Coordinates	34°03′″N118°15′″N
conflict	Battle of Britain
partof	the :Second World War
date	10 July – 31 October 1940
place	United Kingdom airspace
result	Decisive British victory
combatant1
combatant2	Germany Italy
commander1	Hugh Dowding Keith Park Trafford Leigh-Mallory CJ Quintin Brand Richard Saul
commander2	Hermann Göring Albert Kesselring Hugo Sperrle Hans-Jürgen Stumpff Rino Corso Fougier
strength1	1,963 serviceable aircraft
strength2	2,550 serviceable aircraft.
casualties1	544 aircrew killed422 aircrew wounded1,547 aircraft destroyed|groupnb}}

| casualties2 = 2,698 aircrew killed967 captured638 missing bodies identified by British Authorities1,887 aircraft destroyed | casualties3 = | notes = }}

The Battle of Britain (German: ''Luftschlacht um England'' or ''Luftschlacht um Großbritannien'', literally "Air battle for England" or "Air battle for Great Britain") is the name given to the World War II air campaign waged by the German Air Force (''Luftwaffe'') against the United Kingdom during the summer and autumn of 1940. The objective of the campaign was to gain air superiority over the Royal Air Force (RAF), especially Fighter Command. The name derives from a famous speech delivered by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the House of Commons: "...the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin."

The Battle of Britain was the first major campaign to be fought entirely by air forces, and was also the largest and most sustained aerial bombing campaign to that date. From July 1940 coastal shipping convoys and shipping centres, such as Portsmouth, were the main targets; one month later the ''Luftwaffe'' shifted its attacks to RAF airfields and infrastructure. As the battle progressed the ''Luftwaffe'' also targeted aircraft factories and ground infrastructure. Eventually the ''Luftwaffe'' resorted to attacking areas of political significance and using terror bombing tactics.

The failure of Germany to achieve its objectives of destroying Britain's air defences, or forcing Britain to negotiate an armistice or an outright surrender, is considered its first major defeat and one of the crucial turning points in the war. If Germany had gained air superiority over England, Adolf Hitler might have launched Operation Sea Lion, an amphibious and airborne invasion of Britain.

Background

Following the evacuation of British and French soldiers from Dunkirk and the French surrender on 22 June 1940, Adolf Hitler was mainly focused on the possibilities of invading the Soviet Union while believing that the British, defeated on the continent and without European allies, would quickly come to terms. Although the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, and an element of British public and political sentiment favoured a negotiated peace with an ascendant Germany, Winston Churchill, newly installed as Prime Minister, and a majority of his Cabinet refused to consider an armistice with Hitler. Instead Churchill used his skilful rhetoric to harden public opinion against capitulation, and to prepare the British for a long war.

On 11 July, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the ''Kriegsmarine'' (German Navy), told Hitler that an invasion could only be contemplated as a last resort, and only after full air superiority had been achieved. The ''Kriegsmarine'' had been nearly crippled by the Norwegian Campaign, with many of its ships having been sunk or damaged, while the Royal Navy still had over 50 destroyers, 21 cruisers and eight battleships in the British Home Fleet. There was little the weakened ''Kriegsmarine'' could do to stop the Royal Navy from intervening. The only alternative was to use the ''Luftwaffe'''s dive bombers and torpedo bombers, which required air superiority to operate effectively. Grand Admiral Raeder said, "A powerful and effective air force ''might'' create conditions favourable for an invasion, whether it could was not in the Navy War Staff's province."

On 16 July, although he agreed with Raeder, Hitler ordered the preparation of a plan to invade Britain; he also hoped that news of the preparations would frighten Britain into peace negotiations. "Directive No. 16; On the Preparation of a Landing Operation against England" read, in part, as follows:

All preparations were to be made by mid-August.

The plan, code named ''Unternehmen Seelöwe'' ("Operation Sealion"), was submitted by OKW (''Oberkommando der Wehrmacht'' or "High Command of the Armed Forces") and was scheduled to take place in mid-September 1940. ''Seelöwe'' called for landings on the south coast of Great Britain, backed by an airborne assault. Neither Hitler nor OKW believed it would be possible to carry out a successful amphibious assault on Britain until the RAF had been neutralised. Raeder believed that air superiority might make a successful landing possible although it would be a risky operation and required "absolute mastery over the Channel by our air forces".

Conversely Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz believed air superiority was "not enough". Dönitz stated, "we possessed neither control of the air or the sea; nor were we in any position to gain it". Some writers, such as Derek Robinson, have agreed with Dönitz. Robinson argues that the massive superiority of the Royal Navy over the ''Kriegsmarine'' would have made Sealion a disaster and the ''Luftwaffe'' could not have prevented decisive intervention by British cruisers and destroyers, even with air superiority. Williamson Murray argued the task facing the Germans in the summer, 1940 was beyond their capabilities. The three German armed services were not capable of solving the problem of invading the British Isles. Murray contends that the ''Kriegsmarine'' had been effectively eliminated owing to heavy losses during the Norwegian Campaign. Murray states it is doubtful that the ''Kriegsmarine'' and ''Luftwaffe'' could have prevented the Royal Navy engaging the invasion fleet.

Opposing forces

The ''Luftwaffe'' faced a more capable opponent than any it had previously met: a sizeable, highly coordinated, well-supplied, modern air force.

Fighters

The ''Luftwaffe'''s Messerschmitt Bf 109E and Bf 110C squared off against the RAF's workhorse Hurricane Mk I and the less numerous Spitfire Mk I. The Bf 109E had a better climb rate and was 10 to 30 mph faster than the Hurricane, depending on altitude. In the spring and summer of 1940, RAF fighters benefited from increased availability of 100 octane aviation fuel, which allowed their Merlin engines to generate significantly more power through the use of an Emergency Boost Override. In September 1940 the more powerful Mk IIa series 1 Hurricanes started entering service although only in small numbers. This version was capable of a maximum speed of 342 mph, some 25 to 30 mph faster than the Mk I. The performance of the Spitfire over Dunkirk came as a surprise to the ''Jagdwaffe'', although the German pilots retained a strong belief that the 109 was the superior fighter. However, the Bf 109E had a much larger turning circle than either the Hurricane or the Spitfire. The two British fighters were equipped with eight Browning 303 machine guns, while most Bf 109Es had two machine guns and two wing cannons. The Bf 109E and the Spitfire were superior to each other in key areas; for instance, at some altitudes, the Bf 109 could out-climb the British fighter. In general, though, as Alfred Price noted in ''The Spitfire Story'':

The Bf 109 was also used as a fighter-bomber—the E-4/B and E-7 models could carry a 250 kg bomb underneath the fuselage. The Bf 109, unlike the ''Stuka'', could fight on equal terms with RAF fighters after releasing its ordnance.

At the start of the battle, the twin-engined Messerschmitt Bf 110 long range ''Zerstörer'' ("Destroyer") was also expected to engage in air-to-air combat while escorting the ''Luftwaffe'' bomber fleet. Although the 110 was faster than the Hurricane and almost as fast as the Spitfire, its lack of manoeuvrability and acceleration meant that it was a failure as a long-range escort fighter. On 13 and 15 August, 13 and 30 aircraft were lost, the equivalent of an entire ''Gruppe'', and the type's worst losses during the campaign. This trend continued with a further eight and 15 lost on 16 and 17 August. Göring ordered the Bf 110 units to operate "where the range of the single-engined machines were not sufficient".

The most successful role of the Bf 110 during the battle was as a ''Schnellbomber'' (fast bomber). The Bf 110 usually used a shallow dive to bomb the target and escaped at high speed. One unit, ''Erprobungsgruppe 210'', proved that the Bf 110 could be used to good effect in attacking small or "pinpoint" targets. The RAF's Boulton Paul Defiant had some initial success over Dunkirk because of its resemblance to the Hurricane; ''Luftwaffe'' fighters attacking from the rear were surprised by its unusual gun turret. However, during the Battle of Britain, this single-engined two-seater proved hopelessly outclassed. For various reasons, the Defiant lacked any form of forward firing armament and the heavy turret meant it could not out-run or out-manoeuvre either the Bf 109 or Bf 110. By the end of August, after disastrous losses, the aircraft was withdrawn from daylight service.

Fighter formations

In the late 1930s, Fighter Command expected to face only bombers over Britain, not single-engined fighters. With this in mind, a series of "Fighting Area Tactics" were formulated and rigidly adhered to, involving a series of manoeuvres designed to concentrate a squadron's firepower to bring down bombers: with no apparent prospect of escorting fighters to worry about, RAF fighter pilots flew in tight, vee-shaped sections ("vics") of three. These restricted squadrons to tight 12 aircraft formations composed of four sections in another tight "V". With this formation, only the squadron leader at the front was free to watch for the enemy; the other pilots had to concentrate on keeping station. RAF fighter training also emphasised by-the-book attacks by sections breaking away in sequence. Fighter Command recognised the weaknesses of this rigid structure early in the battle, but it was felt too risky to change tactics during the battle, because replacement pilots—often with only minimal flying time—could not be readily retrained, and inexperienced RAF pilots needed firm leadership in the air only rigid formations could provide. German pilots dubbed the RAF formations ''Idiotenreihen'' ("rows of idiots") because they left squadrons vulnerable to attack.

By contrast the, ''Luftwaffe'' formations employed a loose section of two (nicknamed the ''Rotte''), based on a leader (''Rottenführer'') followed at a distance of about 183 meters (200 yards) by his wingman (nicknamed the ''Rottenhund'' or ''Katschmareks''), who also flew slightly higher and was trained to always stay with his leader. While the leader was free to search for enemy aircraft, and could cover his wingman's blind spots, his wingman could concentrate on searching the airspace in the leader's blind spots, behind and below. Attacking aircraft could be sandwiched between the two 109s. The ''rotte'' allowed the ''Rottenführer'' to concentrate on getting kills although this led to some grievances in the lower ranks because it was felt that the high scores of some ''Rottenführer'' came at the expense of the ''Katschmareks''. During the Battle of Britain, a pilot who shot down 20 aircraft was automatically awarded the ''Ritterkreuz'' (Knight's Cross), to which was added ''Oak Leaves'', ''Swords'', and ''Diamonds'' for each additional 20 aircraft. Those pilots who appeared to be pursuing these awards were said to be suffering from ''Halsweh'' (a sore throat), a reference to the convention of wearing the decoration at the neck. Few wingmen in ''Luftwaffe'' fighter formations were able to shoot down opposing aircraft, while their formation leaders were scoring heavily.

Two of these sections were usually teamed up into a ''Schwarm'', where all the pilots could watch what was happening around them. Each ''Schwarm'' in a ''Staffel'' flew at staggered heights and with 183 meters (200 yards) of room between them, making the formation difficult to spot at longer ranges and allowing for a great deal of flexibility. These conspicuous formations were often successful in attracting RAF fighters that were sometimes "bounced" by high-flying Bf 109s. This led to the often repeated myth that the Bf 110s were escorted by Bf 109s. The Bf 110's most successful method of attack was the "bounce" from above.

Front line RAF pilots were acutely aware of the inherent deficiencies of their own tactics. A compromise was adopted whereby squadron formations used much looser formations with one or two "weavers" flying independently above and behind to provide increased observation and rear protection; these tended to be the least experienced men and were often the first to be shot down without the other pilots even noticing that they were under attack. During the battle, 74 Squadron under Squadron Leader Adolph "Sailor" Malan adopted a variation of the German formation called the "fours in line astern", which was a vast improvement on the old three aircraft "vic." Malan's formation was later generally used by Fighter Command.

Bombers

The ''Luftwaffe'''s four primary bombers were the Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17, and Junkers Ju 88 for level bombing, and the Junkers Ju 87 ''Stuka'' for diving attacks. The Heinkel He 111 was used in greater numbers than the others during the conflict and is better known, partly due to its distinctive wing shape. Each level bomber also had a few reconnaissance versions that were used during the battle.

Although successful in previous ''Luftwaffe'' engagements, the ''Stuka'' suffered heavy losses in the Battle of Britain, particularly on 18 August, due to its slow speed and vulnerability to fighter interception after the dive bombing. As a result of the losses and limited payload and range, ''Stuka'' units were largely removed from operations over England and concentrated on shipping instead until they were re-deployed to the Eastern Front in 1941. They returned on occasion, such as on the 13 September attack on Tangmere airfield.

The remaining three bomber types differed in their capabilities; the Heinkel 111 was the slowest; the Ju 88 was the fastest once its mainly external bomb load was dropped; and the Do 17 had the smallest bomb load. Later in the conflict, when night bombing became more frequent, all three were used. However, due to its reduced bomb load, the lighter Do 17 was used less than the He 111 and Ju 88 for this purpose.

On the British side, three bombers were mostly used on night operations against targets such as factories, invasion ports and railway centres; the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley, the Handley-Page Hampden and the Vickers Wellington were classified as heavy bombers by the RAF, although the Hampden was a medium bomber comparable to the He 111. The twin-engined Bristol Blenheim and the obsolescent single-engined Fairey Battle were both light bombers; the Blenheim was the most numerous of the aircraft equipping RAF Bomber Command and was used in attacks against shipping, ports, airfields and factories on the continent by day and by night. The Fairey Battle squadrons, which had suffered heavy losses in daylight attacks during the Battle of France, were brought up to strength with reserve aircraft and continued to operate at night in attacks against the invasion ports, until the Battle was withdrawn from UK front line service in October 1940.

Pilots

Before the war, the RAF's processes for selecting potential candidates was opened to men of all social classes through the creation of the RAF Volunteer Reserve in 1936 which "...was designed to appeal, to...young men...without any class distinctions..." The older squadrons of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force did retain some of their upper class exclusiveness but their number were soon swamped by the newcomers of the RAFVR and by Sept 1 1939, 6646 pilots had been trained through the RAFVR.

By summer 1940, there were about 9,000 pilots in the RAF for approximately 5,000 aircraft, most of which were bombers. Fighter Command was never short of pilots, but the problem of finding sufficient numbers of fully trained fighter pilots became acute by mid-August 1940. At all times, new pilots had "almost no chance at all" of surviving their first five sorties because of inexperience, because they received the most-damaged and least-reliable planes, and because they were likely to be their formations' "tail-end charlie"s and thus most vulnerable. For the survivors, the odds of survival rose during the next 15 sorties as their skill and confidence grew. After 20, however, the odds again decreased to zero.

With aircraft production running at 300 each week, only 200 pilots were trained in the same period. In addition, more pilots were allocated to squadrons than there were aircraft, as this allowed squadrons to maintain operational strength despite casualties and still provide for pilot leave. Another factor was that only about 30% of the 9,000 pilots were assigned to operational squadrons; 20% of the pilots were involved in conducting pilot training, and a further 20% were undergoing further instruction, like those offered in Canada and in Southern Rhodesia to the Commonwealth trainees, although already qualified. The rest were assigned to staff positions, since RAF policy dictated that only pilots could make many staff and operational command decisions, even in engineering matters. At the height of fighting, and despite Churchill's insistence, only 30 pilots were released to the front line from administrative duties.

