Tibetan can refer to:

Of or relating to Tibet

Tibetan people, an ethnic group

Standard Tibetan language

Tibetan script, a writing system

Tibetan art

Music of Tibet

Tibetan culture

Tibetan cuisine

Tibetan Spaniel dog breed

Tibetan Mastiff dog breed

Tibetan Buddhism

de:Tibetisch es:Tibetano it:Tibetano simple:Tibetan tl:Tibetano

The 2008 Tibetan unrest, also known from its Chinese name as the 3•14 Riots, was a series of riots, protests, and demonstrations in the Tibetan regional capital of Lhasa and also Tibetan Buddhist monasteries outside the Tibet Autonomous Region. What originally began as an annual observance of Tibetan Uprising Day resulted in street protests by monks, that later descended into rioting, burning, looting, and killing by March 14. The violence was mostly directed at Han and Hui civilians by Tibetans participating in the unrest. Police intervened to prevent the conflict from further escalation. At the same time but also in response, protests mostly supporting the Tibetans erupted in cities in North America and Europe. 18 Chinese embassies and consulates were attacked.

According to the Tibet regional government, the unrest was motivated by separatism and orchestrated by the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama denied the accusation and said that the situation was caused by wide discontent in Tibet. The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Dalai Lama held talks on the riots on May 4 and July 1 of the same year.

During the riots, Chinese authorities would not allow foreign and Hong Kong media to enter the region. Domestic media downplayed the riots. Only James Miles, a correspondent from ''The Economist'', gained approval for a week-long trip which happened to coincide with the increase in tensions. According to Miles, the riot police response was tame, but Tibetan exile groups claim a brutal crackdown. Western media speculated that the violence might affect attendance at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, but by and large it did not.

Background

The political situation in Tibet makes the area especially sensitive, but it is also reported by some western media that a number of simmering socio-economic issues may have led to the riots in Lhasa on March 14. ''The Economist'' reporter James Miles, when asked in an interview if the Dalai Lama was responsible for the riots, responded that he "didn't see any evidence of any organized activity" and that "it's more likely that what we saw was yes inspired by a general desire of Tibetans both inside Tibet and among the Dalai Lama's followers, to take advantage of this Olympic year. But also inspired simply by all these festering grievances on the ground in Lhasa," and he noted in another report that "[the] rioting seemed to be primarily an eruption of ethnic hatred." Some Tibetans also complained about social discrimination, unequal pay, and rumors that Tibetan monks had been arrested, and even killed, in the days before the riots.

In recent years many migrants from other parts of the People's Republic of China have been moving into Lhasa and now own many of the city's small businesses. According to the Tibetan Independence Movement and some western media, Tibetans in Lhasa are angered by inflation that has caused the prices of food and consumer goods to increase. Residents were worried that a railway built to link Lhasa to China would increase the number of migrants in the city, but they accepted it because the government assured them that cheaper transportation would keep prices lower. However, as in other parts of the country, prices have continued to rise, creating resentment amongst the residents of Lhasa. Tibetan youth complain about not having equal access to jobs and education.

Chinese Communist Party authorities in Tibet have said that the uprising was masterminded by the Dalai Lama, whom the People's Republic of China government accuses of separatism. The uprising coincided with demonstrations to commemorate the 49th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising in other countries.

The Chinese Ministry for Public Security alleged that those who were arrested after the unrest confessed they were found and employed by some unknown persons to undertake the violence, such as arson, destroying shops and attacking non-Tibetan civilians, with a daily payment of several RMB ".

Protest and violence

Violence and protests in Lhasa

Violence started in Lhasa in Tibet on March 14 when police cars, fire engines and other official vehicles were set on fire as anger erupted following the police's dispersal of a peaceful demonstration near Ramoche Temple in Lhasa. Rioters attacked Han and Hui passers-by and burned down Han- or Hui-owned businesses. Police used tear gas and cattle prods to quell the riots. According to Chinese media, 18 civilians were killed by rioters.

A mob tried to storm the city's main mosque and succeeded in setting fire to the front gate. Shops and restaurants in the Muslim quarter were destroyed. A Chinese businessman reported that many Hui Muslim beef shops were burnt, also stationery shops, banks, a wholesale market at Tsomtsikhang (one of the most important Tibetan markets, where many shops are owned by Hans and Hui Muslims).

Gansu riots

The Tibetan riots spread outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region for the first time. Demonstrations by ethnic Tibetans and monks took place in the northwest province of Gansu on Saturday, March 15, 2008. The riots were centered around Gansu's Labrang Monastery, which is one of the largest Tibetan Buddhist monasteries outside of Tibet. Demonstrators marched through the streets of Xiahe, a predominantly Tibetan county in Gansu which surrounds the Labrang Monastery, a region referred to by Tibetans by its traditional name, ''Amdo Golog''. There were reports of government offices being damaged by the rioters, and police using tear gas and force to break up the demonstrations. The Tibetan government-in-exile claims that 19 Tibetan rioters were shot dead on March 18. Little is known about Han or Hui deaths. China's Xinhua News Agency reported the cost of damage in Gansu at an estimated ¥230 million (US$32.7 million).

Qinghai protests

Chinese authorities have reportedly arrested twelve Tibetan monks after an incident in the historic region of Rebkong, which is located in the Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai (known to Tibetans as ''Amdo''). Chinese security forces have reportedly surrounded the Ditsa monastery in Bayan County. Qinghai province borders Tibet and has a large Tibetan population (still known as ''Amdo'' according to Tibetans).

The Swiss Newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung published an account by a foreign journalist who managed to travel in the region of Xining at the end of March. According to the reports Tibetan teachers were receiving intimidation calls from the Public Security Bureau (PSB), passports belonging to Tibetans were confiscated to prevent traveling abroad and foreign residents were informed about their possible expulsion in case they got involved in Tibetan Independence activism. Students in the region were receiving one-sided "political teaching". Notwithstanding, Tibetan students of the Medical University of Xining held demonstrations to express their solidarity with the demonstrators and victims in Lhasa.

Sichuan riot

In an area of Sichuan province incorporating the traditional Tibetan areas Kham and Amdo, Tibetan monks and police clashed on March 16 in Ngawa county after the monks staged a protest, killing at least one policeman, and setting fire to three or four police vans. The India-based Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy claimed at least seven people were shot dead; however the claim could not be independently confirmed. There are claims that police shot between 13 and 30 protesters after a police station was set on fire, however reports of deaths have been impossible to verify because of restrictions on journalists.

International protests

According to Wen Jiabao, the Premier of the People's Republic of China, attacks on between ten and twenty Chinese embassies and consulates occurred around the same time as attacks on non-Tibetan interests in the Tibet Autonomous Region and several other ethnic Tibetan areas.

According to an article by Doug Saunders published in ''The Globe and Mail'', the protests were loosely coordinated by a group of full-time organizers hired by two umbrella groups that were loyal to the Tibetan government in exile. Documents were sent to more than 150 Tibet support groups around the world giving them detailed notes on how to behave when organizing similar disruptions as the torch made its six-month trip around the world. This included advice on maintaining non-violence and following the Dalai Lama's opposition to Tibetan national independence. (Protesters were to advocate a more autonomous Tibet within China). However, many of the protests did not follow this advice. However, Doug Saunders further published that the torch-relay protests had no relationship with the riots and uprisings inside Tibet.

Casualties and fatalities

China's official Xinhua News Agency reported on early Saturday, March 15, that 10 people to date had been burned to death by rioters, including two hotel employees and two shop owners. It also reported that the victims were all innocent civilians and that most of them were business people. It again reported on March 21 that, according to the Tibet regional government, 18 civilians and 1 police officer had been confirmed dead in the unrest by the night of Friday, March 15. In addition, the number of injured civilians rose to 382 from 325, 58 of whom were critically wounded. 241 police officers were injured, 23 of whom were critically wounded.

The Associated Press reported that at a press conference on Monday, March 17, Tibet Autonomous Region governor Champa Phuntsok announced that 16 had been confirmed dead over the weekend's violence and dozens injured. Other sources published after the same press conference indicate that China put the death toll in Lhasa at 13. The Associated Press claimed later that the Chinese government's official death toll from the previous week's rioting in Lhasa had risen to 22. Accordingly, the death toll provided by Xinhua had risen to 19.

Tibet's government-in-exile claimed to have confirmed at least 80 deaths.

According to James Miles, ''The Economist'''s correspondent in Lhasa, the police fatalities included both Tibetans and the Han ethnic group who were the target of much of the violence. Qiangba Puncog, the head of Tibet's regional government, said that Chinese police did not fire their guns or use anti-personnel weapons against the Tibetan protesters, even though the Tibetans wounded 61 police officers, including six seriously, and the Tibetan regional government reported that 13 innocent civilians had been killed by mobs.

According to a news source affiliated with a Tibetan exile group, the People's Armed Police had blocked off water, electricity, food and health facilities in Sera, Drepung and Ganden monasteries and others active in the demonstrations. As a consequence, monks were suffering starvation, and on March 25 one monk reportedly died from starvation at Ramoche Temple.

On March 28, IHT reported 5 shopgirls, Yang Dongmei, 24; He Xinxin, 20; Chen Jia, 19; Liu Yan, 22; Ciren Zhuoga, 21 had been burned alive when the rioters torched the Yishion clothing store where they worked. The IHT article noted Ciren Zhuoga was Tibetan.

On April 5, the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) stated that the Chinese authorities arrested over 2,300 Tibetans from various parts of Tibet. According to the Tibetan Government in Exile, more than 140 people were killed in the crackdown on recent unrest.

On April 18, in an interview to Canadian journalists, it was reported that the Dalai Lama said that since the beginning of the demonstrations in Tibet at least 400 people had been killed and thousands of others arrested.

