

ATTACHMENT 1

Interview Summaries

(50 Pages)

Interview: Dexter A. Clarke
Time/Date: 1300, October 30, 2002
Location: Executive Aviation, FCM
Present: Kirchgessner, Bramble, Hallaux, Gilbertson, Perhus

During the interview, Mr. Clarke stated the following information:

His DOB was October 12, 1949 and his DOH with Ryan Companies, US, was April 1999. Mr. Clarke is a corporate pilot for this construction and design company and flies a King Air 350.

He indicated that his trip on Friday morning, October 25, 2002, to the Saint Paul Downtown airport (STP) from Duluth, MN (DLH) was uneventful. The flight originated at Flying Cloud (FCM) airport about 0700 and Hibbing, MN (HIB) was the first destination. He had received a full weather briefing before flight. During his descent into Hibbing, he did receive a report of icing from Duluth approach. Because of the icing, he elected to remain high until his final descent from 10,000 down to 5,000 feet. He gave a report to Duluth approach on 127.4 indicating the temperature in descent, icing conditions, and surface temperature after landing. He was approximately 35 miles from HIB at the time he commenced the descent. He characterized the icing as light, with some occasional moderate icing. It did require him to inflate the de-ice boots. The ice came off easily when the de-ice boots were inflated.

There was light snow on the runway surface upon landing. It gave the impression from the approach that it might be slippery, but it was not. He reported that the braking action was good. The time of landing at HIB was 0746 or 0747. A global positioning system (GPS) gives wheels up and wheels down time. He recalled that it was prior to the scheduled arrival 0800.

He picked up two passengers, and was back on board at 0800. They departed runway 13 and proceeded enroute to Duluth at 5,000 feet. HIB to DLH is 42 nautical miles and they received radar vectors to runway nine at DLH. The DLH automatic terminal information service (ATIS) was reporting 300 feet overcast, and a visibility of 1 mile in mist. Both of his approaches were instrument landing system (ILS) approaches. One to Hibbing, runway 31, and the other in Duluth, runway 9.

They arrived in Duluth about 0820. They taxied to North Country Aviation and the copilot assisted in enplaning the passengers. He received his air traffic control (ATC) clearance, and was cleared to taxi to runway nine. His clearance was to Minneapolis via Golf, Gopher Four into St. Paul (STP). Once airborne, they were cleared direct to the Golf intersection, then the Gopher Four arrival to STP. Minneapolis approach cleared them for the ILS to runway 14 into STP. The landing at STP was uneventful. STP weather was as reported as 700 feet overcast with light drizzle. They broke out of the clouds over I-35, went visual, but they were backed up by the ILS. During the approach, the clock said 0859.

They landed on runway 14, taxied to the end and then onto Million Air. They were parked by Alfred at Million Air, next to building. As Mr. Clarke was departing the airplane, the accident pilot approached him, and I knew him because I had seen him before. The accident pilot asked, "How was it up there?" Mr. Clarke was wondering to himself if he meant HIB or just generally up in the sky. Mr. Clarke said that the visibility was at minimums. He also told the accident pilot that there was icing at 5,000 feet with the cloud tops at 10,000. The accident pilot asked if they encountered much icing. Mr. Clarke said, "not much coming into here, but we did in Hibbing." Then the accident pilot proceeded into the office. Mr. Clarke thought it was odd that he was not even off the airplane and the accident pilot was asking me what the weather was like. He also indicated that the accident pilot was soft-spoken and it was only natural that a pilot would ask about the weather.

Mr. Clarke then proceeded into the office and then he had a donut. He was sitting there, talking to Alfred and another line guy. The accident copilot then approached and Mr. Clarke greeted him. Each asked how the other was doing. Mr. Clarke was surprised to see the accident copilot in uniform there at Million Air. The accident copilot had just come into the Minneapolis area three or four years before. Mr. Clarke asked if he was flying a lot. The accident copilot said it was "feast or famine." The accident copilot did not say anything else about the weather. Then the accident copilot asked the line guy to pull the plane outside of the hangar and exited the room. Mr. Clarke asked him if he was married yet and the accident copilot said, "no."

Mr. Clarke then indicated that the accident pilot came into the office at about 0900 and politely asked Mr. Clarke if he would mind having a few words with Senator Wellstone due to the Senator's apprehension about flying in weather that day. Mr. Clarke proceeded to the lobby accompanied by the accident pilot, extended his hand, and introduced himself to Senator Wellstone. Senator Wellstone then introduced him to his wife, and his daughter. As a courtesy, Mr. Clarke congratulated Senator Wellstone and told him that he had just returned from the Duluth and Hibbing area. Mr. Clarke told Senator Wellstone that the weather was at minimums, but indicated that he was sure that the pilots could handle the flight and that there were other options. During this conversation, the accident pilot was standing there with the weather information in his hand and he did not seem at all nervous. The accident pilot seemed like he wanted the Senator to have some reassurance from someone who had just come from that area. It just seemed like a normal departure. Mr. Clarke congratulated him on getting his name in on his third bid for the senate. Senator Wellstone looked at his daughter and they smiled at Mr. Clarke. In response to that, the Senator made some congratulations to Mr. Clarke's efforts. Mr. Clarke's observation of Senator Wellstone was that he was not as visibly nervous as one would think for someone who was so nervous about flying. Senator Wellstone's response to weather information was minor. Mr. Clarke said that he had just come from that area, but that the two pilots could handle the flight, but that there were always other options.

The entire entourage left together. Mr. Clarke then spoke with Trish, the manager of Million Air, in casual conversation. Mr. Clarke's copilot had gotten a courtesy car for them to get something to eat, and he was out warming it up. Mr. Clarke got in the car, and noticed the door closing on the accident airplane. Then he went back into the front office to get his cellular telephone, and then got back in the car. He noticed that the right engine was starting on the accident airplane.

Mr. Clarke said that the conversation with the Senator and his family was shortly after 0900, but not past 0920. He then indicated that the engine was starting probably 5-6 minutes later.

Speaking again about the first conversation with the accident pilot that morning, Mr. Clarke indicated that the accident pilot approached the airplane while Mr. Clarke was getting out of his aircraft. The accident pilot did not even say, "Hello," but just inquired, "How was it up there?" They did not shake hands. The accident pilot just approached the rear exit of Mr. Clarke's King Air 300. Mr. Clarke again indicated that he gave the accident pilot a casual weather assessment.

Mr. Clarke indicated that the accident pilot always looked kind of sullen and "laid back." "He just looked like Rich - kind of sullen - nothing unusual about him," Mr. Clarke indicated. He elaborated that he meant sullen to mean "no emotional excitement" and "no sense of apprehension." He indicated that the accident pilot was not grumpy, apprehensive, or had any sign of worry or discontent. From his observation, the accident pilot did his duties, while the accident copilot performed his duties, going about their individual responsibilities. Mr. Clarke indicated that the accident pilot looked healthy and rested to him. Mr. Clarke said that a person who is overworked or stressed has a tired appearance, with bags under eyes, and would look sleepy. He indicated that the accident pilot did not have that look about him at all. Both pilots looked rested and fit. They were of a normal pilot mindset. The accident pilot was going about his duties just like anybody, doing his preflight, and checking the weather. The accident airplane was in the hangar, and Mr. Clarke did not see him preflight the airplane. He indicated that he might have done it before Mr. Clarke's arrival. Mr. Clarke did hear the accident copilot ask to have the airplane pulled out of the hangar.

Mr. Clarke indicated that the accident pilot was not an overly excited person. He described the accident pilot as kind of a natural - a typical pilot - just doing his job. Mr. Clarke felt that the accident pilot's mood might have been even more serious on that day, considering that he was flying Senator Wellstone. Mr. Clarke said that it was commendable for the accident pilot for inquiring him so that the Senator could have another pilot's opinion. Mr. Clarke believed that the accident pilot inquired him because he knew his background and because they were flying similar equipment and had just arrived in from the Eveleth area.

Mr. Clarke did not hear the accident pilot's opinion about flying the trip, but he did overhear that the accident flight was scheduled for a later departure. He believed that he

heard that from Trish, the manager from Million Air. Mr. Clarke indicated that the accident pilot expressed no concerns about the flight, factors in planning the flight, and asked no other questions of him other than the weather.

Mr. Clarke indicated that he has been in to Eveleth many times. His greatest concern was always the VOR approach's limitations. He has nearly always relied on the GPS and has only done the VOR approach on one occasion. He stated that his concerns about the VOR approach to Eveleth, indicating terrain and sparse population. He also indicated that a pilot had better adhere to the minimums of the approach, again, due to the terrain. He indicated that he has executed approaches to Eveleth many times. He then discussed the transition from the HIB VOR to Eveleth. He believed that during the spring and fall, the visibility can be greatly restricted due to fog and that it's not the kind of approach that he, as a professional pilot, would want to execute twice. He indicated that HIB has an ILS approach and that the terrain was less sparse. He thought that the terrain around Eveleth was more critical, hilly, and there was a mine 10 miles northeast of the airport.

Mr. Clarke saw no conversation between the pilots and the passengers, which, in his opinion, was somewhat unusual. He saw no briefing or interchange going on. He thought that perhaps they had met previously and conducted the briefing. He believed that it was customary to discuss the flight, weather conditions, and intentions as to flight with the passengers.

Mr. Clarke said that he did not know the accident pilot that well. He knew who he was and what company he flew for, but knew nothing about his background. Mr. Clarke indicated that he was surprised when he heard that he had worked for American Airlines, and that he had so little flight time. He was much more familiar with the accident copilot, but never socialized with either of them.

At first, Mr. Clarke was reluctant to say whether he had ever flown with either of the accident pilots. Then he indicated that he had flown with the accident copilot. He indicated that the accident copilot was referred to him for experience and training about four years ago. He believed that the accident copilot's flying skills were adequate, but his understanding of aircraft systems and standard procedures was marginal. He indicated that he spent considerable time discussing regulatory, performance, operational criteria with the accident copilot. They flew together in a Piper Navajo Chieftain, and a Piper PA-23. The accident copilot's level of experience was less than 300 hours. Mr. Clarke believed that the accident copilot's style as a copilot, and his interaction skills were not good. He said that the accident copilot had never flown as a two-person crew. Mr. Clarke worked with the accident copilot diligently for a time, but his other commitments made it difficult to schedule and he was doing it as a courtesy. He believed that they were basic, professional flying skills. In his estimation, they probably trained 20-25 hours of flight time, whereas ground time was an additional 30 hours. The accident copilot rode along on revenue flights with Mr. Clarke, but he was not compensated.

Mr. Clarke indicated that the accident copilot was not an assertive individual. He believed that he was an only son or only child, and was raised by his mother. The accident copilot tended to gravitate toward men with a dominant or strong presence. When asked whether the accident copilot was capable of being assertive, Mr. Clarke indicated that it was not his nature.

Mr. Clarke indicated that the accident copilot lived with his mother, had attended the University of North Dakota (UND), and had a girlfriend that he wanted to marry. Mr. Clarke thought that the accident copilot was “a good kid with a great attitude, but just needed more nurturing.” Mr. Clarke then indicated that it was nearly three years since he had seen the accident copilot before the day of the accident. Mr. Clarke remarked that he was one of the first persons that the accident copilot had gotten involved with when he came back to Minneapolis. Mr. Clarke then remarked that he was one of the last persons that the accident copilot saw before the accident, which made this especially difficult for Mr. Clarke.

Mr. Clarke did not know enough about the accident pilot to characterize his decision making style. Mr. Clarke indicated that he had never talked to any other pilots who had flown Senator Wellstone, nor had he ever heard of any pilots being pressured to fly Senator Wellstone.

Mr. Clarke felt that Aviation Charter was one of the premier flight operations in the Minneapolis area and he has referred many people to them. He welcomed the competition that they provided to the industry. He said that they have an exceptional history and that the owners are honorable people and has enjoyed working with their staff and knowing their pilots. Mr. Clarke indicated that his company has done a great deal of business with Aviation Charter.