For these reasons, and the permanent loss of 435 pilots during Battle of France alone with many more wounded, and others lost in Norway, the RAF had fewer experienced pilots at the start of the battle, and it was the lack of trained pilots in the fighting squadrons, rather than the lack of aircraft, that became the greatest concern for Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, Commander of Fighter Command. Drawing from regular RAF forces and the Auxiliary Air Force and the Volunteer Reserve, the British could muster some 1,103 fighter pilots on 1 July. Replacement pilots, with little flight training and often no gunnery training, suffered high casualty rates.

The ''Luftwaffe'' could muster a larger number (1,450) of more experienced fighter pilots. Training manuals also discouraged heroism, stressing the utmost importance of attacking only when the odds were in the pilot's favour. However, German fighter formations did not provide a sufficient reserve of pilots to allow for losses and leave, These included 145 Poles, 127 New Zealanders, 112 Canadians, 88 Czechoslovaks, 32 Australians, 28 Belgians, 25 South Africans, 13 French, 10 Irish, 7 Americans, and one each from Jamaica, the British Mandate of Palestine, and Southern Rhodesia.

Axis

An element of the Italian Royal Air Force (''Regia Aeronautica'') called the Italian Air Corps (''Corpo Aereo Italiano'' or CAI) first saw action in late October 1940. It took part in the latter stages of the battle, but achieved limited success. The unit was redeployed in early 1941.

''Luftwaffe'' strategy

The ''Luftwaffe'' was devised to provide tactical support for the army on the battlefield. During the ''blitzkrieg'' offensives against Poland, Denmark and Norway and France and the Low Countries, the ''Luftwaffe'' had co-operated fully with the ''Wehrmacht''. For the Battle of Britain however, the ''Luftwaffe'' had to operate in a strategic role, something for which it was unsuited. Its main task was to ensure air supremacy over southeast England, to pave the way for an invasion fleet.

The ''Luftwaffe'' regrouped after the Battle of France into three ''Luftflotten'' (Air Fleets) on Britain's southern and northern flanks. ''Luftflotte'' 2, commanded by ''Generalfeldmarschall'' Albert Kesselring, was responsible for the bombing of southeast England and the London area. ''Luftflotte'' 3, under ''Generalfeldmarschall'' Hugo Sperrle, targeted the West Country, Wales, the Midlands, and northwest England. ''Luftflotte'' 5, led by ''Generaloberst'' Hans-Jürgen Stumpff from his headquarters in Norway, targeted the north of England and Scotland. As the battle progressed, command responsibility shifted, with ''Luftflotte'' 3 taking more responsibility for the night-time ''Blitz'' attacks while the main daylight operations fell upon ''Luftflotte'' 2's shoulders.

Initial ''Luftwaffe'' estimates were that it would take four days to defeat the RAF Fighter Command in southern England. This would be followed by a four-week offensive during which the bombers and long-range fighters would destroy all military installations throughout the country and wreck the British aircraft industry. The campaign was planned to begin with attacks on airfields near the coast, gradually moving inland to attack the ring of sector airfields defending London. Later reassessments gave the ''Luftwaffe'' five weeks, from 8 August to 15 September, to establish temporary air superiority over England. To achieve this goal, Fighter Command had to be destroyed, either on the ground or in the air, yet the ''Luftwaffe'' had to be able to preserve its own strength to be able to support the invasion; this meant that the ''Luftwaffe'' had to maintain a high "kill ratio" over the RAF fighters. The only alternative to the goal of air superiority was a terror bombing campaign aimed at the civilian population, but this was considered a last resort and it was expressly forbidden by Hitler.

The ''Luftwaffe'' kept broadly to this scheme, but its commanders had differences of opinion on strategy. Sperrle wanted to eradicate the air defence infrastructure by bombing it. His counterpart, Kesselring, championed attacking London directly—either to bombard the British government into submission or to draw RAF fighters into a decisive battle. Göring did nothing to resolve this disagreement between his commanders, and only vague directives were set down during the initial stages of the battle, with Göring seemingly unable to decide upon which strategy to pursue. He seemed at times obsessed with maintaining his own power base in the ''Luftwaffe'' and indulging his out-dated beliefs on air fighting, which were later to lead to tactical and strategic errors.

Tactics

''Luftwaffe'' tactics were influenced by their fighters. The Bf 110 proved too vulnerable to the nimble single-engined RAF fighters. This meant the bulk of fighter escort duties fell on the Bf 109. Fighter tactics were then complicated by bomber crews who demanded closer protection. After the hard-fought battles of 15 and 18 August, Göring met with his unit leaders. During this conference, the need for the fighters to meet up on time with the bombers was stressed. It was also decided that one bomber ''Gruppe'' could only be properly protected by several ''Gruppen'' of 109s. In addition Göring stipulated that as many fighters as possible were to be left free for ''Freie Jagd'' ("Free Hunts": a free-roving fighter sweep preceded a raid to try to sweep defenders out of the raid's path). The Ju 87 units, which had suffered heavy casualties, were only to be used under favourable circumstances. In early September, due to increasing complaints from the bomber crews about RAF fighters seemingly able to get through the escort screen, Göring ordered an increase in close escort duties. This decision shackled many of the Bf 109s to the bombers and, although they were more successful at protecting the bomber forces, casualties amongst the fighters mounted primarily because they were forced to fly and manoeuvre at reduced speeds.

The ''Luftwaffe'' consistently varied its tactics in its attempts to break through the RAF defences. It launched many ''Freie Jagd'' to draw up RAF fighters. RAF fighter controllers, however, were often able to detect these and position squadrons to avoid them, keeping to Dowding's plan to preserve fighter strength for the bomber formations. The ''Luftwaffe'' also tried using small formations of bombers as bait, covering them with large numbers of escorts. This was more successful, but escort duty tied the fighters to the bombers' slow speed and made them more vulnerable.

By September, standard tactics for raids had become an amalgam of techniques. A ''Freie Jagd'' would precede the main attack formations. The bombers would fly in at altitudes between and , closely escorted by fighters. Escorts were divided into two parts (usually ''Gruppen''), some operating in close contact with the bombers, and others a few hundred yards away and a little above. If the formation was attacked from the starboard, the starboard section engaged the attackers, the top section moving to starboard and the port section to the top position. If the attack came from the port side the system was reversed. British fighters coming from the rear were engaged by the rear section and the two outside sections similarly moving to the rear. If the threat came from above, the top section went into action while the side sections gained height to be able to follow RAF fighters down as they broke away. If attacked, all sections flew in defensive circles. These tactics were skilfully evolved and carried out, and were extremely difficult to counter.

Adolf Galland noted:

The biggest disadvantage faced by Bf 109 pilots was that without the benefit of long-range drop tanks (which were introduced in limited numbers in the late stages of the battle), usually of capacity, the 109s had an endurance of just over an hour and, for the 109E, a 600 km (360 mi) range. Once over Britain, a 109 pilot had to keep an eye on a red "low fuel" light on the instrument panel: once this was illuminated, he was forced to turn back and head for France. With the prospect of two long over-water flights, and knowing their range was substantially reduced when escorting bombers or during combat, the ''Jagdflieger'' coined the term ''Kanalkrankheit'' or "Channel sickness".

Intelligence

The ''Luftwaffe'' was ill-served by its lack of military intelligence about the British defences. The German intelligence services were fractured and plagued by rivalries; their performance was "amateurish". By 1940, there were few German agents operating in Great Britain and a handful of bungled attempts to insert spies into the country were foiled.

As a result of intercepted radio transmissions, the Germans began to realise that the RAF fighters were being controlled from ground facilities; in July and August 1939, for example, the airship ''Graf Zeppelin'', which was packed with equipment for listening in on RAF radio and RDF transmissions, flew around the coasts of Britain. Although the ''Luftwaffe'' correctly interpreted these new ground control procedures, they were incorrectly assessed as being rigid and ineffectual. A British radar system was well known to the ''Luftwaffe'' from intelligence gathered before the war, but the highly developed "Dowding system" linked with fighter control had been a well-kept secret. Even when good information existed, such as a November 1939 ''Abwehr'' assessment of Fighter Command strengths and capabilities by ''Abteilung V'', it was ignored if it did not match conventional preconceptions.

On 16 July 1940, ''Abteilung V'', commanded by ''Oberstleutnant'' "Beppo" Schmid, produced a report on the RAF and on Britain's defensive capabilities which was adopted by the frontline commanders as a basis for their operational plans. One of the most conspicuous failures of the report was the lack of information on the RAF's RDF network and control systems capabilities; it was assumed that the system was rigid and inflexible, with the RAF fighters being "tied" to their home bases. An optimistic and, as it turned out, erroneous conclusion reached was:

Because of this statement, reinforced by another more detailed report, issued on 10 August, there was a mindset in the ranks of the ''Luftwaffe'' that the RAF would run out of frontline fighters. Many times, the leadership believed Fighter Command's strength had collapsed, only to discover that the RAF were able to send up defensive formations at will.

Throughout the battle, the ''Luftwaffe'' had to use numerous reconnaissance sorties to make up for the poor intelligence. Reconnaissance aircraft (initially mostly Dornier Do 17s, but increasingly Bf 110s) proved easy prey for British fighters, as it was seldom possible for them to be escorted by Bf 109s. Thus, the ''Luftwaffe'' operated "blind" for much of the battle, unsure of its enemy's true strengths, capabilities, and deployments. Many of the Fighter Command airfields were never attacked, while raids against supposed fighter airfields fell instead on bomber or coastal defence stations. The results of bombing and air fighting were consistently exaggerated, due to over-enthusiastic claims and the difficulty of confirmation over enemy territory. In the euphoric atmosphere of perceived victory, the ''Luftwaffe'' leadership became increasingly disconnected from reality. This lack of leadership and solid intelligence meant the Germans did not adopt consistent strategy, even when the RAF had its back to the wall. Moreover, there was never a systematic focus on one type of target (such as airbases, radar stations, or aircraft factories); consequently, the already haphazard effort was further diluted.

Navigational aids

While the British were using radar for air defence more effectively than the Germans realised, the ''Luftwaffe'' attempted to press its own offensive advantage with advanced radio navigation systems of which the British were initially not aware. One of these was ''Knickebein'' ("crooked leg"); this system was used at night and for raids where precision was required. It was rarely used during the Battle of Britain (see Reginald Victor Jones and Battle of the Beams).

Air-sea rescue

The ''Luftwaffe'' was much better prepared for the task of air-sea rescue than the RAF, specifically tasking the ''Seenotdienst'' unit, equipped with Heinkel He 59 floatplanes, with picking up downed aircrew from the North Sea, English Channel and the Dover Straits. In addition, ''Luftwaffe'' aircraft were equipped with life rafts and the aircrew were provided with sachets of a chemical called fluorescein which, on reacting with water, created a large, easy-to-see, bright green patch.

In accordance with the Geneva Convention, the He 59s were unarmed and painted white with civilian registration markings and red crosses. Nevertheless, RAF aircraft attacked these aircraft, as some were escorted by Bf 109s.

After single He 59s were forced to land on the sea by RAF fighters, on 1 and 9 July respectively, a controversial order was issued to the RAF on 13 July; this stated that as of 20 July, ''Seenotdienst'' aircraft were to be shot down. One of the reasons given by Churchill was:

The Air Ministry issuing a communiqué to the German government on 14 July:

The white He 59s were soon repainted in camouflage colours and armed with defensive machine guns. Although another four He 59s were shot down by RAF aircraft, the ''Seenotdienst'' continued to pick up downed ''Luftwaffe'' and Allied aircrew throughout the battle, earning praise from Adolf Galland for their gallantry.

RAF strategy

The Dowding System

The keystone of the British defence was the complex infrastructure of detection, command, and control that ran the battle. This was the "''Dowding System''", after its chief architect, Air Chief Marshal Sir H.C.T. "Stuffy" Dowding, and the leader of RAF Fighter Command. Much of the air defence system had been originally set up from 1917 by Major General E B Ashmore. Dowding built upon and modernised many of the features of this system, including the use of two-way radio and the Royal Observer Corps (ROC). However, the core of Dowding's system was implemented by Dowding himself: the use of Radio Direction Finding (RDF, later called radar, for radio detection and ranging) was at his behest, and its use, supplemented by information by the ROC, was crucial to the RAF's ability to efficiently intercept incoming German aircraft. He also insisted on having the radar operators linked via telephone (whose wires were laid deep underground with concrete anti-bomb protection) to an operational centre: this was Fighter Command control at Bentley Priory. During the Battle several Coastal Command and Fleet Air Arm units came under Fighter Command control.

Groups

The British airspace was divided up into four Groups.

10 Group defended Wales and the West Country and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Quintin Brand.

11 Group covered the southeast of England and the critical approaches to London and was commanded by New Zealander Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park from the No. 11 Group Fighter Command Operations Room in the underground bunker at RAF Uxbridge, now known as the Battle of Britain Bunker.

12 Group defended the Midlands and East Anglia and was led by Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory.

13 Group covered the north of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Richard Saul.

Control systems

Usually the first indications of incoming air raids were received by the Chain Home Radio Direction Finding (RDF) facilities which were located around the coastlines of Great Britain. In most circumstances, RDF could pick up formations of ''Luftwaffe'' aircraft as they organised over their own airfields. Once the raiding aircraft moved inland over England, the formations were also plotted by the Observer Corps. The information from RDF and the Observer Corps were sent through to the main operations room of Fighter Command Headquarters at Bentley Priory. The plots were assessed to determine whether they were "hostile" or "friendly". If hostile, the information was sent to the main "operations room", which was in a large underground bunker.

Here the course information of each raid was plotted by WAAFs who received information by a telephone system. Additional intelligence was provided by the "Y" Service radio posts, which monitored enemy radio transmissions, and the "Ultra" decoding centre based at Bletchley Park. Colour coded counters representing each raid were placed on a large table, which had a map of Britain overlaid and squared off with a British Modified Grid. The colour of counter to use for a new sighting was determined by the time of the sighting, the proper colour being indicated by the minute hand of the sector clock. As the plots of the raiding aircraft moved, the counters were pushed across the map by magnetic "rakes". This system enabled the main "Fighter Controller" (usually of squadron leader rank) and Dowding to see quickly where each formation was heading and allowed an estimate to be made of possible targets. The age of the information was readily apparent from the colour of the counter. Because of the simplicity of the system, decisions could be made quickly and easily.

Apart from the controller, most of the room and map information was operated by members of the WAAF. Before the war, there was still a great deal of doubt about the ability of women to stand up to battle conditions, with many airwomen employed on front-line RDF stations and aerodromes. Experience during the battle proved that such doubts were unfounded and the contribution of the WAAFs became essential to the RAF in its control and communications systems and in many other duties.

This information was simultaneously sent to the headquarters of each Group (for example, RAF Uxbridge for 11 Group), where it was "filtered" through a filter room (that is, collated, cross-checked and simplified), before being sent through to another operations room, housed in the Battle of Britain Bunker. Because Group had tactical control of the battle the operations room was different in layout from the one at Bentley Priory. The main map on the plotting table represented the Group command area and its associated airfields. Extensive radio and telephone equipment transmitted and received a constant flow of information from the various sector airfields as well as the Observer Corps, AA Command and the navy. The "Duty fighter controller" was (for example in 11 Group) Park's personal representative, whose job was to control how and when each raid would be dealt with. He ordered the squadrons airborne and positioned them as he thought best. Timing was of the essence, because "(e)ach minute of unnecessary delay waiting to make absolutely sure that the raid was coming in meant about 2,000 feet of vital altitude our fighters would not have when they met the enemy." (Wing Commander Lord Willoughby de Broke, Senior Fighter Controller, Uxbridge.)

