"Do not let the Syrian people down; the violence must end," implored Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Arabi at the Security Council yesterday.  U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton posed the challenge even more bluntly:  "We all have a choice: Stand with the people of Syria and the region or become complicit in the continuing violence there."  As the death toll rapidly mounts, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe denounced the "shameful silence of the Security Council."  Most of the people around me in the press gallery at the Security Council seemed to feel the weight of what felt like an historic, urgent public debate. 

But as fierce as the urgency for action in the face of the rapidly escalating body count was the crystal clear rejection of any authorization for military intervention.  Qatari Foreign Minister Hamed bin Jassem began the debate by assuring that the League was not calling for a military intervention, and returned to the floor at the end of the session to again stress the point. "We aim to avoid any foreign intervention, specifically any foreign military intervention," declared the Arab League's Nabel al-Arabi.   U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton dismissed fears about another Libya-style intervention as "a false analogy," and in a press opportunity outside the Council told reporters that "we want to underscore that there is no intention to seek any authority or to pursue any kind of military intervention." Even Juppe, the most passionate voice for the resolution, insisted that "absolutely nothing in the draft could lead to such intervention."  The Security Council will not be authorizing military action in Syria any time soon.

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The formal seating of Egypt's Parliament today, after a grueling two months of elections and political turmoil, marks the end of one stage of Egypt's transition. The Islamist-dominated Parliament will begin its work without clearly defined powers or responsibilities amidst a fractured, suspicious political environment. We will now see whether this Parliament will be able to deliver on the hopes invested in electoral legitimacy and emerge as an effective check on the power of the SCAF. In many ways, the real struggles start now.

The first test of the resilience of this path will come in two days, the anniversary of the January 25 revolution. I expect that there will likely be a large turnout that day, with all political forces joining in. The question, though, is what happens after the big crowds go home: do activists decide to try another sit-in and force themselves back onto the political stage? And if they do, has the SCAF learned anything from the past few months and recognized that again resorting to tear gas and violent assaults on protestors will overturn the plans it has proposed for an orderly political transition process?

I don't expect the coming months, during which a constitution is supposedly to be drafted and Presidential elections organized and the transition to civilian rule completed, to go smoothly or easily. I still believe that Egypt would be better served by holding Presidential elections and transferring executive power to a legitimate civilian government more quickly, and allowing more time for a Constitution to be drafted and fully debated. But that doesn't seem to be the path Egypt is taking. So for now, let's just hope that the Parliament asserts itself quickly and effectively, and focuses on truly important issues and isn't sidetracked by debates over religion. Let's hope that the activists who have done so much to drive change in Egypt can work with this Parliament in a common drive to ensure that the SCAF lives up to its promises for a genuine democratic transition by the summer. Let's hope that the SCAF doesn't destroy its own plans by teargassing or murdering protestors in Tahrir this week.

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The U.S. Embassy in Damascus is reportedly planning to shut down if the Syrian government can not -- or will not -- provide adequate security guarantees.  If the safety of Embassy personnel is seriously in danger, then of course they should make the safe call to protect them.  But the security rationale masks a deeper question:  at what point should Ambassador Robert Ford be recalled on political grounds?

I argued long and hard for Ford's confirmation as Ambassador, and for the importance of having someone like him on the ground in Damascus.  I believe that his performance has more than vindicated that stance.   But has the usefulness of his presence come to an end? 

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It is time to think seriously about intervening militarily in Syria, argues Steven Cook today. He joins a small but growing chorus pushing for such a move. Some parts of the Syrian opposition have moved toward requesting an intervention, albeit with serious reservations and furious internal disagreements, as has the Emir of Qatar and some other Arab officials. And then of course, there are those who have been pushing for hawkish policies toward Syria for years who have seized the moment to push for action, and others who generally support military solutions. This is the kind of temporary coalition which can drive real policy shifts.  

It is easy to understand the urgency behind such a call. The brutality of the Syrian regime has produced unspeakable atrocities which challenge the conscience of the world. The daily death toll, and the horrific videos and images which circulate freely, can easily make the passions overwhelm the interests and push us to set prudence aside. I supported the intervention in Libya, and believe strongly in the importance of advancing regional and global norms against regime violence. 

But the U.S. should not be contemplating military intervention in Syria. Risky, costly foreign policy decisions can not simply be taken to express moral outrage. They need to have a serious chance of success. None of the military options currently under discussion have a reasonable chance of improving the situation at an acceptable cost, and their failure would likely pave the way to something far worse. 

Syria is not Libya, and has few of the unique conditions which made that intervention appropriate. The moral outrage at the depradations of Assad's forces, as well as the fevered hopes of those hoping to change the region's strategic equation by bringing down Iran's main Arab ally are not enough, any more than hope is a plan. Military intervention in Syria has little prospect of success, a high risk of disastrous failure,  and a near-certainty of escalation which should make the experience of Iraq weigh extremely heavily on anyone contemplating such an intervention. There is no magic number of deaths at which the U.S. must embark on a self-defeating and foolish adventure. 

