Native name | جمهوری اسلامی افغانستان''Jomhūrī-ye Eslāmī-ye Afġānistān''(Persian)د افغانستان اسلامي جمهوریت''Da Afġānistān Islāmī Jomhoriyat''(Pashto) |
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Conventional long name | Islamic Republic of Afghanistan |
Common name | Afghanistan |
Image coat | Coat of arms of Afghanistan.svg |
Symbol type | Emblem |
National anthem | ''Afghan National Anthem'' |
Official languages | Dari (Persian)Pashto |
Demonym | Afghan |
Capital | Kabul |
Largest city | Kabul |
Government type | Islamic republic |
Leader title1 | President |
Leader title2 | Vice President |
Leader name1 | Hamid Karzai |
Leader name2 | Mohammed Fahim |
Leader title3 | Vice President |
Leader name3 | Karim Khalili |
Leader title4 | Chief Justice |
Leader name4 | Abdul Salam Azimi |
Area rank | 41st |
Area magnitude | 1_E11 |
Area km2 | 647500 |
Area sq mi | 251772 |
Percent water | negligible |
Population estimate | 29,835,392 |
Population estimate year | 2011 |
Population estimate rank | 42nd |
Population census | 15.5 million |
Population census year | 1979 |
Population density km2 | 43.5 |
Population density sq mi | 111.8 |
Population density rank | 150th |
Gdp ppp year | 2011 |
Gdp ppp | $30.012 billion |
Gdp ppp per capita | $966 |
Gdp nominal year | 2011 |
Gdp nominal | $17.885 billion |
Gdp nominal per capita | $575 |
Hdi year | 2011 |
Hdi | 0.398 |
Hdi rank | 172st |
Hdi category | low |
Gini | 29 |
Gini year | 2008 |
Gini category | low |
Fsi | 102.3 2.5 |
Fsi year | 2007 |
Fsi rank | 8th |
Fsi category | Alert |
Sovereignty type | Establishment |
Established event1 | First Afghan state |
Established date1 | October 1747 |
Established event2 | Independence (from United Kingdom) |
Established date2 | August 19, 1919 |
Currency | Afghani |
Currency code | AFN |
Country code | AFG |
Time zone | D† |
Utc offset | +4:30 |
Drives on | right |
Cctld | .af |
Calling code | +93 |
Footnote1 | }} |
Afghanistan (Persian/Pashto: , ''Afġānistān''), officially the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, is a landlocked sovereign state located in the centre of Asia, forming part of South Asia, Central Asia and Western Asia. With an estimated population of about 29 million, it has an area of , making it the 42nd most populous and 41st largest nation in the world. It is bordered by Pakistan in the southeast, Iran in the west, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the north, and China in the far northeast. The territory of Afghanistan has been an ancient focal point of the Silk Road and human migration. Archaeologists have found evidence of human habitation from as far back as 50,000 BC. Urban civilization may have begun in the area as early as 3,000 to 2,000 BC.
The country sits at an important geostrategic location that connects the Middle East with Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent, which has been home to various peoples through the ages. The land has witnessed many military campaigns since antiquity, notably by Alexander the Great, Chandragupta Maurya, Genghis Khan, the Soviet Union, and NATO. It has also served as a source from which local dynasties such as the Greco-Bactrians, Kushans, Saffarids, Ghaznavids, Ghorids, Timurids, Mughals and many others have established empires of their own.
The political history of modern Afghanistan begins in 1709 with the rise of the Pashtuns, when the Hotaki dynasty was established in Kandahar followed by Ahmad Shah Durrani's rise to power in 1747. The capital of Afghanistan was shifted in 1776 from Kandahar to Kabul and part of the Afghan Empire was ceded to neighboring empires by 1893. In the late 19th century, Afghanistan became a buffer state in the "Great Game" between the British and Russian empires. Following the third Anglo-Afghan war and the signing of the Treaty of Rawalpindi in 1919, the nation regained control over its foreign policy from the British.
After the 1978 Marxist revolution and 1979 Soviet invasion, a 10-year war took place between the US-backed mujahideen rebel forces and the Soviet-backed Afghan government in which over a million Afghans lost their lives mainly due to land-mines. This was followed by the 1990s Afghan civil war, the rise and fall of the extremist Taliban government and the 2001-present war. In December 2001, the United Nations Security Council authorized the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help maintain security in Afghanistan and assist the Karzai administration. While the international community is rebuilding war-torn Afghanistan, terrorist groups such as the Haqqani network are actively involved in a nationwide Taliban-led insurgency, which includes hundreds of assassinations and suicide attacks. According to the United Nations, the insurgents were responsible for 75% of civilian casualties in 2010 and 80% in 2011.
One prominent 16th century Persian scholar explains extensively about the Afghans. For example, he writes:
It is widely accepted that the terms ''"Pashtun"'' and ''Afghan'' are synonyms. In the writings of the 17th-century Pashto poet Khushal Khan Khattak it is mentioned:
The last part of the name, ''-stān'' is a Persian suffix for "place", prominent in many languages of the region. The name ''"Afghanistan"'' is described by the 16th century Mughal Emperor Babur in his memoirs as well as by the later Persian scholar Firishta and Babur's descendants, referring to the traditional ethnic Afghan (Pashtun) territories between the Hindu Kush mountains and the Indus River. In the early 19th century, Afghan politicians decided to adopt the name ''Afghanistan'' for the entire Afghan Empire after its English translation had already appeared in various treaties with Qajarid Persia and British India. In 1857, in his review of J.W. Kaye's ''The Afghan War'', Friedrich Engels describes "Afghanistan" as:
The Afghan kingdom was sometimes referred to as the ''Kingdom of Kabul'', as mentioned by the British statesman and historian Mountstuart Elphinstone. Afghanistan was officially recognized as a sovereign state by the international community after the signing of the 1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi.
Despite having numerous rivers and reservoirs, large parts of the country are dry. The endorheic Sistan Basin is one of the driest regions in the world. Aside from the usual rain falls, Afghanistan receives snow during winter in the Hindu Kush and Pamir Mountains, and the melting snow in the spring season enters the rivers, lakes, and streams. However, two-thirds of the country's water flows into neighboring countries of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan. The state needs more than to rehabilitate its irrigation systems so that the water is properly managed. The northeastern Hindu Kush mountain range, in and around the Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan, is in a geologically active area where earthquakes may occur almost every year. They can be deadly and destructive sometimes, causing landslides in some parts or avalanche during winter. The last strong earthquake was in 1998, which killed about 6,000 people in Badakhshan near Tajikistan. This was followed by the 2002 Hindu Kush earthquakes in which over 150 people of various regional countries were killed and over 1,000 injured. The 2010 earthquake left 11 Afghans dead, over 70 injured and more than 2,000 houses destroyed.
The country's natural resources include: coal, copper, iron ore, lithium, uranium, rare earth elements, chromite, gold, zinc, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, marble, precious and semi-precious stones, natural gas, and petroleum among other things. In 2010, US and Afghan government officials estimated that untapped mineral deposits located in 2007 by the US Geological Survey are worth between and .
At , Afghanistan is the world's 41st largest country, slightly bigger than France and smaller than Burma, about the size of Texas in the United States. It borders Pakistan in the south and east, Iran in the west, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the north, and China in the far east.
Afghanistan is at a unique nexus point where numerous civilizations have interacted and often fought. It has been home to various peoples through the ages, among them the ancient Iranian peoples who established the dominant role of Indo-Iranian languages in the region. At multiple points, the land has been incorporated within large regional empires, among them the Achaemenid Empire, the Macedonian Empire, the Indian Maurya Empire, the Islamic Empire and the Sassanid Empire.
Many kingdoms have also risen to power in what is now Afghanistan, such as the Greco-Bactrians, Kushans, Hephthalites, Kabul Shahis, Saffarids, Samanids, Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Kartids, Timurids, Mughals, and finally the Hotaki and Durrani dynasties that marked the political origins of the modern state of Afghanistan.
After 2000 BCE, successive waves of semi-nomadic people from Central Asia moved south into the boundaries of modern Afghanistan, among them were many Indo-European-speaking Indo-Iranians. These tribes later migrated further south to India, west to what is now Iran, and towards Europe via the area north of the Caspian. The region was called Ariana.
The ancient Zoroastrianism religion is believed by some to have originated in what is now Afghanistan between 1800 and 800 BCE, as its founder Zoroaster is thought to have lived and died in Balkh. Ancient Eastern Iranian languages may have been spoken in the region around the time of the rise of Zoroastrianism. By the middle of the 6th century BCE, the Achaemenid Persians overthrew the Medians and incorporated Afghanistan (Arachosia, Aria and Bactria) within its boundaries. An inscription on the tombstone of King Darius I of Persia mentions the Kabul Valley in a list of the 29 countries he had conquered. Alexander the Great and his Macedonian army arrived in the area of Afghanistan in 330 BCE after defeating Darius III of Persia a year earlier in the Battle of Gaugamela. Following Alexander's brief occupation, the successor state of the Seleucid Empire controlled the area until 305 BCE when they gave much of it to the Indian Maurya Empire as part of an alliance treaty.|Strabo|64 BC – 24 AD}} The Mauryans brought Buddhism from India and controlled the area south of the Hindu Kush until about 185 BCE when they were overthrown. Their decline began 60 years after Ashoka's rule ended, leading to the Hellenistic reconquest of the region by the Greco-Bactrians. Much of it soon broke away from the Greco-Bactrians and became part of the Indo-Greek Kingdom. The Indo-Greeks were defeated and expelled by the Indo-Scythians in the late 2nd century BCE.
During the 1st century BCE, the Parthian Empire subjugated the region, but lost it to their Indo-Parthian vassals. In the mid to late 1st century CE the vast Kushan Empire, centered in modern Afghanistan, became great patrons of Buddhist culture. The Kushans were defeated by the Sassanids in the 3rd century CE. Although various rulers calling themselves Kushanshas (generally known as the Indo-Sassanids) continued to rule at least parts of the region, they were probably more or less subject to the Sassanids.
The late Kushans were followed by the Kidarite Huns who, in turn, were replaced by the short-lived but powerful Hephthalites, as rulers in the first half of the 5th century. The Hephthalites were defeated by Khosrau I in CE 557, who re-established Sassanid power in Persia. However, in the 6th century CE, the successors to the Kushans and Hepthalites established a small dynasty in Kabulistan called Kabul Shahi.
Afghanistan became one of the main centers in the Muslim world during the Islamic Golden Age. By the 11th century the Ghaznavids had finally Islamized all of the remaining non-Muslim areas, with the exception of the Kafiristan region. They were replaced by the Ghurids who expanded and advanced the already powerful empire. In 1219 AD, Genghis Khan and his Mongol barbarians overran the region. His troops are said to have annihilated the Khorasanian cities of Herat and Balkh. The destruction caused by the Mongols depopulated major cities and forced many of the locals to revert to an agrarian rural society. Mongol rule continued with the Ilkhanate in the northwest while the Khilji dynasty controlled the Afghan tribal areas south of the Hindu Kush, until the invasion of Timur who established the Timurid dynasty in 1370. During the Ghaznavid, Ghurid, and Timurid eras, Afghanistan produced many fine Islamic architectural monuments as well as numerous scientific and literary works.
Babur, a descendant of both Timur and Genghis Khan, arrived from Central Asia and captured Kabul from the Arghun dynasty, and from there he began to seize control of the central and eastern territories of Afghanistan. He remained in Kabulistan until 1526 when he and his army invaded Delhi in India to replace the Afghan Lodi dynasty with the Mughal Empire. From the 16th century to the early 18th century, Afghanistan was part of three regional kingdoms: the Khanate of Bukhara in north, the Shi'a Safavids in the west and the remaining larger area was ruled by the Delhi Sultanate.
In October 1772, Ahmad Shah Durrani died of a natural cause and was buried at a site now adjacent to the Shrine of the Cloak in Kandahar. He was succeeded by his son, Timur Shah Durrani, who transferred the capital of Afghanistan from Kandahar to Kabul in 1776. After Timur Shah's death in 1793, the Durrani throne was passed down to his son Zaman Shah followed by Mahmud Shah, Shuja Shah and others.
The Afghan Empire was under threat in the early 19th century by the Sikhs in the east and the Persians in the west. The western provinces of Khorasan and Kohistan were taken by the Persians in 1800. The Sikhs of Punjab, under Ranjit Singh, invaded Afghanistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region and in 1834 captured its second capital, Peshawar. The regions of Multan, Kashmir, Sindh and Balochistan were also lost. Fateh Khan, leader of the Barakzai tribe, had installed 21 of his brothers in positions of power throughout the Afghan Empire. After his death, they rebelled and divided up the provinces of the empire between themselves. During this turbulent period, Afghanistan had many temporary rulers until 1826 when Dost Mohammad Khan rose to power. In 1837, Akbar Khan and the Afghan army crossed the Khyber Pass to defeat the Sikhs at the Battle of Jamrud, killing Sikh Commander Hari Singh Nalwa before returning to Kabul. By this time the British were advancing to the area from the east and the First Anglo-Afghan War or better known as the Great Game was initiated.
