Coordinates | 21°58′18″N159°42′59″N |
---|---|
Name | Mahdi Army(Jaish al Mahdi) |
War | the Iraq War |
Active | 2003-2008 |
Leaders | Muqtada al-Sadr |
Headquarters | Najaf, Kufa |
Area | Baghdad and Southern Iraq |
Status | depleted (2008 U.S. intelligence , current strength very low) |
Partof | Iraqi Insurgency |
Next | Promised Day Brigades |
Opponents | Iraqi security forcesAnsar al-SunnaIslamic State of IraqIslamic Army in IraqUnited States, United Kingdom (and other coalition forces) |
Battles | Iraq war, Siege of Sadr City, Battle of Najaf (2004), Battle of Diwaniya, Battle of Amarah, Battle of Karbala (2007), Siege of U.K. bases in Basra, Battle of Basra (2008), Iraq Spring Fighting of 2008 }} |
The Mahdi Army, also known as the Mahdi Militia or Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) (Arabic جيش المهدي), was an Iraqi paramilitary force created by the Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in June 2003.
The group rose to international prominence on April 18, 2004 when it spearheaded the first major armed confrontation against the U.S.-led forces in Iraq from the Shia community in an uprising that followed the banning of al-Sadr's newspaper and attempts to arrest him, and lasted until a truce on June 6. This truce was followed by moves to disband the group and transform al-Sadr's movement into a political party to take part in the 2005 elections; Muqtada al-Sadr ordered fighters of the Mahdi army to cease fire unless attacked first. The truce broke down in August 2004 after provocative actions by the Mahdi Army, with new hostilities erupting.
The Mahdi Army's popularity has been strong enough to influence local government, the police, and cooperation with Sunni Iraqis and their supporters. The group is believed to have recently been popular among Iraqi police forces. National Independent Cadres and Elites party that ran in the 2005 Iraqi election was closely linked with the army.
The group is armed with various light weapons, including improvised explosive devices, also called road-side bombs. Many of the bombs used during attacks on Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces have used infra-red sensors as triggers, a technique that was used widely by the IRA in Northern Ireland in the early to mid 1990s.
In the Twelver school of Shia Islam, the Mahdī is believed to have been an historical figure identified with the Twelfth Imām, Muhammad al-Mahdī, and is therefore called al-Imām al-Mahdī. It is believed that he is still present on earth "in occultation" (i.e., hidden), and will emerge again in the end times. Those Shi`ites of this school believe that the Imām Mahdī is the rightful ruler of the whole Islamic community (ummah) at any given time, and he is therefore also called Imām al-Zamān, meaning "Imām of the Age/Time."
Gradually, the militia grew and al-Sadr formalized it in June 2003. The Mahdi Army grew into a sizable force of up to 10,000 who even operated what amounted to a shadow government in some areas. Al-Sadr's preaching is critical of the US occupation, but he did not initially join the Sunni Islamist and Baathist guerrillas in their attacks on coalition forces.
After sporadic clashes, coalition forces temporarily suppressed most militia activity in Nasiriyah, Amarah, and Basra. Mahdi rebels expelled Iraqi police from three police stations and ambushed U.S forces in Sadr City, killing seven U.S troops and wounding several more. U.S forces subsequently regained control of the police stations after running firefights with the fighters, killing dozens of Mahdi militiamen. Mahdi Army members still maintained some influence over many of the slum areas of Sadr City, however.
On April 16, Kut was retaken by US forces, and several dozen Mahdi Army members were killed in the battle. However, the area around Najaf and Kufa along with Karbala remained under the control of Sadr's forces. Sadr himself was believed to be in Najaf. Coalition troops cordoned off Najaf with 2500 troops, but reduced the number of forces to pursue negotiations with the Mahdi Army. At the beginning of May, coalition forces estimated that there were 200-500 militants still present in Karbala, 300-400 in Diwaniyah, an unknown number still left in Amarah and Basra, and 1,000-2,000 still in the Najaf-Kufa region.