The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy reported that a Tibetan woman, 38, who was involved in peaceful protests on 16 and March 17, 2008 in Ngaba County, died after being tortured in a Chinese prison. Following her release, the government hospital, possibly under the influence of local Chinese authorities, had refused to admit her.

Media coverage

Initially, Chinese officials tried to contain information about the unrest and play down protests. According to ''The Guardian'' correspondent Tania Branigan, the government blocked foreign broadcasters and websites and denied journalists access to areas of unrest. Video sharing websites like YouTube, the entire ''The Guardian'' website, portions of the Yahoo! portal, and sections of ''The Times'' website had been restricted.

In European and US newspapers and TV, oppression of Tibetans was reported with inaccuracy and little independent cross-checking. The Chinese newspaper, ''China Daily'' reported that there had been bias in the western media's coverage of the rioting in Tibet, including deliberate mispresentation of the situation. The newspaper pointed out Western media sources such as the ''Washington Post'' used pictures of baton-wielding Nepalese police in clashes with Tibetan protesters in Kathmandu, claiming that the officers were Chinese. The article stated that Chinese netizens across Beijing were angered by what they saw as "biased and sometimes dishonest" reporting by Western media. There was also criticism of CNN's use of a particular cropped picture. John Vause, who reported this story, responded to the criticism saying "...technically it was impossible to include the crashed car on the left", however CNN later replaced the image with one that was cropped differently. On March 24, 2008, the German TV news channel RTL disclosed that one photograph depicting rioters had been erroneously captioned. Separately, another German station, n-tv, admitted that it had mistakenly aired footage from Nepal during a story on Chinese riots. AFP further reported that Chinese students abroad had set up a website, namely Anti-CNN, to collect evidence of "one-sided and untrue" foreign reporting. Media companies accused of "falsified reporting" include CNN, Fox News Channel, the Times Online, Sky News, Spiegel Online and the BBC. Spiegel Online has rejected the accusations in an article. According to the New York Times, CNN apologized on May 18 over some comments made on April 9.

China's downplaying of the event soon ended. Riots against non-Tibetans began on Friday, March 14. Chinese TV channels aired hours of anti-Chinese riots in Lhasa and the aftermath. Employees at the state television service CCTV's English service were instructed to keep broadcasting footage of burned-out shops and Chinese wounded in attacks. As of March 18, 2008, no footages of demonstrators acting peacefully were shown. China's Communist Party newspaper, the ''People's Daily'', called on the government to "resolutely crush the 'Tibet independence' forces' conspiracy and sabotaging activities". The People's Daily also accused the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration of orchestrating the protests in its commentary. Yahoo! China have published "most wanted" poster across its homepage to help China police to catch 24 Tibetans. MSN! China has published the same list as well.

To counteract what the Chinese government called biased Western reporting on the crisis, foreign journalists were allowed to access the region again. Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Deutsche Welle (DW) reported that the Chinese government has allowed a small group of foreign journalists on a tour of Tibet. These reporters included those from the American ''Wall Street Journal'', ''USA Today'', Britain's ''Financial Times'', Japan's Kyodo News Agency, KBS of South Korea, and Arab broadcaster Al-Jazeera. However, on March 27 in Lhasa, a riot by a group of monks from the Jokhang Monastery disrupted a media tour organised by Chinese authorities through Lhasa. The tour was the first opportunity given to selected foreign journalists to enter Tibet after the de facto ban on foreign reporters. The delegation was composed of journalists from the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, USA Today, the Arabic news station Al-Jazeera and the Associated Press. The journalists were selected by the Chinese authorities and were kept under close control while in Lhasa. The authorities blamed the limited number of journalists permitted to attend and the restrictions on their movement on logistical considerations. The Taiwanese media, who were also invited on the tour, reported that the monks told them that they had been locked down in the temple even though they had not participated in the riots and implored the foreign media to report the truth. The vice-chairman of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Padma Choling, explained that they were locked down pending police interviews in relation to the riots, and that once interviewed they were released. He also promised that the monks involved in the protest would be "dealt with" according to law. The Tibetan activist group International Campaign for Tibet stated on March 28, 2008 that it feared for the welfare and whereabouts of the monks involved in the protest -- Sera Monastery, Drepung Monastery, Ganden Monastery and Ramoche Temple. The group did not explain why it identified four monasteries when the protest involved only monks from Jokhang. Choling later told reporters the monks would not be punished.

On March 17, 2008, The Toronto Star reported details from Canadians caught in the violent riots in Tibet. 19-year-old John Kenwood of Victoria, B.C. was witnessing a Chinese motorcyclist being pummelled unconscious by a Tibetan mob hurling chunks of pavement as big as bricks. "He may have died," Kenwood said last night (March 16). "I can't be certain." "He didn't seem to understand what was going on," said Kenwood. "He was wearing a gold helmet and he got off his bike and raised his arms. He didn't know what to do." Also the report cited Canadian eye-witnesses of how the riots turned violent and how some of them escaped with help from taxi drivers and guides. Another report described in detail how Canadian traveller Justin Winfield from Toronto helped to save a Han Chinese from mobs and took him to a local hospital along with two women.

People's Republic of China response

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao blamed supporters of the Dalai Lama for the recent violence in Tibet. "There is ample fact and we also have plenty of evidence proving that this incident was organised, premeditated, masterminded and incited by the Dalai clique," said the Premier; however, the young generation of Tibetans are dissatisfied with the Dalai Lama's insistence on peaceful protest, revealing deep divisions within the Tibetan community. The Dalai Lama denied any involvement in the events, On April 1, 2008, the Chinese government escalated its accusation against supporters of the Dalai Lama, accusing them of planning suicide attacks. The prime minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Samdhong Rinpoche, denied these allegations, saying "Tibetan exiles are 100 percent committed to nonviolence. There is no question of suicide attacks."

On March 31, 2008, the PRC state-owned news agency Xinhua published what it claimed to be an account of the process by which the Dalai Lama allegedly masterminded the riots. Key claims include that five groups associated with the Government-in-Exile recruited agents for the "Tibetan People's Great Uprising" in India in February, that 101 agents sent from Dharamsala were instrumental in organising the protests and riots, that the Government-in-Exile directly funded the protests and that the Tibetan Youth Congress intends to conduct an armed guerilla campaign in China.

''The West Australian'' reported that Chinese forces claimed to have found semi-automatic firearms hidden throughout a temple in Ngawa prefecture, in an ethnic Tibetan area of southwestern China which had been the scene of anti-Chinese riots in recent weeks. Police officers told state television, "they were modified semi-automatic weapons."

Riot actions

The People's Republic of China responded by deploying the People's Armed Police. The BBC reported seeing over 400 troop carriers mobilizing into Tibet, which would represent a deployment of up to 4,000 troops. The Chinese authorities ordered all Hong Kong and foreign journalists to leave Lhasa. According to General Yang Deping, regular military troops from the People's Liberation Army were not deployed.

Chinese authorities were also reportedly concerned that the Tibetan protests could "embolden activists in restive Xinjiang province" to organise street protests as well. The Chinese-backed Panchen Lama, Gyaincain Norbu, condemned the unrest, saying, "the rioters' acts not only harmed the interests of the nation and the people, but also violated the aim of Buddhism.... We strongly condemn the crime of a tiny number of people to hurt the lives and properties of the people."

In addition to sealing off monasteries, an eyewitness at Sera Monastery identified as John claimed, "They were grabbing monks, kicking and beating them". In Ngawa county, Sichuan, police fired at the crowd after the rioters had burned down government buildings including the local police station, destroyed public and private vehicles including police cars, stabbed police officers with swords, and finally attempted to take firearms from the police, and after the police fired warning shots to no avail. The government claimed that the police acted in self-defense. According to the Chinese government, four protesters were wounded, and 18 "innocent" civilians, along with a police officer, were killed. In contrast, the Tibetan government in exile claimed there were at least 99 deaths across the region.

PRC and Dalai Lama dialogues

On March 19, 2008 Premier Wen Jiabao condemned the Dalai Lama's alleged role in the riot, but said the door for dialogue remained open if he renounced Tibetan independence, and if he "recognizes Tibet and Taiwan as inalienable parts of the Chinese territory." The Dalai Lama has repeatedly stated he seeks autonomy, not independence, citing the need for Tibet to develop as a modern nation.

On May 4, 2008, two representatives of the PRC government, Zhu Weiqun and Sitar met with two representatives of the Dalai Lama, Lodi Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen, in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen. The two sides exchanged views and agreed that a further round of talks should be held at an appropriate time. Plans for the meeting had been announced by the Xinhua News Agency on April 25, 2008 and was confirmed by the Dalai Lama's spokesman.

This was the first high-level dialogue between the Dalai Lama's representatives and the PRC government since the March unrest, and was the continuation of a series of talks between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama's representatives, including his immediate family and close aides. During the Shenzhen meeting, a second meeting was scheduled for June 11, 2008. However, due to the 2008 Sichuan earthquakes, the two sides agreed to postpone the meeting. The second meeting was held on July 1, 2008.

International reaction

Aftermath and appraisal

According to the People's Daily, on March 24 order returned to some affected areas in Sichuan Province as schools, shops and restaurants reopened to the public.

On March 26 a small group of foreign journalists was taken by bus into Tibet, in a move that appeared calculated to bolster government claims that authorities were in control and that the protests which began peacefully were acts of destruction and murder. The heavily armed police presence indicated Lhasa remained under lockdown. Reporters were guided to burned streets in Lhasa hung with a red banner that read, "Construct a Harmonious Society," a catchphrase from the Chinese president's efforts to deal with social unrest created by an increasing gap between an urban middle class and the poor. The Dalai Lama called the trip "a first step," provided that reporters were given complete freedom.

The US State Department issued a warning to US Citizens on March 20, to those who are attending the Beijing Olympics, that "Americans' conversations and telephones could be monitored and their rooms could be searched without their knowledge or consent."

