Notre Europe

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Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

An analysis of think tanks specialised in European policy issues in the enlarged European Union

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Notre Europe

Notre Europe is an independent research and policy planning group about Europe, its past, its civilisations, its march towards unification and its future prospects. The group was founded by Jacques Delors in the fall of 1996. Its team includes researchers from different countries. As a think tank on European integration, the research group seeks to contribute to the public debate on Europe through analysis and by putting forward relevant policy proposals.

Notre Europe participates in the public debate in many ways : by publishing studies and by bringing together external researchers and thinkers to contribute to current research on European matters. The documents published are aimed at decision makers, academics and journalists in Europe. All of its output is published on its website. Notre Europe also organises seminars and conferences, sometimes in collaboration with other organisations and media.

Its President and its board can take a stand on important matters concerning the future of the European Union. The Board administers the association and direct the association's publications programme. An International Committee, composed of high level European personalities, meets once or twice a year to discuss a strategic European issue.

Foreword

It is always interesting to watch the arrival of a word onto the European political and media scene. That of "think tank" seems to be on the way to establishing itself in the lexicon – some might say jargon - of European discourse.

Paradoxically, the development of think tanks in Europe has hardly been "thought" about. The phenomenon itself is relatively new and few studies have concentrated specifically on the subject. By focusing on the development of think tanks in the 25 member States of the European Union which are interested – exclusively or in large part – in the analysis of EU institutions and policies, the present survey therefore seeks to explore largely uncharted research territory.

The exercise was carried out by a team of external researchers led by Stephen Boucher, with the support of Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul, Secretary General of Notre Europe. It is not, of course, unrelated to Notre Europe's analysis of what role it may play today. But it goes further than that by presenting as in-depth an examination as possible of think tanks working on European affairs, both from the descriptive angle (which mission, activities, resources ?) and from the analytical one (which strengths, weaknesses, influences, challenges and future trends ?).

Have the groups that are dedicated to independent research and the formulation of innovative public policies not become essential cogs in the complex mechanisms which today's "public opinion" democracies have become ? Is it not therefore their duty to (re)think how they operate ?

Is this question not even more relevant for the European Union, criticised for too long for its lack of appeal to the ordinary citizen, in what has, sometimes too hastily, been dubbed the European « democratic deficit » ?

Do think tanks have a flourishing future ahead of them? Will they be closed circles of influence or architects of a true European democracy ? How will they reconcile scientific rigour with communication requirements ? How will they respond to the challenge of their "europeanisation" both in terms of their internal organisation and transnational cooperation ?

These are some of the questions on which Notre Europe wished to shed some light, with the ambition to contribute to the development of the sector while allowing further research on the same topic.

With 10 new members States and the prospect of further enlargement, the European Union is probably experiencing one of the most challenging transitions in its history. Now more than ever, the EU will need to dip into its "think tanks".

I believe that this analysis of think tanks will be of interest to both observers and actors of the European construction, those who know that any great project starts with the idea that opens the way.

Jacques Delors

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- Ideas and the shapers of ideas have always been central to the European 'project'. Potentially, they have an important role to play in the formulation of public policies, in democratic decision-making, and in providing support to Member States and the European Union's diplomatic efforts. Yet the groups that seek to generate and disseminate policy ideas related to the European continent –'Euro-think tanks'– have never been studied as a distinct community within the 25 E.U. Member States.
- Using nine criteria derived from previous literature, 149 think tanks have been identified and analysed. 36 are 'Euro-specific' organisations that specialise in European policy issues. For the remaining 113, Europe is a significant research area among other issues.
- They employ nearly 3,000 researchers working more or less closely on policies related to Europe. Communities of researchers working within 'Euro-think tanks' are particularly large in Germany, Austria, Poland, and the U.K. They are relatively underdeveloped in France and Italy. Only 5 per cent work with E.U. actors from Brussels, the rest are based in the Member States.
- Overall, think tank 'supply' is relatively limited, as the sector is somewhat fragmented and focuses on issues – such as institutional matters – where there is significant overlap. Certain policy areas – such as the environment – are relatively neglected. Euro-think tanks' audience is limited, as well as the range of methods they use. Organisations that use a mode of operation founded in Anglo-American practice seem to predominate.
- Qualitative interviews confirm that Euro-think tanks, although welcomed by policy-makers and observers of the sector, have not yet found their place fully in European policy-making: the value they add is not perceived clearly, they are seen as moderately useful, and even sometimes elitist. Overall, they are believed to have a limited impact on policies and public opinion.
- Enlargement has not affected Euro-think tanks' operations much. Academia's increasing entrepreneurship throughout Europe, growing competition, both from within and outside the sector, and, most importantly, financial difficulties due to reduced public funding are however reshaping the market.
- Euro-think tanks are seeking to meet changes in their operating environment through more deliberate fund-raising, networks and cooperation, greater specialisation, financial transparency, and even performance measurement. Traditional perceptions of independence and their role vis-à-vis the mass public are challenged.
- Yet the sector is also getting stronger as smaller, more specialised and militant players join the 'market of ideas'. Actors adapt to new financial imperatives, learn the 'advocacy' game and how to use the media.

Introduction

The European Union as we know it today is, essentially, the result of an intellectual process. The idea of unifying European countries which had been divided and in conflict throughout history was born in the mind of a few visionary men and women, promoted by militant organisations, and implemented by purposeful politicians. Having overcome many obstacles, the unique and complex European institutional framework that we know today, which governs most of everyday life for over 450 million citizens, illustrates a process by which a political project emerged from analysis and was translated into reality. Some will even add that this project has met its goal of ensuring peace in Europe, and even, despite its drawbacks, of promoting the public good. The actions of a small number of experts, academics and prominent intellectuals are therefore at the heart of the integration process.

In this perspective, the history of European construction illustrates the ambition of think tanks that specialise in European matters. Think tanks are indeed organisations dedicated to researching and disseminating policy solutions that aim to contribute to the policy-making process. However, despite a few national studies, what do we know about these groups within the European Union? Notre Europe, itself an independent research institute based in Paris and created by Jacques Delors, has decided to investigate them in the aftermath of the enlargement to 25 Member States. It has therefore asked an outside team to "analyse think tanks based in the European Union that follow European matters, either think tanks that deal, even partially, with issues related to the European construction process and that seek to achieve transnational influence, or purely national think tanks which focus their research on European issues."

The authors of this report have therefore tried to identify and describe these organisations rigorously during the months of July, August, and September 2004. Who are they ? What is their contribution to community construction and decision-making processes ? How do they operate ? Which are the influential players and what are the factors of influence ? Has enlargement to 25 Member States affected their role? These are some of the initial questions which this report has sought to answer.

NINE CRITERIA TO IDENTIFY THINK TANKS

Before sharing the results of our work, what do we actually mean by "think tanks?" This expression is used and misused, within the think tank sector itself, by the media, and even sometimes by specialists. We have tried in this survey to use a definition that is accurate and covers all relevant organisations. Our definition is therefore founded on previous academic work (Weiss, 1992 ; Stone, Denham, Garnett, 1998 ; McGann, Weaver, 2000 ; Sherrington, 2000 ; Stone, 2000a/b). It includes nine criteria: think tanks are [1] permanent organisations, [2] that specialise in the production of public policy solutions, [3] thanks to in-house staff dedicated to research. [4] They generate an original production of ideas, analysis and advice, [5] which is meant to be communicated to policy-makers and public opinion (incidentally, think tanks should therefore have a website). [6] Such organisations are not responsible for

governmental activities. [7] They seek, more generally, to maintain their research independence and not to be committed to particular interests. [8] Their main activity is not to train nor to grant diplomas. [9] Finally, their implicit or explicit goal is to contribute to the public good, unlike purely commercial groups.

Our nine criteria : think tanks...

- are permanent
- specialise in the production of public policy solutions
- have in-house staff dedicated to research
- produce ideas, analysis, and advice
- put emphasis as their primary aim on communicating their research to policymakers and public opinion (and therefore have a website)
- are not responsible for government operations
- aim to maintain their research freedom and not to be beholden to any specific interest
- are not degree granting and training is not their primary activity
- seek, explicitly or implicitly to act in the public interest

Annex 3 explains how these criteria were chosen. They were applied as rigorously as possible, in order to distinguish consistently think tanks from related organisations, such as research centres that are primarily academic (e.g. CAP in Munich is included, but not CERI in Paris), organisations that perform activities on behalf of governments (EIPA is not included as a think tank but mentioned as an organisation that has similar characteristics), and interest and pressure groups (the International Crisis Group in Brussels is not listed, unlike ISIS Europe).[1] On the other hand, we have also tried to apply these criteria flexibly. This may at first seem paradoxical, but is unavoidable: our criteria remain in part subjective and absolute rigour is not realistic. Omitting a criterion was sometimes favoured over excluding artificially an important organisation. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (see Section 2.1) is an example of this double requirement of rigour and flexibility, as are several German institutes. Our list, despite the care taken in selecting organisations, therefore remains partial. It is important however to stress that this list is not meant to provide a label of « think tank authenticity » to the organisations surveyed, but, more realistically, to select our population as consistently as possible within a very diverse sector.[2]

EURO-THINK TANKS IN THE 25 E.U. MEMBER STATES

Among the 670 'thinking cells' listed in today's 25 E.U. Member States by McGann and Weaver in 2000, this survey focused on those that deal with European affairs in a broad sense. We shall refer to institutes that analyse political problems related to Europe as a geographic whole, including international affairs issues, as "Euro-think tanks." We have studied them in two stages, according to the following distinction, which we will use throughout this report :

TABLE 1

Euro think tanks

'EURO-SPECIFIC' RESEARCH CENTERS

deal *primarily* with European matters,

- either in general (as does *Notre Europe*, the Centre for European Reform in Great Britain or the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels)
- or in relation to a sectoral policy (as does IRI in The Netherlands).

'EURO-ORIENTED' RESEARCH CENTERS

- Europe is a distinct and significant research programme, studied alongside other issues, as is the case for many think tanks that specialise in international relations (such as the Institute of International Strategic Studies in Lisbon).

Armed with the criteria outlined above, a typology of think tanks is also helpful to analyse the sector, while acknowledging that reality never fits neatly in general categories. Analysts usually distinguish four categories of think tanks (in particular Weiss, 1992; McGann, Weaver, 2000) :

1. **Academic think tanks / universities without students**, or what Weiss calls "analytic organisations", put a premium on high standards of academic research in their staff and production. They "examine the entire body of evidence available, not simply what is consistent with favoured policy conclusions. In addition, they handle their evidence systematically, applying methods consistently." (Park, 2004)
2. **Contract researchers** are similar to academic think tanks, but differ primarily in their sources of funding, which comes essentially from contracts with government agencies.
3. **Advocacy tanks** produce ideas and recommendations that consistently adhere to a particular set of core beliefs or values. "They tend to view their role in the policy making process as winning the war of ideas rather than as a disinterested search for the best policies." (Park, 2004)
4. **Political party *thinks tanks*** "are organised around the issues and platform of a political party and are often staffed by current or former party officials, politicians and party members. The agenda is frequently heavily influenced by the needs of the party."

For practical reasons of time and resources, the survey is limited to the enlarged European Union. Clearly though, important organisations that exist beyond today's borders of the E.U. should be looked at in the future.[3] Please note also that this survey, also for practical reasons, does not take into account the many research organisations dedicated to Europe that have been created and have disappeared in the past, although such an analysis would most likely yield interesting lessons for existing bodies. Although limited to existing think tanks dealing with European policy matters, which headquarters are based in today's E.U. Member States, this survey provides, we believe, as useful basis for further research as well as elements of analysis that are valid more generally for think tanks in Europe and in the rest of the world.

AN EXPLORATORY AND INDEPENDENT SURVEY

The authors are sole responsible for the methodological and content choices made in this report. The survey was conducted on behalf of Notre Europe, but in full independence. The information provided comes from public data provided by the think tanks themselves, in particular through their websites and annual reports, as well as from individual interviews with representatives from nearly all the organisations analysed. In total, 129 interviews were conducted throughout Europe, including 87 managers of think tanks, 21 political decision-makers, 11 academics and 10 journalists (listed in Annex 3). We have provided the opportunity to all the organisations mentioned to check the data published. Nevertheless, it is possible that some data may have been omitted or may need to be amended, that certain classification choices will seem debatable, not to mention the fact that part of the information provided will by nature soon need to be updated. We still hope that this report offers a reasonably exhaustive and accurate picture of the sector, albeit exploratory. We invite readers to share with Notre Europe any amendment they feel is required.

FIVE SECTIONS FOR A PRELIMINARY SECTORAL ANALYSIS

The report includes five sections :

1. The first puts today's Euro-think tanks in a historical and theoretical context and underscores the gap between their potentially very significant role for European integration and the relative lack of knowledge of their activities.
2. We then give a factual and analytical overview of the Euro-think tank population studied in order to understand how they work, what topics they research, both horizontally and country by country. Annex 1 complements this section by providing a list of the 149 think tanks surveyed, which detailed description can be found on Notre Europe's website (www.notre-europe.asso.fr).
3. The viewpoint of the potential recipients of Euro-think tanks' work as well as observers of the European policy making process – politicians, journalists and academics – is then provided.
4. We subsequently examine Euro-think tanks' operating environment in order to identify the main challenges and dilemmas which they currently face.
5. Finally, we outline possible developments for the sector, as well as a few elements of further research, as our survey could obviously not cover all possible aspects related to our population.

Annex 2 provides an initial overview of think tank networks. Annex 3 provides methodological information and Annex 4 a list of references. Altogether, these different elements aim to allow a first structural analysis of the sector, according to the framework provided by Oster (1995).

The objective of this study, which is partly academic and practical in nature, is to allow European think tank managers, as well as decision-makers and academics interested in such

organisations, to know the sector better. We thus hope to help them identify new ways to work together, to help generate new research projects, and encourage new vocations, as well as greater dialogue and the spreading of best practices. We thereby also hope to enhance the sector's contribution to the process of community integration. We indeed believe that think tanks can contribute to building a more prosperous Europe that innovates and is close to its citizens.

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[1] These different criteria were checked directly with the organisations surveyed or through their Website. The table in Annex 1 does not provide all the data collected, which could not be provided in this report for practical reasons.

[2] Several "melting pots of thought" (Féat, 2004) with interesting activities are not covered in our study. Institutional groups, such as the Scientific Council for Government Policy in the Netherlands (WRR), university centres, such as the European University Institute in Florence, or those which are only indirectly interested in European questions, like the Fondation Jean Jaures, will nonetheless be mentioned because they have functions which are complementary to or in competition with the institutes studied here. We have also excluded from the study two or three organisations which did not possess a website – a sign of their lack of capacity to disseminate effectively their research results, one of the two essential elements of think tanks' work today.

[3] For example, the European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication Management (EURISC) in Bucharest, the Center for Strategic Studies/21st Century Foundation, also in Bucharest, the Institute for International Relations (IMO) in Zagreb, or the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). The think tanks which have chosen to base themselves in Brussels but which have a clear European vocation as opposed to Belgian – such as the European Institute for Asian Studies as opposed to IRRI (the Belgian research institute specialising in international affairs) – have not been classed as Belgian think tanks, but are considered in a separate European Union category. We therefore have 26 "country" reports.

1 European think tanks : limited knowledge, important stakes

The study of think tanks is a relatively recent discipline, in particular within the European Union. We draw a parallel here between the academic study of think tanks and their emergence at a European level (1.1). We then place the study in a historical context (1.2). Finally, we highlight the stakes which are behind a better understanding of think tanks' contribution to community decision-making processes (1.3).

1.1 THE STUDY OF THINK TANKS IS RECENT, ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE

The specific study of independent policy research institutes as political actors is very recent. Whereas the first book in the United States dedicated specifically to think tanks was published 33 years ago (Dickson, 1971, cited by Stone, 1996), a quick look at our bibliography (Annex 3) – as well as references of other studies – shows that nearly everything that has been published on think tanks is less than eight years of age, apart from isolated studies of individual research institutes written in the 1980s.[4] A significant proportion of the existing literature is North American, then British, and focuses therefore on these two geographical areas, although a few recent publications have made up for this exclusive Anglo-American bias (Stone, Denham Garnett, 1998; McGann, Weaver, 2000). In any case, if several academics have investigated think tanks within the European Union (in particular Sherrington, 2000), and if others have conducted multi-country studies, nobody has yet examined specifically think tanks that specialise in European matters within the enlarged European Union.

"The lack of attention to think tanks illuminates the biases of social scientists as much as it reflects the late development and characteristics of these organisations"

Does this reflect the limited influence of think tanks in European politics or a lack of academic interest? Stone (2000a) explains that "the lack of attention to think tanks illuminates the biases of social scientists as much as it reflects the late development and characteristics of these organisations" as think tanks became more visible in the US and Western Europe only after the mid-1970s, when they became increasingly advocacy and media-oriented. As "these organisations were extremely few in number", she adds that specialists had "little cause to address these organisations." In the case of Europe, indeed "most of the exclusively EU-oriented think tanks only emerged in the 1980s." (Sherrington, 2000) She also contends that the difficulty to define and classify think tanks has deterred scholars from accounting for the role of think tanks in politics. However, this argument "is a misconception," replies Stone (1996), who reminds us: "Think tanks have been around for most of this century." Indeed, several organisations within our sample, such as the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Federal Trust in the U.K. were established 85 and 60 years ago respectively. Stone argues that "what the recent spate of books indicates is that think tanks have been rediscovered and deemed important" and that "the myth that think tanks are objective and

non-partisan research institutes once lulled many scholars into overlooking their participation in the political sphere."

By contrast, research on the role played by interest groups in the formulation of policies at the E.U. level is comparatively extensive and diverse (Greenwood 1997; 2003). [5] Similarly, there has been relatively little research on E.U. think tanks and the role they play in the construction of the E.U. compared to the United States. Sherrington (2000), in one of her several reports on think tanks in the EU, in fact argues that "the extent of think tank activity at the European Union level has largely been ignored." This survey, although exploratory in nature, seeks to contribute to a growing literature on think tanks in line with recent research [6] :

- It provides data on recent organisations as well as countries not considered so far. The approach is comparative, although a rigorous and fully comparative analysis would require a more systematic look at the political and institutional contexts within which think tanks operate in each Member State and at the E.U. level.[7] The report is therefore also fairly descriptive in nature, as is most of the existing literature on think tanks in Europe.
- Borrowing from the epistemic model, this report also tries to present think tanks in the wider policy community of European affairs by providing some insights into think tanks' relations with other European power elites and how they try to influence public policy at different stages of the policy cycle.
- This study also finds its place in the series of recent publications which have investigated the increasingly transnational nature of think tanks' operations. Whereas most of the original production focused on think tanks within their national environment, several recent papers have indeed examined the internationalisation efforts of think tanks (Stone, 2000a/b; Sherrington, 2000). [8]

1.2 THINK TANKS, AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The history of European integration is above all a history of ideas. From the original hopes for post-war European unity shown by resistance fighters in World War II, to Jean Monnet's idea for a European Coal and Steel Community, which laid the foundations for the EEC, through to Economic and Monetary Union in the 1990s, the process of integration has always been driven forward by ideas. Such ideas have been important because often they introduced unique experiments, untested elsewhere in the world. The role of think tanks in this picture is clear. As promoters of new policy ideas, they have the potential to stimulate debate amongst European leaders, and publics, about the future shape which the European Union could take.

EXPLAINING POST-WAR THINK TANK GROWTH IN EUROPE

There was a considerable growth in the number of European think tanks in the 20th century. McGann and Weaver estimated the number in today's 25 E.U. Member States in 1998 to stand at approximately 670. The majority of these were created in the period after World War II. Since the regime changes in Eastern Europe after 1989 there has been a rapid growth in think

tank numbers there too. What explains this high level of growth? Of course, a major factor was the emergence of stable democratic governments in Western Europe in the post-war period. Think tanks require democracy to function because they need to express their views freely. Thus, the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in Germany, Austria and Italy from 1943 to 1945, the end of dictatorship in Spain, Portugal and Greece in the 1970s, and the political changes in Eastern Europe after 1989 allowed think tanks to prosper.

A second important factor is the ever-greater complexity of government in the post-war era. As the size and functions of the state grew, there was an increasing need for specialist policy knowledge, which could not always be supplied by traditional civil servants. Think tanks have partly filled this gap by acting as a source of policy advice to governments. The process of 'contracting out' of many state functions during the 1980s and 1990s, for example the privatisation of government agencies, also further increased governments' dependency on private and other non-state actors, such as consultants, auditors, think tanks, and other advisors, for independent evaluation of policy performance.

A third factor is the increased openness of government in recent decades. More attempts are now made to engage with civil society groups, for example through consultation exercises at the policy planning stage. This has increased the chance for think tanks to influence government thinking. Such a trend has been visible in the Member States and in Brussels, where the European Commission has pursued an active policy of including civil society and other groups, such as NGOs and think tanks, in decision-making.

THINK TANKS' EUROPEAN 'TRANSNATIONALISATION'

The think tanks which were created in the early part of the 20th century were essentially national research institutes.[9] Their names denoted in many ways an international outlook—for example, the Royal Institute for International Affairs in Britain (1920) or the Kiel Institute for World Economics in Germany (1914)–but their main locus of activity was the nation-state and its place in the world alongside other nation-states. This situation probably pertained for think tanks until the 1970s. Although there were a small number of 'regional' think tanks created in the years immediately after the war which sought to both examine and promote moves toward European integration–e.g. Federal Trust (1945), Institut für europäische Politik (1959), Istituto Affari Internazionali (1965)—very few organisations had developed links which went beyond their national borders.

In order to explain why European think tanks' primary research focus and main audiences became increasingly 'transnationalised' from the 1970s onwards, we need to examine two questions: the growing importance of international policy-making fora and the growth in E.U. power and competences.

First, public policy is increasingly being determined by governments acting together within international fora, such as the WTO, the UN, the G8, or indeed the E.U. This is one element of the process of globalisation. Because think tanks generally seek to influence centres of decision-making power, as these fora grew in status, it was logical that think tank activities should have migrated there. Many think tanks now also target international, in addition to

national, decision-makers: i.e. diplomats, national politicians and policy experts working at this level, and civil servants in supranational or intergovernmental organisations.[10] The shift in focus made by think tanks to this level is of course merely one example of the recent, more general expansion of the international non-profit sector on the international scene, a process which has led to a similarly rapid growth in NGOs and other lobbying groups operating here. There are also wider structural factors which have facilitated this process of transnationalisation. For example, the reduction in journey times and improved transport links means that people can easily cross borders to attend meetings, seminars and conferences. The development of information technology has had a major impact too, for example by enabling research and project collaboration to take place via e-mail.

This process of the transnationalisation of think tank work has been more pronounced in Europe than elsewhere because of the development of the European Union. This has created an environment of multi-level governance where decisions are increasingly taken between—rather than just by—governments within the E.U. institutions and where there are multiple opportunities for think tanks seeking to influence decision-makers. This process is best understood by reference to the impact which external political and economic events have always had on think tank development in the 20th century—whether at the national or global level. For example, think tanks studying international affairs first emerged in the 1920s at a time when Europe's governments were concerned about the stability of the international order. Think tanks studying global disarmament, peace and strategic questions emerged during the Cold War. In the UK, free market, 'advocacy' think tanks, such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (1955) and Centre for Policy Studies (1974), grew in importance only when Britain's governing elite lost faith in Keynesianism in the 1970s.[11] Therefore, likewise for the Euro-specific think tanks, these grew in number only from the mid-1980s onwards as the power of the European Community grew (and the second category think tanks also began at this stage to focus much more on European issues). It should come as no surprise that think tanks studying European and E.U. questions grew in numbers as the European Union's powers and competences expanded from the mid-1980s onwards.

There are, however, other factors which explain transnationalisation within the E.U. context. One is the question of funding. The availability of European funding for think tanks which engage in research partnerships with think tanks and other organisations across the Union has driven forward greater collaboration in this sector. (This was reported by think tank directors and will be explored in Section 4). Another factor is the increased demand by actors in the domestic political scene, especially governments, for European or internationally oriented research. This is also pushing them to collaborate more, as it is necessary to have input from researchers in other countries for a balanced result. A third reason is competition. Think tanks can enhance their status within the domestic political scene by engaging with international policy elites. It wins them respect from government and increases the perception that they are influential.

THE BRUSSELS DECISION-MAKING SCENE : AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THINK TANKS

CEPS, which was founded in 1983, is one of the earliest examples in Brussels of a think tank orienting itself exclusively towards E.U. decision-makers, although there are also examples at the national level (e.g. IEEP, 1980). The growth in this new type of think tank continued steadily throughout the 1980s. However, as section 2.1.2 will show, the largest growth in think tanks working on E.U. issues came in the 1990s, during a period of major institutional and political reform, and economic and monetary integration. As Sherrington (2000) explains, the nature of decision-making in Brussels makes it easier for think tanks to operate at a E.U. level. Because E.U. power structures are diffuse (European Commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament), multiple 'entry points' exist for think tanks and interest groups wishing to exert influence on decision-makers. Also, it is part of the Commission's strategy to make the process of policy consultation as open and participatory as possible. This 'neo-pluralist' approach of actively encouraging interest group participation in policy-making has given think tanks both greater access to policy-makers, and has legitimised their presence in the Brussels arena.

EXAMINING THE PAST INFLUENCE OF THINK TANKS AND OTHER POLICY EXPERTS ON E.U. POLICY

Think tanks have certainly had an impact on E.U. policy-making in the past, alongside other groups of policy experts who have lobbied for change, although the extent of this impact is difficult to measure. Sherrington (2000), in her analysis of E.U. think tanks, identifies important cases where such organisations have helped shape future E.U. policy. For example, the Kangaroo Group, a once influential lobby group 'set up to promote the four founding principles of the EU, free movement of goods, services, persons and capital,' helped build up momentum for the re-launch of the EC in the 1980s, providing impetus for the 1985 White Paper on Completion of the Internal Market. Elements of CEPS' 1988 study on Economic and Monetary Union were included in the Delors Report published the next year. The Forward Studies Unit – the Commission's own internal 'think tank" now known as the Group of Policy Advisers – had a major input into the 1993 White Paper on Industrial Policy. The Belgian Presidency also used its report on Europe 2000 as the basis for the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, published in 1993.

Of course, out of the three cases listed here, only CEPS is an independent think tank of the type we will include in our survey. However, the examples do indicate how leading think tanks, or groups of experts working closely with the Commission, can influence the direction of E.U. policy.

1.3 THINK TANKS' ROLE IN E.U. DECISION–MAKING AND CONSTRUCTION PROCESSES IS POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT

Beyond the contribution of specific individuals and interest groups to the construction of a unified Europe, the specific role of think tanks deserves, we believe, closer examination as think tanks have a potentially important role to play in helping the formulation of public policies, in promoting healthy political and democratic practices within Europe, and in contributing to Europe's intellectual and cultural diplomatic efforts. As the title of the report

suggests, one of its objectives is indeed to understand whether, and to what extent, Euro-think tanks live up to what can be expected of them.

THINK TANKS' IMPACT ON DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IS UNCERTAIN

Before going into the three types of roles just outlined, it is important to stress that it is not possible to determine with any degree of certainty what impact think tanks have on decision-making processes. This is the conclusion which several authors have reached, in contradiction with think tanks which often include particular cases of supposed influence on the political agenda and policy alternatives in their annual reports.[12]

In fact, Abelson (2002) argues in Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes, that it is "onerous" and "notoriously difficult" to determine "the extent to which think tanks have influenced public opinion and public policy." Furthermore, answering the question "do think tanks matter ?" is even more difficult because of the institutional differences from one country to another and the diversity of think tanks and strategies used. Abelson cites two major methodological barriers that prevent us from determining how influential think tanks may be, the difficulty to measure policy influence and to trace the origin of an idea to a particular individual or organisation. He concludes, "It may be more appropriate to discuss the relevance of think tanks in the policy-making process than to speculate about how much policy influence they wield."

One can add to this note of caution that, even if academics and think tanks provide on occasion specific instances of influential activities, cases of misleading analysis or erroneous recommendations are seldom mentioned, except when they are particularly blatant, as was the case when several Western think tanks recently tried to demonstrate the urgency of a military attack against Iraq.[13]

THE DIFFICULTY TO MEASURE THEIR IMPACT DOES NOT CONTRADICT THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE FORMULATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES...

Beyond such methodological difficulties, many academic studies have demonstrated the theoretical relevance of think tanks for democratic and healthy decision making processes. As aptly captured by Wallace (1998), "think tanks deal in 'soft power'—the term coined by Nye (2000)—in shaping policy agendas, in challenging the language and terminology of public debate, in redefining the mental maps of policy-makers. These are all subtle processes, the workings of which are harder to trace than the direct impact of hard political bargaining, but which set the terms within which political bargaining is conducted in modern political systems." McGann, Weaver (2000) in fact list six important roles which think tanks usually play in relation to policy formulation: they carry out "basic research on policy problems and policy solutions"; they provide "advice on immediate policy concerns that are being considered by government officials"; they evaluate government programs, they "serve as facilitators of issue networks and the exchange of ideas"; they "serve as suppliers of personnel to government and as a place for politicians and policy-makers who are out of power to recharge their batteries"; and they help interpret "policies and current events for the electronic and print media."

Kingdon (1984) himself highlighted the role played by academics, researchers, and consultants in promoting new issues onto the agenda, and more importantly, in offering a range of alternatives to decision-makers. He described in particular how academics and researchers were essential in laying the groundwork for deregulation in different economic sectors. What Kingdon also found was that "academics might well affect the alternatives more than governmental agendas" over the long run. As Wallace (1998) concludes, "new issues crowd onto the public agenda (…), on which generalist policy-makers must turn to the contending recommendations of expert advisors before they can grasp the choices to be made. The political demand for the services, which think tanks can offer is thus likely to increase further, in all highly developed industrial and post-industrial societies. It is therefore likely that the supply of institutionalised expertise, packaged in different ways to fit the requirements of political debate and policy-makers will continue to grow in response."

... TO A DEMOCRATIC DEBATE ...

As highlighted again by McGann and Weaver in Think Tanks and Civil Societies (2000; see also Smith, 1991), think tanks have the "potential to provide an important element of what is known as civil society or the third sector," which contribution to democratisation, however difficult to measure, is also widely recognised. McGann and Weaver insist: "It is our contention that think tanks are an integral part of the civil society and serve as an important catalyst for ideas and action in emerging and advanced democracies around the world." Can the very clear case Greenwood (2003) makes about interest groups' contribution to E.U. decision-making institutions to help them with devising policies and for "taking issues to the doors of Member State governments and to everyday citizens" be extended to E.U. think tanks ?

More generally, however uncertain their impact, think tanks presumably contribute to the livelihood of democratic debates. To use a common expression, they contribute to the 'marketplace for ideas'. In this respect, the greater the number of think tanks, the greater competition between them and with other institutions responsible for formulating plans and political strategies. This should, in principle, stimulate the intellectual production regarding public policies. Without determining now what is think tanks' capacity to renew political alternatives and agendas, one can note that most think tanks make explicit their ambition to innovate intellectually. As Wallace (1998) underlines, think tanks have in principle two fundamental roles: "the questioning of the conventional wisdom" and "the formulation and dissemination of alternative concepts and policy agendas." Hopefully, think tanks' desire to challenge prevailing frameworks, to "think outside the box", to work "at the 'cutting-edge' of European policy-making" (EPC), to "think ahead for Europe" (CEPS), to encourage politicians to act boldly[14] helps fight political apathy and conformity of ideas that can damage the health of our democracies. As Sunstein (2003) explains in Why Societies Need Dissent, actors such as think tanks have, potentially, a crucial role to play in making freedom of speech and thought real and in promoting dissidence and true democracy.

Finally, think tanks' relevance is perhaps further justified by the so-called 'democratic deficit' between E.U. institutions and E.U. citizens, a common preoccupation in E.U. politics. Without initiating a detailed discussion of this concept, better described elsewhere (e.g. Baun, 1996;

Dinan, 1999; McCormick, 2002), the lack of public accountability in the Union clearly affects the operations of E.U. think tanks that follow European affairs. Many people see the Union as distant, believe that important decisions are taken behind 'closed doors', and anticipate that their ability to influence and supervise E.U. institutions will be further threatened by the accession of ever more Member States and the transfer of further elements of national sovereignty to the E.U. level. As we shall see, many think tanks believe they have a role to play in this area.

… AND TO MEMBER STATES AND THE E.U.'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

Think tanks' potential contribution can also be seen in the context of a Union of states based on negotiation and compromise, and which seek to play a greater international role. A country's 'soft power' is, in principle, enhanced if it hosts a thriving think tank sector. Pierre Lepetit, Executive Director of IFRI in Paris (Institut Français des Relations Internationales) argues: "An international marketplace of ideas on public policies, where competition is now intense, is emerging." (Gadault, 2004)[15] As the exchange of ideas and political options from one country to another is presumably facilitated by the same mechanisms that stimulate globalisation, it is legitimate to speculate that political recommendations also have an increasing impact beyond their country of origin. Considering the current domination of North-American think tanks on the international scene, this is a significant issue for the Union and its Member States.

Generally speaking, think tanks have therefore the potential to engage citizens in varied and concrete ways in the management of society. They can contribute, at least in theory, to a sustainable and democratic community construction process. In fact, this is why one of our selection criterion is that think tanks should aim to contribute to the public good. It is indeed a common aspiration of all think tanks, albeit often implicit, as we shall see in Section 2.1.3.[16] Last but not least, this perspective warrants, in our opinion, a closer examination of who think tanks are and how they work, in order to understand whether they in fact live up to their inherent promise. This is what we shall do in the following section.

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[4] James Allen Smith, *The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite*, New York: The Free Press, 1991. R. Kent Weaver, "The Changing Work of Think Tanks", in *PS: Political Science and Politics*, XXII (3), September 1989. Previous studies focused on specific cases, such as D.T. Critchlow, *The Brookings Institution, 1916-52: Expertise and the Public Interest in a Democratic Society*, Dekalb: Northern Illinois Press. The bulk dates back however essentially to the last decade, e.g. Jeffrey Telgarsky et Makiko Ueno, eds. *Think Tanks in a Democratic Society: An Alternative Voice*, Washington DC: The Urban Institute, 1996; Richard Cockett, *Thinking the Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the Economic Counter Revolution, 1931-1983*, London: Harper Collins U.K., 1994.

[5] Research on interest groups is relatively rich, including sociological analyses (symbolic functions of a group, mobilisation of resources), psychological (what members seek in taking part in political activities, how single issue groups can motivate members beyond any other issue...), and political (relations between the state and civil society organisations, and what role groups play in the decision making process).

[6] For an overview of studies of think tanks, see Abelson (2002, pp.49-57). He explains how such studies have been organised around three schools of thought: elitist, pluralist, and epistemic communities.

[7] Sherrington (2000) provides such an E.U.-wide analysis. The articles published in McGann, Weaver (2000) and Stone, Denham, Garnett (1998) also put think tanks and their political and institutional context into perspective.

. . . . . .

[8] As Stone stresses: "It is increasingly evident that some think tanks have become global policy actors or, at the very least, policy informants. Many think tanks are building regional and international networks. While think tank networks are not new, over the past two decades the scale and density of exchange within these networks has mounted significantly and extended from North American and European institutes to include a more globally diverse range of organisations." (Stone, 2000a) As we will see, this is indeed an important aspect of E.U. think tank developments.

[9] Day refers to these think tanks as the 'establishment think tanks'.

[10] A good example of a truly transnational organisation is the International Institute for Strategic Studies (1958), which has offices in London, Washington and Singapore and whose analysis of 'political-military conflicts' is aimed at international policy-makers. It members are based in more than 100 countries.

[11] This is a typical case of the chicken and egg problem: did these think tanks *cause* the change in government policy or did they simply provide *ex-post* intellectual legitimacy for Thatcher's policies? The problem is that these think tanks would like to claim credit for these changes but it is difficult to assess their impact.

[12] Think tanks of course like to take credit for major changes in government policy, such as the one seen in the UK in the 1980s. However, there is a legitimate debate about whether think tanks' ideas are actually the catalyst for policy changes, or whether they simply "piggy-back" on more general changes in the intellectual climate (cf. for instance Cockett (1994), *Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution 1931-1983*, and Denham & Garnett (1988), *British Think Tanks and the Climate of Opinion*, on the influence of the free-market think tanks in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s). A third way of interpreting their influence – and one which perhaps combines these two positions – is to argue that think tanks play an important role in changing the "climate of opinion" in national political debates. Exactly how they achieve this is hard to measure, but could involve coverage in the media of their ideas and politicians reading their work. Although this process may take many years before it comes to fruition, it may nonetheless be a necessary precondition for a paradigmatic shift in government policy-making, such as that seen in the UK after 1979.

[13] Numerous think tanks point out that their ideas, when they are taken up, are rarely attributed since, according to them, politicians do not like to admit that they have had to rely on the help of outside researchers for their ideas. As Kingdon emphasizes, the genealogy of a policy idea is difficult to determine.

[14] E.g. the Lisbon Council for Economic Competitiveness wants "politicians to be bold and to take more effective action".

[15] Besides, IFRI has coined the term "intellectual diplomacy" to underline its contribution to France's intellectual and international political influence. This is also a role highlighted by other research centres. Gaudault (2004), in support of the sector, argues that "these research institutes specialising in international relations and defence are an essential part of the diplomatic influence of a country and of its capacity to influence decisions taken in large international organisations."

[16] Many in fact state explicitly that the wish to contribute to the "general interest of Europe" (e.g. see Website of the Institut Choiseul in France).

2 State of play : an overview of Europe-focused think tanks in the E.U. and E.U. Member States

This section summarises the information collected – presented in detail on Notre Europe's website – first through an overview of the E.U. situation (2.1), then by looking at the situation in individual E.U. Member States (2.2) and what is specific about the ten new Member States (2.3). We finally draw a few preliminary conclusions (2.4).

2.1 An overview of the situation in the EU

The analysis provided in this section is based on the population of think tanks selected for this report. It is therefore a snapshot view, based on our own, somewhat subjective criteria. The Case Study on the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung illustrates how the reality of think tanks that deal with European policy matters is not straightforward. Although we acknowledge the limitations of such an exercise and that it is probably impossible to achieve totally uniform collection and presentation of data, we also believe that the categories and trends identified here will be of use to readers.

2.1.1 Key facts

Our survey population of EU-focused think tanks in the 25 member states and in Brussels is presented in full on Notre Europe's website. We have looked at 149 think tanks in the E.U. currently working on European issues. A quarter (36) are 'Euro-specific', the remaining 113 'Euro-oriented' think tanks, as we call them, work on other issues besides Europe.

Table 2 below presents an overview of our findings. Germany has the largest number of think tanks operating in this sector : 23, including 4 Euro-specific. This reflects the fact that Germany has more think tanks in general than any other European country, a function of its population size and its greater think tank "tradition". It also has some of the largest organisations with an average of 48.5 researchers per institute. The U.K. comes second with 16 (7 Euro-specific), and third is Austria, with 11 (3 Euro-specific), despite its smaller population (8.1m). We identified 10 EU/Brussels-based think tanks (7 Euro-specific), which we treated separately from Belgian organisations. Greece (population 10.6m) has 8 Euro-think tanks, i.e. more than France (7) and Italy (7). As the country reports indicate, these figures of course do not tell everything (Section 2.2).

Looking at staff figures – with due caution considering their relative lack of precision and the fact that not all recorded researchers always work on European policy issues – it would appear that Denmark, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Poland have larger-than-average research teams (E.U. average: 18). Euro-specific think tanks, which have appeared mostly in the last 20 years, tend to be younger than Euro-oriented think tanks. At the other end, countries such as Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Baltic States, Cyprus and the Czech Republic have relatively small teams of researchers. Overall, think tank teams in Brussels are also relatively small.