Each Group room had a "tote board" which showed each squadron available to that group. The tote board had a system of lights which enabled the controllers to see the squadron status: ''Released'' (not available); ''Available'' (airborne in 20 minutes); ''Readiness'' (airborne in 5 minutes); ''Standby'' (pilots in cockpit, airborne in 2 minutes); ''Airborne and moving into position''; ''Enemy sighted''; ''Ordered to land''; ''Landed and refuelling/rearming''. Next to the tote board, where it could be clearly seen, was a weather board which showed the state of the weather around each airfield. It was the responsibility of the WAAF plotters to continually update the tote and weather boards.

A vital role was played by the telephone engineers of the GPO "who worked all hours repairing communications, installing completely new facilities in the emergency centres, and keeping the nervous system of Fighter Command functioning..." (Air Commodore Eric Roberts, Commander Middle Wallop Sector in 1940)

Despite appearances, the Groups were not mutually supporting; Park, for instance, could only request – not demand – assistance from Brand (who usually co-operated), or from Leigh-Mallory (who often prevaricated). This was because Dowding had never issued standing orders to assist, nor had he created a method to co-ordinate it.

There was a further problem in that the aircraft were not assigned equitably between Groups. While the most effective RAF fighter was the Spitfire, 70% of 11 Group aircraft were Hurricanes. "In total, less than a third of Britain's best fighters were operating in the key sector."

Sectors

The Group areas were subdivided into Sectors; each commanding officer was assigned between two and four squadrons. Sector Stations, comprising an aerodrome with a "Sector operations room", were the heart of this organisation, and they were also responsible for operating satellite aerodromes to which squadrons could be dispersed. The operations rooms duplicated those at the Group HQs, although they were on a smaller scale and most were still housed in brick, single-storey, tile-roofed structures above ground, where they were vulnerable to attack. By 1940, most were semi-protected by an earth bank or "blast wall" surrounding them which reached as high as the eaves. Fortunately for Fighter Command, ''Luftwaffe'' Intelligence was unaware of the importance of these rooms and most were left alone. The control rooms at Biggin Hill were destroyed by a raid on 31 August, but this was due to a chance bomb hit. Their vulnerability in time of war was appreciated and new airfields built during the expansion programme of the 1930s had new, bombproof Mk II, L-shaped structures. As a further precaution, emergency control rooms were set up in different locations away from the airfields, with small loss in efficiency; RAF Kenley, for example, could use an alternative room housed in a butcher's shop in nearby Caterham. The plotting table was laid out with a map of the sector and its airfields, and the tote and weather boards reflected this more localised information.

Limitations

Though it was the most sophisticated air defence system in the world at that time, the Dowding System had many limitations, including, but not often stressed, its emphatic need for qualified ground maintenance personnel, many of whom had received their training under the Aircraft Apprentice scheme instituted by Hugh Trenchard. RDF (radar) was subject to significant errors and the Observer Corps had difficulties tracking raids at night and in bad weather. R/T (radio telephone) communications with airborne fighters were restricted because the standard radio set used by RAF fighters at the beginning of the battle was the TR9D HF set, which operated over two selectable frequencies in the band 4.3–6.6 Megahertz (MHz); the RAF soon realised that this equipment was limited in the range at which it could receive and transmit radio signals because of its limited power. In addition, the increase in the number of civil, military and foreign HF-band radio transmitters since the adoption of the TR9 meant that the signal often suffered from distortion and interference, making clear communication with the RAF fighters difficult. It was also restricted to a single frequency per squadron, making inter-squadron communication impossible. Ultra helped establish the strength and composition of the ''Luftwaffe's'' formations, the aims of the commanders and provided early warning of some raids. In early August it was decided that a small unit would be set up at Fighter Command headquarters (Stanmore), which would process the flow of information from Bletchley and provide Dowding only with the most essential Ultra material; thus the Air Ministry did not have to send a continual flow of information to Stanmore, preserving secrecy, and Dowding was not inundated with non-essential information. Keith Park and his controllers were also told about Ultra. In a further attempt to camouflage the existence of Ultra Dowding created a unit called 421 Flight. This unit (which later became 91 Squadron), was equipped with Hurricanes and Spitfires and sent out aircraft to search for and report ''Luftwaffe'' formations approaching England. In addition the radio listening service (known as Y Service), monitoring the patterns of ''Luftwaffe'' radio traffic, contributed considerably to the early warning of raids.

Air-sea rescue

One of the biggest oversights of the entire system was the lack of a proper air-sea rescue organisation. The RAF had started organising a system in 1940 with High Speed Launches (HSLs) based on flying boat bases and at a number of overseas locations, but it was still believed that the amount of cross-Channel traffic meant that there was no need for a rescue service to cover these areas. Downed pilots and aircrew, it was hoped, would be picked up by any boats or ships which happened to be passing by. Otherwise the local life boat would be alerted, assuming someone had seen the pilot going into the water.

RAF aircrew were issued with a life jacket, nicknamed the "Mae West" but in 1940 it still required manual inflation, which was almost impossible for someone who was injured or in shock. The waters of the English Channel and Dover Straits are cold, even in the middle of summer, and clothing issued to RAF aircrew did little to insulate them against these freezing conditions. A conference in 1939 had placed air-sea rescue under Coastal Command. Because a number of pilots had been lost at sea during the "Channel Battle", on 22 August, control of RAF rescue launches was passed to the local naval authorities and 12 Lysanders were given to Fighter Command to help look for pilots at sea. In all some 200 pilots and aircrew were lost at sea during the battle. No proper air-sea rescue service was formed until 1941. Park also issued instructions to his units to engage in frontal attacks against the bombers, which were more vulnerable to such attacks. Again, in the environment of fast moving, three-dimensional air battles, few RAF fighter units were able to attack the bombers from head-on.

The issue caused intense friction between Park and Leigh-Mallory, as 12 Group was tasked with protecting 11 Group's airfields whilst Park's squadrons intercepted incoming raids. However, the delay in forming up Big Wings meant the formations often did not arrive at all or until after German bombers had hit 11 Group's airfields. Dowding, to highlight the problem of the Big Wing's performance, submitted a report compiled by Park to the Air Ministry on 15 November. In the report, he highlighted that during the period of 11 September – 31 October, the extensive use of the Big Wing had resulted in just 10 interceptions and one German aircraft destroyed, but his report was ignored. Post-war analysis agrees Dowding and Park's approach was best for 11 Group.

Dowding's removal from his post in November 1940 has been blamed on this struggle between Park and Leigh-Mallory's daylight strategy. However, the intensive raids and destruction wrought during the Blitz damaged both Dowding and Park in particular, for the failure to produce an effective night-fighter defence system, something for which the influential Leigh-Mallory had long criticised them.

Bomber and Coastal Command contributions

Bomber Command and Coastal Command aircraft flew offensive sorties against targets in Germany and France during the battle. After the initial disasters of the war, with Vickers Wellington bombers shot down in large numbers attacking Wilhelmshaven and the slaughter of the Fairey Battle squadrons sent to France, it became clear that Bomber Command would have to operate mainly at night to achieve any results without incurring very high losses. From 15 May 1940, a night time bomber campaign was launched against the German oil industry, communications, and forests/crops, mainly in the Ruhr area.

As the threat mounted, Bomber Command changed targeting priority on 3 June 1940 to attack the German aircraft industry. On 4 July, the Air Ministry gave Bomber Command orders to attack ports and shipping. By September, the build-up of invasion barges in the Channel ports had become a top priority target. On 7 September, the government issued a warning that the invasion could be expected within the next few days and, that night, Bomber Command attacked the Channel ports and supply dumps. On 13 September, they carried out another large raid on the Channel ports, sinking 80 large barges in the port of Ostend. 84 barges were sunk in Dunkirk after another raid on 17 September and by 19 September, almost 200 barges had been sunk. The loss of these barges may have contributed to Hitler's decision to postpone Operation Sealion indefinitely. The success of these raids was in part because the Germans had few Freya radar stations set up in France, so that air defences of the French harbours were not nearly as good as the air defences over Germany; Bomber Command had directed some 60% of its strength against the Channel ports.

The Bristol Blenheim units also raided German-occupied airfields throughout July to December 1940, both during daylight hours and at night. Although most of these raids were unproductive, there were some successes; on 1 August, five out of 12 Blenheims sent to attack Haamstede and Evere (Brussels) were able to bomb, destroying or heavily damaging three Bf 109s of II./JG 27 and apparently killing a ''Staffelkapitän'' identified as a ''Hauptmann'' Albrecht von Ankum-Frank. Two other 109s were claimed by Blenheim gunners. Another successful raid on Haamstede was made by a single Blenheim on 7 August which destroyed one 109 of 4./JG 54, heavily damaged another and caused lighter damage to four more.

There were some missions which produced an almost 100% casualty rate amongst the Blenheims; one such operation was mounted on 13 August 1940 against a ''Luftwaffe'' airfield near Aalborg in north-eastern Denmark by 12 aircraft of 82 Squadron. One Blenheim returned early (the pilot was later charged and due to appear before a court martial, but was killed on another operation), the other 11, which reached Denmark, were shot down, five by flak and six by Bf 109s. Of the 33 crewmen who took part in the attack, 20 were killed and 13 captured.

As well as the bombing operations, Blenheim-equipped units had been formed to carry out long-range strategic reconnaissance missions over Germany and German-occupied territories. In this role, the Blenheims again proved to be too slow and vulnerable against ''Luftwaffe'' fighters, and they took constant casualties.

Coastal Command directed its attention towards the protection of British shipping, and the destruction of enemy shipping. As invasion became more likely, it participated in the strikes on French harbours and airfields, laying mines, and mounting numerous reconnaissance missions over the enemy-held coast. In all, some 9,180 sorties were flown by bombers from July to October 1940. Although this was much less than the 80,000 sorties flown by fighters, bomber crews suffered about half the total number of casualties borne by their fighter colleagues. The bomber contribution was, therefore, much more dangerous on a loss-per-sortie comparison.

It is a testament to the courage of the men in these bomber, reconnaissance and Coastal Command units that they continued to operate throughout these months with little respite and with little of the publicity accorded to Fighter Command. In his famous 20 August speech about "The Few", praising Fighter Command, Churchill also made a point to mention Bomber Command's contribution, adding that bombers were even then striking back at Germany; this part of the speech is often overlooked. The Battle of Britain Chapel in Westminster Abbey lists in a Roll of Honour 718 Bomber Command crew members, and 280 from Coastal Command who were killed between 10 July and 31 October.

Phases of the battle

The Battle can be roughly divided into four phases:

10 July – 11 August: ''Kanalkampf'', ("the Channel battles").

12 August – 23 August: ''Adlerangriff'' ("Eagle Attack"), the early assault against the coastal airfields.

24 August – 6 September: the ''Luftwaffe'' targets the airfields. The critical phase of the battle.

7 September onwards: the day attacks switch to British towns and cities.

Channel battles

The ''Kanalkampf'' comprised a series of running fights over convoys in the English Channel and occasional attacks on the convoys by Stuka dive bombers. It was launched partly because Kesselring and Sperrle were not sure about what else to do, and partly because it gave German aircrews some training and a chance to probe the British defences. The raids appeared to show that British radars were difficult to knock out. The failure to mount follow-up attacks allowed the RAF to get the stations back on the air, and the ''Luftwaffe'' neglected strikes on the supporting infrastructure, such as phone lines and power stations, which could have rendered the radars useless, even if the towers themselves (which were very difficult to destroy) remained intact.

''Adlertag'' opened with a series of attacks, led again by ''Epro'' 210, (including Manston and Hawkinge). As a result of these casualties, ''Luftflotte'' 5 did not appear in strength again in the campaign.

18 August, which had the greatest number of casualties to both sides, has been dubbed "The Hardest Day". Following the grinding battles of 18 August, exhaustion and the weather reduced operations for most of a week, allowing the ''Luftwaffe'' to review their performance. "The Hardest Day" had sounded the end for the Ju 87 in the campaign. This veteran of ''Blitzkrieg'' was too vulnerable to fighters to operate over Britain, and to preserve the ''Stuka'' force, Göring withdrew them from the fighting. This removed the main ''Luftwaffe'' precision-bombing weapon and shifted the burden of pinpoint attacks on the already-stretched ''Erpro'' 210. The Bf 110 proved too clumsy for dogfighting with single-engined fighters, and its participation was scaled back. It would only be used when range required it or when sufficient single-engined escort could not be provided for the bombers.

Göring made yet another fateful decision: to order more bomber escorts at the expense of free-hunting sweeps. To achieve this, the weight of the attack now fell on ''Luftflotte'' 2, and the bulk of the Bf 109s in ''Luftflotte 3'' were transferred to Kesselring's command, reinforcing the fighter bases in the Pas-de-Calais. Stripped of its fighters, ''Luftflotte 3'' would concentrate on the night bombing campaign. Göring, expressing disappointment with the fighter performance thus far in the campaign, also made sweeping changes in the command structure of the fighter units, replacing many ''Geschwaderkommodore'' with younger, more aggressive pilots like Adolf Galland and Werner Mölders.

Finally, Göring stopped the attacks on the radar chain. These were seen as unsuccessful, and neither the ''Reichsmarschall'' nor his subordinates realised how vital the Chain Home stations were to the defence. It was known that radar provided some early warning of raids, but the belief among German fighter pilots was that anything bringing up the "Tommies" to fight was to be encouraged.

The ''Luftwaffe'' targets RAF airfields

Battle

Göring ordered attacks on aircraft factories on 19 August 1940; on 23 August 1940 he ordered that RAF airfields be attacked. That evening an attack was mounted on a tyre factory in Birmingham. Raids on airfields continued through 24 August, and Portsmouth was hit by a major attack. That night, several areas of London were bombed; the East End was set ablaze and bombs landed on central London. Some historians believe that these bombs were dropped accidentally by a group of Heinkel He 111s which had failed to find their target; this account has been contested. In retaliation, the RAF bombed Berlin on the night of 25–26 August, and continued bombing raids on Berlin. Göring's pride was hurt, as he had previously claimed the British would never be able to bomb the city. The attacks enraged Hitler, who ordered retaliatory attacks on London.

From 24 August onwards, the battle was a fight between Kesselring's ''Luftflotte'' 2 and Park's 11 Group. The ''Luftwaffe'' concentrated all their strength on knocking out Fighter Command and made repeated attacks on the airfields. Of the 33 heavy attacks in the following two weeks, 24 were against airfields. The key sector stations were hit repeatedly: Biggin Hill and Hornchurch four times each; Debden and North Weald twice each. Croydon, Gravesend, Rochford, Hawkinge and Manston were also attacked in strength. Coastal Command's Eastchurch was bombed at least seven times because it was believed to be a Fighter Command aerodrome. At times these raids caused some damage to the sector stations, threatening the integrity of the Dowding system.