On October 2009, Four Tibetans were executed in connection with their involvement with the unrest.

Amnesty International reported in June 2008 that over 1000 Tibetan protesters detained by Chinese authorities were unaccounted for. According to an October 10, 2009 report by the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, at least 670 Tibetans had been jailed in 2009 for activities that included peaceful protest or leaking information to the outside world.

The Open Constitution Initiative, operated by several Weiquan lawyers and intellectuals, issued a paper in May 2009 challenging the official narrative, and suggesting that the protests were a response to economic inequities, Han Chinese migration, and religious sentiments. The OCI recommended that Chinese authorities better respect and protect the rights and interests of the Tibetan people, including religious freedom.

Impact on Olympics

There were rumors that some athletes were considering boycotting the 2008 Summer Olympics over the Tibetan violence. The vice-president of the International Olympic Committee discouraged this, as well as the European Union and the Olympic Committees of Europe and Australia, who condemned politicizing sport. Even the 14th Dalai Lama reiterated that he was against any boycott.

The attendance of government leaders at the 2008 Summer Olympics opening ceremony was watched by the media, because some groups called for a boycott of the ceremony on both human rights and Tibetan violence grounds. Nonetheless, by the end of July 2008, the leaders of more than 80 countries had decided to attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, more than in any of the preceding Olympics. All but one leader of the countries that did not attend the opening ceremonies emphasized that it was not to boycott the olympics; one German chancellor said that there was "no link to Tibet". Conservative Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk was the one European head of government to boycott the opening ceremonies because of the violence in Tibet.

See also

Tibetan Resistance Since 1950

1959 Tibetan uprising

1987–1993 Tibetan unrest

2007 Burmese anti-government protests

2008 in China

2008 Summer Olympics torch relay

2008 Uyghur unrest

2011 Xilinhot incident

Censorship in the People's Republic of China

List of revolutions and rebellions

Nangpa La shootings

Sinicization of Tibet

Human rights in Tibet

References

Further reading

Muni, S.D. ''The Third Tibetan Uprising: India's Response'' in ISAS Background Briefs, Issue: 61, Mar 24, 2008. Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS).

Zellen, Barry. ''Tibetans Rise Up, as Hope Overtakes Fear on China’s Western Front'' in Strategic Insights, Volume VII, Issue April 2, 2008. Monterey: Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC).

External links

Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD)

Google Map of Tibet protests at TCHRD

The Uprising Archive, Photos, videos, and documents of the historic Tibetan Uprising

Eyewitness accounts of the Tibet unrest from foreign travelers, Christian Science Monitor''

BBC News Special report: Tension in Tibet

BBC News: In pictures: Protests in Tibet

BBC News: In pictures: Tibet aftermath

BBC News: Eyewitness accounts: Tibet clashes

Monster & Critics News: In photos: 'Protests in Tibet'

YouTube blocked in China, Tibet protests likely the cause

Wikileaks defies Chinese "Great Firewall" with 120 pictures and videos

"Tibet, the 'great game' and the CIA", Richard Bennett, Asia Times, March 26, 2008

Crackdown on Tibet

Dubious politics behind anti-Chinese protests

After Tibet, protests reported in China's Xinjiang

Real Reason For Tibet Protests

The Olympic Torch Relay Campaign

China's Forbidden Zones (Human Rights Watch)

Tibetan Unrest Tibetan Unrest Category:Crime in China Category:Political riots Category:Ethnic riots Category:Riots and civil unrest in the People's Republic of China Category:Tibetan independence movement Category:History of Tibet Category:Protests in the People's Republic of China

br:Darvoudoù 2008 e Tibet da:Optøjerne i Tibet 2008 de:Tibetische Unruhen 2008 es:Disturbios en el Tíbet de 2008 eo:Tumultoj de Tibeto en 2008 fa:قیام تبت (۲۰۰۸) fr:Troubles au Tibet en mars 2008 ko:2008년 티베트 반중국 시위 hu:2008-as tibeti zavargások ms:Pergolakan di Tibet 2008 nl:Opstand in Tibet (2008) ja:2008年のチベット騒乱 no:Opptøyene i Tibet 2008 pl:Zamieszki w Tybecie w 2008 roku pt:Distúrbios no Tibete em 2008 rm:Tumults dal 2008 en Tibet ru:Беспорядки в Тибете sl:Nemiri v Tibetu 2008 sv:Oroligheterna i Tibet 2008 vi:Bạo động năm 2008 tại Tây Tạng zh:2008年藏区骚乱

Coordinates	45°30′″N73°40′″N
birth name	Richard Tiffany Gere
birth date	August 31, 1949
birth place	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.
occupation	Actor
years active	1973–present
nationality	American
spouse	Cindy Crawford (1991–1995)Carey Lowell (2002–present)
children	Son }}

Richard Tiffany Gere ( ; born August 31, 1949) is an American actor. He began acting in the 1970s, playing a supporting role in ''Looking for Mr. Goodbar'', and a starring role in ''Days of Heaven''. He came to prominence in 1980 for his role in the film ''American Gigolo'', which established him as a leading man and a sex symbol. He went on to star in several hit films including ''An Officer and a Gentleman'', ''Pretty Woman'', ''Primal Fear'', and ''Chicago'', for which he won a Golden Globe Award as Best Actor, as well as a Screen Actors Guild Award as part of the Best Cast.

Early life

Born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Gere is a descendant of ''Mayflower'' Pilgrims Francis Eaton, John Billington, George Soule, Richard Warren, Degory Priest, William Brewster and Francis Cooke. Gere's mother, Doris Ann (née Tiffany, born 1924), was a homemaker, and his father, Homer George Gere (born 1922), was an insurance agent for the Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and had originally intended to become a minister. Gere is their eldest son and second child. In 1967, he graduated from North Syracuse Central High School, where he excelled at gymnastics and music, playing the trumpet. He attended the University of Massachusetts Amherst on a gymnastics scholarship, majoring in philosophy, but did not graduate, leaving after two years.

Career

Gere first worked professionally at the Provincetown Playhouse on Cape Cod in 1971 where he starred in ''Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead.'' His first major acting role was in the original London stage version of ''Grease'' in 1973. He began appearing in Hollywood films in the mid 1970s, co-starring in the thriller ''Looking for Mr. Goodbar'' (1977) and playing the leading role in director Terrence Malick's well-reviewed 1978 film, ''Days of Heaven''. In 1980, Gere appeared in the Broadway production of ''Bent''. He became a major star that year with the film ''American Gigolo'', followed by the romantic drama ''An Officer and a Gentleman'', which grossed almost $130 million in 1982.

However, after 1982, Gere's career was dogged by several box office failures. His career was somewhat resurrected after the release of both ''Internal Affairs'' and ''Pretty Woman'' in 1990. Gere's status as a leading man was again solidified, and he went on to star in several successful films throughout the 1990s, including ''Sommersby'' (1993), ''Primal Fear'' (1996), and ''Runaway Bride'' (1999) which reunited him with his ''Pretty Woman'' co-star Julia Roberts. Richard also took a leading role in the 1997 action movie ''The Jackal'', playing Declan Mulqueen.

''People'' magazine named Gere the "Sexiest Man Alive" in 1999. In 2002, he appeared in three major releases: the horror thriller ''The Mothman Prophecies'', the drama ''Unfaithful'', and the Academy Award-winning film version of ''Chicago'', for which he won a Golden Globe as "Best Actor – Comedy or Musical". Gere's 2004 ballroom dancing drama ''Shall We Dance?'' was also a solid performer that grossed $170 million worldwide though his next film, 2005's ''Bee Season'', was a commercial failure.

Gere was Harvard University's Hasty Pudding Theatricals' "Man of the Year" for 2006. In 2007, he co-starred with Jesse Eisenberg and Terrence Howard in ''The Hunting Party'', a comic thriller in which he played a journalist in Bosnia. The same year he also starred with Christian Bale, Heath Ledger, and Cate Blanchett in Todd Haynes' semi-biographical film about Bob Dylan, ''I'm Not There''.

Gere co-starred with Diane Lane in the romantic drama ''Nights in Rodanthe'', released in 2008. The film was widely panned by critics (even making #74 on ''The London Times'' Worst Films of 2008 list), but grossed over $84 million worldwide.

In December 2010, Gere was honored for his lifetime achievement from the 34th Cairo International Film Festival.

Gere remains one of the few actors, if not the only actor, to be nominated multiple times for the Golden Globe Award without ever being nominated for an Academy Award.

Personal life and activism

Gere was married to supermodel Cindy Crawford from 1991 to 1995. In 2002, he married model and actress Carey Lowell. They have a son, Homer James Jigme Gere, who was born in 2000 and is named after Gere's father.

Gere was raised by Methodist parents; his interest in Buddhism began when he traveled to Nepal in 1978 with the Brazilian painter, Sylvia Martins. He is a practicing Buddhist and an active supporter of the Dalai Lama. Gere is also a persistent advocate for human rights in Tibet; he is a co-founder of the Tibet House, creator of The Gere Foundation, and he is Chairman of the Board of Directors for the International Campaign for Tibet. Because he strongly supports the Tibetan Independence Movement, he is permanently banned from entering the People's Republic of China. Gere was banned as an Academy Award presenter in 1993 after he denounced the Chinese government in his capacity as presenter. In September 2007, Gere called for the boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games to put pressure on China to make Tibet independent. He starred in Free Tibet-themed Lancia commercial featuring the Lancia Delta. In June 27, 2011 Richard Gere done meditation in Borobudur temple.