TABLE 2

Overview of the Euro-oriented think tanks surveyed

Member State	No. of think tanks surveyed	No. Euro-specific think tanks identified	Total number of 'Euro-think tank' staff	Total no.of researchers	Av. no. staff	Average no. permanent in-house researchers	Country population (m)	Nos. by McGann & Weaver type* aca: academic think tank adv: advocacy tank con: contract researcher par: party think tank			**See introduction for definition of McGann categories*
EU. Brussels	10	7	175	100	17.5	10	-	4 aca	4 adv	2 con	
Austria	11	3	348	271	31.5	24.5	8.1	6 aca	5 con		
Belgium	2	0	34	19	17	9.5	10.3	2 aca			
Cyprus	3	1	68	15	22.5	5	0.78	1 aca	2 adv		
Czech Rep.	5	1	97	37 (in 4 TT)	19.5	9	10.3	2 aca	3 adv		
Denmark	1	0	118	78	118	78	5.3	1 aca			
Estonia	4	1	61	22 (in 3 TT)	15	7	1.4		2 adv	1 con	1 aca/con
Finland	6	0	141 (in 5 TT)	72 (5 TT)	28	14.5	5.2	2 aca	4 adv		
France	7	5	145	82	21	12	58.8	1 aca	4 adv	2 con	
Germany	23	4	1925 (20 TT)	1065 (22 TT)	96	48.5	82.1	17 aca	1 adv	2 con	3 par
Great Britain	16	7	366 (14 TT)	175 (14 TT)	23	11	59.7	5 aca	6 adv	5 con	
Greece	8	3	143 (5 TT)	Ap. 77 (5 TT)	28.5	15.5	10.6	5 aca	3 adv		
Hungary	5	0	140 (4 TT)	90 (4 TT)	35	22.5	10.0	2 aca	3 con		
Ireland	2	1	93	42	46.5	21	3.8		1 adv	1 con	
Italy	7	0	160	115	23	16.5	57.7	6 aca	1 con		
Latvia	5	1	105	55	21	11	2.3	1 aca	3 adv	1 con	
Lithuania	4	0	69 (3 TT)	48	23	12	3.6	1 aca	1 adv	1 con	1 aca/con
Luxembourg			See country reports				0.4			-	
Malta			See country reports				0.4			-	
Netherlands	4	1	90	57	22	14	15.9	2 aca	2 con		
Poland	6	0	236	173	39	29	38.7	4 aca	2 adv		
Portugal	2	0	26	18	13	9	10.0	2 aca			
Slovakia	5	0	49 (4 TT)	27	12	6.75	5.4	4 aca	1 adv		
Slovenia	1	0	23	17	23	17	2.0	1 con			
Spain	7	0	155	55 (6 TT)	22	9	39.5	2 aca		2 par 2 aca/adv	1 aca/con
Sweden	5	1	183	74	36.5	15	8.7				
E.U. total	**149**	**36**	**4950** (139 TT)	**2784** (140 TT)	**31.5**	**18**	**453**	**71**	**37**	**26**	**5 par** **5 other**

CASE STUDY

The case of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung : To what extent can German foundations be considered think tanks?

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is the SPD's political foundation (German socialist party). There are seven political foundations in Germany: the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), close to the CDU, the Hans-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS), close to the CSU, the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS), close to the FPD, the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung (HBS), close to the DGB, the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS), linked to the Greens, and the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (RSL), affiliated to the PDS. The two largest are the FES and the KAS, both created in the 1960s. The two most recent are the HBS (1996) and the RSL (1998).

The activities of the FES can be grouped in three concentric circles : international activities, political training, and scientific research. It also offers a scholarship programme and seminars for German and foreign students and academics.

Nearly half of the Foundation's current expenditures are dedicated to international activities. The FES has operations in developing countries aimed at promoting peace and understanding between nations, and, within partner countries, at furthering the democratisation of State and social institutions, strengthening civil society, improving political, economic, and social conditions, and enforcing human rights. To this end, the FES has offices in 70 countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle-East, and Latin America. Furthermore, some 70 associated workers oversee—with the help of local recruits—political and social development projects. Its international activities also seek to promote international dialogue. The FES thus has offices in 33 western and eastern European countries, CIS countries, as well as the United States and Japan. There the FES promotes dialogue between democratic forces in order to balance conflicting interests and formulate political options. In order to fulfil its various missions, it works in cooperation with different partners from civil society (unions, political parties, training and research institutes, administrations, municipalities).

Political training is the second area of the Foundation's activities. The objective is to help citizens from the German Federal Republic to react to changes in society and thereby to allow them to take part actively and critically to the political life of their country.

Finally, the FES has research and consulting activities. These are led by its teams of analysts on the economy, new technologies, employment and social policy, as well as contemporary history. It has a total of 60 permanent researchers and 40 temporary researchers.

Overall, only 10 to 15 per cent (20 per cent maximum) of its budget is thus allocated to research and analysis activities similar to other think tanks' activities. In this third type of activitiy, 20 to 25 per cent, in general, of its research efforts focus on Europe. The FES is also interested in Germany's role in the European Union and to the impact of the E.U. on Germany. It also has research projects on the E.U.'s foreign policy, on central and eastern Europe, and on the Union's policy-making process. This share is increasing though, because of the ever greater importance of the European dimension for topics of interest to the FES. Its various publications, analyses and policy options, devised through projects, seminars, conferences and debates, are made available to a wide audience of political, economic and scientific experts, as well as interested citizens. It is thus common to consider that the research activities of the FES justify considering it in part as a think tank.

However, it is also important to stress through this example how German political foundations are not just think tanks. Think tank activities, although performed internally, are in fact secondary for them. The funding they receive from federal and regional ministries must be allocated in priority to activities such as political training and the promotion of democracy in developing countries. Their think tank work should therefore neither be ignored, nor overestimated.

In some countries, we were also able to collect budgetary information. This information revealed again that Germany is an exception on the European think tank scene : outside foundations, which budgets are often ten times larger but which spending is not only on think tank activities, the average budget of German think tanks in our survey was €8.9m. By comparison, the average budget of Euro-think tanks in other countries is much smaller: for example, Austria: €2.2m; France: €2.3m; UK: €3.9m; Sweden: €3.3m.[17]

Finally, the table also presents the numbers of think tanks in each of the four McGann and Weaver categories. Putting each think tank into just one of these categories proved difficult because many think tanks display the characteristics of several categories. We can see that overall academic-type think tanks, typical of earlier American tanks such as the Brookings Institution and the Hoover Institute, seem to dominate. Then come advocacy tanks and contract researchers. There are few party-affiliated independent research institutes on European matters. Most countries have a mix of the first three types : academic, advocacy and contract research. Germany and Spain have a few party think tanks. Countries such as Germany, Austria and Sweden tend to have higher numbers of academic and contract research think tanks, and relatively few advocacy tanks. The U.K. and Brussels have larger numbers of advocacy tanks. This reveals an important difference between the Anglo-American think tank model – which also seems to have spread to Brussels – which is more typically advocacy-oriented, and the traditional model in continental Europe of an academic-type research institute.

The number of advocacy tanks seems to be increasing though : academic think tanks were on average created 25 years ago, contract research organisations 23 years ago, and advocacy tanks 16 years ago. While this average hides large differences, it indicates a trend that, if confirmed, would be similar to the U.S. situation since the early 1950s, as we shall explore more fully in Section 4.2.1.

2.1.2 Why and when were they created ?

The most common reasons cited by the Euro-specific think tanks for their creation in the first place are :

- To help prepare a country for its accession to the E.U.
- A government initiative to improve the level of analysis of E.U. policy in a country.
- To provide a forum for the analysis of a country's position within the E.U. (and/or its relationship with it regional neighbours).
- To examine a specific area of E.U. policy (e.g. environmental or social policy).
- To enhance the quality of debate on European issues.
- To create a platform for researchers and students to express their views on Europe.
- To provide support to European integration (or, more rarely, to oppose it).

- To promote economic reform in the E.U.;
- To promote interest from the corporate sector in E.U. political affairs.[18]

Many think tanks were set up in anticipation of a country's accession to the EU, or to study a country's position within the Union and the impact of E.U. policies on that country. This is best explained by the fact that all the nationally based institutes, i.e. the majority of those surveyed, need a domestic raison d'être and have to be seen as relevant by their own publics and policy-makers. Therefore they naturally focus on E.U. issues from a domestic perspective.[19] The table below shows the growth in the number of Euro-specific think tanks created in each decade of the post-war period in the 25 Member States.

The growth seen in the 1980s – 10 new think tanks – was visible for three distinct types of 'thinking cells' : (1) new institutes focusing on expanding areas of EC competence (e.g. CEPR, 1983, economic policy ; IEEP, 1980, environmental policy; OSE, 1984, social policy) ; (2) think tanks seeking to join the steadily increasing number of interest groups present in Brussels (e.g. CEPS, 1983) ; and (3) institutes linked to their country's entry to the EC (e.g. EKEME, 1980 in Greece; the Institute for European Studies, [20] 1989 in Finland).

TABLE 3

Euro-specific think tanks : creation periods

Decade	Think tanks established *
1940s	1
1950s	1
1960s	1
1970s	2
1980s	10
1990s	24
2000-04	6

* i.e. only the first tier of think tanks covered in our survey that are dedicated to European policy issues. Figures only from 1989-90 for New Member States in Eastern Europe. These figures do not include think tanks which have disappeared, although where a think tank is the result of a merger of two or more previous institutes, the former institute – if it was Euro-specific – has been included.

This sudden growth turned into an outright explosion in the 1990s. Three main factors explain this. First, the democratic transition in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s created an entirely new political environment, which enabled think tanks there, for the first time since the war, to set up without fear of hindrance from the state. [21] A second factor was the Nordic and Austrian accessions in 1995. This provided a spur for new think tanks in these countries which could explore and explain accession challenges and other E.U. themes, particularly in the immediate post-accession period (e.g. Austrian Institute for European Security Policy, 1996; SIEPS in Sweden, 2002). The third, and perhaps most important factor, already mentioned in section 1.2, was the considerable growth in the power and competences of the E.U. At each new stage in the development of the E.U.'s policy competences – the Single European Act (1986)

leading to the Single Market in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty (1992), Economic and Monetary Union, the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) – think tanks, along with policy elites and interest groups, became increasingly interested in E.U. policies. This is clear for instance in France, where five Euro-specific think tanks were established in the 1990s, but also in Britain and Germany.[22] The growth in the legislative power of the E.U. also explains the rapid growth in Euro-specific think tanks in Brussels during both the 1990s and early 2000s (five in total[23]).

2.1.3 Missions

Missions clearly evolve with time. Today (see Figure 1 below), thinks tanks that deal with European affairs aim to, in order of priority :

- Promote better policy making through the spread of "best practices", "the practical application of research results", the promotion of "rationality in politics" and "decisions based on better analysis." CEPS's dedication to "producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe today" is an example of this type of mission.
- Increase the level of awareness and involvement of citizens in politics, by "informing the public and other actors", "promoting better understanding", "fostering public debate", "improving the quality of the debate", "promoting participation of the public in the policy process", and more generally fostering "discussion." Europe 2020 in France or www.policy.lv in Latvia illustrate this type of approach. IFRI in Paris also wants to "structure the debate on international questions and contribute to the expansion of an informed and responsible society."
- Assist policy-makers in their work, usually through contacts with academics, and by providing a platform, "interface" or forum for discussion with experts, and through services such as training. Germany has a relatively larger share of such institutes : "Officially, the Stiftungen's main mission is to engage in what the Germans call 'politische Bildungsarbeit', a concept covering a wide range of political training activities generally targeting 'opinion-formers' and other citizens with an active political interest." (European Voice, 1998a)
- Promote the general interest : a significant share of the organisations surveyed have the ambition to contribute to "solving society's problems", for instance through "a better environment," security, peace, and conflict prevention, economic freedom, democracy, development, multilateralism, or social justice. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Austrian Sustainable Europe Research Institute, which aims "to develop the concept of environmental space and show ways to sustainability", are examples of this type of mission.
- Support the E.U. project, in general or in relation to their own country's integration.
- A few specifically mention other communities they wish to cater for, in particular the business community (through contacts with decision-makers), academia (research outlet, platform, etc.), and NGOs (information, analysis).

FIGURE 1

Think tanks stated mission – EU 25



The previous and following pie charts present the different categories of stated missions. They do not reflect think tanks' actual research production, but what their claimed ambitions are. These categories, although somewhat subjective, cover all think tanks' stated missions apart from a few exceptions. Clearly some think tanks declare more than one type of mission; we have counted these accordingly and the figures below do not indicate the relative numbers of think tanks that have a particular mission, but the relative number of times a particular time of mission appears in think tanks' public statements.

Several intra-European differences can be identified within this general framework, in particular a tendency toward more advocacy in the former E.U. 15 than in the Member States that recently joined the Union. In the former E.U. 15, think tanks seek to support decision-making in a creative, proactive way, in particular by advocating specific policies or promoting a particular approach dealing with a specific problem, while think tanks in the new Central and Eastern European Member States tend to concentrate more on providing information and offering practical assistance. Examples of these two trends are the Institute for the Study of International Politics (ISPI) in Italy on the one hand and the Public Policy Centre Providus in Latvia or the Institute of Public Affairs in Poland, on the other hand. Similarly, research institutes interpret more often their role as "orienting the action" in Member States with an older and more diversified think tank population, such as the founding E.U. Member States. IWG Bonn for instance "tries, through the advice it gives, to orient the public policy choices in a free market direction." Think tanks show a greater inclination toward providing basic expertise and support for policy-makers in the new Member States that are confronted with the multiple new challenges of European integration.

FIGURE 2

Think tanks stated mission – Former EU 15



FIGURE 3

Think tanks stated mission – New Members states



2.1.4 POLICY RESEARCH TOPICS

Within their broad mission, some 54 per cent of the organisations surveyed are either multi-disciplinary think tanks dedicated to Europe without any specific focus (such as Notre Europe in France or the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels) or multi-issue institutes (i.e. concentrating on three or more research topics, such as ELIAMEP in Athens or the Instituto Elcano in Madrid). 46 per cent can be considered single-issue or specialised think tanks, even within a broad topic, such as E.U. macroeconomic policy in the case of the forthcoming European Centre for International Economics (EU) or the environment for the Institute for European Environmental Policy (UK).

In order to describe more precisely which research topics E.U. think tanks concentrate on, fifteen ad hoc categories were defined on the basis of the interviews conducted and the information encountered on the think tanks' websites : [24]

- Constitutional affairs (including Community law, European constitution, process of European construction)[25]
- Enlargement
- External relations and trade policy
- Security and defence
- Economic, financial and monetary policy
- Environmental policy
- Social policy
- Development policy and human rights
- Cohesion policy and regional affairs
- Industrial policy
- Cultural and educational policy
- Transport policy
- Information society and technological development
- Reflection on the respective national role or interests within the community[26]
- Others

At first glance, the topics listed correspond, broadly speaking but with significant differences, to policy areas of the E.U. Those familiar with European 'brain boxes' will be aware though that issues such as foreign policy or security and defence receive far more attention than could be justified simply in terms of E.U. competencies and legislative activity. Is this a sign that European think tanks go beyond simple policy analysis and seek to provide long-term policy options for the future of the Union? We do not have an answer to this question, but we have tried to analyse the relative incidence of every topic by measuring their recurrence

among the think tanks surveyed (a more precise analysis would require looking at the actual production of think tanks rather than simply declared intentions).

The two most important areas of research are economic, financial and monetary policy and external relations. They are considered core areas of research by more than 35 per cent and 30 per cent of think tanks respectively. Three subjects follow: enlargement (26.3 per cent), constitutional affairs (23.3 per cent) and national roles (24.8 per cent). A strong focus on national interests within the E.U. indeed characterises much of E.U. research, which explains to some extent why over 95 per cent of think tank researchers are based not in Brussels but in the Member States. Figure 4 below shows the areas of research which European think tanks declare concentrating on.

FIGURE 4

Areas of research which European think tanks declare concentrating on (%)



Distinguishing the ten new E.U. member countries from their peers provides further insights. Clearly, enlargement has been the priority and a major area of concentration (52.5 per cent) for research institutes in acceding Member States, whereas constitutional matters receive far more attention in the former E.U. 15 (30 per cent). Finally, research into a country's national role and interests within the E.U. is particularly strong in the new Member States, presumably as a consequence of their efforts to make the most of accession negotiations. It is also very present in the United Kingdom and Denmark, probably as a sign of their special and separate status within the Union. This national perspective is also apparent in Spain and Greece.

A third cluster includes Security and Defence (18 per cent), Social Policy (13.5 per cent) and Environmental policy (12 per cent), without any substantial difference between former and new Member States, although environmental policy receives more attention in the former 15 E.U. Member States, in particular in Scandinavian countries and Germany. The other categories follow with decreasing percentages.

Unsurprisingly, geography and history also affect think tanks' priorities. Apart from Europe and the enlarged European Union, which is obviously of primary interest to all, the United States and transatlantic relations stand out as a key research issue in France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Russia and neighbouring eastern countries such as Ukraine and Belarus are a priority for Poland and the Baltic States, as well as Finland and Sweden. The Mediterranean is a key research area for Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus. Spain and Portugal also look at relations with Latin America. Finally, the Middle East is a key topic for most think tanks that specialise in security matters. Africa (except for Portuguese institutes) and Asia on the other hand seem to be less covered.[27]

Overall, there is a relative concentration of Euro-think tanks' research, reinforced by the fact that academic research is also strong in some think tanks' favourite areas, such as constitutional matters and foreign affairs. Other fields however, such as competition policy or external trade issues receive comparatively less attention despite their crucial importance for E.U. politics. Similarly, many issues for which co-decision applies, and therefore that are particularly relevant for Members of the European Parliament are the object of relatively little research by Euro-think tanks, for instance transport, research, and health policy, with exceptions obviously.

NEUTRAL, PRO-, OR ANTI-EU ?

Finally, a question many will have in mind : what is the share of think tanks that are pro-E.U. integration or Euro-sceptic? In our sample, the majority present a neutral or positive perspective vis-à-vis the process of E.U. integration, as shown in Figure 5 below. In our definition, 'pro-EU' think tanks seek to promote and / or facilitate the process of E.U. integration. This was usually made explicit in the organisation's mission, its statements to us, or the approach taken in its research. 'Neutral' and 'anti' can be understood by extension.

Traditionally euro-enthusiastic countries such as France, Spain and Italy show the highest percentages of pro-E.U. institutes. Dutch think tanks also seem to have a generally positive attitude. A second group of countries, including Belgium, Ireland and Greece, show more balanced figures, while most of the remaining countries have a more neutral think tank population. Significantly, the only country with a distinct community of anti-European think tanks seems to be the United Kingdom, although greater (see U.K. country report), the Eurosceptic think tanks operate more as lobbying organisations for a particular set of Eurosceptic U.K. politicians and as a result of this the objectivity of their research is seriously compromised. Perhaps because the interest in community affairs is much more recent in the new central and eastern European Member States (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia), positions are less clearly defined. Nevertheless, the general orientation seems to be rather neutral and overtly anti-E.U. think tanks are absent.

Overall therefore, it appears that there is a relative congruence of efforts both in terms of scope of research and in the approach taken by think tanks that focus on E.U. policy issues. While on average we found that the large majority of think tanks surveyed can be considered neutral (68 per cent), over 30 per cent show a clear bias in favour of E.U. integration.

FIGURE 5

Neutral – Pro – Anti – EU think tanks (%)



2.1.5 AUDIENCES

We asked the think tanks surveyed to identify their main target audiences. Figure 6 below presents data for think tanks in three key Member States and Brussels. The main target audience for think tanks in Italy, Germany, U.K. and Brussels appear to be policy-makers (98 per cent), followed by the media (61 per cent), the public, including NGOs and civil society groups (61 per cent), academia (44 per cent), business (34 per cent), and others (15 per cent), such as other think tanks and trade unions.

That think tanks should gravitate towards policy-makers is of course no surprise, it is in fact a key selection criterion. What is more interesting, however, is how clearly think tanks in these

countries seem to target policy-makers operating in the executive rather than national or E.U. legislatures. Thus the percentages shown in Figure 7 below indicate that, among the policy-makers targeted, greatest attention is given by think tanks in Germany, Italy and the U.K. to national governments (85 per cent) than to national parliaments and politicians (54 per cent). Think tanks also target the European Commission with a higher frequency than other E.U. institutions : 11 out of the 26 think tanks supplying this information cited the European Commission as an audience.

FIGURE N°6

Main audiences of 41 think tanks in UK, Germany, Italy and Brussels[i]
(% of think tanks mentioning audience type in interviews)



This presumably illustrates the fact that think tanks generally prefer to intervene in policy-making 'upstream', or at the policy initiation stage. They are less interested in scrutiny of existing policy, a role traditionally performed by other actors, such as national parliaments and pressure groups (see Section 2.1.6). The majority of the organisations studied declare that their priority is influencing policy formation upstream, before the European Commission drafts Green Papers or legislation, before Parliaments hold hearings and governments tackle issues. There is a clear bias toward forward-looking policies. Relatively few declare that they seek to monitor the implementation of policies.[28] This seems to indicate that, at least in terms of aspirations, the ambition to introduce new items on the policy agenda and shape

[i] Germany: IEP, SWP, DGAP, Internationales Institut fur Politik und Wissenschaft, Bertelsmann Stiftung, FES, Hans-Siedel Stiftung, DIW, IfW, IFO, HWWA, CAP, ZEI, MZES, ZEW (15) - UK: E.U. Policy Network, EPF, Federal Trust, CER, IEEP, ODI, FPC, Policy Network, RIIA, CEPR, Stockholm Network (11) - Italy: IAI, CeSPI, SIOI, ISPI, CENSIS (5) - Brussels : CEPS, EPC, ETUI, Friends of Europe, OSE, Lisbon Council, ISIS Europe, MEDEA, EU-Asia Institute (10).

alternatives prevails over other types of services to policy-makers and over other audiences such as the media.

FIGURE 7

Main audiences of 41 think tanks in the U.K., Germany, Italy and Brussels29

(% of think tanks mentioning audience type in interviews)



In addition, it would appear that think tanks have an ambiguous stance when it comes to engaging with the public. Many institutes we surveyed said that public engagement was an important part of their work; but we often found that in reality such activities were limited in scope. Often a lack of resources was cited as a reason for this. It is no surprise that the best-funded think tanks, i.e. those in Germany, are also the ones that have the highest level of engagement with the public. We will come back to this in Section 4.2.2.

2.1.6 ACTIVITIES

'Thinking cells' are in the business of analysing policy issues and producing new policy options, but how do Euro-think tanks think? As mentioned before, creativity, innovation, originality, and 'added value' are characteristic of an effective think tank in the eyes of the market's representatives. This is a tall order in any economic sector. Our survey confirms that Euro-think tanks seek to promote the creation of ideas essentially through the following activities :

- Academic research : in order to produce added value, managers of think tanks generally seek to attract researchers with good academic credentials or, when they are more policy-oriented, researchers that combine an academic ability with a wealth of experience in policy making, including in some cases media work. While the reliance on expertise and formal methodologies of research derived from the social sciences might seem obvious to people from the think tank sector, one only needs to look at highly creative sectors such as design, architecture, marketing, art, or advertising to realise that relying to such a large extent on academic research and sectoral expertise to "think" is indeed very specific.

FIGURE 8

Principal activities reported by think tanks in the EU-15 and the new Member States (% of think tanks citing each activity)



- Cross-fertilisation and dissemination through working groups, seminars, conferences, and meetings with decision-makers: a key component of think tanks' activities is to bring together people from different horizons.[30] This also gives them the opportunity to propagate their ideas. We found that, in addition to publishing and the media, seminars and conferences form the backbone of the discussion and dissemination work for the think tanks interviewed. Indeed conferences are the main source of funding for several think tanks. Over two-thirds of think tanks reported holding conferences in 2003. Over half reported holding seminars. Of course, the number of such events varies considerably between think tanks, ranging from none to upwards of a hundred per year for some of the large institutes that do not deal solely with Europe (e.g. RIIA : 140, IIPW in Hamburg : 130). Euro-specific think tanks, however, typically organise around 20 public events per year. Public lectures and meetings are held less frequently : slightly under one quarter of think tanks reported putting on events for the general public, which include discussion forums and guest speakers in front of an open audience. Interestingly, as Figure 8 shows, these events are significantly more common in the new Member States (reported by 47 per cent of think tanks there). This is perhaps a reflection of the fact that think tanks in the new Member States have less contact with government decision-makers and so devote more of their efforts to a public audience.[31]

Figure 8 below provides more detail of the type of activities which the think tanks in our survey are currently engaged in, both in the EU-15 and the new Member States.

MEETINGS WITH DECISION-MAKERS : after seminars and conferences, this was the third most reported activity among the EU-15 think tanks (56 per cent). They could include both one-to-one meetings with Government ministers and civil servants, and other meetings, such as 'closed-doors' discussions involving a range of policy experts. This type of activity was only reported by one in five of the think tanks surveyed in the new Member States.

CONSULTANCY : Many think tanks described an important part of their work as giving 'advice', particularly to officials, on different policy matters. Much of this advice is provided through the channels described above, i.e. seminars, meetings and so forth. However, a sizeable number of institutes in the survey (29 per cent in the EU-15, 26 per cent in the 10 new Member States) have gone one step further and are carrying out proper consultancy work for the Government, the private sector, or both. This finding is of significance because it shows that a good proportion of think tanks are dependent for their income on other activities besides research. Consultancy is particularly important for German think tanks, as 'Denkfabriken' offer a wide range of services to business, including forecasting and survey work. It is also an important ancillary activity for several organisations in Brussels such as EPC and CEPS. This phenomenon raises interesting questions about the future status of think tanks as non-profit actors without commercial interests, which we will explore further in Section 4.1.1.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS : a surprisingly low number of think tanks reported interacting with national parliaments in committee hearings—just one in ten of the think tanks in the EU-15 and none in the new Member States. This may reflect the fact that, as discussed above, think tanks' main audiences tend to be national executives rather than legislatures. However, this apparent lack of formal involvement in Parliamentary scrutiny of legislation does not mean that think tanks do not seek to influence individual MPs and political parties. They do, but more often through informal channels, for example at events, dinners and other policy meetings. Participation in committee work is however more frequent in Brussels, where think tanks are often called to contribute to European Parliament committee hearings, which even sometimes fund independent research. The absence of research institutes from committee hearings is particularly noticeable in the new Member States. Eastern European governments, perhaps because of the Soviet political legacy, are not yet fully prepared to integrate 'alien' input in their policy-making process. Civil society is still emerging and its role is not well defined to date. As a result, in Latvia for instance, "given the fact that policy making does not always take place in a well-planned, transparent fashion, think tanks often find themselves reacting to proposals already being examined at a later stage of the policy process." This is not to say that the think tanks covered do not exert influence in their national legislatures. They do, but more through less formal channels, such as meetings with individual politicians at public events and via the briefing material and updates which they send politicians on different issues.

THE OTHER PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES reported by think tanks in the EU-15 were, in order of importance : working groups (27 per cent), research workshops (18 per cent), educational work (12 per cent), documentation centres (12 per cent), scholarships (11 per cent), the

training of government and E.U. officials and other professionals (10 per cent), and 'other' (9 per cent), including book launches, exhibitions, and survey and forecasting work.

Individuals within the think tanks surveyed also often pursue other 'public engagement' activities, sometimes on a pro bono basis, for example as experts and speakers at public conferences and training seminars. This is an informal part of many think tanks' 'public service' mission. It is also quite common for think tanks – in particular in Scandinavia – to have a documentation centre where the public can consult books on the think tank's area of expertise.[32] However, only about one in eight of think tanks currently offer this facility. A number of the think tanks surveyed also give scholarships to students (e.g. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), young economists (e.g. ODI in Britain), or academics for research on European questions (SIEPS in Sweden). Some think tanks, particularly the German ones, also run courses for members of the public interested in particular subjects, while others have produced educational material for schools in the past (e.g. The Federal Trust on international citizenship). A significant share of the think tanks we covered in the survey also provided places for interns within their organisation.

Overall, it can be observed that European research institutes tend to engage in cross-fertilisation efforts more with policy and decision-making elites in their vicinity than with less conventional types of actors or even the general public (see sections 2.1.5 and 4.2.2).[33] Most of the activities reported, such as seminars, conferences and meetings with decision-makers are designed to allow think tanks to get their particular message across to a fairly narrow circle of policy-makers and journalists. Public lectures and other types of engagement with the public tend to come a poor second, with the exception of the Scandinavian Member States and Germany where this role seems to be taken more seriously. One form of public engagement which does seem to be growing though are on-line discussion forums (e.g. E.U. Policy Network's "EPN Blog" in the UK ; and the objective of Europhilia, the forthcoming French think tank to organise "weblogs"). These fora are relatively cheap to run and enable a think tank to market itself as an open and inclusive organisation.

Quite legitimately, European 'thinking cells' do a lot more than just think. The name created by a couple of new actors—think and action tanks—is probably more reflective of many institutes' true nature. This corresponds to the dual mission think tanks have of producing and disseminating policy alternatives, and is therefore expected. A more surprising fact is that the think tank managers interviewed rarely had a clear answer when asked what methodologies their organisations use to stimulate maximum collective creativity, although a handful mentioned techniques such as scenario planning. This was particularly striking in the case of a prominent French think tank, the representative of which started the interview by insisting on the fact that true think tanks produce innovative concepts, whereas "fake" think tanks are more in the "compilation business." To the question "what processes have you put in place to promote the generation of new ideas in your institute," the same manager answered: "This is an interesting question, I've never thought about it…" This candid respondent, although head of one of the most productive and prestigious French institutes, believes that "few people can produce new ideas, even we are limited." He attributed this lack of creativity to insufficient

involvement of academics in applied policy research, State authorities' tendency in many countries to monopolise policy expertise, as well as think tanks' reluctance to recruit former high civil servants and public officials, unlike U.S. research centres. This lack of circulation "limits the ability to innovate, because cross-fertilisation is not happening."

Beyond this example, other converging signs indicate that the production of innovative policy perspectives within think tanks as organizations rests essentially on three components :

- Relatively isolated individuals who are recognised as particularly brilliant in their own field.
- A general process of research that relies mainly on academic research methods and increasing specialisation.
- A method of orchestrated exchange of views within relatively limited communities.

While bearing in mind the many constraints think tanks face in the production of viable policy alternatives, a valid question therefore is whether Euro-think tanks think or only isolated individuals within them? Unlike other creative industries such as design, architecture, marketing, art, and advertising, the range of systematic and collective methods to produce ideas within think tanks and their knowledge communities appears relatively limited.

2.1.7 Main publication types

The think tanks we surveyed publish a vast array of material, with each publication type carrying a different name depending on the think tank. We observed seven main types :

- Short and topical policy briefings, primarily aimed at politicians and government officials – and journalists – who have limited time for reading. These are usually produced in large numbers and often available on-line.
- Longer policy papers, called 'research reports', 'research papers', 'occasional papers', 'discussion papers', 'booklets' and 'pamphlets', which present the results of research and give recommendations for future action. These form the core research output for most of the organisations in the survey. The euro-specific think tanks usually produce these at a rate of 10-20 a year,[34] often in a series.
- Conference reports and event proceedings, usually published on an ad hoc basis.
- Books : if we exclude conference volumes and other larger reports from this category, the number of books published is actually relatively small. 'Euro-oriented' think tanks usually publish the most books because they tend to have greater financial resources. The Euro-specific think tanks on the other hand usually prefer to concentrate on producing policy papers. If they do publish books, it is often only at a rate of 1-2 per year.
- Journals : most of the journals are published, usually quarterly, by the 'Euro-oriented' think tanks (e.g. in the UK, ODI, Chatham House and IISS) although a number are also published by the Euro-specific think tanks.[35]

- Opinion pieces and articles which appear in newspapers or on the web only and are penned by a range of contributors from both inside and outside the think tank.
- Newsletters : these tend to be either weekly or monthly, essentially informing members and other subscribers of events, publications and other relevant policy news.

Much of this material is available from think tanks' websites, for free or for a subscription fee. It is also used as a 'tie-in' to encourage subscribers to join up. Some supply briefing services to other institutions.[36] Publishing research is only the first stage in a strategy to influence decision-makers. The more successful think tanks have developed sophisticated dissemination strategies, including press releases and conferences, media appearances and launch events for publications (see CER Case Study).

2.1.8 FUNDING

The think tanks in our survey are financed from a wide variety of sources, both public and private, including the European Commission, foundations, universities, and individual donations. Funding is usually either for core activities or for specific research projects. Revenue is also often generated by the think tanks themselves through their own activities, including fees from events and conferences, training courses, and consultancy work. There is a considerable variance in the types of funding in each country, with broader regional patterns.

The information presented below is a summary of the findings from the survey related to principal funding sources. Readers should note that the percentages given here relate only to the number of times that a think tank reported a particular funding source and do not indicate the *proportion* of funding from each source either for individual think tanks, or for the think tanks as a whole. The main findings are:

- STATE FUNDING : core funding of think tanks by the State is most common in Scandinavia, Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria, and, to a lesser extent, France. The countries where think tanks appear least often dependent on state funding are the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Greece. It is also rare for Brussels-based E.U. think tanks to receive core state funding. In all, slightly under half of the think tanks surveyed (48 per cent) receive funding from state authorities. Such funding is of differing types: this can be a line in an individual ministry's budget (most often a country's ministry of foreign affairs, or the ministry of education/research); or money from a specific central government research fund (for example in Sweden this is a fund for policy research on labour markets); or again funding by a state-funded research council (e.g. the Economic and Social Research Council in the UK); or finally from the regional government level (most common for the German and Spanish think tanks).
- COMMISSION : in the 2004 European Commission budget there was a special budget line (15 06 01 03) "Grants to European think tanks and organisations advancing the idea of Europe" with appropriations of €2.4 million, another line (15 06 01 05) for

"European Think Tanks" with an allocation of €500.000, and one for *Notre Europe* (€600,000). This represents a total of €3.5 million out of total of almost €20 million for "dialogue with the citizens." 15 per cent of the think tanks surveyed declared receiving a share of this allocation for core funding, usually in the form of grants. In the EU-15 countries, we found twelve such think tanks. These think tanks are all focused on European policy research and / or the study of international affairs. The Commission also provides core funding for a number of Brussels-based think tanks, including CEPS. The core funding that is given by the Commission to research centres in the new Member States is usually support for capacity building, for example through the Phare programme.[37]

- PRIVATE SECTOR : most common in Britain, Germany, and for the Brussels-based think tanks, this type of funding is one of the other major sources for Euro-focused think tanks. 44 per cent reported receiving *core* funding from the private sector, including 10 per cent from banks. The companies which fund independent policy research are very often large multi-nationals with a considerable share of their business in the E.U.
- FOUNDATION AND TRUST SUPPORT : this is another important source of income. Around one quarter of think tanks receive money this way, usually for core activities.[38]
- RESEARCH CONTRACTS : a growing proportion of funding comes in the form of money for specific research projects. The most common funders of these projects are national and foreign governments, the European Commission, private business, and universities. Project funding is cited as a source of income by nearly 40 per cent of the think tanks surveyed, although the actual percentage figure could well be higher.
- OTHER SOURCES : these include publications sales (typically this is a low proportion of total revenue, rarely more than 20 per cent), events income, fees for training courses and consultancy work,[39] membership fees, and individual donations. The last category, donations, is obviously important for many think tanks. However, a more detailed analysis of think tanks' accounts—and indeed more openness on their part—would be required in order to estimate what proportion of funding this represents.

Whether we can talk of a 'European funding model' for think tanks is unclear because of the wide variation in funding patterns in each country (see Section 2.2). European think tanks, like their counterparts in other regions of the world, all seek however to have funding from as broad a range of sources as possible. It was very rare to find a think tank that relies either 100 per cent on the State or 100 per cent on the corporate sector for its funding. Even in countries where state funding is least expected, for example in Britain, most think tanks receive a significant amount of government and/or Commission money for research projects. Funding challenges and its consequences on think tank activity will be analysed in further detail in Section 4.1.1.

2.1.9 STAFF

The average staff numbers for Euro-think tanks operating in the 25 Member States and Brussels has already been discussed in section 2.1.1. We present here the information collected on the profile of think tank researchers (nationalities, professional and academic backgrounds).

First, Euro-think tank staffs are already very 'Europeanised' and, albeit to a lesser extent, internationalised, with many foreign researchers working in think tanks. These researchers are mostly from other European countries but there were also some from further afield, particularly Russia, the U.S. and Canada. Observing the national origin of staff in three think tanks demonstrates this point well: at ODI in the UK, researchers come from the UK, Ireland, Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Italy, Finland, India and Kenya. In ETUI in Brussels, we found French, German, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Belgian, Danish and Dutch researchers. And at SIPRI in Sweden, the director of the institute is British and is the former U.K. Ambassador to Finland. There is concern that such mobility does not apply uniformly (e.g. in the case of French researchers, Féat, 2004).

Euro-researchers usually hold either a Master's degree or a PhD. The more academic-type think tanks, such as those in Germany and Scandinavia, tend to have a higher proportion of researchers with post-doctorates. Indeed, researchers in Denmark must hold by law a PhD if they want to obtain a permanent research post with a policy institute.[40] The advocacy tanks in our study, on the other hand, were more likely to employ researchers with Master's or first degrees only. Here the focus is less on academic excellence of a researcher than his or her ability to repackage an idea and sell it to policy-makers (or ideally both skills!).

Unfortunately our research did not yield detailed figures on how many employees had previously held posts in government, or indeed how many researchers went from think tanks back into government. This process of exchange, the so-called 'revolving doors' process, is an interesting phenomenon because it shows the intimacy of the link between think tanks and authorities in power. What is clear from our survey, however, is that often the policy entrepreneurs who set up think tanks are themselves politicians, who may be looking for a way to enhance their own political standing domestically and possibly promote a particular cause.[41]

2.1.10 EURO–THINK TANKS PERCEPTION OF THEIR OWN WORK

Despite academic efforts to clarify the notion, 'think tanks' are a complex and evolving concept. We have therefore asked what the managers of European 'brain boxes' perceive to be the main features of their activities and of an effective, credible, and influential independent research centre. Based upon the results of our research and interviews of managers, the main features that characterise a think tank seem to be dominated by a traditional model of academic research centres, while evolving toward a more advocacy-oriented model :

- A strong – but diminishing – emphasis on ACADEMIC CREDENTIALS : think tank directors insist on the importance of an academic style of publications (books and articles), a rigorous methodology of research, and staff with a sound background in research or teaching at university level, in particular for senior researchers. We have also come across institutes which team includes more policy-oriented researchers (e.g. EPC, CER, ISIS). The EPC for instance emphasises its primary wish to be politically influential, to give "the right message, to the right people, at the right time" over academic-like research. A French observer of the E.U. scene confirmed that think tanks "are increasingly political."

- INDEPENDENCE : as will be analysed in greater detail below, this aspect of their activity and their institutions is considered crucial, although some research centres acknowledge that traditional standards of neutrality may impair their capacity to contribute to decision making processes. As one manager put it, "European think tanks have very little influence indeed, partly because they are not politicised." A minority group of European research institutes argue that being close to political circles and endorsing a clear political stance is a necessary evolution (the Case Study on the CER below is an illustration of this trend) that does not necessarily imply a loss of independence nor of the capacity of giving sound political advice.

- THE PROMOTION OF DEBATE AND THE DISSEMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE : this is seen as particularly important for European issues. As stated by a Czech research institute, "it is better for the decision making process to know more opinions and views before those in charge take decisions."[42] Visibility, and more specifically media coverage, is also mentioned as attributes of think tanks, and in particular of the more influential ones.

- PROVIDING TIMELY ADDED-VALUE : for many sector leaders, "good" or even simply "real" think tanks are those capable of producing new policy options that tie in with the current political agenda. A debate emerges regarding the best approach in this respect, in particular whether 'thinking cells' should specialise or remain multi-disciplinary. A Dutch institute claims for instance: "generalist think tanks are a model on the way out… As democratic debate in Europe develops, you will need more specialised expertise (…)" Managers of multi-issue think tanks, although keen to advertise the broad range of skill of their staff, agree that a true, quality think tank requires very specialised researchers that can bring "real added value." Furthermore, what distinguishes think tanks from their academic peers in university research centres is their ability to react to new topics very fast. "Speed of reaction is essential to contribute to the debate, you need to be able to anticipate and react," according to the founder of a new think tank.[43]

- ACTING AS A PUBLIC SERVICE INSTITUTION : this is a model most often seen in Scandinavian countries and in Germany.[44]

- BEING INNOVATIVE, AND FORWARD-LOOKING : related to the previous point, think tanks help deal with emerging issues. A Portuguese director argues that the key task is "to produce information that anticipates the future needs of decision-makers."[45]

- PROVIDING A FORUM FOR DEBATE AND NETWORKING ON EUROPEAN ISSUES : the IEA in Dublin, for instance, sees its role as a facilitator for discussion by bringing together under its roof different actors, Irish politicians, academics and journalists who otherwise might not meet.[46]

The emphasis placed on qualities of speed, influence, and networking in parallel with what appears to be a diminishing emphasis on academic credentials and ideological independence probably reflect the emerging trend noted earlier towards greater 'advocacy'. We will come back to this issue and the questions it raises for the sector in Sections 4 and 5.

2.1.11 INDEPENDENCE, A CORE VALUE

INDEPENDENCE FROM WHOM AND WHAT ?

For all the 'Euro-think tanks' interviewed, independence is perceived both as a core value and an important factor of effectiveness.[47] This notion is, however, understood differently by managers of think tanks. It essentially rests on three pillars: intellectual, structural and ideological.

For most respondents, what counts above all is intellectual independence, which is founded in traditional notions of scientific research. A university professor and founder of a think tank which has gained a solid reputation for the quality of its research insists that what matters is the ability of researchers to conduct research, to define their own agenda, and to defend positions independently. If these criteria are fulfilled, then the fact that certain sources of funding are greater than others, or even a bias toward advocacy need not, according to him, contradict the organisation's research freedom. A key criterion for many think tanks is in fact that they determine their own agenda. And when the board or other authorities provide guidance, they insist that independence requires that nobody interferes with research conclusions. In fact, results of research should be reported independently, even when the research is conducted on behalf of, or paid for, by an external organisation. The IWE (Forschungsstelle für institutionellen Wandel & europäische Integration) based in Vienna, always discusses its conclusions with the people who commissioned its research, but stresses that it "never changes them."