To offset some losses, some 58 Fleet Air Arm fighter pilot volunteers were seconded to RAF squadrons, and a similar number of former Fairey Battle pilots were used. Most replacements from Operational Training Units (OTUs) had as little as nine hours flying time and no gunnery or air-to-air combat training. At this point, the multinational nature of Fighter Command came to the fore. Many squadrons and personnel from the air forces of the Dominions were already attached to the RAF, including top level commanders – Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, Rhodesians and South Africans. In addition, there were other nationalities represented, including Free French, Belgian and a Jewish pilot from the British mandate of Palestine.

They were bolstered by the arrival of fresh Czechoslovak and Polish squadrons. These had been held back by Dowding, who mistakenly thought non-English speaking aircrew would have trouble working within his control system. However, Polish and Czech fliers proved to be especially effective. The pre-war Polish Air Force had lengthy and extensive training, and high standards; with Poland conquered and under brutal German occupation, the pilots of No. 303 (Polish) Squadron, the highest-scoring Allied unit, were strongly motivated. Josef František, a Czech regular airman who had flown from the occupation of his own country to join the Polish and then French air forces before arriving in Britain, flew as a guest of 303 Squadron and was ultimately credited with the highest "RAF score" in the Battle of Britain.

The RAF had the advantage of fighting over home territory. Pilots who bailed out of their downed aircraft could be back at their airfields within hours. For ''Luftwaffe'' aircrews, a bailout over England meant capture, while parachuting into the English Channel often meant drowning or death from exposure. Morale began to suffer, and ''Kanalkrankheit'' ("Channel sickness") – a form of combat fatigue – began to appear among the German pilots. Their replacement problem was even worse than the British.

Impact of offensive

The effect of the German attacks on airfields is not straightforward. Stephen Bungay's research tells us that Dowding, in a letter to Hugh Trenchard accompanying Park's report on the period 8 August – 10 September 1940, states that the ''Luftwaffe'' "achieved very little" in the last week of August and the first week of September. The only Sector Station to be shut down operationally was Biggin Hill, and it was non-operational for just two hours. Dowding admitted 11 Group's efficiency was impaired but, despite serious damage to some airfields, only two out of 13 heavily attacked airfields were down for more than a few hours. The German refocus on London was not critical. and 2010, dealing specifically with the single-seat fighters. Dye contends that not only was British aircraft production replacing aircraft, but replacement pilots were keeping pace with losses. The number of pilots in RAF Fighter Command increased during July, August and September. The figures indicate the number of pilots available never decreased. From July, 1 200 were available. In 1 August, 1 400 were available. Just over that number were in the field by September. In October the figure was nearly 1,600. By 1 November 1800 were available. Throughout the battle, the RAF had more fighter pilots available than the ''Luftwaffe''. Although the RAF's reserves of single seat fighters fell during July, the wastage was made up for by an efficient Civilian Repair Organisation (CRO), which by December had repaired and put back into service some 4,955 aircraft, and by aircraft held at Air Servicing Unit (ASU) airfields.

Richard Overy endorses Dye and Bungay. Overy asserts only one airfield was temporarily put out of action and "only" 103 pilots were lost. British fighter production produced 496 new aircraft in July and 467 in August, and another 467 in September (not counting repaired aircraft), covering the losses of August and September. Overy indicates the number of serviceable and total strength returns reveal an ''increase'' in fighters from 3 August to 7 September, 1,061 on strength and 708 serviceable to 1,161 on strength and 746 serviceable. Moreover, Overy points out that the number of RAF fighter pilots grew by one-third between June and August 1940. Personnel records show a constant supply of around 1,400 pilots in the crucial weeks of the battle. In the second half of September it reached 1,500. The shortfall of pilots was never above 10 percent. The Germans never had more than between 1,100 and 1,200 pilots, a deficiency of up to one-third. "If Fighter Command were 'the few', the German fighter pilots were fewer".

American historian James Corum points out that it was unlikely that the ''Luftwaffe'' was ever able to destroy the RAF. If British losses became severe, the RAF could simply withdraw northward and regroup. It could then deploy when and if the Germans launched an invasion. Corum doubts that the ''Luftwaffe'' could have defeated the RAF in the limited time available before the weather window closed in October. Corum also argues that the ''Sea Lion'' would have failed because of the weaknesses of German sea power.

Older history books assert this period was the most dangerous of all. In ''The Narrow Margin'', published in 1961, historians Derek Wood and Derek Dempster believed that the period from 24 August to 6 September represented a real danger. According to them, from 24 August to 6 September 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. They assert that 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just fewer than 1,000. They conclude that during August no more than 260 fighter pilots were turned out by OTUs and casualties in the same month were just over 300. A full squadron establishment was 26 pilots whereas the average in August was 16. In their assessment, the RAF was losing the battle.

By this point Hitler had becoming impatient with the ''Luftwaffe''. On 14 September, General Hans Jeschonnek, ''Luftwaffe'' Chief of Staff, persuaded Hitler for a last chance to defeat the RAF and sought permission to launch attacks on civilian residential areas to cause mass panic. Hitler refused the latter, perhaps unaware of just how much damage had already been done to civilian targets, as he wanted to reserve for himself the right to unleash the terror weapon. Political will was to be broken by the collapse of the material infrastructure, the weapons industry, along with the destruction of stocks of fuel and food. On 16 September, Göring ordered the air fleets to begin the new phase of the battle.

Raids on British cities

Hitler's No. 17 Directive, issued 1 August 1940 on the conduct of war against England specifically prohibited ''Luftwaffe'' from conducting terror raids on its own initiative, and reserved the right of ordering terror attacks as means of reprisal for the Führer himself:

The ''Luftwaffe'' offensive against Britain had included numerous raids on major ports since August, but Hitler had issued a directive London was not to be bombed save on his sole instruction. However, on the afternoon of 15 August, ''Hauptmann'' Walter Rubensdörffer leading ''Erprobungsgruppe'' 210 mistakenly bombed the Croydon airfield (on the outskirts of London) instead of the intended target, RAF Kenley; this was followed on the night of 23/24 August by the accidental bombing of Harrow, also on the outskirts of London, as well as raids on Aberdeen, Bristol, and South Wales. The focus on attacking airfields had also been accompanied by a sustained bombing campaign which begun on 24 August with the largest raid so far, killing 100 in Portsmouth, and that evening the first night raid on London as described above. On 25 August 1940, 81 bombers of Bomber Command were sent out to raid industrial and commercial targets in Berlin. Clouds prevented accurate identification and the bombs fell across the city, causing some casualties amongst the civilian population as well as damage to residential areas. Continuing RAF raids on Berlin in retaliation led to Hitler withdrawing his directive, and on 3 September Göring planned to bomb London daily, with Kesselring's enthusiastic support, having received reports the average strength of RAF squadrons was down to five or seven fighters out of 12 and their airfields in the area were out of action. Hitler issued a directive on 5 September to attack cities including London. In his speech delivered on the 4 September 1940, Hitler threatened to obliterate (''ausradieren'') British cities if British bombing runs against Germany did not stop.

On 7 September, a massive series of raids involving nearly four hundred bombers and more than six hundred fighters targeted docks in the East End of London, day and night. The raids were codenamed Operation Loge. The RAF anticipated attacks on airfields and 11 Group rose to meet them, in greater numbers than the ''Luftwaffe'' expected. The first official deployment of 12 Group's Big Wing took twenty minutes to gain formation, missing its intended target, but encountering another formation of bombers while still climbing. They returned, apologetic about their limited success, and blamed the delay on being requested too late. Fighter Command had been at its lowest ebb, short of men and machines, and the break from airfield attacks allowed them to recover. 11 Group had considerable success in breaking up daytime raids. 12 Group repeatedly disobeyed orders and failed to meet requests to protect 11 Group airfields, but their experiments with increasingly large Big Wings had some successes. The ''Luftwaffe'' began to abandon their morning raids, with attacks on London starting late in the afternoon for 57 consecutive nights of attacks.

The most damaging aspect to the ''Luftwaffe'' of the change in targets (to London) was the increase in range. The Bf 109 escorts had a limited fuel capacity, and by the time they arrived had only 10 minutes of flying time before they had to turn for home. This left many raids undefended by fighter escorts.

On 14 September Hitler chaired a meeting with the OKW staff. Göring was absent in France, as he had decided to direct the decisive part of the battle from there, and left Erhard Milch to deputise for him. At the meeting Hitler raised the question, "Should we call it off altogether?". Hitler had accepted that an invasion with massive air cover was no longer possible. Instead he opted to try to crush British morale, while maintaining the threat of invasion. Hitler concluded this might result in "eight million going mad" (referring to the population of London in 1940), which would "cause a catastrophe" for the British. In those circumstances, Hitler said, "even a small invasion might go a long way". At this point Hitler was against cancelling the invasion as "the cancellation would reach the ears of the enemy and strengthen his resolve".

On 15 September two massive waves of German attacks were decisively repulsed by the RAF, with every aircraft of 11 Group being used on that day. The total casualties on this critical day were 60 German and 26 RAF aircraft shot down. The German defeat caused Hitler to order, two days later, the ''postponement'' of preparations for the invasion of Britain. Henceforth, in the face of mounting losses in men, aircraft and the lack of adequate replacements, the ''Luftwaffe'' switched from daylight to nighttime bombing. The air battles on the 15 September became known as the Battle of Britain Day.

On 27 September, a Junkers Ju 88 returning from a raid on London was shot down in Kent, resulting in the Battle of Graveney Marsh, the last action between British and foreign military forces on British mainland soil.

On 13 October, Hitler again postponed the invasion "until the spring of 1941"; however, the invasion never happened, and October is regarded as the month regular bombing of Britain ended. It was not until Hitler's Directive 21 was issued, on 18 December 1940, that the threat of invasion finally dissipated.

During the battle, and for the rest of the war, an important factor in keeping public morale high was the continued presence in London of King George VI and his wife Queen Elizabeth. When war broke out in 1939, the King and Queen decided to stay in London and not flee to Canada, as had been suggested. George VI and Elizabeth officially stayed in Buckingham Palace throughout the war, although they often spent weekends at Windsor Castle to visit their daughters, Elizabeth (the future queen) and Margaret. Buckingham Palace was damaged by bombs which landed in the grounds on 10 September, and on 13 September, more serious damage was caused by two bombs which destroyed the Royal Chapel. The royal couple were in a small sitting room about 80 yards from where the bombs exploded. On 24 September, in recognition of the bravery of civilians, King George VI inaugurated the award of the George Cross.

Attrition statistics

Overall, by 2 November, the RAF fielded 1,796 pilots, an increase of over 40% from July 1940's count of 1,259 pilots. Based on German sources (from a ''Luftwaffe'' intelligence officer Otto Bechtle attached to KG 2 in February 1944) translated by the Air Historical Branch, Stephen Bungay asserts German fighter and bomber "strength" declined without recovery, and that from August – December 1940, the German fighter and bomber strength declined by 30 and 25 percent. In contrast, Williamson Murray, asserts (using translations by the Air Historical Branch) that 1,380 German bombers were on strength on 29 June 1940, 1,420 bombers on 28 September, 1,423 level bombers on 2 November and 1,393 bombers on 30 November 1940. The first week of September accounted for 25 per cent of the Fighter Command, and 24 per cent of the ''Luftwaffe's'' overall losses. Between the dates 26 August – 6 September, the Germans destroyed more aircraft than they lost on only one day (1 September). Losses were 325 German and 248 British.

''Luftwaffe'' losses for August numbered 774 aircraft to all causes, representing 18.5 per cent of all combat aircraft at the beginning of the month. Fighter Command's losses in August were 426 fighters destroyed, amounting to 40 per cent of 1,061 fighters available on 3 August. In addition, 99 bombers and 27 other types were destroyed between 1 and 29 August.

From July to September, the ''Luftwaffe's'' loss records indicate the loss of 1,636 aircraft, 1,184 to enemy action.

Throughout the battle, the Germans

greatly underestimated the size of the RAF and the scale of British aircraft production. Across the Channel, the Air Intelligence division of the Air Ministry consistently overestimated the size of the German air enemy and the productive capacity of the German aviation industry. As the battle was fought, both sides exaggerated the losses inflicted on the other by an equally large margin. However, the intelligence picture formed before the battle encouraged the German Air Force to believe that such losses pushed Fighter Command to the very edge of defeat, while the exaggerated picture of German air strength persuaded the RAF that the threat it faced was larger and more dangerous than was the case.

This led the British to the conclusion that another fortnight of attacks on airfields might force Fighter Command to withdraw their squadrons from the south of England. The German misconception, on the other hand,

encouraged first complacency, then strategic misjudgement. The shift of targets from air bases to industry and communications was taken because it was assumed that Fighter Command was virtually eliminated.

Between the 24 August and 4 September German serviceability rates, which were acceptable at ''Stuka'' units, were running at 75% with Bf 109s, 70% with bombers and 65% with Bf 110s, indicating a shortage of spare parts. All units were well below established strength. The attrition was beginning to affect the fighters in particular." By 14 September the ''Luftwaffe's'' Bf 109 ''Geschwader'' possessed only 67 percent of their operational crews against authorised aircraft. For Bf 110 units it was 46 per cent; and for bombers it was 59 per cent. A week later the figures had dropped to 64 per cent, 52 per cent, and 52 per cent.

Aftermath

The Battle of Britain marked the first defeat of Hitler's military forces, with air superiority seen as the key to victory. Pre-war theories led to exaggerated fears of strategic bombing, and British public opinion was invigorated by having come through the ordeal. For the British, Fighter Command had achieved a great victory in successfully carrying out Sir Thomas Inskip's 1937 air policy of preventing the Germans from knocking Britain out of the war. The Fighter Command was so successful that the conclusion to Churchill's famous 'Battle of Britain' speech made in the House of Commons on 18 June, has come to refer solely to them: "...if the British Empire and its Commonwealth lasts for a thousand years, men will still say, 'This was their finest hour.'"

The Battle also signalled a significant shift in US opinion. During the battle, many people from the U.S. accepted the view promoted by Joseph Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador in London, and believed that Great Britain could not survive. However, Roosevelt wanted a second opinion, and sent "Wild Bill" Donovan on a brief visit to Britain; he became convinced Britain would survive and should be supported in every possible way.

Both sides in the battle made exaggerated claims of numbers of enemy aircraft shot down. In general, claims were two to three times the actual numbers, because of the confusion of fighting in dynamic three-dimensional air battles. Postwar analysis of records has shown that between July and September, the RAF claimed 2,698 kills, while the ''Luftwaffe'' fighters claimed 3,198 RAF aircraft downed. Total losses, and start and end dates for recorded losses, vary for both sides. ''Luftwaffe'' losses from 10 July to 30 October 1940 total 1,652 aircraft, including 229 twin- and 533 single-engined fighters. In the same period, RAF Fighter Command aircraft losses number 1,087, including 53 twin-engined fighters. To the RAF figure should be added 376 Bomber Command and 148 Coastal Command aircraft conducting bombing, mining, and reconnaissance operations in defence of the country.

Dr. Andrew Gordon, who lectures at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, and a former lecturer Professor Gary Sheffield, have suggested the existence of the Royal Navy was enough to prevent the Germans from invading; even had the ''Luftwaffe'' won the air battle, the Germans had limited means with which to combat the Royal Navy, which would have intervened to prevent a landing. Some veterans of the battle point out the Royal Navy would have been vulnerable to air attack by the ''Luftwaffe'' if Germany had achieved air superiority, citing the fate of ''Prince of Wales'' and ''Repulse'' which, in December 1941, were sunk in an attack by Japanese aircraft. However, in late May 1941, the Royal Navy was able to completely defeat the attempted seaborne invasion of Crete, despite overwhelming, and completely undisputed, ''Luftwaffe'' supremacy.