Richard Gere actively supports Survival International, an organization dedicated to protecting the rights and lands of tribal peoples throughout the world. He contributed some of his writing for the book, ''We Are One: A Celebration of Tribal Peoples'', released in October 2009. The book explores the culture of peoples around the world, portraying both its diversity and the threats it faces. Among other contributors, we can find several western writers, such as Laurens van der Post, Noam Chomsky, Claude Lévi-Strauss; and also indigenous peoples, such as Davi Kopenawa Yanomami and Roy Sesana. Richard Gere discusses the persecution and loss of land of the Jummas, as an example of a tragic story that repeats itself in different continents of the world. He calls attention to the crime against their peaceful culture and how it reflects on our own relationship with nature and capacity to survive. The royalties from the sale of this book go to the indigenous rights organization, Survival International.

Gere campaigns for ecological causes and AIDS awareness. He currently serves on the Board of Directors for Healing the Divide, an organization that supports global initiatives to promote peace, justice and understanding. He helped to establish the AIDS Care Home, a residential facility in India for women and children with AIDS, and also supports campaigns for AIDS awareness and education that country. In 1999, he created the Gere Foundation India Trust to support a variety of humanitarian programs in India.

On April 15, 2007, Gere appeared at an AIDS awareness rally in Jaipur, India. During a live news conference to promote condom use among truck drivers, he embraced Bollywood superstar Shilpa Shetty, dipped her, and kissed her several times on the cheek. As a result of that gesture, a local court ordered the arrest of Gere and Shetty, finding them in violation "public obscenity" laws. Gere, who quickly fled the country, has said the controversy was "manufactured by a small hard-line political party." About a month later, a two-judge bench headed by the Chief Justice of India, KG Balakrishnan, described the case as "frivolous" and believed that such complaints (against celebrities) were filed for "cheap publicity" and have brought a bad name to the country. They ruled that "Richard Gere is free to enter the country. This is the end of the matter."

In June 2008, Gere appeared in a Fiat commercial for the European market, driving a new Lancia Delta from Hollywood to Tibet. The commercial concluded with a tagline of "New Lancia Delta: the power to be different". The commercial was reported in Chinese newspapers, and Fiat apologized to the PRC. Branding expert John Tantillo argued that Fiat had foreseen the controversy the ad would cause and hoped to benefit from press coverage it would receive, labeling it a case of adpublitizing.

Political views

Invasion of Iraq

Gere has stated that the decision to go to war in Iraq was one that the American people were not in support of and that the administration at the time “bullied” Americans into the decision. He blamed the situation on a very “poor president”.

“I'm very sorry about what the U.S. has done in Iraq. This war has been a tragedy for everyone. I hope that the people of Iraq can rebuild their country," Richard Gere said in a press conference, held on the sidelines of the 34th Cairo International Film Festival.

Filmography

! Year	! Title	! Role	Notes
1975	''Report to the Commissioner''	Billy
1976	''Baby Blue Marine''	Raider
1977		Tony Lo Porto
1978		Thomas Stony De Coco
1978	''Days of Heaven''	Bill
1979	''Yanks''	Matt Dyson
1980	''American Gigolo''	Julian Kaye
1982	''An Officer and a Gentleman''	Zack Mayo	Nominated — Golden Globe Award for Best Actor - Motion Picture Drama
1983		Dr. Eduardo Plarr
1983		Jesse Lujack
1984		Dixie Dwyer
1985		David
1986		Eddie Jillette
1986		Pete St. John
1988	''Miles from Home''	Frank Roberts, Jr.
1990		Dennis Peck
1990	''Pretty Woman''	Edward Lewis	Nominated — Golden Globe Award for Best Actor - Motion Picture Musical or Comedy
1991	''Rhapsody in August''	Clark
1992	''Final Analysis''	Dr. Isaac Barr
1993		Mr. Jones
1993	''Sommersby''	John Robert 'Jack' Sommersby
1993		The Choreographer	Nominated — CableACE Awards
1994		Vincent Eastman
1995	''[[First Knight''	Lancelot
1996		Martin Vail
1997		Declan Joseph Mulqueen
1997	''Red Corner''	Jack Moore
1999		Ike Graham
2000	''Dr. T & the Women''	Dr. T	Nominated — Satellite Award for Best Actor - Motion Picture Musical or Comedy
2000		Will Keane
2002		Billy Flynn	Broadcast Film Critics Association Award for Best CastGolden Globe Award for Best Actor - Motion Picture Musical or ComedyScreen Actors Guild Award for Outstanding Performance by a Cast in a Motion PictureNominated — Phoenix Film Critics Society Award for Best CastNominated — Screen Actors Guild Award for Outstanding Performance by a Male Actor in a Leading Role
2002		Edward Sumner
2002		John Klein
2004		John Clark
2005		Saul Naumann
2007		Clifford Irving	Nominated — Satellite Award for Best Actor - Motion Picture Musical or Comedy
2007		Simon
2007	''I'm Not There''	Bob Dylan as Billy The Kid
2007		Agent Erroll Babbage
2008	''Nights in Rodanthe''	Dr. Paul Flanner
2009
2009	''Hachiko: A Dog's Story''	Parker Wilson
2010	''Brooklyn's Finest''	Eddie Dugan
2011		Paul Shepherdson
2012		Robert Miller	filming

References

External links

Defended India's nuclear tests

The Gere Foundation

The Druk White Lotus School (external link) of which Gere is an Honorary Patron.

Shambhala Sun Interview

Category:1949 births Category:Actors from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Category:AIDS activists Category:American health activists Category:American anti-communists Category:Best Musical or Comedy Actor Golden Globe (film) winners Category:Converts to Buddhism Category:American Buddhists Category:American people of English descent Category:Living people Category:Outstanding Performance by a Cast in a Motion Picture Screen Actors Guild Award winners Category:Tibetan activists Category:Tibetan Buddhists from the United States Category:Tibetan independence movement Category:Personae non gratae

ar:ريتشارد جير az:Riçard Gir be:Рычард Гір be-x-old:Рычард Гір bs:Richard Gere bg:Ричард Гиър ca:Richard Gere cs:Richard Gere cy:Richard Gere da:Richard Gere de:Richard Gere el:Ρίτσαρντ Γκιρ es:Richard Gere eo:Richard Gere eu:Richard Gere fa:ریچارد گر fr:Richard Gere ga:Richard Gere gd:Richard Gere gl:Richard Gere ko:리처드 기어 hi:रिचर्ड गेयर hr:Richard Gere id:Richard Gere it:Richard Gere he:ריצ'רד גיר la:Ricardus Gere hu:Richard Gere mr:रिचर्ड गेर nl:Richard Gere ja:リチャード・ギア no:Richard Gere pl:Richard Gere pt:Richard Gere ro:Richard Gere ru:Гир, Ричард sq:Richard Gere simple:Richard Gere sl:Richard Gere sr:Ричард Гир sh:Richard Gere fi:Richard Gere sv:Richard Gere ta:ரிச்சர்ட் கியர் te:రిచర్డ్ గేర్ th:ริชาร์ด เกียร์ tr:Richard Gere uk:Річард Гір zh:李察·基爾

Coordinates	45°30′″N73°40′″N
Name	Hu Jintao胡锦涛
Office	9th General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
Deputy	Wu BangguoWen JiabaoJia QinglinLi Changchun
Term start	15 November 2002
Term end
Predecessor	Jiang Zemin
Successor
Office1	6th President of the People's Republic of China
Premier1	Wen Jiabao
Vicepresident1	Zeng QinghongXi Jinping
Term start1	15 March 2003
Term end1
Predecessor1	Jiang Zemin
Successor1
Office2	Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission
Deputy2	Xi JinpingGuo BoxiongXu Caihou
Term start2	19 September 2004
Predecessor2	Jiang Zemin
Office3	Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission
Deputy3	Xi JinpingGuo BoxiongXu Caihou
Term start3	13 March 2005
Predecessor3	Jiang Zemin
Office4	First Secretary of the Central Secretariat of the Communist Party of China
1blankname4	General Secretary
1namedata4	Jiang Zemin
Term start4	19 October 1992
Term end4	15 November 2002
Predecessor4	Hu Qili
Successor4	Zeng Qinghong
Office5	6th Vice President of the People's Republic of China
President5	Jiang Zemin
Term start5	15 March 1998
Term end5	15 March 2003
Predecessor5	Rong Yiren
Successor5	Zeng Qinghong
Birth date	December 21, 1942
Birth place	Taizhou, Jiangsu, China
Party	Communist Party
Spouse	Liu Yongqing
Children	HaifengHaiqing
Residence	Zhongnanhai
Alma mater	Tsinghua University
Profession	Hydraulic engineer
Signature	Hu Jintao Sign.png }}

Hu Jintao (Pinyin: ''Hú Jǐntāo'', pronounced ; born 21 December 1942) is the current Paramount leader of the People's Republic of China. He has held the titles of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China since 2002, President of the People's Republic of China since 2003, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission since 2004, succeeding Jiang Zemin as the chief of the fourth generation of leadership of the Communist Party of China.

Hu has been involved in the Communist party bureaucracy for most of his adult life, notably as Party secretary for Guizhou province and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and then later first Secretary of the CPC Secretariat and Vice-President under former leader Jiang Zemin. Hu is the first leader of the Communist Party without any significant revolutionary credentials. As such, his rise to the presidency represented China's transition of leadership from establishment communists to younger, more pragmatic technocrats.

During his term in office, Hu reintroduced state control in some sectors of the economy that were relaxed by the previous administration, and has been conservative with political reforms. Along with his colleague, Premier Wen Jiabao, Hu presided over nearly a decade of consistent economic growth and development that cemented China as a major world power. He sought to improve socio-economic equality domestically through the Scientific Development Concept, which aimed to build a "Harmonious Society" that was prosperous and free of social conflict. Meanwhile, Hu kept a tight lid on China politically, cracking down on social disturbances, ethnic minority protests, and dissident figures. In foreign policy, Hu advocated for "China's peaceful development", pursuing soft power in international relations and a business-oriented approach to diplomacy. Through Hu's tenure, China's influence in Africa, Latin America, and other developing countries has increased.