Others insist also on organisational and financial autonomy, which are deemed necessary to protect a think tank's intellectual independence. Scholarly and material independence are therefore distinguished.

HOW IS INDEPENDENCE MAINTAINED ?

Overall, however, there is general agreement on the following key features of independence:

- The key factor of independence for nearly all think tanks interviewed is the diversity, balance and permanence of sources of funding. The forthcoming European Centre for International Economics, which will start its operations in Brussels in the fall of 2004 illustrates for instance this model, as it is currently trying to ensure that the funds provided by its twelve original participating Member States are matched by a wide

range of contributors from the private sector, which will be complemented with publications and event fees.[48] Finding a niche market, through specialised activities or topics is therefore an important strategy (see Section 4). Several respondents, such as Notre Europe, also highlighted the need for long-term funding that protects think tanks against the need to look constantly for new funding. What the ideal mix of funding sources should be varies however according to various think tanks' specific arrangements.[49] Interestingly, some think tanks argue that strong links with public authorities in fact protect them against the need to seek corporate funding and helps guarantee their independence.[50] Also revealing of this ambiguous relation to funding, a few contract research outfits, such as MESA 10 in Slovakia, seek to develop separate consulting activities that help finance research activities.

- Most think tanks adopt a legal status that provides protection against outside pressures. As associations, foundations, or otherwise, they seek to remain "independent", "non-profit", even "non-partisan." Independence is sometimes explicitly mentioned in their mission statement or statutes.[51] No clear pattern emerges regarding the best type of structure to protect a think tank's independence, although several indicate that an academic environment is more favourable.

- Some have complex decision making "checks and balances" mechanisms designed to ensure that the directors and the different stakeholders of a research institute need the approval of other parties to make decisions, and that the members of the boards of executives or directors are carefully selected. The diversity of views represented on their board, the board's role in ensuring intellectual integrity, the ability to cultivate contacts with different political parties and professional sectors are important to prevent biased research. Several think tanks have a scientific committee.[52]

- Unlike the Kiel Institute for World Economics (IfW) or ISPI in Milan (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale), few make explicit reference to a "rigorous empirical methodology" or claim to "respect academic research criteria" (Observatoire Social Européen), "objective approach to research without political prejudice", or "academic-like criteria of research." Very few explain on their website whether and how research is reviewed and how standard criteria of academic research are met, although the IFO-Institut (Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung in Munich) explained to us that its research is "to some extent peer reviewed."

- A few think tanks explain that it is more generally the quality of their research, their "transparency", "competence," and "good work" that best protect their reputation in the long run and ensure that they "cannot easily be used." (IRI Europe)[53]

- The reputation and prestige of the founders and the current executives of think tanks also play a role in guaranteeing an image of serious research. For many, it is vital to include "personalities beyond suspicion" on the board, as a German think tank put it. This is particularly emphasised in Italy.

- The fact that some think tanks have close links with public institutions (financial or organisational) are perceived by some as compromising independence and credibility, although none complained explicitly about decision-makers seeking to influence their work. Others however see such institutional links as reinforcing independence. Most, if not all think tanks perceive themselves as independent in fact, even when they have strong institutional links (e.g. the European Centre for Social Welfare Training and Research in Vienna) and depend on limited sources of funding, in some case, a single public source.[54] Many of the U.K. advocacy think tanks which are funded by the corporate sector argue, however, that the best way of maintaining independence is not to receive any funding from the State.
- Think tank managers feel however that the coordination and validation of their agenda by institutional partners does not imply control over the intellectual content of their research even when the research program is approved by an academy or the advocacy group to which think tanks are affiliated (e.g. Friends of the Earth's Sustainable Europe campaign in the case of the Sustainable Europe Research Institute in Vienna). Partnerships are not seen as affecting think tanks' ability to protect their independence. Even those that have strong links with political parties, such as some of the large German Stiftungen are careful to protect their image of independence by involving politicians from different sides. The Institut für europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin "involves key policymakers in order not to be perceived as one-sided." (see also Section 2.4).[55]

Several think tanks expressed how maintaining a research centre's independence is difficult, although "independence has never been an issue so far" for a handful.[56] We will take forward this discussion of independence in Section 4 (regarding the challenges which advocacy, financial pressures, and the proximity with decision-makers present).

2.1.12 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

All the think tanks examined monitor and report their activities in more or less detail on their websites and through annual reports, presumably to promote their activities and guide their work. Beyond monitoring, most think tanks are interested in measuring the impact of their activities on the European agenda and the alternatives debated, but few have developed proper means to do so. A manager replied to our questionnaire: "No specific mechanism in place to measure performance; there is so much competition, a simple test is the ability to survive!"

More generally, "performance measurement" is usually limited to the identification of instances when an organisation's messages have shaped these two aspects of policy making. As outlined above (Section 2.1.3), the think tanks examined here indeed have a variety of missions and objectives, which fulfilment is challenging and, furthermore, particularly difficult to measure. Think tanks that seek to influence policy making usually seek to demonstrate the relevance of their work by identifying particular examples of ideas that have been promoted by the organisation and later debated or enacted by policy-makers. Even though "there

always is a difference between the research results and policies approved by the State, the contribution of a think tank may be observed anyway," according to one of the think tank managers interviewed. Many then advertise such purported achievements. An oft-cited example is CEPS and EMU in 1988 (see section 1.2). Those that seek to disseminate ideas more widely usually look at media coverage.

The perspective is usually short term, as think tanks hope for a rapid response to their efforts, although individual respondents insisted that it is necessary to adopt a long run perspective to influence the policy making process and public opinion. "Running a think tank is not like a restaurant where you can display your dishes on the menu and then people walk by and decide to eat there!" told us the head of a British think tank to illustrate his argument that changing minds can take a very long time. In the new Member States, where we were told repeatedly that think tanks created after the political changes of the 1990s have limited direct contact with public authorities, research institutes find it more difficult to measure their influence on the decision-making process, as their impact can only be largely indirect. Some nevertheless give examples of laws approved on the basis, they believe, of projects developed by their organisation. Besides circumstantial examples, the think tanks surveyed seek to measure their impact by looking mainly at :

- Membership trends: "if membership increases, it means my work is useful."
- Attendance figures for conferences and seminars.
- Trends in purchases of publications.
- Visits and downloads on their websites.[57]
- Media coverage, although very few keep precise figures.

We were unable to obtain more precise detail that would have allowed us to understand what conclusions think tanks draw from such data, with regard both to opinion change and impact on policy making. The case study in Sections 4 on the Lithuanian Free Market Institute's efforts to measure its notoriety is somewhat exceptional. As will be further discussed (Section 5), one has to look beyond the E.U. to find think tanks that have researched and tried to implement more elaborate performance measurement mechanisms.

2.2. COUNTRY REPORTS

In this section we present the results of our survey by country, in order to give a deeper understanding of the specific institutional, political, and societal factors shaping Euro-think tanks' development in each country. All the 25 E.U. Member States are covered in the following order, with a separate report for the E.U. institutes in Brussels :

- European Union, Brussels
- Austria
- The Baltic States
- Benelux
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Hungary
- Ireland
- Italy
- Malta
- Poland
- Portugal
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Spain
- Sweden
- United Kingdom

E.U. – BRUSSELS

E.U. THINK TANKS AT THE HEART OF THE EU

It is in Brussels, at the heart of the E.U. policy-making machine, that one finds some of the most influential and renowned transnational think tanks focused on European issues. Brussels currently hosts ten think tanks that meet all our criteria, including two of its most respected, CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies) and the EPC (European Policy Centre), as well as a large number of organisations that perform similar functions.

A first group was established in the early days of E.U. integration (such as the European Trade Union Institute, in 1978, and CEPS, in 1983). Most, including the EPC (1996) are recent. Their number is likely to increase in the future. Some think tanks were in fact created very recently (e.g. the Lisbon Council for Economic Competitiveness, launched in the summer of 2003). More are yet to be formally launched (such as Jean Pisani-Ferry's European Centre for International Economics). While some may disappear, more are likely to emerge in the years to come.

Think tanks in Brussels tend to conform more to an Anglo-American model than their peers in the Member States. Nearly all are established as independent not-for-profit associations under Belgian law and offer similar services. Conferences, seminars and taskforces in particular are important platforms to network with other actors and discuss policy alternatives. They allow participants from the private sector to meet and think with individuals from E.U. institutions in a "neutral environment", as stressed by CEPS. As such, many in Brussels have members and seek in particular corporate memberships. Their audiences are also largely similar, as they all aim their work at E.U. decision-makers, first the Commission, increasingly the European Parliament, then national governments and the media. All have a neutral, or more frequently pro-European agenda, apart from the Euro-sceptic Centre for the New Europe. All, in one way or another, have the ambition to help bridge the democratic deficit between the E.U. and its citizens. All seek to diversify their funding base to preserve their independence and some organisations in Brussels have very sophisticated funding mechanisms. The EPC and CEPS have succeeded particularly well in this respect, with relatively large funds stemming from membership fees, fees for services, contracts, and subsidies. Others have different strategies, ranging from personal funds and private donations in the case of the Lisbon Council, to subscriptions from its state and corporate members in the case of the forthcoming European Centre for International Economics.

However, beyond these general similarities, competition is strong in Brussels and organisations seek to develop a niche market. While the largest think tanks tend to be multi-disciplinary, specialisation can be in Euro-think tanks' areas of research, for instance defence issues for the International Security Information Service (ISIS Europe), Asia for the European Institute for Asian Studies, and the "social implications of the building of Europe" for the Observatoire Social Européen. Think tanks also try to offer different approaches to E.U. matters. The EPC for instance takes pride in being first a "welcome platform for balanced

discussion" while CEPS seeks to produce "sound policy research" and "achieve high standards of academic excellence." They offer different activities, such as the EPC's forums. As a result, Brussels has a mix of academic, advocacy, and contract research think tanks.

Of course, competition in Brussels is increased by the huge number of organisations that may not have in-house research teams, but perform functions similar to those of think tanks. Providing an exhaustive list would be a daunting task. One should however mention well-regarded discussion forums such as Friends of Europe and Forum Europe, and innovative additions such as The Centre, a hybrid between a think tank and a consultancy created in early 2004. This type of organisation plays an important role as "incubators of ideas by hosting seminars, round-tables, book-launches, debates and a range of social events" and "instigators of ideas, by collaborating with think tanks, foundations and other thinking communities around Europe."[58] They also include networks such as TEPSA (Trans-European Policy Association), EPIN (European Policy Institutes Network), and the European Ideas Network ("an open pan-European think tank process sponsored by the EPP-ED [conservative] group, the largest political group in the European Parliament.") Created in 1998, the European Madariaga Foundation also brings together College of Europe Alumni "to place the research capacity of the College at the service of the European debate."

Brussels is of course also home to scores of diverse groups that have the capability to produce policy alternatives. The Commission has its own 'brain box', in the form of the Group of Policy Advisers, created in 1992 by former President Jacques Delors, not included in our survey because it is within the structures of the Commission. There are also scores of lobby group / think tank hybrids that contribute to E.U. policy making, such as the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), the International Crisis Group (ICG), the European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E), and the European Citizen Action Service (ECAS), to name a few.[59] Industry lobby UNICE and trade union lobby ETUC, while not strictly speaking think tanks, also regularly produce detailed reports on how they feel the E.U.'s economy and labour markets should evolve.

One should also mention E.U. branches of U.S. think tanks, based in Brussels or around the EU, such as RAND Europe, the East West Institute (EWI), and the Aspen Institute. These are strong and getting stronger. EWI, which has an office in Brussels, is "an independent, not-for-profit, European-American institution working to address the most dangerous fault lines of the 21st century and to help build fair, prosperous and peaceful civil societies in those areas." It operates "long-term projects that create trust and understanding and seek to reduce tensions from Eurasia to the trans-Atlantic region using [its] unique network of private and public sector leaders in more than 40 nations." RAND Europe, which does essentially contract research, has no less than 56 full-time researchers in total in Leiden, Cambridge and Berlin helping "European governments, institutions, and firms with rigorous, impartial analysis of the hardest problems they face."[60] The Aspen Institute, with offices in Lyon, Berlin and Rome (and Milan), is especially active in promoting transatlantic and regional relations, examining the role of the home countries in Europe, and addressing important political, economic and ethical issues.

AUSTRIA

A VARIED LANDSCAPE OF YOUNG THINK TANKS

Austria hosts thirteen think tanks that have a significant interest in European matters. Among these, two deal exclusively with the European Union: the Forschungsstelle für institutionellen Wandel und europäische Integration (IWE-ICE) and the Österreichisches Institut für europäische Sicherheitspolitik (ÖIES), which focuses more specifically on issues related to the CFSP. Several think tanks were created and specialised in community issues, after Austria joined the European Union in 1995 and following the transfer of political competencies to Brussels, such the IWE-ICE (created as an independent institute in April 2004) and the ÖIES (established in 1996).

There is also an important international politics institute in Austria, the Österreichisches Institut für internationale Politik (OIIP), which focuses mainly on the E.U.'s development policies. The Zentrum für angewandte Politikforschung (ZAP) is an applied policy research organisation which offers a comparative analysis of current trends within the main political and economic institutions in Austria and the Union. Austria also hosts two large economic research institutes, the Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO) and the Wiener Institut für internationale Wirtschaftsvergleich (WIIW), which has a research programme on European integration. A new think tank recently joined the ranks of these two economic institutes: Austria-Perspektiv, founded in 2002 to "remedy the lack of long term analyses and perspectives." According to this research centre, nobody in Austria, neither the parties' political academies (such as the Renner-Institut, which is close to the SPÖ, and Modern Politics, close to the ÖVP),[61] nor the social partners takes a long-term perspective. Austria-Perspektiv argues that the consequences of political decisions have long been under-estimated and its objective therefore is to forecast the possible impact of policy decisions. Finally, the Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences (ICCR) hosts a think tank dedicated to Europe. It is called EURO: European Developments – Policies and Politics, and its activities focus, among other things, on enlargement.

Austrian think tanks are essentially funded by the federal and regional governments, to which can be added some European funding and project work from Ministries. Contracted research is a common means to diversify Austrian think tanks' sources of funding. The development of think tanks in Austria was made easier by the decline of the social partners, which for many years had monopoly control over governmental consultation. This created a gap which independent organisations were able to fill. Consultation institutes in the field of economics created in the 1960s and 1970s, such as the Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO), the Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), and the Europäische Zentrum für Wohlfahrtspolitik und Sozialforschung, are now bodies which policy-makers are used to consulting.

Apart from the larger organisations just mentioned, which have teams of at least 20 researchers, most Austrian thinks tanks have very small research staffs, which usually do not exceed ten people. Contacts with decision-makers are very informal. Whereas in the United

States the President's advisors are known and each round of presidential appointments is reported on publicly, the names of political advisers in Austria are generally kept relatively quiet and discussions regarding political appointments take place behind the scenes. Such contacts are sometimes founded on a personal friendship between political advisers and decision-makers, which could be explained by the relatively small size of the country. Furthermore, the influence of think tanks is limited by the complexities of the Austrian federal system. A consensus at the federal level sometimes is blocked by the opposition of the Länder when these have the final say.

Overall, despite the recent creation of a number of research centres following Austria's accession to the E.U. and the fact that the policy-making process today is more flexible, pluralist and open to outside experts, Austria has relatively few think tanks dealing with European issues. Because of their size and influence, however, they are still taken seriously by decision-makers.

It is also worth mentioning an Internet-based quasi-think tank, the Sustainable Europe Research Institute, established in 1999. Pan-European, its objective is to explore sustainable development option for Europe. Its unusual structure – a network organisation without any in-house researchers – is an interesting addition to Austria's policy-making community, but does not fully meet our criteria.

THE BALTIC STATES

A SOCIETY AND POLITICAL ELITES IN TRANSITION

Four think tanks meet our criteria in ESTONIA, with only one that is dedicated specifically to European issues (the Institute for European Studies, affiliated to the Audientes University of Tallinn). Another has a research programme on European integration and enlargement (the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute), the remaining two look at specific European policy issues on an *ad hoc* basis (the Estonian Institute for Future Studies and the Praxis Centre for Policy Studies).[62]

In LATVIA, we identified five Euro-think tanks: the Centre for European and Transition Studies that focuses exclusively on the European Union ; three other independent research centres (the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, the Institute of Economics - Academy of Science, and the Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies - BICEPS) are 'Euro-oriented' think tanks, and the fifth, policy.lv, is a borderline case: it is an on-line think tank that regularly looks at European policy issues.

Four think tanks were listed in LITHUANIA : the Institute for International Relations and Political Science, the Lithuanian Regional Research Institute, the Lithuanian Free Market Institute, and the Institute of Labour and Social Research. None focuses exclusively on community matters.

The Baltic states have two main types of think tanks: (1) academic think tanks / universities without students, which are linked to universities, have academic staff, and receive part of their funding from universities, while remaining independent (they were often created by a

small group of academics with a common interest, but they remain separate from the universities which host them), and (2) independent centres which emerged spontaneously as early as 1991, sometimes thanks to governmental initiatives,[63] or with the help of foundations, such as the Soros foundation. The latter are often a hybrid of contract researchers and shapers of public opinion. All claim to be independent, without any links to political parties, even those created by parties.

Most were created in the 1990s, as a direct result of the fall of the Soviet empire, although with local nuances. The think tank community in Lithuania, strengthened by a stronger tradition of independence and as the country that first freed itself from Soviet control, developed in the early 1990s, while Latvia waited until 2000, probably in part because of its slower adaptation to the E.U. accession criteria. In the three Baltic States, however, at least one think tanks had been created by 1991, the official date of their independence. There was a marked growth in the sector between 1995 and 2000, during the accession negotiations with the E.U.

Euro-specific think tanks in the Baltic States indeed focus mainly on E.U. enlargement and European integration, at a general level or through country-specific issues (integration process for their home country, relations with countries outside the E.U., comparison of the three Baltic States in the run-up to accession, etc.). The other, 'Euro-oriented' centres focus on their specific research areas such as security in the Baltic region, regional cooperation, market development, economic forecasting, and social and environmental policies, in particular with regard to the adaptation to European norms. This is in part dictated by the many research contracts requested by ministries and other official bodies to assist them with the accession process.

Baltic Euro-think tanks usually have anywhere between a dozen and forty researchers. It is not unusual to find members of the government sitting on the board of independent research institutes, sometimes even as researchers. Staffing however is a major issue for think tanks in the Baltic States, because the pool of potential recruits is small on certain issues, and because of the language barrier. Budgetary constraints also prevent further recruitment, and researchers often perform many administrative tasks, which makes it harder for them to conduct research and organise projects.

Private donations are still very unusual in former communist countries. The think tank sector therefore has difficulties surviving and accessing funds for long-term projects. Developing a diversified portfolio of funders is therefore essential. Similarly, national budgetary difficulties prevent adequate funding of research and public financing is limited, except for think tanks created by the government and government-initiated studies. Foreign foundations, international organisations, and sometimes foreign governments provide the rest of their funding: the Soros Foundation, the European Commission, the World Bank, OECD, the government of Sweden. Think tanks in the Baltic States also cooperate regularly with Scandinavian and Finnish organisations, helped in this by their geographic, as well as linguistic and cultural proximity.

Euro-think tanks in the Baltic States tend to focus on national decision-makers, as all were created with the same goal of assisting their national governments with the post-Soviet transition and the accession to the European Union. The founders of today's think tanks felt in the early 1990s that mentalities needed to be adjusted in several areas (governance, institutional processes, market mechanisms, etc.) where Baltic politicians lacked experience, because the Soviet era had shaped society and governments so deeply. There was therefore a real need for better policy analysis and scientific expertise, which created new demand for think tanks. On the other hand, independence from Soviet tutelage and a centralised, even totalitarian political regime is still less than 15 years old. Civil society and mechanisms of public consultation and participation are therefore still very recent. Government is perceived not to be very keen to involve citizens and outside organisations in policy making. Think tanks that receive public funding often need to resist government attempts to use them for their own purposes, although things are apparently progressing as governments tend to use think tanks more and more as independent outside consultants, and try less than in the past to influence the results of research they finance. In any case, it is clear that the think tank sector in the Baltic States is emerging and is bound to develop further in the future.

BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, LUXEMBOURG

A WELL-ESTABLISHED AND VARIED CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN POLICIES

The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, geographically and historically at the heart of the European construction process, have six think tanks altogether with a significant interest in European affairs that meet our criteria. The Netherlands has always been open to the rest of the world and a supporter of E.U. integration, for historic and geopolitical reasons, which shows today in the strength of its think tanks specialised in E.U. and wider-European and international affairs.

One of the four Dutch think tanks listed, the Cicero Foundation, is a generalist E.U. research centre, three have specific research portfolios covering international relations, security and participatory democracy. Belgium has two relevant think tanks for our survey, one is an international relations research centre, and the other is focused on issues of peace and security. Luxembourg has no think tank that matches our criteria, although its Institute of European and International Studies performs some think tank functions.[64] Overall, the majority of Benelux think tanks and the ones described as more influential at the E.U. level, such as the prestigious Clingendael institute, are based in The Netherlands.

Although nearly all are independent, not-for-profit organisations, they paint a diverse picture.[65] Most are not typical of European-focused think tanks though, because of their specialised interest (e.g. IRI Europe which focuses on "the practice of initiative and referendum" throughout Europe) and their activities (e.g. Clingendael has important training activities).[66] Founded on average over 20 years ago, most Benelux think tanks are well established, though the latest (IRI Europe) was created as late as 2001. Heavyweight organisations have a large staff of permanent researchers (e.g. Clingendael, 25), while

smaller outfits have less than five researchers (e.g. Belgium's GRIP, the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security). Several are very influential and work actively, in particular Clingendael, the Cicero Foundation, the Centre for European Security Studies, and GRIP, thanks in part to their geographic proximity, both with E.U. institutions and their national governments. All seek to get involved in the policy-making process upstream and at the higher levels of E.U. and national decision-makers.

Benelux think tanks operate in political environments already well endowed with influential party organisations, government bodies and academic centres. Indeed, other organisations not listed here perform important work. These include the Alfred Mozer Foundation, which focuses primarily on Eastern Europe, and the Netherlands Atlantic Association, which has no in-house research team but provides a useful forum to study questions regarding transatlantic security issues, NATO and European security. The main Dutch parties have foundations that, on occasion, work on E.U. matters, including the Christian Democrats, the Socialists' Anne Vondeling Foundation, the Liberals' Telders Foundation, and the Democrats 66's Scientific Institute.

The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), "an independent think tank for Dutch government", writes occasionally about E.U. affairs. EIPA, the European Institute of Public Administration is an important organisation. Its core mission is not the conduct of research and it is tied to E.U. institutions, but it nonetheless has a very large research production.[67] The European Cultural Foundation conducts, on and off, influential policy research on issues related to European culture, notably recently on behalf of the Dutch presidency of the E.U.[68] In Belgium, GEPE (Groupe d'Etudes Politiques Européennes), a federation of university centres, and ULB and KUL (universities of Brussels and Leuven) complement independent Belgian think tanks' capacity on the E.U.

CYPRUS

A STRONG DEMAND DRIVING DEVELOPMENT

We recorded three 'Euro-think tanks' in Cyprus, including one specifically dedicated to Europe (the European Institute of Cyprus), and two with at least one significant programme on the E.U. (the Research and Development Centre – Intercollege and Civilitas Research). Relative to the size of the country, Cypriot research on Europe is therefore very dynamic.[69] Because of its history, society in Cyprus is highly politicised and informed of national and regional political debates.

The three organisations listed were created in the second half of the 1990s, ahead of accession negotiations, which officially started in November 1998. Their research focuses largely on the division of Cyprus, in particular in the light of the accession of the Greek part to the European Union and of the poor economic situation of the Turkish side, which contrasts sharply with the economic boom of the other part and creates tension on the island. In fact, one week before Cyprus' accession to the E.U. in May 2004, 75 per cent of Greek voters

rejected Kofi Annan's plan for reunification, even though 65 per cent of Turkish voters approved it.

Cyprus hosts three different types of think tanks: two independent research centres, including one that is more academic (the RDC is associated to Intercollege, the university with the highest reputation in Cyprus), and the other that is the result of a joint initiative of the E.U. and the Republic of Cyprus (the European Institute of Cyprus). The third institute is a private initiative (Civilitas Research). Despite different origins, all three provide high quality economic, political and social analyses to national and European decision-makers, both regarding the relations between Cyprus and the Mediterranean region and between Cyprus and the E.U. Consulting activities are commonplace, both for public and private contractors, even for the more prestigious centres such as Civilitas Research which has worked for the United Nations, the Romanian Foreign Ministry, the Economist Intelligence Unit, McKinsey & Co., British American Tobacco, Lukoil, BBC World and Barclays Bank. Cypriot think tanks are crucial interlocutors for many outside organisations, because of the specificity of the Cypriot issue, as well as the island's peculiar geographic and cultural position.

Cypriot Euro-think tanks are relatively large: they have between 15 and 50 permanent employees. They are funded essentially through private donations and their own activities. The Cypriot government and the European Commission fund massively the European Institute of Cyprus, which hopes to diversify its sources of funding in years to come. All benefit from a high degree of independence, as the first two do not depend on any particular donor, and the mission of the third institute is to be as objective and neutral as possible.

CZECH REPUBLIC

A YOUNG, GROWING, AND MILITANT COMMUNITY

European policy matters are covered by five think tanks in the Czech Republic. Europe is the core research area for Europeum-Institute for European Policy, while another institute, the Prague Institute for International Relations works on international relations in general, and the remaining three touch on European issues through sectoral policies: the Centre for Economics and Politics, the Civic Institute, and the Policy Centre for the Promotion of Democracy.

Most Czech think tanks are non-profit organisations and receive the bulk of their financial resources from private foundations, private sponsors, and private gifts and grants. Some of them self-finance part of their work through subscriptions, books, and consulting activities. Two research institutes also receive part of their funding from the State.

Most are quite young, as they were created after the political changes of the early 1990s. As the integration process is a very important matter in the Czech Republic, where Euroscepticism is now running particularly high, the activities of think tanks very often focus on the preparation of accession, as well as its consequences and the evolution of the legal and practical situation of the country. Besides, they also cover general and current European issues, such as the E.U. legal system or E.U. politics, European elections in June 2004, the

elaboration of the Constitutional Treaty, and the question of the new external border of the Union and its consequences for '3rd pillar' policies.

Czech think tanks usually have less than 10 full time researchers, although the Prague Institute for International Relations has nearly 30. Apart from the permanent ones, the think tanks also often co-operate with external researchers, whose number depends on projects currently realised.

Most Czech think tanks can be classified as "advocacy tanks." In most cases, public authorities at the national level constitute the main target group of Czech think tanks. However, the institutions are almost in all cases also interested in co-operating with journalists and informing society in general. Europeum, the only institution that can be classified as a 'Euro-specific' think tank, is particularly interested in university students because of its connection with Charles University.

DENMARK

THE MYSTERIOUS CASE OF THE DISAPPEARING THINK TANKS

Only one Danish think tank was included in our survey : the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), which, according to our definition, is not Euro-specific.

DIIS was formed in January 2003 following the controversial merger in 2002 by the Danish government of four existing international institutes: the Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), the Danish Centre for Genocide and Holocaust Studies, and the Centre for Development Studies. DIIS is now one half of the Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights.[70] The move provoked controversy in Denmark because it was viewed as a political attack by the new right-wing government on the so-called "taste judgers" who ran these institutes and who had previously expressed their criticism of the government on various matters, including asylum policy and the Kosovo conflict. However, it was also no doubt an attempt by the new government to cut costs in the publicly funded research sector.

DIIS is a publicly funded, sector-specific research institute, similar to others existing in Denmark such as the National Institute of Social Research (SFI). About two-thirds of its 58m DKK budget comes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other third from different government ministries or the European Commission for specific projects. It has five main research departments, one of which is concerned with European policy. 14 out of its 78 researchers work in this department. Its current work includes: the E.U. as international actor; the relationship between Denmark and the E.U.; and changes in the international system post-September 11 and consequences for the E.U. DIIS organises on average about 75 seminars and conferences a year.

We were unable to interview the head of DIIS' European department, so it is difficult to estimate what influence it is currently having on the Danish policy-making scene. However, a former director of DUPI did say to us that DIIS is still in a process of readjustment following

the merger and that its influence has suffered as a result. They said that there is very little actual policy research currently being done by the department, and that since the merger the Danish Parliament had not officially requested any reports from DIIS on European matters, as had previously happened with DUPI, for instance on the Danish opt-out from the single currency. A number of factors explain the low number of think tanks working on European issues in Denmark:

THE LACK OF A CORPORATE FUNDING BASE TO SUPPORT NEW THINK TANK WORK : the currently limited availability of public funding for think tank activities in Denmark means that new think tanks have to look elsewhere for potential funding. There is however no real tradition of corporate sector funding of think tanks in Denmark.[71] Therefore, an "ossification" of think tank structures has arguably taken place, whereby existing government-linked research institutes have monopolised both research space and government funding in their specific sector (e.g. DIIS in international affairs, SFI in social policy), but relatively few new think tanks can emerge because of the lack of other financial support mechanisms.[72]

THE CONTINUING EFFECT OF THE 2002 MERGER : this reduced dramatically the number of think tanks working on international and European policy issues. For example, the Centre for Development Studies and COPRI had both previously carried out important European work in their respective sectors prior to the merger. Much of this expertise and research output has been lost as a result, and it will take time for DIIS to reproduce a similar level of work.[73]

COMPETITION FROM THE UNIVERSITY SECTOR : there are a number of university centres in Denmark with an interest in European policy. An important example is the Centre for European Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. The Centre, in addition to its Master's programme, also produces research of a similar kind to think tanks (e.g. working papers), aimed at a similar audience (such as the public, business and policy-makers). Such work could also pose a challenge to any Euro-specific, academic-style think tank attempting to establish itself in Denmark the future. Another example is EPRU, a university-based policy research body (not a think tank according to our criteria). Founded in 1991 by a group of Danish economists at the Copenhagen Business School and the University of Copenhagen, EPRU undertakes research on international macroeconomic policy issues. One of the motivations for its creation was the change occurring at the time in the international economy and increasing European economic integration. Much of its work is relevant to E.U. policy-makers.[74]

FINLAND

A MODERN AND VARIED COMMUNITY OF EURO–THINK TANKS

In 1997, McGann, Weaver (2000) had identified nine think tanks in Finland in different fields. Three were research centres affiliated to political parties (K.J. Stahlberg Foundation, Labour Institute for Economic Research, National Coalition Institute). Today, six think tanks (including five new institutes) examine European policy issues, either very closely (Pan-European Institute, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, The Research Institute for the Finnish

Economy - ETLA) or as part of a wider research remit (EVA - Finnish Business and Policy Forum, Pellervo Economic Research Centre - PTT, Labour Institute for Economic Research).

Finland has a strong think tank tradition. Out of the nine think tanks listed by McGann and Weaver, six had been established between 1945 and 1974 and one before 1945. Among our six 'Euro-think tanks', five date back to the 1960s and 1970s. The most recent (the Pan European Institute) is more specialised in Europe as a continent, including the E.U. as well as Eastern Europe (the new Member States) and E.U. neighbouring countries, especially Russia. Russia is indeed a major area of research for the majority of Finnish think tanks, in particular in the framework of the 'Northern Dimension' and Russian relations with the E.U.

Finland has three types of think tanks: academic institutes (Pan-European Institute), private and completely independent organisations with a clear sectoral focus (international trade, economics, agriculture/wood, food industry), and one think tank which is affiliated to the social-democratic party (the Labour Institute for Economic Research-PSTL, its role is to provide expertise, mainly economic, to Finnish policy-makers). Finnish think tanks' audiences vary largely according to the nature of their research. Besides policy-makers, Finnish think tanks have many other activities, including providing information to the public, consultancy services for the private sector, and *ad hoc* projects such as economic forecasts (PTT, EVA, ETLA).

Their sources of funding also depend largely on the public they cater for: academic institutes depend essentially on public subsidies and a share of the funds allocated to the universities they are affiliated to. More specialised centres are funded more through cooperatives or unions close to their areas of interest. The Finnish Ministry of Education remains a large and regular funder of Finnish think tanks.

Finland's think tanks are overall characterised by a modern and fairly specific approach to European studies. The discretion of the Finnish government, its relative absence in the funding of research groups, and the fact that public opinion is very politicised and active (80.2 per cent participation rate in the 2000 presidential elections) are also indications of what Finnish think tanks perceive as the modern nature of their policy making process. Independent research was long dominated in Northern European countries by institutional think tanks, established after World War II through national legislation and mainly funded by the State. They were required to provide objective and non-partisan research in their areas of expertise, with no State interference. This is the case in particular for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Finnish 'Euro-think tanks' tend to be largely pro-European, which can be understood in the light of Finland's recent accession to the E.U. (January 1995) and strong public support for accession (57 per cent approval in a referendum conducted at the time).[75] According to the managers of Finnish think tanks, proportional representation in Finland also helps them remain as objective as possible, as it forces broad governmental coalitions: a left-to-right coalition included the communists and the conservatives in 1999, another brought together the social-democrats, the conservatives and the greens after the legislative elections in 2000, and the Centre Party, which won the legislative elections in 2003 joined forces with the social-

democrats and a party representing the Swedish minority. Because all political forces have a chance to be represented in the government, Finnish think tanks feel that they do not need to develop particular links with any party.

Furthermore, Prime Minister Urho Kaleva Kekkonen's policy of developing good contacts with Finland's neighbouring countries, led from 1956 to 1981, is still very much alive. A key component of Finland's foreign policy has in fact always been to maintain strict neutrality and good relations with the USSR. As early as 1991, Finland started developing its relations with former Soviet republics. This is visible today in the large number of research programmes that focus on regional collaboration, in particular with the Baltic States.

FRANCE

EXPERIENCING ANOTHER REVOLUTION?

Currently, only seven French organisations qualify as think tanks with an explicit focus on European policy matters, according to the criteria of this survey. Five are Euro-specific think tanks : Confrontations Europe, which seeks to generate new and more "conflicting" ideas about Europe by bringing together representatives from different sectors ; Europe 2020, which seeks to promote greater democracy through prospective studies ; the Fondation Robert Schuman that strives for the reunification of the European continent ; and Notre Europe, which acts in "the spirit of a closer European union comprising a common defence and a common currency, respecting community assets, and resting on common policies that support full employment, competitiveness, and solidarity." The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is a borderline case as it is an autonomous E.U. agency specialised in security matters.[76] The two remaining are international affairs institutes with significant programmes dedicated to Europe: the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), with a broad research portfolio, and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), more focused on military and defence matters. Many more organisations besides these seven organisations perform a similar role in terms of research and policy planning on European affairs. France also expects to welcome a new generalist Euro-think tank in the autumn of 2004.

Nearly all French E.U. think tanks are organised as non-profit associations under a flexible, catch-all French statute dating back to 1901, except for two: one is a foundation and the other a European agency. They are all based in Paris. Most are largely dependent on public funds, European, but also French. Apart from IFRI, which has experienced recent reductions in public funding but is large and well established, few have succeeded in developing sustainable private sources of funding. Despite France's long-time intellectual investment in the E.U. construction process, the seven organisations listed are very recent. Except again for IFRI, which recently celebrated its 25th anniversary and is considered one of France's first think tanks created on the Anglo-American model, the remaining six are on average only nine years of age.[77] French 'boîtes à idées' also tend to be relatively small. In-house research teams working on European issues usually have less than ten researchers and budgets are fairly

limited. France does not have Euro-sceptic think tanks. Approximately half in fact advocate greater E.U. integration and involvement of citizens in E.U. affairs, as will Europhilia, to be created later this year. The remaining think tanks are more academic in nature.

The impact of France on the E.U. scene is considered insufficient, as highlighted recently by French Deputy Jacques Floch (2004), by the French Permanent Representation to the E.U. (Féat, 2004) and by Foreign Affairs Minister Michel Barnier (August 2004). French think tanks publish too often only in French and not systematically in English or other E.U. languages. They have developed very close links with their official French interlocutors in French and E.U. institutions and have strong work programmes with German institutes, but still have difficulties reaching beyond their traditional networks of influence. They are not very visible in the E.U. media. One think tank, Confrontations Europe, has a permanent office in Brussels (since May of this year), another, the Fondation Robert Schuman, will follow in Confrontations' step later in 2005. This lack of visibility and presence on the ground explains, according to France's PermRep, why French think tanks cannot test and disseminate their ideas as effectively as their English or German counterparts, even though the seven think tanks dedicated to E.U. affairs listed represent a significant share of the 70 think tanks identified in total by McGann and Weaver in 2000.

However, France's "intellectual diplomacy" also relies on a significant number of active organisations that make a significant contribution to French research and communication efforts on E.U. policies :

- Government and E.U. institutional bodies such as the 'Centre d'Analyse et de Prévision', the in-house, official think tank of the foreign affairs ministry.
- Recent quasi-think tanks / forums for debate, such as A Gauche, en Europe and Europartenaires, which are very active in the formation and dissemination of ideas at a European level, but that do not have an in-house research team.
- Influential and active academic centres that touch on European affairs regularly, including the Centre d'Etudes des Relations Internationales (CERI), the Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherches sur la Paix et d'Etudes Stratégiques (CIRPES), the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII); and the Institut de l'Europe, based at the French business school HEC and managed by former European Affairs Minister (turned professor) Noëlle Lenoir. These academic centres are getting increasingly involved, as discussed in Section 4.1.
- Many associations, either pro-European, such as the Association Jean Monnet; Association Française d'Etudes pour l'Union européenne; and Europe et Sociétés; or more critical, such as anti-world-trade group Attac.
- Foundations : the Fondation Jean Jaurès for instance, although not dedicated to Europe, often includes the E.U. dimension in its studies.
- Other more generalist think tanks, such as Polemia, the Institut Montaigne, and Prométhée (French branch of an international think tank), look at E.U. issues and increasingly so. They were not included however because Europe is not an explicit

research topic. Two think tanks in the fields of international relations and strategy studies besides IFRI and FRS generate strong policy research related to European affairs: IRIS (Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques), and the Institut Choiseul.[78]

Clearly, put together, these different complementary research bodies significantly counterbalance the relative paucity of French Euro-think tanks. On the other hand, the fact that so many structures, in particular ministerial cabinets, political clubs, national research institutes, and policy research groups play a similar role to think tanks in the French political landscape, also prevents the emergence of strong independent research centres, according to Fieschi and Gaffney (in Stone, Denham, Garnett, 1998). Overall, it is assumed that France does not have a strong think tank culture. Gadault (2004) links this situation to the general under investment in research in France. According to a French professor of European affairs, French public authorities, traditionally very centralised, are also not open to outside input. "In France," he argues, "everyone believes she or he has all the answers. Bercy [the Finance Ministry] has its own think tank, and they only trust what they produce internally. Some countries are more open (…), their bureaucracies tend to think less that they do not need external support." Another researcher adds that this is "a cultural problem of French elites."

There are however encouraging signs that this culture is changing. "We understand the problem fast, although it takes a lot of time to find the solution," observes a French official. There is increased realisation of the importance of Europe among decision-makers, and younger generations of students and leaders of the corporate sector are finding their place on the European and international stage.

GERMANY

AN EXCEPTION ON THE EUROPEAN THINK TANK SCENE

The system of think tanks in Germany is characterised by a large number of independent organisations, which are located outside the structures of government but are nonetheless supported, financed and sometimes even operated by these same structures. There are about 20 think tanks in Germany which display an interest for European questions and which are therefore included in this study.

The system of think tanks in Germany is unusual in the European context. The types of think tank are extremely varied. There are, firstly, a large number of "universities without students", which main activity is academic research. This category includes the major institutes dealing with foreign policy, peace and security issues, such as the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP). Their mission is international and therefore a large part of their activities relates to Europe. The SWP and DGAP both have research programmes on the European Union. This is focused for SWP on European integration, the E.U.'s external relations and security policy, and for DGAP on Franco-German relations and Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to SWP, which main mission is to advise the Federal Government, DGAP is an independent, non-partisan

organisation similar to the Council for Foreign Relations in New York and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

Also counted as "universities without students" are the six large economic research institutes (DIW in Berlin (Deutsches Institüt fur Wirtschaftsforschung), IFO-Institut, HWWA in Hamburg (Hamburgischen Welt-Wirtschafts Archiv), RWI in Essen (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), IFW in Kiel (Institüt für Weltwirtschaft) and IWH in Halle). Their academic research on Europe focuses on the economic aspects of European integration, with the exception of RWI, which does not undertake European research. For instance, these institutes seek to place in a European perspective the results of their research on the German economy. The financing of these economic think tanks, which comes both from the Federal and *Länder* Governments, is a reflection of the federal structure of the country.