Though the claims about the Royal Navy's ability to repel an invasion may be contested, there is a consensus among historians the ''Luftwaffe'' simply could not crush the RAF. Stephen Bungay described Dowding and Park's strategy of choosing when to engage the enemy whilst maintaining a coherent force as vindicated. The RAF proved to be a robust and capable organisation which was to use all the modern resources available to it to the maximum advantage. Richard Evans wrote:

A more considered view of the battle has to take into account the vital role of the Royal Navy. It was widely acknowledged by both sides that the only way of achieving a successful invasion of the British Isles was through the establishment of naval supremacy. Given the inability of the ''Luftwaffe''' to effect real damage on the RN throughout the Battle and during the Dunkirk and Norwegian campaigns, as well as the lack of surface assets in the Kreigsmarine's inventory, sea control of the Channel by Germany was impossible. As one of 'the Few', Wg Cdr H R Allen said, "It was sea power that ruled the day in 1940, and fortunately Britain had a sufficiency. The air situation was, of course, important, but by no means fundamental. Without doubt the five hundred of so section, flight and squadron commanders in Fighter Command earned their laurels. But the real victor was the Royal Navy, the Silent Service."

The ''Luftwaffe'' had 1,380 bombers on 29 June 1940. By 2 November 1940 this had increased to 1,423, and to 1,511 by 21 June 1941, prior to Operation Barbarossa, but showing a drop of 200 from 1,711 reported on 11 May 1940. 1,107 single- and 357 twin-engined daylight fighters were reported on strength prior to the Battle on 29 June 1940, compared to 1,440 single- and 188 twin-engined fighters, plus 263 night fighters, on 21 June 1941. The victory was as much psychological as physical. Alfred Price:

The truth of the matter, borne out by the events of 18 August is more prosaic: neither by attacking the airfields, nor by attacking London, was the ''Luftwaffe'' likely to destroy Fighter Command. Given the size of the British fighter force and the general high quality of its equipment, training and morale, the ''Luftwaffe'' could have achieved no more than a Pyrrhic victory. During the action on 18 August it had cost the ''Luftwaffe'' five trained aircrewmen killed, wounded or taken prisoner, for each British fighter pilot killed or wounded; the ratio was similar on other days in the battle. And this ratio of 5:1 was very close to that between the number of German aircrew involved in the battle and those in Fighter Command. In other words the two sides were suffering almost the same losses in trained aircrew, in proportion to their overall strengths. In the Battle of Britain, for the first time during the Second World War, the German war machine had set itself a major task which it patently failed to achieve, and so demonstrated that it was not invincible. In stiffening the resolve of those determined to resist Hitler the battle was an important turning point in the conflict.

The British triumph in the Battle of Britain was won at a heavy cost. Total British civilian losses from July to December 1940 were 23,002 dead and 32,138 wounded, with one of the largest single raids on 19 December 1940, in which almost 3,000 civilians died.

The brilliant leadership of Dowding and Keith Park in successfully proving their theories of air defence, however, had created enmity among RAF senior commanders and both were sacked from their posts in the immediate aftermath of the battle.

The end of the battle allowed Britain to rebuild its military forces and establish itself as an Allied stronghold. Britain later served as a base from which the Liberation of Western Europe was launched. Pilots who fought in the Battle have been known as ''The Few'' ever since. Battle of Britain Day is commemorated in the United Kingdom on 15 September. Within the Commonwealth, Battle of Britain Day is usually observed on the third Sunday in September. In some areas in the British Channel Islands, it is celebrated on the second Thursday in September.

Film

The story of the battle was documented in, amongst many others, the 1969 film ''Battle of Britain'', which drew many respected British actors to act key figures of the battle, including Sir Laurence Olivier as Hugh Dowding and Trevor Howard as Keith Park. It also starred Michael Caine, Christopher Plummer and Robert Shaw as Squadron Leaders. Former participants of the battle served as technical advisors including Douglas Bader, James Lacey, Robert Stanford Tuck, Adolf Galland and Dowding himself. An Italian film around the same time titled ''Eagles Over London'' (1969) also featured the Battle of Britain.

It was also the subject of the 1941 Allied propaganda film ''Churchill's Island'', winner of the first-ever Academy Award for Documentary Short Subject.

In 2010, actor Julian Glover played a 101-year-old Polish veteran RAF pilot in the short film, ''Battle for Britain''.

See also

Air warfare of World War II

Battle Information

* Battle of Britain RAF squadrons

* Battle of Britain RAF airfields

* List of RAF aircrew in the Battle of Britain

* List of military aircraft operational during World War II

* Operation Banquet

* Operation Lucid

Battle in contemporary history

* The Darkest Hour

* The Few

* Coventry Blitz

* Polish Air Forces in France and Great Britain

* Evacuations of civilians in Britain during World War II

* History of the Luftwaffe (1933–1945)

Post-war memorials

* Battle of Britain Memorial Flight

* Battle of Britain Memorial, Capel-le-Ferne

* Battle of Britain Monument in London

* Kent Battle of Britain Museum

* Battle of Britain Class steam locomotives of the Southern Railway

References

;Footnotes

;Citations

Bibliography

General

Allen, Hubert Raymond "Dizzy", Wing Commander, RAF. ''Who Won the Battle of Britain?'' London: Arthur Barker, 1974. ISBN 0-213-16489-2.

Bishop, Edward. ''Their Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain 1940''. London: Ballantine Books, 1968.

Buckley, John. ''Air Power in the Age of Total War''. London: UCL Press, 1999. ISBN 1-85728-589-1.

Buell, Thomas. ''The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean''. New York: Square One Publishers, 2002. ISBN 978-0757001604.

Bungay, Stephen. ''The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain''. London: Aurum Press, 2000. ISBN 1-85410-721-6 (hardcover), 2002, ISBN 1-85410-801-8 (paperback).

Churchill, Winston S. ''The Second World War – Their Finest Hour (Volume 2)''. London: Cassell, 1949.

Corum, James. ''The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940''. Kansas University Press, 1997. ISBN 0-7006-0836-2

Deighton, Len. ''Fighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain''. London: Pimlico, 1996. (Originally published: London: Jonathan Cape, 1977.) ISBN 0-71267-423-3.

Deighton, Len. ''Battle of Britain''. London: Cape, 1980. ISBN 0-22401-826-4.

de Zeng, Henry L., Doug G. Stankey and Eddie J. Creek. ''Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–1945: A Reference Source, Volume 1''. Hersham, Surrey, UK: Ian Allen Publishing, 2007. ISBN 978-1-85780-279-5.

Dönitz, Karl. ''Ten years and Twenty Days''. New York: Da Capo Press, First Edition, 1997. ISBN 0-306-80764-5.

Dye, Air Commodore Peter J. "Logistics and the Battle of Britain". ''Air Force Journal of Logistics'' No. 24, Vol 4, Winter 2000.

Ellis, John. ''Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War''. London: Andre Deutsch, 1990. ISBN 0-8264-8031-4.

Evans, Michael. "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to... the Navy." ''The Times'', 24 August 2006. Retrieved: 3 March 2007.

Haining, Peter. ''The Chianti Raiders: The Extraordinary Story of the Italian Air Force in the Battle of Britain''. London: Robson Books, 2005. ISBN1-86105-829-2

Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. ''Action Station 4: Military Airfields of Yorkshire''. Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stevens, 1984. ISBN 0-85059-532-0.

Harding, Thomas. "Battle of Britain was won at sea." ''The Telegraph'', 25 August 2006. Retrieved: 25 August 2006.

Holland, James. ''The Battle of Britain''. London: Bantam, 2010. ISBN 978-0-59305-913-5.

Hooton, E.R. ''Luftwaffe at War: Blitzkrieg in the West, Vol. 2''. London: Chevron/Ian Allen, 2007. ISBN 978-1-85780-272-6.

Hough, Richard and Denis Richards. ''The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Air Battle of World War II''. New York: W.W. Norton & Co Inc, 2007. ISBN 978-0393027662.

Irving, David. ''The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of Field Marshal Erhard Milch''. Dorney, Windsor, UK: Focal Point Publications, 1974. ISBN 978-029776-532-5.

Keegan, John. ''The Second World War'' London: Pimlico, 1997. ISBN 978-0712673488.

Kieser, Egbert. ''Operation Sea Lion; The German Plan to Invade Britain 1940.'' London: Cassel Military Paperbacks, 1999. ISBN 0-304-35208-X.

Kieser, Egbert. ''Unternehmen Seelöwe: Die geplante Invasion in England 1940'' (in German). Berlin, Germany: Becthle, 2000. ISBN 3-76280-457-5.

Korda, Michael. ''With Wings Like Eagles: The Untold Story of the Battle of Britain''. New York: Harper Perennial, 2010. ISBN 978-0-06-112536-2.

Macksey, Kenneth. ''Invasion: The German Invasion of England, July 1940''. London: Greenhill Books, 1990. ISBN 0-85368-324-7.

Murray, Willamson. ''Strategy for Defeat. The Luftwaffe 1935–1945.'' Princeton, New Jersey: University Press of the Pacific, 2002. ISBN 0-898-75797-5.

Overy, Richard. ''The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality''. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001. ISBN 0-393-02008-8 (hardcover); 2002, ISBN 0-393-32297-1(paperback).

Peszke, Michael Alfred. "A Synopsis of Polish-Allied Military Agreements During World War Two." ''The Journal of Military History'' , Volume 44, No. 3, October 1980, pp. 128–134.

Ponting, Clive. ''1940: Myth and reality''. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1991. ISBN 978-1-56663-036-8.

Pope, Stephan. "Across the Ether: Part One". ''Aeroplane'', Vol. 23, No. 5, Issue No. 265, May 1995.

Price, Alfred. ''The Hardest Day: 18 August 1940''. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980. ISBN 0-684-16503-1.

Ramsay, Winston, ed. ''The Blitz Then and Now: Volume 1''. London: Battle of Britain Prints International Ltd, 1987. ISBN 0-900913-45-2.

Raeder, Erich. ''Erich Rader, Grand Admiral''. New York: Da Capo Press. United States Naval Institute, 2001. ISBN 0-306-80962-1.

Ramsay, Winston, ed. ''The Blitz Then and Now: Volume 2''. London: Battle of Britain Prints International Ltd, 1988. ISBN 0-900913-54-1.

Ramsay, Winston, ed. ''The Battle of Britain Then and Now Mk V''. London: Battle of Britain Prints International Ltd, 1989. ISBN 0-900913-46-0.

Robinson, Derek. ''Invasion, 1940: Did the Battle of Britain Alone Stop Hitler?'' New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005. ISBN 0-7867-1618-5.

Shulman, Milton. ''Defeat in the West''. London: Cassell, 2004 (First edition 1947). ISBN 03-0436-603-X.

Shirer, William. ''The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany‎''. London: Ballantine, 1991. ISBN 978-0449219775.

Taylor, A.J.P. and S.L. Mayer, eds. ''A History Of World War Two''. London: Octopus Books, 1974. ISBN 0-70640-399-1.

Terraine, John. ''The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939–1945''. New York: Sceptre, 1985. ISBN 0-340-41919-9.

Terraine, John. ''A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939–1945''. London: Macmillan, 1985. ISBN 978-0026169707.

Winterbotham, F.W. ''The Ultra Secret''. London: Futura Publications Limited, 1975. ISBN 0-860-07268-1 (paperback).

Wood, Derek and Derek Dempster. ''The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power, 1930–1949''. London: Pen & Sword, 2003, First edition 1961. ISBN 978-0850529159.

Wright, Gordon. ''The Ordeal of Total War: 1939–1945.'' New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

Autobiographies and biographies

Deere, Alan C. ''Nine Lives''. London: Hodder Paperbacks Ltd for Coronet Books, 1974. ISBN 0-340-01441-5.

Duncan Smith, Group Captain W.G.G. ''Spitfire into Battle''. London: John Murray, 2002. ISBN 0-71955-484-5.

Franks, Norman. ''Wings of Freedom: Twelve Battle of Britain Pilots''. London: William Kimber, 1980. ISBN 0-7183-01978.

Galland, Adolf. ''The First and the Last: Germany's Fighter Force in WWII'' (Fortunes of War). South Miami, Florida: Cerberus Press, 2005. ISBN 1-84145-020-0.

Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. ''Fight for the Sky: Stories of Wartime Fighter Pilots.'' Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1986. ISBN 0-85059-749-8.

Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. ''Fighter Pilots in World War II: True Stories of Frontline Air Combat (paperback)''. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books Ltd, 2004. ISBN 1-84415-065-8.

Orange, Vincent. ''Park: The Biography of Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park''. London: Grub Street, 2001. ISBN 1-902-304-616.

Aircraft

Ansell, Mark. ''Boulton Paul Defiant: Technical Details and History of the Famous British Night Fighter''. Redbourn, Herts, UK: Mushroom Model Publications, 2005. pp. 712–714. ISBN 8-389-45019-4.

de Zeng, Henry L., Doug G. Stankey and Eddie J. Creek. ''Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–1945: A Reference Source, Volume 2''. Hersham, Surrey, UK: Ian Allen Publishing, 2007. ISBN 978-1-903223-87-1.

Feist, Uwe. ''The Fighting Me 109''. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1993. ISBN 1-85409-209-X.

Goss, Chris.'' Dornier 17: In Focus''. Surrey, UK: Red Kite Books, 2005. ISBN 0-9546201-4-3.

Green, William. ''Famous Fighters of the Second World War''. London: Macdonald, 1962.

Holmes, Tony. ''Hurricane Aces 1939–1940'' (Aircraft of the Aces). Botley, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 1998. ISBN 1-85532-597-7.

Holmes, Tony. ''Spitfire vs Bf 109: Battle of Britain''. Oxford, London: Osprey Publishing, 2007. ISBN 978-1-84603-190-8.

Huntley, Ian D. ''Fairey Battle, Aviation Guide 1''. Bedford, UK: SAM Publications, 2004. ISBN 0-9533465-9-5.

Jones, Robert C. ''Camouflage and Markings Number 8:Boulton Paul Defiant, RAF Norther Europe 1936–45''. London: Ducimus Book Limited.

Mason, Francis K. ''Hawker Aircraft since 1920.'' London: Putnam, 1991. ISBN 0-85177-839-9.

McKinstry, Leo. ''Hurricane: Victor of the Battle of Britain''. London: John Murray Publishers, 2010. ISBN 1-84854-339-5

Molson, Kenneth M. et al. ''Canada's National Aviation Museum: Its History and Collections''. Ottawa: National Aviation Museum, 1988. ISBN 978-0-660-12001-0.

Moyes, Philip, J.R. "The Fairey Battle." ''Aircraft in Profile, Volume 2 (nos. 25–48)''. Windsor, Berkshire, UK: Profile Publications, 1971. ISBN 0-85383-011-8

Parry, Simon W. ''Intruders over Britain: The Story of the Luftwaffe's Night Intruder Force, the Fernnachtjager''. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 1989. ISBN 0-904811-07-7.

