


Why Revival of "SALT" Won't Stop War

*A Special Memorandum to explore whether
a basis exists in potential common perspectives
of Atlantic Alliance and Comecon powers
for pursuing effective war-avoidance
measures.*

by **Lyndon Hermyle LaRouche, Jr.**
Candidate for the Democratic Party Presidential Nomination

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Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

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LaRouche



From:
Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Re:
Why Revival
of "SALT"
Won't Stop War

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Why Revival of "SALT" Won't Stop War

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

At the least, the resignation of U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has facilitated a tentative reassessment of policy among some of those U.S. influentials who ordinarily create and "Watergate" U.S. governments. So far, there is useful comment from such circles, but no indication of the formation of a sizable faction in support of an actually workable set of alternative policies.

Even if we assumed that a large section of U.S. influentials were to agree academically to the desirability of some workable new policies, it would be an adventurous assumption to insist that those circles have retained the moral qualifications to act efficiently on their own initiatives in behalf of such perceptions.

I disagree with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's recent public statements insofar as he places equal responsibility for the crisis on Washington and Moscow. (What Schmidt believes privately, I do not know.) The Soviet Union does manifest presently a limited kind of war-avoidance policy, whereas the forces represented by the Thatcher-Brzezinski-Carter trio remain committed totally to a war-causing policy.

The difficulty from the Soviet side which Chancellor Schmidt should have reported is this. If leading U.S.

circles were to prove themselves capable not only of stopping Carter's war-causing policy, but of adopting workable war-avoidance policies, we are not yet assured that the Soviet leadership would entertain negotiations on that basis.

What is needed, and immediately, is a *shared perception* among Moscow and the ruling circles of the Atlantic Alliance powers. "SALT" and related approaches to "detente" have failed miserably to prevent this crisis, and were intrinsically doomed to failure. *Both principals must share a perception of an entirely new and effective approach to peaceful coexistence.*

That locates more or less exactly the key place in the larger scheme occupied by this writer. This writer has three kinds of special qualifications for catalyzing a perception of workable new policies of peaceful coexistence. The alternatives proposed by this writer continue to be studied intensively by some intelligence circles directly advising sections of the ruling families of Atlantic Alliance nations, including the United States itself. If a *common perception* of the writer's proposed alternatives can be established as fact on both sides of the conflict, the optimal preconditions for workable new policies and treaty institutions will be established.

The writer's three kinds of special qualifications are these.

First, retrospectively, his institutionalized competence as an analyst of the causes of this war danger was first generally established for relevant circles by his U.S. nationwide television broadcast of November 1, 1976. In that broadcast he outlined the way in which the assured policies of a Carter administration would lead rapidly toward thermonuclear confrontation.

Earlier this present year, he gave two nationwide half-hour television broadcasts, which have proven to have been accurate assessments of the current state of affairs. Those more widely circulated statements are buttressed by a substantial amount of published materials.

Second, the publication of analysis and forecasts involving the Riemann-LaRouche computer-based technologies has strengthened the perceived authority of the writer's position as a political economist in the tradition of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Hence, his positive economic proposals for securing durable peace are acquiring the same or even greater practical weight as his related analysis of strategic patterns of development.

Third, he is not only a candidate for the Democratic Party 1980 presidential nomination, but has channels of direct and indirect communication into a variety of policy-making circles of Atlantic Alliance nations.

The juridical basis for this present form of action by this writer, according to combined U.S. law and custom, is the writer's political candidacy. Up to the point that he avoids the color of invasion of the diplomatic prerogatives of the current U.S. administration, a presidential candidate customarily conducts exploratory efforts in foreign policy areas for the purpose of establishing perceptions of possible alternative policies both for his prospective administration, and as a policy-contributing influence within his party.

It has been demonstrated almost violently that the ruling circles of the United States have been determined, so far this year, that this writer will not successfully contend for the August 1980 presidential nomination of the Democratic Party. For example: those circles variously initiated or condoned a unified policy in support

of the running of vote fraud exceeding a probable 20 percent of the total vote in the February 26, 1980, New Hampshire primary, a fraud that was directed from the top by elements of the National Security Council and the White House. This circumstance is also demonstrated by the massive, largely unlawful activities of the so-called Zionist Lobby against this candidate, activities conducted under “contract” from Anglo-American inner circles that include Sir Keith Joseph, Robert Moss, and the Mont Pelerin Society generally, and with the consent and cooperation of circles intersecting multinational firms associated with British intelligence.