There exists moreover another group of think tanks, characteristic of Germany's political structures: the political foundations or "Stiftungen". According to Martin Thunert (interview), they have no real equivalent in any other country, with the possible exception of Austria, Holland and, to a lesser extent, France. They are essentially "idea laboratories" which defend particular interests and ideologies. Today there are seven such political foundations, of which the two main ones are the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (close to the SPD) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (close to the CDU). These foundations were established in the 1960s, except for two which are more recent, the Heinrich Boll Stiftung (1996), linked to the Greens, and the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, linked to the left-wing PDS.[79] These foundations are very active abroad, for example one of their main roles is to promote democracy in Africa and Latin America. Their research work does not in fact represent much more than 20 per cent of their total activities. They are therefore only "partial" think tanks. They are financed wholly by the State and are linked to the political parties represented in the Bundestag. However, in no sense are they instruments of the party leaderships, nor extensions of parties' internal research departments.

Until the 1970s the development of think tanks was closely linked to the needs of the State or of corporatist organisations linked to it. For instance, a number of peace research institutes were created by Social-Democratic *Länder* governments, such as the Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HFSK), established in Frankfurt in 1970, and the Institüt für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (IFSH), established in 1971 at Hamburg University. IFSH concentrates exclusively on the E.U.'s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Even today, the Federal and *Länder* Governments are still the main source of funding and infrastructure support for the majority of think tanks.

In Germany, large companies also undertake research on future scenarios, or assist in setting up foundations. The latter in turn hire external bodies (often university research centres) to carry out studies and forecasting, particularly on European questions. The best known of these foundations is the Bertelsmann Stiftung, which includes among its six principal fields of activity international relations, and thus Europe. In the 1990s, the Bertelsmann Stiftung came to be seen as one of the most important of the research organisations receiving private funding. It had at its disposal even greater resources than the largest of the state-financed

policy institutes. Even though the Bertelsmann Stiftung is above all an organisation which distributes grants for research, its mode of operation also resembles that of a think tank. It organises its work on its own initiative, determines its own research priorities, and actively participates in projects, which it itself initiates. Its activities are both national and international, with a particular interest in European integration.

Since Germany has a strong university tradition, we also find a large number of think tanks linked to universities. Many are affiliated to universities or act within a semi-academic environment, like the Max Planck Institüt für Gesellschaftsforschung, which conducts research on different aspects of European integration. In the 1990s, some institutes went further and created policy research units at universities, such as the Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) and the Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung (CAP), which main sponsor is the Bertelsmann Stiftung. One of the most recent university-based think tanks is the Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), established in 1995 at Bonn University. The German Government gave a large grant so that ZEI could be set up, as part of a wider policy of compensating Bonn after the Federal capital moved to Berlin.

Although all the German think tanks in this survey were founded after the Second World War, the origins of some of the economic research institutes reach back as far as the Weimar Republic and even Imperial Germany. For instance, four of the six main economic institutes, HWWA (created in 1908), IFW (1914), DIW (1925), as well as the RWI (created in 1926, but not included in our survey because of its purely national focus) were re-launched after the war but already existed before. Certain political foundations, such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, also existed before the Nazi period.

German think tanks are not only large in terms of their staff numbers but also in terms of the scope of their activities. Only two think tanks work exclusively on European questions: IEP (Institut fur europaisches Politik) and ZEI. All the others undertake research which is oriented towards international questions in general, and therefore only one part is on Europe.

We can observe several trends concerning the development of think tanks in Germany. They are becoming, in general, more and more visible. The transfer of the capital to Berlin has given think tanks a new audience which did not exist in Bonn. The German media are relying more than ever on think tanks for expert comment, to the detriment of university professors. Moreover, private sector actors are increasingly interested in think tanks and are funding them more than before. The Bertelsmann Stiftung is the main one, but the existence of a group of smaller foundations enables German research institutes to be no longer dependent solely on public funds. Think tanks are welcoming in addition a growing number of young, dynamic entrepreneurs who sometimes try to create their own research centres, for example, the BerlinPolis or the Global Public Policy Initiative. German think tanks are also becoming less ideological and more pragmatic. For instance, the political foundations underline that they do not support a single point of view or source of ideas in spite of their links with the political parties. Finally, policy-makers expect now think tanks not only to produce novel political ideas, but also a strategy for communicating these ideas to a wider audience. We are therefore witnessing a coming together of the worlds of consultancy and policy advice.

Germany houses a rich community of think tanks working on European questions, one which is in many ways atypical in the European context. Despite their links with numerous institutes across the world and the international scope of their activities, German think tanks are very much a product of the German federal and parliamentary system and are deeply anchored in the national political culture and its structures.

GREECE

RELEVANT THINK TANKS, READY FOR GLOBAL CHALLENGES

According to the most recent study, there are 16 think tanks in Greece (McGann & Weaver, 2000). The first ones were created between 1945 and 1974. The end of the military regime of 1967-73 stimulated their development further, as did Greece's accession to the European Community in 1981. The main areas of interest for Greek think tanks focused on Europe are Greece's future position within the EU, as well as its relations with Turkey and the wider "Hellenistic community"[80] (McGann, Weaver, 2000). Even though some think tanks receive public funding, independent research in the political sphere remains relatively undeveloped but it is nonetheless rapidly growing. The current state of think tanks in Greece can be considered to represent the "first wave" in their development, with the creation of academic, non-partisan research institutes. Other think tanks are affiliated to political parties, like the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies Andreas Papandreou established in 1995.

Eight Euro-think tanks have been surveyed in Greece in total: three are interested exclusively in European questions (Hellenic Center for European Studies – EKEM, Greek Center of European Studies and Research – EKEME, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy – ELIAMEP); three others concentrate more particularly on economic and legal issues at an international and European level (Institute for International Economic Relations, Centre for European Constitutional Law – CECL, and the Centre for International and European Economic Law – CIEEL); and two target more specific subjects, such as the free market, while also integrating the European dimension (Research Institute for European and American Studies – RIEAS, Society for Social and Economic Studies – EKOME).

The three Euro-specific think tanks were established in the 1980s to make up for a lack of expertise on European questions and to respond to a need for independent research centres (ELIAMEP interview). At the time of Greece's candidacy for membership of the EC, the public debate on Europe was often Manichean and divided between those in favour and those against integration, with little consideration of the real questions which membership raised. The research of these institutes is centred on E.U. enlargement and the process of European integration (the application of Community law by Greek public administration, the impact of enlargement, etc). Their objective is to propose an evaluation of the future outlook for Greece within the EU, to respond to the specific needs and interests of policy-makers, and to participate in the formulation of national policies.

EKEM operates under the institutional supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and receives a regular grant from it. It is therefore only semi-independent. However, even though

research priorities are set by the Ministry, it does not interfere, in theory, in the conduct and results of EKEM's work. The other think tanks covered here are, for the most part, of the contract research type. Moreover, they depend on E.U. or international grants, as well as on donations from their members (EKEME) and the sale of their publications (ELIAMEP). Government grants are given only on a one-off basis, within the framework of the work requested by various ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defence). Shaped by a national history punctuated by instability and political upheavals, it seems logical and legitimate that these institutions should seek a maximum degree of independence vis-à-vis their government. In the same way, the geographical position of Greece, located at a crossroads of civilisations and at the centre of many strategic questions (NATO, the Cyprus question, Turkey and the Balkans), could explain the proliferation of research centres focused on legal, economic and strategic issues (CECL, CIEEL, RIEAS, EKOME).

HUNGARY

FROM FOREIGN DEPENDENCY TO THE E.U. MARKET : AN ATYPICAL LANDSCAPE FOR AN EMERGING LEADER

We have identified five "Euro-oriented" think tanks in Hungary that have a significant and current research activity on Europe, mostly from an economic perspective. Two were founded pre-1989 : the Institute of Economics (1954) of Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the prestigious Institute for World Economics (1973) of Hungarian Academy of Sciences, then a centre of propaganda for Soviet ideology. Three are more recently created, independent research centres: the ICEG European Center (research and network center) was created in 1998, the Századvég Foundation's Centre for Political Analysis in 1996, and the Foundation for a Market Economy in 1992.

All five focus on economic issues at a national, regional or international level: economic developments of Central and Eastern Europe, including all issues related to E.U. accession and economic transition, management of key issues for the benefit of Hungary's economy and public, analysis of the contemporary market economy and the transformation of the Hungarian economy, underlying trends and factors behind global and regional economic developments, and their present and future impact on the Hungarian economy, etc.. As for Euro-oriented research, it is focused on E.U. integration, the enlargement process, and EMU, in the framework of Hungary's economic and political relations with the E.U. and neighbouring states.

The ICEG, the Szàzadvég Foundation and the Foundation for a Market Economy are small organisations with limited staff (6-7), whereas the two academic think tanks enjoy much larger research teams (average of 38 in-house researchers). It is due to their status as academic or contract research tanks. Indeed, between 45 and 55 per cent of the funding for the two organisations linked to the Academy of Sciences comes from state institutions, while the three other think tanks depend on contract research and project funding, which implies a much more unstable budget, often resulting in smaller structures.

Think tanks in Hungary were usually created by the previous regime. Today, most Hungarian think tanks are still funded via direct budgetary allocations or contracts for services. They were also often the early recipients of grants from the European Union's PHARE programme. However, Western funding has increasingly sought think tanks independent from governmental institutions. This has proved more difficult than in any other country in the region, since state funding has continued to be a major financial source. Indeed, most influential thinkers remained in state-financed organisations instead of creating their own independent, non-profit think tanks. Today, most Hungarian think tanks not associated with government institutions have some form of for-profit activities, contract research and consulting having become a key part of their work (Kimball, in McGann & Weaver, 2000). Hungarian think tanks which had secured substantial funds from Western Europe and the United States in recent years might be affected by the withdrawal of this support. In fact, according to Kimball, "market forces will no doubt thin the field, but the consulting activities that have developed in the 1990s will ensure the survival of the most advanced organisations."

The significant development of Hungarian EU-oriented think tanks in the nineties probably derives from the fact that Hungary was the first Central European country to join the Council of Europe (in 1990), as well as the first Central European country to apply for E.U. accession. Hungary then had a leading role to play in terms of EU-oriented research for the whole region, all the more since it was selected by the NATO summit of July 1997 to join the Alliance in 1999. Furthermore, the socialist Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy set Hungary's accession to the E.U. as its main goal in 2002. In this he succeeded, as Hungary was granted the status of most advanced nation in terms of reforms by the European Commission in 2002, which invited Hungary to join the E.U. in 2004, all of which provided a favourable environment for the development of Hungarian 'Euro-think tanks'. Furthermore. 83.76 per cent of Hungarians sanctioned their country's adhesion to the E.U. during the referendum on April 2003. It would be interesting to understand to what extent Hungarian think tanks and other local players played a role in this successful outcome.[81]

IRELAND

GRADUALLY CATCHING-UP?

Two think tanks in Ireland have been included in our survey: the Institute of European Affairs (IEA) and the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). Both have their homes in Dublin. The IEA is a Euro-specific think tank while ESRI has a research agenda which includes European affairs.

IEA is the only Euro-specific think tank operating in Ireland. Founded in Dublin in 1991 by former MEP and Irish Labour Party chair, Brendan Halligan, it provides a forum where Irish decision-makers can meet and discuss European issues. It is a relatively small organisation with only 10 full-time members of staff, although it has up to 100 occasional contributors to its work.[82] It compensates for its lack of size by maintaining very close ties to the Irish

political establishment. For example, it hosts official-type events in partnership with the Irish government when foreign dignitaries visit Dublin – for example during the Irish Presidency of the E.U. in the first half of 2004. And it regularly briefs the Irish Parliament on European matters. Its main audience is domestic and E.U. policy-makers, for example the Taoiseach's office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Irish officials working in the European institutions.[83] Recent work by the IEA has focused particularly on the Nice Treaty and the Future of Europe debate.

It has been able to exert influence for two main reasons: firstly, because it operates at the centre of a fairly small network of policy-makers in Ireland who are regularly dealing with European affairs. Its co-ordinating role in policy discussion in this sector has enabled it to establish close personal relationships with key politicians and business people in Ireland, who themselves rely on the institute as a source of information on Europe. And secondly, its activities are given good coverage by the Irish media, which the IEA considers to be relatively 'switched on' to European questions.

ESRI is the other think tank covered in our survey. Established in 1960 with the support of the Ford Foundation, ESRI is similar to the old guard, government-linked research institutes found in Germany, the U.S. and Britain. A large proportion of its work is contract research and consultancy work for Irish government departments, and also the European Commission and its specialized agencies (including Eurostat and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in Dublin). Its EU-oriented areas of work include its programmes on labour markets and labour migration, industrial development and macroeconomics. Some of its most influential work in the past has been its provision of frameworks in which to evaluate Structural Fund investments, and on Ireland's participation in EMU.

There are also a number of other bodies in Ireland which conduct research on European affairs but which were not included in our survey (because they did not come under our definition of an independent think tank, as defined in the introduction). One such body is the Dublin European Institute (DEI), which is part of University College Dublin. The DEI organises visiting speakers, research roundtables, and two annual lectures on European themes. It also participates in Framework V research projects. Another is the National Committee for the Study of International Affairs, based at the Royal Irish Academy. The committee, whose members includes the Irish Foreign Minister, university academics, and IEA and ESRI staff, is currently in the process of re-organising its structures and intends to increase the amount of policy-relevant research which it does in the future.

Harvey (2001) notes the relatively small number of think tanks in Ireland – just five according to his estimate.[84] One of the reasons for this is the lack of funding available for such organisations. There are only small numbers of domestic and foreign trusts supporting think tank work in the country (Harvey, 2001). There is though some corporate sector funding of think tanks, most notably for the ESRI and IEA, and this will probably be the most likely source of funding for new think tanks here in the future.

ITALY

A STRIKING LACK OF EURO–THINK TANKS CONSIDERING ITALY'S HISTORIC ROLE IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Considering that Italy was one of the "Founding Fathers" of the E.U. project, the absence of a single think tank that has the word "Europe" or the adjective "European" in its name is surprising.[85] Currently, there are six relatively large think tanks in Italy with a significant interest in European matters: Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI); Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI); Societa per l'Organizzazione Internazionale (SIOI); Centro Studi Politica Internazionale (CeSPI); Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali (CENSIS); Fondazione Rosselli and other two ones (Centro Einaudi e Istituto di Ricerca Cattaneo) which deal with Europe as a smaller part of their work. Four are based in Rome, two in Turin, one in Milan and one in Bologna. They all deal with European issues as an increasingly relevant part of their work and enlargement has influenced them all. However, as previously mentioned, none of them focuses exclusively on Europe.

Some are organised as non-profit associations (SIOI, CeSPI), others are private institutes (CENSIS, ISPI); all of them are legally recognised as "persone giuridiche" (including IAI and Fondazione Rosselli). Almost all of them, apart from CENSIS, receive public support from the Government and, in particular, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although the size of the subsidy allocated varies quite heavily from one institute to another. They all stressed the fact that this portion of their sources is slowly but progressively decreasing and that they are relying more and more on private research contracts or other forms of funding. For example, ISPI, CeSPI and SIOI organise a well-known range of classes and courses that prepare students for public exams or for administrative careers. The IAI does the same with one or two day workshops and seminars. CENSIS is the only one which has always based its resources on its own forces and its capacity to answer market demand. In this regard, they are all concerned about a recent trend; they pointed out that if on the one hand, less dependence on Government funding may enhance the independence of research institutes, the restriction of public sources also implies that they are forced to rely more on private contracts, which they view as constraining their independence and research freedom.

Italy has no Euro-sceptic think tank, all welcome the development of the EU, support further integration and welcome the opportunities that this process offers them: a broader dissemination of their work, more opportunities for collaboration with other organisations, universities and research centres. For example, IAI is currently leading a project with other foreign institutes on the possible consequences of the non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty by some Member States.

Several common features of independent Italian research centres deserve to be mentioned. The first one, as several studies have previously indicated, is the near absence of political commitment (Lucarelli, Radaelli, in Stone, Denham, Garnett, 2003). None of the institutes interviewed seems politically biased nor wishes to be considered so. They are actually weary of being perceived as supporting a specific political party or coalition. In fact, it is interesting

to note how two of the latest and most successful entities in the European policy community—the so-called "policy clubs"—dedicated more to the promotion of political debate and discussion than to produce research on a regular basis (Fondazione Italianieuropei e Fondazione Liberal) are very openly politically biased. A third club, Limes, is considered more ideologically neutral.[86] It remains to be seen, however, whether they will evolve into proper think tanks, and, if so, whether they will keep a strong ideological position.

The second common feature is the importance which Italian think tanks give to the prestige of their founders and to the personal charisma of their current directors. Traditionally, the links with the academic world have been burdensome. Even today, having a well-known founder or being directed by a famous leader is considered as vitally important, almost at the same level as the quality of their research and the organisation of their activities.

Despite the publicity and debate on European issues generated recently by the "policy clubs", the state of Euro-think tanks in Italy today paints a somewhat gloomy picture, in particular compared to the countries like the U.K. and Germany and considering the absence of a single institute dedicated to European policy issues (although some like the IAI have large research programmes on the EU). Although a leading Italian journalist claims that "the problem is not the lack of think tanks but the lack of popular interest and the self-centredness of many governments," we believe that the presence of easily recognisable groups of "thinking heads" supporting government decisions and the opposition would improve Italian policy making and give greater legitimacy to the political debate.

In fact, the public profile of these institutions is rather low. Consequently, their role as promoters of public debate needs to be enhanced through increased media coverage. To this end, some organisations may aspire in the future to a clearer and more institutionalised role in the policy-making process. Some may even reconsider their traditional ideological neutrality through more clear-cut positions on important issues.

Other institutions, such as the Fondazione Agnelli, Centro di Ricerca Einaudi, Il Mulino (with its Istituto di Studi e Ricerche Carlo Cattaneo), and the Istituto per la Ricerca Sociale, perform some of the activities of a think tank, but only look marginally at European issues within broader research areas (international political economy, Italian public policies, Italian culture and communities, Italian trade, etc.).

MALTA

MUCH STILL TO BE DONE

There are currently no think tanks in Malta interested specifically in European questions. In fact, only one think tank was counted there in 1997 (McGann & Weaver, 2000), and that was a relatively new one. The only organisations which activities can be said to be close to those of a think tank (using our definition) are two university research institutes, which are part of the University of Malta: the European Documentation and Research Centre (ERDC) and the Foundation for International Studies. ERDC houses the Malta European Studies Association

(MESA), which is the Centre's research body on the E.U. Re-opened in 2001, MESA previously suffered from a lack of official recognition in Brussels, something which had threatened its existence. However, in 2002 it received from the European Commission a Jean Monnet Project grant.[87] The absence of think tanks in Malta is not due to a lack of interest in European questions as the research programmes of the university institutes demonstrates.[88] As a Maltese journalist explains, the small population of the island (c. 400,000) is not particularly conducive to the development of think tanks. The market of ideas is too small and there is no-one either willing or capable of setting up and financing such organisations. Finally, the currently very conservative political context leaves little room for really independent research, with most research centres being affiliated to political parties.

POLAND

AN EMERGING CENTRE LIMITED BY FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS

In this new Member State which can lay claim "to the most developed, independent, and diverse think tank community in the region," (Kimball, in McGann, Weaver, 2000), six think tanks have a significant interest in European matters. None works exclusively on European policy questions however. Two are generalist research centres, four are specialised in economic matters.

There are two principal types of think tank organisations in Poland: the older, more "traditional" ones (e.g. the Foreign Trade Research Institute, 1928) and those created after the system changes in 1989: Adam Smith Research Centre, Centre for Social and Economic Research, Centre for International Relations, Gdansk Institute for Market Economics (the only think tank in Poland with its main office outside Warsaw), Institute of Public Affairs.

The research institutes surveyed focus on general aspects of E.U. integration. Accession to the E.U. and its consequences have naturally dominated the agenda in recent years. Logically, their size is usually linked to their age. The older organisations are in most cases much larger: their research teams exceed 20 to 30 researchers, whereas the younger institutes are much smaller, with at the most 20 people, often less than 10 permanent staff. All therefore co-operate extensively with external researchers. All can be classified as advocacy tanks, though some of them have the characteristics of contract researchers.

In most cases, public authorities at the national level constitute the main target group of Polish think tanks. However, we found that there is often little direct contact between think tanks and national authorities, which is attributed to decision-makers' unwillingness to co-operate. Some think tanks though host former officials, such as the Centre for Social and Economic Research which often works for the Polish government thanks to its strong relation with Professor Leszek Balcerowicz, former minister of finance, deputy prime minister, and currently the director of the Central Bank (Przybylski, 2004). Many therefore also target journalists and Polish society in general to try to influence their target groups. They usually keep good and frequent contact with the media, by providing opinions, information and advice

on current events. "There is therefore a natural interest in approaching and appearing on television and in newspapers," confirms Przybylski (2004).

The main problems faced by Polish think tanks are financial. They are most commonly organised as foundations or non-profit associations, with a significant share of their financial resources coming from foundations (usually foreign), as well as private sponsors, but it is apparently increasingly difficult to obtain financial assistance from important foreign foundations. Financing seldom comes from the state, except for a few organisations such as the Polish Institute of International Affairs. This, according to Przybylski (2004), probably explains Polish think tanks' freedom to criticise the government. Many institutes have consequently developed contracting capabilities and contracts constitute their main source of income.[89] European Community money, although available in theory since the introduction of the Phare programme and more easily accessible since May 1, is usually difficult to obtain, as the administrative process is long and cumbersome. European funding does not therefore account for an important part of Polish think tanks' budget.

Beyond the independent research centres selected here, several organisations provide valuable services, including the Centre for Eastern Studies. Created in 1990, it is financed from the state budget and looks at E.U. integration in connection with issues in Central and Eastern European countries. The Centre for Political Thought, a forum for public debate, also organises some activities on Polish foreign policy and even has an academic course on E.U. integration. The Institute of Strategic Studies does some occasional work on E.U. matters, as well as the Polish Economic Society and, most significantly, the Polish Institute of International Affairs, a State body.[90]

PORTUGAL

LESS INFLUENTIAL, BUT COMPLEMENTARY THINK TANKS

According to our survey results, Portugal is characterised by a relatively low development of think tanks, as seems to be the case for the Iberian Peninsula in general. There is still a relative lack of organisations corresponding to our think tank criteria and the concept of 'think tanks' itself is often hardly understood. According to Freres et al. (2000), this situation is due to a "recent experience of democratisation," a "relatively underdeveloped" civil society, and "political systems that are heavily dominated by the central governments" (Freres, Seabra, de Moraes, in McGann, Weaver, 2000). However, an increasing number of organisations presenting the basic features of think tanks appeared in the 1980s, first thanks to the end of dictatorship and the beginning of the transition, respectively in 1974 and 1975 in Portugal and Spain, and subsequently thanks to the process of E.U. integration, which, starting in the second half of the 1970s, was completed in 1986. As a result, academic-style institutions dominate today's think tank scene in the Iberian Peninsula, with a relative lack of "mature" advocacy think tanks (Day, in McGann, Weaver, 2000).

Moreover, it is difficult to identify Euro-specific think tanks in Portugal (and in fact also in Spain) that are solely dedicated to E.U. issues. In most cases, the research centres' field of

work includes one or several issues within the international relations area, including usually security, environment, international politics, law and economics. In this framework, relevant references are regularly made to E.U. policies, further integration, the process of enlargement, and regional co-operation. Significantly, such references are often related, or even conditioned, by the desire to identify and promote national interests in Europe and at the same time promote and improve the image of the centres' own country.

Portuguese, as well as Spanish think tanks do, however, provide a distinctly valuable complement to other think tanks within the E.U. by offering a strong connection with Latin America, the Mediterranean area, and in the case of Portugal, Africa. This geographic focus shapes the research priorities of the organisations taken into consideration. In this respect, Iberian think tanks not only provide a rich pool of specific knowledge, but they also create a concrete connection with political, cultural and international organisations active in these areas.

Portugal is a relative newcomer to the E.U. think tank scene. With only two international think tanks with an interest in European affairs, out of a total of about twenty-five independent national research centres, this country represents today a small player on the E.U. think tank scene.

The two organisations analysed here are the Institute of International Strategic Studies (IEEI) and the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI). The former, founded in 1980, is one of Portugal's first think tanks, while the latter is one of its most recent. Both are private, independent, non-profit institutions, relatively academic, and roughly similar in size.

They target mainly Portuguese and European decision-makers, as well as the media and civil society organisations, through publications, conferences and journals. They depend financially on public funding and occasionally initiate research projects on behalf of Portuguese public authorities, mostly on matters of E.U. integration and foreign policy. The IEEI and IPRI are reflective of the relatively limited role played by think tanks in Portugal compared to university institutes.

SLOVAKIA

A NASCENT BUT DETERMINED GROUP OF CONTRIBUTORS

Slovakia, which "think tank community is by far the most politicised in Central Europe," (Kimball, in McGann, Weaver, 2000) has five think tanks with a particular interest in European policy matters. One, the Centre for European Policy, is specialised in European issues, another, the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, is a multi-disciplinary international relations think tank, the remaining three include Europe as a significant part of their overall activities: Institute for Public Affairs IVO, the Centre for Economic Development, and the Centre for Economic and Social Analyses M.E.S.A. 10.

As is generally the case in other new Central European Member States, Slovak think tanks are non-profit foundations or non-governmental organisations. Usually they receive their financial

resources from private foundations (very often the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Ford Foundation) and from private sponsors. Besides, some are partially self-financed by their consulting activities, others get part of their finance resources from the State.

Almost all the think tank organisations in the Slovak Republic are young. They were created after and as a result of the political changes in the beginning of the 90s. As a result of the process of the integration of the Republic into the E.U. structures, their research and other activities usually deal with general aspects of E.U. integration, most often the preparations for integration and the evolution of the legal and practical situation of the country. Besides, they also cover current European issues, for instance the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty and the first European parliamentary elections after enlargement. Slovak think tanks usually have less than ten full time researchers. Apart from the permanent ones, they often co-operate with external researchers, whose number depends on projects carried out. Like most other independent research centres in new Central European Member States, they can be classified as "advocacy tanks."

In most cases, public authorities at the national level are Slovak think tanks' main target group. They are also interested in co-operating with journalists and informing Slovak society in general. The last aspect makes the presence in media very important from their point of view. On the other hand, working through the media, as well as the organising conferences and seminars and publishing remain the most important ways of influencing their first target group, as quite often there are no direct contacts between the think tanks and the authorities, or at least such contacts are not frequent.

As is again the case for other Central Europe Member States, Slovak think tanks' main problems are financial. As a result of the process of E.U. integration, it is increasingly difficult to get financial assistance from foreign foundations, as these gradually move their focus of attention eastwards, to Ukraine, Belarus and other former Soviet Union and non-E.U. Republics. On the other hand, the procedures of applying for E.U. grants are long and complex. Consequently, seeking financial resources elsewhere creates problems of independence. For that reason, some of the interviewed organisations openly refuse State funding.

SLOVENIA

JOINING THE CLUB

Despite the relatively small size of the country (a little under 2 million inhabitants), we found one think tank in Slovenia that meets our criteria, the Institute of Economic Research, established in 1995 as a non-governmental organisation. It focuses specifically on economic issues. It describes itself as an "autonomous non-governmental research organisation with a long tradition in the field of macroeconomics and microeconomics analysis." More recently, research has been carried out on specific policy issues regarding Europe, for instance the readiness and the timing of Slovenia's inclusion in the E.U. and EMU.

SPAIN

RECENT THINK TANKS IN A DEVELOPING SECTOR

As is also visible in Portugal, the think tank scene in the Iberian Peninsula is relatively recent and underdeveloped in Spain. The representatives of the think tanks whom we interviewed confirmed this situation, and actually mentioned this lack of think tanks as one of the key-reasons for the creation of their institute. There are indications however from interviews with observers of the sector that things are evolving and that, despite severe constraints, many think tanks are seeking to innovate.

We have identified seven independent research institutes in Spain with a significant European research programme. Five are in the capital Madrid, two in Barcelona. None is 'Euro-specific', the European Union is only one research issue within a wider complex of international topics. A common feature is the special attention paid to Spanish interests within the European Union. The majority of the think tanks taken into consideration are organised as private non-profit associations, except for IEMED (European Institute for the Mediterranean), which is a mixed consortium of public and private actors. Nevertheless, most of them receive a substantial part of public financing at the regional, national or community level. A special case is the Instituto Elcano, which limits its public contribution to 15 per cent.

All the think tanks analysed were created after 1978, shortly after the death of Franco and the adoption of a new democratic constitution. The majority are therefore recent, and were formed between 1989 and 2001. Most think tanks were created to encourage a public debate on international and European issues and Spain's ever-closer integration within the EU, with a marked positive evaluation of such a process. Their resources are usually relatively limited. Their staff is between 15 and 20 persons, including academics and administrative staff. Elcano here also is the exception, with more than 40 regular employees and an extended network of external collaborators.

In terms of audience, all the think tanks surveyed seek to target the general public through a wide range of publications. Some are more oriented toward the academic community (CIDOB), while others clearly aspire to influence more the decision-making community (IPAE, IEMED, Elcano). Moreover, a third clearly show a definite political orientation and therefore work more closely with certain political groups (Fundación FAES and Fundación Pablo Iglesias). All the organisations taken into consideration promote research and release publications. Nearly all organise public events, such as conferences and seminars. Two offer also teaching programmes on a regular basis, mainly in the form of postgraduate studies (FOG, CIDOB), whereas the others (IPAE, IEMED, Elcano) focus on monographic seminars and direct contact with decision-makers. According to McGann and Weaver categories, two are "Academic Think tanks / Universities without students;" three are borderline, between academic and advocacy tanks; two focus on contract research in cooperation with public authorities. The remaining two are more typical of "Party Think Tanks", linked to the Peoples' Party (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE).

Finally, it is important to mention the existence of Spanish organisations that have think tank-like activities and exert significant influence. Some University departments develop important research activities on the EU, such as the Fundación Ortega y Gasset (a non profit private association and well-known cultural foundation with branches in Spain and abroad and does research on European law, economics, and trade); IDEE (Institute of European studies, Universidad San Pablo CEU); UNISCI (Research Unit on Security and International Cooperation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid); and IUEE (University Institute for European Studies, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona). Two bank foundations (BBVA and La Caixa) yield significant influence over the national scientific community. They do not perform internal research, but sponsor other institutes, offer scholarships and promote publications. They organise purely non-profit activities that are research and development-oriented. They use their own financial resources and do not depend therefore on any public institution or political party. Also, we did not include the Instituto para la Política Ambiental Europea (IPAE), although it contributes to research on European environmental law and policy because it does not have a website.

SWEDEN

FACING DOWN THE FUNDING CHALLENGE

Five think tanks in Sweden were included in our survey of Euro-think tanks: one, the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) was Euro-specific, the other four were Euro-oriented. These were the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Timbro, and the Centre for Business and Policy Studies (SNS).[91]

All the Swedish think tank directors interviewed for the study said that there was not a 'think tank tradition' in Sweden. However, we did find five institutes working on European questions and this was certainly a higher figure than for their Scandinavian neighbour, Denmark.

SIEPS, the only Euro-specific think tank, was set up in 2002 on the initiative of the Swedish Government, who believed that there was too little public policy research being conducted in Sweden on European questions. They therefore sought to remedy this by establishing an independent research agency charged with looking at European policy. SIEPS is government funded and its management board includes representatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Ministers Office. It acts as a bridge between the academic sector and policy-makers and one of its roles is to commission research by academics into European questions (it gives out grants for this purpose.) However, it also has an in-house research team of its own (see below).

Two other, larger government-funded research institutes also operate in this sector. These are SIIA (1938) and SIPRI (1966). Their role differs significantly to that of an advocacy think tank in the British or American mould. For example, in addition to their research, they also fulfil an important public service function, which includes distributing information to the public via schools, bookshops and their specialist research libraries, as well as organising a number of

public lectures. However, other think tanks in this survey have also developed close ties to Swedish civil society: for instance, SNS has an impressive grassroots membership base and its local branches – found throughout Sweden and abroad – hold an average of 150 meetings a year for SNS members.

The history and organisational structures of SIIA and SIPRI are revealing in that they illustrate the close links which have always existed between think tanks and the Swedish state.[92] Both SIIA and SIPRI were created by Acts of Parliament. Typically, 50 per cent or more of their funding comes directly from the state: SIPRI, which was set up in the 1960s in part "to commemorate Sweden's 150 years of unbroken peace", is an independent foundation and receives an annual grant from the Swedish Parliament; and SIIA receives funding from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The government also appoints SIPRI's governing board and director. However, both are able to maintain their scholarly independence. SIIA by law must be politically independent and it is owned by the Swedish Foreign Policy Assembly, a non-government body composed of journalists, academics and other figures from Swedish public life. SIPRI also insists that in spite of the aforementioned links, no attempt is made by the government to influence its research agenda.

Privately funded think tanks are rare in Sweden. There are, however, some examples: SNS, a relatively old think tank founded in 1948 by a group of Swedish businessmen keen to improve the business community's understanding of and input to public policy, relies on a mix of public and private support for it research; and Timbro (1978), an advocacy think tank with a free market philosophy, is part of the Free Enterprise Foundation, an organisation financed by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise.

Regarding their European research, SIEPS produces research on both internal and external aspects of the European Union and is also interested in the draft Constitution. Both SIPRI and SIIA conduct important work on European security issues, with a particular focus on the EU-NATO relationship. SIIA's research programmes also cover EU-Russia relations, security and enlargement questions in the Baltic region, and international environmental and trade policy. SNS's focus mainly on comparative aspects of economic and business policy in Sweden and the rest of Europe, while Timbro's European work is focused on promoting liberal economic solutions in policy areas such as international trade, CAP and the welfare state.

As to the influence which these institutes exert, this varies according to the different missions they have. SIPRI's main audience is the international diplomatic community (particularly in less developed countries) and international civil society. This is illustrated by the fact that many of its staff, 90 per cent of its governing board, and the current director are foreigners, and that the majority of its publications are in English. SIIA, on the other hand, publishes mainly in Swedish and its work gets a considerable amount of coverage in the national and regional press.[93] It sees one of its main roles as transmitting new ideas from abroad on foreign policy to the Swedish public as a whole. SIEPS is more influential within government circles and the university sector: for example, it takes part in government consultation exercises and it also is involved in Framework VI research projects with universities both in Sweden and abroad. Finally, SNS, which espouses "reasonable" free market views, also seeks to maintain

a good dialogue with whichever government is in power in Sweden, regardless of their political orientation.

The think tanks interviewed for the survey said that they face a number of important challenges for the future: the first is the question of funding. The Swedish government has been keen to limit spending on the established research institutes in recent years. And it has been encouraging the larger institutes to search for more corporate funding in future. However, these institutes face difficulties adapting because corporate funders usually have a preference for financing think tanks with an ideology rather than non-partisan bodies such as themselves, which can appear to outsiders like government agencies. This dilemma has the potential to threaten the long-term viability and organisational capacity of the larger research institutes, such as SIIA and SIPRI, particularly if the government decides to cut their budgets significantly in future.

A second challenge facing the Euro-think tanks is the apparently low level of public interest in Sweden for European issues. This is indicated by the fact that it was the government who took the initiative to create a Euro-specific think tank in 2002. Also the media is not always supportive of these think tanks. For example, one think tank director said: "The poor knowledge among most journalists means that it is difficult to get across with more nuanced or subtle views on Europe."

One of the causes is undoubtedly the deep divide in Sweden between those broadly supportive of the EU, and those who are hostile to further integration because of fears about a loss of political and economic sovereignty. As in the UK, this leads the government to adopt a cautious stance on European issues, which may have an important impact on the relative influence of Euro-think tanks. Hence, the same director complained that the Swedish debate on European issues "is still, almost ten years after the Swedish accession to the [EU] structured along the same old yes/no divide… the legacy of the two referenda held in 1994 (on accession) and 2003 (the euro) is still evident." He argued that the result of this was "a strong tendency from the government's side to defend the status quo". The success of the Eurosceptic list in the June European Parliament elections had merely served to reinforce this tendency.

A third challenge comes from the university sector. There are a number of university centres already carrying out significant work on the EU, for instance the Jean Monnet Centres at the universities of Lund and Gothenburg. Swedish universities have traditionally viewed think tanks as a threat rather than as potential partners. One think tank director hoped that this might change and there could be more collaboration between the two sectors in future, with a greater exchange of staff and expertise occurring between them.

UNITED KINGDOM

THINK TANKS SHAPED BY TRADITIONAL POLITICAL FAULT LINES ON EUROPE

The survey found 16 Euro-think tanks currently operating in the UK; seven are Europe-specific, the remaining nine are Euro-oriented. Many other domestically-oriented think tanks (e.g. Civitas, Centre for Reform, Demos, Fabian Society) do look at the European Union from time to time but they are excluded here because their work on Europe tends to be only an occasional paper or project – for example on the draft Constitution – and not a systematic treatment of the subject.[94] A think tank network called the Stockholm Network is also included. It is a partnership of free market think tanks with members in the UK, Scandinavia and France, operated from London (see Annex 2).

Think tanks covered in the survey are usually one of three organisational types: a charity, a non-profit company limited by guarantee, or a registered company. Sometimes they are both a charity and a company limited by guarantee (CLG). The majority are membership organisations and have a wide range of both corporate and individual supporters.

Broadly speaking, the second-tier, Euro-oriented think tanks tend to be longer-established organisations than the Euro-specific think tanks, which are a relatively recent phenomenon. For instance, the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA) was founded in 1920 and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 1958. These think tanks were established to examine questions of foreign policy and nuclear weapons respectively but both now have quite important European programmes - for example IISS has focused recently on the strategic implications of NATO and E.U. enlargement to Eastern Europe. Another think tank which original *raison d'être* is not the study of the E.U. but which nonetheless does important European work is the Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 1960).

The development of the Euro-specific think tanks in the U.K. mirrors in many ways the different phases in the E.U.'s history. The Federal Trust was created in 1945 at a time when the debate on the need for a new, unified structure of governance for Europe after the war was at its height. The Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP), set up in 1980, appeared at a time when environmental questions were gaining more political salience in Europe. And the newer Euro-specific think tanks like the Centre for European Reform (as well as the second-tier Foreign Policy Centre (FPC)) have tended to focus mostly on questions of E.U. institutional and economic reform (including Britain's possible entry to the single currency) – the main political debate in the E.U. in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The Euro-specific think tanks are smaller organisations than the others in the survey, never having a core staff of more than about 20 people. Budgets are not as large as in the American or German think tanks and the emphasis is usually on maintaining a small but dynamic team of researchers capable of 'punching above their weight' and using their good contacts in the media and government circles to compensate for their small size. The Euro-oriented think tanks are often much larger organisations: ODI, for instance, has 80 staff and 45 researchers, RIIA has a staff of 66, and the IISS has a staff of 46 including 25 researchers.

Regarding transnational structures, only one of the think tanks has a second office in Brussels, that is IEEP, and this was only set up in 2001. IISS – which is one of the few truly global think tanks, with offices in the U.S. and Singapore – also runs joint events with CEPS in Brussels on European defence and security issues via its 'European Security Forum'. This does not mean that the other think tanks are not focused on Brussels: for example, half of the Centre for European Reform's (CER) seminars are held in the Belgian capital. But limited funding is a big constraint for think tanks wanting to expand in this direction.

Wider pressures in the U.K. think tank market shape euro-think tanks' research activities. The market is very congested and space for new and original research is limited. Therefore, in response to this competition the Euro-specific think tanks either carry out general research on the E.U. (e.g. CER, FPC, Federal Trust) or they develop a particular research 'niche' in which to operate. The Centre for Economic Policy Research is a good example of the latter type: it operates in the sphere of economic policy research. Founded in 1983, it is different from a traditional think tank in that it has no in-house researchers. Instead, for its research output it relies on a loose network of 650 economists based in universities across Europe. Despite being funded by U.K. bodies, its outlook is therefore essentially international and much of its work is on macroeconomics at the E.U. level. Other examples of 'niche' operators would be the British Institute of International Comparative Law (E.U. and international law), the European Policy Forum (regulatory politics), and the IEEP (E.U. environmental policy).

The large number of institutes dealing with defence and strategic studies (at the national and international level) has probably also prevented the emergence of any think tank working exclusively on the European angle of these questions. RIIA, IISS, and the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College (the only university-based U.K. think tank in this study) all have substantial programmes and/or projects on European defence matters.

As regards funding, none of the think tanks surveyed receive core funding from the State. On the other hand, many do receive funding for specific projects from government departments and the European Commission. This includes the Federal Trust, FPC, and IEEP. All the think tanks in the survey rely on a mix of foundation, corporate support, and private donations for their financing. Some of the most important foundations supporting European research are the Joseph Rowntree Trust, the Cadbury Trust and the James Maddison Trust. The Economic and Social Research Council also finances at least one Euro-specific think tank. Corporate sponsorship often comes from large US, British, or European multinationals with a pro-European outlook, such as Unilever, BT, GlaxoSmithKline and Tesco.