On May 4, coalition forces began a counter-offensive to eliminate Mahdi Army in southern Iraq following a breakdown in negotiations. The first wave began with simultaneous raids in Karbala and Diwaniyah on militia forces, followed by a second wave on May 5 in Karbala and more attacks that seized the governor's office in Najaf on May 6. 86 militiamen were estimated killed in the fighting along with 4 U.S soldiers. Several high ranking militia commanders were also killed in a separate raid by US Special Operations units. On May 8, U.S forces launched a follow-up offensive into Karbala, launching a two-pronged attack into the city. U.S tanks also launched an incursion into Sadr City. At the same time, perhaps as a diversionary tactic, hundreds of Mahdi Army members swept through Basra, firing on British patrols and seizing parts of the city. 2 militants were killed and several British troops were wounded.
On May 24, after suffering heavy losses in weeks of fighting, Mahdi Army forces withdrew from the city of Karbala. This left the only area still under their firm control being the Najaf-Kufa region, also under sustained American assault. Several hundred Mahdi Army militia in total were killed. Unfazed by the fighting, Muqtada al-Sadr regularly gave Friday sermons in Kufa throughout the uprising.
The return of Najaf to Iraqi security forces following the cease-fire left Sadr City as the last bastion of Mahdi Army guerrillas still pursuing violent resistance. Clashes continued periodically in the district following the end of the Najaf-Kufa battles. On June 24, Mahdi Army declared an end to operations in Sadr City as well, effectively ending militia activity, at least for the time being.
After the June 4 truce with the occupation forces, al-Sadr took steps to disband the Mahdi Army. In a statement, he called on militia members from outside Najaf to "do their duty" and go home. US forces in Najaf were then replaced by Iraqi police. Al-Sadr told supporters not to attack Iraqi security forces and announced his intention to form a party and enter the 2005 elections. He said the interim government was an opportunity to build a unified Iraq. Interim President Ghazi Yawer gave assurances that al-Sadr could join the political process provided he abandoned his militia. Iraqi officials also assured al-Sadr that he was not to face arrest.
On August 5, via his spokesman Ahmed al-Shaibany, al-Sadr re-affirmed his commitment to the truce and called on US forces to honour the truce. He announced that if the restoration of the cease-fire failed "then the firing and igniting of the revolution will continue". The offer was rejected by the governor of Najaf, Adnan al-Zurufi ("There is no compromise or room for another truce") and US officials ("This is one battle we really do feel we can win").
In the days that followed fighting continued around the old city of Najaf, in particular at the Imam Ali shrine and the cemetery. The Mahdi Army, estimated at 2,000 in Najaf, was outnumbered by some 2,000 US troops and 1,800 Iraqi security forces, and at a disadvantage due to the vastly superior American tactics, training, firepower and air power, such as helicopters and AC-130 gunships. On August 13, the militia was trapped in a cordon around the Imam Ali shrine. While negotiations continued between the interim government and the Mahdi army, news came that al-Sadr had been wounded.
On August 12, British journalist James Brandon, a reporter for the Sunday Telegraph was kidnapped in Basra by unidentified militants. A video tape was released, featuring Brandon and a hooded militant, threatening to kill the British hostage unless US forces withdrew from Najaf within 24 hours. Brandon was released after less than a day, following intervention by al-Sadr. At a press conference immediately after his release, Brandon commented on his treatment and thanked his kidnappers: "Initially I was treated roughly, but once they knew I was a journalist I was treated very well and I want to say thank you to the people who kidnapped me." A spokesman for al-Sadr said: "We apologise for what happened to you. This is not our tradition, not our rules. It is not the tradition of Islam."
The fact that American troops surrounded the Shrine led to an impasse as the Mahdi army could not leave the shrine and US troops did not want to offend Islam by setting foot inside the shrine. The standoff did not end for three weeks until Sistani emerged from convalescence in London and brokered an agreement between the two forces.
The movement is believed to have infiltrated the Iraqi police forces, and to have been involved in the September 2005 arrest of two British soldiers by Iraqi police.
On December 4, 2005 Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi was assaulted by a mob in Najaf, where the Mahdi army is influential.
By the morning of October 20, 2006, local leaders and residents said that victorious Mahdi fighters were patrolling the city on foot and in commandeered police vehicles and were setting up roadblocks. Sheik al-Muhamadawi stated early October 20 that "there is no state in the city. Policemen do not have enough weapons and ammunition compared with the militia, which has all kinds of weapons." At least 27 people were killed and 118 wounded in the clashes.