Price, Alfred. ''Spitfire Mark I/II Aces 1939–41 (Aircraft of the Aces 12)''. London: Osprey Books, 1996, ISBN 1-85532-627-2.

Price, Alfred. ''The Spitfire Story: Revised second edition''. Enderby, Leicester, UK: Silverdale Books, 2002. ISBN 1-85605-702-X.

Sarkar, Dilip. ''How the Spitfire Won the Battle of Britain''. London: Amberly, 2011. ISBN 1-84868-868-7.

Scutts, Jerry. ''Messerschmitt Bf 109: The Operational Record''. Sarasota, FL: Crestline Publishers, 1996. ISBN 978-076-030262-0.

Ward, John. ''Hitler's Stuka Squadrons''. London: Brown Reference, 2004. ISBN 0-76031-991-X.

Warner, G. ''The Bristol Blenheim: A Complete History''. London: Crécy Publishing, 2nd edition 2005. ISBN 0-85979-101-7.

Weal, John. ''Messerschmitt Bf 110 ''Zerstōrer'' Aces of World War 2''. Botley, Oxford UK: Osprey Publishing, 1999. ISBN 1-85532-753-8.

Additional references

;Books

Addison, Paul and Jeremy Crang. ''The Burning Blue: A New History of the Battle of Britain''. London: Pimlico, 2000. ISBN 0-7126-6475-0.

Bergström, Christer. ''Barbarossa – The Air Battle: July–December 1941''. London: Chervron/Ian Allen, 2007. ISBN 978-1-85780-270-2.

Bishop, Patrick. ''Fighter Boys: The Battle of Britain, 1940''. New York: Viking, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-670-03230-1); Penguin Books, 2004. ISBN 0-14-200466-9. As ''Fighter Boys: Saving Britain 1940''. London: Harper Perennial, 2004. ISBN 0-00-653204-7.

Brittain, Vera. ''England's Hour''. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-8264-8031-4); Obscure Press (paperback, ISBN 1-84664-834-3).

Cooper, Matthew. ''The German Air Force 1933–1945: An Anatomy of Failure''. New York: Jane's Publishing Incorporated, 1981. ISBN 0-531-03733-9.

Craig, Phil and Tim Clayton. ''Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain''. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. ISBN 0-684-86930-6 (hardcover); 2006, ISBN 0-684-86931-4(paperback).

Fisher, David E. ''A Summer Bright and Terrible: Winston Churchill, Lord Dowding, Radar and the Impossible Triumph of the Battle of Britain''. Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005. ISBN 1-59376-047-7 (hardcover,); 2006, ISBN 1-59376-116-3 (paperback).

Foreman, John. ''Battle of Britain: The Forgotten Months, November And December 1940''. Wythenshawe, Lancashire, UK: Crécy Publishing, 1989. ISBN 1-871187-02-8.

Gaskin, Margaret. ''Blitz: The Story of 29 December 1940''. New York: Harcourt, 2006. ISBN 0-15-101404-3.

Haining, Peter. ''Where the Eagle Landed: The Mystery of the German Invasion of Britain, 1940''. London: Robson Books, 2004. ISBN 1-86105-750-4.

Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. ''Action Stations: Military Airfields of Greater London v. 8''. Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1984. ISBN 0-85039-885-1.

Harding, Thomas. "It's baloney, say RAF aces". ''The Telegraph'', 24 August 2006. Retrieved: 3 March 2007.

Hough, Richard. ''The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Air Battle of World War II''. New York: W.W. Norton, 1989. ISBN 0-393-02766-X (hardcover); 2005, ISBN 0-393-30734-4(paperback).

James, T.C.G. ''The Battle of Britain (Air Defence of Great Britain; vol. 2)''. London/New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000. ISBN 0-7146-5123-0(hardcover); ISBN 0-7146-8149-0 (paperback,).

James, T.C.G. ''Growth of Fighter Command, 1936–1940 (Air Defence of Great Britain; vol. 1)''. London; New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000. ISBN 0-7146-5118-4.

James, T.C.G. ''Night Air Defence During the Blitz''. London/New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003. ISBN 0-7146-5166-4.

McGlashan, Kenneth B. with Owen P. Zupp. ''Down to Earth: A Fighter Pilot Recounts His Experiences of Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, Dieppe, D-Day and Beyond''. London: Grub Street Publishing, 2007. ISBN 1-90494-384-5.

March, Edgar J. ''British Destroyers; a History of Development 1892–1953.'' London: Seely Service & Co. Limited, 1966.

Olson, Lynne and Stanley Cloud. ''A Question of Honor: The Kościuszko Squadron: Forgotten Heroes of World War II''. New York: Knopf, 2003. ISBN 0-37541-197-6. NB: This book is also published under the following title:

* ''For Your Freedom and Ours: The Kościuszko Squadron – Forgotten Heroes of World War II''.

Prien, Jochen and Peter Rodeike.''Messerschmitt Bf 109 F,G, and K: An Illustrated Study.'' Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing, 1995. ISBN 0-88740-424-3.

Ray, John. ''Battle of Britain.'' London: The Orion Publishing Co., 2003. ISBN 1-85409-345-2.

Ray, John Philip. ''The Battle of Britain: Dowding and the First Victory 1940''. London: Cassel & Co., 2001. ISBN 0-304-35677-8.

Ray, John Philip. ''The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives: Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War''. London: Arms & Armour Press, 1994 (hardcover, ISBN 1-85409-229-4); London: Orion Publishing, 1996 (paperback, ISBN 1-85409-345-2).

Rongers, Eppo H. ''De oorlog in mei '40'', Utrecht/Antwerpen: Uitgeverij Het Spectrum N.V., 1969, No ISBN.

Townsend, Peter. ''Duel of Eagles (new edition)''. London: Phoenix, 2000. ISBN 1-84212-211-8.

Wellum, Geoffrey. ''First Light: The Story of the Boy Who Became a Man in the War-Torn Skies Above Britain''. New York: Viking Books, 2002. ISBN 0-670-91248-4 (hardcover); Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2003. ISBN 0-471-42627-X (hardcover); London: Penguin Books, 2003. ISBN 0-14-100814-8 (paperback).

Zaloga, Steven J. and Richard Hook. ''The Polish Army 1939–45''. London: Osprey, 1982. ISBN 0-85045-417-4.

External links

; General

Day by Day blog charting the progress of the Battle by ex RAF veteran

Battle Of Britain Historical Society

video: ''Battle of Britain'', (52 min.) complete film documentary by Frank Capra made for U.S. Army

The Battle of Britain "In Photos"

Royal Air Force history

RAF Battle of Britain Roll of Honour

Battle of Britain Memorial

BBC History Overview of Battle

Historical recording BBC: Churchill's "This Was Their Finest Hour" speech

Historical recording Radio New Zealand: Sir Keith Park describes Battle of Britain.(scroll down to 10:50 am, 25 April 2008).

Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding on the Battle of Britain (despatch to the Secretary of State, August 1941)

Royal Engineers Museum: Royal Engineers during the Second World War (airfield repair)

Shoreham Aircraft Museum

Tangmere Military Aviation Museum

Kent Battle of Britain Museum

ADLG Visits RAF Uxbridge Battle of Britain Operations Room

British Invasion Defences

Battle of Britain Website in Dutch.

The Falco and Regia Aeronautica in the Battle of Britain

History of North Weald Airfield

The Royal Mint Memorial website

New Zealanders in the Battle of Britain (NZHistory.net.nz)

Battle for Britain, short film starring Julian Glover

Interactive map showing Battle of Britain airfields and squadrons by date

Category:Aerial operations and battles of World War II involving the United Kingdom Category:Aerial operations and battles of World War II involving Germany Category:Battles of World War II involving Italy Category:World War II aerial operations and battles of the Western European Theatre Category:1940 in the United Kingdom Category:Conflicts in 1940

Category:World War II strategic bombing Category:United Kingdom home front during World War II

ar:معركة بريطانيا bn:ব্রিটেনের যুদ্ধ bs:Bitka za Britaniju bg:Битка за Британия ca:Batalla d'Anglaterra ceb:Sangka sa Britanya cs:Bitva o Británii da:Slaget om England de:Luftschlacht um England el:Μάχη της Αγγλίας es:Batalla de Inglaterra eu:Ingalaterrako Gudua fa:نبرد بریتانیا fr:Bataille d'Angleterre gl:Batalla de Inglaterra ko:영국 본토 항공전 hr:Bitka za Britaniju id:Pertempuran Britania it:Battaglia d'Inghilterra he:הקרב על בריטניה lt:Britanijos mūšis hu:Angliai csata lb:Loftschluecht iwwer England mk:Битката за Британија mr:बॅटल ऑफ ब्रिटन ms:Pertempuran Britain nl:Slag om Engeland ja:バトル・オブ・ブリテン no:Slaget om Storbritannia pl:Bitwa o Anglię pt:Batalha da Grã-Bretanha ro:Bătălia Angliei ru:Битва за Британию simple:Battle of Britain sk:Bitka o Britániu (druhá svetová vojna) sl:Bitka za Britanijo sr:Битка за Британију sh:Bitka za Britaniju fi:Taistelu Britanniasta sv:Slaget om Storbritannien ta:பிரிட்டன் சண்டை th:ยุทธการบริเตน tr:Britanya Savaşı uk:Битва за Британію vi:Không chiến tại Anh Quốc zh:不列顛戰役

Coordinates	34°03′″N118°15′″N
honorific prefix	The Right Honourable
name	The Lord Olivier
honorific suffix	OM
birth date	May 22, 1907
birth place	Dorking, Surrey,United Kingdom
death date	July 11, 1989
death place	Steyning, West Sussex,United Kingdom
years active	1926–88
occupation	Actor, director, producer, screenwriter
spouse	Jill Esmond (1930–40; divorced)Vivien Leigh (1940–60; divorced)Joan Plowright (1961–89; his death)
children	2 sons, 2 daughters
relatives	Sydney Olivier (uncle, deceased)Noel Olivier (cousin, deceased)
website	http://www.laurenceolivier.com/ }}

Laurence Kerr Olivier, Baron Olivier of Brighton, OM (; 22 May 1907 11 July 1989) was an English actor, director, and producer. He was one of the most famous and revered actors of the 20th century. He married three times, to fellow actors Jill Esmond, Vivien Leigh, and Joan Plowright.

Olivier played a wide variety of roles on stage and screen from Greek tragedy, Shakespeare and Restoration comedy to modern American and British drama. He was the first artistic director of the National Theatre of Great Britain and its main stage is named in his honour. He is regarded by some to be the greatest actor of the 20th century, in the same category as David Garrick, Richard Burbage, Edmund Kean and Henry Irving in their own centuries. Olivier's AMPAS acknowledgments are considerable: fourteen Oscar nominations, with two awards (for Best Actor and Best Picture for the 1948 film ''Hamlet''), and two honorary awards including a statuette and certificate. He was also awarded five Emmy awards from the nine nominations he received. Additionally, he was a three-time Golden Globe and BAFTA winner.

Olivier's career as a stage and film actor spanned more than six decades and included a wide variety of roles, from the title role in Shakespeare's ''Othello'' and Sir Toby Belch in ''Twelfth Night'' to the sadistic Nazi dentist Christian Szell in ''Marathon Man'' and the kindly but determined Nazi-hunter in ''The Boys from Brazil.'' A High church clergyman's son who found fame on the West End stage, Olivier became determined early on to master Shakespeare, and eventually came to be regarded as one of the foremost Shakespeare interpreters of the 20th century. He continued to act until the year before his death in 1989. Olivier played more than 120 stage roles: Richard III, Macbeth, Romeo, Hamlet, Othello, Uncle Vanya, and Archie Rice in ''The Entertainer''. He appeared in nearly sixty films, including William Wyler's ''Wuthering Heights'', Alfred Hitchcock's ''Rebecca'', Stanley Kubrick's ''Spartacus'', Otto Preminger's ''Bunny Lake Is Missing'', Richard Attenborough's ''Oh! What a Lovely War'', and ''A Bridge Too Far'', Joseph L. Mankiewicz's ''Sleuth'', John Schlesinger's ''Marathon Man'', Daniel Petrie's ''The Betsy'', Desmond Davis' ''Clash of the Titans'', and his own ''Henry V'', ''Hamlet'', and ''Richard III''. He also preserved his ''Othello'' on film, with its stage cast virtually intact. For television, he starred in ''The Moon and Sixpence'', ''John Gabriel Borkman'', ''Long Day's Journey into Night'', ''Brideshead Revisited'', ''The Merchant of Venice'', ''Cat on a Hot Tin Roof'', and ''King Lear'', among others.

In 1999, the American Film Institute named Olivier among the Greatest Male Stars of All Time, at number 14 on the list.

Early life

Olivier was born on 22 May 1907 in Dorking, Surrey, England. He was raised in a severe, strict, and religious household, ruled over by his father, Gerard Kerr Olivier (1869–1939), a High Anglican priest whose father was Henry Arnold Olivier, a rector. Olivier took solace in the care of his mother, Agnes Louis (née Crookenden; 1871–1920, and herself the younger sister of High Anglican vicar George Pelham Crookenden), and was grief-stricken when she died (at 48) when he was only 12. Gerard Dacres "Dickie" (1904–1958) and Sybille (1901–1989) were his two older siblings. His uncle was Sydney Olivier, 1st Baron Olivier, a career civil servant and Fabian who ended up as a Governor of Jamaica and as Secretary of State for India in the first government of Ramsay MacDonald.

In 1918 his father became the new church minister at St. Mary's Church, Letchworth, Hertfordshire and the family lived at the Old Rectory, now part of St Christopher School. He was educated at the choir school of All Saints', Margaret Street, London. He played Brutus in his school's production of "Julius Caesar" at the age of 9, where Ellen Terry noted he was "already a great actor". At 13 he went to St Edward's School, Oxford again appearing in school drama productions: he was a "bold" Katherine in ''The Taming of the Shrew'' (selected for a schools' drama festival at the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre, Stratford) and Puck in ''A Midsummer Night's Dream'', played "very well, to everyone's disgust", as Olivier noted in his diary. After his brother, Dickie, left for India, it was his father who decided that Laurence—or "Kim", as the family called him—would become an actor.

Early career

Olivier, 17 years old, attended the Central School of Speech and Drama, tutored by Elsie Fogerty. In 1926, he joined The Birmingham Repertory Company. At first he was given only minor tasks at the theatre, such as bell-ringing; however, his roles eventually became more significant, and in 1927 he was playing Hamlet and Macbeth. In 1928, he was cast to play Captain Stanhope in the Apollo theatre's first production of ''Journey's End'', a play which would expand his career. He always insisted that his acting was pure technique, and he was contemptuous of contemporaries who adopted method acting popularised by Lee Strasberg. Olivier married Jill Esmond, a rising young actress, on 25 July 1930; their only son, Simon Tarquin was born on 21 August 1936. Olivier was, however, from the beginning not happy in his first marriage. Repressed, as he came to see it, by his religious upbringing, Olivier recounted in his autobiography the disappointments of his wedding night, culminating in his failure to perform sexually. He temporarily renounced religion and soon came to resent his wife, though the marriage would last for ten years. Despite this supposed resentment, Olivier remained in congenial contact with Esmond until his death (as documented by their son Tarquin in his book ''My Father Laurence Olivier''), accompanying her to Tarquin’s wedding in January 1965.