After the Third Anglo-Afghan War and the signing of the Treaty of Rawalpindi in 1919, King Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan a sovereign and fully independent state. He moved to end his country's traditional isolation by establishing diplomatic relations with the international community and, following a 1927–28 tour of Europe and Turkey, introduced several reforms intended to modernize his nation. A key force behind these reforms was Mahmud Tarzi, an ardent supporter of the education of women. He fought for Article 68 of Afghanistan's 1923 constitution (declared through a loya jirga), which made elementary education compulsory.
Some of the reforms that were actually put in place, such as the abolition of the traditional burqa for women and the opening of a number of co-educational schools, quickly alienated many tribal and religious leaders. Faced with overwhelming armed opposition, Amanullah Khan was forced to abdicate in January 1929 after Kabul fell to rebel forces led by Habibullah Kalakani. Prince Mohammed Nadir Shah, Amanullah's cousin, in turn defeated and killed Kalakani in November 1929, and was declared King Nadir Shah. He abandoned the reforms of Amanullah Khan in favor of a more gradual approach to modernisation but was assassinated in 1933 by Abdul Khaliq, a Hazara school student.
Mohammed Zahir Shah, Nadir Shah's 19-year-old son, succeeded to the throne and reigned from 1933 to 1973. Until 1946 Zahir Shah ruled with the assistance of his uncle, who held the post of Prime Minister and continued the policies of Nadir Shah. Another of Zahir Shah's uncles, Shah Mahmud Khan, became Prime Minister in 1946 and began an experiment allowing greater political freedom, but reversed the policy when it went further than he expected. He was replaced in 1953 by Mohammed Daoud Khan, the king's cousin and brother-in-law. Daoud Khan sought a closer relationship with the Soviet Union and a more distant one towards Pakistan. Afghanistan remained neutral and was neither a participant in World War II, nor aligned with either power bloc in the Cold War. However, it was a beneficiary of the latter rivalry as both the Soviet Union and the United States vied for influence by building Afghanistan's main highways, airports and other vital infrastructure. By the late 1960s, many Western travelers were using these as part of the hippie trail. In 1973, while King Zahir Shah was on an official overseas visit, Daoud Khan launched a bloodless coup and became the first President of Afghanistan.
To bolster the Parcham faction and as part of its Cold War strategy to ultimately reach Gwadar in Balochistan, the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan in December 1979 by sending 100,000 soldiers of the Red Army to its southern neighbor. In the meantime, Hafizullah Amin was killed and replaced by Babrak Karmal. In response to all these, the Reagan administration in the U.S. increased arming and funding of the Mujahideen, thanks in large part to the efforts of Charlie Wilson and CIA officer Gust Avrakotos. Early reports estimated $6–20 billion but more recent reports suggest that up to $40 billion were provided by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to Pakistan. This was in the forms of cash and weapons, which included over two thousand FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles. The money and weapons were directly given to Pakistani Armed Forces, which was distributed by its ISI network to various Mujahideen groups although much of it was secretly kept for Pakistan's own defense and other purposes. Despite receiving only minor aid compared to leaders of other Mujahideen groups, Ahmad Shah Massoud was named "the Afghan who won the Cold War" by the ''Wall Street Journal''.
The 10-year Soviet war resulted in the deaths of over 1 million Afghans, mostly civilians and due to land-mines. About 6million fled to Pakistan and Iran, and from there tens of thousands began emigrating to the European Union, United States, Australia and other parts of the world. Faced with mounting international pressure and great number of casualties, the Soviets withdrew in 1989 but continued to support Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah until 1992.
Due to the sudden initiation of the war, working government departments, police units or a system of justice and accountability for the newly-created Islamic State of Afghanistan did not have time to form. Atrocities were committed by individuals of the different armed factions while Kabul descended into lawlessness and chaos as described in reports by Human Rights Watch and the Afghanistan Justice Project. Because of the chaos, some leaders increasingly had only nominal control over their (sub-)commanders. For civilians there was little security from murder, rape and extortion. When the Taliban took control of the city in 1994, they forced the surrender of dozens of local Pashtun leaders. The Islamic State government took steps to restore law and order. Courts started to work again. Massoud tried to initiate a nationwide political process with the goal of national consolidation and democratic elections, also inviting the Taliban to join the process but they refused as they did not believe in a democratic system.
According to a 55-page report by the United Nations, the Taliban, while trying to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians. UN officials stated that there had been "15 massacres" between 1996 and 2001 and that "[t]hese have been highly systematic and they all lead back to the [Taliban] Ministry of Defense or to Mullah Omar himself." The Taliban especially targeted people of Shia religious or Hazara ethnic background. Upon taking Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998, 4,000-6,000 civilians were killed by the Taliban and many more reported tortured. The documents also reveal the role of Arab and Pakistani support troops in these killings. Bin Laden's so-called 055 Brigade was responsible for mass-killings of Afghan civilians. The report by the UN quotes "eyewitnesses in many villages describing Arab fighters carrying long knives used for slitting throats and skinning people".
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf – then as Chief of Army Staff – was responsible for sending thousands of Pakistanis to fight alongside the Taliban and bin Laden against the forces of Massoud. According to Pakistani Afghanistan expert Ahmed Rashid, "between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan" on the side of the Taliban. In 2001 alone, there were believed to be 28,000 Pakistani nationals, many either from the Frontier Corps or army, fighting inside Afghanistan. An estimated 8,000 Pakistani militants were recruited in madrassas filling the ranks of the estimated 25,000 regular Taliban force. Bin Laden sent Arab recruits to join the fight against the United Front. 3,000 fighters of the regular Taliban army were Arab and Central Asian militants. Human Rights Watch cites no human rights crimes for the forces under direct control of Massoud for the period from October 1996 until the assassination of Massoud in September 2001. As a consequence many civilians fled to the area of Ahmad Shah Massoud. In total, estimates range up to one million people fleeing the Taliban. (see video) National Geographic concluded in its documentary ''"Inside the Taliban"'': : In early 2001 Massoud addressed the European Parliament in Brussels asking the international community to provide humanitarian help to the people of Afghanistan. He stated that the Taliban and al-Qaeda had introduced "a very wrong perception of Islam" and that without the support of Pakistan and bin Laden the Taliban would not be able to sustain their military campaign for up to a year. On this visit to Europe he also warned that his intelligence had gathered information about a large-scale attack on U.S. soil being imminent.
While the Taliban began regrouping inside Pakistan, more coalition troops entered the escalating US-led war. Meanwhile, the rebuilding of war-torn Afghanistan kicked off in 2002. The Afghan nation was able to build democratic structures over the years, and some progress was made in key areas such as governance, economy, health, education, transport, and agriculture. NATO is training the Afghan armed forces as well its national police. ISAF and Afghan troops led many offensives against the Taliban but failed to fully defeat them. By 2009, a Taliban-led shadow government began to form in many parts of the country complete with their own version of mediation court. After U.S. President Barack Obama announced the deployment of another 30,000 soldiers in 2010 for a period of two years, Der Spiegel published images of the US soldiers who killed unarmed Afghan civilians.
At the 2010 International Conference on Afghanistan in London, Afghan President Hamid Karzai said he intends to reach out to the Taliban leadership (including Mullah Omar, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar). Supported by NATO, Karzai called on the group's leadership to take part in a loya jirga meeting to initiate peace talks. These steps have resulted in an intensification of bombings, assassinations and ambushes. Some Afghan groups (including the former intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh and opposition leader Dr. Abdullah Abdullah) believe that Karzai plans to appease the insurgents' senior leadership at the cost of the democratic constitution, the democratic process and progess in the field of human rights especially women's rights. Dr. Abdullah stated: :"I should say that Taliban are not fighting in order to be accommodated. They are fighting in order to bring the state down. So it's a futile exercise, and it's just misleading. ... There are groups that will fight to the death. Whether we like to talk to them or we don't like to talk to them, they will continue to fight. So, for them, I don't think that we have a way forward with talks or negotiations or contacts or anything as such. Then we have to be prepared to tackle and deal with them militarily. In terms of the Taliban on the ground, there are lots of possibilities and opportunities that with the help of the people in different parts of the country, we can attract them to the peace process; provided, we create a favorable environment on this side of the line. At the moment, the people are leaving support for the government because of corruption. So that expectation is also not realistic at this stage."
Over five million Afghan refugees were repatriated in the last decade, including many who were forcefully deported from NATO countries. This large return of Afghans may have helped the nation's economy but the country still remains one of the poorest in the world due to the decades of war, lack of foreign investment, ongoing government corruption and the Pakistani-backed Taliban insurgency. According to a report by the United Nations, the Taliban and other militants were responsible for 76% of civilian casualties in 2009, 75% in 2010 and 80% in 2011. In 2011 a record 3,021 civilians were killed in the ongoing insurgency, the fifth successive annual rise. After the May 2011 death of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, many prominent Afghan figures began being assassinated, including Mohammed Daud Daud, Ahmad Wali Karzai, Jan Mohammad Khan, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, Burhanuddin Rabbani and others. Also in the same year, the Pak-Afghan border skirmishes intensified and many large scale attacks by the Pakistani-based Haqqani network took place across Afghanistan. This led to the United States warning Pakistan of a possible military action against the Haqqanis in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The U.S. blamed Pakistan's government, mainly Pakistani Army and its ISI spy network as the masterminds behind all of this. |Admiral Mike Mullen|Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff}} U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, told Radio Pakistan that "The attack that took place in Kabul a few days ago, that was the work of the Haqqani network. There is evidence linking the Haqqani Network to the Pakistan government. This is something that must stop." Other top U.S. officials such as Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta made similar statements. On October 16, 2011, "Operation Knife Edge" was launched by NATO and Afghan forces against the Haqqani network in south-eastern Afghanistan. Afghan Defense Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak, explained that the operation will "help eliminate the insurgents before they struck in areas along the troubled frontier".
In anticipation of the 2014 NATO withdrawal and a subsequent expected push to regain power by the Taliban, the anti-Taliban United Front (Northern Alliance) groups have started to regroup under the umbrella of the National Coalition of Afghanistan (political arm) and the National Front of Afghanistan (military arm).
The Supreme Court is led by Chief Justice Abdul Salam Azimi, a former university professor who had been a legal advisor to the president. The current court is seen as more moderate and led by more technocrats than the previous one, which was dominated by fundamentalist religious figures such as Chief Justice Faisal Ahmad Shinwari who issued several controversial rulings, including seeking to place a limit on the rights of women.
According to Transparency International's corruption perceptions index 2010 results, Afghanistan was ranked as the third most-corrupt country in the world. A January 2010 report published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime revealed that bribery consumes an amount equal to 23 percent of the GDP of the nation. A number of government ministries are believed to be rife with corruption, and while President Karzai vowed to tackle the problem in late 2009 by stating that "individuals who are involved in corruption will have no place in the government", top government officials were busy stealing and misusing hundreds of millions of dollars through the Kabul Bank. Although the nation's institutions are newly formed and steps have been taken to arrest some, the United States warned that aid to Afghanistan would be reduced to very little if the corruption is not stopped.
Two months later, under international pressure, a second round run-off vote between Karzai and remaining challenger Abdullah was announced, but a few days later Abdullah announced that he is not participating in the November 7 run-off because his demands for changes in the electoral commission had not been met. The next day, officials of the election commission cancelled the run-off and declared Hamid Karzai as President for another 5-year term.
In the 2005 parliamentary election, among the elected officials were former mujahideen, Islamic fundamentalists, warlords, communists, reformists, and several Taliban associates. In the same period, Afghanistan reached to the 30th nation in terms of female representation in parliament. The last parliamentary election was held in September 2010, but due to disputes and investigation of fraud, the sworn in ceremony took place in late January 2011. After the issuance of computerized ID cards for the first time, which is a $101 million project that the Afghan government plans to start in 2012, it is expected to help prevent major fraud in future elections and improve the security situation.
The provincial governors are appointed by the President of Afghanistan and the district governors are selected by the provincial governors. The provincial governors are representatives of the central government in Kabul and are responsible for all administrative and formal issues within their provinces. There are also provincial councils which are elected through direct and general elections for a period of four years. The functions of provincial councils are to take part in provincial development planning and to participate in monitoring and appraisal of other provincial governance institutions.
