretary and bequeathed him a large legacy.

Bentham is frequently associated with the foundation of the University of London, specifically University College London (UCL), though he was 78 years old when UCL opened in 1826 and played no active part in its establishment. It is likely that without his inspiration, UCL would not have been created when it was. Bentham strongly believed that education should be more widely available, particularly to those who were not wealthy or who did not belong to the established church, both of which were required of students by Oxford and Cambridge. As UCL was the first English university to admit all, regardless of race, creed or political belief, it was largely consistent with Bentham's vision. He oversaw the appointment of one of his pupils, John Austin, as the first professor of Jurisprudence in 1829.

An insight into his character is given in Michael St. John Packe's ''The Life of John Stuart Mill'': do not let me go back to the past."}}

Work

Utilitarianism

Bentham's ambition in life was to create a "Pannomion", a complete utilitarian code of law. Bentham not only proposed many legal and social reforms, but also expounded an underlying moral principle on which they should be based. This utilitarianism philosophy argued that the right act or policy was that which would cause "the greatest good for the greatest number of people", also known as "the greatest happiness principle", or the principle of utility. He wrote in ''The Principles of Morals and Legislation'':

He also suggested a procedure for estimating the moral status of any action, which he called the Hedonistic or felicific calculus. Utilitarianism was revised and expanded by Bentham's student John Stuart Mill. In Mill's hands, "Benthamism" became a major element in the liberal conception of state policy objectives.

Bentham proposed a classification of 12 pains and 14 pleasures and 'felicific calculus' by which we might test the 'happiness factor' of any action. Nonetheless, it should not be overlooked that Bentham's 'hedonistic' theory (a term from J.J.C. Smart), unlike Mill's, is often said to lack a principle of fairness embodied in a conception of justice. In "Bentham and the Common Law Tradition", Gerald J. Postema states, "No moral concept suffers more at Bentham's hand than the concept of justice. There is no sustained, mature analysis of the notion ..." Thus, some critics object, it would be acceptable to torture one person if this would produce an amount of happiness in other people outweighing the unhappiness of the tortured individual. However, as P. J. Kelly argued in his book, ''Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice: Jeremy Bentham and the Civil Law'', Bentham had a theory of justice that prevented such consequences. According to Kelly, for Bentham the law "provides the basic framework of social interaction by delimiting spheres of personal inviolability within which individuals can form and pursue their own conceptions of well-being." It provides security, a precondition for the formation of expectations. As the hedonic calculus shows "expectation utilities" to be much higher than natural ones, it follows that Bentham does not favour the sacrifice of a few to the benefit of the many.

Bentham's ''Principles of Legislation'' focuses on the principle of utility and how this view of morality ties into legislative practices. His principle of utility regards "good" as that which produces the greatest amount of pleasure and the minimum amount of pain and "evil" as that which produces the most pain without the pleasure. This concept of pleasure and pain is defined by Bentham as physical as well as spiritual. Bentham writes about this principle as it manifests itself within the legislation of a society. He lays down a set of criteria for measuring the extent of pain or pleasure that a certain decision will create.

The criteria are divided into the categories of intensity, duration, certainty, proximity, productiveness, purity, and extent. Using these measurements, he reviews the concept of punishment and when it should be used as far as whether a punishment will create more pleasure or more pain for a society. He calls for legislators to determine whether punishment creates an even more evil offence. Instead of suppressing the evil acts, Bentham is arguing that certain unnecessary laws and punishments could ultimately lead to new and more dangerous vices than those being punished to begin with. Bentham follows these statements with explanations on how antiquity, religion, reproach of innovation, metaphor, fiction, fancy, antipathy and sympathy, begging the question and imaginary law are not justification for the creation of legislature. Instead, Bentham is calling upon legislators to measure the pleasures and pains associated with any legislation and to form laws in order to create the greatest good for the greatest number. He argues that the concept of the individual pursuing his or her own happiness cannot be necessarily declared "right", because often these individual pursuits can lead to greater pain and less pleasure for the society as a whole. Therefore, the legislation of a society is vital to maintaining a society with optimum pleasure and the minimum degree of pain for the greatest amount of people.

Economics

Bentham's opinions about monetary economics were completely different from those of David Ricardo; however, they had some similarities to those of Thornton. He focused on monetary expansion as a means of helping to create full employment. He was also aware of the relevance of forced saving, propensity to consume, the saving-investment relationship, and other matters that form the content of modern income and employment analysis. His monetary view was close to the fundamental concepts employed in his model of utilitarian decision making. His work is widely regarded to be at the forefront of modern welfare economics.