Hu possesses a low-key and reserved leadership style, and is reportedly a firm believer in consensus-based rule. These traits have made Hu a rather bland figure in the public eye, embodying the focus in Chinese politics on technocratic competence rather than personality. Due to term restrictions, Hu must step down as General Secretary in 2012 and President in 2013.

Early life

Hu Jintao was born in Taizhou, Jiangsu province on 21 December 1942. He grew up in Taizhou and finished his high school education there. His branch of the family migrated from Jixi County of Anhui province to Jiangyan during his grandfather's generation. His mother was a native of Taixian in Jiangsu.

Though his father owned a small tea trading business in Taizhou, the family was relatively poor. His mother was a teacher and died when he was seven, and he was raised by an aunt. Hu's father was later denounced during the Cultural Revolution, an event that (together with his relatively humble origins) apparently had a deep effect upon Hu, who diligently tried to clear his father's name.

Hu was a gifted student in Taizhou high school, excelling in activities such as singing and dancing. In 1964, while still a student at Beijing's Tsinghua University, Hu joined the Communist Party of China (CPC), before the Cultural Revolution. He was the chairman of Tsinghua Student Union at that time. He graduated in hydraulic engineering in 1965. At Tsinghua, Hu met a fellow student Liu Yongqing, now his wife. They have a son and a daughter named Hu Haifeng and Hu Haiqing respectively.

In 1968, Hu volunteered for his service in Gansu and worked on the construction of Liujiaxia Hydroelectric Station while also managing Party affairs for the local branch of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power. From 1969 to 1974, Hu worked for Sinohydro Engineering Bureau, as an engineer.

Early political career

In 1973, Hu was transferred to the Construction Department of Gansu as a secretary. The next year he was promoted to vice senior chief. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping implemented the "Four Transformations" program, which aimed to produce communist leaders who were "more revolutionary, younger, more knowledgeable, and more specialized." In response to this nation-wide search for young party members, Song Ping, the first secretary of CPC Gansu Committee (Gansu's governor) discovered Hu Jintao and promoted him several ranks to the position of deputy head of the commission. Another protégé of Song, Wen Jiabao, also became prominent at the same time.

In 1982, Hu was promoted to the position of Communist Youth League Gansu Branch Secretary and was appointed as the director of the All-China Youth Federation. His mentor Song Ping was transferred to Beijing as Minister of Organization of the Communist Party of China, and was in charge of senior cadres' recommendation, candidacy and promotion. With the support of Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping, Hu was assured of a bright future in the party. At Song Ping's suggestion, in 1982 central Party authorities invited Hu to Beijing to study at the Central Party School. Soon after, he was transferred to Beijing and appointed as secretariat of the Communist Youth League Central Committee ("CY Central"). Two years later Hu was promoted to First Secretary of CY Central, thus its actual leader. During his term in the Youth League, Hu escorted Hu Yaobang, who was General Secretary of CPC then, in visits around the country. Hu Yaobang, himself a veteran coming from the Youth League, could reminiscence his youth through Hu's company.

Party Committee Secretary of Guizhou

In 1985, Hu Yaobang pushed for Hu Jintao to be transferred to Guizhou as the provincial Committee Secretary of Communist Party of China. Hu attempted to improve the economy of the backwater province, and reputedly visited all of its eighty-six counties. While in Guizhou, Hu was careful to follow Beijing's directives and had a reputation of being "airtight"; he rarely would offer his views on policy matters in public. While Hu was generally seen as an official with integrity and honesty, some locals preferred his predecessor Zhu Houze. In 1987, Hu Jintao handled the local students protest parallel to the Democracy Wall carefully, whereas in Beijing similar protests resulted in Hu Yaobang's forced resignation.

Tenure in Tibet

The exit of his patron Hu Yaobang from the political scene was initially seen as unfavourable towards Hu Jintao. He drew criticism from party elders for failing to criticize the ousted reformer. In 1988, Hu was transferred to become Party Regional Committee Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the restive area's number-one figure, while also taking on the role of Political Commissar of the local People's Liberation Army units. A number of Tibetans have long been opposed to government policy in the region and unrest and ethnic conflict were brewing, particularly anti-Han Chinese sentiments amongst local Tibetans. Minor clashes had been occurring since 1987, and when the scale of unrest grew, Hu responded with the deployment of some 1,700 People's Armed Police into Lhasa in February 1989 in an attempt to warn against further disturbance. Increased clashes culminated in serious rioting in Lhasa's core on 5 March 1989, five days before the 30th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising. What occurred after is a matter of dispute: rioters accused the police of shooting them arbitrarily, and the police claiming that they had acted in self-defense. In addition, there was speculation that Hu delayed his orders to clamp down on the protesters until late into the evening, when the police chief was forced to act because the situation was spiraling out of control. The protesters were suppressed early into the next day, and Hu asked Beijing to declare martial law on 8 March.

Hu's role in the demonstrations and rioting on March 5 was never made clear. While it is general protocol that Hu must have at least implicitly approved the use of force against protesters, whether he actually gave orders throughout March 5 is a matter of debate. In addition, John Tkacik cites that Hu had been coordinating with the Chengdu Military Region for troops to be on full alert as the situation progressed. Some diplomatic analysts linked what they saw as Hu's brutal use of force to the suppression of activists and students at in Tiananmen Square, which took place a mere three months later. Whether Hu provided "inspiration" for the PLA on June 4 is a matter of debate, but it was clear that Hu's actions in Lhasa earned him unprecedented attention in the upper echelons of party power, including paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. When tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square, Hu was one of the first regional leaders to declare his support for the central authorities. Hu experienced high-altitude sickness in June 1990, and returned to Beijing, but remained in his position for another two years, during which Hu achieved little. But his departure to Beijing was seen as a means to return to the centrefold of Chinese politics, which led to some doubts as to whether or not he was as ill as he had claimed.

Candidacy

Before the opening of the 14th National Congress of the CPC in 1992, the Party's senior leaders, including Deng and Chen Yun, were to select candidates for the Politburo Standing Committee to ensure a smooth transition of power from the so-called second-generation leaders (Deng, Chen, Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen, etc.) to third-generation Communist Party of China leaders (Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi etc.). Deng also proposed that they should consider another candidate for a further future transition, preferably someone under fifty to represent the next generation of leaders. Song, as the organization chief, recommended Hu as an ideal candidate for the prospect of a future leader. As a result, shortly before his 50th birthday, Hu Jintao became the youngest member of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, and the second youngest Politburo Standing Committee member ever since the CPC took power in 1949.

In 1993, Hu took charge of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, which oversaw day-to-day operations of the Central Committee, and the Central Party School, which was convenient for him to bring up his own supporters among senior CPC cadres. Hu was also put in charge of the ideological work of the CPC. Although Hu was considered heir apparent to Jiang, he always took great care to ensure that Jiang be at the center of the spotlight. In late 1998, Hu promoted Jiang's unpopular movement of the "Three Stresses" "stress study, stress politics, and stress healthy trends" giving speeches to promote it. In 2001, he publicized Jiang's Three Represents theory, which Jiang hoped to place him on the same level as other Marxist theoreticians. As a result, he left the public with an impression of being low-key, courteous, and adept at forming coalitions. In 1998, Hu became Vice-President of China, and Jiang wanted Hu to play a more active role in foreign affairs. Hu became China's leading voice during the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.

Secretaryship and Presidency

Since taking over as Party General Secretary at the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hu and his premier, Wen Jiabao, proposed to set up a Harmonious Society which aims at lessening the inequality and changing the style of the "GDP first and Welfare Second" policies. They focused on sectors of the Chinese population that have been left behind by the economic reform, and have taken a number of high profile trips to the poorer areas of China with the stated goal of understanding these areas better. Hu and Wen Jiabao have also attempted to move China away from a policy of favouring economic growth at all costs and toward a more balanced view of growth that includes factors in social inequality and environmental damage, including the use of the green gross domestic product in personnel decisions. Jiang's clique, however, maintained control in most developing areas, therefore Hu and Wen's measures of macroeconomic regulation faced great resistance.

SARS crisis

The first crisis of Hu's leadership happened during the outbreak of SARS in 2003. Following strong criticism of China for initially covering up and responding slowly to the crisis, he dismissed several party and government officials, including the health minister, who supported Jiang, and the Mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong, widely perceived as Hu's protégé. Meng's dismissal was sometimes seen as a yielding compromise to erode Jiang's support in the party. Hu and Wen took steps to increase the transparency of China's reporting to international health organizations, indirectly dealing a blow to Jiang's stance on the issue at hand.

Succession of Jiang Zemin

On 15 November 2002, a new Hu Jintao-led Politburo nominally succeeded Jiang. Although Jiang, then 76, stepped down from the powerful General Secretary and the Politburo Standing Committee to make way for a younger ''fourth generation'' of leadership, there was speculation that Jiang would retain significant influence because Hu was not associated with Jiang's influential ''Shanghai clique'', to which six out of the nine members of the all-powerful Standing Committee were believed to be linked. However, later developments show that many of its members have shifted their positions. Zeng Qinghong, for example, moved from a disciple of Jiang to serving as an intermediary between the two factions. In 2003, Jiang was also re-elected to the post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, a post from which Deng Xiaoping was able to wield power from behind the scenes as 'paramount leader', thus retaining military power.

Western observers attribute a sense of caution to Hu's philosophies, citing China's recent history of fallen heirs. Deng Xiaoping appointed three party General Secretaries, all designed to be successors, and was instrumental in the ousting of two of them, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. His third and final selection, Jiang Zemin, won Deng's continued, although ambiguous backing and was the only General Secretary in Communist Chinese history to voluntarily leave his post when his term ended.