According to article 140 of the constitution and the presidential decree on electoral law, mayors of cities should be elected through free and direct elections for a four-year term. However, due to huge election costs, mayoral and municipal elections have never been held. Instead, mayors have been appointed by the government. As for the capital city of Kabul, the mayor is appointed by the President of Afghanistan.
The following is a list of all the 34 provinces of Afghanistan in alphabetical order and on the right is a map showing where each province is located:
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established in 2002 under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1401 to help the nation recover from decades of war and establish a normal functioning government. Today, more than 22 NATO nations deploy about 140,000 troops in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Apart from close military links, Afghanistan also enjoys strong economic relations with NATO members and their allies.
Afghanistan also has diplomatic relations with neighboring Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, the People's Republic of China, including regional states such as India, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Russia, United Arab Emirate, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Japan, South Korea, and others. Afghanistan's relationship with Pakistan has often fluctuated since 1947. They have cultural, security and economic links with each other but disputes between the two states remain. Afghanistan continues to reject the porous and poorly-marked Durrand Line as its international border with Pakistan, and has repeatedly accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban insurgents, Haqqani network, and other anti-Afghanistan terrorist groups. Economically, Afghanistan is highly dependent on Pakistan in terms of imports, supplies and trade routes. Conversely, Pakistan considers Afghanistan as an important trade route for access to Central Asian resources.
Pakistan harbors concerns over the growing influence of its rival India in Afghanistan. Relations between the two states were strained further after recent border skirmishes. Afghan officials allege that Pakistani intelligence agencies are involved in terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan. Pakistan has denied supporting the Taliban and claimed that a stable Afghanistan is in its interest.
India and Iran have actively participated in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, with India being the largest regional donor to the country. Since 2002, India has pledged up to $2 billion in economic assistance to Afghanistan and has participated in multiple socio-economic reconstruction efforts, including power, roads, agricultural and educational projects. There are also military ties between Afghanistan and India, which is expected to increase after the October 2011 strategic pact that was signed by President Karzai and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
The military of Afghanistan is under the Ministry of Defense, which includes the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Air Force. It currently has about 180,000 active soldiers and is expected to reach 260,000 in the coming years. They are trained and equipped by NATO countries, mainly by the United States Department of Defense. The ANA is divided into 7 major Corps, with the 201st Selab ("Flood") in Kabul being the main one. The ANA also has a commando brigade which was established in 2007. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan serves as the main educational institute for the militarymen of the country. A new $200 million Afghan Defense University (ADU) is under construction near the capital.
The police are being trained by NATO countries through the Afghanistan Police Program. According to a 2009 news report, large percent of the police officers are illiterate and are accused of demanding bribes. Jack Kem, deputy to the commander of NATO Training Mission Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan, stated that the literacy rate in the ANP will rise to over 50 percent by January 2012. What began as a voluntary literacy program became mandatory for basic police training in early 2011. Approximately 17 percent of them test positive for illegal drug use. In 2009, President Karzai created two anti-corruption units within the Interior Ministry. Former Interior Minister Hanif Atmar said that security officials from the U.S. (FBI), Britain (Scotland Yard) and the European Union will train prosecutors in the unit.
The south and eastern parts of Afghanistan are the most dangerous due to the flourishing drug trade and militancy. These areas in particular are often patrolled by Taliban insurgents, and in many cases they plan attacks by using suicide bombers and planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on roads. Kidnapping and robberies are also often reported. Every year many Afghan police officers are killed in the line of duty in these areas. The Afghan Border Police are responsible for protecting the nation's airports and borders, especially the disputed Durand Line border which is often used by members of criminal organizations and terrorists for their illegal activities. Reports in 2011 suggested that up to 3 million people are involved in the illegal drug business in Afghanistan, many of the attacks on government employees and institutions are carried out not only by the Taliban militants but also by powerful criminal gangs. Drugs from Afghanistan are exported to Iran, Pakistan, Russia, India, the United Arab Emirate, and the European Union. The Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics is dealing with this problem.
The Afghan economy has been growing at about 10% per year in the last decade, which is due to the infusion of over $50 billion dollars in international aid and remittances from Afghan expats. It is also due to improvements made to the transportation system and agricultural production, which is the backbone of the nation's economy. The country is known for producing some of the finest pomegranates, grapes, apricots, melons, and several other fresh and dry fruits, including nuts.
While the nations's current account deficit is largely financed with the donor money, only a small portion is provided directly to the government budget. The rest is provided to non-budgetary expenditure and donor-designated projects through the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations. The Afghan Ministry of Finance is focusing on improved revenue collection and public sector expenditure discipline. For example, government revenues increased 31% to $1.7 billion from March 2010 to March 2011.
Da Afghanistan Bank serves as the central bank of the nation and the "Afghani" (AFN) is the national currency, with an exchange rate of about 47 Afghanis to 1 US dollar. Since 2003, over 16 new banks have opened in the country, including Afghanistan International Bank, Kabul Bank, Azizi Bank, Pashtany Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, First Micro Finance Bank, and others.
One of the main drivers for the current economic recovery is the return of over 5 million expatriates, who brought with them fresh energy, entrepreneurship and wealth-creating skills as well as much needed funds to start up businesses. For the first time since the 1970s, Afghans have involved themselves in construction, one of the largest industries in the country. Some of the major national construction projects include the ''New Kabul City'' next to the capital, the ''Ghazi Amanullah Khan City'' near Jalalabad, and the ''Aino Mena'' in Kandahar. Similar development projects have also begun in Herat in the west, Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and in other cities.
In addition, a number of companies and small factories began operating in different parts of the country, which not only provide revenues to the government but also create new jobs. Improvements to the business-enabling environment have resulted in more than $1.5 billion in telecom investment and created more than 100,000 jobs since 2003. The Afghan rugs are becoming popular again and this gives many carpet dealers around the country to expand their business by hiring more workers.
Afghanistan is a member of SAARC, ECO and OIC. It is hoping to join SCO soon to develop closer economic ties with neighboring and regional countries in the so-called ''New Silk Road'' trade project. Foreign Minister Zalmai Rassoul told the media in 2011 that his nation's "goal is to achieve an Afghan economy whose growth is based on trade, private enterprise and investment". Experts believe that this will revolutionize the economy of the region. Opium production in Afghanistan has soared to a record in 2007 with about 3 million people reported to be involved in the business but then declined significantly in the years following. The government started programs to help reduce cultivation of poppy, and by 2010 it was reported that 24 out of the 34 provinces were free from poppy grow.
Other reports show that the country has huge amounts of lithium, copper, gold, coal, iron ore and other minerals. The Khanashin carbonatite in Helmand Province contains of rare earth elements. In 2007, a 30-year lease was granted for the Aynak copper mine to the China Metallurgical Group for $3 billion, making it the biggest foreign investment and private business venture in Afghanistan's history. Government officials estimate that the country's untapped mineral deposits are worth between and . One official asserted that "this will become the backbone of the Afghan economy" and a Pentagon memo stated that Afghanistan could become the "Saudi Arabia of lithium".
There are also domestic and international flight services available from the locally owned Kam Air, Pamir Airways and Safi Airways. Airlines from a number of regional nations such as Turkish Airlines, Gulf Air, Air Arabia, Air India, PIA and others also provide services to Afghanistan. Flights between Dubai and Kabul take roughly 2 hours to reach.
The country has limited rail service with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in the north. The government plans to extended the rail line to the capital and then to the eastern border town of Torkham by 2014, connecting with Pakistan Railways. Long distant road journeys are made by older model company-owned Mercedes-Benz coach buses or carpool and private cars. Newer automobiles have recently become more widely available after the rebuilding of roads and highways. They are imported from the United Arab Emirates through Pakistan and Iran. As of 2012, vehicles that are older than 10 years are banned from being imported into the country. The development of the nation's road network is a major boost for the economy due to trade with neighboring countries. Afghanistan's postal and package services such as FedEx, DHL and others make deliveries to major cities and towns.
Telecommunication services in the country are provided by Afghan Wireless, Etisalat, Roshan, MTN Group and Afghan Telecom. In 2006, the Afghan Ministry of Communications signed a $64.5 million agreement with ZTE for the establishment of a countrywide optical fiber cable network. As of 2011, Afghanistan has around 17 million GSM phone subscribers and over 1 million internet users. It only has about 75,000 fixed telephone lines and little over 190,000 CDMA subscribers.
A number of new hospitals and clinics have been built over the last decade, with the most advanced treatments being available in Kabul. The French Medical Institute for Children and Indira Gandhi Childrens Hospital in Kabul are the leading children's hospitals in the country. Some of the other main hospitals in Kabul include the 350-bed Jamhuriat Hospital and the Jinnah Hospital, which is still under construction. There are also a number of well-equipped military controlled hospitals in different regions of the country.
It was reported in 2006 that nearly 60% of the population lives within two hours walking distance of the nearest health facility, up from nine percent in 2002. Latest surveys show that 57 percent of Afghans say they have good or very good access to clinics or hospitals. The nation also has one of the highest incidences of people with disabilities, with an estimated one million handicapped people. About 80,000 citizens have lost limbs, mainly as a result of landmines. Non-governmental charities such as Save the Children and Mahboba's Promise assist orphans in association with governmental structures. Demographic and Health Surveys is working with the Indian Institute of Health Management Research and others to conduct a survey in Afghanistan focusing on Maternal death, among other things.
Education in the country includes K-12 and Higher Education, which is supervised by the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Higher Education. The nation's education system was destroyed due to the decades of war, but it began reviving after the Karzai administration came to power in late 2001. More than 5,000 schools were built or renovated, with more than 100,000 teachers being trained and recruited. It was reported in 2011 that more than seven million male and female students were enrolled in schools.
As of 2011, about 82,000 students are enrolled in different universities around the country. Kabul University reopened in 2002 to both male and female students. In 2006, the American University of Afghanistan was established in Kabul, with the aim of providing a world-class, English-language, co-educational learning environment in Afghanistan. The capital of Kabul serves as the learning center of Afghanistan, with many of the best educational institutions being based there. Major universities outside of Kabul include Kandahar University in the south, Herat University in the northwest, Balkh University in the north, Nangarhar University and Khost University in the eastern zones, as well as a number of others. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan, modeled after the United States Military Academy at West Point, is a four-year military development institution dedicated to graduating officers for the Afghan armed forces. The $200 million Afghan Defense University is under construction near Qargha in Kabul. The United States is building six faculties of education and five provincial teacher training colleges around the country, two large secondary schools in Kabul and one school in Jalalabad.
Literacy rate of the entire population is low, around 28%. Female literacy may be as low as 10%. In 2010, the United States began establishing a number of Lincoln learning centers in Afghanistan. They are set up to serve as programming platforms offering English language classes, library facilities, programming venues, Internet connectivity, educational and other counseling services. A goal of the program is to reach at least 4,000 Afghan citizens per month per location. The military and national police are also provided with mandatory literacy courses. In addition to this, Baghch-e-Simsim (based on the American Sesame Street) was launched in late 2011 to help Afghan children learn from preschool and onward.
+Ethnic groups in Afghanistan | |||
Ethnic group | Image | ||
Others (Pashai, Nuristani, Arab, Brahui, Pamiri, Gujjar, etc.) |
The 2004–present suggested estimations in the above chart are supported by recent national opinion polls, which were aimed at knowing how a group of 7,760 Afghan citizens felt about the current war, political situation, as well as the economic and social issues affecting their daily lives. Two of the surveys were conducted between 2006 to 2010 by the Asia Foundation (with technical assistance by the Indian ''Centre for the Study of Developing Societies'' and the ''Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research'') and one between 2004 to 2009 by a combined effort of the broadcasting companies NBC News, BBC, and ARD.
Other languages, such as Uzbek, Arabic, Turkmen, Balochi, Pashayi and Nuristani languages (Ashkunu, Kamkata-viri, Vasi-vari, Tregami and Kalasha-ala), are used as native tongue by minority groups across the country and have official status in the regions where they are widely spoken. Minor languages also include Pamiri (Shughni, Munji, Ishkashimi and Wakhi), Brahui, Hindko, Kyrgyz, etc. Many Afghans are also fluent in Urdu, Punjabi, Hindi, English, and other languages.
{|class="wikitable" |- !|Language !|}} |- style="text-align:center;" ! Dari (Persian) | 50% |- style="text-align:center;" ! Pashto | 35% |- style="text-align:center;" ! Uzbek and Turkmen | 11% |- style="text-align:center;" ! 30 minor languages | 4% |}
Afghans display pride in their culture, nation, ancestry, and above all, their religion and independence. Like other highlanders, they are regarded with mingled apprehension and condescension, for their high regard for personal honor, for their tribe loyalty and for their readiness to use force to settle disputes. As tribal warfare and internecine feuding has been one of their chief occupations since time immemorial, this individualistic trait has made it difficult for foreigners to conquer them. Tony Heathcote considers the tribal system to be the best way of organizing large groups of people in a country that is geographically difficult, and in a society that, from a materialistic point of view, has an uncomplicated lifestyle. There are an estimated 60 major Pashtun tribes, and the Afghan nomads are estimated at about 2–3 million.