Bentham stated that pleasures and pains can be ranked according to their value or "dimension" such as intensity, duration, certainty of a pleasure or a pain. He was concerned with maxima and minima of pleasures and pains; and they set a precedent for the future employment of the maximisation principle in the economics of the consumer, the firm and the search for an optimum in welfare economics.

Animal rights

Bentham is widely recognised as one of the earliest proponents of animal rights. He argued that the ability to suffer, not the ability to reason, should be the benchmark, or what he called the "insuperable line." If reason alone were the criterion by which we judge who ought to have rights, human infants and adults with certain forms of disability might fall short, too. In 1789, alluding to the limited degree of legal protection afforded to slaves in the French West Indies by the Code Noir, he wrote:

Gender and sexuality

Bentham said that it was the placing of women in a legally inferior position that made him choose, at the age of eleven, the career of a reformist. Bentham spoke for a complete equality between sexes.

The essay Against One's Self,'' argued for the liberalisation of laws prohibiting homosexuality. The essay remained unpublished during his lifetime for fear of offending public morality. It was published for the first time in 1931. While Bentham clearly disapproves of homosexuality as "irregularities of the venereal appetite," the essay chastises the society of the time for making a disproportionate response to what Bentham appears to consider a largely private offence–public displays or forced acts being dealt with rightly by other laws.

Auto-icon

As requested in his will, Bentham's body was dissected as part of a public anatomy lecture. Afterward, the skeleton and head were preserved and stored in a wooden cabinet called the "Auto-icon", with the skeleton stuffed out with hay and dressed in Bentham's clothes. Originally kept by his disciple Thomas Southwood Smith, it was acquired by University College London in 1850. It is normally kept on public display at the end of the South Cloisters in the main building of the college, but for the 100th and 150th anniversaries of the college, it was brought to the meeting of the College Council, where it was listed as "present but not voting".

The Auto-icon has a wax head, as Bentham's head was badly damaged in the preservation process. The real head was displayed in the same case for many years but became the target of repeated student pranks. It is now locked away securely.

Publications

Bentham was an obsessive writer and reviser, but was constitutionally incapable, except on rare occasions, of bringing his work to completion and publication. Most of what appeared in print in his lifetime (see this list of published works) was prepared for publication by others. Several of his works first appeared in French translation, prepared for the press by Étienne Dumont. Some made their first appearance in English in the 1820s as a result of back-translation from Dumont's 1802 collection (and redaction) of Bentham's writing on civil and penal legislation. On his death, Bentham left manuscripts amounting to some 5,000,000 words. Since 1968, the Bentham Project at University College London has been working on an edition of his collected works. So far, 25 volumes have appeared; there are likely to be at least as many again before the edition is completed. The Project is currently attempting to digitise the Bentham papers and crowdsource their transcription: see Transcribe Bentham below.

Works published in Bentham's lifetime include:

"Short Review of the Declaration" (1776). An attack on America's Declaration of Independence.

''Fragment on Government'' (1776). This was an unsparing criticism of some introductory passages relating to political theory in William Blackstone's ''Commentaries on the Laws of England''. The book, published anonymously, was well-received and credited to some of the greatest minds of the time. Bentham disagreed with Blackstone's defence of judge-made law, his defence of legal fictions, his theological formulation of the doctrine of mixed government, his appeal to a social contract and his use of the vocabulary of natural law. Bentham's "Fragment" was only a small part of a "Commentary on the Commentaries", which remained unpublished until the twentieth century.

''Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation'' (printed for publication 1780, published 1789).

''Defence of Usury'' (1787). Jeremy Bentham wrote a series of thirteen “Letters” addressed to Adam Smith, published in 1787 as ''Defence of Usury''. Bentham’s main argument against the restriction is that “projectors” generate positive externalities. G.K. Chesterton identified Bentham's essay on usury as the very beginning of the 'modern world.' Bentham’s arguments were very influential. “Writers of eminence” moved to abolish the restriction, and repeal was achieved in stages and fully achieved in England in 1854. There is little evidence as to Smith’s reaction. He did not revise the offending passages in ''The Wealth of Nations'', but Smith made little or no substantial revisions after the third edition of 1784.

''Panopticon'' (1787, 1791).