That could change significantly for one or a combination of reasons. However, even pending such a change, the scope and intensity of the international intelligence community’s escalated harassment and other “containment” of this writer express perversely the importance those circles attribute to this writer and his conceptions. “LaRouche may be right” has become an increasingly frequent formulation from the first and second rank of such circles as the present crisis has developed.

Those points outline broadly the special kind of efficiency of the writer’s exploratory efforts at this moment.

There is a coincidence between the maturity of the present crisis and the remaining weeks of political campaigning preceding the Democratic Party primary elections of June 3, 1980, in those three major states—California, Ohio, and New Jersey—in which the writer is one of three candidates on the ballot. Useful developments arising out of this present proposal for exploratory activity will be the basis for major policy statements circulated through television and other campaign communications,

as well as otherwise introduced to appropriate channels of policy-making.

The Organization of this Memorandum

This memorandum is intended to be read, as if simultaneously, by policy-influencing circles, including those of both Western nations and the Soviet Union. It therefore includes information that may appear to be redundantly stated here for any one group of such readers, but which must be included for the information of some among the others.

The memorandum is divided into four principal sections, or chapters, as follows.

The first chapter summarizes the crucial issues to be solved to avoid war. The second summarizes the policies that created and perpetuate those issues, and that must therefore be understood in that light. The final, fourth chapter, sets forth the proposed war-avoidance policy. Those three chapters constitute the working parts of this proposal.

The additional chapter, the third, provides a background discussion of the origins and historically determined character of the geopolitical doctrine. This is not a working part of the proposal, but rather reflects the need to accompany the working parts with such indispensable background material.

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
Wiesbaden, Federal Republic of Germany
May 8, 1980

I

THE CAUSES FOR THE DANGER OF GENERAL WAR

There are three, and only three intersecting direct causes for the presently accelerating approach to the point of strategic miscalculations at which general war might erupt.

The first, and most general direct cause for such a potentiality is the continuation of the same general, "geopolitical" policy-doctrine that has already produced two "World Wars" during the present century.

The second, subsumed general direct cause for such a potentiality is the combined economic-depressive general effects, plus the specific destabilization of developing nations, caused by the emergence of policies coinciding with International Monetary Fund "conditionalities" in the course of the continuing breakdown of the institutions of the Bretton Woods system.

The third, exacerbating direct general cause for the growing danger of general war is the United States' adoption of the genocidal, "neo-Malthusian" doctrine of the Club of Rome.

These three, interconnected policies are the only direct causes for the danger of general war.

Other past and current developments may contribute to the danger of war, but not as direct causes of the war danger. These other, contributing developments are to be classed as either lack of suitable proposals, or toleration of or inadequate opposition to the three war-causing policies.

Among the second sort of contributing causes for war, we must include leading features of the "SALT"-centered institutions of "detente." The false and dangerous assumption, that disarmament agreements are either the principal or initial opening to peaceful coexistence has had the effect of directing energies to support of a delusion. This wishful thinking has drawn attention and energies away from effective courses of action.

Admittedly, there were other considerations that justified Soviet participation in a process of negotiations centered around the *pretext* of disarmament discussions. Those "other considerations" can be reduced to the usefulness of establishing and maintaining channels of diplomacy aiding (a) more narrowly, the enhanced possibility for managing episodic, potentially dangerous developments, and (b) more fundamentally, the maintenance of channels through which negotiations might proceed to focus upon the actual war-causing issues in the dimensions of political-economic policies.

Against those positive aspects of the "SALT" process, "SALT" contributed to the development of the war danger by (a) creating a climate favoring substitution of illusory emphasis on disarmament for address to the actual political-economic causes of war, and (b) strengthening directly and indirectly the delusions associated

with "flexible response" within the command of the Atlantic Alliance powers.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt committed a counter-productive error in stating recently the exaggerated view that the Soviet Union has no "war-avoidance" perspective. Recent events have proven that the Soviet actions beginning with the deployment into Afghanistan have been decisive, if ironically, in effecting a situation in which war-avoidance might become possible. That continuing "hard" posture by Moscow has had the specific, most useful effect of discrediting the strategic assumptions associated with "flexible response." By thus discrediting a most important part of the broader strategic miscalculation embedded in current NATO policy, Soviet "hard" postures have brought about the present moment of tentative reassessment of U.S. policy.