Despite an often heavy reliance on corporate funding, all the think tanks maintain that this does not affect their editorial independence. In the view of a number of directors, the key to this is ensuring a diverse funding base. As one said, "the fact that we have 35 corporate funders means that if one tried to interfere in any way with what we were doing, we could simply sack them." However, while in most cases funders are well aware of the need to maintain an arms-length relationship with their think tank, many of the think tanks also accept private money for specific projects. As previously mentioned, the U.K. Government and the European Commission only give project funding to U.K. think tanks. In both cases a think

tank is likely to design project at least partly to meet a funder's requirements. This raises questions about the long-term research autonomy of British think tanks. In fact, the director of one think tank even said that he believed that think tanks were becoming increasingly like consultancies, "providing unpalatable advice or conclusions so that the government doesn't have to".

The influence which these think tanks have varies according to a number of factors. An important one is a *perceived* closeness of a think tank to the Government. For example, both CER's views on Europe (pro-European but also in favour of E.U. reform) and FPC's (pro-European but with an essentially intergovernmental outlook) match those of the Blair Government. The origins of both are also closely linked to the rise to power of the New Labour political elite in the mid- to late 1990s.[95] They have therefore been more successful at exerting influence than the Federal Trust in recent years, whose views on Europe are currently outside the political mainstream. However, this was not the only factor determining influence. A successful media strategy, the pragmatism of its policy proposals, and the quality of the research output all appeared to be important factors of influence too (see CER case study).

Other think tanks in this field, such as IEEP and ODI, can also be considered influential but their influence is mainly exerted within a distinct "epistemic" community. In IEEP's case, this would be with the U.K. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, green legislators in Brussels, and the wider environmental think tank and NGO sector.

Two further observations can be made about the think tank sector in the U.K. of relevance to this study. The first is the trend toward more coverage of international and European themes. This is particularly visible in some of the larger, domestic policy think tanks. For example, the Institute for Public Policy Research is currently in the process of building up a new international programme. This could be explained by the increasing Europeanisation of the domestic policy debate in the UK: more policy sectors are influenced by E.U. legislation than before and the domestic think tanks are probably adapting their work to reflect this.

Secondly, think tanks are also affected by the polarisation of the political debate on Europe in Great Britain. The debate in the media and party politics is often of the "pro- or anti-EU" variety and this limits the potential for think tanks to engage with other political actors in a more nuanced debate on European themes. For example, because of the Government's cautious approach in public on questions such as the euro, or the draft Constitution, it has been hard for think tanks to gain support from the Government for a pro-European policy platform. This will not, however, prevent pro-European think tanks like the Federal Trust from backing the new Constitution in the run-up to the referendum planned for next year.[96]

Eurosceptic organisations now claim they hold the initiative in this debate since the Government's decision in 2003 to postpone any decision on joining the euro until after the next election. A number of Eurosceptic groups and organisations opposed outright to Britain's membership of the E.U. have emerged in recent years on the political scene, often backed by Conservative politicians and wealthy businessmen. One such organisation included in our survey because it has an in-house research capacity is the European Foundation, founded by Tory MP Bill Cash after the Maastricht Treaty debate.[97]

In addition, some of the domestically oriented, right wing think tanks, such as Civitas, have recently used the debate on the draft E.U. Constitution to publish papers which are thinly veiled attacks on the European Union and British membership. The referendum on the Constitution could therefore prove a watershed for the pro-European think tanks because they may be called upon to rebut more vigorously the claims of the anti-E.U. camp.[98]

2.3 SPECIFICITIES OF THINK TANKS IN THE TEN NEW MEMBER STATES

A key factor specific to think tank expansion in the new Member States has been the lack of institutions that could, until recently, undertake policy research and analysis. Most Central European think tanks were created after 1989 with foreign support.[99] Apart from Malta and Cyprus, the great majority of independent research institutes were indeed created after the system changes, with only a handful that were in existence prior to 1990 (e.g. the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Science, Latvia, 1946). The older institutions were generally government agencies until budget cuts forced them to find alternative sources of funding.

As a result, the majority have less than 20 or even 10 researchers, although a couple have nearly 80 researchers. Research is often not even the only activity for people who work for Euro-think tanks. University professors for instance only dedicate part of their attention to think tank activities. Research institutes very rarely have the means to open offices outside their home capital and none is present in Brussels. There is also a smaller proportion of Euro-specific think tanks in the ten new members states, as most are general international affairs or economic research institutes, though for some with a very strong interest in E.U. affairs and apparently significant influence in this field.

Most reported that they encounter difficulties in their direct contact with authorities. Many concentrate on indirect, public-oriented activities. This may be a result of their relative youth, but also of the authorities' lack of receptiveness to external advice and expertise. Indeed, "given the absence of independent research institutes during communism, think tanks face the formidable task of teaching government who they are and how they can help." (Johnson, 1996)

In addition to all European think tanks' financial worries, certain sources of money specific to this region, such as U.S. and other foreign foundations, have started moving eastwards, to former USSR and non-E.U. countries (see Kimball, in McGann, Weaver, 2000). Yet think tanks have not fully succeeded so far in tapping into E.U. sources of funding, as they are learning the mechanisms and networks required to access such funds. It also appears that public funding is less available than in the other 15 E.U. Member States and that private funding is not yet sufficient. Foreign funders include the European Union, other national governments, and foreign banks, foundations and companies (often from the U.S. and Germany).[100] Universities, private businesses, banks, and occasionally foundations from the home country are another significant source of funding. Many think tanks therefore undertake consultancy work.

Think tanks in this region tend to focus on issues of direct interest to their governments and countries, mostly enlargement and general questions of E.U. integration to assist officials and increase the level of public awareness. Although young, the think tanks monitored display a healthy network of contacts with their peers around Europe and the world, in particular through the organisation of joint events. Think tanks in the Baltic States have been particularly close to Scandinavian and Finnish organisations, some even receiving material support from these countries.

According to Johnson (1996), "despite the numerous challenges facing Central Europe's think tanks, their capacity to adapt to changing conditions is impressive." The future will likely put this flexibility to test, with increasing financial pressure.

2.4 PROVISIONAL CONCLUSION : A LACK OF SUPPLY RELATIVE TO EUROPE'S NEEDS ?

It has been noted elsewhere that, compared to the United States, Europe's think tank community is insufficiently developed (Gadault, 2004). The contrast is particularly strong when one compares this community with the media and the lobbying industry specialised in European affairs (Féat, 2004). There are more accredited journalists in Brussels than in Washington and the interest group community in Brussels is at least as large as the number of civil servants working for the European Commission (Greenwood, 1997). Yet, if one pools together the total capacity of the think tanks surveyed here, we find an approximate total of researchers working more or less closely on European policy issues of nearly 3,000.[101]

Furthermore, it is important to stress again the fact that many organisations complement the activities of the think tanks listed: universities, networks of university research centres,[102] public bodies, etc. Some are mentioned in the country reports above. Many others were not listed here, such as specialised agencies of the European Union, (e.g. the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions), to name just one example. These organisations also undertake significant policy research. All would deserve further analysis than this survey allowed in order to understand fully the contribution of think tanks to European policy-making in relation to fellow organisations. Think tanks networks, briefly presented in Annex 2, as well as academic research communities also offer some useful additions to the organisations described here.

On the other hand, the new European Union has a population since 1st May 2004 of over 450 million. Its institutions are responsible for drafting many of the laws which matter most today at the national level. Considering how much is at stake, do European think tanks do a sufficient amount of "thinking" which contributes to the E.U. decision-making process? And what measures can be taken to develop further their output? These are the two main questions which we will address in the following sections.

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[17] Not all the think tanks in these countries gave details of their annual budgets. However, a sufficient number did for us to be able to give an average figure.

[18] a) Preparing a country for accession: European Institute of Cyprus; Institute for European Studies (Finland); EKEME (Greece); Center for European and Transition Studies (Latvia) b) Government initiative to improve the level of E.U. analysis: IWE-ICE (Austria); EKEM (Greece); SIEPS (Sweden) c) Forum for the analysis of a country's position within the EU: ELIAMEP (Greece); IEA (Ireland); European Documentation and Research Center (Malta) d) Examining specific area of E.U. policy (e.g. environmental or social policy): IPAE (Spain); IEEP (UK); OSE (Brussels) e) Enhancing quality of debate: Europe 2020 (France); Friends of Europe (Brussels) f) New platform for researchers and students to express their views on Europe: EUROPEUM (Czech Republic); g) Supporting European integration: IAI (Italy); Fondation Robert Schuman (France); Polish Robert Schuman Foundation; Federal Trust (UK); Notre Europe (France) h) Opposing further integration: Bruges Group (UK) i) Economic reform: Lisbon Council (Brussels) j) Interest from the corporate sector: EPC (Brussels).

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[19] For example, ELIAMEP in Greece was established in 1988 to examine Greece's relationship with other states in the Mediterranean, Balkan and Black Sea regions and the Center for European and Transition Studies in Latvia was founded in 2000 "to respond to the challenges of E.U. enlargement."

[20] Now part of the Pan-European Institute.

[21] Think tank numbers grew rapidly in these states, together with the number of other civil society organisations, often with support of foreign donors and foundations (e.g. the Polish Robert Schuman Foundation, 1991). It was natural for many of these new think tanks to orient themselves toward European questions because Europe was of central importance to their country's security and future economic prosperity. Also, as these countries applied to join the E.U. from the mid-1990s onwards, the need for analysis of E.U. policies—and how their country could adapt to them—grew even further.

[22] France: Confrontations Europe (1991); Europartenaires (1994); Europe 2020 (1992); Fondation Robert Schuman (1991); Notre Europe (1996). Britain : EPF (1992) ; Centre for European Reform (1997) ; Foreign Policy Centre (1998). Germany: ZEI (1995); Mannheimer Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (1990)

[23] Brussels: Centre for New Europe (1993); EPC (1996); Friends of Europe (1999); Lisbon Council (2003); The Centre (2004).

[24] This is clearly not an exhaustive classification, but it reflects as accurately as possible the complex and diverse range of research areas covered by the think tanks surveyed (i.e. not individual research products). The list has been constructed using all the themes defined as core research areas by the single think tanks and subsequently by aggregating them in this simplified range of categories. The difference between single-issue and multi-issue organisations must be taken into account here : in the first case the identification of the topic is easier, whereas in the second it is sometimes necessary to select only a few core subjects within a scope which at first sight seems to cover the entire European political panorama.

[25] This definition of "Constitutional affairs", in which we have chosen to insert all references to community law studies and to the process of "European construction" or "deepening" of the Union, is very broad. There is indeed an obvious difference between classical Community law studies, which distinguish between these two categories and the think tanks analysed which do not make this distinction.

[26] We have created this category as certain think tanks refer to the role of their country or their national interests within the community system. With such a formula, we intend to summarise all references made by think tanks to measures taken in order to improve the position or the image of their respective country in the E.U. The Greek Centre of European Studies and Research (EKEME) for instance constantly monitors the Greek membership of the Union. The Spanish Real Instituto Elcano tries to identify and promote the Spanish position regarding major international issues; and several Central-Eastern European institutes concentrate on assisting their governments in overcoming difficulties related to the enlargement.

[27] With rare exceptions, such as the European Institute for Asian Studies in Brussels.

[28] Few organisations declared being involved with parliamentary scrutiny of legislation for instance.

[29] Germany: IEP, SWP, DGAP, Internationales Institut fur Politik und Wissenschaft, Bertelsmann Stiftung, FES, Hans-Siedel Stiftung, DIW, IfW, IFO, HWWA, CAP, ZEI, MZES, ZEW (15) - UK: E.U. Policy Network, EPF, Federal Trust, CER, IEEP, ODI, FPC, Policy Network, RIIA, CEPR, Stockholm Network (11) - Italy: IAI, CeSPI, SIOI, ISPI, CENSIS (5) - Brussels : CEPS, EPC, ETUI, Friends of Europe, OSE, Lisbon Council, ISIS Europe, MEDEA, EU-Asia Institute (10).

[30] CEPS for instance takes pride in providing a meeting place where representatives from the Commission and the European Parliament can meet corporate members, NGO activists, and others to reflect in a neutral environment. Such CEPS 'taskforces' are meant to allow ideas to emerge from different fields of activity.

[31] The popularity of such events is not surprising as this activity has the value of enabling a franker exchange of views between Governments and think tanks than the more formal and open setting of a seminar or conference and allow think tank researchers to conduct more in-depth discussions.

[32] For example at the Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights in Copenhagen or at SIPRI's library in Solna, near Stockholm.

[33] A Commission official argues for instance about think tanks' research and debating activities: "Il y a toujours les mêmes, on tourne en rond. Il faut par exemple aller parler d'Europe dans les zones d'éducation prioritaire, pas pour faire gadget, mais pour écouter ce qu'ils ont à dire sur l'Europe." A U.K. grassroots activist agrees that EU-specific think tanks in Great Britain "are influential, but only within the 'Westminster village'."

[34] One exception was CEPR, which produced 500+ discussion papers per annum.

[35] Because of the nature of our study, it is difficult to assess the overall research value of these in-house journals.

[36] E.g. the IEEP in the U.K. provides this for the U.K. Environment Agency.

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[37] E.g. Centre for European and Transition Studies, Latvia.

[38] Examples of foundations were the Joseph Rowntree Trust in the U.K. and Ireland, and the Ford Foundation and the Open Society Foundation in Eastern Europe.

[39] These activities were particularly important for Italian think tanks.

[40] In the DIIS, for example, researchers with only Master's degrees are employed on temporary contracts lasting one to two years.

[41] E.g. see details in table of Policy Network in UK, IAI in Italy and, in the country reports, Progressivt Centrum in Denmark.

[42] Through various public events. It is also possible to detect a minority of think tanks aware of the influential role they can have for policy-makers; the Finland Pan European Institute claims that it generates information on new phenomena "for the use of decision-makers in government and business communities." Here also think tanks appear more policy-oriented.

[43] This is what would distinguish for example the IRRI (Institut Royal des Relations Internationales) in Belgium from its more academic peer, the GEPE (Groupe d'Etude des Politiques Européennes).

[44] The think tank directors interviewed in Sweden, for example, saw one of their roles as providing certain services to the public. This could include ensuring public access to their library, publishing part of their work for school and university students, educational courses, and the organising of meetings of local membership branches both across Sweden and abroad.

[45] A prominent Dutch institute agrees that a think tank "has to be innovative, to have new ideas and to find support for its action on them." Another, talking about two of the most influential tanks in Europe claims that "what we like about them is that they go on unexplored paths, they think about issues that are not on the agenda yet and therefore they influence policy-makers." Such views can be linked to the agenda of the first advocacy tanks in the United states, where "thinking the unthinkable" was a must after World War II.

[46] This networking aspect is much appreciated by an Irish journalist we interviewed, because it gave him access through the think tank to knowledge about the latest policy developments and also to people and organisations working in politics in different countries. He also believed that think tank events give politicians the chance to engage in debate with an informed audience in a way that is no longer possible in the media (for example, on television). This dialogue is important for democracy in his view. One of the IEA's directors believes that this type of facilitating and mediating role is becoming more important now for many European think tanks. For example, many of the Brussels think tanks, such as CEPS, also provide this service.

[47] Some insist on the need to be independent "of any organisation, movement or private or public institution" (the GRIP in Belgium), others that an organisation should be "in no way dependent on an exclusive public or private partner", that it should carry out all its research tasks "in a spirit of total academic freedom," (IRRI, Belgium), and finally others that think tanks should not have political party affiliations (e.g. the Polish Centre for International Relations). CEPS's website claims its "complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence."

[48] Many think tanks, such as ISIS Europe, mentioned to us that they were also in the process of diversifying their sources of funding.

[49] The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Berlin, illustrates a dilemma which many other think tanks face. For the FES, independence "is sometimes a bit difficult because 95 per cent of our money comes from the government, but part of our deal is that we have to account for the funds we get but do not have to report on what we are going to do. We report only after the research has been completed."

[50] This view was expressed by the European Union Institute for Strategic Studies in Paris (EUISS), a European Agency totally financed through the E.U. budget. For several German think tanks, being affiliated to a university is also a safeguard against party influence. CESS, the Dutch Centre for European Security Studies similarly "stays away from corporate funding." On the other hand, others such as the Pan-European Institute in Finland seek to protect their independence by relying mostly on private funds, or argue that contract research better helps them manage their independence. The Centre for European Policy in Slovakia declares that it is "a highly independent and critical think tank," and therefore refuses money from the State (which it also admits the government would not want to give it anyway).

[51] This is the case for instance for the Prague Institute of International Relations, or the Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik at the University of Hamburg

[52] At the SWP in Berlin, all important decisions are taken by a two-thirds majority of the Board of Trustees, which specific role is to guarantee the SWP's independence. The members of the Board include leading scientists, economists and other public figures as well as representatives of various federal ministries and parties in the Bundestag. Those from the "political side" cannot numerically form a two-thirds majority of their own. At the MZES (Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische SozialForschung) at the University of Mannheim, the researchers submit proposals, which are evaluated by an external scientific advisory board. In the Scandinavian research

institutes there is often a board or council responsible for overseeing the work of the institute. Such a body is often composed of a mix of civil servants, academics, journalists and other public figures. Even if the government is present on these boards, the involvement of other actors here usually enables the institute to maintain an arms-length relationship with the former.

[53] The Institut Royal des Relations Internationales in Brussels tries to prevent external pressure by targeting its research work at a variety of audiences and by always providing sound practical recommendations "so that even those who may be against what we say can see the practical merits of our research." "Recruiting among the best researchers" is part of ELIAMEP's strategy in Greece.

[54] The EUISS sees itself as the only true E.U. think tank *thanks* to its official status. In the UK, "perceived closeness to government" is often clearly stated as an effective way of being influential and effective, not as a threat to the independence and credibility of an institute. The Hellenic Centre for European Studies indicated that independence vis-à-vis public authorities was "a matter of good relations. Nobody gives orders, the government asks questions, but does not influence the answer. The government has its priorities, but respects our independence regarding the results of our analysis."

[55] The European Trade Union Institute also collaborates with actors coming from the employers' side. For instance, it has worked on joint projects with the Hans Boeckler Foundation, which is a foundation supported by the Deutsche Gesellschafts Bund (the German Confederation of Industry)

[56] The Estonian Foreign Policy Institute described to us how it seeks to maintain a certain distance with the state which provides a significant share of its budget and commissions studies. The Belgian Institut Royal de sRelations Internationales said that preserving independence is "complicated," others that their independence is "always fragile." For the Internationales Institut für Politik und Wirtschaft in Hamburg it is "an everyday struggle."

[57] CEPS (2003 Annual Report) describes an Online Survey it conducted on its homepage between July and December 2003. This survey revealed who visits its website (academia : 23 per cent; professional occupations : 19 per cent; national governments : 16 per cent; research : 15 per cent); their country of origin (the largest group is based in Belgium, followed by the U.K. and the USA); and principal areas of interest (future of Europe; economic policy; wider Europe; and security). "Publications are the most wanted item, followed by CEPS commentaries and analysis. An additional 13 per cent of CEPS website visitors are on their way to the CEPS online bookshop to purchase or download publications."

[58] Taken from the website of The Centre, which was not included in our list because it does not conduct in-house research.

[59] Organisations such as WWF Europe which are sometimes identified as "E.U. think tanks" confirmed to us that they do not regard their Brussels office as a think tank, but as a lobbying team that does some research and advice for the WWF network.

[60] There may be other branches of US think tanks in Europe, which were not included in our research.

[61] These two institutes are not think tanks according to our criteria, in the sense that they do not have permanent in-house researchers and do not produce research themselves.

[62] Another think tank, the Jaan Tonisson Institute, had initially been included in this survey, but it seems to have ceased all activity in early July 2004.

[63] For example, the Ministry for Social Security and Employment, the Supreme Council for the Liberation of Lithuania, the Soviet politburo which created the Academy of Sciences which the IEAS in Latvia is affiliated to, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Estonia.

[64] The Institute defines itself "perhaps partially" as a think tank. Luxembourg also hosts the Robert Schuman Centre (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Européennes Robert Schuman), which focuses mainly on the historical study of European integration. Although it conducts research and contributes to knowledge about Europe, it is therefore not policy-oriented and does not target policy-makers.

[65] Dutch think tanks are all foundations ('stichtingen'), but not in the traditional sense of organisations dedicated to managing and allocating an endowment fund. This status explains why Dutch think tanks do not have members, although they have different options for developing *de facto* membership.

[66] Clingendael is different from the French IFRI, the German DGAP, or the British RIIA in that it has a very substantial training programme. It even offers a Master's Programme in International Relations and Diplomacy. Although one of our nine criteria for a think tank is that it should not be a degree-granting organisation, we have nonetheless kept Clingendael and EIPA in our list, as excluding them from the Dutch think tank scene would clearly have been perceived as artificially strict.

[67] Created to stimulate cooperation between administrations and administrative training institutes across Member States, EIPA is supported by the E.U. administrations and the Commission. The institute carries out training and research on public administration and European policies, and provides a variety of services to the administrations of the Member States and the candidate countries as well as to the E.U. institutions in support

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of their tasks and responsibilities related to European integration. It defines itself primarily as "a European instrument for training public officials (...) 'to support the European Union and its Member States and the countries associated with EIPA by providing relevant and high quality services to develop the capacities of public officials in dealing with E.U. affairs.''

[68] We have not included the ECF because its research work is not permanent, and it does not have an in-house research team. It does not appear therefore to be primarily a think tank.

[69] As the survey is focused on think tanks based in E.U. Member States, organisations not based in the Greek part of Cyprus were not included.

[70] The Danish Institute for Human Rights makes up the other half.

[71] Libertas, a free market think tank, and CEPOS, a newly-formed think tank also on the right of the political spectrum, are the only two think tanks we found which have private sector funding.

[72] Cf. Day, p.108, in McGann and Weaver, 2000. The Danish National Research Foundation funds the activities of 30 different research centres in the science and arts field. It currently has a budget of 250m DKK but the only centre that it funds which conducts European work is EPRU – and their work is just on one narrow area of E.U. policy, macroeconomics.

[73] COPRI was one of the institutes which fought hardest against the merger. It organised an international coalition of over 300 high-profile academics to oppose it.

[74] For instance, it publishes research on institutions and the formation of economic policy; international monetary economics and European economic integration; and international trade theory and policy. Now based at the Institute of Economics at Copenhagen University, EPRU is funded by a grant from the Danish National Research Foundation and two Danish government ministries.[74] It currently has a staff of 24. EPRU also co-operates with other foreign institutes in the field of international economics. Its partners include the National Bureau of Economic Research in the US, CEPR in London, CEPS in Brussels, and the *Institut für Höheren Studien* in Vienna. It also receives a large number of academics from abroad as visitors.

[75] The country's excellent rate of economic growth at the end of the 1990s (after the 1990-93 recession) testifies to the country's strong desire to join the E.U. Finland was in fact selected in May 1998 to join the Euro.

[76] Its research production however is highly regarded and its statute and decision-making structures protect its independence.

[77] More generally, think tanks are a recent phenomenon in France. They appeared timidly in the 1980s and a fairly large number was created in recent years: see *Le Journal du Management*, 2004.

[78] The Institute of International and Strategic Relations (www.iris-france.org), created in 1990 with the support of Pierre Joxe, then Minister of Defence, offers different degrees and training programs, but also has a research programme, which covers in part E.U. matters (e.g. 8 books out of the past 31 since 2000); The Institut Choiseul (www.choiseul.info/institut/index.php), besides general research and strategic consulting, "vise aussi à favoriser l'émergence d'une vision européenne des affaires mondiales dans l'espoir de voir l'Union mener une politique étrangère efficace et cohérente." This institute, created in 1999, already has a budget of half a million euros and a team of 6 permanent and 20 occasional researchers. Its research is focused on international relations and economic questions, and it publishes four journals, on geoeconomics, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East, and China.

[79] Of these seven foundations, we have only retained the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Hanns Siedel Stiftung. The other four (the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Hans Boeckler Stiftung and Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung) either do not carry out research on Europe, or do not have an in-house research team (two of the most important criteria for our survey).

[80] In 1994, six major Greek research institutes joined the Cyprus Research Institute (KYKEM) and other Australian, Canadian and U.S. think tanks to create a coordinating committee of research institutes specialised in Hellenism.

[81] Complementary organisations include the Lajos Batthyany Foundation, which research arm does some research on E.U. integration. The Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe, which works on behalf of Hungary and international institutional actors to "assist in solving environmental problems in Central and Eastern Europe." It is a "non-partisan, non-advocacy, non-profit international organisation legally based on a charter signed by the governments of 28 countries and the European Commission, and on an international agreement with the government of Hungary." The Hungarian Institute of International Affairs no longer seems to be in existence. Its website (a basic criterion for our survey) was not in operation at the time of this study. For similar reasons, the Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies was not included, although it is known for having conducted research on the European security environment.

[82] Although it maintains a large number of projects on European issues: 20

[83] IEA has a branch in Brussels comprised of Irish officials working in the E.U.'s institutions. The branch holds regular events in order to keep these officials informed on broader Irish policy towards the E.U.

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[84] This goes up to six if we include the Economic and Social Council

[85] In fact, we came across the Centro Europa Ricerche (CER), which however does not appear to have a website and seems to have had very few initiatives.

[86] See www.italianieuropei.it, www.liberalfondazione.it, www.limesonline.it for further information. Policy clubs are considered "fora of discussion among like-minded politicians and intellectuals more than organisations producing research on a regular basis". (Lucarelli, Radaelli, 2003)

[87] The purpose of this grant is to establish a transnational research group to study the integration process and the future prospects for the Mediterranean region within the enlarged Union. The project runs for two years, from 2002 to 2004.

[88] Perhaps this absence reflects the controversy which divided the population and the Government on the question of Malta's entry to the E.U. (those opposing entry gained 47.6 per cent of votes, and 31 seats in Parliament; compared to 51.7 per cent and 34 seats for the pro-European party).

[89] A recent law allows citizens to donate 1 per cent of their personal income tax to non-profit, non-governmental organisations, but few people are aware of this possibility.

[90] See www.osw.waw.pl; www.omp.org.pl/indexang.html; and http://iss.krakow.pl for further information.

[91] Three bordeline cases in Sweden were the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) (which has published work recently on topics such as E.U. foreign direct investment flows but which does not appear to have a large number of publications or indeed a distinct programme on the EU), the Stockholm Environment Institute (whose research is not EU-focused), and the Bertil Ohlin Institute (a small Liberal Party think tank which does occasionally look at European questions but does not seem to publish regularly enough on the E.U. to be included).

[92] Day (2001) refers to these institutes as 'establishment' think tanks because of their longevity and close ties to the state.

[93] On average, 15-20 quotations per month.

[94] Other borderline cases in our study were: the Centre for Local Economic Strategies and the Institute of Welsh Affairs (both had looked in the past at E.U. regional fund spending); the Labour Research Department (which provides information services to U.K. trade unions, including on E.U. legislation, but which does not appear to be currently conducting policy research on Europe); and the Eurosceptic, pseudo-think tanks, the Bruges Group and New Frontiers Foundation.

[95] CER was founded by a group which included influential Labour Party advisors, such as David Miliband, David Clark and Wendy Alexander (Miliband later became an MP and government minister and Alexander an MSP and Scottish minister). FPC was launched under the patronage of Tony Blair in 1998.

[96] In the past the media has preferred the views of other, more 'objective' think tanks, such as the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR), when reporting on European debates, for example in the one that took place on the euro.

[97] Other groups label themselves think tanks, such as the Bruges Group and New Frontiers Foundation, but because they are essentially lobbying organisations with no in-house research capacity, they are not included in our list of Euro-think tanks.

[98] Think tanks with a charitable status in the U.K. are however not allowed to engage directly in political campaigning.

[99] "Perhaps the strongest impetus was the exodus of often underpaid researchers from academia. (…) Opposition groups such as the Solidarity movement in Poland also provided fertile ground for the growth of new institutions such as the Gdansk Institute for Market Economics, arguably that country's premier think tank. As in other countries, another strong motivation behind the formation of think tanks has been the departure of frustrated or replaced officials (…). Despite the strength of their convictions, most of Central Europe's think tanks could not have been established without substantial foreign assistance from grant-making institutions such as CIPE, the Pew Charitable trusts, and the MacArthur Foundation in the United States, the German party foundations, and the British Know How Fund," (Johnson, 1996), to which one should add the Open Society Institute, which has massively funded think tanks and brought together research institutes in the region.

[100] E.g. Bertelsmann Foundation, Ford Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Soros-Open Society Foundation; German Marshall Fund of the US; Robert Schuman Foundation.

[101] These figures can be compared with, for instance, the 16 researchers at the Center for the United States and Europe of the Brookings Institution, the 6 researchers on Europe of the Cato Institute's foreign policy programme, the Council on Foreign Relations' 5 experts on Europe, or the RAND Corporation's 56 researchers based in Europe.

[102] To mention just one example, the University Association for Contemporary European Studies "bringing together academics involved in researching Europe with practitioners active in European affairs." www.uaces.org

3 The point of view of recipients and observers of think tanks' work

Although the recipients of Euro-think tanks' work agree that such work is important in theory, their perception is often not very positive. A number report that think tanks' work does not add value, that the services think tanks provide lack impact and are rarely used. They are also critical of their approach, which is perceived as too technocratic, elitist and lacking transparency (3.1). This harsh verdict on the sector by some of those interviewed does not however prevent a regular dialogue with and a varied use of think tanks by their recipients (3.2.4).

In addition to describing the sector of think tanks with an interest in European matters, it is important to reach out to think tanks' "user group", i.e. those who are the supposed targets of think tanks' efforts, to understand what 'the other side' thinks. 42 qualitative interviews were conducted with E.U. and national decision-makers, as well as journalists, academics and other actors specialised in European affairs from civil society, to better understand what contribution E.U. think tanks make (we could not materially investigate the role played by think tanks beyond these expert communities). They allow the identification of general trends, which would require further, more rigorous research.

3.1 Do decision-makers, journalists and academics find Europe-focused think tanks useful ?

The short answer to this question is "yes, but not uniformly so." The observers of the think tank market interviewed indeed made four types of remarks. All insisted on the importance of a healthy think tank sector for E.U. policy-making, while criticising their relative lack of strength and ability to provide added-value; sometimes their lack of impact and relevance; and finally an approach seen as too technocratic and elitist. Their possible contribution to helping bridge the E.U. 'democratic deficit' is considered at best uncertain.

Think tanks : sources of innovative policies and sounding boards

In theory, policy-makers can use think tanks as sources of innovative policy options and as sounding boards for new approaches. In fact, the policy-makers interviewed see their work as potentially useful, and do in fact use them. Among the roles they identify, officials mention certain think tanks' ability to engage in 'blue-skies thinking', "new ways of looking at things", to provide "innovative thinking." Thinking about the medium term, for which administrations do not always have sufficient capacity, is viewed as particularly helpful. More frequently though, their main function is perceived as providers of analysis and information, of networking opportunities, as mediators between the academic and political worlds, and as "a filter and a forum for debate."[103] They also have a "socialisation" and a training role for

national public and elected officials, identified as particularly necessary in the E.U. field, in particular for new Member States.[104]

However, these two approaches are used very unevenly from one organisation and country to another. Whereas the Commission and think tanks are in fairly close contact, other institutions are much less involved, for instance the European Central Bank or even, to some extent, the European Parliament.[105] In countries—such as France—where independent research institutes are not yet a strong part of the policy-making community, "governments do not ask anything from think tanks, with a few exceptions," argues a respondent. In other countries though, most notably in the UK, but also in Germany (e.g. SWP), the government has developed strategic links with certain think tanks, which it uses for its own purposes, mainly to test new policy ideas at arms-length. According to the author of a French official survey of think tanks, the new E.U. Member States are starting to realise the benefit of maintaining a dialogue with think tanks. In Poland, however, Katarzyna Skorzynska, president of the Centre for International and Local Government Relations, a Polish think tank (Skorzynska, 2003) recently blamed her government "for monopolising the debate on issues related to Poland's preparations for accession, for a lack of openness manifested in [its] aversion to sharing the accession-related tasks with NGOs, think tanks, and specialised private companies (…). Making initiatives and presenting them in a convincing way on the E.U. forum is not a task that would be beyond Poland's capacities. However, it requires that the government give up its monopoly on Europe. It requires a partnership-based co-operation with independent think tanks, as well as efficient administration and diplomacy." Similarly, an Austrian research centre told us: "Even the civil servants in the ministries have the feeling that they have to compete with us. The future strategy of think tanks should be to cooperate more closely with the public administration, because think tanks can provide other means to tackle policy issues."

The first quality that decision-makers identify in Euro-think tanks they perceive as useful and influential is the quality and objectivity of their proposals, although this should not preclude them from taking where necessary a political stance. CER, for instance, widely seen as influential and useful, is systematically associated with "a Blairist approach." (See Section 4.2.1). "Creativity in the ideas proposed and how to communicate them" is also believed to be important. To develop such qualities, decision-makers and other recipients look for people with a reputation, "a diversified panel of people, a representation of different points of view," organisational independence from other parties, and finally the ability to work persistently on issues over the long term.

"Taking initiatives and presenting them in a convincing way… requires that the government give up its monopoly on Europe. It requires a partnership-based co-operation with independent think tanks, as well as efficient administration and diplomacy."

The media take some copy from representatives of think tanks, in particular in the form of op-eds, but do not use them as sources of information as often as they do with other types of experts. "Think tanks are not people you usually call up, and they're not freelancers who can write papers for you on specific topics,"

although the "more incisive ones can write features on a particular topic if they are known specialists." Journalists also perceive the value of think tanks differently. Because of the urgency of media work, journalists told us that they are very interested in analysis and research work that saves them time. In this respect, "think tanks are a real plus." Prospective thinking and conferences are not suited to the way the mass media work, although they do look for "unusual ideas." They are more appropriate for the specialist press. A French journalist commented that one-hour breakfast meetings that allow real discussions for a small number of participants, like the ones organised by the Institut de l'Europe, a quasi-think tank, are particularly useful. Another confirmed that the opportunity to meet and confront ideas outside the ring of "usual suspects" is very valuable.[106] Journalists all told us that they were very keen to identify experts on particular issues better for future reference. Geographical and physical proximity is a plus, as evidenced for instance by the close dialogue between the EPC and European Voice, both of which are based in the same media centre in Brussels. There seems to be little transnational consultation of think tank experts by the journalists we interviewed.

"Useful, but only moderately so"

Overall, however, our interviews indicate that, today, thinks tanks with an interest in European affairs provide limited added value in the eyes of decision-makers, their primary targets. According to the journalists interviewed, they are not very visible. On the positive side, this perception reflects more the situation to date than a rejection of think tanks per se. The need and expectations of potential users of think tanks is not satisfied, they want more and better think tanks. As summarised by a high-level Commission official, "supply does not meet demand". "There are a few high quality institutes, but compared to Europe's economic and political power, think tank production is not as dense as one might hope." In fact, observers regret the relative scarcity of think tanks, "they lack leverage", "we need more think tanks and more capacity to think," in particular compared to what exists in the United States. Less positively, the respondents were also sceptical of what think tanks offer today : they argue that they provide limited added-value, that few are good and that when they are, it is thanks to individuals within think tanks, particularly gifted members who are capable of producing truly innovative ideas, not to organisations as a whole. One academic was also critical : "You know what they'll say even before you read it." [107]

"You know what they'll say even before you read it."

As summarised by a particularly critical E.U. official, think tanks are "useful, but only moderately so." This official added : "They waste a lot of my time, they come to seek ideas at the Commission (…) and produce little (…). Only a handful of people really think, the rest is more compilation (…), they should be more original." Another confirmed that "there are those who keep repeating the same things, and those who try to challenge the received wisdom, but I really couldn't tell which is more important." An observer told us that she was in fact "annoyed" by the rhetoric of those who "pretend that they help bring the E.U. closer to its citizens," while receiving "so much money from E.U. institutions to feed an elite," whereas in fact "they lack creativity." Even the most

influential ones noted are "places to meet decision-makers rather than places where original, innovative ideas are created," added an academic. "Their role is interesting, but their production is weak." Some of the most prominent organisations are criticised as "fake think tanks" that do more "vulgarisation" and lobbying than produce original ideas. As a result, the Commission is perceived as dominating the intellectual production on E.U. policy matters according to another official, even though its own capacity is not adequate.

On the other hand, the journalists and decision-makers interviewed in some of the Member States, particularly the U.K. and Ireland, tended to have a more positive view of the (potential) role of think tanks in the European debate. These views are detailed in note [108].

LIMITED IMPACT

A second prominent criticism is think tanks' current lack of impact and even relevance beyond a limited circle of people and issues. First, our interviews indicate that think tanks' audience is perhaps smaller than it should be. Nearly all potential targets told us that that they are mainly passive recipients of think tank work, they rarely seek to obtain information or studies directly from think tanks, yet, the latter also reach the ears of the policy-makers we interviewed. Potentially relevant actors in the European parliament for instance commentated that they were not the targets of think tank work, but that they learnt occasionally about their work through the media and then sought a copy of relevant reports themselves. Several respondents noted the very "Anglo-Saxon" bias of today's prominent think tanks, which limits their audience. Others perceive today's Euro-think tanks as "very national," with teams of researchers determined by the nationality of the organisation's home country. Finally, observers highlighted the fact that very few think tanks based in the Member States have a presence in Brussels, and vice-versa (see Section 4.2).

Furthermore, few are seen as good at communicating. One of the journalists interviewed summarised in vivid terms his colleagues' general feeling: "Most think tank people are good, but some are too technical, they use too much of the inside lingo, they're anoraks really." Another confirmed : "There is room for improvement in their communications." Again, the CER was cited by several observers as one of the few organisations that knows how to handle the media, whereas another took Notre Europe as an example of research centres that "produce high quality papers, but which we do not hear about. You really need to do public relations work." A professor noted: "In stark contrast with the CER, it's impossible to notice the French and the Germans, not to mention think tanks from other countries." More generally, both policy-makers and journalists told us that they contact think tanks or seek their publications far more often than the opposite. Most often they cite the Agence Europe bulletin as the place where they learn about events and reports.

"MEPs' competencies tend not to be, for instance, at the level of foreign policy. In this regard, interest groups' contributions tend to be more appropriate to our work."

Again on the more critical side, some respondents attributed such limited impact to a relative lack of relevance. Several respondents noted that independent research centres deal with matters that too often repeat themselves and are of limited interest to citizens, in particular institutional issues. This is also where

policy-makers use research institutes more frequently, rather than on issues such as the environment or transport where think tanks are relatively absent. Issues related to the Convention, for instance, received paradoxically too much attention. This dynamic leads to "repetition, lately on constitutional matters and transatlantic relations." This is perhaps most striking for those active in the European Parliament. An analyst there told us : "I do not feel that this type of reflection, with a few exceptions, is very useful for Members of the European Parliament, because MEPs' competencies tend not to be, for instance, at the level of foreign policy. In this regard, interest groups' contributions tend to be more appropriate to our work." Such views are even stronger at the national level. For example, another E.U. official argued : "German think tanks lately have been thinking mostly about two issues, the reduction of the German contribution [to the E.U. budget] and the division of competencies, for which their proposals have completely failed at the Convention, because in fact their vision is very inward-looking. It's easy to get very excited at home about a particular idea of Europe, but political concepts are affected by cultural and political contexts (…), you need to prepare the ground in other Member States, to test your ideas with European partners."

DEMOCRATIC PLAYERS OR TECHNOCRATIC AND ELITIST?

Some E.U. policy-makers we interviewed also blame think tanks for being too technocratic and elitist, and thereby as not helping bridge the so-called 'E.U. democratic deficit'. Even those respondents who work with E.U. research institutes, very often see think tanks as "speaking too much among themselves," as operating in closed circuits, as "too Anglo-Saxon," meaning too focused on issues defined along UK-centric terms. "They are part of the chattering classes," stated dismissively a journalist, "they do not cater for the mass circulation publication outfits, their target audience is elitist." This criticism is in fact a common theme among journalists.[109] Those we interviewed presented us with a range of views. Most were 'against' and some were 'for' the idea that think tanks play a role in reducing the democratic deficit.

FOR : a U.K. politician argued that think tanks were important in this respect because, by publishing material for debate on European questions, they help to meet a widespread public demand for more information on European matters (thus partly reducing voters' 'information deficit' regarding the E.U. institutions). In his view, responding to this would be a key challenge for think tanks in the future: "If think tanks really want to make an input they should be thinking about how to better inform the public [on E.U. matters]. If they have the capacity and willingness to do that, they can be major players in the democratisation of the E.U." A journalist also thought that think tanks were important because the networks which they had built up across Europe helped to connect better national researchers and policy-makers in different countries. This is improving the quality and range of the debate on pan-European themes. Think tanks are also, in his view, an essential "intellectual support framework" for the "European project', which ensure that there is at least a measure of public debate at this level, in spite of the widespread feeling of disconnection between Europe's political elites and its voters.