Mr. Clarke was wishing that he could have had foresight into this accident and was wondering how he could have prevented it - even by saying something to the accident pilot or by checking the weather information that the accident pilot had.

He also indicated that the Senator did not have a smile on his face that morning, but that his daughter and wife were very upbeat.

Mr. Clarke flew back over to FCM and picked up more passengers. After the news of the accident, Mr. Clarke’s passengers at St. Paul said that they would rather not fly to Hibbing that day. On the next day, Mr. Clarke’s passengers said that they would fly, so he picked them up. He was also supposed to pick up passenger at Grand Rapids, MN, which was down to minimums.

Mr. Clarke was asked again about the icing on the day of the accident. He indicated that there was icing at 5,000 feet going to Duluth and that he had considered it light icing, but it came off easily. Upon leaving Duluth, the icing was light to moderate. Mr. Clarke indicated that he had been flying in Minnesota for 31 years, so he knew ice. He indicated that it is an accepted practice to get out of it if you can.

Mr. Clarke indicated that the accident copilot was a new graduate from UND at the time and that he had recently located to St. Paul. He said that there are not many professional black pilots in the Twin Cities area. Mr. Clarke was known for founding a program to try to get young people off the streets and to get them out of undesirable behavior and into aviation. He had gotten a call from a teacher asking Mr. Clarke to meet with the accident copilot. He spoke of one trip to Ohio in which he took the accident copilot. On the way back, they were over central Illinois near a big thunderstorm. Mr. Clarke indicated that the accident copilot commented that it was “pretty cool” how Mr. Clarke picked his way through the thunderstorms with radar. At that time, Mr. Clarke felt that the accident copilot needed to get back to basic flying skills, so they worked in a Piper Apache. The accident copilot then got a job with Northwest Airlines Training Corporation (NATCO). The teacher that called Mr. Clarke happened to be the accident copilot’s aunt. He indicated that his last flight with the accident copilot was three years ago.

When asked again about the VOR 27 instrument approach to Eveleth, Mr. Clarke indicated that a pilot would really have to maintain his awareness, especially distance from the VOR. It was possible for a pilot to get too close to the VOR, making the approach more difficult. Mr. Clarke concluded that he would rather take the time to go around and do the whole procedure.

Interview: Grace Glander, R.N., Acute Care Charge Nurse, Fresenius Medical Care
Represented by: John Markus, Senior Vice President for Corporate Compliance, Fresenius Medical Care
Time/Date: 1745, November 2, 2002
Location: Telephone
Present: Bramble

During the interview, Ms. Glander stated the following information:

Richard Conry performed work for Fresenius Medical Care on Thursday, October 24, 2002. He came in to the hospital around 1500 and finished around 2100. Glander added an additional hour to his time card after the accident, in consultation with other company employees, as a kindness to Conry's family. For this reason, Conry's time card would show his work period ending that day at 2200. Conry would have finished providing dialysis treatment around 2015, but it typically took 30 to 45 minutes after to clean everything up after a treatment. Conry gave one treatment during his work period that day.

When a person came in for a dialysis treatment, they would sit in a chair and be connected to a blood circulatory system. Conry connected the patient to this system and would then wait for the treatment to end. The treatment lasted about four hours. When the treatment was finished, Conry would disconnect the patient from the machine, and sent them on their way.

Conry worked on per diem, or casual basis. Glander spoke with Conry in the morning on October 24, 2002, and scheduled him to work that afternoon. Glander did not actually see Conry arrive at the hospital. However, she spoke to him again at 1930, while he was working. Conry called Glander to tell her he could not work the next day because he had been assigned a flight. Glander asked if he needed her to come to the hospital and relieve him from his work. Conry said "no, not to worry about it." Conry seemed his usual self. He sounded alert. He sounded healthy. During their conversations on October 24, 2002, Conry never mentioned anything about his activities before or after he came to work at the hospital.

Conry's routine was to call Glander when he was available to work. He first called Glander on October 24, 2002, around 1000, saying "he had just gotten back from a flight and he was going to go home and sleep but he could help me out after 3 PM. He said, 'Is that alright?'" Glander asked, "Is that enough sleep?" Conry said, "Yeah, I'll sleep and come in at three." Glander told Conry to call her back if he was not able to get enough sleep.

The most recent day before October 24, 2002, that Conry did any work for Fresenius Medical Care was October 16, 2002. The most recent time before that was October 8, 2002. He worked for the company very infrequently.

Glander only knew Conry “casually, not socially.”

Glander could not recall Conry’s date of hire. [Glander subsequently checked Conry’s employment records, and mailed a letter to investigators, stating that Conry’s date of hire with Fresenius Medical was May 26, 1998.]

When asked if anyone else interacted with Conry at the hospital, Glander said that Conry did a lot of neurotrauma. There would have been a lot of other nurses present when he was working. Conry took a portable machine to a dialysis patient. His patient on October 24, 2002 was in the neurotrauma intensive care unit. It would be possible to get a list of nurses on duty at that time, between 1500 and 2015.

Interview: Kris Wiegand, Customer Service, Aviation Charter
Time/Date: 1040, November 3, 2002
Location: Telephone
Present: Bramble

Ms. Wiegand was contacted at her residence by telephone. During the interview, Ms. Wiegand stated the following information.

She worked at the front desk for Aviation Charter's airport office at the Flying Cloud Municipal Airport in Eden Prairie, Minnesota.

She left work on Thursday, October 24 at 1400.

Rachel, another desk clerk, would have notified Richard Conry and Michael Guess on the evening of October 24, 2002 about their trip scheduled to depart the morning of October 25, 2002.

On Friday morning, October 25, 2002, Conry called the office and told Wiegand to let Pamela Nolan (a company scheduler) know they would be delayed in departing St. Paul. Conry said they would be delayed until 11 because of the weather. Conry said he wanted to make sure the company did not book the airplane for another customer. Wiegand could not recall the time of this call.

Conry called back a second time before 1100 to speak with Nolan. Conry said to let Nolan know they were going to go ahead and go.

Conry did not mention any disagreement between the Senator's staff members. Conry sounded fine during both phone calls.

Wiegand guessed Conry's two phone calls were an hour apart.

Wiegand did not know if Conry ever actually spoke with Nolan. Wiegand just transferred his calls. She did not know if Nolan ever picked up.

Wiegand did not know the time of Conry's second call.

Interview: Pamela Nolan, Charter/Sales/Marketing, Aviation Charter
Time/Date: 1100, November 3, 2002
Location: Aviation Charter, Eden Prairie, Minnesota
Present: Bramble

During a second interview conducted by telephone, Ms. Nolan stated the following information:

Conry would have been notified about the flight to Eveleth between 1700 and 1800 on Thursday evening, October 24, 2002. A different copilot had been scheduled for the flight, but he could not be reached. Guess was notified as a replacement on Thursday evening, some time after Conry was notified.

Conry called Nolan at 0840 on October 25th. He said he had done a weather check with the Wellstone campaign people. The campaign staff wanted to depart on the trip as originally scheduled. However, one of the senate offices was telling him something different. Conry "Didn't want to make a decision because whichever one he made would be the wrong one." Conry did not sound too concerned about the situation. He "just did not want to make the wrong decision."

Nolan told Conry he should speak with the chief pilot about the matter. Conry said he had tried to contact the chief pilot, but could not reach him. Nolan next suggested Conry speak with the director of operations. She transferred him to the front desk so someone there could connect him with the director of operations. That was the last time Nolan spoke with Conry. During their conversation Conry said he was in his car, and had almost arrived at the airport. Nolan heard later that Conry arrived at the airport, checked again on the trip condition and talked with the passengers. Then the passengers said, "Yeah, let's go."

Nolan did not know if Conry called Guess Friday morning. Normally, details would be handled at the airport during the hour prior to flight departure time, and Conry would only have spoken to a copilot before that if there was a problem or if he wanted to make him aware of something well in advance of the flight. On this occasion, Nolan assumed Conry would have spoken with Guess because they were going to be flying Senator Wellstone, and Conry would have wanted it to go smoothly. Guess was usually early, so Conry may not have been able to reach him in advance, but Nolan thought Conry probably spoke with Guess that morning.

Senator Wellstone's senate staff member who coordinated his non-campaign trips was Karmi Matsen.

When asked whether possible confusion over the departure time of the trip may have led Conry to feel rushed or behind schedule, Nolan said Conry did not seem overly stressed, just "concerned to do a good job." It seemed as though the Wellstone campaign office was thinking of leaving later than the originally scheduled departure time and the actual departure time had yet to be firmly established. For that reason, Nolan felt Conry would not have been too worried about getting to the airport. She believed he was going to talk to the passengers when he arrived at the airport and see what the final decision was.

Nolan said crews were asked to arrive at the departure airport one hour before takeoff. Conry usually arrived an hour and a half early.

Interview: Rachel Davies, Customer Service, Aviation Charter
Time/Date: 1330, November 3, 2002
Location: Telephone
Present: Bramble

Ms. Davies was contacted at her residence by telephone. During the interview, Ms. Davies stated the following information.

Davies was working the front desk at Aviation Charter's office at Flying Cloud Municipal Airport on the evening of October 24, 2002. She notified Richard Conry and Michael Guess that evening about the flight they were scheduled to make the next morning with Senator Wellstone.

Davies called Conry first at his home number and on his cell phone, leaving messages. Conry called her back between 1930 and 2000. Davies reached Guess on his cell phone between 2100 and 2130. Another copilot had originally been scheduled for the flight, but that copilot was not returning their calls. The president of Aviation Charter said to assign Guess to the flight by 2100 if the first copilot did not call back. Neither Conry nor Guess said what they were doing at the time she called.

During her first conversation with Conry, Davies gave him the flight information, including the number of passengers. Conry thanked her and said he would be at the airport an hour early. He sounded "pretty normal" on the phone. He did not sound fatigued.

After she spoke with Guess, Davies called Conry a second time, and reminded him to call the Senator's representative in the morning before the flight and inform that person of the weather. This second call was placed between 2130 and 2140. Conry said he usually did that anyway, but thanked her for calling.

Davies's conversation with Guess was unremarkable. Guess was grateful to be assigned to the flight. Davies told him the basic information for the flight: the plane they would take, the name of the captain, and the number of passengers. He just said "thank you." When asked if he said anything about the fact that he would be flying with Conry, Davies said that Guess responded, "Oh, okay, cool."

Davies thought Guess and Conry knew each other, but she did not know if they had flown together before.

Between her first and second call to Conry, Pat Johnson, the Senator's campaign scheduler, called and spoke with Davies to ensure that the captain knew about their desire for a weather check in the morning. That prompted Davies to call Conry the second time.

Davies did not know when the trip was first put on the schedule at Aviation Charter. She just received the trip sheet around 1600-1700 on October 24, 2002 and notified the crew.

Interview: Jan Nelson, Fiancée of Michael Guess
Time/Date: 0900, November 4, 2002
Location: Telephone
Present: Bramble, Kirchgessner

During the interview, Ms. Nelson stated the following information.

Guess last flew on Tuesday, October 22, 2002. He was not working a full time job at the time of the accident.

Guess had been laid off from Pan Am International Flight Academy in Minneapolis about a month before the accident. He took a job with FedEx ground after he was laid off. He would call FedEx to work when he wanted extra money, but he hadn't called them for weeks. The last time Guess worked for FedEx was within a couple weeks after his layoff from Pan Am. Nelson had suggested to Guess that he collect unemployment and look for better work.

During the three nights before the accident, Guess slept "probably from 10 til 8 in the morning." The night before the accident, he received a call about 2000, notifying him of the flight on October 25, 2002. He was happy the flight was not scheduled to depart the evening he received the call.

Guess had regular sleep during the three nights before the accident, with no interruptions. Wednesday and Thursday nights were, "Normal, exactly the same." Both nights, the two had dinner, relaxed around the house, and then went to bed early because Nelson had to get up for work in the morning.