Schmidt's observation was implicitly correct in one part. Although current Soviet "hard" postures are an indispensable element of what would be an overall war-avoidance posture, this course of forcing reassessment upon NATO influentials will fail unless the reassessment leads to elimination of the three general, direct causes for the war danger. Lack of highly visible, public Soviet proposals respecting those three causes of war does represent a lack of overall war-avoidance posture from Moscow.

The alternative path, toward a merely postponed future general war, from the side of the Atlantic powers, is defined by the scrapping of both the IMF "conditionalities" and "neo-Malthusian" doctrines, but retaining the geopolitical posture.

It is feasible for the United States and its allies to create immediately a new, gold-based monetary system which unleashes the potential of the Atlantic Alliance nations and sections of the developing nations for broad-based economic growth. If this is accompanied by dirigist emphasis upon scientific progress, modeled upon the NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) experience, the military potentials of the Western Alliance could develop at an accelerating rate over the coming decade, under conditions of a sharply reduced emphasis on a "China option."

This could be instituted through energies mobilized into channels defined by the embedded anti-Soviet mythos of the institutions and general populations of the industrialized Atlantic Alliance nations.

There is a precedent for such a "middle course" in the deliberations of Lord Alfred Milner's Coefficients at the beginning of this century. The kernel of the Anglo-American elites has periodically recognized the qualitative superiority of "Hamiltonian" political economy over the *monetarist* doctrines flowing from British ideology. They are capable, under special circumstances, of using those "Hamiltonian" policies to develop the broad civilian economy basis for massive rearmament.

The innermost circles of this elite also have demonstrated themselves repeatedly to be capable of adopting policy perspectives for a span of a generation or two. They are implicitly capable of *temporarily* shelving neo-Malthusian policies—in approximately the same way the establishment of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) shifted Britain temporarily from a Malthusian policy during the middle of the nineteenth

century, and as Milner's group undertook to rebuild the British navy and army in preparation for World War I.

We now restate the point just made.

The stated, and related considerations show that the ruling strata of the Atlantic Alliance powers have but three categories of strategic options from which to choose at this juncture.

(1) They may choose to reaffirm support of the present policies, or might merely let the policies continue by default. That means an assured decisive strategic confrontation during the short term.

(2) They may muster the resolution to scrap for a period of a generation the neo-Malthusian institutions established during the post-1966 period, for the sake of a "quasi-Hamiltonian" decade of mobilization under conditions of "managed hostility" with the Soviet Union.

(3) Under special conditions, they might choose to seek establishment of the kinds of treaty institutions of durable peaceful coexistence identified in this memorandum.

The principal concerns of this memorandum are both to show why the third choice is indispensable, and what contributing efforts from the Soviet leadership are indispensable for prompting ruling Atlantic Alliance circles to perceive the cited third option as a serious, desirable choice.

CURRENT POLICY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

The Atlantic Alliance is composed primarily of Japan and Western continental Europe, plus Israel, all dominated by an Anglo-American elite based on the dominant postwar power of the United States.

The industrial-capitalist traditions of Germany's industrialists and of Japan's Meiji Restoration factions constitute the kernel of a political-centrifugal resistance to the monetarist and related premises of Anglo-American policy, a resistance that efficiently expresses itself politically only through factional alliances with Gaullist tendencies in France.

In general, in matters of what the British term "grand strategy" to the present date, the other members of the Atlantic Alliance are virtually mere satrapies of the Anglo-American ruling elites.

In general, the policies of the Anglo-American elites have been created in Britain, then conduited through the leading U.S. news media and the mouths of anglophile elements of the political-intelligence elites of the United States. The rule established during the middle to late 1940s—"British brains directing American muscle"—continues to prevail.

Although the inner kernel of political and military power of the Anglo-American ruling elites is based on the resources of the United States, Britain, Canada, and, to a lesser extent, Australia and New Zealand, *the top-most strata of these elites are a supranational, oligarchical collection of "families" and talented aides.* This supranational collection's visible principal form of association is the confederated Order of Malta, the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem.