''Emancipate your Colonies'' (1793)

''Traité de Législation Civile et Penale'' (1802, edited by Étienne Dumont. 3 vols)

''Punishments and Rewards'' (1811)

''A Table of the Springs of Action'' (1815)

''Parliamentary Reform Catechism'' (1817)

''Church-of-Englandism'' (printed 1817, published 1818)

''Elements of the Art of Packing'' (1821)

''The Influence of Natural Religion upon the Temporal Happiness of Mankind'' (1822, written with George Grote and published under the pseudonym Philip Beauchamp)

''Not Paul But Jesus'' (1823, published under the pseudonym Gamaliel Smith)

''Book of Fallacies'' (1824)

''A Treatise on Judicial Evidence'' (1825)

John Bowring, a British politician who had been Bentham's trusted friend, was appointed his literary executor and charged with the task of preparing a collected edition of his works. This appeared in 11 volumes in 1838–1843: Bowring based his edition on previously published editions (including those of Dumont) rather than Bentham's own manuscripts, and he did not reprint Bentham's works on religion at all. Bowring's work has been criticised, although it includes such interesting writings on international relations as Bentham's A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace written 1786–89, which forms part IV of the Principles of International Law.

In 1952–54, Werner Stark published a three-volume set, ''Jeremy Bentham's Economic Writings'', in which he attempted to bring together all of Bentham's writings on economic matters, including both published and unpublished material. Although a significant achievement, the work is considered by scholars to be flawed in many points of detail, and a new edition of the economic writings is currently being prepared by the Bentham Project.

Transcribe Bentham

The Bentham Project in UCL has launched a digitisation and crowdsourcing initiative whose aim is to engage the public in the online transcription of Bentham's unstudied manuscripts. Manuscripts can be viewed and transcribed by signing-up for an MediaWiki account in Transcription Desk via the Transcribe Bentham website.

See also

List of liberal theorists

Philosophy of happiness

Rule of law

Rule according to higher law

References

Further reading

Lea Campos Boralevi (1980). 'Bentham and the Oppressed'. Walter De Gruyter Inc, 1984 ISBN 3-11-009974-8

John Dinwiddy (1989), ''Bentham'', Oxford University Press. ISBN 0 19 287622 8.

J. A. W. Gunn (1989). 'Jeremy Bentham and the Public Interest'. In J. Lively & A. Reeve (eds.) '''Modern Political Theory from Hobbes to Marx: Key Debates'', London, pp. 199–219

Jonathan Harris (1998),'Bernardino Rivadavia and Benthamite "discipleship"', ''Latin American Research Review'' 33, pp. 129–49

R. Harrison (1983) ''Bentham''. London.

P. J. Kelly (1990). ''Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice: Jeremy Bentham and the Civil Law''. Oxford.

F. Rosen (1983). ''Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democracy: A Study of the "Constitutional Code"''. Oxford.

F. Rosen (1990) 'The Origins of Liberal Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham and Liberty'. In R. Bellamy, ed., ''Victorian Liberalism: Nineteenth-century Political Thought and Practice'', London, pp. 5870

Robinson, Dave & Groves, Judy (2003). ''Introducing Political Philosophy''. Icon Books. ISBN 1-84046-450-X.

External links

Jeremy Bentham, "Critique of the Doctrine of Inalienable, Natural Rights", in '' Anarchical Fallacies'', vol. 2 of Bowring (ed.), ''Works'', 1843.

Jeremy Bentham, "Offences Against One's Self: Paederasty", c. 1785, free audiobook from LibriVox.

The Bentham Project at University College London. Includes a history and a FAQ on the Auto-Icon, and details of Bentham's will.

Transcribe Bentham initiative run by the Bentham Project has its own website with useful links

Bentham Index, a rich bibliographical resource

Jeremy Bentham, categorised links

Jeremy Bentham's Life and Impact

Benthamism – Catholic Encyclopedia article

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an extensive biographical reference of Bentham.

Utilitarianism as Secondary Ethic A concise review of Utilitarianism, its proponents and critics.

"Jeremy Bentham at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe 2007" A play-reading of the life and legacy of Jeremy Bentham.

Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation

Detailed summary of Bentham's Principles of Morals and Legislation

;Works

Online Library of Liberty – Jeremy Bentham, partially including Bowring's (1843) ''The Works of Jeremy Bentham'', and additional titles

Jeremy Bentham. Extensive collection of links to writings by and about Bentham

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