Although many believe Hu was originally hand-picked by Deng as the youngest member of China's top leadership and a leading candidate to succeed Jiang, he had exercised a great deal of political skills between 1992 and 2002 to consolidate his position, and eventually emerged as Jiang's heir apparent in his own right. Hu also benefited from the slow but progressive institutionalization of power succession within the Party, something his predecessors lacked entirely. Since the early 1980s, the People's Republic of China has been marked by progressive institutionalization and rule by consensus, and moved away from the Maoist authoritarian model. Although a western-style legal institution and rule of law remain to be put in place, Hu's power succession was conducted in a fairly orderly and civil manner, which was unprecedented in Communist China's history. This trend is expected to continue and an institutionalized mechanism of power transition is expected to emerge, first perhaps within the Party. In fact, it has been one of the Party's stated major goals to create an orderly system of succession and mechanism to prevent informal rule and a cult of personality. The rivalry between Jiang and Hu after Jiang stepped down from his posts was, arguably, an inevitable product of China's tradition of succession. Some analysts argue that although Jiang has consolidated power by the time he retired, his ideological stature within the Communist Party remains shaky at best, thus Jiang had to buy time to ensure that his ideological legacy such as the Three Represents, is enshrined in China's socialism doctrine. Jiang resigned as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in September 2004, his last official post. Whether this is the result of pressure from Hu or a personal decision is up for speculation. Since then Hu has officially taken on the three institutions in the People's Republic of China where power lie, the party, the state, as well as the military, thus informally, has become the paramount leader.

Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao inherited a China wrought with internal social, political and environmental problems. One of the biggest challenges Hu faces is the large wealth disparity between the Chinese rich and poor, for which discontent and anger mounted to a degree which wreaked havoc on communist rule. Furthermore, the cronyism and corruption plaguing China's civil service, military, educational, judicial and medical systems sought to destroy the country bit by bit. In the beginning of 2006, however, Hu launched the "8 Honours and 8 Shames" movement in a bid to promote a more selfless and moral outlook amongst the population. China's increasingly fragile environment has caused massive urban pollution, sandstorms and the destruction of vast tracts of habitable land. It remains to be seen if Hu, usually cautious in nature, is capable of managing the continued peaceful development of China while avoiding international incidents, at the same time presiding over an unprecedented increase in Chinese nationalist sentiment.

At the 17th CPC National Congress, Hu was re-elected as General Secretary and Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission on 22 October 2007. At the 11th National People's Congress, Hu was re-elected as President on 15 March 2008. He was also re-elected as Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission.

''Newsweek'' named Hu the second most powerful person in the world referring to him as "the man behind the wheel of the world's most supercharged economy." ''Forbes'' also named him the second most powerful person in the world. Hu was named the 2010 World's Most Powerful Person by Forbes Magazine. Hu has been listed four times (2008, 2007, 2005 & 2004) on the Time 100 annual list of most influential people.

Political positions

Scientific Perspective and Harmonious Society

Political observers indicate that Hu has distinguished himself from his predecessor in both domestic and foreign policy. Hu's political philosophy during his presidency is summarized by three slogans — a "Harmonious Society" domestically and "Peaceful Development" internationally, the former aided by the Scientific Development Concept, which seeks integrated sets of solutions to arrays of economic, environmental and social problems, and recognizes, in inner circles, a need for cautious and gradual political reforms. The Scientific Development doctrine has been written into the Communist Party and State Constitutions in 2007 and 2008, respectively. The role of the Party has changed, as formulated by Deng Xiaoping and implemented by Jiang Zemin, from a revolutionary party to a ruling party. Hu continues the Party’s modernization, calling for both "Advancement" of the Party and its increasing transparency in governance.

What emerges from these philosophies, in the view of Hu, is a country with systematic approach to national structure and development that combines dynamic economic growth, a free market energized by a vigorous "nonpublic" (i.e., private) sector, heavy-handed political and media control, personal but not political freedoms, concern for the welfare of all citizens, cultural enlightenment, and a synergistic approach to diverse social issues (the Scientific Development Perspective) that lead, in Hu’s vision, to a "Harmonious Society". In the view of the Chinese government, these philosophies, which has created a new "China Model" of governance, serves as a legitimate alternative to the West's "Democracy Model", particularly for developing countries. In Hu’s words, "A harmonious society should feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality." Such a society, he says, will give full scope to people's talent and creativity, enable all the people to share the social wealth brought by reform and development, and forge an ever closer relationship between the people and government. Hu has even emphasized the potential of religious communities to contribute to economic and social development under the banner of “Building a Harmonious Society.”

Western criticism of Hu, particularly regarding human rights, exposes his hypersensitivity to social stability but does not lay as much emphasis on his fresh commitment to address China’s multi-faceted social problems. Hu’s pragmatic, non-ideological agenda has two core values—maintaining social stability to further economic development and sustaining Chinese culture to enrich national sovereignty. In domestic policy, he seems to want more openness to the public on governmental functions and meetings. Recently, China's news agency published many Politburo Standing Committee meeting details. He also cancelled many events that are traditionally seen as communist extravagances, such as the lavish send-off and welcoming-back ceremonies of Chinese leaders when visiting foreign lands. Furthermore the Chinese leadership under Hu has also focused on such problems as the gap between rich and poor and uneven development between the interior and coastal regions. Both party and state seem to have moved away from a definition of development that focuses solely on GDP growth and toward a definition which includes social equality and environment effects.

In 2004, Hu gave an unprecedented showing and ordered all cadres from the five major power functions to stop the tradition of going to the Beidaihe seaside retreat for their annual summer meeting which, before, was commonly seen as a gathering of ruling elites from both current and elder cadres to decide China's destiny, and also an unnecessary waste of public funds. The move was seen by the Chinese public as symbolic of Hu's attitude towards corruption.

In June 2007, Hu gave an important speech at the Central Party School that was indicative of his position of power and his guiding philosophies. In the speech Hu used a very populist tone to appeal to ordinary Chinese, making serious note of the recent challenges China has been facing, especially with regards to income disparity. In addition, Hu noted the need for "increased democracy" in the country. Although the term has different meanings in the party than it does in the general Western sense, it shows that Hu's administration has placed political reform as an important part of the agenda in the coming years, a tone that was nonexistent during the Jiang era.

Media control

Despite initial expectations that Hu was a "closet liberal", Hu has shown a fairly hard-line approach to liberalisation of the media.

The media has been given greater latitude in reporting many topics of popular concern, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, as well as into malpractices at the local level. The government has also been responsive to criticism of its media policy, for example in response to the SARS epidemic, and in regard to public commemorations of popular, but deposed, former leader Zhao Ziyang.

Hu has been very cautious with regards to the Internet, choosing to censor politically sensitive material to a degree more strict than the Jiang era. In February 2007, Hu embarked on further domestic media controls that restricted primetime TV series to "morally correct" content—he objected to lowbrow programming including some reality shows—on all Chinese TV stations, and listed "20 forbidden areas" of coverage on news reporting.

Taiwan

Early in his presidency, Hu faced an independence-supporting counterpart in then ROC president Chen Shui-bian. Chen called for talks without any preconditions, repudiating the 1992 consensus. Chen Shui-bian and his party had continued to express an ultimate goal of ''de jure'' Taiwanese independence, and made statements on the political status of Taiwan that the PRC considers provocative. Hu's initial response was a combination of "soft" and "hard" approaches. On the one hand, Hu expressed a flexibility to negotiate on many issues of concern to Taiwan. On the other hand, he continued to refuse talks without preconditions and remained committed to Chinese reunification as an ultimate goal. While Hu gave some signs of being more flexible with regard to political relationships with Taiwan as in his 17 May Statement, where he offered to address the issue of "international living space" for Taiwan, Hu's government remains firm in its position that the PRC will not tolerate any attempt by the Taiwanese government to declare ''de jure'' independence from China.

After the re-election of Chen Shui-bian in 2004, Hu's government changed tactics. Hu's government has conducted a no contact policy with Taiwan due to Chen Shui-Bian and the DPP's independence leanings and repudiation of the 1992 consensus. The government maintained its military build-up against Taiwan, and pursued a vigorous policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically. In March 2005, the Anti-Secession Law was passed by the National People's Congress, formalising "non-peaceful means" as an option of response to a declaration of independence in Taiwan.

Hu's government increased contacts with the Kuomintang (KMT), its erstwhile foe in the Chinese Civil War, and still a major party in Taiwan. The increased contacts culminated in the 2005 Pan-Blue visits to mainland China, including a historic meeting between Hu and then-KMT chairman Lien Chan in April 2005. This was the first meeting between the leaders of the two parties since the conclusion of World War II.

On 20 March 2008, the Kuomintang under Ma Ying-jeou won the presidency in Taiwan, and a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Thereafter Hu immediately turned to a more 'soft' diplomatic approach and opened the way to a thaw in relations between the two sides. A series of historic meetings between the CPC and KMT have followed. On 12 April 2008, Hu Jintao met with Taiwan's Vice President-elect Vincent Siew in the latter's role as chairman of the Cross-strait Common Market Foundation during the Boao Forum for Asia. On 28 May 2008, Hu met with KMT chairman Wu Poh-hsiung, the first meeting between the heads of the CPC and the KMT as ruling parties. During this meeting, Hu and Wu agreed that both sides should re-commence official dialogue under the 1992 consensus – that "both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition.". Wu committed the new government in Taiwan against Taiwanese independence; Hu committed his government to addressing the concerns of the Taiwanese people in regard to security, dignity, and "international living space", with a priority given to allowing Taiwan to participate in the World Health Organization.