The nation has a complex history that has survived either in its current cultures or in the form of various languages and monuments. However, many of its historic monuments have been damaged in recent wars. The two famous Buddhas of Bamiyan were destroyed by the Taliban, who regarded them as idolatrous. Despite that archaeologists are still finding Buddhist relics in different parts of the country, some of them date back to the 2nd century. This indicates that Buddhism was widespread in Afghanistan. Other historical places include the cities of Herat, Kandahar, Ghazni, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Zarang. The Minaret of Jam in the Hari River valley is a UNESCO World Heritage site. A cloak reputedly worn by Islam's Prophet Muhammad is kept inside the Shrine of the Cloak in Kandahar, a city founded by Alexander and the first capital of Afghanistan. The citadel of Alexander in the western city of Herat has been renovated in recent years and is a popular attraction for tourists. In the north of the country is the Shrine of Hazrat Ali, believed by many to be the location where Ali was buried. The Afghan Ministry of Information and Culture is renovating 42 historic sites in Ghazni until 2013, when the province will be declared as the capital of Islamic civilization. The National Museum of Afghanistan is located in Kabul.
Although literacy level is low, classic Persian and Pashto poetry play an important role in the Afghan culture. Poetry has always been one of the major educational pillars in the region, to the level that it has integrated itself into culture. Some notable poets include Rumi, Rabi'a Balkhi, Sanai, Jami, Khushal Khan Khattak, Rahman Baba, Khalilullah Khalili, and Parwin Pazhwak.
The city of Kabul has been home to many musicians in the past, who were masters of both traditional and modern Afghan music, especially during the Nowruz (New Year) and National Independence Day celebrations. Ahmad Zahir, Nashenas, Ustad Sarahang, Sarban, Ubaidullah Jan, Farhad Darya, and Naghma are some of the notable Afghan musicians but there are many others. Most Afghans are accustomed to watching Bollywood films from India and listening to its filmi hit songs. Many of the Bollywood film stars have roots in Afghanistan, including Madhubala, Feroz Khan, Shahrukh Khan, Aamir Khan, Salman Khan, Naseeruddin Shah, Fardeen Khan, Sohail Khan, Celina Jaitley and many others. In addition, several Bollywood films such as Dharmatma, Khuda Gawah, Escape from Taliban and Kabul Express have been shot inside Afghanistan.
Cricket, which is a newly introduced sport in Afghanistan fuelled by the success of the Afghan national cricket team is growing in popularity. It has risen from the lower levels of international cricket to qualifying for the 2010 Twenty20 World Cup. More recently the under-19 team has qualified for the 2012 ICC Under-19 Cricket World Cup. The Afghanistan Cricket Board (ACB) is the official governing body of the sport and is headquartered in Kabul. The Ghazi Amanullah Khan International Cricket Stadium serves as the nation's main cricket stadium, followed by the Kabul National Cricket Stadium. Several other stadiums are under construction. Cricket is played between teams from different provinces, mostly by the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line.
Buzkashi is a traditional sport, mainly among the northern Afghans. It is similar to polo, played by horsemen in two teams, each trying to grab and hold a goat carcass. Afghan Hounds (a type of running dog) originated in Afghanistan and was originally used in the sport of hunting.
Category:Central Asian countries Category:Iranian Plateau Category:Islamic republics Category:Islamic states Category:Landlocked countries Category:Least developed countries Category:Member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Category:Member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Category:Member states of the United Nations Category:Middle Eastern countries Category:Pashto-speaking countries and territories Category:Persian-speaking countries and territories Category:South Asian countries Category:States and territories established in 1709 Category:States and territories established in 1747 Category:Territories under military occupation Category:Republics
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A large number of the inhabitants of the region of northern Afghanistan accepted Islam through Umayyad missionary efforts particularly under the reign of Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik and Umar ibn AbdulAziz. At times, Muslim leaders in their effort to win converts encouraged attendance at Muslim prayer with promises of money and allowed the Quran to be recited in Persian instead of Arabic so that it would be intelligible to all. During the reign of Al-Mu'tasim Islam was generally practiced amongst most inhabitants of the region and finally under Ya'qub-i Laith Saffari, Islam was by far, the predominate religion of Kabul along with other major cities of modern day Afghanistan. Later, the Samanids propagated Sunni Islam deep into the heart of Central Asia, as the first complete translation of the Qur'an into Persian occurred in the 9th century. The remnants of a Shahi presence in Afghanistan's eastern borders were expelled by Mahmud of Ghazni during 998 and 1030.
Although Shariah courts existed in urban centers after Ahmad Shah Durrani established an Afghan state in 1747, the primary judicial basis for the society remained in the tribal code of the Pashtunwali until the end of the nineteenth century. Sporadic fatwas (formal legal opinions) were issued and occasional jihads were called not so much to advance Islamic ideology as to sanction the actions of specific individuals against their political opponents so that power might be consolidated.
The first systematic employment of Islam as an instrument for state-building was introduced by Amir Abdur Rahman (1880–1901) during his drive toward centralization. He decreed that all laws must comply with Islamic law and thus elevated the Shariah over customary laws embodied in the Pashtunwali. The ulama were enlisted to legitimize and sanction his state efforts as well as his central authority. This enhanced the religious community on the one hand, but as they were increasingly inducted into the bureaucracy as servants of the state, the religious leadership was ultimately weakened. Many economic privileges enjoyed by religious personalities and institutions were restructured within the framework of the state, the propagation of learning, once the sole prerogative of the ulama, was closely supervised, and the Amir became the supreme arbiter of justice.
His successors continued and expanded Amir Abdur Rahman's policies as they increased the momentum of secularization. Islam continued central to interactions, but the religious establishment remained essentially non-political, functioning as a moral rather than a political influence. Nevertheless, Islam asserted itself in times of national crisis. And, when the religious leadership considered themselves severely threatened, charismatic religious personalities periodically employed Islam to rally disparate groups in opposition to the state. They rose up on several occasions against Amanullah Shah (1919–1929), for example, in protest against reforms they believed to be western intrusions inimical to Islam.
Subsequent rulers, mindful of traditional attitudes antithetical to secularization were careful to underline the compatibility of Islam with modernization. Even so, and despite its pivotal position within the society which continued to draw no distinction between religion and state, the role of religion in state affairs continued to decline.
The 1931 Constitution made the Hanafi Shariah the state religion, while the 1964 Constitution simply prescribed that the state should conduct its religious ritual according to the Hanafi School. The 1977 Constitution, declared Islam the religion of Afghanistan, but made no mention that the state ritual should be Hanafi. The Penal Code (1976) and civil law (1977), covering the entire field of social justice, represent major attempts to cope with elements of secular law, based on, but superseded by other systems. Courts, for instance, were enjoined to consider cases first according to secular law, resorting to the BCShariah in areas where secular law did not exist. By 1978, the government of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) openly expressed its aversion to the religious establishment. This precipitated the fledgling Islamist Movement into a national revolt; Islam moved from its passive stance on the periphery to play an active role.
Politicized Islam in Afghanistan represents a break from Afghan traditions. The Islamist Movement originated in 1958 among faculties of Kabul University, particularly within the Faculty of Islamic Law which had been formed in 1952 with the announced purpose of raising the quality of religious teaching to accommodate modern science and technology. The founders were largely professors influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, a party formed in the 1930s that was dedicated to Islamic revivalism and social, economic, and political equity. Their objective is to come to terms with the modern world through the development of a political ideology based on Islam. The Afghan leaders, while indebted to many of these concepts, did not forge strong ties to similar movements in other countries.
The liberalization of government attitudes following the passage of the 1964 Constitution ushered in a period of intense activism among students at Kabul University. Professors and their students set up the Muslim Youth Organization (Sazmani Jawanani Musulman) in the mid-1960s at the same time that the leftists were also forming many parties. Initially communist students outnumbered the Muslim students, but by 1970 the Muslim Youth had gained a majority in student elections. Their membership was recruited from university faculties and from secondary schools in several cities such as Mazari Sharif and Herat. These professors and students became the leaders of the Afghan Resistance in the 1980s.
The mujahidin leaders were charismatic figures with dyadic ties to followers. In many cases military and political leaders replaced the tribal leadership; at times the religious leadership was strengthened; often the religious combined with the political leadership. Followers selected their local leaders on the basis of personal choice and precedence among regions, sects, ethnic groups or tribes, but the major leaders rose to prominence through their ties to outsiders who controlled the resources of money and arms.
With the support of foreign aid, the mujahidin were ultimately successful in their jihad to drive out the Soviet forces, but not in their attempts to construct a political alternative to govern Afghanistan after their victory. Throughout the war, the mujahidin were never fully able to replace traditional structures with a modern political system based on Islam. Most mujahidin commanders either used traditional patterns of power, becoming the new khans, or sought to adapt modern political structures to the traditional society. In time the prominent leaders accumulated wealth and power and, in contrast to the past, wealth became a determining factor in the delineation of power at all levels.
With the departure of foreign troops and the long sought demise of Kabul's leftist government, The Islamic State of Afghanistan finally came into being in April 1992. This represented a distinct break with Afghan history, for religious specialists had never before exercised state power. But the new government failed to establish its legitimacy and, as much of its financial support dissipated, local and middle range commanders and their militia not only fought among themselves but resorted to a host of unacceptable practices in their protracted scrambles for power and profit. Throughout the nation the populous suffered from harassment, extortion, kidnapping, burglary, hijacking and acts dishonoring women. Drug trafficking increased alarmingly; nowhere were the highways safe. The mujahidin had forfeited the trust they once enjoyed.
Headquartered in Kandahar, initially almost entirely Pushtun, predominantly from the rural areas, and from the top leadership down to the fighting militia characteristically in their thirties or forties and even younger, the Taliban swept the country. In September 1996 they captured Kabul and ruled over two-thirds of Afghanistan.
The meteoric take over went almost unchallenged. Arms were collected and security was established. At the same time, acts committed for the purpose of enforcing the Shariah included public executions of murderers, stoning for adultery, amputation for theft, a ban on all forms of gambling such as kite flying, chess and cockfights, prohibition of music and videos, proscriptions against pictures of humans and animals, and an embargo on women's voices over the radio. Women were to remain as invisible as possible, behind the veil, in purdah in their homes, and dismissed from work or study outside their homes.
Islam is a central, pervasive influence throughout Afghan society; religious observances punctuate the rhythm of each day and season. In addition to a central Friday mosque for weekly communal prayers which are not obligatory but generally attended, smaller community-maintained mosques stand at the center of villages, as well as town and city neighborhoods. Mosques serve not only as places of worship, but for a multitude of functions, including shelter for guests, places to meet and gossip, the focus of social religious festivities and schools. Almost every Afghan has at one time during his youth studied at a mosque school; for many this is the only formal education they receive.
Because Islam is a total way of life and functions as a comprehensive code of social behavior regulating all human relationships, individual and family status depends on the proper observance of the society's value system based on concepts defined in Islam. These are characterized by honesty, frugality, generosity, virtuousness, piousness, fairness, truthfulness, tolerance and respect for others. To uphold family honor, elders also control the behavior of their children according to these same Islamic prescriptions. At times, even competitive relations between tribal or ethnic groups are expressed in terms claiming religious superiority. In short, Islam structures day-to-day interactions of all members of the community.
The religious establishment consists of several levels. Any Muslim can lead informal groups in prayer. Mullahs who officiate at mosques are normally appointed by the government after consultation with their communities and, although partially financed by the government, mullahs are largely dependent for their livelihood on community contributions including shelter and a portion of the harvest. Supposedly versed in the Qur'an, Sunnah, Hadith and Shariah, they must ensure that their communities are knowledgeable in the fundamentals of Islamic ritual and behavior. This qualifies them to arbitrate disputes over religious interpretation. Often they function as paid teachers responsible for religious education classes held in mosques where children learn basic moral values and correct ritual practices. Their role has additional social aspects for they officiate on the occasion of life crisis rituals associated with births, marriages and deaths.