There are persisting and recurring factional differences within that Maltese oligarchical elite, and sometimes significant factional differences concerning program and perspectives. However, the Order of Malta, as a confederation, is a reflection of *the supranational entity whose existence as an entity supplants the notion of nation in defining the notions of self-interest motivating the policies and related ventures of this supranational elite as a whole.*

Among all of the subordinate entities employed by this supranational elite, two distinguishable organizations' networks are currently outstanding. The first is the British Psychological Warfare Executive, centered formally in the London Tavistock Institute. The other is the Society of Jesus, the Jesuits.

The practical power of this supranational elite is exemplified by the following elements.

It controls top down most of the governing and policy-making institutions of Britain, Canada, the United States, Australia, and so forth, and exerts a large degree of similar forms of control over the institutions of other allied and developing nations.

This control of the power represented by nations and

their principal political-party institutions complements the monetarist (rentier-financier) control of nations' debts and so forth by an interlocking financial interest centered in the City of London. (In addition to profits of the international illegal drug traffic and the petroleum-marketing cartel, the City of London-centered interest controls a large portion of the primary commodities markets generally.)

This rentier-financier interest controls in fact the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank is historically, and in the policy reflected in its practice, a product of shift of British bureaucrats from the old colonial office to this institution during the 1950s. Key regular institutions of the United Nations Organization, including the UN Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), are under top-down control of elements of British intelligence, and have functioned, as has UNCTAD in particular, as political-intelligence operations arms in behalf of City of London "neocolonialist" interests.

Inside the United States, in addition to traditional City of London influence over the principal commercial and investment banks, London control, with aid of King's College and the London School of Economics, the key monetary and economic policy-shaping institutions, led by the Brookings Institution and the Wharton School adjunct.

These institutions of top-down control are reinforced by British control of most of the intellectual life of the United States. This centers over the course of this century in the turn-of-the-century policy of breaking U.S.

universities away from close collaboration with continental institutions such as Göttingen University, and bringing those institutions under the more or less direct control of Oxford and Cambridge universities. In addition to British-Canadian and anglophile control of the principal mass news media in the United States, the principal entertainment media as well as the book and magazine publishing and distributing apparatus are under the same source of controlling, regulating influence.

To understand the intellectual basis for current, neo-Malthusian vectors of Anglo-American policy, one must focus special attention on the destructive effects of the "educational reforms" instituted in the United States, France, Italy, West Germany, and elsewhere over the course of the past two decades: this is relevant to a point of President de Gaulle's blindness, which enabled the destabilization of his government and decay of France generally since the period beginning 1968.

This supranational control has limitations. The tendency toward cultural and technological devolution of the capitalist industrialized nations produces results directly contrary to the material and related interests of large groups of people of those nations, and of each such nation as a whole. The British population generally has been successfully degraded into predominantly a mass of wretched political sheep over the period since the 1660 Restoration, but in other nations, reality periodically bestirs a more or less vigorous resistance to the effects of neo-Malthusian devolution, especially in those less-subverted sectors of the populations whose age is in excess of approximately thirty-five years.

The countervailing impact of reality against current policy-trends of the Hospitaliers is not uniform, of course, but expresses itself periodically, as the accumulated effects of devolutionary policies take the form of discrete “shocks” to the consciousness of various strata of the populations.

The contradictions between Hospitalier-generated policies and the consequences of those policies in reality define *ambiguities* in the ranks of the ruling elites themselves. For example, the publication of the book, *The Unfinished Agenda*, produced oppositional tendencies around the ranks of former members of Nelson Rockefeller’s Commission on Critical Choices, just as West Germany’s industrial elites and other nationalistic elements of the international elites experience painful conflicts between the consequences of continued unfolding of current Atlantic Alliance policies and national and related real self-interests.

It is only at times that the countervailing shocks of reality produce exceptional disquietude among elements of the supranational elites that it is possible to anticipate a realistic assessment of current policies. A very profound shock is required to prompt the depth and scope of reassessment that might lead to an overturning of the embedded policies of the cited varieties of supranationally directed institutions.