Monday night, Guess would have gone to bed at the usual time and gotten up at around 0700 on Tuesday because he had a flight in the morning. Tuesday night would have been "normal" sleep. Nelson added, "When I would get up he would usually just get up and watch the news."

Guess's daytime activities during the 72 hours preceding the accident included: routine activities around the house, running errands, and looking for aviation jobs on the internet. When Nelson would get home from work between 1700 and 1800, Guess would be home, "wondering what's for dinner."

From October 22 to October 24, Nelson worked from about 0800 to 1800. She would run some errands after work, but she knew he was home when she was running errands.

Guess's typical schedule consisted of working occasional flights from Aviation Charter and otherwise "hanging around at home." He would call Aviation Charter and tell them that he was available, hoping to get a flight.

Guess was taking the job search slowly, because he wanted to fly more. He didn't want just any job. He wanted one in the aviation field, and Nelson and Guess's family were supportive of his goals. Guess was doing a lot of investigating with American Eagle and other regional airlines.

He was looking for jobs on the internet. He would frequently forward updated resumes to potential aviation employers.

When asked to clarify the time Guess was notified that he was assigned to the flight on October 25, 2002, Nelson said he was notified between 2000 and 2100. Guess received the notification via his cell phone and he said he wanted to take the trip. He got off the phone and said, "Thank god it wasn't tonight," because he didn't want to go right away. He spoke to his mother on the phone, and she said Guess should get some rest. Then Guess and Nelson went to sleep.

When asked how Guess felt about the trip, Nelson said Guess was very excited and he loved to fly. He knew they would be carrying Senator Wellstone and he said he had to pick up doughnuts in the morning.

When asked who, specifically, notified Guess of the flight, Nelson said she did not know.

The morning of the accident, Guess got up with his alarm between 0630 and 0645 and took a shower. Nelson got up around 0815 and sat with him for a while. Guess told Nelson that Conry had called about 0810 and told him the trip was canceled. Guess was excited because he had a new car in the shop for repairs, and this meant he was going to be able to pick it up. However, Conry called back 20 minutes later and said they were going to depart as scheduled, after all. Guess and Nelson talked for a little while, then Guess left.

When asked if Guess was worried about making it to the airport on time for the flight, Nelson said, "He wasn't worried about getting there on time because it was extended a little bit – they postponed the time a little bit." When asked how long it would take Guess to drive from their residence to the St. Paul downtown airport, Nelson said it would have taken 7 to 10 minutes, at most.

Before he left, Guess called Aviation Charter and asked what plane they would be flying. He also asked if they could fuel the plane and bring it out of the hangar. That was about 10 ten minutes after Conry called.

When asked how Guess first got involved in aviation, Nelson said, "Ever since the age of 6 or 7 he loved airplanes. He just put his mind to it. He was very passionate about it. He was the type of guy who, if he wanted to do something, he was going to do it." Guess went through the Tuskegee program in high school. Later, he studied aviation in college. Guess looked into other jobs, including becoming a police officer, but aviation was "in his blood."

Guess went to the University of North Dakota at Grand Forks, and studied in the aviation program there. Once he was out of college, he wanted to join the Air National Guard in Duluth, but he did not get a pilot slot. Guess was disappointed, but he just started building flight hours when he could. Finally, Aviation Charter gave him a chance. It was his dream to get paid for doing what he loved.

Nelson thought Guess either had his private pilot's certificate before the Tuskegee program or might have earned it during the program. She only knew him well since college. They met in

high school, but they did not begin dating until their second year in college, in 1992. Guess and Nelson were engaged to be married in 2000, but they had not yet set a date for the ceremony.

Guess had not been involved in previous accidents or incidents. He had never been disciplined for his performance. She did not know if Guess had received any commendations or awards for his flying.

There had been no significant changes in Guess's health in the twelve months before the accident. Guess "took care of himself" because he knew how important it was for flying. He visit the doctor even if he had a slight cold.

In the twelve months before the accident, Guess had changes in his finances because he had been laid off from Pan Am. Nelson and Guess's family helped him financially. They told Guess not to worry, because he could count on them. His bills were always paid and nothing was delinquent. Guess did not have many stresses in terms of his finances. Nelson said, "I just knew how important flying was, so I would take a lot of that off of him." He had a great flying job, but he could go for weeks without getting a flight.

When asked what Guess thought of Aviation Charter's copilot program with Eagle Jet, Nelson said Guess understood it. She added, "He knew he was not the only copilot. When he wouldn't get trips for weeks and weeks, he didn't really say much. He just went around and I reminded him that he was still employed there and that they would call him."

Guess had had no significant changes in his personal life in the twelve months before the accident. Nelson said, "He was from a great, stable family."

Guess's health was "great." He went every six months to an aviation doctor in Bloomington. Guess was not sick the day of the accident, and he wasn't taking medication. He never took over the counter medication, because he was concerned that it might impair him and he wanted to be available if he was called for a flight. He would suffer with a runny nose or a cough. He would not even take cough syrup.

Nelson did not know if Guess had a personal doctor. He went to an aviation doctor on 494 and 21st avenue. That was his aviation medical examiner. Nelson did not think he went to a personal doctor. He had insurance but he did not have a particular clinic that he went to.

Guess's vision was perfect. He always worried about keeping his eyes in good health, and he was very careful to avoid situations where his eyes might be damaged.

Guess's hearing was perfect. There was nothing unusual about it.

Guess was not taking any prescription medication.

Guess never drank alcohol.

Guess did not smoke tobacco.

Nelson said that in the 72 hours before the accident, Guess did not take any drugs, prescription or nonprescription, that would have affected his performance.

When asked how confident Guess was in his flying abilities, Nelson said he was “very comfortable.” About six months before the interview, Guess told Nelson that he was “finally feeling comfortable in the airplanes.” Before that he was somewhat unfamiliar with them. He went through an extensive training program at Aviation Charter, but he told Nelson that, after gaining some experience, he “finally could breathe.”

When asked if Guess ever expressed concerns about flying with any specific captains, Nelson said, “He flew with all the captains and he was always flying with somebody new. He flew with Rich a lot and other names would come up a lot too.”

When asked if Guess ever expressed any concerns about Aviation Charter, Nelson said, “No, not at all. He was always excited to go. He would get his uniform ready on the couch before he went to bed, and make sure he was shaven.” He would already be up when Nelson got out of bed on the mornings that he flew.

When asked how many times Guess had flown with Conry, Nelson said, she did not know how often, perhaps two or three times per month. Nelson stated that Guess was very thorough when filling out his logbooks and that the logbooks should indicate when Guess last flew with Conry. Guess was so thorough he would write the information on a regular piece of paper before transferring it to his logbook.

When asked if Guess socialized with Conry outside of work, Nelson said she did not think so. She did not think Guess ever went over to Conry’s house. Nelson said, Guess “was a very private person with his personal life.” She never met anybody from Aviation Charter. Guess and Nelson, “were very private and just did our own thing.” Sometimes they would read together at bookstores. The two spent more time at home with each other than doing anything else. Guess would take drives in his new sports car. That was about it.

When asked if Guess ever talked about flying with Paul Stanton, Nelson said Guess said he flew with Stanton quite often. Stanton would often request Guess as a copilot. Stanton was a stubborn man, and would not wear his uniform. Guess was proud to wear his uniform.

When asked if Guess ever talked about flying with Dexter Clarke, Nelson said Clarke had an airplane and Guess had flown with him. Nelson never met Clarke. Guess and Nelson later felt that Clarke had taken advantage of Guess financially. Clarke had his own kind of company. They flew together and Guess was paying Clarke to fly with him. Nelson said she did not fully understand the arrangement between the two of them. It was years ago.

Guess’s mood in the days before the accident was happy. His relationship with Nelson was “going great.” He was getting his car painted and he was happy about that. There was no fighting at home. The two parted “just fine” the day of the accident.

When asked about Guess's relationship with his parents, Nelson said, "He grew up here. His mother was here. He was adopted at the age of 5 months." Guess's Father was a little older than his mother and was back in Michigan. Guess's father's health was failing, but he was not bedridden. Guess's mother would go back and forth between Minnesota and Michigan. Guess would speak with his mother two or three times per week. He always wanted to share his flying experiences with her.

Guess's mother came to town to visit on Thursday morning. She had her own house in St. Paul. Guess went over to his mother's house and visited with her during the day on Thursday, October 24th. However, Nelson and Guess were at their own house and Nelson was making Guess dinner when he was notified of the flight scheduled for October 25th. He called his mother and she said he should get some rest.

When asked if she had anything to add that could help the Board in the investigation, Nelson said, that he loved flying, his health was good, and he was a very stable person.

Interview: Timothy M. Cooney, Minnesota Licensed Bill Collector
Time/Date: 1000, November 15, 2002
Location: Telephone
Present: Bramble, Kirchgessner

The interview was conducted by telephone conference call. Mr. Cooney was at his residence. During the interview, Mr. Cooney stated the following information:

Cooney worked as a Minnesota-licensed bill collector, specializing in collecting district court judgments.

Cooney had originally contacted a Safety Board field office because he had some information he thought would be helpful to the Board's investigation of the crash involving Senator Wellstone.

Cooney was a friend of Richard Conry's. He had known him since Conry was 9 years old.

He had not seen Conry during the week before the accident. He had not spoken to him since June, 2001.

Conry began flying when he was 16. Before that he flew a lot with his father. The last plane Conry's father owned was a Beech Travel Air, which was based at Flying Cloud Municipal Airport. Conry's father died when Conry was 13.

Over the years, Conry and Cooney flew together quite a bit. Cooney estimated he had flown with Conry about 300 hours. Cooney was always in the right seat when they flew together. They flew in Piper 140, Piper 180, Cherokee 6, Cessna Centurion, Star Duster, Champion, Decathlon, and Cessna 310 aircraft together. Conry was a very cautious pilot.

Shortly after he began his training with Executive Aviation they had a phone conversation. In that conversation, Conry said he was flying right hand for an instructor with Executive Aviation. He mentioned several things. Conry said he didn't think his legs were strong enough to operate the rudder pedals for taxi, takeoff, or landing. His legs were too weak to guide it with the rudder pedals.

Also, Conry was told by Exec Aviation not to use the toe brakes on landing, he was told to use the beta mode on the props. He was not sure if Conry was talking about the 100, but he did recall he was told to stay off the brakes because they are expensive and to use the beta mode.

The third thing Conry said was he did not feel he was fast enough to fly the King Air 100. He said he felt behind the airplane. This was shortly after he began training with Executive Aviation. He was concerned about his response time. The phrase Conry used was that "he wasn't fast enough," and he was worried about it. The last time Conry expressed concerns about feeling behind the airplane in the King Air 100 was in April 2001. When asked if the King Air 100 was the only aircraft he expressed concerns about flying for Aviation Charter Cooney said yes. That was the only aircraft he trained in at Aviation Charter, although he had trained in the

ATR-72 at American Eagle. Cooney re-confirmed that he had not spoken with Conry at all since June 2001.

Conry did not express concerns about getting back into flying commercially for Aviation Charter after being out of it for some time. He had spent time in quite a few piston-engine aircraft. He spent around 500 hours in ATRs for American Eagle. Conry never told Cooney how many flight hours he had at American Eagle. Cooney got the figure of 400 to 500 hours from reading recent press coverage of the accident. During the four-month period when Conry was at American Eagle, they spoke a couple times and Cooney got the impression Conry was flying a lot, but Cooney did not know for sure if he had ever flown passenger flights. He had the impression that Conry was flying passenger flights. He would tell Cooney about the procedure he would follow in reviewing preflight paperwork before departure. Conry never specifically mentioned whether he was flying left or right seat and never specifically stated whether he had completed training.

Cooney thought there was a lapse in his flying between the time he left American Eagle and when he joined Aviation Charter. Conry went into nursing after he got out of prison. He could not say how long Conry was out of flying. Cooney thought that if Conry had purchased an aircraft or gotten into a flying club during that period he would have called Cooney, because they spoke on the phone from time to time and they liked to share stories about aviation. Cooney and his wife sometimes went to the Conry's home during this time. On a couple of occasions, they helped Conry and his wife edit their employment resumes.