But rural mullahs are not part of an institutionalized hierarchy of clergy. Most are part-time mullahs working also as farmers or craftsmen. Some are barely literate, or only slightly more educated than the people they serve. Often, but by no means always, they are men of minimal wealth and, because they depend for their livelihood on the community that appoints them, they have little authority even within their own social boundaries. They are often treated with scant respect and are the butt of a vast body of jokes making fun of their arrogance and ignorance. Yet their role as religious arbiters forces them to take positions on issues that have political ramifications and since mullahs often disagree with one another, pitting one community against the other, they are frequently perceived as disruptive elements within their communities.
Veneration of saints and shrines is opposed by some Islamic groups, particularly those ascribing to the Salafi or Ahle Hadith methodology. Nevertheless, Afghanistan's landscape is liberally strewn with shrines honoring saints of all descriptions. Many of Afghanistan's oldest villages and towns grew up around shrines of considerable antiquity. Some are used as sanctuaries by fugitives.
Shrines vary in form from simple mounds of earth or stones marked by pennants to lavishly ornamented complexes surrounding a central domed tomb. These large establishments are controlled by prominent religious and secular leaders. Shrines may mark the final resting place of a fallen hero (shahid), a venerated religious teacher, a renowned Sufi poet, or relics, such as a hair of the Prophet Muhammad or a piece of his cloak (khirqah). A great many commemorate legends about the miraculous exploits of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth caliph and the first Imam of Shi'a Islam believed to be buried at the nation's most elaborate shrine located in the heart of Mazari Sharif, the Exalted Shrine. Hazrat Ali is revered throughout Afghanistan for his role as an intermediary in the face of tyranny.
Festive annual fairs celebrated at shrines attract thousands of pilgrims and bring together all sections of communities. Pilgrims also visit shrines to seek the intercession of the saint for special favors, be it a cure for illness or the birth of a son. Women are particularly devoted to activities associated with shrines. These visits may be short or last several days and many pilgrims carry away specially blessed curative and protective amulets (usually a tawiz) to ward off the evil eye, assure loving relationships between husbands and wives and many other forms of solace. It should be noted however, that like saint veneration, such practices are generally not encouraged in Islam.
The political involvement of Shi'a communities grew dramatically during the politicized era during and following the Soviet invasion. Politically aware Shi'a students formed the hard core of the Afghan Maoist movement of the 1960s and early 1970s After 1978, Shi'a mujahidin groups in the Hazarajat, although frequently at odds with one another, were active in the jihad and subsequently in the fighting for the control of Kabul. During the political maneuvering leading up to the establishment of The Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1992, the Shi'a groups unsuccessfully negotiated for more equitable, consequential political and social roles.
Ismaili in Afghanistan are generally regarded with suspicion by other ethnic groups and for the most part their economic status is very poor. Although Ismaili in other areas such as the northern areas of Pakistan operate well-organized social welfare programs including schools, hospitals and cooperatives, little has been done among Afghan Ismaili communities.
Considered less zealous than other Afghan Muslims, Ismaili are seen to follow their leaders uncritically. The pir or leader of Afghan Ismaili comes from the Sayyid family of Kayan, located near Doshi, a small town at the northern foot of the Salang Pass, in western Baghlan Province. During the Soviet-Afghan War this family acquired considerable political power.
Three Sufi orders are prominent: the Naqshbandiya founded in Bukhara, the Qadiriya founded in Baghdad, and the Cheshtiya located at Chesht-i-Sharif east of Herat. Among the Naqshbandi, Ahmad al Faruqi Kabuli, born north of Kabul, acquired renown for his teachings in India during the reign of the Moghul Emperor Akbar in the sixteenth century. Another famous Qadiriya pir named Mawlana Faizani came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s, and was a leading critic against the creeping influence of communist philosophy. Jailed in the mid-70s, Mawlana Faizani disappeared when the khalqis came to power and remains missing to this day.
The Cheshtiya order was founded by Mawdid al-Cheshti who was born in the twelfth century and later taught in India. The Cheshtiya brotherhood, concentrated in the Hari River valley around Obe, Karukh and Chehst-i-Sharif, is very strong locally and maintains madrasas with fine libraries. Traditionally the Cheshtiya have kept aloof from politics, although they were effectively active during the resistance within their own organizations and in their own areas.
Herat and its environs has the largest number and greatest diversity of Sufi branches, many of which are connected with local tombs of pir (ziarat). Other Sufi groups are found all across the north, with important centers in Maimana, Faryab Province, and in Kunduz. The brotherhoods in Kabul and around Mazari Sharif are mostly associated with the Naqshbandiya. The Qadiriya are found mainly among the eastern Pushtun of Wardak, Paktia and Nangarhar, including many Ghilzai nomadic groups. Other smaller groups are settled in Kandahar and in Shindand, Farah Province. The Cheshtiya are centered in the Hari River valley. There are no formal Sufi orders among the Shi'a in the central Hazarajat, although some of the concepts are associated with Sayyids, descendants of the Prophet Mohammad, who are especially venerated among the Shi'a.
Afghanistan is unique in that there is little hostility between the ulama (religion scholars) and the Sufi orders. A number of Sufi leaders are considered as ulama, and many ulama closely associate with Sufi brotherhoods. The general populace accords Sufis respect for their learning and for possessing karamat, the psychic spiritual power conferred upon them by God that enables pirs to perform acts of generosity and bestow blessings (barakat). Sufism therefore is an effective popular force. In addition, since Sufi leaders distance themselves from the mundane, they are at times turned to as more disinterested mediators in tribal disputes in preference to mullahs who are reputed to escalate minor secular issues into volatile confrontations couched in Islamic rhetoric.
Despite the Afghan Sufis stable position in Afghan society, Sufi leaders were among those executed in 1978-1979 following the communist Saur Revolution, among them Baha'uddin Jan, the ''pir naqshbandi'' of the Aimaq of Purchaman District, Farah.
ar:الإسلام في أفغانستان id:Islam di Afganistan ms:Islam di Afghanistan
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Shia Islam (, ''Shīʿah'') is the second largest denomination of Islam, after Sunni Islam. About 25% Muslim population are Shias. The followers of Shia Islam are called Shi'ites or Shias. "Shia" is the short form of the historic phrase ''Shīʻatu ʻAlī'' (), meaning "followers of Ali", "faction of Ali", or "party of Ali".
Like other schools of thought in Islam, Shia Islam is based on the teachings of the Islamic holy book, the Qurʻān and the message of the final prophet of Islam, Muhammad. In contrast to other schools of thought, Shias believe that only the Almighty has the right to choose a representative to safeguard Islam, Qurʻān and Shariah (based upon verses in the Qurʻān which stipulate this according to Shias). Shias believe that these Quranic verses make it clear that only Allah chooses a viceregent on Earth, therefore no one else has a choice in the matter. This means that God's representatives like Prophets and Imāms cannot be elected by common Muslims, which is why Shias disown the election and selection of Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman ibn Affan by the people, to represent Islam and the Qurʻān. Thus Shias do not consider Ali to be the fourth Caliph, rather the first "Imam". Shias believe that there are numerous narrations where the prophet selected Ali as his successor.
Shias believe that Muhammad's family, the Ahl al-Bayt ("the People of the House"), and certain individuals among his descendants, who are known as infallible Imāms, have special spiritual and political authority over the community and they acquired this authority since God gave it to them just the same way God chose Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, David, Jesus and other prophets, Imams such as the offspring of Abraham and from amongst the Children of Israel as well as kings, such as King Saul. Shia Muslims further believe that Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, was the first of The Twelve Imams and was the rightful successor to Muhammad and thus reject the legitimacy of the first three caliphs. The Grandsons of the Prophet Muhammad, Hasan ibn Ali and Husayn Ibn Ali are agreed upon by all Muslims to be the "leaders of all youths in Paradise." Shias also believe that these sons of Imam Ali were the true leaders and caliphs of the Muslims.
Shias regard Ali as the second most important figure after Prophet Muhammad. Muhammad suggested on various occasions during his lifetime that Ali should be the leader of Muslims after his demise. According to this view, Ali as the successor of Muhammad not only ruled over the community in justice, but also interpreted the Shariah Law and its esoteric meaning. Hence he was regarded as being free from error and sin (infallible), and appointed by God by divine decree (Nass) to be the first Imam. Ali is known as "perfect man" (al-insan al-kamil) similar to Muhammad according to Shia viewpoint. As a result, Shias favor Hadiths attributed to Muhammad and Imāms, and credited to the Prophet's family and close associates, in contrast to the Sunni traditions where the Sunnah is largely narrated by the Prophet Muhammad's companions, whom Sunnis hold to all be trustworthy. Thus the Qurʻān and Hadith interpretation and differences in Hadith narrators are the main distinction of the Shias.
Although there were several Shia branches through history, nowadays Shi'a Islam is divided into three main branches. The largest Shia sect in the early 21st century is the Ithnā ʿAshariyyah, commonly referred to in English as the Twelvers, while smaller branches include the Ismaili and Zaidi, who dispute the Twelver lineage of Imams and beliefs. Twelvers constitute the majority of the population in Iran, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, and Iraq. Zaidiyyah constitute a considerable portion of Yemen. Other countries with a significant proportion of Shia are Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, south Turkey.
The Shia Islamic faith is vast and inclusive of many different groups. Shia theological beliefs, and religious practise such as prayers slightly differ from the Sunnis. While all Muslims pray 5 times daily, Shi'as have the option of combining Dhuhr with Asr and Maghrib with Isha, as there are 3 distinct times mentioned in the Qur'an and in the Hadith. The Sunnis tend to combine only under certain circumstances. Shi'a Islam embodies a completely independent system of religious interpretation and political authority in the Muslim world. The Shi'a identity emerged during the lifetime of Muhammad, and Shia theology was formulated in the 2nd century AH, or after Hijra (8th century CE). The first Shi'a governments and societies were established by the end of the 3rd century AH/9th century CE. The 4th century AH /10th century CE has been referred by Louis Massignon 'the Shiite Ismaili century in the history of Islam'.
Whereas Sunnis believe the Mahdi will appear sometime in the future, Shias believe the Mahdi A.S (allah huma sale ala muhammad in wa aale muhammad) was already on earth, is currently the "hidden imam" who distributes RIZQ and will return at the end of time near the KHUROOJ of DAJJAL.
Shī'ah Muslims believe that just as a prophet is appointed by God alone, only God has the prerogative to appoint the successor to his prophet. They believe that God chose 'Alī to be the successor, infallible and divinely chosen. Thus they say that Muhammad, before his death, appointed Ali as his successor.
Ali was Muhammad's first cousin and closest living male relative, as well as his son-in-law, having married his daughter Fatimah. 'Ali would eventually become the fourth Muslim caliph.
Shi'a Muslims believe that after the last pilgrimage, Muhammad ordered the gathering of Muslims at the pond of Khumm and it was there that Muhammad nominated Ali to be his successor.The Hadith of the pond of Khumm () refers to the saying (i.e. Hadith) about a historical event of appointment, crucial to Islamic history. This event took place on 18th of Dhu al-Hijjah of 10 AH in the Islamic calendar (March 10, 632 AD) at a place called Ghadir Khumm, which is located near the city of al-Juhfah, Saudi Arabia. Shi'a Muslims believe it to be an appointment of Ali by Muhammad as his successor, while Sunni Muslims believe it to be a simple defense of Ali in the face of unjust criticism.
When Muhammad died, 'Ali and Muhammad's closest relatives made the funeral arrangements. While they were preparing his body, Abu Bakr, 'Umar, and Abu 'Ubayda met with the leaders of Medina and elected Abu Bakr as khalifa ("caliph"). 'Ali and his family were dismayed, but accepted the appointment for the sake of unity in the early Muslim community.
'Ali's rule over the early Muslim community was often contested, to the extent that wars were waged against him. As a result, he had to struggle to maintain his power against the groups who broke away after giving him allegiance, or those who wished to take his position. After Ali's murder in 661 CE, his main rival Mu'awiya claimed the caliphate. While the rebels who accused 'Uthman of nepotism affirmed 'Ali's khilafa, they later turned against him and fought him. while prostrating (sujud) in prayer. Shī'as add "و عليٌ وليُّ الله" "and Ali is the ''wali'' (chosen one) of God" (''wa-'Aliyun waliyu l-Lāh''), to the adhan and shahada but this is not obligatory. Ali is regarded as the foremost authority on the Tafsir and hadith.
Most of the early Shia as well as Zaydis differed only marginally from mainstream Sunnis in their views on political leadership, but it is possible in this sect to see a refinement of Shīa doctrine. Early Sunnis traditionally held that the political leader must come from the tribe of Muhammad—namely, the Quraysh. The Zaydīs narrowed the political claims of the Ali's supporters, claiming that not just any descendant of 'Alī would be eligible to lead the Muslim community (ummah) but only those males directly descended from Muḥammad through the union of 'Alī and Fāṭimah. But during the Abbasid revolts, other Shīa, who came to be known as imāmiyyah (followers of the Imams), followed the theological school of Ja'far al-Sadiq. They asserted a more exalted religious role for Imams and insisted that, at any given time, whether in power or not, a single male descendant of 'Alī and Fāṭimah was the divinely appointed Imam and the sole authority, in his time, on all matters of faith and law. To those Shīʿites, love of the imams and of their persecuted cause became as important as belief in God's oneness and the mission of Muhammad.