The Mahdi Army eventually withdrew from their positions in Amarah following negotiations between local tribal and political leaders and representatives from the Baghdad offices of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. A battalion from the Iraqi Army sent from Basra then took control of the city.
The stunning and defiant display of militia strength underscored the weaknesses of the Iraqi security forces and the potency of the Mahdi Army, which had been able to operate virtually unchecked in Iraq. The Mahdi Army was widely accused of propelling the cycle of sectarian violence that threatened to plunge the country into all-out civil war.
On March 25, 2008 thousands of Iraqi troops carried out a military strike against the Mahdi Army in their stronghold of Basra. This operation, code named Operation Charge of the Knights, was the first of its kind since British troops withdrew from the city centre.
Fierce clashes took place between security forces and the militants loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr after a dawn military offensive in the southern city. In Al-Sadr's headquarters of Najaf, the cleric ordered the field commanders of his Mahdi Army militia to go to 'maximum alert' and prepare "to strike the occupiers". Gunmen also reportedly clashed with Iraqi police in the southern city of Kut.
The Mahdi Army launched a nationwide civil disobedience campaign across Iraq to protest raids and detentions against the Mahdi Army. The discord also threatened to unravel al-Sadr's ceasefire, spark renewed sectarian violence, and prompt the United States to delay any troop withdrawals. Violent rivalries among Shiites had been predicted by many observers ahead of the Iraqi governorate elections, 2008, which were to be held by October 1, 2008.
Concurrently, on April 6, Iraqi and U.S. forces moved into the southern third of Sadr City to prevent rocket and mortar fire from the area against the Green Zone. U.S. engineers began construction of a concrete barrier along al-Quds Street to seal the southern third of the city off and allow reconstruction to take place. Over the next month, the Mahdi Army launched a number of attacks on the troops building the barrier, but sustained heavy losses. On May 10, a ceasefire was ordered by Muqtada al-Sadr, allowing Iraqi troops into all of Sadr City. On 20 May, in an entirely Iraqi-planned and executed operation, six battalions of Iraqi troops, operating without the involvement of U.S. ground forces, pushed deep into Sadr City. The Iraqi Security Forces met little resistance in moving through Sadr City and took up positions outside key Mahdi Army positions, as well as the Imam Ali and al-Sadr hospitals and al-Sadr's political office.
In Baghdad alone, US and Iraqi forces killed 173 Mahdi Army fighters during the six days of fighting from March 25 up until the cease-fire. The fighting has not abated in Sadr City and other Mahdi Army-dominated neighborhoods in northern and eastern Baghdad. A total of 520 Mahdi Army fighters have been confirmed killed in and around Sadr City since March 25.
Iran remains engaged and interested in the activities of Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr has spent the past few years in Iran, studying at the Hawza in Qom.
One member of Iraqi intelligence has predicted that a new highly specialized incarnation of the Mahdi Army will number from 150 to 200 and carry out attacks against high profile leaders to resist the occupation. Aaos al Khafagy, the general commander of the Mahdi Army in Nasariyah, meanwhile predicted the new group would consist of “thousands” of men highly skilled in guerrilla warfare. Khafagy further stated that the Mahdi Army would resist occupation through the political process.
In September 2006, a senior coalition intelligence official had remarked to reporters how there were political fractures within Al-Sadr's organization in protest of his relatively moderate political course of action, with one coalition intelligence official claiming that at least six major leaders no longer answer to al-Sadr and as many as a third of the army was now out of his direct control.
Category:2003 establishments Category:Iraqi insurgency Category:Military wings of political parties Category:Shi'a organizations Category:Resistance movements
ar:جيش المهدي cs:Mahdího armáda da:Mahdi-militsen de:Mahdi-Armee es:Ejército de al-Mahdi fr:Armée du Mahdi ko:메흐디민병대 id:Tentara Mahdi nl:Mahdi-leger ja:マフディー軍 pl:Armia Mahdiego ru:Армия Махди fi:Mahdin armeija sv:Mahdimilisen tr:Mehdi Ordusu zh:迈赫迪军This text is licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA License. This text was originally published on Wikipedia and was developed by the Wikipedia community.
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