The last time Cooney flew with Conry, they flew a Cessna 310. That was over ten years ago. Cooney was not aware that Conry did any recreational flying after his time at American Eagle, but he could not be sure.

When asked if he knew anything about Conry's eye health, he said Conry had had lasik excimer surgery on both eyes and had recommended that Cooney have it done also. Conry said he had had the surgery done to improve distance vision in one eye and reading vision in the other. Cooney asked him about whether that made him dizzy, and Conry said no. Conry did not wear glasses after the surgery. Prior to the surgery, Conry wore contact lenses and occasionally wore glasses at home. The lasik procedure worked extremely well for him. His vision did not cause him problems in flying before he had the procedure.

Cooney had the same lasik eye surgery done in June 2000, Conry had his done about a year and a half before that.

Cooney knew Conry's wife, Johanne. He did not get along with her very well. Conry and Johanne got along very well together. They were very much in love. They were married about 1989 or 1990, just before Conry was sentenced and went to jail. Conry's wife stuck with him through that. They met in Canada at an air show or some kind of event.

Conry was in prison for about a year, then he had a probationary period. Cooney picked him up at the bus station when he got back from prison. Conry served some time in a halfway house in South Minneapolis run by Volunteers of America.

Regarding the mail and wire fraud offense, Conry had a trio of companies under his control in the late 1980s. A couple of subcontractors did not receive payments. They sued Conry in civil court and were awarded their loss. Then Conry did not pay and a federal prosecutor took him into criminal court. That's how he ended up in Yankton. He pled innocent and was convicted. Conry went to jail. When he got out he went into nursing.

As everything was coming down around him he decided to get out of the home building business and applied for a position with American Eagle. Cooney did not know exactly when Conry started looking for airline jobs. He was only with Eagle for a short period of time. Cooney did not know where Conry was based when he flew with American Eagle. Cooney never got the impression that Conry was doing anything at the airline other than flying the airplane with an instructor. Cooney never asked him if he flew left seat or carried passengers. Conry just talked about the airplane. The ATR Conry flew while he was with American Eagle was number 427. There was a segment on the news where an ATR72 flipped and crashed in an Ohio cornfield. Cooney called Conry and he said that was the aircraft he trained in. Conry didn't say how many hours he flew with American Eagle.

They never talked about Conry's total flight experience. He was flying a lot after prison, but it would be in fits and starts. Even when he was homebuilding we would fly together. He did not fly commercially before prison that I'm aware of. He belonged to a flying club before he went to prison - "Cloud 7" or "Cloud 9," based at Flying Cloud airport. They had seven aircraft and would take turns flying each other or family members out on fishing trips. That was back in the 1980s. He never flew commercially before flying for American Eagle. As far as Cooney was aware, all of Conry's flight experience was gained under Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, except for his flying at American Eagle and Aviation Charter.

Conry was "kind of a renaissance guy." Had a lot of interests. He was always good to Cooney. Cooney was down on his luck in 1975 and Conry had a home and took him in and gave him a job. Cooney was able to pay his rent and pay his way. Cooney did not think he could have done it without him. Conry had shortcomings like anyone, but he was a good guy.

Cooney never saw him take any drugs. He only saw him drink one beer in all the time they knew each other. Conry did not smoke marijuana or cigarettes. Conry had a terrible bronchitis in 1975 and Cooney saw him take some codeine cough syrup for two days, then he threw it away.

When asked about his own flight experience, Cooney said he had about 300 hours. Every hour of it was with Conry. He was a stern, demanding, no nonsense teacher. He would make Cooney do the same maneuver over and over again. The next time they went out, Conry would have him do it again. They would start out over the Minnesota river in a Piper 140 or 180 or whatever they could get their hands on, and go out and do slow flight and spins. Conry took flying very seriously. It was safety first. One day they were out over a lake and saw a hot air balloon and

Cooney wanted to buzz it. Conry said to stay at least a quarter mile away from it. That was his safety parameter. Cooney had a student pilot's certificate. Conry never signed Cooney's log book because he was not a flight instructor. Usually Conry would pay for the aircraft rental, but Cooney would sometimes pay for gas.

When asked whether Conry ever mentioned any other concerns about flying the King Air, Cooney said, "he just said he felt like he wasn't fast enough and was behind." He expressed these concerns during his initial training with aviation charter, and Cooney thought that his comfort level may have improved over time. He became captain pretty quickly, and never expressed any specific concerns about upgrading.

Cooney did not know Michael Guess.

Conry never mentioned anything about losing his logbooks. He carried a briefcase around with him with his logbooks and charts when the two used to fly together. The last time Cooney saw it was ten years ago.

Conry never specifically stated that he completed training at American Eagle and he never related any "line flying stories." He just mentioned that he had to sign departure paperwork that documented the number of passengers on board and other information before American Eagle flights.

When asked if there was anything else he could say that might help in the investigation, Cooney said, "I just want to reiterate that Conry was a good guy and a good pilot. I think there was a mechanical problem. I hope there was, for the sake of the families."

Interview: **Johanne C. Conry, Wife of Richard E. Conry**
Represented by: **Errol Kantor, Attorney at Law**
Time/Date: **1330, November 25, 2002**
Location: **150 South Fifth St., Suite 2500, Minneapolis, Minnesota**
Board Staff: **William Bramble, Evan Byrne**
Also Present: **Diane Mahowald, friend of Mrs. Conry**
Gilles Gein, Professional Interpreting Service

During the interview Mrs. Conry provided the following information:

She was born June 24, 1955. She was employed as a nurse at a local hospital. Mrs. Conry had learned how to fly, but never obtained a private pilot's license. She was married to Richard E. Conry at the time of his death in an aircraft accident near Eveleth Minnesota. The couple had no children.

Mrs. Conry had flown with her husband before. They flew every weekend when he owned his own airplane.

Richard first learned he was assigned to the trip to Eveleth the night before the accident. She was not sure when he learned Senator Wellstone would be on board. Most of the time Richard found that out either the night before or two hours before the trip.

Richard had contact with Wellstone's staff early in the morning on October 25, 2002. Mrs. Conry was in bed and heard Richard talking on the phone with the Wellstone people. She did not know the identity of the person or people with whom Richard spoke. The only thing she remembered Richard saying was that they would "see how the weather was" and that it was, "going to be your call." That was the last thing she heard Richard say before he left the house.

Richard did not express any concerns to her before he left for the trip. They had no conversation because she was still in bed. She thought he would not have flown if he had been really concerned about something.

When asked if she was aware of any confusion the morning of the accident regarding when the flight was supposed to depart, Mrs. Conry said the only thing she heard was Richard's statement on the phone, as described above.

When asked if there had been any scheduling difficulties with Wellstone in the past, Mrs. Conry said that Wellstone would decide if he wanted to go after Richard would give him a report on weather. First Conry would tell Wellstone's staff whether he was willing to go, then Wellstone's staff would decide if they were willing to go. Wellstone would sometimes want to turn around if it was bumpy, and Richard was fine with that. Richard was always on time for trips.

When asked to describe his schedule in the 72 hours before the accident, Mrs. Conry said Richard had a check ride on Wednesday, October 23, 2002. He came home afterward, was tired, and went to bed. He flew a trip for Aviation Charter during the early morning hours on Thursday, October 24, 2002, then came home fairly early in the morning. Richard's supervisor at Fresenius Medical called after he came home, asking him to do some dialysis work. Richard said he could not work right away. He had to sleep, and that he would call her when he got up. Later, Richard went to a local hospital at 1500 to do dialysis work. He returned home between 2130 and 2140 and went to bed right away.

Mrs. Conry added that performing dialysis involves a lot of sitting, and is not strenuous or difficult work. The night before the accident, Richard slept at least 8 hours. He had come back from the hospital at 2140 on October 24, 2002, and went to bed right away. Richard was required by Aviation Charter to arrive at the airport an hour before his flights.

On Thursday morning, October 24, 2002, Richard went to sleep about 0730, and got up at 1500. It would have taken him about 15 minutes to drive to the hospital. All he had to do after he got up was put on his scrubs and drive to the hospital. He would have left the house about 1500.

On Wednesday evening, October 23, 2002, Richard was very tired in the evening after his check ride with Aviation Charter's chief pilot. Mrs. Conry made him dinner. Then Richard engaged in routine activities around the house and went to bed early, between 1900 and 2000.

Mrs. Conry was unsure exactly when Richard went to sleep on Tuesday evening. She stated that when he had a check ride he usually went to bed early and studied early in the morning.

Mrs. Conry did not know when he left the house for his early morning flight on Thursday, October 24, 2002. She was asleep when he left. Richard normally left an hour before a flight.

When asked about Richard's sleep quality the night before the accident, Mrs. Conry said he slept solidly. She added that he slept easily. On his days off, Richard tended to go to bed early in the evening, and get up early in the morning. She agreed that he could be considered a "morning person."

When asked to describe Richard's non-work activities, Mrs. Conry said Richard exercised regularly. He worked around the house. He walked the dogs every day. She thought it was accurate to characterize Richard's non-work activities in the days before the accident as routine.

When asked about Richard's exercise habits, Mrs. Conry said he exercised three times per week. When exercising, he used a weight set in his home and jumped rope.

When asked how she would characterize Richard's health, Mrs. Conry said he was "healthy." He was usually in good health, and he was in good health the week of the accident. He did not have a cold or flu.

Richard's mood the week of the accident was "happy." He had just taken a trip to San Diego and had the opportunity to see a large air show there. Richard was usually in a happy mood. He smiled a lot. Mrs. Conry and Richard were getting along fine the week of the accident. He did not have any special plans coming up, only routine activities.

When asked to describe Richard's last vacation during the previous year, Mrs. Conry said that fairly recently there was a period where he did not fly for two or three weeks in a row. Then they flew him every night. Then he didn't fly for a while. He had a sporadic schedule. If Fresenius needed him to do dialysis on his days off, he would do that, otherwise he would work around the house. The couple's house was undergoing a major renovation.

In the twelve months before the accident, Richard experienced no major health changes and no major personal changes (such as births, deaths, etc.). He had incurred financial changes as a result of expenses related to renovation of the couple's home.

Richard's vision was good. He had had vision difficulties before he underwent lens implant surgery. She could not recall the year he had that surgery, but it was before he started flying for Aviation Charter. The surgery worked out very well for him. Richard's vision was better than normal. He did not need to wear glasses after the surgery. She did not know if Richard had had any laser surgery to reshape his cornea for improved vision. She thought the last name of the doctor who performed the lens implant surgery was Yancy.

Richard's hearing was normal, with no history of problems.

Richard did not take prescription medication. He did not drink alcohol or use tobacco products. When asked whether, in the 72 hours before the accident, Richard had taken any drugs, prescription or nonprescription, that might have affected his performance, Mrs. Conry said that she wasn't aware of his taking any but he could have taken two Tylenol after his flight check. She did not know for certain.

Richard began flying with his father when he was a young child. Mrs. Conry did not know if they did any flight training together. Richard's father died when he was 14.

With respect to Richard's long term plans for his flying career, Mrs. Conry said Richard had a verbal contract with Aviation Charter requiring him to stay there for ten months. Richard was hoping to move on to Net Jets or a similar company because he was not flying as often as he wanted at Aviation Charter. His flight hours varied a lot.

Richard was confident in his flying abilities. When asked if Richard had received any commendations or awards for his flying, Mrs. Conry said he had some certificates. She added that he liked acrobatics, and had his own acrobatic plane at one time.

He had owned several other aircraft, including a Cessna 150, an Apache, a Cessna 210 or 310, a Starduster, and a seaplane Mrs. Conry did not know Richard when he owned these airplanes, she just saw pictures of them later. Mrs. Conry trained in an Apache and a Cessna.

Mrs. Conry met her husband around 1987. August 31st was the date, but she was unsure of the year. The two met at a race track in Quebec. They were married on April 7, 1990, just before Richard served time in prison.