The present interval of *possible* reassessment was prompted chiefly by the shocked perception that the Soviet leadership would not “accept” conflict ordered according to the Atlantic Alliance’s hegemonic “flexible response” doctrine. It was that specific shock, added to the centrifugal impulses of continental Europe, and to

the effects of the “uncontrolled” developments in the monetary situation, which made the present interval of *possible reassessment* a reality.

The current state of Anglo-American policy into the present moment of possible reassessment is most efficiently outlined for analysis by comparing post-1976 developments in U.S. policy and practice with the world-view presented in the 1975-1976 *1980s Project* papers of the New York Council on Foreign Relations.

Although these specific papers were not in the writer’s possession during 1976, the writer’s half-hour nationwide television broadcast of November 1, 1976, was premised on other, conclusive evidence of the policy commitments of a Carter administration.

The driving element of Carter administration policy presented among those *1980s Project* papers is the assertion that the principal adversary of the Anglo-American interest is the “neomercantilist” impulse centered in West Germany and Japanese industrialist interests and in the Gaullist impulses of France.

The *1980s Project* papers emphasize that this adversary is described as a set of impulses toward introducing the monetary and economic policies inclusively associated historically with Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List.

This purported threat to the United States from the American System of Hamilton, List et al. is identified by the Council on Foreign Relations as currently a major, rather than abstract danger, chiefly because of the tendency of such “neomercantilist” impulses of France, Germany, Japan et al. to converge upon supporting impulses from the “Marxists.” The “Marxists” are identified by *1980s Project* doctrine as the combined aspira-

tions for high-technology development among developing nations and coinciding impulses from the Soviet Union.

These papers were compiled under the policy direction of a group led by Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, W. Michael Blumenthal, and others. They represent the policies designed for the Carter administration, and to be continued by that administration's immediate successor. They have been, in fact, the policies that have governed every principal feature of Carter administration policy and practice.

These papers define the Anglo-Americans' adversary relationship to the Soviet Union in terms of the premises we have just reported. Their stated policy is that either: (a) the Soviet Union accepts some technological devolution of its own society, beginning with Soviet military policy, or (b) a condition of strategic deterioration leading toward war emerges.

Broadly, therefore, the Anglo-Americans propose that a persisting threat to a neo-Malthusian world order will exist, unless the continental European nations, Japan, and developing nations generally, are isolated from any direct or indirect impact of continued Soviet high-technology development.

One can reconstruct in one's own mind the view of possible continued detente with Moscow that the sponsors envisage in connection with that summarized argument. However, reality intervenes—this time on the Soviet side of the equation.

Were the Soviet Union to weaken itself to the extent the doctrine implies as required, the attempted break-up of Eastern Europe and then the Soviet Union itself would

ensue—just as Milner's geopoliticians prescribed at the beginning of this century. Thus, the conditions for peace cited in the Council's *1980s Project* papers have the flaw of being acceptable only to outright traitors in the Soviet leadership.

An analogously paradoxical sort of thinking was illustrated by a recent complaint issued through NATO and allied sources: the Soviet Union's deployments "unfairly" exceeded "purely defensive requirements." In opposition to such nonsense, there is no adequate defensive requirement for a principal power except a decisive margin of in-depth war-winning capability against any probable combination of adversary powers. It is irrelevant whether or not the NATO sources of that complaint did or did not believe their own propaganda in this matter. The mixed audience of influential politicians and others, to whose hearing the complaint was addressed, were clearly intended to believe in the existence of such mythical beings as "purely defensive capabilities"—more or less as gullible readers of the *1980s Project* papers might believe in the acceptability of technological devolution to the Soviet leadership.

The likely place to find conceptions of that same distinctive quality is in the mental life of chess players who cheat when playing against themselves.

It is not necessary to go further here with discussion of the *1980s Project* papers as such. We have identified the critical point of those papers bearing upon the Carter administration's strategic policy. Most of the volumes of *1980s Project* papers are currently in print and merely corroborate the further elaboration we offer in connection with the identified point.