Later most of Shia, including Twelver and Ismaili, became Imami. Imamis Shia believe that Imams are the spiritual and political successors to Muhammad. Imams are human individual who not only rule over the community with justice, but also are able to keep and interpret the Divine Law and its esoteric meaning. Muhammad and Imams' words and deeds are a guide and model for the community to follow; as a result, they must be free from error and sin, and must be chosen by divine decree, or ''nass'', through Muhammad.
According to this view, there is always an Imam of the Age, who is the divinely appointed authority on all matters of faith and law in the Muslim community. 'Alī was the first Imam of this line, the rightful successor to Muhammad, followed by male descendants of Muhammad through his daughter Fatimah Zahra.
This difference between following either the Ahl al-Bayt (Muhammad's family and descendants) or the Caliph Abu Bakr has shaped Shia and non-Shia views on some of the Qur'an, the Hadith (narrations from Muhammad) and other areas of Islam. For instance, the collection of Hadith venerated by Shia Muslims is centered on narrations by members of the Ahl al-Bayt and their supporters, while some Hadith by narrators not belonging to or supporting the Ahl al-Bayt are not included (those of Abu Huraira, for example). According to Sunnis, Ali was the fourth successor to Abu Bakr while Shias maintain that Ali was the first divinely sanctioned "Imam," or successor of Muhammad. The seminal event in Shia history is the martyrdom in 680 CE at the Battle of Karbala of Ali's son Hussein, who led a non-allegiance movement against the defiant caliph (71 of Hussein's followers were killed as well). Hussein came to symbolize resistance to tyranny.
It is believed in Twelver and Ismaili Shī'ah Islam that 'aql, divine wisdom, was the source of the souls of the prophets and imams and gave them esoteric knowledge called ''ḥikmah'' and that their sufferings were a means of divine grace to their devotees. Although the imam was not the recipient of a divine revelation, he had a close relationship with God, through which God guides him, and the Imam in turn guides the people. Imamate, or belief in the divine guide is a fundamental belief in the Twelver and Ismaili Shī'ī branches and is based on the concept that God would not leave humanity without access to divine guidance.
In Shia Islam, there is a third phrase of the Kalema, 'Ali-un-waliullah,' which depicts the importance of the Imamate.
- The fundamental first phrase "La- ilaha-ill-al-lah" is the foundation stone of Islam, the belief that "there is no god but Allah". This is the confession of "Tauhid".
- The second phrase, "Mohammad-ur –rasul-al-lah," says "Mohammad is Allah's "Rasul", "Nabi", the Messenger, Apostle". This is the acceptance of the "Nabuwat," or prophethood, of Mohammad.
- According to Shia Islam, Mohammad declared Ali bin Abu Talib as his successor and said that "for whoever I am a 'Moula' of them, Ali is his 'Moula'". Hence, they say the Kalema required further confession of the third phrase "Ali-un- wali-ul-lah," meaning "Ali is his (Mohammad's) "Wali", its care taker, stressing the need that for continuation of faith there is a requirement of Wali, the Imams which are the real care-takers of Islam.
The Kalema-tut-shahadat includes three Islamic teachings, "Tauhid", "Nabuwat" and "Imamate". In this belief, the Nabi, Mohammad and the Imams are so linked together that these cannot be viewed separately. One leads to the other and finally to God, "Allah", the Almighty.
In one of the Qiblah of Imam Mustansir of the Fatemi era, the masjid of Qahira (Mosque of Ahmed-ibn-tulun), was engraved his name and the phrase "kalema‐tut‐sahadat" (see image), giving specific importance to the third phrase Ali –un‐ wali ‐ ul –lah' hence to the Imamate.
''Ismah'' is the concept of infallibility or "divinely bestowed freedom from error and sin" in Islam. Muslims believe that Muhammad and other prophets in Islam possessed 'iṣmah. Twelver and Ismaili Shī'ah Muslims also attribute the quality to Imāms as well as to Fatima Zahra, daughter of Muhammad, in contrast to the Zaidi, who do not attribute 'ismah to the Imāms.
According to Shī'ah theologians, infallibility is considered a rational necessary precondition for spiritual and religious guidance. They argue that since God has commanded absolute obedience from these figures they must only order that which is right. The state of infallibility is based on the Shī'ah interpretation of the verse of purification. Thus they are, the most pure ones, the only immaculate ones preserved from, and immune to, all uncleanness. It does not mean that supernatural powers prevent them from committing a sin, but it is due to the fact that they have an absolute belief in God so that they find themselves in the presence of God. They also have a complete knowledge of God's will. They are in possession of all knowledge brought by the angels to the prophets (''nabi'') and the messengers (''Rasul''). Their knowledge encompasses the totality of all times. They thus act without fault in religious matters.
Tawassul () is an Islamic religious practice in which a Muslim seeks nearness to God. A rough translation would be: "To draw near to what one seeks after and to approach that which one desires." The exact definition and method of tawassul is a matter of some dispute within the Muslim community.
Muslims who practice tawassul point to the Qur'an, Islam's holy book, as the origin of the practice. Many Muslims believe it is a commandment upon them to "draw near" to God. Amongst Sufi and Barelwi Muslims within Sunni Islam, as well as Twelver Shi'a Muslims, it refers to the act of supplicating to God through a prophet, imam or Sufi saint, whether dead or alive.
Hossein Nasr disagrees with this as he writes:
Shi'ism was not brought into existence only by the question of the political succession to Muhammad as so many Western works claim (although this question was of course of great importance). The problem of political succession may be said to be the element that crystallized the Shi'ites into a distinct group, and political suppression in later periods, especially the martyrdom of Imam Husayn-upon whom be peace-only accentuated this tendency of the Shi'ites to see themselves as a separate community within the Islamic world. The principal cause of the coming into being of Shi'ism, however, lies in the fact that this possibility existed within the Islamic revelation itself and so had to be realized. Inasmuch as there were exoteric [Zaheri] and esoteric [Bateni] interpretations from the very beginning, from which developed the schools (madhhab) of the Sharia and Sufism in the Sunni world, there also had to be an interpretation of Islam, which would combine these elements in a single whole. This possibility was realized in Shi'ism, for which the Imam is the person in whom these two aspects of traditional authority are united and in whom the religious life is marked by a sense of tragedy and martyrdom... Hence the question which arose was not so much who should be the successor of Muhammad as what the function and qualifications of such a person would be.
The Second Fitna was when the first Umayyad Caliph Muawiya I was succeeded upon his death in 680 by his son, Yazid I. Yazid's first opposition came from supporters of Husayn ibn Ali, who was the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the son of the former Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib, who had been assassinated. Husayn and many of his closest supporters were killed by Yazid's troops at the Battle of Karbala. This battle is often cited as the definitive break between the Shi'a and Sunni sects of Islam, and until this day it has been commemorated each year by Shi'a Muslims on the Day of Ashura.
With the fall of the Safavids, the state in Persia – including the state system of courts with government-appointed judges (qadis) – became much weaker, This gave the Sharia courts of mujtahids an opportunity to fill in the slack and enabled "the ulama to assert their judicial authority." The Usuli School also increased in strength at this time.
It achieved its greatest influence in the late Safavid and early post-Safavid era when it dominated Twelver Shi'a Islam. However, shortly thereafter Muhammad Baqir Behbahani (died 1792), along with other Usuli mujtahids, crushed the Akhbari movement. and it remains now in the Shia Muslim world only as a small minority. One result of the resolution of this conflict was the rise in importance of the concept of ijtihad and the position of the mujtahid (as opposed to other ulema) in the 18th and early 19th centuries. It was from this time that the division of the Shia world into mujtahid (those who could follow their own independent judgment) and muqallid (those who had to follow the rulings of a mujtahid) took place. According to author Moojan Momen, "up to the middle of the 19th century there were very few mujtahids (three or four) anywhere at any one time," but "several hundred existed by the end of the 19th century."
It is variously estimated that 10–20% of the world's Muslims are Shi'a, while the remaining larger percentage follow Sunni Islam.|Vali Nasr|October 18, 2006}} They may number up to 200 million as of 2009. The Shia majority countries are Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain. They also constitute 36.3% of entire local population and 38.6% of local Muslim population of Middle East.
Shi'a Muslims constitute over 35% of the population in Lebanon, over 45% of the population in Yemen, 20-40% of the population in Kuwait, over 20% in Turkey, 10–20% of the population in Pakistan, and 10-19% of Afghanistan's population.
Nations with populations of more than one million Shi'as include (in descending order): Iran, Pakistan, India, Iraq, Turkey, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Nigeria, Lebanon, and Tanzania.
Saudi Arabia hosts a number of distinct Shia communities, including the Twelver Baharna in the Eastern Province, the Nakhawila of Medina, and the Ismaili Sulaymani and Zaidiyyah of Najran. Estimations put the Shiite number of citizen at 2-4 million accounting for roughly 15% of the local population.
Significant Shi'a communities exist on the coastal regions of West Sumatra and Aceh in Indonesia (see Tabuik). The Shi'a presence is negligible elsewhere in Southeast Asia, where Muslims are predominantly Shafi'i Sunnis.
A significant syncretic Shi'a minority is present in Nigeria, centered around the state of Kano (see Shia in Nigeria). East Africa holds several populations of Ismaili Shia, primarily descendants of immigrants from South Asia during the colonial period, such as the Khoja.
According to Shi'a Muslims, one of the lingering problems in estimating Shi'a population is that unless Shi'a form a significant minority in a Muslim country, the entire population is often listed as Sunni. The reverse, however, has not held true, which may contribute to imprecise estimates of the size of each sect. For example, the 1926 rise of the House of Saud in Arabia brought official discrimination against Shi'a.
+Nations with over 100,000 Shi'a | |||||
Country | Shi'a population | Percent of Muslim population that is Shi'a | Percent of global Shi'a population | Minimum estimate/claim | Maximum estimate/claim |
The dispute over the right successor to Muhammad resulted in the formation of two main sects, the Sunni and the Shia. The Sunni, or followers of the way, followed the caliphate and maintained the premise that any devout Muslim could potentially become the successor to Muhammad if accepted by his peers. The Shia, however, maintain that only the person selected by God and announced by the Prophet could become his successor, thus Ali became the religious authority for the Shia people. Militarily established and holding control over the Umayyad government, many Sunni rulers perceived the Shia as a threat – both to their political and religious authority.
The Sunni rulers under the Umayyads sought to marginalize the Shia minority and later the Abbasids turned on their Shia allies and further imprisoned, persecuted, and killed Shias. The persecution of Shias throughout history by Sunni co-religionists has often been characterized by brutal and genocidal acts. Comprising only about 10–15% of the entire Muslim population, to this day, the Shia remain a marginalized community in many Sunni Arab dominant countries without the rights to practice their religion and organize.
At various times Shi'a groups have faced persecution. In 1514 the Ottoman sultan Selim I ordered the massacre of 40,000 Anatolian Shias. According to Jalāl Āl Aḥmad, "Sultan Selim I carried things so far that he announced that the killing of one Shiite had as much otherworldly reward as killing 70 Christians." In 1801 the Al Saud-Wahhabi armies attacked and sacked Karbala, the Shia shrine in eastern Iraq that commemorates the death of Husayn.
In March 2011, the Malaysian government declared Shias a 'deviant' sect and banned them from promoting their faith to other Muslims, but left them free to practise it themselves.
Both Sunni and Shia, celebrate the following annual holidays:
The following days are some of the most important holidays observed by Shia Muslims: Eid al-Ghadeer which is the anniversary of the Ghadir Khum, the occasion when Muhammad announced Ali's Imamate before a multitude of Muslims. Eid al-Ghadeer is held on the 18th of Dhil-Hijjah.
Most of the holy Islamic sites in today Saudia have been destroyed by Wahhabis and the Saudi Royal Family, the most notable being the shrines and tombs in the Baqi' cemetery in 1925. In 2006, a bombing resulted in the destruction of the shrine of Askari Mosque.
The Shia faith throughout its history split over the issue of Imamate. The largest branch are the Twelvers, to which over 85% of Shia belong. The only other surviving branches are the Zaidi and Ismaili. All three groups follow a different line of Imamate.