Richard was never disciplined by his employer.

When asked if Richard had experienced any aviation emergencies, Mrs. Conry said that the front wheel detached from the hydraulic system on one occasion. Heat wasn't working once. He had also had problems with the autopilot not disengaging. She added that these problems would all be noted on his trip forms. Richard had experienced no previous accidents or incidents, to her knowledge.

Richard had flown for forty years and had between 3,000 and 4,000 hours of flight experience.

When asked if she knew the purpose of a large number of flights between Crystal airport, Wausau Airport, and Chicago O'Hare that Richard documented in his logbook during the years 1986-1987, Mrs. Conry said she did not know what he was doing. When asked if he did any professional flying during that period, Mrs. Conry said he did some charter for companies such as Lyman Lumber during the 1980s. Someone named Jim at that company had to travel to Wisconsin and other sites and transport people. Mrs. Conry did not know if Richard charged them or not. He just loved flying. Richard would also fly to Canada with friend for recreational purposes. She did not recall Richard flying for any companies other than Lyman Lumber.

When asked if Richard ever flew for any airlines other than Aviation Charter or Simmons Airlines, Mrs. Conry said that he sent applications to other airlines, but he never went past the application stage.

Richard felt proud to fly for Simmons. Mrs. Conry did not know if he flew passengers there. He resigned from Simmons because he was indicted. When asked if there was anyone at Simmons with whom Mr. Conry was particularly close, Mrs. Conry said she never met the people at Simmons. Richard asked her to help him review training material at their residence during his initial training program. They used ATR 42 cockpit maps. It was a very stressful, demanding training program.

When asked what Richard did professionally before he began working for Simmons, Mrs. Conry said he had his own company for many years. It was called American Engineering Services. He may have had another company too. She had limited knowledge of his work then, as she knew him after that time. He no longer ran those companies when he went to work for Simmons.

Richard had his own airplane during that time. He was part of a flying club at the Flying Cloud airport. Mrs. Conry did not know if Mr. Conry transported his own company employees by airplane.

Richard started working at Aviation Charter in April, 2001. He was surprised that they hired him because he felt old. He told his wife that Aviation Charter had said they were looking for people with experience who were not just looking to go to the airlines. After he was brought on board, he was on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It was like that the whole time he worked for Aviation Charter.

Richard thought the training at Aviation Charter was good. They went to a place out of state. They had a good airplane. He did not say anything negative about the training.

Mrs. Conry remembered Richard undergoing training to fly the Cessna Citation jets owned by Aviation Charter. He was qualified by training to fly as captain on the jet, but was not utilized as a captain yet by Aviation Charter. He had obtained a type rating in that airplane.

Aviation Charter made pilots pay for their type ratings. The first one Richard paid for was in the King Air. It cost \$5,000. The second one was for the jet. That one cost \$2,500. Mrs. Conry provided the money for both type ratings. If pilots stay with the company for ten months, they are supposed to get the money back that they paid for their type ratings.

When asked if Richard talked about flying with specific pilots at Aviation Charter, Mrs. Conry said he liked to fly with Dan, Chris, and Justin, and added that he liked everybody with the exception of one pilot named Gary.

When asked if Richard ever mentioned concerns about flying with any particular pilots, Mrs. Conry said that Richard had told her some pilots were not given the chance to fly and practice in the airplane. Some pilots refused to let the copilots fly. He said it was sad. When asked how often Richard let the copilots fly, Mrs. Conry said it depended on the copilot. If Wellstone was on board, he would not let the copilot fly. He would let the copilots fly if the airplane was empty. When asked if Richard had any favorite copilots, Mrs. Conry said he did not.

When asked if Richard ever spoke of flying with Guess, Mrs. Conry said her husband had told her a story about Guess. He said the other pilots thought Guess was not a good pilot. Richard said when Guess flew with him he was just fine. Richard did not say specifically what complaints the other pilots had about Guess. Guess came over to the Conry's home

once to practice on Richard's simulator. Mrs. Conry did not interact with Guess much when he came over.

Richard said flying the jet was noisy, but he liked it. He looked forward to being captain on that airplane. Richard never spoke of having any difficulties switching back and forth between aircraft types at Aviation Charter. He thought the King Air was easier to fly because things happened faster in the jet.

Senator Wellstone liked Richard. They got along well together. Wellstone or his staff would always call Richard at home and ask him to fly. They respected the fact that Richard respected Wellstone's fear. Richard would abide by their wishes with respect to canceling flights, even if Aviation Charter did not like it.

Mrs. Conry found Richard's logbooks in the attic of their home. They were located near the insulation in the attic, behind about forty other boxes. She did not believe Richard was aware of their location. He had looked for them, but they were not easy to find. When asked if she believed Richard's logbooks were truly lost, Mrs. Conry said that both her log book and Richard's log books were, in fact, lost. They found after six hours of searching the house. She began this search after she received the subpoena from the Safety Board. Mrs. Conry also found her own log book during the search. It was the first time she had seen the old log books in four or five years.

Mrs. Conry had never seen the log book containing Richard's flight time from training with Simmons. It was a large brown Jeppesen log book and the others were small and black. Theresa, a pilot from Aviation Charter, helped Mrs. Conry search the house for the missing log books and it was Theresa who noticed the brown Jeppesen log book.

When asked if there was anything she could add that might help further the Board's investigation, Mrs. Conry said, "the only thing I know is that Richard in driving or anything dangerous was attentive to what's going on. He drove the speed limit. If Richard was conducting an approach, his attention would be on what he was doing."

When asked if she had any information that might be relevant to the Board's investigation that she had not been asked for specifically, Mrs. Conry said no.

When asked if there was anyone else she believed the Board should talk to, Mrs. Conry said Richard used to talk with Theresa, another pilot at aviation charter, a lot. They shared a lot of information that was not shared with Mrs. Conry and Theresa was the only one who could really say how Richard felt about one airplane or another. Justin Lowe, one of Aviation Charter's copilots could provide information about Richard's attitude on the airplane.

When asked if she knew Mark Cooney, Mrs. Conry said Cooney was a friend of her husband. He was not her friend. They had a strong dislike for one another. She did not like his character. When asked to explain the cause of the animosity between them, Mrs. Conry gave an example involving the planned sale of a boat to Cooney, which ended

when Cooney backed out at the last minute. More recently, Cooney called Mrs. Conry after Richard died. Mrs. Conry did not want to talk to him. Cooney asked if he should call Richard's mother to inform her of Richard's death. Mrs. Conry said no, but when she called Richard's mother she found Cooney had spoken with her already.

When asked to clarify where the brown log book containing Richard's time at Simmons was found, Mrs. Conry said that one was found in the basement of her home.

When asked about Richard's driving history, Mrs. Conry said he never received any traffic tickets. Someone ran into his car at a stoplight once. His elbow was hurt in the accident, but he was okay.

When asked if the money the Conry's were spending on the renovation of their house was "beyond their means," Mrs. Conry said, "Yes and no, Richard was not making same money as when he was a nurse. In September I was covering for him, going full time in nursing."

When asked if she knew whether Richard ever maintained two sets of log books, Mrs. Conry said she did not know about that.

Interview: **John P. Berg, R.N., Shift Coordinator, Trauma-Neuro Intensive Care, North Memorial Medical Center**
Time/Date: **1345, November 26, 2002**
Location: **North Memorial Medical Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota**
Present: **Bramble**

During the interview Mr. Berg provided the following information:

He was a registered nurse and served as unit shift coordinator in the trauma-neuro intensive care unit (ICU) at North Memorial Medical Center the evening of October 24, 2002. He had worked at North Memorial since March 1998.

On October 24, 2002, Berg was working as the charge nurse in the trauma-neuro ICU. Duties as charge nurse included ensuring that the unit was staffed according to the patient population, and coordinating a response to any problems that might arise. Other duties included working with the ER to take admissions, placing incoming patients in the appropriate ICU, and helping staff on the unit if a patient ran into problems.

Berg sometimes interacted with contract dialysis nurses provided by Fresenius Medical when they came to the unit to perform dialysis services. If there was concern at the unit that a patient in the ICU needed to be dialyzed, they would have hospital kidney specialists check the patient. If dialysis was necessary, the ICU secretary would call Fresenius Medical and tell them they needed a dialysis run. Fresenius had a charge person who coordinated their runs at the hospital, but the ICU called Fresenius company offices if they needed to schedule a run.

Fresenius nurses worked mostly on the seventh floor of the hospital, the Acute Medical Surgical Floor. That unit took the chronic and acute renal patients. Typically there was a charge person from Fresenius on the seventh floor. This person would do runs too, but they also coordinated the work of the other Fresenius nurses on site. They did not have regular office hours.

Berg did not recognize the name of Richard Conry's immediate supervisor at Fresenius Medical.

On October 24, 2002, Berg started his shift at 0645. His shift ended at 1930. He first saw Conry in the late morning or early afternoon, about 1100, 1200, or 1300. It was some time mid-day. When Berg first saw Conry, Conry was in front of room one, near the entrance to the ICU. He was looking at a chart for the patient he was to dialyze in room 2. Berg had a discussion with Conry about flying, saying that he wanted to learn to fly. The two discussed what it would take for Berg to obtain a private pilot's certificate. He had talked with Conry hundreds of times, but this was the first time they discussed Berg's interest in being a pilot.

When asked if he knew Conry well, Berg said, "Not really well, I was a colleague with him. He worked a lot with Fresenius, then he had his vision corrected and started flying and he wasn't here as much any more. Then in the last year he started picking up extra shifts here again. They need a lot of help here."

After Berg and Conry spoke near the entrance to the ICU, Conry left. There was about an hour delay and he did not end up running patient until about 1600. During the dialysis, Conry stayed in the patient's room and Berg did not see him. Later in the evening, Berg made a round and checked on everyone. He did not remember speaking with Conry at that time.

Berg stated, "As far as looking tired or under the influence – he looked the same. He was kind of a quiet person. He kept to himself. That day he was no different."

When Berg made his rounds that evening, Conry was "just sitting in a chair." Berg added that the dialysis nurses cannot leave during a dialysis treatment because there is a lot of the patient's blood in tubes and in a machine under pressure. They have to be there to stabilize vital signs, as necessary. Berg did not see Conry again after he made his rounds that evening.

Conry was in a normal mood. Conry did not typically initiate conversation, but would reciprocate if you engaged him. He was somewhat introverted, "not weird or odd, just quiet. He was generally well-liked among the staff." Berg had known Conry for about three and a half years. Conry's mood has always been pretty much the same. Conry did not mention any significant changes in his personal life, finances, or health in the previous twelve months.

With respect to what time Conry might have left the hospital, Berg said he had spoken to a nurse who worked with Conry that evening named Jacquelyn Feyereisen. Feyereisen had told him she looked at the dialysis chart for Conry's patient and the chart showed that the dialysis machine was turned off at 2015.

Berg could not give a date for the last time Conry had worked at the hospital before October 24, 2002. Conry did not come in that often, maybe once a month to the ICU. He probably worked on the seventh floor more often.

When asked if Conry's schedule on October 24, 2002 was typical for him at the hospital, Berg said the dialysis nurses have a pretty hectic schedule. They can work all day long, then they might have another call. They might have to go to another hospital after they finish a shift and work some more. They put in long hours. Dialysis nurses sometimes experience burnout from their work schedule.

A typical dialysis treatment lasted three to four hours.

Berg was not aware of Conry receiving any awards or being disciplined at North Memorial.

Berg did not think Conry wore glasses.

Conry did not talk about what he was doing before he came in to work that day or what he planned to do afterward.

Berg said he trusted Conry and would have let Conry perform dialysis on him if he had ever needed it. Conry was liked, and was good at what he did.

When asked if there was anything he could add that might help further the Board's investigation, Berg said no.

When asked if he had any information that might be relevant to the Board's investigation that he had not been asked for specifically, Berg said he did not believe so.

When asked if there was anyone else he believed the Board should talk to, Berg said the Board could talk to Conry's coworkers at Fresenius.