AGAINST : others are more sceptical about think tanks' capacities to bridge the democratic gap. An academic who specialises in E.U. politics felt that in some cases, think tanks could help by warning decision-makers of problems that could undermine the credibility of E.U. construction. However, he in fact gave a counter-example when pressed to illustrate his argument. In his view, too many think tanks focused on the economic aspects of the stability pact during the clash between France, Germany and the Commission. None of the organisations he knew had denounced the negative impact such flouting of common policies could have on the public's confidence in the E.U. construction process in the context of the Convention and enlargement negotiations. A Commission official felt that the issue of a democratic deficit should be solved first and foremost by greater involvement of regional, national parliaments and the European parliament, not think tanks. He insisted that their actions could potentially be damaging, because they contribute to shaping an image of the E.U. as distant and technocratic. Another academic believes that, because some are too dependent on contract research, certain think tanks tend to play more the role of 'spin doctors'. In his opinion, they help find and shape arguments to defend certain policies, and by doing so, sometimes "promise miracles" and in the end risk disappointing citizens yet a bit more when their inflated promises fall through.[110]

UNDERSTANDING OF THINK TANKS' CONSTRAINTS

On the other hand, our respondents acknowledged that there were systemic reasons for E.U. think tanks' relative lack of strength. It is, they realise, first a question of resources: "to make progress and be more useful, they should attract more people who can think, but it is unusual to see prominent academics or former political leaders take work inside think tanks, as is the case in the United States, and they lack the resources to attract them." "These institutes are not rich enough, they lack visibility, it is therefore very difficult to perceive their added value, it is difficult to see what they bring," without denying their usefulness. Lack of funds also means that very few national think tanks with an interest in E.U. matters can open an office in Brussels. French EU-focused think tanks for instance are judged as not very influential in Brussels, "even when they have ideas, because they lack the means to be present and to develop appropriate communications techniques."

Furthermore, "Lots of people, individually, are excellent, but there is a fundamental problem: strategic, political thinking and applied research are not sufficiently part of the academic culture," in contrast with the United States, argued another academic, "it is a question of culture more than ability." As a result, some decision-makers told us that they in fact turn sometimes to U.S. think tanks and universities.[111]

Nevertheless, E.U. and national officials all felt that think tanks should not become more dependent on public funds. According to a German professor and specialist of think tanks, no funding source should indeed, ideally, represent more than 5 per cent of an independent research centre's budget.[112]

To be fair, the criticisms voiced also denoted, in some cases, a lack of knowledge of what independent research centres actually do. There were three specific instances when prominent and European Commission officials – who are supposed to be well informed – told us that "nothing" had been produced by think tanks on a particular topic, when in fact a paper had

recently been released on the very same issue by prominent think tanks. Do E.U. policy-makers neglect Europe-focused think tanks as a source of analysis, information and new ideas? Or do think tanks fail in their mission? We shall not attempt to resolve these sensitive questions here. Further investigations would be necessary to go beyond such anecdotal views of a reasonably representative but limited section of E.U. decision-makers. Nevertheless, to readers who feel that criticisms of elitism, lack of relevance and transparency remind them of the pot calling the kettle black, we answer that further research would probably confirm the picture which emerges here of unsatisfied expectations.

INCREASING INTEREST FOR THINK TANKS?

Finally, decision-makers in certain countries are waking up to the importance of think tanks, both among institutional policy-makers and more generally civil society organisations. The head of a large European international relations research centre believes that "what is new is decision-makers' desire to take part in a debate." Of course, the situation varies considerably from one country to another. A Commission civil servant told us, for instance, how German and British officials in Brussels share policy documents with think tanks much more readily than their French counterparts. Even French authorities, however, which are more generally considered somewhat less open to think tanks within the sector than other E.U. governments, are joining the trend. In this perspective, the French PermRep's recent report on French influence in think tanks dealing with European matters (Féat, 2004) is encouraging. The problem, comments an observer who knows the E.U. and the U.S. situations well, is that such interest might not be backed by ageing political leaders that have been in government for too long. In France and elsewhere where dialogue between think tanks and policy-makers is lacking, this respondent argued: "We need a complete renewal of the policy elites. In the U.S.A., decision-makers circulate much faster, unlike in France, where you've had the same politicians for forty years. We need to move faster."

Which independent policy organisations do policy-makers, journalists, academics and other observers of the E.U. decision-making process at the moment know and tend to work with ? In general, they usually cited the same transnational institutes and one or two national groups closest to them. Based on our interviews, i.e. not on a systematic poll, organisations (not all in our list) that appear most frequently are, in order of decreasing frequency:[113] CER (UK), CEPS (Brussels), EPC (Brussels), EUISS (Paris), IFRI (France), Bertelsmann Foundation (Germany), Brookings Institution (U.S.A.), Chatham House (UK), Friends of Europe (Brussels), SIPRI (Sweden), FRS (France), TEPSA (EU), DGAP (Germany), Clingendael (Netherlands), IEP (Germany), IAI (Italy), and Eliamep (Greece). [114]

3.2 PROVISIONAL CONCLUSION : BRIDGING THE E.U. 'DEMAND DEFICIT' FOR INDEPENDENT POLICY RESEARCH

There are many possible reasons why elected and appointed officials at the national and E.U. level, as outlined in Section 1.3, should in theory work actively with Euro-think tanks. We listed three types of reasons: think tanks help formulate sound public policies; they can contribute to a healthy democratic life; and they can be a resource for Member States and E.U. institutions' international 'soft power'. While we have seen how the supply side is

somewhat insufficient with respect to these ambitious objectives, there is also the perception that decision-makers could encourage dialogue with independent research centres more actively. There are indications that in countries where demand is lacking, there is an indication that think tanks have a role to play.

To encourage this trend, we share the views of think tank specialist Martin Thunert (interview), who places the onus on think tanks and urges them to take the following steps to bridge the gap between them and decision-makers :

- Think tanks should establish themselves as essential sources of information on key topics of their choice for decision-makers, be it EU-Russian relations or E.U. climate change policies. In the future, individual think tanks should become "inescapable" references to which decision-makers around Europe know they can turn to in order to obtain up-to-date information and analysis.
- Think tanks need to work more actively through the media in order to cultivate indirect links with decision-makers. Thunert describes how German media recruit young journalists that lack expertise on many policy issues. Journalists should also know whom to call within think tanks.
- Think tanks, ideally, should have a presence in Brussels, and at least in their country's capital (many German think tanks are based outside Berlin).
- More generally, independent research centres need to think strategically about their positioning in relation to parties, political forces, and advocacy in general.

The following section continues this discussion by addressing in further detail the challenges and dilemmas which Euro-think tanks face, such as the danger of instrumentalisation by policy-makers.

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[103] This interest is substantiated, among other things by the fact that the European Commission, other E.U. actors, and national authorities do provide significant support, principally in the form of requests for studies, direct funding, and staff on leave. The French Permanent Representation to the E.U. conducted recently its own study of French E.U. think tanks to understand how to cooperate better with them. Anecdotally, several decision-makers told us that they might be interested to pursue a career in think tanks in the future.

[104] A national official told us, for instance: "We need more than ever greater information and more sophisticated tools to analyse problems." Think tanks "bring together people who need to meet." Another, in the European Parliament, described how "many members of Parliament from the new Member States would probably like to take part in these studies, many think 'where could I "think" in Brussels?' Think tanks have the potential to help integrate these new Parliamentarians."

[105] Certain groups try to contribute to the ECB's thinking and policy-making process, as illustrated by recent studies by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, a network of economists based in London, which regularly comments on the bank's interest rate decisions.

[106] Yet another journalist noted that they were a very useful source of information on recent policy developments – particularly for off-the-record briefings, and that, unlike with politicians, journalists could engage with think tanks on an "equal footing".

[107] This person also added that, like NGOs, think tanks tended to focus on "process over product". They were more interested in being invited along to meetings with politicians and feeling part of the 'inner circle' than in producing objective and relevant policy research, which should after all be their main function. One exception in this person's mind were the economic think tanks, whose work was often much more objective.

. . . . . .

[108] For example, Lord Grenfell, the Chair of the Lords E.U. Select Committee in the U.K. Parliament (the main Parliamentary committee scrutinizing E.U. policy), said that the think tanks which regularly give evidence to their Committee as part of an inquiry make a valuable contribution to the Committee's work. This is especially the case when they are able to provide MPs and Peers with specialist expertise on a particular E.U. issue, such as development aid, foreign policy, and economic and financial affairs, in an objective and well thought-out fashion. This process of gathering evidence is an important part of the Committee's work as it gives MPs and Peers the chance to assess the views of bodies and individuals outside Parlliament and it increases the credibility of the Committee's reports. Similarly, an Irish journalist saw think tanks as a force for good for a variety of reasons. He believed that they allowed a more informed debate to take place between policy-makers and experts in a particular policy sector. In his view, such debate was no longer possible on television for example because it had become progressively "dumbed down" over the years. He also thought that think tanks helped to "sharpen and focus perceptions of an issue": even if they were not as good at developing new policy, think tanks could help focus attention on a *specific* aspect of current government policy, which might previously have been overlooked.

[109] Writing about think tanks, the *European Voice* (2002) once argued: "There may be an information deficit elsewhere in the European Union, but its self-styled capital enjoys something of a surplus. Indeed, the only dilemma facing Brussels' chattering classes is which think tank debate, industry reception or press conference to attend next."

[110] One journalist also argued that it was difficult for think tanks in Brussels to develop independent and useful viewpoints on the future of the E.U. because they were "part of a system which they are seeking to analyse and understand". In his view, those organisations which are involved in the integration process (including think tanks) are also the ones that are likely to be most supportive of this process. The challenge therefore is to find organisations that are not afraid to think differently and challenge the *status quo*. In his view this problem is compounded by the fact that one of the E.U.'s major political actors, the European Commission, is also funding many of these think tanks. For him, it was no surprise that some of the most influential think tanks were not to be found in Brussels but instead in the Member State countries, where they had greater distance from (and hence more objectivity on) E.U. matters.

[111] This is confirmed by, among others, a senior official in the European Commission, who reported that the contacts which he and the rest of his service had with American think tanks showed that on the other side of the Atlantic they have a "vision which is not our own, and we must be careful because if this vision is dominant it will have an influence on our way of thinking."

[112] An academic stressed this drawback of sponsored research: "think tanks are very interesting organisations, but when they depend too much on research contracts, the risk is that they become too "obliging" ("obligeants")."

[113] *Notre Europe* was purposefully excluded from this informal poll because of the clear bias generated by the fact that interviewers came from the organisation.

[114] Clearly, notoriety, in particular within such a limited sample, should not be confused either with credibility or influence, in particular as some of the organisations noted here were criticised by the same people who listed them. It is interesting to note though that few organisations are remembered by our respondents beyond the national organisations they work with. A more systematic analysis of existing E.U. think tanks' reputations will be provided by Professor McGann in his forthcoming survey.

4 Challenges, dilemmas and strategic choices

Think tanks that focus on European policy matters within the E.U. operate, broadly speaking, in the same operating environment, which is constantly changing, be it on the economic or political side. This section attempts to understand what threats and opportunities think tanks identify in the short term (4.1) before examining other sources of potential difficulties that emerge out of our conversations with research institutes and observers of the sector (4.2).

4.1 THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

According to the think tanks interviewed, the overwhelming current challenge in their operating environment is funding, which generates problems of independence and competition. Enlargement is generally perceived positively or as not affecting activities significantly, while changes in the academia are broadly welcomed. Few other challenges were mentioned.

"WHAT CHALLENGES DO WE FACE? MONEY, MONEY, MONEY !" [i]

Funding is a major and recurring preoccupation for the think tanks interviewed, save only for a small minority. There is little point in us citing here all those who highlighted this difficulty to us. Although it affects most think tanks in the new Member States, it also appears to affect large and small organisations alike across the whole of the E.U. In fact, according to the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, "Most [think tanks] are in a budgetary crisis."

Sources of funding appear to be insufficient and in decline, whether they are public, private, national or international, donations or contracts. As the Austrian Society for Political Science (OGPW) explains, "Funding sources are more and more limited and concentrated." Most of the people interviewed underline the insufficiency and reduction of public financing, even in Germany and Italy.[115] Independent research institutes also complain of a lack of permanence in public funding. Allocations can sometimes be put in doubt by changes of government and of political priorities, a problem currently being experienced in France by certain well-known institutes.

The problem is the same for private funding. In Poland, the Centre for International Relations told us that "it is very difficult to get any financial assistance from the State," and "foreign (American) foundations do not wish to invest in Poland any more, as they move their support more to the East. Polish business is not very helpful either." Many research institutes find it difficult to cover a significant share of their expenses through contract work and membership fees.[116] Another major concern regarding private funding is that it is project-based and short

[i] Interview with the Internationales Institut für Politik und Wirtschaft, Hamburg

term, whereas think tanks would welcome "on-going", long-term funding, through donations or multi-year projects.

Funding is not only limited but also is often difficult to access. Many of the organisations studied complain about the complexity of rules on donations and above all about calls for tender from the European Commission, which discourage many initiatives.[117]

Another problem reported by many think tanks is the growing tendency for governments to favour funding only for specific projects rather than for a think tank's core activities. This has the potential to damage the long-term viability of think tanks in future because it could prevent them from investing in organisational capacity, in particular research teams. It could also force a client-supplier relationship where they would seek to satisfy the needs of government rather than set their own agenda.

This funding problem logically affects the research capacity of these institutes. In the first place, it threatens their independence, a fundamental value for think tanks, as we have seen earlier.[118] Financial constraints limit their capacity to recruit and use their staff adequately. More fundamentally, according to the Instituto Affari Internazionali (Rome), it affects their capacity to act: "European think tanks dangerously lack dynamism, there is a problem of poor renewal of executives within these institutions." According to the European Voice (2003): "In any case, it probably keeps most of the thinking well within a political box."[119]

Financial constraints have another effect, which some consider to have a positive effect: they force these institutes to prove the efficiency of their work and to justify their existence. In particular, the use of private funding, according to the head of an organization which has managed to master the system well enough, "keeps think tanks on their toes by having to demonstrate to corporate funders that they are working effectively." One of the six main German economic research institutes has been encouraged recently to close down after a recent assessment by the Science Council (Wissenschaftsrat). This assessment was also carried out for the other economic research institutes there.[120]

But what is the real situation ? To answer this question, a specific research on the development of think tanks' budgets and their funding would be needed, an area where information is not easily accessible. However, as it has been already reported (Gadault, 2004), the budgets of European think tanks are actually lower than those of their American counterparts.[121] This situation reflects as well the general picture of R&D spending as a percentage of GDP. This was 50 percent higher in the U.S. than the European average in 2002 and more than three times as high as in the new Member States.[122] From this perspective, one could argue that the independent research institutes in Europe are too dispersed. One can also note that the European Commission's spending is relatively small, although it is increasing.[123] We shall return to this question of funding in Sections 4.1.1 and 5.2.

ENLARGEMENT : MORE AN OPPORTUNITY THAN A CONSTRAINT

A key factor of change in the operating environment of think tanks in the recent past has clearly been the accession of ten new Member States to the European Union. Somewhat

surprisingly however, according to our interviews, it did not significantly affect the Euro-think tanks' situation, whether in the old or the new Member States, for three reasons.

1. First, the preparations for enlargement, as well as the enlargement process itself and its consequences had been on think tanks' agenda for a while. The head of a research institute in one of the new Member States even claimed: "The topic is not as urgent as it used to be in the early 1990s." In the new Member States, the major part of think tank work had been dedicated to enlargement. Now that accession is a reality, the attention given to such issues is anticipated to focus more on practical matters of integration within the E.U.

2. Co-operation between former and new Member States also existed before May 1, 2004. Networks such as TEPSA for instance, as well as individual organisations have developed many links with sister organisations in the acceding Member States since at least the early 1990s.[124]

3. To date, accession has not changed significantly the financial situation of think tanks in the new Member States either, because they benefited from E.U. financial assistance before enlargement (e.g. through the Phare programme). Besides, the new possibilities of receiving resources from the Community budget made possible through accession, usually requires complicated and time-consuming procedures. They are therefore not considered today as a significant source of funding by research centres in the new Member States. On the other hand, others feel that the increased opportunities for independent research organisations from 10 new countries to access E.U. funding sources will "increase competition on the funding market of the European Commission, unlike in the United States where the amounts of money available are huge and increasing."

ACADEMIA'S INCREASING ENTREPRENEURSHIP

One of the factors of success of Anglo-American think tanks highlighted by many respondents is the relative autonomy of the academic world in which it operates, characterised in part by its independence from public funding, its greater ability to work with private actors, the circulation of personnel between academia, administration, and think tanks, and more generally a greater readiness to engage in applied research. A French think tank manager observes for instance: "The Anglo-Saxons are better at producing new ideas. Why? Because in the U.S. and in Great Britain, there is a good interaction between the world of decision-makers and the academic world, which does not exist in continental Europe." Things are changing though. Several observers indeed noted in our survey that the sector is catching up with the Anglo-American trend, i.e. academics who focus on European issues are more involved in policy work, their research is more driven by news agendas, and they are increasingly reaching out for partnerships and funding with outside organisations, not unlike the corporate sector. This is particularly visible in France, which perhaps has more catching up to do,[125] but the same trend is present in other European Member States. Everywhere in Europe academic research institutes tend to work increasingly like independent institutes on

issues related to Europe, to reach out for partnerships, raise funds, and generally compete on the same turf for contracts and attention.

Is this an opportunity or a threat for independent research organisations? According to the academics interviewed, it can be an opportunity for both sides if they retain their specificities. Such synergies will be allowed if public research is given the means to be independent through a combination of appropriate long-term public funding, as well as competition and cooperation with think tanks and other organisations on project work. On the other hand, think tanks face growing competition from universities for E.U. funding for 'networks of excellence' and other research projects under Framework Programme VI (FP6) as they often do not have the critical mass of researchers, or indeed the finance, that universities enjoy. Independent research institutes have, therefore, found it very difficult to win bids for FP6 money. Indeed a brief glance at the list of current FP6 projects shows that there are very few think tanks presently involved.[126]

OTHER PERCEIVED CHANGES : INCREASED COMPETITION, RECRUITMENT, GLOBALISATION

A few think tanks mentioned other threats : increasing competition (discussed as a strategic issue in Section 4.2.3), difficulties to recruit (a consequence of funding difficulties), and changing political contexts.

Increasing competition between think tanks, due to a recent influx of new entrants, was indeed mentioned by several respondents. These new think tanks are described as "smaller", "more flexible", having "greater specialisation on issues", and mostly working on "short-term projects." Competition is expected to increase as national independent research institutes with a generalist agenda that do not yet study European issues thoroughly are expected to do so increasingly in the future. A specific challenge at the European level is the difficulty to have sufficient resources to be relevant in the context of an ever-growing European Union. For a German institute, this factor, in addition to funding problems, signals the possible decline in favour of networks of research centres.[127]

Competition from new substitutes outside the sector is also increasing. Another German research centre sees a threat and an opportunity for think tanks in the fact that "political decision making is more and more influenced by external advice not from within ministries but from private expertise." Competition comes from bodies such as institutional think tanks, in particular in Germany.[128] An Estonian organisation for instance told us: "Reduced public financing is leading to greater competition for contract research from government agencies. Policy-makers prefer shorter studies, which are not funded as well, and they often create commissions to conduct studies instead of commissioning a research think tank." With the disadvantage in some cases that independent think tanks may be unpopular because "very critical to bureaucratic institutions." Academic research centres are also more actively involved in contract research and applied policy research. National academic institutes are developing at the EU-level, by recruiting European students and professors, and by networking. The French CEPII has for instance produced a number of papers that proved influential at the European level.

Overall, there is a feeling that the policy-making environment, in certain areas and certain countries, is somewhat crowded. Obviously, this increase in the number of actors and the exposure of existing think tanks to other players is strengthened by the fact that "think tank networks are expanding beyond the borders of nations and regions." Globalisation, enlargement, and the increasing use of information technology reinforce this trend, by allowing actors to reach audiences across borders, as is shown by the increase in joint projects between institutes from various Member States and the active presence of E.U. branches of large U.S. think tanks.[129] "Competition is increasingly international," summarises an Austrian think tank. This competition is both a fight over limited resources (funding, researchers, etc.), audiences, and ideas.[130]

A handful of independent research institutes also mentioned their difficulties in attracting competent researchers because of funding difficulties. The situation seems to vary from country – and probably topic – to country. The same Austrian think tank told us that its "main challenge is to have a very good group of very well-trained young researchers." In Latvia, because of insufficient funding, "leading researchers get tired, [they] cannot afford many assistants." Even with sufficient funds, the inability to recruit and pay good salaries was highlighted by one of the largest think tanks, which deplores how the best and brightest prefer going to the private sector or emigrating to the United States. In addition, some countries suffer from a lack of interest in E.U. matters.[131]

Finally, some think tanks deplored the fact that the E.U. political agenda affects their research capacity. Security issues for instance are prominent at the moment and receive relatively more funding, while others are somewhat neglected, such as more technical issues. Similarly, transatlantic relations have been the subject of greater attention in the recent past, to the benefit of think tanks specialised in international relations.

4.2 Dilemmas and strategic choices

How are think tanks adapting to the development of the environment in which they operate? In the EU, perhaps more than in other regions, think tanks are facing a number of strategic dilemmas, which will shape their future efficiency and credibility. We have come across essentially three :

- The preservation of their independence and intellectual credibility in the face of the possible pre-eminence of advocacy and the growing need for communication and influence.
- The ambition of think tanks to communicate both with public authorities and the general public, at a time when the European democratic deficit is being criticised.
- The issues and methods involved in possible co-operation between think tanks, in the context of the growing competition mentioned previously.

4.2.1 INDEPENDENCE, ACADEMIC RIGOR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE

It is impossible for us to determine the level of independence with which research is conducted by the think tanks surveyed, and one has no reason to doubt think tanks' genuine concern for independence. The importance attached to independence however raises a number of questions which condition European think tanks' future credibility, some of which are exacerbated by current trends in the EU, while others are valid for think tanks around the world. A number of pressures exist which serve to thwart the legitimate aspiration of think tanks to be scientifically rigorous in their work and independent at the European level. These include :

- An apparently growing tension between techniques of influence and advocacy on the one hand, and intellectual rigour and credibility on the other.
- Practical constraints which limit their room for manoeuvre, notably the constant competition for grants and contracts mentioned above.
- The need to cultivate a certain proximity to political elites.

In the first place, because the number of advocacy tanks is growing and because the environment in which they operate requires a greater capacity for communication and influence, European think tanks today have to learn to combine academic rigour on the one hand with advocacy and techniques of persuasion on the other. At a general level, the notion of a strict respect for academic criteria in research, which most of the independent research institutes in Europe espouse (see Section 2.1), contrasts at first glance with the requirement of influence. Are advocacy and scientific rigour therefore incompatible? And to what level of independence can European think tanks legitimately aspire today? [132]

The different positions currently adopted by European think tanks illustrate the degree to which think tanks are hesitating between the traditional academic model of research and the realities of a sector where advocacy seems to be gaining ground. The box below on the Centre for European Reform shows how an advocacy tank can be both credible and influential and represent, in the eyes of numerous observers within as well as outside the sector, a model of the synthesis between these differing aspirations.[133]

The recipients of think tanks' work do not perceive the primacy given to independence in the same manner. Several observers of the sector point out that it is not absolutely necessary to be ideologically neutral or academically orthodox in order to be credible. A European journalist argues that an absolute independence is not crucial in itself: "It doesn't have to be a problem as long as you know where people are coming from (…), generally people are reasonably upfront." He adds that he has "no evidence that anybody has sold out on account of their funding". His colleagues share his views. Within the framework of this survey, some even expressed a wish that think tanks would become more partisan. One of them even insists: "That a think tank has political commitment and values, and takes an identifiable position is a good thing, it stimulates the debate."[134]

More generally, numerous recipients of think tanks' work state that it is beneficial for them to be clearly identified with a theme or a cause and to know how to communicate effectively with the media.[135] In addition, one of the academics interviewed believes that influence must be conceived of over the long term. According to him, managers of research institutes must become true "policy entrepreneurs", whose efforts respond to current political themes as well as the political agenda, and are measured over the duration. A good think tank must therefore ensure that its initial proposals remain relevant in the "after sales" period and that they are updated according to the opportunities of the moment.

"That a think tank has political commitment and values, and takes an identifiable position is a good thing, it stimulates the debate."

Perhaps the apparent contradiction between influence and advocacy on the one hand and independence on the other can be explained by the fact that historically at the outset the sector was dominated by organisations of an academic type, but that today this is no longer an accurate reflection of the state of the sector? Perhaps it corresponds as well to an idealised vision of the role of the social sciences in politics, one of whose goals is seen as contributing to the rationalisation of public affairs?[136] This search for independence is in any case complicated by the material constraints which think tanks face, a source of tension underlined by virtually everyone working in this sector. We have measured the degree to which diversity and the balance of funding sources are a guarantee of think tanks' scholarly independence and how being inclined toward a more political and advocacy-based approach can compromise contacts with future funders.[137]

As a result, "they're all partial to a certain degree," according to a journalist. Without firm data to confirm this, this respondent felt that "it's possible that there could be some measure of self-censorship going on, a reluctance to criticise things in the institution" among think tanks financed by the European Commission. Few indeed have a diverse enough and sufficient stream of funding that they can ignore the desires of their donors, and there is no guarantee that all donors are equally magnanimous and fair in giving think tanks complete autonomy. In fact, policy-makers in government have an interest in think tank activity as targets of think tank influence. In many cases, one can note the clear correlation between think tanks' sources of public funding and their primary targets of influence. We are not questioning think tanks' desire to maintain their independence, nor are we suggesting that public authorities use funding to influence think tanks, but we are contrasting the emphasis placed on independence with the realities of advocacy and funding in today's European think tank market. Importantly, the same dilemmas exist, of course, for think tanks funded by the corporate sector.[138]

A third source of tension for think tanks is the necessity of cultivating close links with the government of the day, while at the same time maintaining enough distance to ensure their long-term credibility. Although CER is perceived as being close to the Labour Party and the Blair Government, it seems nonetheless to have been able to preserve its independence and credibility. Demos, described by a French journalist as "the faded dream of "Cool Britannia" " (Le Corre, 2004) has perhaps been less successful at managing this relationship.[139] Contracts with public authorities create as well a risk of "vampirisation". According to an academic

specialising in E.U. affairs : "There is a risk when studies are prepared that they will be biased because of the results which are expected. One moves then from a think tank approach to that of "spin doctoring" and media massaging, which perhaps enables one to sell an idea initially, but will create only disillusion in the long term. There are too many obliging studies at the European level."

This is a classic dilemma and considered as ordinary by most think tanks, which have understood, like pressure groups, that influence over the long term requires balanced contacts with different political families. Despite a lack of systematic data, one can eventually note (see Section 2.1.9) how a fair share of researchers evolves between think tanks and positions as public or elected officials. Some are on leave from the European Commission or national governments, others seek public appointments. Without questioning the integrity of these researchers, there are doubtless complex loyalties that shape the attitudes and priorities of a number of researchers in think tanks.

There exists, finally, a danger of instrumentalisation of think tanks by political leaders. Think tanks are in fact very careful about the risk of losing their independence if they are associated or financed too much by public authorities (cf. conclusion Section 3).[140] In this respect, we can note politicians' recent interest in these organisations as evidenced by the study carried out by the French Permanent Representation in Brussels (Féat, 2004).

The important notion of independence clearly raises difficult questions of definition and implementation. As the same journalist quoted earlier told us : "How important is it to be independent? What type of independence counts ?" Faced with a sometimes abstract notion of independence, we observe the emergence of a vision which is pragmatic and balanced. This is illustrated by CER, which successfully combines innovation, intellectual rigour, and a capacity to exert influence through advocacy. This discussion has outlined the conditions which are necessary for a mutually beneficial co-operation between think tanks and public authorities. If independent research institutes wish to develop their potential for action in a context of increasing competition, they will need to reflect strategically on their positioning.[141]

CASE STUDY

The Centre for European Reform, a credible and influential advocacy tank

Today, the CER successfully combines research and the production of influential policy ideas with a certain proximity to its national government and a clear agenda. Is it an example to be followed? The CER indeed has a mission, it is "a think tank devoted to improving the quality of the debate on the future of the European Union." It provides a "forum for people with ideas to discuss the many political, economic and social challenges facing Europe." In a country where Euro-scepticism is rampant, the CER "is pro-European but not uncritical." Its objectives are in a sense similar to Tony Blair's agenda of reforming Europe by engaging more actively with its institutions and partners. Like Tony Blair, it has also tried to build a bridge between Europe and the United States. As *The Economist* concludes, it "manages to be both Atlanticist and Europhile." It is in fact described as very closely engaged with the New Labour government. Le Corre (2004) describes how Charles Grant, current Director of the CER and a "refined Blairist", has the ambition to use the CER to help the U.K. regain its respectability within the E.U. through conferences and "high quality publications."

According to Le Corre, “CER is characterised by a skilful dosage of specialisation and public communication, thanks in part to a regular presence in the press.” This is indeed confirmed by the journalists and decision-makers interviewed who place the CER among the very few E.U. think tanks that add value to current thinking about European policies. Today, after only six years in operation, the CER is widely acknowledged as "a think tank with an increasingly influential role in the shaping of official policy."[142] It is the only think tank which was mentioned in nearly all answers to the question "which E.U. think tanks do you believe have influence today," throughout the E.U. What is the secret behind such success?

"They [CER researchers] can be relied on to say something that is concise and clean," according to a E.U. media correspondent. Besides the CER's qualities as a reliable source of good quotes for the media, several European Commission officials cited the CER as one of the only think tanks which "occasionally produces some excellent papers, even if [we] don't agree with what they say," thanks to a virtuous circle of quality work and quality researchers, which users are ready to pay for and which gives the CER greater resources and organisational independence. Another believes that it is its practice of testing ideas before publishing them. Another E.U. official questions whether it is not in the nature of their proposals to be easily accepted: "At the Centre for European Reform, they are influential because they are good, that is undeniable, but it is also because they propose things which are easy to buy in European politics! A priority for the national, liberalism, an avoidance of trouble with the United States, and not arguing in favour of more European Union, this is not choosing the path of greatest risk today." On the other hand, an academic who specialises in E.U. matters argues: "What characterises a good think tank is the ability to massage its ideas over the long term. In terms of content, the CER is good at disseminating the main ideas of Blair's policies, because it is persistent."

According to CER staff, six reasons lie behind the organisation's success: (1) the CER is independent from E.U. institutions which allows it to be more critical; (2) it aims for what is plausible when proposing policy even though it also tries "to do some 'blue skies' thinking;" (3) its views on Europe are close to those of the current U.K. government; (4) it seeks to "make its publications readable" and "get presentations right" through "simple language, but also glossy covers;" (5) it has cultivated a strong team that has been working together for several years and "enjoys the challenge;" and (6) it knows how to "work the media," which "creates a virtuous circle because corporate funders equate this with influence and want to fund you more."

The CER is an interesting example of a trend toward smaller think tanks that are privately funded. It gives hope to others that a presence in Brussels is not a prerequisite to be listened to on European matters. Sector observers will want to watch its ability to retain the same level of audience the day they are no longer "within the tent."

4.2.2 THINK TANKS AND THE 'DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT' : THINK TANKS' ROLE BETWEEN PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL ELITES

We have examined which audiences think tanks seek to target overall (section 2.1.5) and have provided elements of information and analysis regarding the role played by E.U. think tanks in European politics throughout this report. Beyond the factual elements of information provided so far lies the question of how they and other parties perceive this role, considering in particular the importance of the notion that a 'democratic deficit' between the institutions of the E.U. and its citizens exists. As we asked in Section 1.3, do European-focused think tanks and policy-makers believe that they have a role to play in bridging the E.U. 'democratic deficit' ?

The former indeed are preoccupied with this issue, which is reflected in how they present themselves. Many, both in Brussels and in the national capitals – and not just the ones that are explicitly pro-European – claim that they have a role to play, which they referred to spontaneously in interviews.[143] Generally, many think tanks seek to bring together not only experts and policy-makers, but also the general public. Some aim to provide a place for dialogue for citizens, policy-makers and experts. Member of the European Parliament Olivier Duhamel, founder of the forthcoming think tank Europhilia, to be launched in Paris in the fall of 2004, wants to use the media deliberately to reach popular audiences and seek peoples' views about Europe, including in less favoured environments.[144]

This trend is also reflected in the large share of think tanks that claim that they target both public opinion and civil society alongside decision-makers and the media. This claim is clearly valid concerning "third sector" actors, where cooperation through joint publications, conferences, and other events with NGOs, trade unions, industry representatives, academia, etc is clearly extensive. It is far less obvious that the research and dissemination efforts of think tanks involve, or are targeted toward, the general public. Unlike organisations such as the European Movement of Friends of Europe (see Case Study) which seek to involve the mass public in E.U. affairs, few think tanks organise events that include members of the general public. Even fewer seek to include contributions from members of the public in their research production, as Europe 2020 recently did.[145] Finally, think tanks' mobilisation during the European Parliamentary elections of June 2004 demonstrates their interest in democratic participation at the E.U. level. Our survey also revealed a growing number of think tanks that are interested in comparative European studies of left-right political issues.[146]

In reality, most think tanks, by nature, focus their efforts and limited resources on communicating with policy-makers. In this perspective, policy-makers are quite legitimately their prime objective (Section 2.1.5). For the large majority of research centres, changing – and even more so, reflecting – people's perceptions is, understandably, either a secondary objective, albeit important for some, or a strategy to influence their core target, i.e. policy-makers. In fact, it could be argued that the criticism by external observers that E.U. think tanks are "elitist" and "speaking largely to themselves" reflects the gap between reality where think tanks have limited resources and focus on a small community of E.U. policy-makers and an abstract and more ambitious vision of their work, cultivated by certain actors in the

industry. There is indeed a contrast between the perception some think tanks have—or wish to shape—of themselves and their contribution to E.U. politics on the one hand in the debate over the E.U. 'democratic deficit', and their actual objectives and the reality of their work on the other hand. Their use of the media helps illustrate this contrast. Take for instance a Brussels-based think tank which told us that its "main target is the media, in order to shape public opinion and the policy agenda," insisting that its "prime target is voters, citizens." This organisation has indeed published to date a significant number of articles and op-eds, but in newspapers which arguably reach only a well-informed and small share of the E.U.'s 453 million citizens : the Financial Times, Bloomberg, the Wall Street Journal Europe, Reuters, Handelsblatt, and other similar titles.

CASE STUDY

Friends of Europe, a quasi-think tank bridging the E.U. democratic deficit by satellite?

Friends of Europe is an E.U. policy forum which objective is to "stimulate new thinking on the future of Europe and to broaden the E.U. debate." Although not included in our survey because without in-house research capacity, FoE seeks to provide new ideas and approaches to E.U. policies. Interestingly, FoE experimented between June 23 and 27, 2004 with an online forum by satellite, "the first Europe-wide debate on reforming and streamlining the E.U. institutions and its decision-making mechanisms." FoE linked citizens from the 28 countries participating in the Convention through a series of seven high-profile videoconferences across the continent in partnership with leading think tanks.

FoE's website reports : "This event, organised in partnership with the European Commission and T-Systems, enjoyed the full support of the Secretariat of the European Convention (…). Convention President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Friends of Europe trustee and Convention Vice-President Jean-Luc Dehaene, both took part in the debates and answered questions from audience members around Europe. Advanced satellite technology allowed groups of four countries to engage in debate at any one time. The resulting TV quality images were broadcast daily by Europe by Satellite (EbS) and all debates could be viewed live on the Internet." FoE Secretary General Giles Merritt told us: "The result was quite remarkable, somebody in Lisbon could put a question to somebody in Helsinki. This whetted our appetite. We then launched transatlantic satellite debates, which occur on a monthly basis. They will likely be picked up by national TV."

Do E.U. think tanks really try to speak to the masses ? Why such a contrast between their proclaimed ambitions and what they actually achieve ? How much is the public affected by think tanks' activities and ideas? How much of an impact do they have in promoting a dialogue on E.U. issues ? These are very difficult questions to answer, although the example of the Lithuanian think tank highlighted in the Case Study below and our discussion of performance measurement provide some elements of information.[147]

On the other side of the policy making fence, we highlighted in Section 3.1 how the policy-makers and other observers we interviewed are at best sceptical about Euro-think tanks' capacity today to contribute to E.U. institutions' democratic challenge. Overall, it is unclear whether European 'brain boxes' have a role to play in bridging the E.U. 'democratic deficit'. Which is their natural constituency, or 'user group' : policy-makers only, or policy-makers and voters? Is their claim that they help widen the debate about the E.U. and represent citizens' views valid? Should they be encouraged to play a more active role in connecting with E.U. citizens, within and across national borders ? Our feeling is that this issue is possibly a distraction from think tanks' core contribution to E.U. policy making and that a fuller answer would require further research.

CASE STUDY

The Lithuanian Free Market Institute measures its reputation amongst the public

If Estonia is often considered the most European of the Baltic States, Lithuania is without doubt the boldest, as a recent public consultation undertaken by the Lithuanian Free Market Institute (LFMI) shows. LFMI was created in 1990 in order to promote classic liberal ideas, based on the principals of individual responsibility and freedom, the free market and the cutting back of the State. This was at a time when Lithuania was not officially independent and was still under Soviet control. Dynamic and innovative, the LFMI works closely with the business world, international financial institutions, opinion-formers, and journalists. Thanks to its innovative proposals, the media are paying increasing attention to the institute. The institute believes that its work has had a positive impact on people's lives in Lithuania. It is perceived by at least one famous Lithuanian journalist to be a model of dynamism.

One of the LFMI's interesting practices has been the launching of a study aimed at better evaluating the institute's true reputation and the impact of its work within Lithuanian society. As far as we know, such an exercise has never before been conducted by a think tank in Europe. The study was carried out by TNS Gallup in October 2003 in the form of a survey of a representative cross-section of the population. It found that more than one-third of Lithuanian citizens know of LFMI. LFMI and its activities are known above all amongst those most directly concerned with their work, particularly university academics (80 per cent).

More surprisingly, this study permitted an evaluation of what LFMI represents in the eyes of the public. Besides the expected answer that it stood for free market ideas, one third of those who had heard of LFMI thought that it represented the interests of Lithuanian consumers, citizens and business (several answers were possible). 69 per cent of those who knew LFMI had total or partial confidence in the organisation. The majority of those who know LFMI were aware that it was a non-governmental and non-profit organisation. It is interesting to note that none of the people surveyed considered LFMI to be a political organisation.

This type of survey demonstrates the potential for studying a think tank's reputation, its credibility and influence among the wider public, and helps to identify whether a think tank has met the expectations which it has set itself in its mission, while keeping in mind that the credibility of such a survey depends to a large extent on the methodology used.

To consult all the results of the survey go to : www.freema.org/About/Survey.phtml

4.2.3 DEVELOPING SYNERGIES IN A CONTEXT OF INCREASING COMPETITION

As noted previously (Sections 2.1 and 2.2), the number of think tanks that specialise in European issues as well as of new substitutes is growing. Because they are - mostly - non-profit organisations, operating often in different environments but on similar issues, sometimes with a similar ideological agenda (Section 2.1), European think tanks dedicated to E.U. matters face simultaneously the question of competition and collaboration with their peers. Oster (1995) argues : "In the non-profit area (…), in addition to the structural analysis of how many and what kind of organisations are in the market, in non-profit markets we will typically also want to know something about the nature of relations among those organisations." This tension between cooperation and competition is indeed likely to shape think tanks' operations in the coming years. This section seeks to answer more particularly the following two questions :

- Do the Euro-think tanks analysed consider themselves as peers or competitors and how real is competition today?
- What future strategies could they adopt?

"THE MORE, THE BETTER..." [i]

On the one hand, steadily decreasing public funding and a growing number of think tanks mean greater competition at the national and E.U. levels. E.U. think tanks fight, broadly speaking, for the same audiences, which capacity to absorb their production is not boundless. At least on the public side, they compete largely for the same national and E.U. funding sources. They face the same problem for media attention, with European issues that typically generate little media interest. Logically, the majority of think tanks, as noted in Section 4.1, perceives competition as an issue. Overall, there is a feeling that "not everybody is going to survive, there will be some real changes," as summarised by the head of a large French 'thinking cell'. Yet, co-operation is also very much on the agenda. We have seen in Section 2.4 that networks of think tanks have emerged in the recent past and how think tanks initiate either institutional partnerships or occasional joint initiatives.[148]

Without clearer data, it is difficult to identify a clear trend toward greater co-operation or more intense competition, only to confirm that both strategies are present. It is not possible either at this stage to determine whether the policy-making environment is overcrowded for European think tanks or not. Most complain that their funding base is too narrow, that new entrants therefore logically present a threat for most, yet many observers concurrently feel that the community is underdeveloped as mentionned above. This report agrees with an academic interviewed that "fundamentally, the onus is on think tanks," and more specifically that:

- The current coverage of issues is limited, as indicated before. The emergence of Jean Pisani-Ferry's think tank dedicated to macroeconomic policy issues and his ability to develop successfully a sound funding base so far is not only testament to his personal qualities, but also to the fact that there is room for development within the sector.
- Think tanks need to learn how to develop their funding base. Relying for the most part on public funding, many have not actively sought partnerships beyond traditional supporters. Some of the think tanks surveyed are leading the way in this regard, and discovering that obstacles to private funding are not so much a question of fiscal and regulatory constraints as they previously believed, but more of culture on both sides.
- If think tanks are to be better funded, then they must also respond to many of the criticisms which people make of them today. Section 3 showed how external parties consider that think tanks are overall not good enough at communicating their work and at producing innovative ideas for which they would be willing to pay more. A journalist suggested that something simple that research centres should do is send on a regular basis an up-to-date list of experts within think tanks and their fields of expertise, which would allow journalists to know whom to call when investigating a particular issue.[149] It can be anticipated that the think tanks that will prosper in the

[i] Interview with the Intercollege, Cyprus

future will be those that succeed in initiating a virtuous circle of quality work, recruitment of the best researchers, media strategies that promote their work, and transnational influence.