Twelver Shia believe in the lineage of the Twelve Imams. The Twelver Shia faith is predominantly found in Iran (est. 90%), Azerbaijan (est. 65%), Bahrain (est. 70%), Iraq (est. 60%), Lebanon (est. 24%), Kuwait (est. 33%), Turkey (est. 15%), Albania (est. 10%), Pakistan (est. 10–15%) and Afghanistan (est. 15%). The Zaidi Shi'a are predominantly found in Yemen (est. 40%).
The Zaidi dispute the succession of the fifth Twelver Imam, Muhammad al-Baqir, because he did not stage a revolution against the corrupt government, unlike Zaid ibn Ali. They do not believe in a direct lineage, but rather that any descendant of Hasan ibn Ali or Husayn ibn Ali who stages a revolution against a corrupt government is an Imam. The Zaidi are mainly found in Yemen.
The Ismaili dispute the succession of the seventh Imam, Musa al-Kadhim, believing his older brother Isma'il ibn Jafar actually succeeded their father Ja'far al-Sadiq. Ismailis believe that Ja'far al-Ṣādiq thought his son, Ismā'īl ibn Ja'far "al-Mubārak", would be heir to the Imamate. However, Ismā'īl predeceased his father. Some of the Shia claimed Ismā'īl had not died, but rather gone into occultation, but the proto-Ismā'īlī group accepted his death and therefore that his eldest son, Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl, was now Imām. Muḥammad remained in contact with this "Mubārakiyyah" group, most of whom resided in Kūfah. Ismailis are dominant group in Badakhshan. They form small communities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, India, Yemen, China and Saudi Arabia and have several subbranches.
1st | Ali| | 600 - 661 | 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib , also known as ''Amīru al-Mu'minīn'' |
2nd | Hasan ibn AliHasan || | 625 – 669 | Ḥasan ibn 'Alī , also known as ''Al-Hasan al-Mujtaba'' |
3rd | Husain ibn AliHusain || | 626 – 680 | Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī , also known as ''Al-Husayn ash-Shaheed'' |
4th | Zayn al-Abidin| | 658 – 713 | 'Alī ibn Ḥusayn , also known as ''Ali Zayn al-'Abideen'' |
5th | Muhammad al-BaqirMuḥammad Baqir || | 676 – 743 | Muḥammad ibn 'Alī , also known as ''Muhammad al-Bāqir'' |
6th | Ja'far as-SadiqJa'far Sadiq || | 703 – 765 | Ja'far ibn Muḥammad , also known as ''Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq'' |
7th | Musa al-KadhimMusa Kadhim || | 745 – 799 | Mūsá ibn Ja'far , also known as ''Mūsá al-Kāżim'' |
8th | Ali ar-RidaAli Rida || | 765 – 818 | 'Alī ibn Mūsá , also known as ''Ali ar-Riża'' |
9th | Muhammad at-TaqiMuhammad Taqi || | 810 – 835 | Muḥammad ibn 'Alī , also known as ''Muḥammad al-Jawad'' and ''Muḥammad at-Taqi'' |
10th | Ali al-HadiAli Hadi || | 827 – 868 | 'Alī ibn Muḥammad , also known as ''Alī al-Ḥādī'' and ""Alī an-Naqī'' |
11th | Hasan al-AskariHasan Askari || | 846 – 874 | Ḥasan ibn 'Alī , also known as ''Hasan al Askari'' |
12th | Muhammad al-MahdiMuhammad Mahdi || | 869 – In occultation | Muhammad ibn Ḥasan , also known as ''al-Hujjat ibn al-Ḥasan'', ''Imām al-Mahdī'', ''Imām al-Aṣr'', etc. |
In Ja'fari jurisprudence, there are ten ancillary pillars, known as ''Furu' ad-Din'', which are as follow: #''Prayer'' #''Fasting'' #''Pilgrimage'' #''Alms giving'' #''Struggle'' #''Directing others towards good'' #''Directing others away from evil'' #''Alms giving "(One Fifth)'' (20% tax on yearly earnings after deduction of house-hold and commercial expenses.) #''Love those who are in God's path'' #''Disassociation with those who oppose God''
According to Twelvers, defining and interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence is the responsibility of Muhammad and the twelve Imams. As the 12th Imam is in occultation, it's the duty of clerics to refer to the Islamic literature such as Qur'an and Hadith and identify legal decisions within the confines of Islamic law to provide means to deal with current issues from an Islamic perspective. In other words, Twelvers clerics provide Guardianship of the Islamic Jurisprudent, which was defined by Muhammad and his twelve successors. This process is known as ''Ijtihad'' and the clerics are known as ''Marja''', meaning reference. The labels ''Allamah'' and ''Ayatollah'' are in use for Twelvers clerics.
After the death or Occultation of Imām Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl in the 8th century, the teachings of Ismailism further transformed into the belief system as it is known today, with an explicit concentration on the deeper, esoteric meaning (''bāṭin'') of the faith. With the eventual development of Twelverism into the more literalistic ''(zahir)'' oriented Akhbari and later Uṣūlī schools of thought, Shī'ism developed in two separate directions: the metaphorical Ismā'īlī group focusing on the mystical path and nature of God and the divine manifestation in the personage of the "Imam of the Time" as the "Face of God", while the more literalistic Twelver group focusing on divine law (''sharī'ah'') and the deeds and sayings (''sunnah'') of Muḥammad and his successors (the ''Ahlu l-Bayt''), who as A'immah were guides and a light to God.
Though there are several sub-groupings within the Ismā'īlīs, the term in today's vernacular generally refers to the Nizārī community who are followers of the Aga Khan and the largest group among the Ismā'īliyyah. Another famous community which falls under the Isma'il's are the Dawoodi Bohra's whose religious leader in Syedna Mohammed Burhanuddin, while there are many other the branches have extremely differing exterior practices, much of the spiritual theology has remained the same since the days of the faith's early Imāms. In recent centuries Ismā'īlīs have largely been an Indo-Iranian community, but they are found in India, Pakistan, Syria, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, China, Jordan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, East Africa and South Africa, and have in recent years emigrated to Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and North America.
In 909, 'Ubaydallāh al-Mahdi bil-Lāh, a claimant to the Ismā'īlī Imāmate, established the Fatimid Empire. During this period, three lineages of Imāms formed. The first branch, known today as the Druze, occurred with the Imām al-Hākim bi-Amrallāh. Born in 386 AH (985), he ascended as ruler at the age of eleven and was feared for his eccentricity and believed insanity. The typical religiously tolerant Fatimid Empire saw much persecution under his reign. When in 411 AH (1021) his mule returned without him, soaked in blood, a religious group that was even forming in his lifetime broke off from mainstream Ismā'īlism and did not acknowledge his successor. Later to be known as the Druze, they believe al-Hākim to be the incarnation of God and the prophecized Mahdi, who would one day return and bring justice to the world. The faith further split from Ismā'īlism as it developed very unusual doctrines which often classes it separately from both Ismā'īliyyah and Islam. The second split occurred following the death of Ma'ad al-Mustansir Billah in 487 AH (1094). His rule was the longest of any Caliph in any Islamic empires. Upon his passing away his sons, the older Nizār and the younger al-Musta'lī fought for political and spiritual control of the dynasty. Nizār was defeated and jailed, but according to Nizāri tradition, his son to escaped to Alamut where the Iranian Ismā'īlī had accepted his claim. From here on, the Nizari Ismaili community has continued with a present, living Imam. The Musta'lī line split again between the Taiyabi(Dawoodi Bohra is main exist) and the Ḥāfizī, the former claiming that the 21st Imām Tayyib (son of al-Amīr) and the Imāms following him went into a period of anonymity (Dawr-e-Satr) and appointed a Dā'ī al-Muṭlaq to guide the community, in a similar manner as the Ismā'īlī had lived after the death of Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl. The latter(Hafizi) claimed that the ruling Fatimid Caliph was the Imām, and they died out with the fall of the Fatimid Empire.
Divine leadership has continued in the Bohra branch through the institution of the "Unrestricted Missionary" Dai. According to Bohra tradition, before the last Imām, Ṭayyib Abi l-Qāṣim, went into seclusion, his father, the 20th Imām Mansur al-Amir Bi-Ahkamillah had instructed Queen Al-Hurra Al-Malika in Yemen to appoint a vicegerent after the seclusion – the ''Unrestricted Missionary'', who as the Imām's vicegerent has full authority to govern the community in all matters both spiritual and temporal while the lineage of Musta'ali-Tayyibi Imams remain in seclusion (Dawr-e-Satr). The three branches of the Musta'lī, the Alavi Bohra, Sulaimani Bohra and Dawoodi Bohra, differ on who the current Unrestricted Missionary is.
The Zaidi doctrine of imamah does not presuppose the infallibility of the Imam, nor that the Imams receive divine guidance. Zaidis also do not believe that the Imamate must pass from father to son, but believe it can be held by any Sayyid descended from either Hasan ibn Ali or Husayn ibn Ali (as was the case after the death of Hasan ibn Ali). Historically, Zaidis held that Zayd was the rightful successor of the 4th Imam as he led a rebellion against the Umayyads in protest of their tyranny and corruption. Muhammad al-Baqir did not engage in political action and the followers of Zayd believed that a true Imām must fight against corrupt rulers.
A Zaydi state was established in Daylaman and Tabaristan (northern Iran) in 864 C.E. by the Alavids; it lasted until the death of its leader at the hand of the Samanids in 928 C.E. Roughly forty years later the state was revived in Gilan (north-western Iran) and survived under Hasanid leaders until 1126 C.E. After which from the 12th-13th centuries, the Zaydis of Daylaman, Gilan and Tabaristan then acknowledge the Zaydi Imams of Yemen or rival Zaydi Imams within Iran.
The Buyids were initially Zaidi as well as the Ukhaidhirite rulers of al-Yamama in the 9th and 10th centuries. The leader of the Zaydi community took the title of Caliph. As such, the ruler of Yemen was known as the Caliph, al-Hadi Yahya bin al-Hussain bin al-Qasim ar-Rassi Rassids (a descendant of Imam Hasan the son of Ali) who, at Sa'da, in 893-7 CE, founded the Zaydi Imamate and this system continued until the middle of the 20th century, when the revolution of 1962 CE that deposed the Zaydi Imam. The founding Zaidism of Yemen was of the Jarudiyya group, however with increasing interaction with Hanafi and Shafi'i rites of Sunni Islam, there was a shift from the Jarudiyya group to the Sulaimaniyya, Tabiriyya, Butriyya or Salihiyya groups. Zaidis form the second dominant religious group in Yemen. Currently, they constitute about 40–45% of the population in Yemen. Ja'faris and Isma'ilis are 2–5%. In Saudi Arabia, it is estimated that there are over 1 million Zaydis (primarily in the western provinces).
Currently the most prominent Zaydi movement is Houthis' movement known by the name of Shabab Al Mu'mineen (Believing Youth) who have been the subject of an ongoing campaign against them by the Yemeni Government in which the army has lost 743 men and thousands of innocent civilians have been killed or displaced by government forces causing a grave humanitarian crisis in north Yemen. Shia Population of the Middle East
Category:Article Feedback Pilot Category:Islam in Iran Category:Islam in Iraq Category:Islam in Lebanon Category:Islam in Yemen
ace:Nasyid ar:الشيعة an:Xiismo ast:Xiísmu az:Şiə bn:শিয়া ইসলাম be:Шыіты be-x-old:Шыізм bs:Šiitski islam bg:Шиитски ислям ca:Xiisme cs:Ší'itský islám cy:Shia da:Shiisme de:Schia dv:ޝީޢީ މަޛްހަބު et:Šiiidid el:Σιίτες es:Chiismo eo:Ŝijaismo eu:Xiismo fa:شیعه fo:Shia Islam fr:Chiisme gl:Xiísmo ko:시아파 hy:Շիա իսլամ hi:शिया hr:Šijiti id:Syi'ah os:Шииттæ is:Sjía it:Sciismo he:שיעה ka:შიიტობა sw:Washia ku:Şiîtî la:Secta Siitica lv:Šiītu islāms lt:Šiizmas hu:Síita iszlám ml:ഷിയാ ഇസ്ലാം mt:Xigħa mr:शिया इस्लाम mzn:تشیع ms:Syiah nl:Sjiisme ja:シーア派 no:Sjiaislam nn:Sjiaislam oc:Chiisme pnb:شیعہ ps:شیعه pl:Szyizm pt:Xiismo ro:Shi'a ru:Шииты sq:Shia Islam scn:Sciismu simple:Shi'a Islam sk:Šía sl:Šiizem so:Shiica sr:Шиити sh:Šiiti fi:Šiialaisuus sv:Shia tl:Islam na Shia ta:சியா முசுலிம் tt:Шигыйчелек te:షియా ఇస్లాం th:ชีอะหฺ tr:Şiilik uk:Шиїти ur:اہل تشیع vi:Hồi giáo Shia war:Shia Islam yi:שיא איסלאם zh-yue:什葉派 zh:什叶派This text is licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA License. This text was originally published on Wikipedia and was developed by the Wikipedia community.