Interview: Jacquelyn L. Feyereisen, R.N., Staff Nurse, Trauma Neuro Intensive Care, North Memorial Medical Center
Time/Date: 1420, November 26, 2002
Location: North Memorial Medical Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota
Present: William Bramble

During the interview Ms. Feyereisen provided the following information:

Her employer was North Memorial Medical Center where she had worked since August, 1992. Her position was staff nurse, trauma-neuro intensive care. Her duties included patient care, dispensing medication, assisting patients with bathing, and taking vital signs. She would also act as charge nurse on some occasions. That involved the coordination of staffing, and required her to act as a resource to other staff.

When asked about her duties to work with contract dialysis nurses, Feyereisen said the dialysis nurses functioned fairly independently. They were more or less responsible for the patient they were caring for when they provided treatment. They told the staff nurses what they could or could not do with the patient during treatment. During treatment, the dialysis nurses were responsible for recording vital signs. If a patient had problems with blood pressure, the dialysis nurses had standard things they would do. If they ran into problems it would usually be a result of the dialysis, and the dialysis nurse would know what to do to counteract the problem.

On October 24, 2002, Feyereisen worked from 0700 to 1900 at the hospital. When asked when she first saw Conry that day, she said she remembered that Conry came in in the afternoon. The dialysis nurses usually just come in and set up their machine and start doing dialysis. It happens so often that it did not really stand out in her mind.

That evening, Feyereisen spoke with Conry more than she ever had, because she was orienting another nurse. She first spoke with Conry around 1830 or 1900. They had routine conversation. In the middle of that conversation, Conry received a call and stepped outside to the phone outside the room and was notified that he was going to fly Wellstone in the morning. He came back and was excited about it. Conry said Wellstone was a great guy and was nice to everybody and he really enjoyed flying with the Senator. Conry said Wellstone requested him sometimes because they have a good rapport.

When asked if she could recall the details of the phone conversation, Feyereisen said she thought she remembered hearing him speak with someone at his dialysis company and say he had to fly in the morning. She thought he declined another dialysis run.

That evening, Conry looked “totally fine, normal, like he always does, alert, conversive, friendly.” There was nothing out of the ordinary about him.

Conry’s mood was average until he received the call about flying Wellstone. Then he was really happy. He was a little more upbeat after that.

Conry didn’t mention anything about being sleepy, or needing to get sleep.

Conry did not mention what he did before he began his shift or what he planned to do immediately afterward.

Feyereisen and Conry stopped talking slightly after Conry received the phone call about the Wellstone flight because Feyereisen had the new nurse with her and had to watch her finish her shift at 1900. Conry's phone call about the Wellstone flight was between 1600 and 1830. Conry was still at the hospital when Feyereisen left.

Feyereisen checked the dialysis record for the patient Conry treated that night. The first vital sign was recorded at 1615 and the last was recorded at 2015.

Feyereisen left the hospital at 1930.

The dialysis record was stored in the hospital's medical records department. It was called the dialysis flow sheet.

Most of the staff liked working with Conry. Most knew he was a pilot. Many people gave to a collection for his wife after he died. He was not one of the most common dialysis nurses they saw.

Feyereisen thought he had been working at the hospital for five or six years, but she had never really spoken with him much. He was kind of quiet, but friendly. She trusted him with her patients when he did dialysis. He never showed any signs that he was not competent. He was very good at what he did.

Conry never mentioned any major changes occurring in his life in the previous twelve months.

When asked if there was anything she could add that might help further the Board's investigation, Feyereisen said, "I don't think that dialysis is a strenuous task. It was a really routine run, the patient didn't have any problems. There wasn't any reason for him to be excessively tired. It's not a real strenuous thing. I don't feel it would affect his flying ability the next day. I thought he was a nice guy and a good nurse. I would have trusted him to dialyze me."

When asked if she had any information that might be relevant to the Board's investigation that she had not been asked for specifically, Feyereisen said no.

When asked if there was anyone else he believed the Board should talk to, Feyereisen said no, except perhaps for the dialysis people.

Feyereisen was asked to recount exactly how Conry was contacted for the notification of the Wellstone flight, and how he contacted Fresenius. She said that when Conry spoke to Fresenius about not doing another run, he spoke to them on the ICU phone. When he was contacted about the Wellstone flight, he was beeped by the aviation company and then went just outside the

entrance to the ICU and returned that call from another hospital phone. Feyereisen added that no one was allowed to carry a cell phone in the ICU.

Interview: Joseph C. Diedrich Jr., Captain/Fleet Manager, Northwest Airlines (NWA)
Time/Date: 0900, December 4, 2002
Location: NTSB Headquarters, Washington, DC
Present: Bramble, Kirchgessner, Misencik

During the interview, Captain Diedrich stated the following information:

His present positions were line captain on the B-747 and A330 fleet director. He previously held the positions of A320/319 fleet director/chief pilot for 2½ years prior to April 1999. He was also an A320/319 training captain for 4½ years prior to that. He was assigned to the A330 fleet in January 2002.

He knew Michael Guess and had quite a bit of interaction with him at work. He did not know Michael on a personal level.

Michael reported directly to Rich Vosika, the aircrew training manager. He said both Rich and himself were responsible for the student instructors' performance reviews.

Michael first worked for Northwest Aeronautical Training Company (NATCO) prior to being hired by NWA as an aircrew training instructor (ATI). He worked at the front desk and did not report to either Rich or himself at that time.

He said that Michael got to know many NWA employees while he worked at NATCO. He was very likeable and they found out that he had a pilot certificate. After talking with several instructors, Michael said he was interested in becoming a ground instructor. He was interviewed by Rich Vosika and subsequently hired as an ATI.

Each prospective ATI initially completed an airplane systems program that allowed them to teach the first week of the Airbus ground school. They then completed a more intense program that took approximately one year. The trainees' were also given periods in the simulator so that they could fully learn the airplane.

A new ATI started at a grade 5, associate ATI. He was then advanced to grade 6, intermediate ATI. A fully trained ATI was awarded a grade 7, senior ATI, and could teach all the airplane systems, FMS procedures and pilot procedures. A grade 7 applicant must also be capable of passing a first officer checkride in the simulator. Michael was a grade 6 when he resigned.

There were roughly 17 ATIs in the A320/319 fleet in 1999 and they were among the largest.

An associate ATI was required to possess a commercial pilot certificate. Pilot flight time requirements depended on the interview and if the applicant was capable of meeting fleet needs.

The average flight experience for a new ATI was 250-1500 hours. Michael was at the low end of hourly experience. The company also looked for applicants that would make good employees, such as someone eager to learn. He said a number of individuals had completed the program

with only 250 hours of total flight time. The biggest problem was overcoming the computer technology. Young individuals familiar with computers tended to do very well. He said the glass cockpit was highly computerized and some individuals had problems with it and others did not.

There were very rigid gates that an applicant would have to satisfactorily pass before they could teach in the classroom. Any applicant that could not pass the gates was put on a performance improvement program (PIP) developed by Human Resources (HR). The applicant was counseled and then new gates were set that must be passed.

At the end of training, the ATI knew the airplane well enough to teach it, answer questions, and was able to find answers to questions he was unable to answer. He would have to be very familiar with the navigation systems and procedures, such as preflight and general flight deck procedures. Before he could teach, each ATI would have to pass a line first officer simulator checkride, but he had more time to learn it than a line pilot. A line first officer would have six weeks as a new hire to complete the program. An ATI had one year to complete the program with gates along the way. Some applicants were given more than one year while others took less time to complete the program. The current Airbus program completion requirements were now less than one year.

He said that Michael was very receptive to criticism and worked very hard to learn the program. He became involved because Michael was having problems. Rich and Tom decided to work with Michael but subsequently had to go to HR and Michael was assigned a PIP. He said Michael was on the PIP for months. Michael would have been terminated but he was given the option to resign. He said Michael saw it coming and had no emotional reaction. He was very appreciative of the help that he had been given. He chose to resign and look for a job elsewhere. Eventually, the only choice the company would have had was termination.

Michael was unable to meet the PIP's goals and timeline. That generally meant that the individual could not remain with the fleet. There was a possibility that the individual could be placed in another position within the company if there were any openings. NWA could not find Michael another position within the company. He said he thought HR contacted Pan Am and found they had an opening for a customer support representative. Since Michael had already performed the duties of that position while he was at NATCO, Pan Am hired him.

When Michael was assigned the PIP program, he worked very hard and said he would do whatever was necessary. He said there were just some things Michael was not able to assimilate. Michael was not the type of person to deny his problems or say the company was plotting against him. He didn't take it personally. Michael saw that others were picking up the material and he wasn't.

He said there was one other occasion when an ATI was assigned a PIP. The outcome would have been termination but the individual moved to California and found another job.

Michael was a very hard worker, likeable and dependable. He was very personable and that was important in a classroom environment. An ATI taught pilots with high experience levels.

He would say hello to Michael and ask him how he was doing when he saw him at the Pan Am front desk after his resignation. He had no interactions with Michael outside of the office.

He said he was not aware that Michael had a flying job. He last saw him a couple of weeks before the accident at the Pan Am front desk.

A new ATI initially was given bookwork to complete. The company was interested in whether or not the individual could teach in front of a class. Michael was able to complete that part of the process.

He stressed that Michael was not hired to fly passengers. The hiring process differed for ATIs and line first officers. He said that an ATI was not allowed to teach flying in the simulator. An ATI taught in the classroom, level 2 FMS simulators and level 3 simulators where basic procedures, preflight and FMS procedures were covered.

A senior ATI must pass a first officer simulator checkride and also demonstrate that he could teach all of the ground training modules. An ATI was not critiqued in the same manner as a line first officer. A line first officer had only a few weeks to learn the systems and pass a first officer checkride, while an ATI had a year to do the same.

Interview: Richard D. Vosika, Manager A330 Aircrew Training Program (NWA)
Time/Date: 1000, December 4, 2002
Location: NTSB Headquarters, Washington, DC
Present: Bramble, Kirchgessner, Misencik

During the interview, Mr. Vosika stated the following information:

His position in April 1999 was manager of the A320 aircrew training program for Northwest Airlines.

Vosika knew Michael Guess. Guess worked for him at Northwest Airlines (NWA).

In February 1999, the training program at NWA was expanded significantly. The human resources department did a lot of advertising, the training managers interviewed a lot of people, and Guess was one of the first people hired. He was hired as an Aircrew Training Instructor (ATI) in the A320 training program.

The duties of an ATI at that time were to check out on and learn an aircraft's systems, teach systems in a classroom, learn procedures, and teach systems and procedures in a flight training device.

Prior to the rapid expansion in the NWA training program, there were about 5 A320 ATIs at the center in Minneapolis. After the expansion, there were about 15. That was just for the A320.

Vosika became manager of the A320 training program in 1998. He left that position January 1, 2002 to become manager of the new A330 training program. During his tenure as manager of the A320 training program, he hired 17 or 18 ATIs.

Minimum qualifications for an ATI position like the one Guess was offered were a commercial pilot's certificate and an instrument rating. A CFI rating was seen as desirable, but not required.

Average flight experience levels among the new ATIs varied a lot. Vosika tried to hire people with expertise in different fields. The person who had the lowest time had about 250 hours, the person with the most had about 4000. The most common amount was around 1000 hours.

Vosika recalled that Guess had about 300 hours of flight time, a commercial pilot's certificate, and an instrument rating. He was not the lowest time pilot, and he was not the highest. He probably had less experience than the average new ATI, but he was not alone in that situation. There was a new 250 hour ATI and a new 400 hour ATI. The next most experienced had about 400 hours also, then 700 hours, then 900 hours. Those were all new hires. Vosika and another instructor trained all of the new ATIs and had opportunity to observe their performance.

When new ATIs were hired, they first went through NWA's two-week indoctrination course for new NWA pilots and instructors. After that, they went through A320 ground school for two or three weeks. After that, they observed full flight training, but did not have regular participation in full flight training. After that, they normally went through weeks one and two of ground

school a second time. Week one covered systems, and week two covered procedures.