In addition to the party-to-party dialogue, ''de facto'' governmental dialogue took place via the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits in June 2008 on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, with the first meeting held in Beijing. Both Hu and his new counterpart Ma Ying-jeou agreed that the 1992 Consensus is the basis for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan strait. On 26 March 2008, Hu Jintao held a telephone talk with then US President George W. Bush, in which he became the first Chinese leader to officially recognize the 1992 Consensus. After several months of negotiations, in December 2008, the two sides agreed on the resumption of the Three Links, i.e., a re-opening of mail, trade, and direct air links between the two sides. Relations have been cordial since between the two sides, and trade increased immensely, culminating in the signing of the preferential trade agreement ECFA in 2010.

Moral guidance

In response to the great number of social problems in China, in March 2006, Hu Jintao released the "Eight Honors and Eight Shames" as a set of moral codes to be followed by the Chinese people, and emphasized the need to spread the message to youth. Alternatively known as the "Eight Honors and Disgraces", it contained eight poetic lines which summarized what a good citizen should regard as an honor and what to regard as a shame. It has been widely regarded as one of Hu Jintao's ideological solutions to the perceived increasing lack of morality in China after Chinese economic reforms brought in a generation of Chinese predominantly concerned with earning money and power in an increasingly frail social fabric.

It has become a norm for Chinese communist leaders to make their own contributions to Marxist theory. Whether this is Hu's contribution to Marxist theory is debatable, but its general reception with the Chinese public has been moderate. Its promotion, however, is visible almost everywhere: in classroom posters, banners on the street, and electronic display boards for the preparation of the 2008 Olympics, and World Expo 2010 in Shanghai. The codes differ from the ideologies of his predecessors, namely, Jiang's Three Represents, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and Mao Zedong Thought in that the focus, for the first time, has been shifted to codifying moral standards as opposed to setting social or economic goals.

Evaluation

Most external observers agree that Hu presided over a decade of consistent economic growth, led China through the storm of the global financial crisis relatively unscathed, and increased China's international stature immensely. The Hu Administration is also credited with modernizing China's infrastructure, the launch of China's first manned spaceprobe, and the success of two international events: the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai Expo. In addition, Hu's "soft approach" to Taiwan, coinciding with the election of a Kuomintang government in Taipei, was credited for having improved relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. Trade and contact between the two sides increased significantly during Hu's tenure.

In addition, Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao's populist policies has resulted in the elimination of agricultural taxes for farmers, more flexible policies towards migrant workers living in cities, more balanced development between the coastal regions and the hinterlands, enforcing minimum wage in cities and the promotion of sustainable and affordable housing developments. Generally speaking, these policies have been well-received by the Chinese public.

In foreign policy, Hu's critics say that his government has been overly aggressive in asserting its new power, overestimated its reach, and raised the ire and apprehension of various neighbours, including Southeast Asian countries, India, and Japan. Such policies are also said to be provocative towards the United States. Domestic critics, including the country's elites, intellectuals, and particularly dissidents, point to various shortcomings of the Hu administration and his failure in implementing his signature "Harmonious Society" policy. They cite, for example, that China's internal security budget has exceeded its military budget during Hu's tenure as protests and other 'mass incidents' continued to increase across the country. China's gini coefficient, for example, has climbed to 0.47 by 2010, indicating a potentially unsustainable wealth gap between the rich and the poor. Corruption also has not been curbed significantly, with the downfall of Railways Minister Liu Zhijun being emblematic of the endemic level of graft that exists in the highest levels of government. In addition, the Hu Administration's continued insistence on censorship and the curtailing of freedom of speech has drawn many critics from human rights organizations and Western governments, while artists and writers inside the country chided the Hu Administration's increased restrictions on cultural expressions.

Due to the increasingly consensus-based decision making process of the Chinese leadership, there is debate on how much power Hu held personally to effect change. Some credit Hu for being an effective mediator in a system increasingly affected by special interests and political factionalism.

Personal life

Hu is married to Liu Yongqing, whom he met at Tsinghua University. They have two children together, Hu Haifeng and Hu Haiqing. Hu is the first PRC paramount leader to speak relatively unaccented Standard Chinese without strongly regional characteristics. He is well known as having a cautious attitude and a self-deprecatory personality. Unlike Wen Jiabao, the Premier, he has never granted a public one-on-one interview. He has been noted for his liking for table tennis and ballroom dancing. Hu is also said to possess a photographic memory that became evident in his high school days.

Notes

References

"Taiwan." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online School Edition. 12 Aug. 2008. APA style: Taiwan. (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 12 August 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online School Edition

External links

Hu Jintao (ChinaVitae.com)

Hu Jintao calls for upholding Marxism (Xinhua)

Hu Jintao's political philosophies and policies by Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn

China's leader shows his stripes 2005 BBC article arguing Hu more hardline than he initially appeared

Requiem for Reform? Zhao Ziyang's vision of political change in China dims as Hu Jintao hardens the Party line (Time Asia)

|- |colspan="3" style="text-align:center;"|Communist Party of China |- |- |- |- {{s-ttl|title=First Secretary of Secretariat of the Communist Party of China |years=1992–2002}} |- |- |- |- |colspan="3" style="text-align:center;"|People's Republic of China |- |- |- |-

Category:1942 births Category:Chinese engineers Category:Communist rulers Category:Current national leaders Category:Leaders of the Communist Party of China Category:Living people Category:People from Taizhou, Jiangsu Category:Presidents of the People's Republic of China Category:Tsinghua University alumni Category:Tuanpai Category:Vice Presidents of the People's Republic of China

af:Hu Jintao ar:هو جينتاو az:Xu Tsintao bn:হু জিনতাও zh-min-nan:Ô͘ Gím-tô be:Ху Цзіньтаа bg:Ху Дзинтао bo:ཧུའུ་ཅིན་ཐོའོ། bs:Hu Jintao br:Hu Jintao ca:Hu Jintao cs:Chu Ťin-tchao cy:Hu Jintao da:Hu Jintao de:Hu Jintao et:Hu Jintao el:Χου Ζιντάο es:Hu Jintao eo:Hu Jintao eu:Hu Jintao fa:هو جینتائو fr:Hu Jintao ga:Hu Jintao gl:Hu Jintao gan:胡錦濤 gu:હુ જિન્તાઓ hak:Fù Kím-Thàu ko:후진타오 hi:हु जिन्ताओ hr:Hu Jintao ilo:Hu Jintao id:Hu Jintao is:Hu Jintao it:Hu Jintao he:חו ג'ינטאו kn:ಹೂ ಜಿಂಟಾವೊ ka:ჰუ ძინტაო kk:Ху Цзиньтао sw:Hu Jintao la:Hu Jintao lv:Hu Dzjiņtao lb:Hu Jintao lt:Hu Dzintao ln:Hu Jintao hu:Hu Csin-tao mk:Ху Џинтао ml:ഹു ജിന്റാവോ mr:हू चिंताओ ms:Hu Jintao my:ဟူကျင်ထောင်း nl:Hu Jintao new:हु जिन्ताओ ja:胡錦濤 no:Hu Jintao nn:Hu Jintao mhr:Ху Цзыньтао ps:هوجينتاو pl:Hu Jintao pt:Hu Jintao ro:Hu Jintao qu:Hu Jintao ru:Ху Цзиньтао sq:Hu Jin Tao simple:Hu Jintao sk:Ťin-tchao Chu sl:Hu Jintao sr:Ху Ђинтао sh:Hu Jintao fi:Hu Jintao sv:Hu Jintao tl:Hu Jintao ta:கூ சிங்தாவ் te:హు జింటావ్ th:หู จิ่นเทา tr:Hu Jintao uk:Ху Цзіньтао ug:خۇ جىنتاۋ za:Huz Ginjdauh vi:Hồ Cẩm Đào war:Hu Jintao yo:Hu Jintao zh-yue:胡錦濤 bat-smg:Hu Dzintao zh:胡锦涛

This is a list of people whose names in English are commonly appended with the phrase "''the Great''", or who were called that or an equivalent phrase in their own language. Other languages have their own suffixes such as ''e Bozorg'' and ''e azam'' in Persian and Urdu respectively.

In Persia, the title "the Great" at first seems to be a colloquial version of the Old Persian title "Great King". This title was first used by the conqueror Cyrus II of Persia.

The Persian title was inherited by Alexander III of Macedon (336–323 BC) when he conquered the Persian Empire, and the epithet "Great" eventually became personally associated with him. The first reference (in a comedy by Plautus) assumes that everyone knew who "Alexander the Great" was; however, there is no earlier evidence that Alexander III of Macedon was called "''the Great''".

The early Seleucid kings, who succeeded Alexander in Persia, used "Great King" in local documents, but the title was most notably used for Antiochus the Great (223–187 BC).

Later rulers and commanders began to use the epithet "the Great" as a personal name, like the Roman general Pompey. Others received the surname retrospectively, like the Carthaginian Hanno and the Indian emperor Ashoka the Great. Once the surname gained currency, it was also used as an honorific surname for people without political careers, like the philosopher Albert the Great.

As there are no objective criteria for "greatness", the persistence of later generations in using the designation greatly varies. For example, Louis XIV of France was often referred to as "The Great" in his lifetime but is rarely called such nowadays, while Frederick II of Prussia is still called "The Great". A later Hohenzollern - Wilhelm I - was often called "The Great" in the time of his grandson Wilhelm II, but rarely later.