The Israelites were a Hebrew-speaking people of the Ancient Near East who inhabited the Land of Canaan (the modern day Israel, western Jordan, southern Lebanon and Palestinian Territories) during the monarchic period (11th to 7th centuries BCE).
The word "Israelite" derives from the Biblical Hebrew ישראל (Standard: ; Tiberian: ; ISO 259-3: ). The Hebrew Bible etymologizes the name as from ''yisra'' "to prevail over" or "to struggle/fight with", and ''el,'' "God, the divine". The ethnonym is attested as early as the 13th century BCE in an Egyptian inscription. The eponymous biblical patriarch of the Israelites is Jacob, who was given the additional name "Israel" after wrestling with God. (Genesis 32) Jacob demands a blessing from the God which he eventually receives, hence "prevailing over the divine" or "fighting with God". (Genesis 32:28-30)
The biblical term "Israelites" (or the Twelve Tribes or Children of Israel) means both a people, the descendants of the patriarch Jacob/Israel, and the historical population of the kingdom of Israel, or a follower of the God of Israel and Mosaic law. In Modern Hebrew usage, an Israelite is, broadly speaking, a lay member of the Jewish faith, as opposed to the priestly orders of Kohenim and Levites.
The name Hebrews is sometimes used synonymously with "Israelites". For the post-exilic period, beginning in the 5th century BCE, the remnants of the Israelites came to be referred to as Jews, named for the kingdom of Judah. This change is explicit in the Book of Esther (4th century BCE). It replaced the title children of Israel.
Although most literary references to them are located in the Hebrew Bible, there is also abundant non-biblical archaeological and historical evidence of ancient Israel and Judah.
Jacob and his sons are forced by famine to go down into Egypt. When they arrive they and their families are 70 in number, but within four generations they have increased to 600,000 men of fighting age, and the Pharaoh of Egypt, alarmed, first enslaves them and then orders the death of all male Hebrew children. The God of Israel reveals his name to Moses, a Hebrew of the line of Levi; Moses leads the Israelites out of bondage and into the desert, where God gives them their laws and the Israelites agree to become his people. Nevertheless, the Israelites lack complete faith in God, and the generation which left Egypt is not permitted to enter the Promised Land.
;Former Prophets Following the death of the generation of Moses a new generation, led by Joshua, enters Canaan and takes possession of the land in accordance with the curse placed upon Canaan by Noah. Yet even now the Israelites lack strength in God in the face of the peoples of the land, and periods of weakness and backsliding alternate with periods of resilience under a succession of Judges. Eventually the Israelites ask for a king, and God gives them Saul. David, the youngest (divinely favoured) son of Jesse of Bethlehem would succeed Saul. Under David the Israelites establish the kingdom of God, and under David's son Solomon they build the Temple where God takes his earthly dwelling among them. Yet Solomon sins by allowing his foreign wives to worship their own gods, and so on his death the kingdom is divided in two.
The kings of the northern kingdom of Israel are uniformly bad, permitting the worship of other gods and failing to enforce the worship of God alone, and so God eventually allows them to be conquered and dispersed among the peoples of the earth; in their place strangers settle the northern land. In Judah some kings are good and enforce the worship of God alone, but many are bad and permit other gods, even in the Temple itself, and at length God allows the Judah to fall to her enemies, the people taken into captivity in Babylon, the land left empty and desolate, and the Temple itself destroyed.
;Ezra-Nehemiah-Chronicles Yet despite these events God does not forget his people, but sends Cyrus, king of Persia as his messiah to deliver them from bondage. The Israelites are allowed to return to Judah and Benjamin, the Temple is rebuilt, the priestly orders restored, and the service of sacrifice resumed. Through the offices of the sage Ezra Israel is constituted as a holy community, holding itself apart from all other peoples, bound by the Law.
Gilead and Jezreel are listed as tribes of Israel, rather than being treated strictly as locations. In accordance with evidence of this kind elsewhere, all attributed by scholars to the earliest sources, such as in the Song of Deborah, scholars have concluded that the tribal system known as the tribes of Israel evolved over a period of time:
Gilead, Jezreel and Joseph were originally three tribes in the confederation. Jezreel later split into Zebulun and Issachar. Gilead later split into Machir, Gad, and Reuben. Machir later merged with part of Joseph to form Manasseh, while the other part split off to become Ephraim.
This threefold division of the Jewish people persists to this day. To avoid confusion with the broader use of the term Israelite or the modern term Israeli, a member of the Israelite, as opposed to Levite or Aaronite, lineage is usually referred to as a ''Yisrael'' (an Israel) and not a ''Yisraeli'' (which could mean Israelite in the broader sense or in modern Hebrew, an Israeli).
Arthur Koestler claimed in his book "The Thirteenth Tribe" (1976) that Ashkenazi Jews are descendants of central European Khazars who converted into Judaism during the 8th century. Koestler argued that by proving Ashkenazi Jews to have no connection with the biblical Jews, European anti-Semitism would lose all basis. In 2006 Doron Behar and Karl Skorecki of the Technion and Ramban Medical Center in Haifa, Israel claimed that a study carried out by them demoinstrated that: 1) the vast majority of Ashkenazi Jews have some Middle Eastern ancestry; 2) Ashkenazi Jews share a common ancestry with other Jewish groups of European origin; and 3) only 5%-8% of the European Ashkenazi Jews (according to recent studies) were found to have originated in non-Jewish European populations. Dr. David Goldstein, a Duke University geneticist and and director of the Duke Center for Human Genome Variation, has noted that the Technion and Ramban team confirmed that genetic drift played a major role in shaping Ashkenazi mitochondrial DNA, therefore mtDNA studies fail to draw a statistically significant linkage between modern Jews and Middle Eastern populations, however, this differs from the patrilineal case, where Dr. Goldstein said there is no question of a Middle Eastern origin.
There are approximately 50,000 adherents of Karaite Judaism, most of whom live in Israel, but exact numbers are not known, as most Karaites have not participated in any religious censuses. The differences between Karaite and Rabbinic Judaism go back more than a thousand years. Rabbinical Judaism originates from the Pharisees of the Second Temple period. Karaite Judaism may have its origins in the Sadducees of the same era. Unlike the Sadducees who recognized only the Torah as binding, Karaite Jews hold the entire Hebrew Bible to be a religious authority. As such, the vast majority of Karaites believe in the resurrection of the dead. Karaite Jews are widely regarded as being halachically Jewish by the Orthodox Rabbinate. Similarly, members of the rabbinic community are considered to be Jews by the Moetzet Hakhamim, if they are patrilineally Jewish.
Samaritans do not regard the Tanakh as an accurate or truthful history, and regard only Moses as a prophet. They have their own version of Hebrew and their own script for writing Hebrew, which, is descended directly from the Paleo-Hebrew alphabet, unlike the Jewish script for writing Hebrew which is a stylized form of the Aramaic alphabet the Jews adopted during their captivity in Babylonia.
The Samaritans consider themselves ''Bnei Yisrael'' ("Children of Israel" or "Israelites"), but do not regard themselves to be ''Yehudim'' (Jews). They view this term "Jews" as a designation for followers of Judaism, which they assert is a related but altered and amended religion brought back by the exiled Israelite returnees which is not the true religion of the ancient Israelites, which according to them, Samaritanism is.
Judaism regards the Samaritans as descendants of the northern tribesmen whom the Assyrians settled in the territory they conquered from the kingdom of Israel. Since one of those tribes was the Cutheans, this is the name used for the Samaritans in the Talmud. Both the Bible and external sources such as Josephus record intermarriage between Jews and Samaritans in the Hellenistic period.
Modern DNA evidence has proven both most of the world's Jews and the Samaritans have a common ancestral lineage to the Israelites, largely on the paternal lines in both cases. Maternally, both Jews and Samaritans have very low rates of intermarriage with local host (for Jews, local populations in their host diaspora regions) or alien (for Samaritans, foreigners resettled in their midst in attempts by ruling foreign elites to obliterate national identities) populations. Both populations' DNA results indicate the groups having had a high percentage of marriage within their respective communities; in contrast to a low percentage of interfaith marriages.
The name Israel first appears c. 1209 BCE, at the end of the Late Bronze Age and the very beginning of the period archaeologists and historians call Iron Age I, in an inscription of the Egyptian pharaoh Merneptah. The inscription is very brief and says simply: "Israel is laid waste and his seed is not". The hieroglyph accompanying the name "Israel" indicates that it refers to a people, most probably located in the highlands of Samaria.
Over the next two hundred years (the period of Iron Age I) the number of highland villages increased from 25 to over 300 and the settled population doubled to 40,000. There is general agreement that the majority of the population living in these villages was of Canaanite origin. By the 10th century BCE a rudimentary state had emerged in the north-central highlands, and in the 9th century this became a kingdom. The kingdom was sometimes called Israel by its neighbours, but more frequently it was known as the "House (or Land) of Omri." Settlement in the southern highlands was minimal from the 12th through the 10th centuries, but a state began to emerge there in the 9th century, and from 850 onwards a series of inscriptions are evidence of a kingdom which its neighbours refer to as the "House of David."
Category:Semitic peoples Category:Jewish history Category:Ancient peoples Category:Ethnonyms Category:Jews
ar:بنو إسرائيل bg:Дванайсетте израилски племена ca:Tribus d'Israel cs:Izraelské kmeny da:Israelit de:Israeliten et:Iisraellased el:Δώδεκα φυλές του Ισραήλ es:Tribus de Israel eo:Izraelidoj fa:بنیاسرائیل fr:Tribus d'Israël ko:이스라엘 민족 hr:12 izraelskih plemena id:Bani Israil it:Dodici tribù di Israele he:שבטי ישראל lt:Izraelitai ml:ഇസ്രായേൽ ജനത ms:Bani Israel nl:Israëlieten ja:イスラエル (民族) no:Israelitter pnb:بنی اسرائیل pl:Dwanaście Plemion Izraela pt:Tribos de Israel ro:Triburile israelite ru:Колена Израилевы simple:Israelite sk:Izraeliti sr:Дванаест племена Израела fi:Israelin heimot sv:Israeliter tl:Labindalawang lipi ng Israel ta:இசுரவேலர் th:วงศ์วานแห่งอิสราเอล tr:İsrailoğulları ur:بنی اسرائیل zh:以色列人This text is licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA License. This text was originally published on Wikipedia and was developed by the Wikipedia community.
In Persia, the title "the Great" at first seems to be a colloquial version of the Old Persian title "Great King". This title was first used by the conqueror Cyrus II of Persia.
The Persian title was inherited by Alexander III of Macedon (336–323 BC) when he conquered the Persian Empire, and the epithet "Great" eventually became personally associated with him. The first reference (in a comedy by Plautus) assumes that everyone knew who "Alexander the Great" was; however, there is no earlier evidence that Alexander III of Macedon was called "''the Great''".
The early Seleucid kings, who succeeded Alexander in Persia, used "Great King" in local documents, but the title was most notably used for Antiochus the Great (223–187 BC).
Later rulers and commanders began to use the epithet "the Great" as a personal name, like the Roman general Pompey. Others received the surname retrospectively, like the Carthaginian Hanno and the Indian emperor Ashoka the Great. Once the surname gained currency, it was also used as an honorific surname for people without political careers, like the philosopher Albert the Great.
As there are no objective criteria for "greatness", the persistence of later generations in using the designation greatly varies. For example, Louis XIV of France was often referred to as "The Great" in his lifetime but is rarely called such nowadays, while Frederick II of Prussia is still called "The Great". A later Hohenzollern - Wilhelm I - was often called "The Great" in the time of his grandson Wilhelm II, but rarely later.
Category:Monarchs Great, List of people known as The Category:Greatest Nationals Category:Epithets
bs:Spisak osoba znanih kao Veliki id:Daftar tokoh dengan gelar yang Agung jv:Daftar pamimpin ingkang dipun paringi julukan Ingkang Agung la:Magnus lt:Sąrašas:Žmonės, vadinami Didžiaisiais ja:称号に大が付く人物の一覧 ru:Великий (прозвище) sl:Seznam ljudi z vzdevkom Veliki sv:Lista över personer kallade den store th:รายพระนามกษัตริย์ที่ได้รับสมัญญานามมหาราช vi:Đại đếThis text is licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA License. This text was originally published on Wikipedia and was developed by the Wikipedia community.
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