The ATIs always started out teaching systems first. After they became well qualified to teach systems, they would graduate on to teaching procedures.

When the ATIs observed full flight, they would sit in on a one hour pre-brief, four hours in the simulator, then observe a debrief after the training. Each session lasted five or six hours. The ATIs would not have been sitting in either of the two front seats of the simulator.

Vosika was told that Guess had recorded some A320 simulator time in his log book and was asked to explain how he received training in the simulator. He stated that ATIs would actually get to participate in some simulator training during periods of light simulator use. Guess began a full flight training in a seat some time in April. He started his full flight training on April 5, 1999. That was simulator lesson number one.

Guess was hired February 10, 1999. He went through indoctrination training February 26, 1999. He completed monitoring of ground school March 19, 1999. He completed monitoring of fixed-base instruction March 31, 1999. He did not observe full flight, he was lucky enough to go into full flight as a participant in April. That started April 5, and continued on April 9,12, and13. The type of simulator was a level C or D.

At that time, up until the time Guess finished the full flight, he was in the gaining knowledge state. Then he went through ground school systems one more time, then he began a one-on-one checkout to ensure that he could teach each system thoroughly.

Guess did not finish full flight training. He completed only 7 out of 10 lessons. He did not finish the last couple lessons, but that was not a requirement for ground instructor. He probably did not complete the full flight training because of simulator utilization by NWA. It would not have reflected on his training ability.

Vosika and Wally Malem taught Guess and evaluated his ability to teach systems modules. That was when they found out that Guess had problems. He was not learning the systems as fast as other people they hired. In some cases, where another individual could learn the oxygen system in an hour to an hour and half, it took him 4 hours. When they talked about the ADIRS/NAV system, it took most ATIs two to two and a half hours to learn the system. It took Guess 14 hours.

The ADIRS/NAV system is very complicated. Guess's problem was that he just was not grasping it. As they were checking him out on systems, if Vosika taught him the ADIRS/NAV system, and then moved on to the oxygen system, Guess would translate the facts from one system to the next. The training managers had a lot of problems ensuring that Guess knew the systems and could answer questions pilots would pose.

Guess acknowledged that he was having problems. He was a very personable person. He could not hurt a butterfly. He acknowledged the problem, and said it was his goal to learn the systems, and that he would put in every effort to do so. Despite his best efforts and the instructors, he was

not able to do it.

Guess said he had not had problems learning aviation systems in the past at UND. However, Vosika doubted Guess had studied systems of this complexity.

Eventually, they checked Guess out with ADIRS/NAV system, but then he had problems with other systems. The training managers put Guess on a performance improvement program (PIP). As part of the PIP, they gave him time gates for gaining proficiency. It did not take long before it was obvious he would not make the gates. At that point, Vosika told Guess they might as well call it quits. Guess was under a lot of pressure and he sort of breathed a sigh of relief and seemed to accept the fact that it was time to move on. He had put in a valiant effort to learn the systems and Vosika thought Guess accepted that, despite his effort and theirs, it wasn't going to happen.

When asked what level of proficiency was expected of ATIs at the end of their training program, Vosika stated the following. They learned a system early, having seen it taught twice in classroom. Then they learned it on their own, and practiced their PowerPoint presentations until they could pass a one-on-one teaching episode with Vosika or the other ATI instructor. The new ATIs did not always pass the one-on-one teaching trial the first time. After they passed the one-on-one, they were given the opportunity to teach pilots under the supervision of the ATI instructors. After that, the new ATIs were signed off to teach that particular system without supervision.

Mike was signed off to teach some modules without supervision - As of July 9, 1999, he was qualified to teach 7 of 16 systems subjects designated for week one of ground school. That was significantly less than the number of systems most of the new ATIs were checked out to teach. As of July 14, he had been checked out to teach ADIRS/NAV, abnormal (ECAM procedures), lights, radar, oxygen, TCAS, GPWS and EGPWS. That was one-half of what most of the other ATIs had been checked out on by that time.

When asked how Guess's performance compared with others of similar experience, Vosika said Guess was a very friendly person, got along well with other pilots in class. He was able to establish credibility. As far as performance in teaching, Guess did a decent job teaching. It just took a lot of effort to get him to same level of proficiency the other ATIs had, including the other low-time pilots. The pilot with the lowest time 250, was almost a genius in learning the A320. She had had four years of experience as a flight attendant. Vosika thought that might have helped.

Guess had no performance problems in non-technical areas. He had a wonderful personality. He got along well with the other ATIs. They all admired how hard he was working. Anything Vosika asked him to do, Guess would do it right away.

Of the 17 ATIs Vosika hired during his tenure as manager of the A320 training program, only Guess washed out of the ATI training program. He knew of a couple new ATIs who had left during training before he became manager. Guess was also the only ATI who had to be put on a PIP during his time as manager.

At first, they started trying to help him meet the goals that had been established. Then it became obvious he was not going to meet the goals. He was put on the program July 9, 1999. On August 5, Vosika wrote a letter of recommendation for Guess to help him secure other employment. He was not on the program for a full 30 days.

When Vosika met with Guess about seeking other employment, their discussion took place on a friendly basis. When Guess left, they had a going away cake for him. Nobody felt bad about it. Guess didn't feel bad about it. He picked up a job shortly after as a scheduler at Pan Am International Flight Academy. It was the same job he had held before he was hired as an ATI.

Guess was not terminated. Resigned was a better definition of what happened. NWA's human resources department could provide the official definition.

After he resigned, Vosika would see him in the building every once in a while, perhaps every two weeks. He said he was building flying time and continuing toward his goal of becoming a professional pilot.

Vosika never had any interactions with Guess outside of work.

Vosika never had any opportunity to personally evaluate his flying ability in a simulator or aircraft.

When asked if there was anything he could add that might help further the Board's investigation, Vosika said he did not think so.

When asked if he had any information that might be relevant to the Board's investigation that he had not been asked for specifically, Vosika said he did not think so.

When asked if there was anyone else he believed the Board should talk to, Vosika said the Board could talk to the other ATI instructor, but would probably receive no new information.

Guess never received a type rating on the A320. At that time, the company was moving toward giving ATIs a type rating. Vosika was the first instructor to receive a type rating. Many others followed. Mike was not there long enough to get one. They typically let the ATIs learn and teach for a while, then put them through the training program again and the ATIs would get a type rating at about the one year point.

When asked if there were any signs of difficulty in Guess's performance before the one on one evaluation of his systems knowledge, Vosika said when Guess went through the flight training, lessons one through seven, there were comments on the form indicating he was having trouble at that time. In most cases, the captain who was instructing attributed it to Guess's low experience level.

Performance during simulator lessons was graded in terms of three levels - exceeds, meets, or does not meet performance criteria. Guess's first two lessons were checked "meets performance

criteria,” the second two were not checked, the last one was checked “meets performance criteria.”

Before Guess came to work as an ATI, he worked for the Northwest Airlines Training Company (NATCO) as a scheduler. After he left the A320 program, he went back to that job, but the position had moved over to Pan Am International Flight Academy by that time.

When asked about the instructor comments on the simulator evaluation (OP-100) forms, Vosika said the following. Lesson 1 - “some items need to be repeated to ensure insight, understanding, Michael still does fairly well despite low time, experience.” Lesson 2 - “SA needs work, but consistent with his experience.” Lesson 3 - “He has seen the scope and magnitude of the job, but does not possess the skill to safely operate the aircraft. Sometimes has a hard time dealing with constructive criticism.” Lesson 4 - “Needs to work on his callouts. Keep hands on throttle, especially during approach.” That page of comments was full. Lesson 5 - The instructor commented on things Guess should do better - “you must keep your hands on throttles on all approaches. Barely passed lesson, mainly due to lack of flying experience.”

When asked if the type and amount of comments on the OP100 forms was unusual, Vosika said that, considering Guess’s level of experience it would not have been unusual to see occasional comments, but not as many as he had. Pilots with 1000 hours of flight experience or more, typically received no comments on the forms.

When asked if the other low-time ATIs had the same type of comments, Vosika said no. The 250-hour ATI was a quick learner, there were a couple others with 400 hours. One of the 400 hour ATIs did exceptionally well. The other struggled a little, but made it.

When asked if those simulator evaluation records were NWA’s best evaluation of Guess's flight aptitude, in terms of stick and rudder skills, Vosika said yes.

When asked if CRM was evaluated on the forms also, Vosika said CRM could be evaluated with written comments, but there was no box to check off.

When asked if CRM and crew coordination were a part of basic indoctrination training at NWA, Vosika said yes.

The name of the simulator instructor was present on the forms.

When asked if all ATIs except Mike made it through the ATI training program during his time as manager, Vosika said yes.

Interview: Lucy M. Guess, Mother of Michael Guess
Time/Date: 1600, December 13, 2002
Location: Telephone
Present: Bramble, Yeager

During the interview, Ms. Guess stated the following information.

She had formerly worked for the 3M Corporation, but was retired. She was not a pilot.

Michael lived at home with his mother and sister. He stayed at his girlfriend's house from time to time. He stayed at home with his mother two or three times a week. Michael's girlfriend's name was Jan Nelson.

Michael was at Ms. Guess's house Thursday evening, October 24, 2002. Then he left and went to his girlfriend's house. He called Ms. Guess back later and told her he was scheduled to fly a trip for Aviation Charter.

Michael had come over to Ms. Guess's house to eat, but the food had been eaten by other family members, so Mrs. Guess gave Michael some money to pick up a sandwich on the way to Nelson's house. It turned out that Nelson had cooked, so Michael ate what Nelson had made. After that, he called Ms. Guess and told her about the rip. Ms. Guess told him to go to bed and get some rest.

Tuesday and Wednesday night, October 22 and 23, 2002, Michael had also slept at Nelson's house. He was supposed to come back early after the flight on Friday, October 25, 2002, and he was going to come back to the house and take us out to lunch. He said he would be back early.

When asked what time Michael came over to her house on Thursday, October 24, 2002, Ms. Guess said he came over in the early evening and stayed about an hour. He sat at the dining room table and talked about jobs and the situation with the slow economy. He came over about 1800, and stayed about an hour.

When asked how Michael felt about flying for Aviation Charter, Ms. Guess said, "He just always said everyone was so nice."

Michael's mood during his phone conversation with Ms. Guess on the evening of October 24, 2002 was excited. He was excited to fly. He always was.

Ms. Guess did not see Michael on Wednesday, October 23, 2002. She did speak to him on the phone in the early morning. They had routine conversation. He was at Nelson's house when they spoke.

She did not speak with Michael at all on Friday morning, October 25, 2002. He did not call her like he usually did in the morning because he had called her Thursday.

Ms. Guess spoke to Michael on the phone Tuesday, October 22, but did not see him. They had routine conversation.

Ms. Guess could not recall Michael's work schedule the week of the accident. She did not recall how many trips he made, probably not more than one other trip. He used to work for Pan Am during the day, but he had been laid off before that week.

Michael's daytime activities the week of the accident took place at home. He would have washed his clothes, and the uniform he had to wear. He washed his clothes at Ms. Guess's house. He did not do much else. If he was not washing clothes or sitting in the dining room, he would be at the airport, watching planes land. He loved his job. He did not have to go out and get another job. Ms. Guess took care of him.

Michael had not symptoms of illness, such as cold or flu, the week of the accident.

Michael seemed happy.

When asked if she knew what Michael had had to eat in the days before the accident, Ms. Guess said Michael had come over to her house on Thursday evening, October 24, 2002 because Ms. Guess's sister had made some porterhouse steaks, but another family member beat him to the house and there were no steaks left when Michael arrived. Michael's sister fixed a meal for him at Ms. Guess's house once on Tuesday or Wednesday October 22 or 23, 2002. He liked that, but he was not a real big eater. He did not eat a lot.

When asked about his mood that week, Ms. Guess said Michael was always happy and he was happy the week of the accident.