- Despite competitive challenges and the limits of co-operation, Euro-think tanks can foster greater exchanges. In our interviews, most managers welcomed the entry of new players onto the market, for its positive effects on quality, because it "keeps think tanks alive," and because "with more think tanks you raise the general dynamic and then you can attack the funding problem and companies see it is in their interest to help." Many however, even among the better-established ones, appeared mistrustful of think tanks recently created.[150] While certainly not the case for all the think tanks, this negative attitude regarding competition was nonetheless confirmed by the representatives of a new organisation, who criticise the tendency of some of their "seniors" to call for innovative policies in their research, but not to encourage it in their own sector. This type of attitude may exist elsewhere (Gadault, 2004), since others are suspected of "wanting the death of [their] competitors", and being liberals "who love a monopoly". Some people also condemn in France an "uncomradely state of mind" – an attitude which probably exists elsewhere – and a "lack of willingness on the part of French think tanks to work together to publicise better their achievements. Even if it means continuing and deepening a crisis which they [themselves] are debating." (Gadault, 2004)

Therefore, in our view, the perception of competition today is misleading, despite a recent rise in the number of independent research institutes and the very real challenge of accessing funds.

EMERGING STRATEGIES IN THE FACE OF GROWING COMPETITION

In line with the previous comments, Euro-think tanks today are considering – and for some should perhaps consider – five main types of strategies to prepare for the future. Think tanks :

1. Cultivate private sources of funding strategically and actively.
2. Develop performance measurement tools.
3. Welcome new entrants and develop synergies through networks and cooperation.
4. Consider greater focus and perhaps further specialisation.
5. Develop a better awareness of potential audiences.

DELIBERATE FUND-RAISING : First of all, it is a matter of urgency for think tanks to develop their funding base beyond traditional sources, with a proactive strategy. While this is clearly "easier said than done," few players on the market surveyed here have overcome their cultural reluctance to engage in this type of activity and have in fact begun such a process, by appointing a development / fundraising manager from the private sector, by developing a marketing strategy, and by approaching the private sector systematically, both corporate and individual donors for donations rather than project work. This is in the interest of the sector as

a whole, which is relatively unknown beyond limited policy making communities. In this perspective, the current mass media's interest in the think tank sector is an opportunity.

DEVELOP PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT TOOLS : Trends in the non-profit sector in the United States show clearly that non-profit organisations, as they seek greater private support, need to demonstrate that they have performance measurement mechanisms in place in order to justify the funds received and generally monitor their activities. Here also the easy reply would be "easier said than done." It is indeed, as noted before, very difficult to measure policy influence. Some organisations might even be reluctant, and legitimately so, to position themselves as seeking to influence policy or the public one way or another. Measuring performance does not imply changing an organisation's ethics though. Practical and philosophical reasons should not prevent Euro-think tanks from developing concrete, simple tools to monitor and improve the value of their activities with regards to their own mission. While this issue deserves further, more detailed research, one can note that performance and impact measurement for think tanks can be attempted, as the following two examples encouragingly indicate.

Recently, an Estonian institute presented on its website its efforts to measure its performance.[151] This example is not unique. The International Development Research Centre (IDRC), a Canadian public corporation which supports the efforts of researchers from developing countries in order to create "more healthy, equitable and prosperous" societies, carries out frequent strategic evaluations of the impact of its research on public policies (Lindquist, 2001).[152]

DESPITE COMPETITION CHALLENGES, WELCOME NEW ENTRANTS AND DEVELOP SYNERGIES THROUGH NETWORKS AND CO-OPERATION : The authors of this report agree with Intercollege Cyprus that "the more, the better." On the E.U. marketplace of ideas and think tanks, there is considerable scope for new entrants, greater co-operation, and a further co-operation in order to develop synergies on research topics that attract think tanks' attention most. This is clear from the analysis of Euro-think tanks' research topics, but also from numerous interviews.

Furthermore, all Euro-think tanks studied, and most acutely 'Euro-specific' institutes, face the same dilemma, in theory at least: they need to stay close to their target audiences (primarily national decision-makers), local specialists and journalists, as well as funding sources, while taking an active part in European debates, accessing sources of information pertaining to E.U. policies, and sharing their research production with E.U. decision-makers.[153] Recent concerns regarding French Euro-think tanks' absence from Brussels demonstrate the importance of this question. In reality, unlike U.S. federal think tanks, the organisations analysed here operate simultaneously in two markets – national and EU – that overlap in more complex ways than the state / federal levels in the United States. More specifically, the question many face is whether to establish a presence in Brussels, and vice-versa for those based in Brussels, in order to be relevant at home and beyond their national audiences. Despite the ability to travel easily within Europe, this is an onerous solution few can afford. Only ten of the organisations surveyed (approximately) have in fact one or more international offices. Very few, such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, have offices around the world (90 countries).

CASE STUDY

The Centre for Economic Policy Research, Europe's first 'Think-Net'

Founded in 1983, the CEPR is a pan-European network of 650 economists, based in their home universities and carrying out research, which CEPR then publishes. It is run as a think tank from London. The staff numbers around 20; all are administrators and there are no in-house researchers.

CEPR's director sees distinct advantages of adopting this organisational structure compared to a traditionnal think tank. Ideas do not go 'stale' as can happen in ordinary think tanks. New input comes from people who work at the 'cutting edge' of their research field in academia. CEPR taps into this expert knowledge and is able to secure the services of researchers who already have a high level of academic credibility. The research agenda of CEPR is very much driven by the researchers themselves, although there are programme administrators who try to ensure that research is as policy-relevant as possible. The relationship also brings benefits for the academics in the network. They get the opportunity for their work to be read by a new and wider audience (policy-makers and the public, via the media). Being affiliated to CEPR can also enhance their reputation in the academic world. The one disadvantage of this model – which the director also recognises – is that it is harder to follow-up and respond to policy developments than it would be in a traditional think tank, because of course the contributors are also employed elsewhere.

CEPR disseminates its research in various ways: every year it publishes several hundred discussion papers and six larger research reports, as well as a bi-monthly newsletter. It organises research workshops and conferences for a selected audience (on average 50 per year), and lunchtime meetings, which are open to the public and the media (about 20 per year).

CEPR's influence was probably at a peak during the late 1980s and 1990s, when many of its core research areas like the Single Market and the single currency were high on the political agenda in Brussels. Now that many of these themes have been 'done', it is looking for equally relevant new avenues to pursue.

The head of one of the top three most successful E.U. think tanks dismisses such co-operation as "a load of baloney." Another sees think tank networks as "a waste of time (…), all we can expect out of it is a bit of mutual publicity." It is a fact that networks, as well as partnerships, can all too easily waste time and impose extra administrative burdens with limited returns. More respondents however were supportive of collaboration. We ourselves argue that synergies, either through formal partnerships, ad hoc projects, and networks such as the ones mentioned in Annex 2, are in fact the way of the future, in particular for smaller organisations which will have fewer resources in the competition for private funding. This will allow think tanks to tap into local knowledge, produce recommendations that are easier to implement across Member States and therefore be more influential. Considering most think tanks' insistence on "added value", this also makes sense as few institutes and researchers can specialise enough in specific topics to add such value. The CEPR (see Case Study) believes that a 'think net,' a different type of structure, has several definite advantages. Information-technology tools can help this trend.[154]

This report aims to foster such co-operation. However, if these networks are to succeed, they require a greater level of institutional support. For example, very few Member State governments fund them directly. Many think tanks do not have the resources to engage in these networks and often collaboration with other think tanks exists only on an *ad hoc* basis.

CONSIDER GREATER FOCUS AND, FOR SOME, FURTHER SPECIALISATION : A related issue to competition is the question of whether, and to what extent, think tanks should specialise on certain issues. At the E.U. level, we have stressed the overlap in Euro-think tanks' research efforts (Section 2.1.4). The general perception is that specialisation is a logical strategy and, for some, a constructive approach. This is already a reality because of funding difficulties. "Finding the right niche" is a matter of priority for most, and each think tank develops its specificity. According to the a German institute, in a context of competition, "you have to define the market you compete with, and to get a leading position in that market."

Interestingly, both journalists and decision-makers welcome think tanks that have a clear agenda and a real specialisation (which does not prevent them from rating generalist organisations such as the Centre for European Reform or the Centre for European Policy Studies among the most useful). A high-level Commission official argued for instance: "A think tank cannot specialise in everything. They should specialise more, they tend to be too scattered. A think tank should have some clear focus to be credible, and to be a little bit original in the long run.

Faced with these apparently contradictory views, an Italian respondent argued: "Decision-makers tend to change their agenda at a very fast pace, thus modifying their demands in terms of analysis. This means that think tanks need to have a very wide range of competences if they want to play a role and influence policies. Others argue against the dangers of over-specialisation that make the organisation more dependent on its operating environment and less susceptible to contribute to policy making by bringing together different perspectives from different fields of research. Specialised expertise also pitches think tanks against interest groups. Unfortunately they are often incapable of maintaining such a structure." While there is clearly room for multi-disciplinary research centres, Euro-think tanks may well need to cultivate their focus and perceived strengths. Greater specialisation may well be not only a matter of carving a comfortable niche market for individual think tanks, but may become a question of survival.

DEVELOP A BETTER AWARENESS OF POTENTIAL AUDIENCES : This is another area where think tanks can adapt further. Our study has shown that in many cases think tanks are missing the opportunity to improve their links with the public, the national and Brussels-based media, and national Parliaments. Of course, it will not always be possible for them to reach out to these audiences, as their limited resources may prevent them from doing this.

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[115] Nearly all French think tanks complained that French authorities provide too little support. The renowned Friedrich Ebert Stiftung said that it was "very much dependent on public funding, which goes down everyday." The Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale confirmed that in Italy too, "there is a slow but regular diminution of public funding."

[116] The Institute of Economics of the Academy of Science in Latvia struggles for instance with "projects that are cheap and short-term, so they need a lot of [them] to survive."

[117] Procedures for research contracts with the Commission are particularly criticised as unnecessarily complex. The head of a prominent Brussels-based think tank, which no longer participates in calls-for-tender,

complained vehemently that "the method of the Commission supporting think tanks and many other not-for-profit organizations is, to put it bluntly, crazy, because what's happening is that they're tying organisations up in red tape. The cost of servicing Commission funding is high and at the other end, some of the money in the first place is exceeded several times in the cost of the bureaucracy to manage it." The Centre for International Relations described how "in Poland, according to the latest legislation, a private person may give 1 per cent of his or her taxes to finance organisations such as think tanks, but the process is quite complicated and, moreover, people do not always declare their real income... The accession to the European Union offers new possibilities of financing by the Commission, but there also the procedures are complicated."

[118] In Slovakia, the Centre for European Policy warned of the "trade-off between the search for funding and independence." In Poland, the Foreign Trade Research Institute lamented its "dependence on private sponsors" as one of its main current challenges.

[119] A leading German think tank argues that over-reliance on dwindling public funds "prevents intellectual brilliance and provocative ideas from emerging." The IAI denounces the fact that cuts in public funding over the past few years imply that "the institute has to deal with contingent research commissioned by clients and has less space for general research projects."

[120] In Cyprus, Civilitas explained that the quest for funds imposes the "need for think tanks to be able to prove their direct relevance to policy making and the media. Some think tanks promote themselves in a cynical way, but they need to prove some real relevance. Do they have a role in society at large?"

[121] American institutes indeed have much larger budgets than their European peers, even the largest ones such as IFRI (2004: approx. €5m) : Brookings Institutions (2004 budget : $32m income), Urban Institute (2003 budget : $89 m), and even a more "modest" organisation such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University (2004 budget : $22m).

[122] "In 2001 R&D expenditure as a share of GDP in the E.U. was 1.98 per cent and is estimated at 1.99 per cent in 2002, as against 1.95 per cent in 2000. However, the gap with regard to R&D expenditure in Japan (2.98 per cent in 2000) and the United States (2.80 per cent) remained significant. The level reached by the Acceding Countries was 0.84 per cent in 2001." (Eurostat, 2004)

[123] These have increased from €2.759.593 in 2002 to €3.505.000 in 2004, European Commisison Budget, OJEC 23.2.2004

[124] Also an Irish think tank reported that they had advised policy-makers and researchers from Eastern Europe, who visited them prior to their country's accession to learn about how Ireland had adapted to the requirements of E.U. membership.

[125] Originally pure academic types such as the CERI and the CEPII are still distinct from their think tank peers such as IFRI and IRIS. There is a realisation among French academics that "Le modèle du statut de chercheur intouchable par son indépendance et le financement public sans obligation de résultat n'est plus possible. La raison pour laquelle les anglo-saxons ont des think tanks et pas nous, c'est la fonctionnarisation de la recherche, qui a disparue même en Europe de l'Est. Ce modèle est totalement incompatible avec celui des think tanks." French academics told us that they are increasingly involved in contemporary political debates and that financing mechanisms are changing, forcing academic centres to do more policy-oriented work, in particular for the State. "State funding is changing simply because the French education ministry has less money for research and allocates funds no longer on a multi-annual basis but year by year and topic by topic."

[126] Cf. for instance www.cordis.lu Part of the problem may lie with the fact that these projects require very specialised research capabilities, which think tanks often do not possess. Usually, to stand a chance of winning a contract, think tanks need to put in a joint bid with other think tanks. However, even this is not always enough: the manager of one, fairly influential, think tank network in Brussels said that his network had decided not to enter a bid during the last funding round because they simply lacked the capacity to do so.

[127] This view is shared by one of its national peers: "Stronger focus is placed on developing networks of researchers co-ordinated by the think tank. There are more and more international and European co-operations for joint studies."

[128] Think tanks based in Berlin face growing competition from small outfits. See Section 2.4 for further details on networks of think tanks. Although a high-level Commission official contradicted this idea by arguing that there is very little competition at the level of ideas, alleging that think tanks "produce the same papers." – "Advocacy tanks," born after WW2 in the United States, "are linked to particular ideological groupings of interests. (…) They tend to see their role in the policy making process as winning the war of ideas more than as a disinterested search for the best policies". They distinguish themselves from previous tanks for their relative independence from the academic world, "they are more often than not staffed with non-academics," their sources of finance, "draw disproportionately from sources linked to particular interests," and their research products, "likely to be closer to brief advocacy pieces than to academic tomes" (Abelson, 2002).

[129] See Annex 2 for further details on networks of think tanks.

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[130] Although a high-level Commission official contradicted this idea by arguing that there is very little competition at the level of ideas, alleging that think tanks "produce the same papers."

[131] A sister Austrian organisation believes that students show "a decreasing interest in E.U. affairs, may be specific to Austria." On the other hand, the founder of one of the largest E.U. think tanks in Brussels argued, "if you have money, finding people is not the problem. Finding young, bright people in Brussels is easy." This director did qualify his statement though by adding: "In Belgium, the tax structure makes it more difficult to recruit people in their forties, the E.U. salaries take them away."

[132] Intuitively, independence and intellectual rigour on the one hand, and political action on the other, appear contradictory. The normal perception is that political engagement by a research institute risks at the very least harming its image of neutrality and intellectual objectivity. As Smith (1991) highlights in his book about think tank activists, voters know that factual rigor is not essential to political effectiveness for savvy politicians like Ronald Reagan. He describes how "facts were true to Reagan if they harmonised with broad political ideals and if they worked, not to build an accurate description of the world, but to guide and shape political perceptions." Without intellectual independence, we can also think that the range of a think tank's message will not get beyond a narrow circle of converts. Park (2004) quotes David Blockstein, a senior scientist with the U.S. National Council for Science and the Environment, who "recognises that many scientists view even the least interaction with policy-makers as advocacy, and advocacy as anathema." (Blockstein, 2002) Everybody fears that the exactness of facts does not mix well with political reality. Political influence, like other forms of persuasion, means an adaption of one's message to suit the audience (policy-makers, journalists, specialists, and sometimes the general public). The political calendar is not always compatible either with the pace of scientific research. One of the fundamental differences between academic research institutes and "thought reservoirs" is exactly the ability of the latter to react and contribute rapidly to the policy agenda. Political efficiency, support for a theme and vision, and the adaptation of messages for different publics, shaped by the political agenda, are these ideas opposed to the princips and practices which guarantee the intellectual credibility of think tanks' work? Not according to Blockstein, who exhorts "his colleagues to share the fruits of their knowledge with decision-makers, and in doing so, to overcome their natural shyness and concerns about compromising their credibility." In doing so, he proposes six guidelines to help scientists give credible advice to policy-makers: "(1) follow the facts and tell the truth; (2) obey the rules of science (have your research peer reviewed, explain how you arrived at a conclusion, and present the margin of error); (3) present caveats; (4) identify uncertainty; (5) distinguish between uncertainty and guesswork; and (6) avoid hyperbole." These criteria should also help decision-makers identify credible research. Several managers of academic think tanks asserted that it was possible in their experience to conduct research oriented towards political action while also respecting the research criteria suggested by Blockstein. Advocacy and academic rigour are not therefore incompatible.

[133] The Robert Schuman Foundation in France is doing its best to make this synthesis. It works for the unification of the European continent and positions itself, in a flexible manner, on the centre-right, in continuity with the beliefs of Robert Schuman, while also carrying out an important amount of research, targeted above all at politicians, and as independent as possible from external influences. A certain number of think tanks are therefore doing their best to reconcile in practice the two approaches.

[134] At a time when Mr Barroso has promised to lead the European Commission "as a politician and not a technocrat" (Financial Times, 14 July 2004), and when the French MEP Alain Lamassoure is delighted that "for the first time, the Council has taken into account the results of the European elections, by choosing a person who belongs to the winning political party", some might argue that we are seeing a growing politicisation of European questions and institutions, which think tanks can participate in. This could allow for debates and policy at a level which is more accessible for European citizens. (This vision is nonetheless contested by other observers.)

[135] The experience of Initiative and Referendum Europe (Amsterdam) and the Lisbon Council for Economic Competitiveness (Brussels) is perhaps a reflection of this expectation. Both have had up to now an above-average exposure in the media and with policy-makers compared to other think tanks with equivalent resources. This is attributed to their identification of a specific set of problems, and to the constancy of their message, determined according to different themes in current affairs and types of activities.

[136] The advocacy and intellectual independence dilemma is not specific to Europe. In the United States, Park (2004) highlights how this dilemma has become more prominent with the rise of advocacy tanks, which, although also operating in the same space as policy research organisations, "have consciously rejected those very conventions of objectivity *in order* to become more influential and visible in policy making." The question she then asks is whether "a think tank derives its influence from its academic credibility" or whether it "becomes influential by renouncing academic credibility in favour of advocacy." She confirms, through a survey of several leading U.S. think tanks the intuitive conclusion that the answer is in fact "both." She also concludes in the United States that "academic credibility is not a requirement for one's research to be widely cited and influential", and yet that "influential think tanks are associated with some sort of credibility which is

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divorced from traditional academic credibility." She concludes that "there is room for both types of think tanks" and that, overall, credibility may be "understood as a fluid concept in policy making." The notion of credibility for outside observers of think tanks is indeed perceived very differently.

[137] Indeed, those that depend on a single or a limited range of sources of funding, or conduct mainly contract research most likely face certain constraints. The Institute for Public Policy Research in Great Britain illustrates how the quest for private contracts can affect the image of independence of a think tank.

[138] A larger number of corporate funders does make it easier for a think tank to preserve scholarly independence: for instance, the director of one privately-funded U.K. think tank said that the fact that his organisation had over 30 different corporate sponsors meant that if any one of these tried to interfere in their research, he would simply sack them. However, there is also a risk that if a think tank is *solely* funded by private money, its activities and output will end up reflecting the interests of business rather than the public as a whole. In fact, most of the think tanks in this survey funded wholly by business are also those promoting a free market agenda.

[139] This problem has also been experienced in part by the European Policy Forum in the U.K. (a think tank specialising in regulatory affairs), which was previously close to the Conservative Government but is now much less influential under Labour. It could also happen to other U.K. think tanks which have previously been labelled 'New Labour' think tanks.

[140] The Hungarian Centre for Economics and Politics claims that despite its links with Vaclav Klaus, they are not considered dependent on his party, which they do not hesitate to criticise. The Centre acknowledges however that Mr. Klaus, as the President of the Centre, can influence research and work priorities.

[141] Arguably, there is no one model which a think tank can pursue which will ensure complete independence. Think tanks which depend totally on public funding, in order to escape from corporate influence, will be *perceived* as being too closely linked to the state (especially as public funding inevitably requires a degree of public control over how that money is spent in the think tank, for example through the appointment of civil servants to the governing board). Furthermore, think tanks, such as those in the U.K., which eschew state funding in favour of 100 per cent support from the private sector will be accused of being too close to business interests. Therefore, the best balance would seem to be the one which many of the successful think tanks have already adopted: diversifying the funding base to include both private and public sector money (never from a single source), and also seeking long-term support from foundations.

[142] According to the *Financial Times*, quoted by the CER on its website.

[143] The recently-created Lisbon Council announces for instance in its mission statement that it seeks to help "private citizens understand the personal stake they hold in a better, more competitive Europe." Similarly, the core concern of Europe 2020, based in France, is "to promote the democratisation of the European Union." While such language seems mostly present in the literature of multi-disciplinary E.U. think tanks, it is also valid for some that are more specialised. ISIS Europe, in the field of security, claims for example that it "works to increase transparency, stimulate parliamentary engagement and broaden participation in E.U. and NATO policy-making."

[144] Confrontations Europe, based in Paris claims in fact to "have become an interface between society and E.U. institutions", not unlike the Portuguese Institute of International Relations which key objective is "to link academic research, decision-makers and civil society."

[145] This Paris-based think tank recently published a report, which brings together "the thousands of comments, criticisms and propositions expressed by the citizens who took part in the Newropeans Democracy Marathon," a series of one-hundred "debate-conferences" organised in a hundred towns in twenty-five European countries. *Fifteen Fundamental Principles and Reform Proposals for a Democratised Europe in the Coming Decades*, January 2004, available at http://www.europe2020.org/en/partnership/NFELTCP.htm.

[146] Examples would be the Policy Network, Centre for New Europe and the Stockholm Network. These organisations are increasingly focusing on the comparative aspect of many questions, previously discussed only at the national level, for instance the debate on health care, welfare state, and pension reforms in Member States, and also the discussion of how centre-left policy-makers can adapt their policies in response to globalisation.

[147] Other think tanks have conducted such polls in the past, e.g. the Adam Smith Research Centre in Warsaw asked the Institute of Opinion and Market Survey Estimator to analyse its notoriety in April 1998 (based on a sample of a few thousand Poles from across the country). The poll indicated that ASRC is recognised by almost 10 percent of the Polish population (cited by NIRA, http://www.nira.go.jp/ice/nwdtt/dat/1178.html).

[148] ELIAMEP in Greece in fact identifies a current trend toward greater cooperation and networking between think tanks across the E.U. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung also believes that "think tank development means more cooperation, to sit together and to see projects we can support, to create a common base."

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[149] "To receive, for example once a year, a list of this sort which would give me a reserve of people to contact for answers on specific European matters."

[150] The comments of one of the most important think tanks on the Brussels scene demonstrated, for example, how some organisations – including the well-established ones who have in principle the least to fear from competition – can be critical of new initiatives and overly sceptical, as if they wanted to discourage the creation of new, independent centres of research. There are however regional differences. All the Italian think tanks surveyed felt that competition is "not an issue" as there is a lot of collaboration between them, while German research centres stressed how competitive their relations were, as the density of EU-focused think tanks is greater in Germany.

[151] For further information: Institute for European Studies, http://www.ies.ee

[152] Doing its best to overcome the conceptual difficulties of measuring the influence which ideas from research have on policy, the IDRC worked with Evert Lindquist, a specialist on the policy decision-making process, in order to take stock of the knowledge and theories concerning the relations between research and its influence (Lindquist, 2001). On this basis, Lindquist concludes not surprisingly: "We should have realistic expectations about the potential for influence. Ultimately, whether in developed or developing countries, supporting policy inquiry is an act of faith: we build policy capacity not because we believe that there will be measurable and unambiguous impacts on government policy, but rather, because we believe that having more rather than less policy inquiry is better for furthering dialogue, debate, and the sharing of ideas from elsewhere. The majority of the ideas or innovations generated will never become policy or will get 'out-competed', for whatever reason, by other ideas or imperatives. Assessing policy influence, then, is typically about carefully discerning *intermediate* influences, such as expanding capacities of chosen actors and broadening horizons of others that comprise a policy network." His analysis describes the types of policy influence which research can hope to achieve and the different approaches which allow one to study this influence. On this basis, he proposes a framework for the strategic evaluation carried out by the IDRC's Evaluation Unit, which, despite the complexity of the task, does not necessarily lead to a complicated method of measurement. IDRC has notably arrived at the conclusion that *ex post* evaluation is not possible, because policy-makers do not tend to reveal where they have taken their ideas from. Only an *ex ante* analysis can offer satisfactory results. By following all the interactions between a think tank and policy-makers (meetings, telephone conversations, etc) and then trying to analyse the extent to which a civil servant or a politician has changed his/her opinion, one can try to assess the progress made in relation to the original objectives.

[153] A few independent research institutes told us that they do not wish to work outside their national capital.

[154] A Cypriot organisation has for instance decided "not to grow indefinitely, but "to keep it small and do as much as possible on the web in and from Cyprus."

5 Parting thoughts

This section outlines three types of question that emerge naturally after this overview of the Euro-think tank sector: can anything be learnt from recent developments in the United States about the future of the European sector ? (5.1) Can anything be undertaken to encourage Euro-think tanks' development ? (5.2) What issues might deserve further investigation ? (5.3)

5.1 Possible U.S. lessons for the future of Euro-think tanks

Forecasting the future of Euro-think tanks is not an easy task and not one we will attempt here, especially as the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty is in doubt in several Member States and European construction is still a work-in-progress in many respects. However, there are perhaps lessons to draw from the U.S. situation. We refer here in particular to two important characteristics of the American research community, its political and tax systems and the development of advocacy tanks.

The growth of U.S. and European think tanks

The growth in U.S. think tanks has been allowed primarily by the United States' specific institutional construction and its tax regime. Because of "the fragmented and decentralised nature of the American political system," (Abelson, 1998)[155] there are many different centres of power needing policy advice. Furthermore, political parties "have not played (in America) as prominent a role in policy development as they have in other countries." (Stone, 2000). Why? Because, as McGann and Weaver (2000) put it, "in the United States, political parties function primarily as campaign vehicles (…), party platforms often vary considerably over time, depending on the position taken by the party's presidential candidates." Consequently, party discipline is weak, "politicians are not constrained by the philosophical goals of political parties" (Abelson, 1998) and "members of the Congress formulate many of their own policy priorities and pursue their agendas with considerable independence." (Stone, 1996) It seems that there is considerable space for the single policy maker to seek her own political advice and ideological legitimation, which often happens to come from think tanks. Finally, in the United States, political parties are not a primary means of elite recruitment for administrative positions. "Parties are too weak to perform these functions since they are little more than electoral coalitions": think tanks can relatively easily fill the gap as 'party-like' institutions and clearing stations for political and administrative appointments. (Gellner, quoted by Stone, 1998) Overall, the particular shape of the American political system, fragmented and decentralised, with weak political parties, has created a wide number of policy fora, ranging from the various committees and subcommittees of the legislative and executive branches to the high number of politicians working independently from party ideology that provides opportunities for policy analysis and professional research. "Think tanks," argues Abelson, "are provided with multiple channels to convey their ideas to several hundred policy-makers."

A combination of high demand for policy advice with multiple channels of influence explains to a large extent the prominence of U.S. think tanks.

According to Stone (2000a) "in the USA it is not only political factors (…) but also a strong philanthropic culture and generous tax regimes that encourages the proliferation of think tanks." Abelson (in Stone, Denham, Garnett, 1998) and Weiss (1992) both argue that "the (decentralised and fragmented) nature of the American political system" and the presence of "a strong tradition of corporate and individual philanthropy" are clearly among the main factors characterising American think tanks. The tax system is also an important factor explaining the prominent role played by think tanks in U.S. policy making.[156]

Out of these two factors, Europe clearly offers many outlets for think tank research to blossom, which are likely to increase in importance as E.U. integration progresses. As discussed in Section 2.1.8, funding regimes are undergoing major changes that may bear some similarities with the U.S. situation and help promote independent policy research in the future. Possible evidence of this trend can perhaps be identified in the recent advent of what one might call 'start-up tanks', i.e. independent research centres created by young policy entrepreneurs with private funding, such as The Lisbon Council in Brussels. The Economist (2004) noted recently this new trend in Germany, where "some keen youngsters" have started their own outfits, such as BerlinPolis and the Global Public Policy Institute.

THE RISE OF ADVOCACY TANKS

Advocacy tanks have gained importance in the USA since World War II. Abelson (1998) explains: "In an environment where think tanks had to compete aggressively to promote their ideas, their priorities began to change: a new generation of tanks emerged." In other words, the factors of growth of American independent research centres were the pre-conditions to the birth of many institutes; their large number implied a high level of competition and meant that they had to distinguish themselves from one another. In order to achieve this result, "they realised that developing effective marketing techniques to enhance their status in the policy-making community had to become their priority," even before providing sound and impartial advice to policy-makers (Abelson, 1998). This has resulted in a sharp polarisation of their political and ideological positions. Indeed, the need to be easily recognised and, ultimately, to get research contracts forced them to make their positions sharper and, over time, unique. In Abelson's view, the law of competition ruling the market also requires specific marketing techniques.

As noted in Section 4.2.1, many Euro-think tanks may well be confronted with similar dynamics that will encourage the trend toward advocacy, in particular the reduction in governmental funding and therefore think tanks' need to rely more and more on private sources of funding and research contracts and to appear more focused on specific research areas and ideological currents.

THREATS – AND A FEW OPPORTUNITIES – ON THE HORIZON

Beyond further growth and an increase in 'advocacy tanks', recent changes in the operating environment of U.S. think tanks should also be watched, as they announce major threats, as

well as opportunities, for the European think tank community. They also put the possible strategies in the face of growing competition outlined above in perspective (Section 4.2.3). McGann (2004), in a recent survey of 23 of the leading U.S. think tanks, found that "those trends that are affecting think tanks are attributable to six overall changes in the environment (…): how think tanks are funded; an increase in partisan politics; technological developments and the dominance of the Internet; the emergence of an omnipresent media; a proliferation in the number of think tanks; and the impact of globalisation." Respondents highlighted major negative trends in a number of areas, in particular the handling of funding :

"Funding has become increasingly short-term and project-specific, rather than longer term, general institutional support, which has altered the focus and diminished the capacity of many think tanks. The short-term funds have challenged the independence and innovation of think tanks (...)" Similarly, "the omnipresent media with its focus on sound bites rather than sound analysis is driving think tanks to respond to its time and content parameters by producing quick, pithy analysis that is quotable, and accessible. The growth of the Internet has exacerbated the problem of funding, as think tanks increasingly publicize their research findings and policy advice online, providing free access to the public, the media, and potential donors. The independence and objectivity of think tanks is being challenged by an increase in partisan politics, from which a corresponding rise in partisan organisations and institutions that produce analysis along partisan lines has been identified."

McGann found that recent changes "have also provided opportunities for think tanks to advance their missions. The advent of the 24/7 media and the Internet have helped raise the profile of think tanks, enabled them to reach a larger more diverse audience and disseminate their publications more cheaply. The proliferation of organisations has facilitated greater cooperation between think tanks and other NGO's at the local, state, and international levels. This networking allows for the utilisation of new mechanisms to effectively influence policy and to reach larger audiences. Additionally, the impact of globalisation and unexpected transnational events such as 9/11 and SARS have ignited a greater interest in international affairs, foreign policy, and national security, allowing think tanks to increasingly focus on these issues. All these trends have been brought into greater focus during the 2004 presidential campaign."

Surely the threats to "the sustainability of think tanks as independent, reliable providers of sound public policy advice in the future," the opportunities to advance think tanks' role in policy making, as well as the recommendations of this survey – which was about to be published as ours was going to press – should be read with care in Europe also.

5.2 ENCOURAGING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THINK TANKS

The number and relevance of think tanks in Europe are likely to grow in the future. Can this trend be encouraged? The Euro-think tanks interviewed indicated two main avenues to promote their development.

First, many expressed their hope that public authorities and other policy-makers better understand their role in the decision making process. As stated simply by a Cypriot respondent, "it is important that the E.U. understands that think tanks have a role to play." For some, such as certain national governments and the European Commission, it will be a matter of improving existing practices; for others, it will be more of a revolution. Former European Commission President Jacques Delors for instance invites the European Central Bank, and even the European Parliament to engage more actively with think tanks. Most think tanks logically also call for greater public and private financial support, in particular at a pan-European level. The managers of the Euro-think tanks interviewed agreed that "where it is not yet possible, donations to think tanks should be allowed for tax deduction," and that E.U. funding procedures should be simpler. "You should give a sum of money to think tanks that appear to be doing a good job, then audit them periodically to see whether they are spending that money well, but you don't waste time on working out whether the 243 conditions have been satisfied," argued the head of a Brussels-based organisation. In this regard, the new Financial Regulation which requires that, as from 2006, all organisations wanting to get a grant from budget line 15 06 ("Dialogue with Citizens") will have to go through an official call for proposals procedure is worrying, considering their complexity.

In contrast, another French think tank manager believes that the process of weaning think tanks out of public funding is healthy and that it is up to think tanks themselves to mature and look for private sources, as suggested above. The same director argues that the fiscal regime, at least in France, is now satisfactory, but that think tanks and potential donors have not yet realised its full potential. He calls for a dramatic culture change on both sides of the decision-making fence.

"The fiscal regime, at least in France, is now satisfactory, but think tanks and potential donors have not yet realised its full potential. What we need is a dramatic culture change on both sides of the decision-making fence."

With regard to private funding, many think tank leaders call for a simplification of tax regimes and donation rules, in order to help the private sector provide financial support to think tanks. The promotion of foundations is a prominent aspiration. A Baltic think tank manager argues: "Most European countries are in growing need of private foundations that would be able to raise funds domestically and that would allocate part of them (among other organisations) to policy think tanks." There are however large differences between Members States. A French think tank, the Institut Montaigne (2002; see also Archambault, 2001) showed that there were barely 2.000 foundations in France in 2002, compared with 8.300 in Germany and nearly 9.000 in Great Britain. The Fondation Hippocrène (2001), in a similar study, made a number of recommendations for French authorities which are likely to be applicable elsewhere.[157] Both sides overall argue that while public funding is necessary and more of it is required in certain countries, over-dependence on public money is unhealthy. Private funding, if forthcoming, can help improve the quality of think tank research, under strict conditions of diversity and accountability in order to ensure that think tanks' research independence is in no way impaired.

The creation of a European statute for foundations and associations is also seen as a useful step to encourage pan-European work, as funding sources, whether private or public, are still largely national. This issue is currently under debate within the European Commission. Such a legal device could possibly solve part of the problems that European foundations are regularly confronted with, while dealing with transnational activities and international partners. It would help to "improve cross-border operations for foundations and their funders"; it would generate new instruments for cooperation between the foundations themselves; and it would establish equal rights for this kind of organisation in comparison with others, already enjoying community tutelage.[158]

We have seen as well the difficulties which think tanks face in maintaining their independence – or more importantly a perception of independence – when they are funded either by the private or public sector. Of course, it is very hard for think tanks to be completely free of external influence. One solution however to this dilemma could be for think tanks to be more open about their funding sources. Many think tanks covered in our survey do publish an annual report, which shows their income and lists their main donors. However, this was by no means the case for all of them. By making their funding sources more transparent, think tanks would not be harming themselves in the long run. It would enable people to see more clearly where a think tank's money comes from and then make their own decision about whether a think tank's independence is real or not. It would also arguably increase public trust both in think tanks as political actors and in their research conclusions. Trust is an important element in the public's attitude towards political bodies and think tanks need to recognise this if they are to dispel a certain public belief that they are elitist, undemocratic, or mere lobbying organisations. If a move towards more transparency was combined with a greater degree of independent and peer review of think tanks' work, it could also create a climate in which the quality of research in this sector was vastly improved.

Finally, we have seen in the course of the study that Euro-think tanks are increasingly being expected to form cross-border alliances with other think tanks, as well as a range of other actors. It has been shown that this enhances both their national and international status and is indeed a requirement for those think tanks wishing to bid for European Union funding. Much has also been made recently of the building of a single 'European research area' in order to enable 'scientific resources [to] be better deployed to create more jobs and to improve Europe's competitiveness'.[159] However, the think tank networks that have been set up in the E.U. to facilitate this aspect of think tanks' work (see Annex 2) are currently suffering from a major funding crisis. Most of the funding for these networks tends to be of a short-term nature and this is drastically limiting the ability of these networks to have an impact in the field of social science research. Therefore, we believe that a review of the current funding arrangements for these networks is needed and that Member States, as well as the European Commission, should be willing to give them greater financial support.

5.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

We hope that this exploratory survey and the many questions it raises will provide a good place to start for future research. Because of time constraints, we were not able to investigate fully the role played by think tanks with an interest in European affairs in E.U. and national decision-making processes. As we conclude this study, several issues emerge as topics that could be investigated in further detail, including the ones listed here.

First, for practical reasons, the scope of this survey was limited to think tanks with their headquarters based in the 25 E.U. Member States. Important organisations based in candidate countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey), as well as significant U.S. institutes' European branches were overlooked.[160]

For similar reasons, we were not in a position to investigate properly independent research institutes interested in European policy issues that have disappeared in the past. A more accurate and exhaustive study would include such organisations. It would be interesting in particular to understand which think tanks disappeared and what lessons can be learnt from their history.

Think tanks relations with decision-making structures deserve further investigation, in connection with a more systematic and deeper comparative analysis of their institutional and political environments. An area of interest that we did not investigate for instance is the circulation of decision-makers between think tanks and other areas of policy making. The formation of elites in E.U. policy-making and the role played by think tanks in this process is an important structuring factor that has been only mentioned in passing in this report. A comparative analysis of individual Member States and trends regarding issues such as the revolving door phenomenon would be interesting.

This survey did not aim either to analyse Euro-think tanks' contribution to policy making. Beyond their identification and description, it would therefore be interesting to look at their actual relevance and impact in further detail: what ideas do they actually promote in their research production?

More specifically, there would be great value in investigating performance measurement tools adapted to the complexities of think tank operations. A place to start could be to use electronic databases to analyse media coverage for prominent think tanks in relation to some of the issues raised here (as done by Park, 2004 in the U.S. case).

A question in fact this survey does not answer is: "how could E.U. think tanks think better?" While most think tank managers agree that new ideas and "added value" are defining characteristics of true think tanks, few could describe to us the methodologies used to enable "think tankers" to produce innovative policies.

More generally, all the issues this report touched on deserve more detailed research. Funding, as we have seen, is a key issue for the future of E.U. think tanks. In order to allow greater funding to be channelled to research centres around Europe, a more detailed investigation of their situation, of best practices, and of the regulatory and cultural steps that could be taken

to allow further development would be useful. Other topics that would deserve further analysis include think tanks' influence strategies (stage in the policy-making process, audiences, media relations, etc.) and best practices in terms of transparency and the management of conflicts of interest.

Obviously, the picture provided here will soon need to be updated. Developments to watch include the possible politicisation of E.U. knowledge and the trend toward greater advocacy; greater interactions with "new" institutions such as the European Central Bank; transnational collaboration between E.U. institutes and market restructuring in general and its possible impact on the reshaping of intellectual elites, the formation of political concepts, and the cross-fertilisation of national political agendas; changes in the academic world and their impact on independent research institutes.

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[155] In particular the peculiar separation of powers between legislative and executive "which allows both Congress and the President to initiate legislation"; the many divisions within the various departments of the executive itself ; and again, the fragmentation within the Congress where both the Senate and the House of Representatives operate independently when fashioning legislation.

[156] "The American tax structure encourages the formation of foundations; individual giving creates a massive source of funding for think tanks and other non-profit organisations." (Stone, 1998) Abelson (1998) agrees that "corporate financing and tax exemptions for non-profit organisations provide an impetus for policy entrepreneurs, political leaders and aspiring office holders to create think tanks." In other words, there is in the US a strong tradition of private sources associated with corporate or individual funding which, combined with the favourable classification of think tanks under the Internal Revenue Code, gives American independent research centres better access to private funds.