So far, we have indicated that the policy we have identified is stated in the given source and has been Carter administration policy in practice so far. The question is thus posed: Is the present implementation of that policy toward near-term strategic confrontations a matter of subjective *choice of timing* by the administration—such as election campaign considerations—or *are there conditions existing which represent driving-forces toward near-term confrontation, independent of the peculiarities of the Carter administration itself?*

It must be emphasized, especially for the benefit of those who tend to attribute far too much to the pressures of an election year on the administration, that the actual government of the United States is constituted on three levels, of which the formal institutions of government are the lowest of the three levels. The top level is a constellation of ruling families of the Anglo-American elite. The second level is composed of the policy-intelligence elite's upper strata. Below that level are the Executive Branch, Congress, and federal judiciary as institutions.

This does not signify that the formal institutions of U.S. federal government have been so far degraded that they are incapable of challenging Anglo-American elites' policies under all circumstances. As a study of "Watergate" might suggest, the formal power held by elected federal officials and federal judges is still capable of offering resistance to behind-the-scenes forces. However, when the ruling elites are committed to ruining a President—or other elected officials—they exert almost monolithic control of the major news media, have massive covert operations capabilities, and can orchestrate a mobilization of organized popular forces.

It is therefore to be stressed that from the point of Henry A. Kissinger's declaration of "national unity" in support of Carter on the Iran issue last November, until Secretary Vance's recent resignation, virtually all of the institutions controlled by the Anglo-American elite mobilized monolithic unity behind the "national unity" doctrine. It should be noted, to emphasize the same point, that the "Carter doctrine" proclaimed in the President's "state of the union" address was drafted by the Manhattan ruling elites, not in the White House.

We must leave no doubt on one relevant point. The fable that prominent features of current U.S. foreign policy reflect pressures of a domestic election campaign is essentially a myth concocted for the edification of the credulous. It should be added: Jimmy Carter is among the dupes who believe the fable.

Carter had at least one "emotional breakdown" prior to his 1977 inauguration. He is manipulated according to that psychological profile by his immediate controllers. During the recent and current period, this manipulation centers upon causing Carter to perceive that certain policies coincide with his personal ambitions for nomination and re-election. So, *the current election campaign is being used as an added tool for manipulating Carter* into adopting his recent turns in foreign policy adventures.

Puppets, including wretches as miserably inept as Carter, do tend to become "Frankenstein's monsters," under some conditions becoming a menace to their patrons. The Anglo-American imposition of Hitler upon Germany is the modern classic illustration of that principle. The combination of Sir Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher in London, plus "Rasputin" Brze-

zinski controlling the aberrant Carter in Washington, does represent a grave potential danger—even to the Anglo-American elites. Nonetheless, in the matter of the policies behind the current war danger, it is not the Carter administration as such, but the Anglo-American elites who have created and advanced these policies up to the current point.

Accordingly, we must focus attention principally toward the circumstances acting upon the perceptions of the ruling elites—approximately two levels of power above the formal institutions of the present U.S. federal government.

Although the three elements of war-causing policy act interdependently, any rigorous study of the current policy must first consider each separately and then in their interconnections.

1. The Geopolitical Policy

The root of the war danger is the continuation of that same geopolitical policy-doctrine that already has caused two world wars during the present century. Essentially, *today as for Milner's Coefficients, the dissolution of Russia ("the Eurasian heartland") is viewed as indispensable to prevent resurgence of "mercantilist" ententes spanning continental Eurasia into Japan.* That, we re-emphasize, is the central point of strategic doctrine presented in the *1980s Project* papers: the "danger," as Vance et al. argue the point, that "neo-mercantilism" and "Marxism" will become allied on the basis of a common commitment to technological progress in industrially centered economic development of the globe.

If one accepts the Anglo-American assumption that monetarist (anti-"mercantilist") policy and institutions are the vital interest of the ruling forces of London and Manhattan, then the "geopolitical" doctrine is the only possible strategic doctrine acceptable to monetarist interests during this century. To understand the geopolitical doctrine one must comprehend it as flowing directly and inevitably from the commitment to monetarist ruling financial-debt institutions of the type of the Versailles and Bretton Woods monetary systems.

Formally, the geopolitical policy was revived during the postwar period through British initiatives cohering with Winston Churchill's well-known Fulton, Missouri, "Iron Curtain" address of 1946. Actually, the adoption of such a policy was embedded in previously established Bretton Woods agreements.