When asked how Michael was getting along with his girlfriend, Ms. Guess said she thought they got along okay. They had been friends for a long time.

Michael had routine plans for the coming weekend.

Michael had not gone on a vacation lately. He was on call most of the time.

When asked if Michael had had any significant changes in his health in the twelve months before the accident, Ms. Guess said his health was good. He had had some work done on his teeth at one point. He had to have one removed. Ms. Guess could not remember when that was done exactly. It was much earlier than a month before the accident.

When asked if Michael had had any significant changes in his finances in the twelve months before the accident, Ms. Guess said Michael would always get her on the phone if he needed help. What he could not pay, Ms. Guess would pay for him. She paid some of his bills. She told him to concentrate on his flying, saying it may be hard, but he should stick with it. As long as he kept on that path she would give him anything he needed. Guess's need for her financial assistance did not appear to cause him stress. Ms. Guess did not know if Nelson was helping him out financially as well.

Michael had experienced no significant personal or family changes in the twelve months before the accident.

Michael had known Nelson since high school. They been friends since then. She did not know when they began dating. She did not know when they got engaged. Michael said he could not get married yet because he could not support Nelson. He said soon he should have a good job. Ms. Guess was not aware of plans for a wedding date. Michael had no plans for anything but finding a flying job. Everything else was on hold.

When asked about Michael's general health, Ms. Guess said he was always in good health. He underwent regular aviation physicals and passed them. He did not drink or smoke. His vision was good. He did not need glasses. His hearing was good.

Guess did not use prescription medication.

Guess had wanted to fly since he was a little boy. He loved airplanes. They were all he talked about. He met a Tuskegee airman named Colonel Woffert, and the Colonel started talking to him. A couple of those guys showed him what he had to do to become a pilot. They were older men. Ms. Guess did not know how Michael met them. They had him under their wing. He used to go down to Alabama and help out at a school for Negro airman.

Guess's long term plans were to fly for a big airline.

When asked how confident Michael was in his own flying ability, Ms. Guess said, "He knew he was good." She related a story he had told her describing an occasion when he was flying with an older airman and they had to land on a short runway. Michael landed successfully without assistance from the more experienced pilot. The more experienced pilot told Michael he was surprised Michael was able to perform the landing without assistance.

When asked if Michael's employers gave him commendations or awards for his flying performance, Ms. Guess said some did.

When asked if Michael ever experienced disciplinary action as a result of his flying performance, she said no, except for one time at Northwest Airlines. His supervisor at Northwest would not let him go to Duluth for drill duty. Michael stayed in Minneapolis even though he was supposed to go to Duluth and he later received a letter from the National Guard. That was the only problem he ever told Ms. Guess about.

When asked why Michael left Northwest Airlines, Ms. Guess said the airline closed down some of the things they were doing at the center in Minneapolis and Michael began working with Pan Am. He was not fired. Before he went to work for Pan Am, he was helping with the simulators at Northwest Airlines.

When asked how Michael felt about leaving Northwest and going to work for Pan Am, Ms. Guess said it did not make any difference to him.

Michael loved working for Aviation Charter.

When asked how Michael felt about the training at Aviation Charter, Ms. Guess said it was okay with him. She never heard him complain about it.

When asked how Michael felt about flying the King Airs at Aviation Charter, Ms. Guess said she never heard him complain about the airplanes.

When asked if Michael said he ever felt pressured to fly, Ms. Guess said no. She had told him many times that if he was tired, he should say thanks, but he could not make it. He had given up trips once in a while, not often. He was able to turn down trips if he needed to.

Michael never talked about flying with specific captains. He said most all of them were nice. He was all business.

Michael never talked to her about flying Senator Wellstone. Ms. Guess did not know he sometimes flew the Senator until after the accident.

When asked what Michael did in the military, Ms. Guess said he was in the Air Force reserves up in Duluth. She did not know what he did exactly. He did not have a chance to stay there long. She did not know the dates. It was too far a drive.

When asked if he was still in the military, Ms. Guess said, "He got knocked out of it." Someone at Northwest Airlines would not let him go for drill duty. They released him from the reserves and Ms. Guess hired an attorney to see why. When asked what came of her effort to look into Michael's release, Ms. Guess said it had not been going on long. She had not worked with the lawyer much. She was hoping to clear Michael's name.

Interview: Karen M. Brady, Captain, Aviation Charter
Time/Date: 1745, December 13, 2002
Location: NTSB Headquarters, via telephone
Present: Bramble

During the interview, Captain Brady stated the following information:

Her date of hire with Aviation Charter was August 1999. Her initial duties at Aviation Charter involved flying cargo in a Beech 18. In 2001, she was hired by Champion Airlines, but she was furloughed and returned to work at Aviation Charter. Her total flight time was 4,300 hours.

She flew with Guess off and on through the summer. Guess was usually on call, and she flew numerous Life Link flights for a while. These were short-notice flights, so Guess was often assigned as the SIC. She had flown with him about twelve times. When asked to characterize Guess' flying skills relative to the other copilots at Aviation Charter, she said he was average. He needed a little coaching, here and there, but most of the other SICs did also.

Her last flight with Guess was on October 21, 2002. There was nothing unusual about the flight. It was a long day. Guess flew a VOR approach during the trip and they broke out of the clouds into VFR conditions at around 1,500 feet. There was nothing unusual about that particular approach.

When Guess had been flying consistently, she had to do less coaching. When he hadn't been flying for a while, he would go back to his old habits. He had a habit of putting both hands on the control wheel and sometimes she would end up working the power. However, she did not remember having to do a whole lot for Guess on that particular VOR approach. She just had to remind him where his hand was relative to the throttles. She did not have to operate the power for him like she had in the past. She did not have to physically help him in any other way. She said she handled the radios during that flight.

She had seen Richard Conry in passing, but never flew or chatted with him. When asked if she ever heard the SICs talking about Conry, she said the SICs talked about Conry. When asked what they said about him, she said they didn't say anything good. When asked what specifically they said, she said they reported that he would always let the SIC fly. He would just look out the window and let the SIC fly. Many SICs did not even know what Conry's skills were because he always let them fly. When Conry flew, he would always fly with the autopilot engaged.

When asked about the capabilities of the autopilot, she said it was not very sophisticated. It was capable of performing some coupled approaches. She did not completely trust the system, preferring to fly approaches manually.

When asked how the other pilots reacted when they learned Conry was the PIC on the accident aircraft, she said there were mixed reactions.

When asked if there was anything she could add that might help further the Board's investigation, she said no. Maintenance was pretty good at Aviation Charter. She had never had a problem with maintenance.

When asked if there was anyone else she believed the Board should talk to, she said the Eagle Jet SICs might be able to provide additional information.

When asked if there had been any changes at Aviation Charter since the accident, she said no. She added that she would like to see the company adopt standard operating procedures if they were going to continue to use SICs on the flights.

Interview: Connie Lewis, State Director, Minnesota U.S. Senate Offices
Time/Date: 1100, December 17, 2002
Location: NTSB Headquarters, via telephone
Present: Bramble

During the interview, Ms. Lewis stated the following information.

She was not aware of any reason why captain on the accident flight might have been confused about whether Senator Wellstone was supposed to depart as scheduled for Eveleth on the morning of October 25, 2002. There were no conflicting plans.

The decision for the Senator to go to the funeral in Eveleth was probably made a day in advance. That would have been when Aviation Charter was contacted. Lewis was not in touch with the captain because the trip scheduling was being handled out of the campaign office.

The usual instructions to Aviation Charter were to call a designated staffer in the morning and let them know if there were any problems. The morning of October 25, 2002, this would probably have been Pat Johnson. It was possible that Conry might have called Tom Lopic as well, but Lewis did not know whether he had done that or not. Lopic had worked in the senate office and the captain was familiar with him, but Lopic was working on the campaign at the time of the accident.

Lewis spoke with Lopic the morning of the accident and he said there was some question about whether they would make the flight, because of weather. It happened every now and then that the pilot would call early in the morning and say the ceiling was too low, and they would not recommend going. However, sometimes the weather would improve after that and they would say it was okay to go. Lewis was not involved in any decisions that morning first hand, but she understood it was one of those mornings. Initially the captain was concerned about the weather, but then he came back and said it would be okay to fly.

Lewis did not know why Conry would have had the idea that there was conflict between the senate and the campaign offices regarding the senator's schedule. The campaign was calling the shots. Lewis remained involved in the decision making about the schedule, but once a decision was made, there wasn't any conflict. The only thing she was aware of was that on the morning of October 25, 2002, there was discussion about whether it was okay to fly because of the weather. They would not have made the decision to go if the pilot had said it was not okay to go. There was no disagreement.

When asked how Conry came to be one of the Senator's regular pilots, Lewis said, she and Lopic and the scheduler in the senate office were comfortable with Deb Johnson. Then one day in January 2002 Aviation Charter sent Conry as the pilot and the Senator was not happy about it. He really did not like it that that happened. It almost never happened because they made a point of telling the company they wanted to know in advance who the pilot was. If they did not know the scheduled pilot, they would always ask for a resume. They did not have a resume for Conry. Lopic was flying with Paul the first time Conry served as captain for the senator and Lopic

handled the senator's concern about the last minute change. Lewis remembered Lopic saying to the senate office scheduler that he relayed information to the Senator that Conry had commercial flying experience and that, while he was new at Aviation Charter, he had lots of experience.

When asked if there were any problems on any of Conry's flights with the senator, Lewis said she was not aware of any problems. There was a flight in April 2002 with the Senator and Lopic and someone with the Army Corps of Engineers, scheduled so the Senator could examine an area where some flooding had occurred. This was early on a Saturday morning. Conry was flying and when he got up there he concluded it was not safe to land, so they circled for a bit and then came back. After that, the Senator made the comment that Conry was a very cautious pilot and he approved of that.

The Senator was not comfortable flying and they always erred on the side of caution. He did not tolerate turbulence well.

Conry was quite good about calling in the morning before a flight. Occasionally a pilot would not call in the morning, but Conry was very good about doing so.

When asked if the senate office was as concerned with the assignment of copilots as they were with the assignment of captains, Lewis said they were not as concerned about the copilots. Aviation Charter did not have copilots on all the flights until 2001.

The senate office scheduler would not have had any contact with the pilots at all. Pat Johnson, in the campaign office, would have handled the scheduling. Lopic may have had a conversation with Conry that morning. Lewis spoke with Lopic at around 0800 or 0830. He said there was some question about whether they could fly, because of the weather. They weren't due to leave until about 930. Lewis said there was still some time, and wished him luck in sorting out the trip. Lopic was not against taking the flight. He just said there were some questions because of weather. The Senator's staff always considered it up to the pilot to make the call.

Interview: Jim Herd, President, Lyman Lumber
Time/Date: 1000, December 19, 2002
Location: NTSB Headquarters, via telephone
Present: Kirchgessner

During the interview, Mr. Herd stated the following information:

Richard Conry was a builder a good customer for Lyman Lumber. He bought most of his building material from them.

He said Conry rented a C-172 from Cloud Nine Flying Club and the two of them made about 50 flights together. Conry would fly him for both business and pleasure. He did not pay Richard for the flights. Conry enjoyed to fly and wanted to build his hours.

He said that Conry was the pickiest and most careful pilot he had ever flown with. He checked everything on every flight. He said nothing unsafe or unusual ever happened on any of their flights. He said he flew a charter at Aviation Charter and Conry was the pilot. Nothing unusual happened on that flight.

He said he could never remember flying in a twin-engine airplane with Conry. He could not remember ever making an instrument approach with Conry. The weather was usually good. He said Conry told him that he flew fishermen on trips to Canada.

Conry stopped by to visit with him once or twice a year. He said Conry was bummed out that he had to go to jail. He also said Conry was excited about getting a job with American Eagle.

He and his wife and Conry and his wife would often fly to various places together. He said Conry was a good pilot and often jokingly said after a flight, "We cheated death one more time."

He said that Conry always was meticulously filling out what appeared to be his logbook.