Rulers

Abbas I of Persia (1571–1629), Shah of Iran

Akbar (1542–1605), ruler of the Mughal Empire of South Asia, mainly India

Alain I of Albret (1440–1522), French aristocrat

Alexander the Great (356-323 BC), King of Macedonia, Persia, Greece, Egypt, and all of Mesopotamia

Alexander I of Georgia (1386–1446), King of Georgia

Alfonso III of León (c. 848-910), King of León, Galicia and Asturias

Alfred the Great (848/849-899), King of Wessex

Antiochus III the Great (c. 241–187 BC), ruler of the Seleucid Empire

Ashoka the Great (c. 304–232 BC), Indian emperor of the Maurya dynasty

Ashot I of Iberia “the Great”(died 826/830), presiding prince of Iberia (modern Georgia),

Askia Mohammad I (c. 1442–1538), ruler of the Songhai Empire

Bhumibol Adulyadej (born 1927), King of Thailand

Bolesław I Chrobry (967-1025), sometimes called "the Great", first King of Poland

Bruno the Great (925–965), Archbishop of Cologne and Duke of Lotharingia (also listed in the following section)

Buddha Yodfa Chulaloke (1736–1809), founder and ruler of the Rattanakosin Kingdom (in what is now Thailand)

Cnut the Great (c. 985 or 995-1035), King of Denmark, England, Norway and parts of Sweden

Casimir III the Great (1310–1370), King of Poland

Catherine the Great (1729–1796), Empress of Russia

Chandragupta II (reigned 375-413/415), also known as Vikramaditya, ruler of the Gupta empire in India

Charlemagne (died 814), King of the Franks and Emperor of the Romans

Chulalongkorn (1853–1910), King of Siam (now Thailand)

Chlothar II (584-629), King of Neustria and King of the Franks

Conrad, Margrave of Meissen (c. 1097-1157), Margrave of Meissen

Constantine I (c. 272-337), Roman emperor

Cyaxares the Great (c. 625-585 BC), third king of Media

Cyrus the Great (c. 600 BC or 576 BC–530 BC), founder and ruler of the Persian or Achaemenid Empire

Darius the Great (550 – 486 BC), third ruler of the Persian Empire

Devapala (died 850), ruler of the Pala Empire in the Indian subcontinent

Dionysius I, Greek tyrant of Syracuse

Ferdinand I of León and Castile (c. 1015–1065), King of León and Count of Castile

Frederick the Great (1712–1786), King of Prussia

Genghis Khan (1162?-1227), founder and Great Khan of the Mongol Empire

Gero (c. 900–965), ruler of Marca Geronis, a very large march in Europe

Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden (1594–1632), King of Sweden, founder of the Swedish Empire, and noted military leader

Gwanggaeto the Great, King of Goguryeo, one of the Three Kingdoms of Korea

Hanno the Great, the name of three leaders of Carthage, in the 4th, 3rd, and 2nd centuries BC

Henry I, Duke of Burgundy (946–1002)

Henry IV of France (1553–1610), King of France and King of Navarre

Herod the Great (73/74 BC-4 BC), King of Judea

Hugh the Great (898-956), Duke of the Franks and Count of Paris

Hugh Magnus of France (1007–1025), co-King of France

Hugh I, Count of Vermandois (1057–1101)

Humphrey I de Bohun (died c. 1123), Anglo-Norman aristocrat

Ivan III of Russia (1440–1505), Tsar of Russia

John I of Portugal (1358–1433), King of Portugal and the Algarve

John II of Aragon (1398–1479), King of Aragon and, through his wife, King of Navarre

Justinian I (483-565), Byzantine Emperor

Kamehameha I (c. 1758-1819), first King of Hawai'i

Kanishka (died c. 127), ruler of the Kushan Empire in Central Asia and parts of India

Kvirike III of Kakheti (1010–1029), King of Kakheti in eastern Georgia

Kublai Khan (1215–1294), Mongol ruler in the 13th century and Emperor of China; founder of the Yuan Dynasty

Llywelyn the Great (c. 1172–1240), Prince of Gwynedd and de facto ruler of most of Wales

Louis I of Hungary (1326–1382), King of Hungary, Croatia and Poland

Mangrai the Great (1238–1317), Lanna, northern Thailand

Emperor Meiji (1852–1912), Emperor of Japan

Mircea I of Wallachia (1355–1418)

Mithridates II of Parthia (died 88 BC), ruler of the Parthian Empire (in present day Iran)

Mithridates VI of Pontus (134 BC–63 BC), ruler of Pontus and the Bosporan Kingdom

Mstislav I of Kiev (1076–1132), Grand Prince of Kievan Rus

Narai (1633–1688), King of Ayutthaya (in what is now modern Thailand)

Naresuan (1555–1605), King of Ayutthaya

Odo the Great (died c. 735), Duke of Aquitaine

Otto I, Holy Roman Emperor (912-973)

K'inich Janaab' Pakal (603-683), ruler of the Mayan city-state of Palenque

Parakramabahu I of Polonnaruwa (1123–1186), King of Sri Lanka

Peter Krešimir IV of Croatia (died 1075), King of Croatia

Peter the Great (1672–1725), Tsar of Russia

Peter III of Aragon (1239–1285), King of Aragon and King of Sicily

Pompey (106 BC-48 BC), military and political leader of the late Roman Republic, rival of Julius Caesar

Radama I (1793–1828), first king of greater Madagascar

Raja Raja Chola I (c. 947-1014), Indian emperor of the Cholas.

Rajendra Chola I (reigned 1014–1044), Tamil King of India

Ramesses II (reigned 1279 BC – 1213 BC), considered the greatest pharaoh of Ancient Egypt

Ram Khamhaeng (around 1237 to 1247-1298), King of Sukhothai (in present day Thailand)

Ramon Berenguer III, Count of Barcelona (1082–1131), also Count of Provence and various other counties

Rhodri the Great (c. 820–878), King of Gwynedd (in present day Wales)

Roman the Great (after 1160-1205), Grand Prince of Kiev

Saladin (c. 1138-1193), Kurdish Sultan of Egypt and Syria, founder of the Ayyubid dynasty, and victor over the Crusaders

Samudragupta (c. 335–375), ruler of the Gupta empire in the Indian subcontinent

Sancho III of Navarre (c. 992-1035), King of Kingdom of Navarre

Sargon of Akkad (died c. 2215 BC), ruler of the Akkadian Empire

Sejong the Great (1397–1450), Korean king

Shapur II (309-379), king of the Sassanid Empire, Persia

Simeon I of Bulgaria (864/865-927), ruler of the First Bulgarian Empire

Stephen III of Moldavia (1433–1504), Prince of Moldavia (Romania)

Stephen Uroš IV Dušan of Serbia (c. 1308-1355), King of Serbia and Emperor of the Serbs and Greeks

Taksin (1734–1782), King of the Thonburi Kingdom (Thailand)

Timur (1336–1405), better known as Tamerlane, founder of the Timurid Dynasty

Theobald II, Count of Champagne (1090–1151), Count of Blois and of Chartres as Theobald IV, Count of Champagne and of Brie

Theodoric the Great (454-526), King of the Ostrogoths, regent of the Visigoths and a viceroy of the Byzantine Empire

Theodosius I (347-395), Roman emperor

Tigranes the Great (140-55 BC), Emperor of Armenia

Tiridates III of Armenia (285-339), King of Armenia

Umar (c. 586 to 590–644), second caliph of the Muslim Empire

Valdemar I of Denmark (1131–1182), King of Denmark

Valentinian I (364-375), Roman Emperor

Vladimir I of Kiev (c. 958-1015), ruler of Kievan Rus

Vytautas (c. 1350-1430), archduke of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy

William I, Count of Burgundy (1020–1087), Count of Burgandy and Mâcon

William V, Duke of Aquitaine (969-1030), also Count of Poitou

Xerxes I (519-465 BC), King of Kings of the Achaemenid Empire (Persia)

Yu the Great (c. 2200-2100 BC), legendary ruler in ancient China

Religious figures

Abraham the Great of Kashkar (ca. 492-586), monk and saint of the Assyrian Church of the East

Abraham Kidunaia (died c. 366, hermit, priest, and Christian saint of Mesopotamia

Albertus Magnus (1193/1206–1280), medieval German philosopher and theologian

Anthony the Great (c. 251–356), early Christian saint of Egypt

Babai the Great (c. 551–628), Assyrian church leader

Basil of Caesarea (330-379), Greek bishop and theologian

Bruno the Great (925–965), Archbishop of Cologne and Duke of Lotharingia (also listed in the previous section)

Euthymius the Great (377-473), abbot and Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox saint

Gertrude the Great (1256-c. 1302), German Benedictine, mystic, theologian and Roman Catholic saint

Pope Gregory I (c. 540-604)

Hiyya the Great, 3rd-century rabbi, Palestine

Pope John Paul II (1920–2005)

Pope Leo I (c. 391 or 400-461)

Macarius of Egypt (c. 300-391), Egyptian hermit

Pope Nicholas I (c. 800-867)

Photius I of Constantinople (c. 810–c. 893), Eastern Orthodox saint and Patriarch of Constantinople

William of Maleval (died 1157), founder of the Catholic congregation of Williamites

Other

Beli Mawr, a figure in medieval Welsh literature and genealogies

Emmy the Great, folk singer

Matteo Rosso the Great, Roman politician and father of Pope Nicholas III

Prokop the Great, Hussite general in Bohemia

See also

Epithet

List of monarchs by nickname

List of nicknames of European Royalty and Nobility: G-I

James, son of Zebedee, also known as James the Greater, one of the twelve apostles of Jesus

Ajax (mythology), called Ajax the Greater

Notes

Category:Monarchs Great, List of people known as The Category:Greatest Nationals Category:Epithets

bs:Spisak osoba znanih kao Veliki id:Daftar tokoh dengan gelar yang Agung jv:Daftar pamimpin ingkang dipun paringi julukan Ingkang Agung la:Magnus lt:Sąrašas:Žmonės, vadinami Didžiaisiais ja:称号に大が付く人物の一覧 ru:Великий (прозвище) sl:Seznam ljudi z vzdevkom Veliki sv:Lista över personer kallade den store th:รายพระนามกษัตริย์ที่ได้รับสมัญญานามมหาราช vi:Đại đế