The point is better illuminated by comparing the alternative policies contemplated by Roosevelt during the first years of the last world war.

According to a published, eyewitness account from Roosevelt's son Elliott, at the onset of the last war Roosevelt at least twice instructed an apoplectic Winston Churchill that (a) the United States was not going to war for a second time to preserve the British Empire—in any guise, and (b) the United States' postwar policy would not tolerate a continuation of British "eighteenth-century methods" (for example, Adam Smith's policies) in international relations. Roosevelt's son reports verbatim from memory of the Casablanca conference.

Roosevelt illustrated his proposed postwar policy at the Casablanca conference by referring to a map of the

Sahel region of Africa, and summarizing the planned use of high-technology "American methods" to transform that region into a rich breadbasket for Africa. Roosevelt proposed to crank up the industrial-output capacity of the industrialized nations for a high-technology transformation of what we term today the developing nations.

This proposed policy was eminently feasible. If we recognize that military production is intrinsically an inflationary tax on the productive process, we recognize, conversely, that the substitution of high-technology capital goods for military goods is the basis for a sustained economic boom in world trade and in the growing prosperity of both exporting and importing nations. The use of the U.S. war production credit system of 1940-1945 as the model for mobilizing post-war reconstruction is thus readily comprehended as a workable policy.

The effects on the power of the City of London are also rather easily understood. Hence, Churchill's approximately apoplectic reaction to Roosevelt's proposals.

Behind the demagogic babbling concerning "free trade" by Adam Smith and his heirs to this day stand two principal issues. First, "free trade" policies weaken industrial interest to the advantage of rentier-financier interest. Second, preventing the state from controlling the policies of the creation and issuance of national credit leaves the state itself increasingly at the mercy of the rentier-financier interests that control the state debt.

The growth of rentier capital at accelerating rates, relative to a stagnant or slowly expanding productive

basis, causes spiraling ratios of debt-service payments to accounts of rentier interests to cannibalize the productive basis, through tendencies for increasing rates of primitive accumulation. The equivalent of a parasitical rental income, largely disguised as debt service, grows more rapidly than the profits of production.

This converges on the point that required increases in financier rent must come out of productive capital—as looting of land improvements, industrial capital stocks, and the labor force.

The approach to development of colonies is the simplest sort of illustrative case.

Industrial-capitalist interest develops colonies by increasing produced gross and per capita profits, through developing the productive powers of agricultural and industrial labor. Rentier finance exploits colonies by looting primary resources through marketing cartels.

There are three alternative modes for investment in less developed portions of the globe. One may develop a colony, as a colony, in an industrial-capitalist way, by effectively assimilating it into the "mother country" through technological development. One may invest in capitalist firms established in such a region. One may extend long-term credit for high-technology capital purchases to national banks of such regions, developing an expanding market for future capital-goods sales through the industrial development of that region.

It is the last alternative which is most appropriate, especially today, as well as the mode preferred politically by most progressive developing nations' governments and related political forces.

To open up the developing nations' region for large-

scale high-technology development—today, and also at the close of the last war—it is necessary to reorganize the external debt of such nations. This is best done by converting accumulated debts to new forms of debt, through issuance of nominal-interest, deferred-payment, long-term bonds which are conditionally rediscountable by purchasers within a suitable form of gold-based monetary system.

Although such debt reorganization assures ultimate full payment of currently outstanding obligations, the effect of sustained economic development is to cause a relatively massive reduction of the weight of such debt in total capital-flows. So, the rentier-financier banker is paid in full, but his relative political power is sharply reduced, as capital-flows to the account of the productive forces grow more rapidly than capital-flows to the account of rentier capital.

That summary identifies the most immediate motive for hatred of “mercantilism” by rentier-financier interests.

The point is illuminated further by summarily examining the impact of the development of Lenin’s Soviet Union from the specific vantage point of the conflict between “mercantilism” and rentier-finance. It is from this vantage point that “Third Camp” and anarchist political agents for rentier-financial interests have sometimes denounced the industrialization of the Soviet Union as creating a “state capitalist” order.