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The last American troops officially left Iraq before Christmas, mostly completing an American withdrawal by the end of 2011 which few thought possible when then-candidate Barack Obama promised it or even when then-President George Bush formally committed to it. Critics of the withdrawal have blasted Obama for putting politics over policy, risking the alleged gains of the "surge" in order to meet a campaign promise. Many of those who played a role in the desperate attempt to reverse Iraq's 2006 descent into civil war have entirely legitimate and justifiable fears for Iraq's future. But in fact, Obama's decision to complete the withdrawal from Iraq was probably better policy than it was politics -- and it was the right call both for America and for Iraq.

In many ways, it would have been safer politically for Obama to keep the residual force in Iraq which hawks demanded to insulate himself against charges of having "lost Iraq". But it would have been wrong on policy. It's not just that the U.S. was obligated by the SOFA to withdraw its forces, once it proved unable to negotiate the terms of an extended troop presence with the immunity provisions which the Pentagon demanded. It's that the remaining U.S. troops could do little for Iraqi security, had little positive effect on Iraqi politics, and would have soon become an active liability. This is the lesson of the last two years, when U.S. troops were reduced in number and largely withdrew to the bases under the terms of the SOFA. The American troop presence didn't prevent bombings and murders, didn't force political reconciliation, didn't usher in real democracy, and didn't significantly increase American diplomatic influence in the region. But nor did Iraq fall apart. Obama's gamble is that the same sequence will play out in 2012 and that he will have successfully left behind an Iraq which isn't perfect but which has avoided yet another catastrophe.

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It's time for the official, Aardvark-certified list of the Best Books on the Middle East for 2011! (See last year's winners here.) Next year's list will undoubtedly be dominated by books addressing this year's uprisings which have transformed the Arab world, but not many significant books on the topic were published in 2011.  That'll hopefully change on March 27, when my own book The Arab Uprising comes out -- don't worry, it won't be eligible for the 2012 awards of course! -- and, all joking aside, when a number of great journalists and scholars weigh in with books in the pipeline.  In the meantime, you can always go back to Revolution in the Arab World, the eBook based on Foreign Policy articles, which I think remains an outstanding guide to the first few months.

First, the ground rules. The awards are limited to English-language books that were published in calendar year 2011 and which dealt primarily with the contemporary broader Middle East. I read more than 65 books published this year which fit that description, from academic and trade presses alike. The award is entirely subjective, based on what I found impressive or interesting. There's no committee, no publishers sent me free copies or offered up lucrative swag, and I couldn't read everything -- especially if books were published too late in the year or if publishers insisted on releasing them only as $90 hardcovers. If your book didn't make the list, however, then you know what do do (hint: you really can't go wrong by blaming Blake Hounshell).

And with that...the 2011 Aardvark Awards for the Best Books on the Middle East:

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The call to accelerate the transition to civilian rule in Egypt has taken on a new urgency this week.  A wide range of political forces are calling for the SCAF to cede power to an elected leadership by February 2012.  There are many different ideas about how to do this, perhaps through the new Parliament selecting an interim Prime Minister or perhaps by holding Presidential elections at the end of January.  All of the ideas have their problems. But those problems pale against the threat to the Egyptian democratic transition posed by the continuing misrule of and escalating resort to violence by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. I believe that the calls for a new President by February should be taken very seriously indeed. 

This weekend's anomic violence on Qasr el-Aini Street does not likely augur the rekindling of popular revolution, as the protests were almost completely contained to a few blocks and seem to have attracted little popular sympathy.  But the wildly disproportionate, undisciplined, and frankly brutal response by the army does show graphically why the SCAF is rapidly losing its legitimacy to rule among the political elite.  It really doesn't matter whether it ordered the violent crackdown against the Cabinet sit-in or undisciplined troops began the violence on their own, since both point to something deeply problematic.  Such crises will continue to recur and intensify as long as the underlying problem of military rule remains unresolved. 

The greatest political accomplishment during the last bout of violence in November was that the SCAF agreed to to hold Presidential elections and the transfer of power by June.  But as one of Cairo's savviest political analysts told me yesterday, "we can't take six more months of this." 

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 A demonstration outside the Cabinet building in central Cairo turned violent last night when soldiers attacked a sit-in which had been established three weeks ago.  Protestors were pelted with rocks and even furniture from the buildings above.  There are reports of almost 100 injured, and the battle continues to rage on.  At least three members of the Advisory Council appointed by the SCAF have resigned in protest, and the political fallout is likely only beginning.  After three weeks of orderly elections, Cairo once again looks like Bahrain. 

 When I walked through Qasr el-Aini street this afternoon it looked post-apocalyptic, with rubble strewn everywhere and an incredibly tense, unpleasant vibe.  It seems to have gotten worse since then.  The contrast from the orderly, calm voting stations I had visited over the last few days couldn't have been more stark. The violence should puncture any illusions that the SCAF's problems had evaporated with the high turnout and relatively smooth process of the Parliamentary elections now in their third week.  Elections are necessary, but they are not sufficient.

Today's sudden deterioration and brutal violence shows clearly that Egypt will remain unstable as long as the Egyptian military leadership fails to address core political grievances or impose any meaningful accountability for violence by its security forces.  What the SCAF has thus far done is clearly not enough. Egypt can't wait for the SCAF to transfer real power to an effective civilian government, end its abusive security tactics, and hold those responsible for the violence accountable.  

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