He made his film debut in ''The Temporary Widow'' and played his first leading role on film in ''The Yellow Ticket''; however, he held the film in little regard. His stage breakthrough was in Noël Coward's ''Private Lives'' in 1930, followed by Shakespeare's ''Romeo and Juliet'' in 1935, alternating the roles of Romeo and Mercutio with John Gielgud. Olivier did not agree with Gielgud's style of acting Shakespeare and was irritated by the fact that Gielgud was getting better reviews than he was. His tension towards Gielgud came to a head in 1940, when Olivier approached London impresario Binkie Beaumont about financing him in a repertory of the four great Shakespearean tragedies of ''Hamlet'', ''Othello'', ''Macbeth'' and ''King Lear''. However, Beaumont would only agree to the plan if Olivier and Gielgud alternated in the roles of Hamlet/Laertes, Othello/Iago, Macbeth/Macduff, and Lear/Gloucester and that Gielgud direct at least one of the productions, a proposition Olivier bluntly declined.

In 1939, Olivier starred in a production of ''No Time for Comedy'', by S.N. Behrman in a Katharine Cornell with them both in leading roles. It was his first prominent role on Broadway.

The engagement as Romeo resulted in an invitation by Lilian Baylis to be the star at the Old Vic in 1937/38. Olivier's tenure had mixed artistic results, with his performances as Hamlet and Iago drawing a negative response from critics and his first attempt at Macbeth receiving mixed reviews. But his appearances as Henry V, Coriolanus, and Sir Toby Belch in ''Twelfth Night'' were triumphs, and his popularity with Old Vic audiences left Olivier as one of the major Shakespearean actors in England by the season's end.

Olivier continued to hold his scorn for film, and though he constantly worked for Alexander Korda, he still felt most at home on the stage. He made his first Shakespeare film, ''As You Like It'', with Paul Czinner, however, Olivier disliked it, thinking that Shakespeare did not work well on film.

Laurence Olivier saw Vivien Leigh in ''The Mask of Virtue'' in 1936, and a friendship developed after he congratulated her on her performance. While playing lovers in the film ''Fire Over England'' (1937), Olivier and Leigh developed a strong attraction, and after filming was completed, they began an affair. Leigh played Ophelia to Olivier's Hamlet in an Old Vic Theatre production, and Olivier later recalled an incident during which her mood rapidly changed as she was quietly preparing to go on-stage. Without apparent provocation, she began screaming at him, before suddenly becoming silent and staring into space. She was able to perform without mishap, and by the following day, she had returned to normal with no recollection of the event. It was the first time Olivier witnessed such behaviour from her.

The move to Hollywood

Olivier travelled to Hollywood to begin filming ''Wuthering Heights'' as Heathcliff. Leigh followed soon after, partly to be with him, but also to pursue her dream of playing Scarlett O'Hara in ''Gone with the Wind'' (1939). Olivier found the filming of ''Wuthering Heights'' to be difficult but it proved to be a turning point for him, both in his success in the United States, which had eluded him until then, but also in his attitude to film, which he had regarded as an inferior medium to theatre. The film's producer, Samuel Goldwyn was highly dissatisfied with Olivier's overstated performance after several weeks of filming and threatened to dismiss him. Olivier had grown to regard the film's female lead, Merle Oberon, as an amateur; however, when he stated his opinion to Goldwyn, he was reminded that Oberon was the star of the film and already a well-known name in American cinema. Olivier was told that he was dispensable and that he was required to be more tolerant of Oberon. Olivier recalled that he took Goldwyn's words to heart, but after some consideration realised that he was correct; he began to moderate his performance to fit the more intimate film medium and began to appreciate the possibilities it offered.

The film was a hit and Olivier was praised for his performance, with a nomination for an Academy Award for Best Actor. Leigh won the Academy Award for Best Actress for ''Gone with the Wind'', and the couple suddenly found themselves to be major celebrities throughout the world. They wanted to marry, but at first both Leigh's husband and Olivier's wife at the time, Jill Esmond, refused to divorce them. Finally divorced, they were married in simple ceremony on 31 August 1940 with only Katharine Hepburn and Garson Kanin as witnesses. Olivier's American film career flourished with highly regarded performances in ''Rebecca'' and ''Pride and Prejudice'' (both 1940).

Olivier and Leigh starred in a theatre production of ''Romeo and Juliet'' in New York City. It was an extravagant production, but a commercial failure. Brooks Atkinson for ''The New York Times'' wrote, "Although Miss Leigh and Mr Olivier are handsome young people they hardly act their parts at all." The couple had invested almost their entire savings into the project, and its failure was a financial disaster for them.

They filmed ''That Hamilton Woman'' (1941) with Olivier as Horatio Nelson and Leigh as Emma Hamilton. With Britain engaged in World War II, the Oliviers returned to England, and in 1944 tuberculosis was diagnosed in Leigh's left lung, but after spending several weeks in hospital, she appeared to be cured. In the spring, she was filming ''Caesar and Cleopatra'' (1945) when she discovered she was pregnant, but suffered a miscarriage. She fell into a deep depression which reached its nadir when she turned on Olivier, verbally and physically attacking him until she fell to the floor sobbing. This was the first of many major breakdowns related to manic-depression, or bipolar mood disorder. Olivier came to recognise the symptoms of an impending episode—several days of hyperactivity followed by a period of depression and an explosive breakdown, after which Leigh would have no memory of the event, but would be acutely embarrassed and remorseful.

War

When World War II broke out, Olivier intended to join the Royal Air Force, but was still contractually obliged to other parties. He apparently disliked actors such as Charles Laughton and Cedric Hardwicke, who would hold charity cricket matches to help the war effort. Olivier took flying lessons, and racked up over 200 hours. After two years of service, he rose to the rank of Lieutenant Olivier RNVR, as a pilot in the Fleet Air Arm but was never called to see action.

In 1944 he and fellow actor Ralph Richardson were released from their naval commitments to form a new Old Vic Theatre Company at the New Theatre (later the Albery, now the Noël Coward Theatre) with a nightly repertory of three plays, initially Henrik Ibsen's ''Peer Gynt'', Bernard Shaw's ''Arms and the Man'' and Shakespeare's ''Richard III'', rehearsed over 10 weeks to the accompaniment of German V1 'doodlebugs'. The enterprise, with John Burrell as manager, eventually extended to five acclaimed seasons ending in 1949, after a prestigious 1948 tour of Australia and New Zealand.

The second New Theatre season opened with Olivier playing both Harry Hotspur and Justice Shallow to Richardson's Falstaff in ''Henry IV'', ''Parts 1 and 2'', in what is now seen as a high point of English classical theatre. The magic continued with one of Olivier's most famous endeavours, the double bill of Sophocles' ''Oedipus'' and Sheridan's ''The Critic'', with Olivier's transition from Greek tragedy to high comedy in a single evening becoming a thing of legend. He followed this triumph with one of his favourite roles, Astrov in ''Uncle Vanya''.

Kenneth Tynan was to write (in ''He Who Plays the King'', 1950): "The Old Vic was now at its height: the watershed had been reached and one of those rare moments in the theatre had arrived when drama paused, took stock of all that it had learnt since Irving, and then produced a monument in celebration. It is surprising when one considers it, that English acting should have reached up and seized a laurel crown in the middle of a war."

In 1944, Olivier filmed ''Henry V'', which—in view of the patriotic nature of the story of the English victory—was viewed as a psychological contribution to the British war effort.

In 1945 Olivier and Richardson were made honorary Lieutenants with ENSA, and did a six-week tour of Europe for the army, performing ''Arms and the Man'', ''Peer Gynt'' and ''Richard III'' for the troops, followed by a visit to the Comédie-Française in Paris, the first time a foreign company had been invited to play on its famous stage. When Olivier returned to London the populace noticed a change in him. Olivier's only explanation was: "Maybe it's just that I've got older."

A 2007 biography of Olivier, ''Lord Larry: The Secret Life of Laurence Olivier'' by Michael Munn, claims that Olivier was recruited to be an undercover agent inside the United States for the British government by film producer and MI5 operative Alexander Korda on the instructions of Winston Churchill. Munn's main source was Hollywood producer Jesse Lasky, who believed that "Larry...was drumming up support, and doing it with the British Government's sanction".

According to an article in ''The Telegraph'', David Niven, a good friend of Olivier's, is said to have told Michael Munn, "What was dangerous for his country was that (Olivier) could have been accused of being an agent. So this was a danger for Larry because he could have been arrested. And what was worse, if German agents had realised what Larry was doing, they would, I am sure, have gone after him."

Post-war years

In 1947 Olivier was made a Knight Bachelor and by 1948 he was on the Board of Directors for the Old Vic Theatre, and he and Leigh embarked on a tour of Australia and New Zealand to raise funds for the theatre. During their six-month tour, Olivier performed ''Richard III'' and also performed with Leigh in Richard Brinsley Sheridan's''The School for Scandal'' and Thornton Wilder's ''The Skin of Our Teeth''. The tour was an outstanding success, and although Leigh was plagued with insomnia and allowed her understudy to replace her for a week while she was ill, she generally withstood the demands placed upon her, with Olivier noting her ability to "charm the press". Members of the company later recalled several quarrels between the couple, with the most dramatic of these occurring in Christchurch when Leigh refused to go on stage. Olivier slapped her face, and Leigh slapped him in return and swore at him before she made her way to the stage. By the end of the tour, both were exhausted and ill, and Olivier told a journalist, "You may not know it, but you are talking to a couple of walking corpses." Later he would comment that he "lost Vivien" in Australia. The success of the tour encouraged the Oliviers to make their first West End appearance together, performing the same works with one addition, ''Antigone'', included at Leigh's insistence because she wished to play a role in a tragedy.

Leigh next sought the role of Blanche DuBois in the West End stage production of Tennessee Williams's ''A Streetcar Named Desire'', and was cast after Williams and the play's producer, Irene Mayer Selznick, saw her in ''The School for Scandal'' and ''Antigone'', and Olivier was contracted to direct. Leigh would go on to star as Blanche in the 1951 film version of ''A Streetcar Named Desire'', earning her second Academy Award for Best Actress.

In 1951, Leigh and Olivier performed two plays about Cleopatra, William Shakespeare's ''Antony and Cleopatra'' and George Bernard Shaw's ''Caesar and Cleopatra'', alternating the play each night and winning good reviews. They took the productions to New York, where they performed a season at the Ziegfeld Theatre into 1952. The reviews there were also mostly positive, but the critic Kenneth Tynan angered them when he suggested that Leigh's was a mediocre talent which forced Olivier to compromise his own. Tynan's diatribe almost precipitated another collapse; Leigh, terrified of failure and intent on achieving greatness, dwelt on his comments, while ignoring the positive reviews of other critics.

In January 1953, Leigh travelled to Ceylon to film ''Elephant Walk'' with Peter Finch. Shortly after filming commenced, she suffered a breakdown, and Paramount Pictures replaced her with Elizabeth Taylor. Olivier returned her to their home in England, where between periods of incoherence, Leigh told him that she was in love with Finch, and had been having an affair with him. She gradually recovered over a period of several months. As a result of this episode, many of the Oliviers' friends learned of her problems. David Niven said she had been "quite, quite mad", and in his diary, Noël Coward expressed surprise that "things had been bad and getting worse since 1948 or thereabouts."

Leigh recovered sufficiently to play ''The Sleeping Prince'' with Olivier in 1953, and in 1955 they performed a season at Stratford-upon-Avon in Shakespeare's ''Twelfth Night'', ''Macbeth'' and ''Titus Andronicus''. They played to capacity houses and attracted generally good reviews, Leigh's health seemingly stable. Noël Coward was enjoying success with the play ''South Sea Bubble'', with Leigh in the lead role, but she became pregnant and withdrew from the production. Several weeks later, she miscarried and entered a period of depression that lasted for months. She joined Olivier for a European tour with ''Titus Andronicus'', but the tour was marred by Leigh's frequent outbursts against Olivier and other members of the company. After their return to London, her former husband Leigh Holman, who continued to exert a strong influence over her, stayed with the Oliviers and helped calm her.

In 1958, considering her marriage to be over, Leigh began a relationship with the actor Jack Merivale, who knew of Leigh's medical condition and assured Olivier he would care for her. She achieved a success in 1959 with the Noël Coward comedy ''Look After Lulu'', with ''The Times'' critic describing her as "beautiful, delectably cool and matter of fact, she is mistress of every situation."

In December 1960 she and Olivier divorced, and Olivier married the actress Joan Plowright, with whom he later had three children: Richard Kerr (b. 1961), Tamsin Agnes Margaret (b. 1963), and Julie-Kate (b. 1966).

In his autobiography he discussed the years of problems they had experienced because of Leigh's illness, writing, "Throughout her possession by that uncannily evil monster, manic depression, with its deadly ever-tightening spirals, she retained her own individual canniness—an ability to disguise her true mental condition from almost all except me, for whom she could hardly be expected to take the trouble."

Shakespeare trilogy

After gaining widespread popularity in the film medium, Olivier was approached by several investors (namely Filippo Del Giudice, Alexander Korda and J. Arthur Rank), to create several Shakespearean films, based on stage productions of each respective play. Olivier tried his hand at directing, and as a result, created three highly successful films: ''Henry V'', ''Hamlet'', and ''Richard III''.

''Henry V''

During the Second World War, Olivier made his directorial debut with a film of Shakespeare's ''Henry V''. At first, he did not believe he was up to the task, instead trying to offer it to William Wyler, Carol Reed, and Terence Young. The film was shot in Ireland (because it was a neutral country), with the Irish plains serving for the fields of Agincourt and the Irish army providing extras for the battle scenes. During the shooting of one of the battle scenes, a horse collided with a camera that Olivier was operating. Olivier had had his eye to the viewfinder; and, when the horse crashed into his position, the camera smashed into him, cutting his lip and leaving a scar that would be visible in later roles.

The film opened to rave reviews; it was the first widely successful Shakespeare film, and was considered a work of art. The film received Oscar nominations for Best Picture and Best Actor, but the Academy, in Olivier's opinion, did not feel comfortable in giving out all of their major awards to a foreigner, so they gave him a special Honorary Award. Olivier disregarded the award as a "fob-off".

''Hamlet''

Olivier followed up on his success with an adaptation of ''Hamlet''. He had played this role more often than he had Henry, and was more familiar with the melancholy Dane. However, Olivier was not particularly comfortable with the introverted role of Hamlet, as opposed to the extroverts that he was famous for portraying. The running time of ''Hamlet'' (1948) was not allowed to exceed 153 minutes, and as a result Olivier cut almost half of Shakespeare's text, excising Rosencrantz and Guildernstern completely. He was severely criticised for doing so by purists, most notably Ethel Barrymore; Barrymore stated that the adaptation was not nearly as faithful to the original text as her brother John's stage production from 1922. Ironically, Ethel presented the Best Picture Oscar that year—and was visibly shaken when she read,"Hamlet".

The film became another resounding critical and commercial success in Britain and abroad, winning Olivier Best Picture and Best Actor at the 1948 Academy Awards. It was the first British film to win Best Picture, and Olivier's only Best Actor win, a category for which he would be nominated five more times before his death. Olivier also became the first person to direct himself in an Oscar-winning performance, a feat not repeated until Roberto Benigni directed himself to Best Actor of 1998 for ''Life Is Beautiful''. Also, Olivier remains the only actor to receive an Oscar for a Shakespearean role. Olivier, however, did not win the Best Director Oscar that year.