[157] The Hippocrène Foundation recommended for France a certain number of tax incentives inspired by the German, British and Italian situation, which are probably valid either in part or in whole for other Member States: the exemption from tax of foundations' income from property; lower tax on the profits of newly-created foundations, similar to the German model; the removal of the limit on the amount of income from donations which is tax deductible; a tax exemption for gifts benefitting these foundations. The foundation also recommended the simplification of the legal system applying to foundations. Finally, it stressed the need "for a discussion at the European level about the rights of foundations, and for a decision to be taken once and for all on a European statute for foundations." It is worth noting that the European Commission did publish a communication in June 1997 which focused on this question but that the issue had not progressed any further since then. Likewise, the proposal for a regulation which would allow the creation of a statute for European associations and the fiscal issues at stake in donations at a transnational level need to be considered. The Institut Montaigne (2002) made 25 proposals to develop foundations in France, centred on the modernisation of their legal framework, and on the development of finances which are sufficient and permit autonomy. The Institut Montaigne concluded more generally as follows : "The State will have to undertake a true psychological change and accept the principle of supporting the development of other actors which can act alongside it with same objective of the general interest." Without doubt these analyses, even if they still need to be deepened within a European perspective, go beyond the mere case of France.

. . . . . .

[158] In 2002, the European Commission set up a high level group of European company law experts in order to evaluate this question. At the end of the same year the Group concluded that the institution of a European legal form for foundations was not a short-term priority. Nevertheless, in May 2003 the Commission launched an action plan "aiming at assessing in depth the feasibility of such a statute" (COM (2003) 284 final). The plan foresees the completion of a feasibility study for such a European statute by 2006. In June 2004, the European Foundation Centre released a new proposal referring to the constitution of a European Association Statute during its Annual General Assembly, held in Athens. According to the EFC (www.efc.be), a new community regulation is at present particularly needed, since after the enlargement the number of foundations and associations with international cooperation links and cross-border activities has been increasing dramatically. In order to be recognised as a European foundation/association, an organisation should present the characteristics of a non-profit institution, dedicated to the public interest. Moreover, it should "carry out activities in at least two Member States and have a minimum starting capital of 50,000 euros". The European foundation would be registered at the community level and the European statute would be complementary to national law. As far as the financial regime is concerned, the new statute should guarantee "clear and user-friendly" rules regarding tax exemptions and tax incentives for donors. The EFC is organising a conference on June 4-6, 2005 on foundations in Europe.

[159] DG Research Communication Towards a European research area, COM (2000) 6 http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/i23010.htm

[160] In order to be even more complete, one might wish to look at U.S. and other policy research institutes' programmes on Europe, for instance the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe.

Conclusion

Euro-think tanks play a useful role in the process of European integration and for policy-makers in Europe in general. We have seen throughout this report how they fulfil many of the roles presented in Section 1, as do their peers elsewhere. They do indeed, to varying degrees, carry out "basic research on policy problems and policy solutions"; they provide "advice on immediate policy concerns that are being considered by government officials"; they evaluate government programs, they "serve as facilitators of issue networks and the exchange of ideas"; they "serve as suppliers of personnel to government and as a place for politicians and policy-makers who are out of power to recharge their batteries"; and they help interpret "policies and current events for the electronic and print media." They help make European democracy a reality by acting as incubators and facilitators of ideas.

Yet, we have also seen how the sector as a whole is strong in absolute terms (3,000 researchers represent nearly a fifth of the total staff employed by the European Commission!), but also relatively fragmented and isolated in the sense that not all its members are as effective at disseminating their research as they could be. Existing players face growing competition from within its own ranks and from new entrants, as barriers to entry to the 'marketplace of ideas' are relatively low. There is some overlap of issues. Public funding is decreasing; private funding is not yet taking its place. Corporate donors and foundations face obstacles to fund independent policy research at the E.U.-level and the sector itself has grown too dependent on public funding.

Meanwhile, think tanks face new dilemmas, as E.U. politics and think tank activities are becoming more partisan and they need to fight for media attention. Potential users of their work, decision-makers, journalists, academics, are not using think tanks to their maximum value. In many countries, the former still need to learn what a healthy think tank sector can contribute to policy-making and democracy.

While we found many pessimists within and outside the sector, we believe that there are encouraging signs that Euro-think tanks are in fact experiencing the beginnings of a new era. Decision-makers, both in the public and private sectors, indicate growing signs of interest, both in Europe and in independent policy research, even in very centralised France. The diversification of funding resources may in the future encourage greater research quality and innovation, if the corporate sector understands that it too should support the public mission services provided by think tanks, and if think tanks in turn are willing to open themselves up to greater financial scrutiny. This could in turn lead to greater private funding streams. Academics are also engaging more with their think tank colleagues and with other areas of applied research. Cooperation and other forms of exchange between think tanks at the E.U. level are increasing. Anglo-American mastery of media relations techniques is spreading.

The current changes in Euro-think tanks' environment may cause some casualties in the next few years, but many in the sector are also confident that, eventually, European think tanks will emerge stronger. After all, these are the organisations that specialise in analysing trends and drawing lessons for the future.

ANNEX 1 – LIST OF EURO–THINK TANKS SURVEYED

The entirety of the data collected and used for the analysis provided could not materially be presented in printed form. We therefore provide here only a list of the organisations surveyed and invite readers to consult Notre Europe's website for a summary of the data collected on think tanks' contact details, missions, key activities and publications, teams, budgets, and research topics :

http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr

The data presented in the on-line table was collected throughout the summer of 2004, by telephone, by email, and through the organisations' website. The opportunity, which most seized, was given to all the think tanks surveyed to review the data provided.

THINK TANKS LIST

UE-BRUSSELS :

Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

Centre for the New Europe (CNE)

European Centre for International Economics (nom provisoire)

European Policy Centre (EPC)

European Trade Union Institute (Institut Syndical Européen) (ETUI)

Lisbon Council for Economic Competitiveness

Observatoire Social Européen

European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS)

International Security Information Service, Europe - ISIS Europe

Institut Européen de Recherche sur la Coopération Méditerranéenne et Euro-Arabe (MEDEA)

AUSTRIA

Institut für Europäische Integrationsforschung (EIF)

Österreichisches Institut für Europäische Sicherheitspolitik (ÖIES)

Europainstitut der WU Wien (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence)

The interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences (ICCR)

Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) Institute for Advanced Studies

Europäisches Zentrum für Wohlfahrtspolitik und Sozialforschung

Österreichisches Institut für internationale Politik (OIIP)

Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (WIIW)

Zentrum für angewandte Politikforschung (ZAP)

Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO)

Austria Perspektiv (ein Institut der Österreichischen Wirtschaft)

BELGIUM

Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (GRIP)

Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB)

CYPRUS

European Institute of Cyprus

The Research and Development Center – Intercollege

Civilitas Research

CZECH REPUBLIC

EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy

Policy Center for the Promotion of Democracy

Prague Institute of International Relations

Center for Economics and Politics

Civic Institute

DENMARK

Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)

ESTONIA

Institute for European Studies

Estonian Foreign Policy Institute (EVI)

Praxis Center for Policy Studies

The Estonian Institute for Futures Studies (ETI)

FINLAND

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

ETLA, Research Institute of the Finnish Economy

Pan-European Institute

Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA)

Pellervo Economic Research Institute (PTT)

Labour Institute for Economic Research

FRANCE

Confrontations Europe

Europe 2020

Fondation Robert Schuman

Notre Europe

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI)

GERMANY

Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP)

Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) an der Universität Bonn

Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES) an der Universität Mannheim

Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) an der Universität Mannheim

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) - Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit

Forschungsinstitut der deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP)

Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung (CAP) an der Universität München

Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung

Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (IFSH) and der Universität Hamburg

HAUS RISSEN-Internationales Institut für Politik und Wirtschaft (Hamburg)

Bertelsmann Stiftung

Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin)

Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel (IfW)

IFO-Institut

Hamburgische Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA) - - Hamburg Institute of International Economics

Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Institut für Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (IWG Bonn)

Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung

ASKO-EUROPA-STIFTUNG

Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (SEF)

GREECE

ELIAMEP, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

EKEM, Hellenic Center for European Studies

EKEME, Greek Center of European Studies and Research

Institute for International and European Economic Relations

Research Institute for European and American Studies

Centre of European Constitutional Law, Themistocles and Dimitris Tsatsos Foundation

Center for International and European Economic Law

Society for Social and Economic Studies (EKOME)

HONGARY

Foundation for Market Economy

Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Institute of Economics of Hungarian Academy of Sciences (IEHAS)

Policy Research Centre of the Századvég Foundation

International Center for Economic Growth (ICEG) European Center

IRELAND

Institute of European Affairs (IEA)

Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI)

ITALY

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)

Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali CENSIS

Centro Studi Politica Internazionale (CeSPI)

Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI)

Societa' Italiana per l'Organizzazione Internazionale (SIOI)

Fondazione di ricerca Istituto Carlo Cattaneo

Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione Luigi Einaudi

LATVIA

Centre for European and Transition

Latvian Institute of International Affairs

Institute of Economics, Academy of Science (IEAS)

Baltic International Center for Economic Policy Studies (BICEPS)

Centre for Public Policy (PROVIDUS)

LITHUANIA

Institute for International Relations and Political Science

Lithuanian Free Market Institute

Lithuanian Regional Research Institute

Institute of Labour and Social Research

NETHERLANDS

The Cicero Foundation (CF)

Centre for European Security Studies (CESS)

Initiative Referendum Institute Europe (IRI Europe)

Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael

POLAND

Adam Smith Research Centre

Center for International Relations

Center for Social and Economic Research

Institute of Public Affairs

Foreign Trade Research Institute

Gdansk Institute for Market Economics

PORTUGAL

Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (Institute of International Strategic Studies) - IEEI

Instituto Português de Relaçoes Internacionais (Portuguese Institute of International Relations) – IPRI

SLOVAKIA

Centre for European Policy

Institute for Economic and Social Reforms

Institute for Public Affairs IVO

M.E.S.A. 10 - Center for Economic and Social Analyses

Slovak Foreign Policy Association

SLOVENIA

Institute for Economic Research

SPAIN

Asociación de Investigación y Especialización sobre Temas Iberoamericanos (AIETI)

Centro de relaciones internacionales y cooperación internacional (CIDOB)

Fundación Pablo Iglesias

Fundación para el análisis y el estudio social (FAES)

Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales y Política Exterior (INCIPE)

Institut europeo de la mediterrània (IEMed)

Real Instituto Elcano

SWEDEN

Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS)

Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI)

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Timbro

Center for Business and Policy Studies (SNS)

UNITED KINGDOM

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Centre for European Reform (CER)

EU Policy Network (EPN)

European Foundation

Federal Trust for Education and Research

Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP)

The Policy Network

British Institute of International Comparative Law (BIICL)

Centre for Defence Studies (CDS), King's College London

European Policy Forum (EPF)

Foreign Policy Centre (FPC)

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)

Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

Royal Institute of International Affairs/Chatham House

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

ANNEX 2 – MAIN EUROPEAN THINK TANK NETWORKS ENCOUNTERED

Think tanks do not operate in a vacuum, in particular in the field of European affairs. They form networks and are surrounded by organisations that perform similar activities. One of the striking features of the think tanks we studied was the enormous number of links which they had with think tanks and other organisations both across Europe and in other parts of the world.[161] These links varied enormously both in type and depth (cf. section 1.2 for a discussion of causes of think tank 'internationalisation').

THINK TANK LINKS REPORTED IN THE SURVEY

We encountered different types of relationship :

- Contact with another think tank, e.g. through meetings or discussions. This allows in some cases the sharing of best practice.[162]
- Joint hosting of an event : this enables a think tank to have access to a new audience outside its home country. The local 'partner' think tank – with its greater knowledge of the national political scene – can assist in the organisation of an event abroad. Then the first think tank would reciprocate the arrangement for any events organised in its own country.
- Partnership with (an)other think tank(s) for a single research project: This type of ad hoc collaboration is favoured by many of the think tanks in the survey. It provides the opportunity to incorporate a broader range of perspectives into the research while allowing think tanks to maintain their independence from other bodies.
- Participation in multi-partner, multi-sector research projects and networks: these usually involve a range of participants, including universities, scientific experts, and other national research bodies, in addition to think tanks. The best example are the 'Networks of Excellence' funded by the E.U. under the 6th Framework Programme for research, although there is a range of other types. It was not clear from our interviews with European think tanks how active they are in these networks. The research content of each network project is usually fairly specialised and it seems that universities – which have a larger number of specialised researchers – are more successful at getting funding for them.[163] More research is certainly needed to understand better think tanks' participation in such networks. There are one or two examples of think tanks taking part in other networks, not directly related to the 6th Framework Programme. For example, FORNET is a new network which shares ideas among academics and practitioners on different aspects of European foreign policy.[164] There is also a large number of think tank networks operating at the European level. Struyk (2002) has provided a conceptual framework for the discussion of such networks, but essentially they come about when a group of think tanks which share common interests decide to establish a formal network. The network organisation may or may not have institutionalised structures existing outside the individual think tanks.

- Sharing a joint forum with another think tank to promote a particular policy area: this may involve a degree of joint funding and also a sharing of personnel. One example we found is the 'European Security Forum' set up recently by CEPS and IISS in Brussels to enable joint events to be hosted, and joint papers to be written, on European defence and security matters.[165] Another example would be the biannual conference of directors and representatives of institutes of international affairs (fortunately shortened to CDRILA).
- Direct funding by one think tank of another think tank: this is not a common practice between Euro-think tanks, although there were some examples.[166]

THINK TANK NETWORKS IN EUROPE

The table below lists some of the main think tank networks which we came across in our survey. There were also others which seemed important: for example the network of European environmental policy institutes (whose members are IEEP, IPAE, and Ecologic); the network of directors of Nordic and Baltic institutes; and the biannual meetings of the institutes of international affairs. However, none of these currently has a website. This list is therefore not meant to be exhaustive, but to provide an initial overview.

The networks are usually one of two types: either a network which simply brings together different think tanks but has no independent viewpoint (e.g. EPIN; TEPSA, which was founded in 1974 and was one of the first such network set up in Europe); or an 'epistemic' network, which groups together institutes of a similar policy outlook and which is usually more advocacy-oriented. The best example of this latter type in our survey is the Stockholm Network, a relatively new network of free market think tanks with members in Britain, Scandinavia, and France with offices in London.

The ones that are most cohesive tend to be the ones which are administered and core-funded either by a single think tank, or by an external donor (Struyk, 2002). Examples of the more cohesive networks would be TEPSA, which receives E.U. funding and was established on the initiative of the Federal Trust; EPIN, created at the time of the Convention and hosted and run by CEPS (CEPS hosts the secretariat of a number of networks[167]); and the OSI-Related Policy Centres network in Eastern Europe, funded by the Open Society Institute and run from their Budapest office. European think tanks may also belong to a global network of research institutes. One example is the Global ThinkNet, which convenes policy dialogue meetings of think tanks and politicians and is administered by the Japan Centre for International Exchange.

A number of factors arguably limit the impact which networks can have. These include the extra administrative burden which they can create for a think tank participating in the network (for example they may have to organise events or publish papers on behalf of the network); the lack of a strong 'corporate' identity which the network can suffer from; and also the precariousness of funding arrangements for them, especially if they cannot find a long-term donor.

Think tanks have also developed other strategies to increase their impact abroad. One is to open a new office or offices overseas, a trend seen amongst many American think tanks, such as RAND and the Aspen Institute, but less common among the European ones. We did though come across a number of Euro-think tanks which had set up branches outside their home country, either in Brussels or further afield.[168] This enables them to build better links abroad with new constituencies, such as the European institutions, while still retaining their domestic base.

Another strategy adopted by think tanks in this respect is to develop a network of researchers based in different countries and to administer this 'think net' from a single office. This is the organisational form used by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) (See Case Study). This type of operation has undoubtedly been made easier by the spread of information technology. Some think tanks, which do not have the organisational capacity for either of these strategies, have instead chosen to establish themselves as 'online only' think tanks, such as the recently formed E.U. Policy Network, although whether this will take off as a phenomenon remains uncertain. Finally, there are a number of online discussion forums which now exist and have a number of similarities to think tanks. One example would be Open Democracy, an online organisation promoting debate on a range of policy issues. Strictly speaking though, these are not think tanks because conducting policy research is not their main activity.

MAIN EURO-*THINK TANK*S NETWORKS ENCOUNTERED *

Name/website	Date founded	Description	Geographical coverage	Number of member institutes	Secretariat
Association of European Conjuncture Institutes (AIECE) www.econ.ucl.ac.be/CONJ/aiece2002/index.html	1957	Promotes exchange of statistical and institutional information to encourage economic development	17 E.U. countries, Switzerland, Norway and Yugoslavia	43 (some are government agencies)	Belgium (IRES)
TEPSA (Trans-national European Policy Studies Association) www.tepsa.be	1974	Promoting international research on European integration	EU	22	Brussels (TEPSA)
Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) www.euromesco.net	1996	Foreign policy research and analysis of security issues	35 member countries of Euro-Med Partnership (E.U. and North African states)	45 (includes university institutes)	Lisbon (IEEI)
Centres de recherche liés à l'OSI lgi.osi.hu/ppi/	1997	Capacity-building for East European think tanks	Eastern Europe	18	Budapest (Open Society Institute)
European Forecasting Research Association for the Macroeconomy (EUROFRAME) www.euroframe.org	1998	Economic modelling, forecasting and analysis leading to E.U. policy recommendations	Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, GB, France, Italy, Austria, Finland	9	Berlin (DIW)
ENEPRI www.enepri.org	2000	International diffusion of joint research, aiming to increase public awareness of the European dimension of national economic policy issues	Europe, including candidate countries	23	Brussels (CEPS)
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) www.epin.org	2002	Promoting pan-European policy dialogue and research	28 European countries, including all E.U. member states, accession and candidate countries	37	Brussels (CEPS)
Stockholm Network www.stockholm-network.org	2004 (bien que l'initiative date de 1997)	Network of free market European think tanks	UK, France, Sweden, Brussels	120	London

* Networks with predominantly think tanks as members, based in Europe and with a website.

. . . . . .

[161] On the other hand, we were studying think tanks working on international themes and these were probably more likely to have international links than think tanks working on domestic issues.

[162] For example if a new think tank director wishes to learn how an existing think tank operates. Or it is simply to share ideas. In the latter case, it usually occurres between think tanks holding similar research interests and/or outlooks, such as international affairs institutes or free market think tanks.

[163] Cf. for instance the list of current projects at www.cordis.lu

[164] It was set up in January 2003 and is funded by the Commission. It is managed from the London School of Economics and has other universities involved; one of its principal partners is TEPSA and among its other partners are many of the European foreign affairs think tanks. www.fornet.info

[165] Cf. www.eusec.org

[166] A number the well funded German foundations, including the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, give financial support to new think tanks in Eastern Europe. The Robert Schuman Foundation also assists sister institutes in the CEECs.

[167] ENEPRI (European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes), www.enepri.org; ENARPRI (European Network of Agricultural and Rural Policy Research Institutes), www.enarpri.org; ELISE (European Liberty and Security), www.eliseconsortium.org; EPIN (European Policy Institutes Network), www.epin.org; CS (Climate Strategies), www.climate-strategies.org; ESF (European Security Forum) - run jointly with the IISS, London, www.eusec.org; ECRI (European Credit Research Institute), www.ecri.be.

[168] The only truly 'trans-national' European think tanks in this regard found in our survey were: the German party foundations, such as FES and KAS, which had branches spread all over the world; IISS which has offices in London, Washington and Singapore and has members in over 100 countries around the world and a significant presence in Asia; and IEEP, the UK-based environment think tank which opened a Brussels office in 2001.

ANNEX 3 – METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

HOW TO RECOGNISE A THINK TANK: HOW OUR NINE CRITERIA WERE IDENTIFIED

Defining think tanks is not an easy task, considering the diversity of potentially relevant organisations. We concur with Sherrington (2000) who argues that, "with respect to the EU, it is futile to strive for one meaning—an exclusive definition simply cannot be applied to EU-oriented think tanks given the varying contexts in which E.U. policy is shaped." Indeed, it is our belief that no single definition can fit all groups that are involved in the production and dissemination of information about policy. Wallace and Garnett (1998), as quoted by Sherrington (2000), also argue: "It makes little sense to define a "think tank" too precisely. The functions which think tanks fulfil – research relevant to public policy, promotion of public debate, the questioning of the conventional wisdom, the formulation and dissemination of alternative concepts and policy agendas – can be fulfilled in many ways, under different constraints."

Yet, finding and applying a clear definition is crucial for a rigorous analysis. As the world of think tanks becomes richer and diverse, it is also bound to be studied and discussed more often. The term is used ever more vaguely in the media. It is therefore useful to seek a more refined understanding of what makes think tanks specific in the world of policy formation.

The working definition used here is derived from six flexible criteria initially proposed by Weiss (1992, viii), for what she calls "policy analysis organizations." She states that think tanks 1) are permanent organizations, 2) are not responsible for the operations of government, 3) have specialized staff with expertise, 4) are policy oriented, 5) produce analysis and advice, 6) and put emphasis on communicating their research to policymakers.

In the light of our research and other scholars' contributions, the first criterion is a clear demarcation between, for instance, temporary research teams and organisations that aim to last (e.g. committees of experts set up by the European Commission).

The second is trickier though. Weiss's objective in stating that think tanks are not responsible for the operations of government is in some cases difficult to apply. Organisations that are appointed by public officials to undertake research governed by the state's needs, such as government research agencies are nevertheless excluded. The question of think tanks' autonomy goes beyond their relations with government authorities. On the one hand, Stone, Denham and Garnett (1998) argue with reason that "the notion that a think tank requires independence or autonomy from the state in order to be 'free-thinking- is a peculiarly Anglo-American notion that does not travel well into other cultures" and that, for instance "to talk of independence as a defining characteristic of think tanks makes little sense in the French cultural context." What about advocacy tanks, for instance, which research and recommendations are governed by a predetermined view of the world? They may not apply scientifically exact methodologies and usually receive more funding from sources favourable to their agenda. The research of the great majority of EU-focused think tanks in fact is governed by the idea that further integration and enlargement of the European Union is necessary. As

such, they also serve the interest of various actors, including the Commission and certain parties that fund them to a large extent. On the other hand, Stone et al. believe, as we do, that think tanks should be able to define their research agenda independently from government missions, as well as from other actors, be they corporate interests or political parties. As they argue, this may be a "relative" autonomy as "such organizations may operate within government (…) or be attached to a profit-making corporate entity." Essentially though, "these institutes attempt to maintain their research freedom and at least claim not to be beholden to any specific interest." The idea of "independence", although necessary, clearly remains elusive.

As explained by Stone (2000, p.156) for instance, "the distinction between an independent think tank and an official or state-funded think tank is not clear cut. In reality, complete autonomy and independence for think tanks is illusory. Self-generated research agendas, financial autonomy, a dispassionate scholarly focus and retaining organisational distance from official forums may bolster intellectual integrity but it also undermines the potential for policy relevance and input." As she argues, all think tanks are, to some extent, shaped by their political environment, whether through their tax status, public funding, or because they have been created by the government, or have been co-opted by official organisations, are linked to parties, etc. McGann and Weaver (2000, p.5) advocate pursuing "a middle course", restricting their study to organisations that have "significant autonomy from government and from societal interests such as firms, interest groups, and political parties", while recognizing that "autonomy is a relative rather than an absolute term, and that the operational definition of think tanks must differ from region to region." In practice, we have tried to determine how they preserve their capacity to determine their own research agenda by asking this very question, by looking at statutes and the origins of staff and funding, and generally assessing the organisations' ability to work autonomously.

Being "policy oriented", producing "analysis and advice" and communicating their research are also core characteristics of think tanks. As stressed by McGann and Weaver (2000), it "is the transformation of political problems into appropriate public policy solutions" that justifies their existence. Sherrington (2000) adequately states that think tanks' "primary aim is to disseminate that research as widely as possible with the intention of influencing policy-making processes," unlike interest groups or public interest NGOs that analyse policies and propose policy alternatives on an ad hoc basis, but not as their primary activity. In fact, Stone (2000) sees this as the very essence of think tanks: "Think tanks have one thing in common: the individuals in them attempt to make academic theories and scientific paradigms policy-relevant." This allows to draw a line, albeit at times blurred, between think tanks and institutions that only seek to disseminate ideas, but do not have a research capacity that can contribute to policy making (such as Forum Europe, A Gauche, en Europe, the Bruges Group, and Friends of Europe). We have also excluded bodies that do not publish or do not have a website (e.g. Centro Europa Ricerche in Italy). Academic research centres that study policy-related issues but do not seek to shape policy debates and decision-making processes were also excluded (there are for instance numerous 'borderline' cases in Portugal that have not been included for this reason).

In this respect, although Weiss includes only policymakers as think tanks' target, several authors (Stone, 2000; Sherrington, 2000) include both policy-makers and the public. For Stone (2000), "the term "think tank" is used here to mean independent (and usually private) policy research institutes (…) actively seeking to educate or advise policy-makers and the public through a number of channels." Denham and Garnett (1998) also argue that think tanks try to influence the climate of opinion and to inform public policy decisions. This, in our view, is important, as think tanks for the most part produce and market ideas. In other words, they do not merely seek to produce expertise, but also to propagate their ideas. Although their ultimate aim is to see their ideas implemented, the general public therefore being a strategic, yet secondary target, we argue that both aspects of think tanks' operations are equally important.

We also believe that a useful distinction to add to Weiss's original list is that think tanks, as suggested inter alia by Stone, Denham, and Garnett (p.4), are not degree-granting institutions. This allows drawing a line between purely or primarily academic research outfits (e.g. EUI in Florence) and training institutes (e.g. EIPA in The Netherlands) on the one hand, and think tanks that may include different types of training in their activities as part of their wider goals (e.g. Clingendael Institute, also in The Netherlands). Regarding consultancies that offer services equivalent to think tanks, the distinguishing factor in our view is that these outfits only operate on a commercial basis, however scientific their research practices, while think tanks operate for a certain view of the public good. Whether as advocacy or academic think tanks, they perform essentially a public service.

For the sake of completeness, we have chosen not to restrict our research to non-profit organisations, as proposed by McGann and Weaver (2000), as this would risk eliminating a large number of relevant organisations in the European context. In fact, this criterion derives from a North American context, and proves more easily applicable there than in Europe, as experienced by these authors, considering that not all E.U. Member States allow this type of organisation. We have not limited ourselves either to multi-disciplinary organisations, but have included specialised organisations (e.g. IRI Europe in The Netherlands).

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

The following qualitative interviews were conducted in person or by telephone. In a small number of cases by email (indicated).

POLICY MAKERS

1. Christine Verger, Secretary General of the socialist group, European Parliament, 14.07.2004
2. Maïté Abram, director, European Movement Belgium, 14.07.2004
3. Sylvie Goulard, Group of Policy Advisors, European Commission, 14.07.2004
4. Aivar Roop, Director of the European movement in Estonia, 14.07.2004
5. Marina Féat, Researcher, French Permanent Representation to the European institutions, 15.07.2004

6. Odile Chenal, Deputy director, European Cultural Foundation, 16.07.2004
7. Eneko Landaburu, Director general, DG External Relations, European Commission, 19.07.2004
8. Nicole Gnesotto, Director, EUISS, 19.07.2004
9. Jacques Delors, President, Notre Europe, 26.07.2004
10. Helle Thorning Schmidt, former Danish MEP, founder of Progressivt Centrum (Danish think tank), 27.07.04
11. Joachim Bitterlich, former advisor to Helmut Kohl, 11.08.2004
12. Lucy Powell, Campaigns Director, Britain in Europe, 13.08.04
13. François Lamoureux, Director general, DG transport and energy, European Commission, 18.08.2004
14. Lykke Friis, Dansk Industri, 18.08.04
15. Henrik Kröner, Secretary General, European Movement International, 19.08.2004
16. Grégoire Verdeaux, Advisor, Cabinet of Michel Barnier, Foreign Affairs Minister (France), 2.09.2004
17. Hubert Heiss, Head of Unit, Chancellery (Germany), 2.09.2004
18. Pierre Jonckheer, Member of the European Parliament (Belgium), 3.09.2004
19. Juan Ignacio Morro, civil servant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Secretariat for European Affairs (Spain), 7.9.2004
20. Androula Vassiliou, Member of the European Parliament (Cyprus), 27.08 and 8.09.2004
21. Amaya Bloch-Lainé, Director, German Marshall Fund of the U.S., Paris, 9.09.2004
22. Lord Grenfell, Chair, House of Lords EU Select Committee, UK Parliament, 13.09.2004

MEDIA

1. David Cronin, political correspondent, European Voice, 15.07.2004
2. Françoise Croigneau, Chief-editor, international affairs, Les Echos, 27.08.2004
3. Ana Alonso Montes, Spanish journalist, member of the international editorial office of El Mundo,30.8.2004
4. Quentin Dickinson, Deputy Director, Radio France, Brussels, 31.08.2004
5. Martine Dubuisson, journalist, Le Soir (Belgium), 3.09.2004
6. Anthony Manduca, Associate editor, The Times, Malta, Expert in International Relations and E.U. affairs, 3.09.2004
7. Aija Lulle, journalist, Neatkariga (Latvian newspaper), 3.09.2004
8. Erkki Bahovski, journalist, Chief-editor, European affairs, "Postimees" (Estonian daily newspaper), 6.09.2004
9. Paul Gillespie, Foreign Policy Editor, Irish Times, 08.09.04
10. Ian Black, former Brussels Correspondent, The Guardian, 13.09.04

ACADEMICS

1. Iga Krasnowska, Center for International Relations (Poland), 14.07.2004
2. Jean Pisani-Ferry, economist, founder of the European Centre for International Economics, 19.07.2004
3. Renaud Dehousse, Jean Monnet Professor and Director of the European Centre at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques of Paris, 28.07.2004
4. Franklin Dehousse, Professor, University of Liège, assessor of the European Studies department of IRRI (Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, Belgium), 5.08.2004
5. Jacques Rupnik, CERI (Centre d'Etude et de Recherches Internationales, France), 19.08.2004
6. Yves Mény, President of the European University Institute (Florence), 21.08.2004
7. Simon Hix, Professor of European and Comparative Politics, Department of Government, LSE, 24.08.04
8. Martin Thunert, Professor, University of Munich, author of several books on think tanks,[169] 30.08.2004
9. Roderick Pace, Director of the European Documentation and Research Center, Malta 1.09.2004
10. Diane Stone, Reader in Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, 3.09.04
11. Josef Braml, Researcher, SWP (Germany),[170] 7.09.2004

THINK TANKS

1. Abraamides Lysandros, Director's deputy of the Research & Development Center-Intercollege, 08.07.2004
2. Radek Spok, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy (Czech Republic), 09.07.2004
3. Barbara Lippert, Stellvertrete Direktorin, Institut für europäische Politik (IEP), 9.07.2004
4. Monica Cauchi, Communications officer of the European Documentation and Research Center, 09.07.2004
5. Ludger Künhardt, Director at the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI), Bonn Universität, 9.07.2004
6. Mr. Hutter, responsible for the E.U. project, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, 12.07.2004
7. Judas Vorrath, Research and Programme Coordinator, Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (SEF), 12.07.2004
8. Jürgen Turek, Managing Director, Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung (CAP) an der Universität München, 12.07.2004
9. Andreas Theophanous, Director of Research & Development Center-Intercollege, 12.07.2004
10. Aksel Kirch, Director of the Institute for European Studies in Estonia, 12.07.2004
11. James Ker-Lindsay, Director of Civilitas Research, 12.07.2004 and 01.09.2004
12. Erik Terk, Director of the Estonian Institute for Futures Studies, 13.07.2004
13. Giles Merritt, Secretary General, Friends of Europe, 13.07.2004
14. Rolf Langhammer, Vice-president of the Kiel Institute for World Economics (IfW), 13.07.2004

15. Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Arbeitsgebiete : Internationale Organisationen, Konfliktprävention, Europäische Integration, Osteuropa, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, University of Hamburg, 13.07.2004
16. Silvia Stiller, Head of Research Programme European Integration and Spatial Development, Hamburgische Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA), 13.07.2004
17. Andres Kasekamp, Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, 14.07.2004
18. Marlène Arany, Secretary General, TEPSA, 14.07.2004
19. Karel Lannoo, Chief Executive, Staffan Jerneck, Deputy Director, Centre for European Policy Studies, 14.07.2004
20. Ann Metter, Executive Director and co-founder, Paul Hofheinz, President and co-founder, Lisbon Council, 15.07.2004
21. Daniela Manca, Research Fellow, International Security Information Service, Europe, 15.07.2004
22. Graham Mather, Director, European Policy Forum, 15.07.2004
23. Michael Landesmann, Director of Research, Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (WIIW), 15.07.2004
24. Raita Karnite, Director of the Institute of Economics in Latvia
25. Henrietta Riegler, Senior Researcher for southeastern Europe, Österreichisches Institut für internationale Politik (OIIP), 16.07.2004
26. Dr Schmidt, Managing Director, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), 16.07.2004
27. Joseph Melchior, Assistant Professor / Europaforschung, Österreichisches Gesellschaft für Politikwissenschaft (ÖGPW), 16.07.2004
28. Elizabeth Phocas, Deputy Director, ELIAMEP, 16.07.2004
29. Charles Grant, Director, Centre for European Reform, 16.07.2004
30. Brendan Donnelly, Director, Federal Trust, 16.07.2004
31. Thomas Fischer, Project Manager, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 19.07.2004 (mail)
32. Dr. Michael Paul, Head, Research Secretariat, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 19.07.2004 (mail)
33. Tanja Gewis, Management, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), 19.07.2004
34. Otmar Höll, Director, OIIP Österreichisches Institut für internationale Politik (OIIP), 19.07.2004
35. Leslie Agius, Director of the Foundation of International Studies, 19.07.2004
36. Hynek Opolecky, Policy Center for the Promotion of Democracy (République Tchèque), 20.07.2004
37. Thanos Veremis, Director of EKEME, 20.07.2004
38. Dr Hermann Schmitt – Projektleiter, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische SozialForschung (MZES), 20.07.2004
39. Mrs Bapuly, Researcher-lawyer, Institut für Europäische Integrationsforschung (IEF), Wien, 20.07.2004
40. Marek Jakoby, M.E.S.A. 10 - Center for Economic and Social Analyses, 20.07.2004 67.

41. Peter Zsapka, Centre for European Policy (Slovaquie), 20.07.2004
42. Anders Mellbourn, Director, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 21.07.2004
43. Annita Kishi-Manentzou, Director's assistant of the European Institute of Cyprus, 21.07.2004
44. Eckard Bolsinger, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Internationales Institut für Politik und Wirtschaft (Hausrissen), 21.07.2004
45. Dr Helga Haftendorn, Vice-President of the research institute, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP), 21.07.2004
46. Kristina Meskova, Institute for Economic and Social Reforms (Slovaquie), 21.07.2004
47. Jens Rasmussen, Personnel Department, Danish Institute for International Studies, 21.07.2004
48. Harri Lorentz, Research Associate, Pan-European Institute, Finland, 22.07.2004
49. Jan Hrich, The Institute of International Relations-IIR (Czech Republic), 22.07.2004
50. Egle Baroniunaite, Project manager of the Lithuanian Regional Research Institute, 23.07.2004
51. Stephen Yeo, Chief Executive Officer, CEPR, 23.07.2004
52. Robert Dover, Director, E.U. Policy Network, 25.07.2004
53. Ana Pinto, Instituto Português de Relaçoes Internacionais, 26.07.2004
54. Pedro Courela, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais, 27.07.2004
55. Pascale Joannin, Director, Fondation Robert Schuman, 27.07.2004
56. Richard Whitman, Head of European Programme, RIIA, 27.07.2004
57. Tatiana Muravska, Director of the Centre for European and Transition Studies, 28.07.2004
58. Jean Nestor, former Secretary General, Notre Europe, 28.07.2004
59. Pilar Tena, Director of institutional relations, Real Instituto Elcano, 29.7.2004
60. Stanley Crossick, Founder, European Policy Centre, 29.07.2004
61. Brona Pinterova, Institute for Public Affairs (Slovaquie), 30.07.2004
62. Michael Meier, Desk officer for Western industrialised countries, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2.08.2004
63. Hans-Werner Sinn, President of CESifo Group, IFO-Institut, 2.08.2004
64. Margriet Drent, Executive Director, Centre for European Security Studies, 3.08.2004
65. Peter van Ham, Deputy Head of Studies, Clingendael Institute, 3.08.2004
66. Sacha Godeschalk, Rand Europe, Leiden, 3.08.2004
67. Bruno Kaufman, Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe, 4.08.2004
68. Vita Terauda, Director of the Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS in Latvia, 05.08.2004
69. Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann, Director, Institut für Europäische Integrationsforschung (IEF), Wien, 10.08.2004
70. A.D. Papayannides, Member of the Board of EKEME, 10.08.2004 (email)
71. Carolina Mateu, Communications officer, IEMED, Spain, 11.8.2004
72. Maria Palsson, Director of Communications, Timbro, 12.08.2004

73. Ronald J Pohoryles, Chairman & Director, Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research (ICCR), 13.08.2004
74. Atis Lejins, Director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 17.08.2004
75. Inga Kanasta, Director's assistant of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 17.08.2004
76. Richard Gowan, Head of European Research, FPC, 18.08.2004
77. Tomas Dahlman, Director, SIEPS, 18.08.2004
78. Erich Hochleitner, Director, Österreichische Institut für Europäische Sicherheitspolitik, 20.08.2004
79. Pierre Lepetit, Executive Director, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 25.08.2004
80. Ulrika Stuart, Chief Information Officer, SNS, 27.08.2004
81. Francois Lafond, Deputy Director, Policy Network, 2.09.2004
82. Ms Buggel-Asmus, Information Manager, ETUI, 3.09.2004
83. Roderick Pace, Director of the European Documentation and Research Center, 01.09.2004
84. Pete Glennon, Administrator, Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, 3.09.2004
85. Jill Donoghue, Research Director, and Pete Glennon, Administrator
86. Philippe Pochet, Director, OSE, 10.09.2004
87. Marco Incerti, Researcher, EPIN/CEPS, 13.09.2004

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[169] In particular: "Think Tanks in Germany" in Stone, Denham, Garnett, 2003. "Conservative Think Tanks in the United States and Canada" in: Rainer-Olaf Schultze, Roland Sturm and Dagmar Eberle (eds.): *Conservative Parties and Right-Wing Politics in North America*, Opladen (Germany): Leske&Budrich, 2003, 229-254. "Players Beyond Borders? German Think Tanks as Catalysts of Transnationalisation" in: *Global Society*, No.2, April 2000, 191-212.

[170] Author of *Think Tanks vs. "Denkfabriken" ? US and German Policy Research Institutes Coping with and Influencing Their Environments*

QUESTIONNAIRES

The three following questionnaires were used for interviews with managers of think tanks, decision-makers and journalists, and academics. Additional questions were asked when the interviews justified going beyond these initial questions.

THINK TANK MANAGERS

1. What was the rationale for the creation of your think tank ?
2. How do you decide your research priorities ?
3. At what stage of the decision-making process do you usually intervene ? Before: when public policies are being created; or after, in reaction to proposals that are being examined ?
4. How do you seek to preserve your independence ?
5. How would you define a think tank in Europe ?
6. According to you, what are the key factors that dertermine think tank's influence ? The key factors that determine it's credibility ?
7. What think tanks do you consider the most influent ?
8. What current trends are visible in think tank development across Europe ?
9. What are the main challenges facing think tanks today (competition, funding...) ?
10. What is the impact of E.U. enlargement on your activities? And for other think tanks working on European affairs ?
11. What are the other think tanks interested in European affairs in your country ?
12. Can you estimate your media-coverage: interviews, TV, press articles/editorials, quotations, etc. ?
13. What is the benefit for you of having links with other think tanks in Europe ?

POLICY-MAKERS

1. Do you often use think tanks as information sources?
2. Do you contact them on your own initiative, or do they seek contact with you?
3. What is your opinion about such contacts: useful/not very useful, why ?
4. What do you expect from think tanks? What role can they play in the European construction and integration process?
5. What are the think tanks you consider influent?
6. According to you, what are the key factors of influence for a think tank ? Of credibility ?
7. Would you say that independence from other interests (such as political, ideological, etc.) is an important factor of credibility for a think tank ?
8. What are the major trends of think tanks' development today ?
9. Would you work for a think tank yourself ? Why ?

ACADEMICS

1. Are think tanks important actors of the European construction and decision-making processes?
2. What role do you think they play ?
3. Is their contribution to policy making for Europe adequate ?
4. Could / should anything be done in [relevant Member State] / in the European Union to encourage the development of think tanks ?
5. What are the key characteristics of an influential think tank? Of a credible think tank ?
6. What are the most influential think tanks ? Why ?
7. What are the current trends of think tank development in [relevant Member State] ? In other countries ?
8. What is your opinion about the nature and work of [relevant Member State's] think tanks, compared, for instance, to the nature and work of U.S. think tanks ?
9. Are you aware of studies or surveys that deal with think tanks in your country ?

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