''Richard III''

Olivier's third major Shakespeare project as director and star was ''Richard III.'' Alexander Korda initially approached Olivier to reprise on film the role he had played to acclaim at the Old Vic in the 1940s. This role had been lauded as Olivier's greatest (rivalled only by his 1955 stage production of ''Macbeth'' and his performance as the music hall performer Archie Rice in ''The Entertainer''), and is arguably his greatest screen performance. During the filming of the battle scenes in Spain, one of the archers actually shot Olivier in the ankle, causing him to limp. Fortunately, the limp was required for the part, so Olivier had already been limping for the parts of the film already shot.

The film was critically well received (Olivier would be nominated for a Best Actor Academy Award for the fifth time). Korda sold the rights to the American television network NBC, and the film became the first to be aired on television and released in theatres simultaneously. Many deduce that from the enormous ratings that the NBC transmissions received, more people saw ''Richard III'' in that single showing than all the people who had seen it on stage in the play's history.

''The Entertainer''

After World War II, apart from his Shakespeare trilogy, Olivier had made only sporadic film appearances. In the second half of the 1950s, British theatre was changing with the rise of the "Angry Young Men". John Osborne, author of ''Look Back in Anger'', wrote a play for Olivier entitled ''The Entertainer'', centred on a washed-up stage comedian called Archie Rice, which opened at the Royal Court on 10 April 1957. As Olivier later stated, "I am Archie Rice. I am not Hamlet."

During rehearsals of ''The Entertainer'', Olivier met Joan Plowright, who took over the role of Jean Rice from Dorothy Tutin when Tony Richardson's Royal Court production transferred to the Palace Theatre in September 1957. Later, in 1960, Tony Richardson also directed the screen version with Olivier and Plowright repeating their stage roles. Olivier received his fifth Academy Award nomination for Best Actor for ''The Entertainer.''

Olivier married Plowright on St. Patrick's Day, 1961.

National Theatre

Olivier was one of the founders, and the inaugural director, of the National Theatre. He became first NT Director at the Old Vic before the South Bank building was constructed with his opening production of ''Hamlet'' in October 1963.

During his directorship he appeared in twelve plays (taking over roles in three) and directed nine, enjoying particularly remarkable personal successes for his performances in ''Othello'' (1964), ''The Dance of Death'' (1967) and ''Long Day's Journey into Night'' (1971). Reportedly, some felt that his tenure as the director of the NT was marred by his jealousy towards other performers when he manoeuvred to block famous names like John Gielgud and Ralph Richardson from appearing there, although young actors like Michael Gambon, Robert Lang, Maggie Smith, Sheila Reid, Christopher Timothy, Alan Bates, Frank Finlay, Derek Jacobi and Anthony Hopkins (both of whom understudied Olivier) made their names there during the period. Olivier's career at the National ended, in his view, in betrayal when the theatre's governorship decided to replace him with Peter Hall in 1973 without consulting him on the choice and not informing him of the decision until several months after it had been made.

''Othello''

Olivier underwent a transformation, requiring extensive study and heavy weightlifting, to get the physique needed for the Moor of Venice. It is said that he bellowed at a herd of cows for an hour to get the deep voice that was required. John Dexter's 1964 stage production of the play was filmed in 1965, securing Olivier his sixth Oscar nomination for Best Actor. The production was a huge public success as it also was with most of the critics. Franco Zeffirelli said of Olivier's acting: "It's an anthology of everything that has been discovered about acting in the past three centuries." Even so, it has not gone without criticism: in 1997, director Jonathan Miller called it "a condescending view of an Afro Caribbean person".

''Three Sisters''

Olivier's final film as director was the 1970 film ''Three Sisters'', based on the Chekhov play of the same name, and his 1967 National Theatre production. It was, in Olivier's opinion, his best work as director. The film was co-directed by John Sichel.

In addition, his most fondly remembered National Theatre performances at the Old Vic were as Astrov in his own production of Chekhov's ''Uncle Vanya'', seen first in 1962 at the Chichester Festival Theatre, of which he was the founding director; his Captain Brazen in William Gaskill's December 1963 staging of George Farquhar's ''The Recruiting Officer''; Shylock in Jonathan Miller's 1970 revival of ''The Merchant of Venice''; and his definitive portrayal of James Tyrone in Eugene O'Neill's ''Long Day's Journey Into Night'', produced in December 1971 by Michael Blakemore. These last two were later restaged for television, and telecast both in England and in the United States.

He played a droll supporting role as the ancient Antonio in Franco Zeffirelli's 1973 production of Eduardo De Filippo's ''Saturday, Sunday, Monday'', with his wife Joan Plowright in the starring role of Rosa. His final stage appearance, on 21 March 1974, was as the fiery Glaswegian, John Tagg, in John Dexter's production of Trevor Griffiths's ''The Party''.

The only appearance he made on the stage of the new Olivier Theatre was at the royal opening of the new National Theatre building on 25 October 1976.

Later career

Olivier immersed himself even more completely in his work during his later years, reportedly as a way of distracting himself from the guilt he felt at having left his second wife Vivien Leigh. He began appearing more frequently in films, usually in character parts rather than the leading romantic roles of his early career, and received Academy Award nominations for ''Sleuth'' (1972), ''Marathon Man'' (1976; Supporting Actor) and ''The Boys from Brazil'' (1978). Having been recently forced out of his role as director of the Royal National Theatre, he worried that his family would not be sufficiently provided for in the event of his death, and consequently chose to do many of his later TV special and film appearances on a "pay cheque" basis. He later freely admitted that he was not proud of most of these credits, and noted that he particularly despised the 1982 film ''Inchon'', in which he played the role of General Douglas MacArthur.

In 1966, Olivier portrayed the Mahdi (Mahommed Ahmed), opposite Charlton Heston as General Gordon in the film ''Khartoum''. The next year, he underwent radiation treatment for prostate cancer and was also hospitalised with pneumonia. For the remainder of his life, he would suffer from many different health problems, including bronchitis, amnesia and pleurisy. In 1974, at age 67, he was found to have dermatomyositis, a degenerative muscle disorder, and nearly died the following year, but he battled through the next decade.

In 1968, he starred as Piotr Ilyich Kamenev, the Soviet Premier, in the movie version of ''The Shoes of the Fisherman'' along with Anthony Quinn, Leo McKern, John Gielgud, and Oskar Werner. The movie was nominated for two Academy awards, and was produced during the height of the Cold War. One of Olivier's enduring achievements involved neither stage nor screen. From October 1973 in the UK, Thames Television began to transmit ''The World at War'', a 26-part documentary on the Second World War, narrated by Olivier.

His last decade did contain three notable roles for television. In 1981 he appeared in ''Brideshead Revisited'', the final episode of which revolved entirely around Olivier's character Lord Marchmain, patriarch of the Flyte family, as he came home to die. The next year Olivier was cast in the much-praised television adaptation of John Mortimer's stage play ''A Voyage Round My Father'', in the role of Clifford Mortimer, the author's blind father. In 1975 he appeared as an aging British barrister, opposite Katharine Hepburn, in a British TV production of ''Love Among the Ruins''. Finally, in 1983 Olivier played his last great Shakespearean role, King Lear, for Granada Television. For ''Voyage'', Olivier received a BAFTA nomination, but for the final episode of ''Brideshead Revisited'' and for King Lear he won Emmys in the Best Supporting Actor and Best Actor categories, respectively.

When presenting the Best Picture Oscar at the Academy Awards for 1984 (held 25 March 1985), he absent-mindedly presented it by simply stepping up to the microphone and saying ''Amadeus''. He had grown forgetful, and had forgotten to read out the nominees first.

One of Olivier's last feature films was ''Wild Geese II'' (1985), in which, aged 77, he played Rudolf Hess in the sequel to ''The Wild Geese'' (1978). According to the biography ''Olivier'' by Francis Becket (Haus Publishing, 2005), Hess's son Wolf Rüdiger Hess said Olivier's portrayal of his father was "uncannily accurate". In 1986, Olivier appeared as the pre-filmed holographic narrator of the West End production of the multimedia Dave Clark rock musical ''Time''.

On 31 May 1987 the National Theatre put on a 80th birthday tribute pageant, with Olivier, and his family in attendance. It was held in the National’s Olivier theatre with Alec McCowen as Richard Burbage, Edward Petherbridge as David Garrick, Ben Kingsley as Edmund Kean and Anthony Sher as Henry Irving. Peter Hall as Shakespeare, Peggy Ashcroft as Lillian Baylis, Maureen Lipman, Albert Finney, Julia McKenzie and Imelda Staunton.

In 1988 Olivier gave his final performance, aged 81, as a wheelchair-bound old soldier in Derek Jarman's film ''War Requiem'' (1989).

Family and death

Olivier died at his home in Steyning, West Sussex, England, from renal failure on 11 July 1989. He was survived by his son Tarquin from his first marriage, as well as his wife Joan Plowright and their three children. He was cremated and his ashes interred in Poets' Corner in Westminster Abbey, London. Olivier is one of only a few actors, along with David Garrick, Henry Irving, Ben Jonson and Sybil Thorndike to have been accorded this honour. Olivier is buried alongside some of the people he portrayed in theatre and film, for example King Henry V, General John Burgoyne and Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding.

Fifteen years after his death, Olivier once again received star billing in a film. Through the use of computer graphics, footage of him as a young man was integrated into the 2004 film ''Sky Captain and the World of Tomorrow'' in which Olivier "played" the villain.

Sexuality

Since Olivier's death, multiple biographers have produced books about him, several of which include the claim that Olivier was bisexual. Biographer Donald Spoto claimed that Danny Kaye and Olivier were lovers. Joan Plowright, Olivier's widow, denies the affair with Kaye in her memoir. Terry Coleman's authorised biography of Olivier suggests a relationship between Olivier and an older actor, Henry Ainley, based on correspondence from Ainley to Olivier although the book disputes that there is any evidence linking Olivier sexually to Kaye. Olivier's son Tarquin disputed these rumours as 'unforgivable garbage' and sought to suppress them.

In her 2001 autobiography, Joan Plowright wrote, "Larry tended to shower almost everyone he knew with endearments and demonstrative terms of address. In the same way as the macho Sean Kenny had to put up with ‘Shawnie, darling’, and our son Richard had to endure 'Dickie-Wickie' for a short time, there is a published letter addressing his supposed arch-enemy, Peter Hall, as 'My dear Peterkins'. And Larry could say, 'I adored Danny Kaye', in exactly the same way as he said, 'I adored old Ralphie', without anyone suspecting Ralph Richardson of harbouring carnal desires for his own sex. — No man, alive or dead, has ever claimed to have slept with Larry, though the kiss-and-tell merchants of the female sex have tumbled over themselves to boast of a night or two, here or there."

In August 2006, on the radio program ''Desert Island Discs'', Plowright responded to the allegations of Olivier's mistresses and homosexual affairs, and if Plowright felt the need to defend her husband's memory by stating:

And then, referring separately to Olivier's battle with his "demons" which reached a peak in the long years of illness leading up to his death Plowright stated that:

Honours

Olivier was created a Knight Bachelor on 12 June 1947 in the King's Birthday Honours, and created a life peer on 13 June 1970 in the Queen's Birthday Honours as Baron Olivier, of Brighton in the County of Sussex, the first actor to be accorded this distinction. He was admitted to the Order of Merit in 1981. The Laurence Olivier Awards, organised by The Society of London Theatre, were renamed in his honour in 1984.

Though he was a knight, a life peer, and one of the most respected personalities in the industry, Olivier insisted he be addressed as "Larry", which he made clear he preferred to "Sir Laurence" or "Lord Olivier".

Centenary

On 22 May 2007, to mark the centenary of Olivier's birth, Network Media and ITV released DVD libraries of his work: Network Media—''The Laurence Olivier Centenary Collection'' (10 discs):

''Henry V'' (1944)

''Richard III'' (1955)

''King Lear'' (1983)

''The Ebony Tower'' (1984)

''Long Day's Journey Into Night'' (1973)

''The Merchant of Venice'' (1973)

''Laurence Olivier Presents'' (complete)

''The South Bank Show: Laurence Olivier, A Life'' (1982) featuring interviews with Olivier, John Gielgud and Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.

ITV—''Laurence Olivier Shakespeare Collection'' (7 discs):

''King Lear'' (1983)

''Henry V'' (1944)

''Hamlet'' (1948)

''As You Like It'' (1936)

''Richard III'' (1955)

''The Merchant of Venice'' (1973)

ITV – ''The Laurence Olivier "Icon" Collection'' (10 discs):

''Henry V'' (1944)

''Richard III'' (1955)

''Hamlet'' (1948)

''21 Days'' (1940)

''That Hamilton Woman'' (1941)

''49th Parallel'' (1941)

''The Demi-Paradise'' (1943)

''The Boys from Brazil'' (1978)

''A Little Romance'' (1979)

''The Jazz Singer'' (1980)

''Clash of the Titans'' (1981 film)

Both DVD sets include a Michael Parkinson interview with Olivier from the 1970s.

In September 2007, the National Theatre marked the centenary of his birth with a Centenary Celebration. This told the story of Olivier's working life through film and stage extracts, letters, reminiscence and readings; the participants included Eileen Atkins, Claire Bloom, Anna Carteret, Derek Jacobi, Anne-Marie Duff, Lindsay Duncan, Charles Kay, Clive Merrison, Edward Petherbridge, Joan Plowright, Ronald Pickup, Michael Pennington, Rory Kinnear, Samuel West, Antony Sher, Billie Whitelaw and Richard Attenborough. It was directed by Nicholas Hytner. Prior to the evening celebration, a new statue of Olivier as Hamlet, created by the sculptor Angela Conner and funded by private subscription, was unveiled on the South Bank, next to the National's Theatre Square.

Awards and nominations

Theatre credits and filmography

See also

AFI's 100 Years...100 Stars

References

Works cited

Further reading

Hall, Lyn, editor (1989). ''Olivier at Work: The National Years''. Nick Hern Books/National Theatre. ISBN 1-85459-037-5

External links

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Category:1907 births Category:1989 deaths Category:20th-century actors Category:Academy Honorary Award recipients Category:Actors awarded British knighthoods Category:Alumni of the Central School of Speech and Drama Category:Artistic directors Category:BAFTA winners (people) Category:BAFTA Award for Best Supporting Actor Category:Best Actor Academy Award winners Category:Best British Actor BAFTA Award winners Category:Best Drama Actor Golden Globe (film) winners Category:Best Supporting Actor Golden Globe (film) winners Category:Burials at Westminster Abbey Category:Deaths from renal failure Category:Emmy Award winners Category:English Anglicans Category:English film actors Category:English film directors Category:English stage actors Category:English television actors Category:English theatre directors Category:Fleet Air Arm aviators Category:Knights Bachelor Category:Bisexual actors Category:Life peers Category:Members of the Order of Merit Category:Officiers of the Légion d'honneur Category:Old St Edwards Category:People from Dorking Category:Royal National Theatre Company members Category:Royal Navy personnel of World War II Category:Shakespearean actors

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