With the destabilization of Russian finance minister Count Sergei Witte and his faction at the beginning of this century, and with the other international correla-

tives of the defeat of both France’s foreign minister Gabriel Hanotaux and Witte, the comprehensive *capitalist* industrial development of Russia was virtually precluded; emphasis was to be placed on the foreign rentier-financier grip on the debts of Russian agriculture. In the absence of a viable capitalist prospect, Lenin utilized the circumstances generated largely by British, German, and other intelligence services’ 1917 destabilization of the Russian government to establish an industrial republic on a socialist basis.

Despite the absence of capitalist property forms in the principal means of Soviet production, the Soviet economy as a whole functions as a “mercantilist” element of the world economy. This is especially the view of the matter from the standpoint of rentier-financier interest.

The danger to monetarist interest represented by the Soviet Union’s existence was first tangibly underlined by the 1922 Rapallo agreements between Lenin’s Soviet Union and Germany. Although this involved needed import of technology as well as merely capital goods for reconstruction, over the longer term of Soviet economic development another consideration implicitly predominates.

Given the current status of Soviet science, the Soviet Union’s import needs are not presently still those of a relatively less-developed economy. The key problem today is that the full spectrum of a modern, capital-intensive division of labor in production cannot be efficiently developed on so narrow a base as even the Soviet Union’s physical scale and population provide.

As President Leonid Brezhnev put the point most simply and elegantly in a May 1978 address to the population of the German Federal Republic, Soviet economic interests require the development of a rational division of international labor—an impulse that naturally emphasizes Western continental Europe and Japan. This development of a more rational division of international labor permits substantial increases in the capital-efficiency and growth rates of the Soviet economy and is also most beneficial to Soviet trading partners.

Indeed, the Comecon and the urban population of India, combined, represent presently the great key portion of the potential for rapid increases in overall world-trade volumes through such cooperation from the industrialized capitalist nations.

Although a “mercantilist” policy defines cooperation with the Soviet Union (and progressive developing nations) as in the clearest self-interest of the industrialized capitalist nations, *for that very reason*, the very existence of the Soviet Union constitutes an intolerable threat to the London-centered rentier-financier interests.

Accordingly, as industrialized capitalist nations choose a “mercantilist” or monetarist policy for the ordering of their own ruling political-economic institutions, they have made a corresponding strategic choice respecting relations with both the developing nations and the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, the shift of U.S. policy away from Roosevelt’s commitments at the Casablanca conference, toward the Bretton Woods alternative, meant a shift

toward resuming a geopolitical policy-doctrine for the postwar world. It was that policy shift which established the Anglo-American strategic-policy combination; once the United States was so placed, once again, under domination by the British elites, and this time to a greater degree than ever before, the geopolitical policy was predetermined.

2. IMF “Conditionalities”

The IMF “conditionalities” and related policies flow directly from the 1944 establishment of the Bretton Woods system. As the self-expansion of indebtedness depresses trends in productive capital formation, the combined rent and debt-service charges overtake and tend to exceed the gross profit from total production of tangible useful commodities.

The critical point, the turning point, for the postwar U.S. economy was reached in 1957. However, the continued development of India (into 1962), and of West Germany, Japan, and Gaullist France, kept the entire industrialized capitalist sector stable into the middle of the 1960s, at which point there began a series of monetary crises of generally increasing intensity. The Bretton Woods system crumbled *in its old forms*, beginning with the British devaluation of November 1967, the ensuing dollar crisis of 1968, and the crisis of March through August 1971.

The principal offset to this decay within the United States was centered around the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA mediated advances in technology into the economy, maintaining some degree of impetus for the development of the

productivity of labor, a development that reached a turning point about 1972, after which the overall productivity of the U.S. economy turned downward.

A brief glance at the credit-expansion from 1954 to 1957 makes the issues clearer.

Instead of promoting post-Korean War U.S. recovery by credit and tax incentives for capital-investment expansion, the Eisenhower administration adopted a policy that emphasized consumer credit expansion.

Consumer credit may effect a short-term increase in total consumer purchases, by converting a portion of household incomes from direct purchases to debt-service payment. Total purchases are increased by the factor which is determined by multiplying increased consumer credit debt-service by the ratio of total purchase-credit extended to debt service incurred by that credit.

This is, at best, a one-time increase in "demand," in which debt-service charges in excess of value of purchases have a regressive effect. As the rolled-over debt-service balances to be paid exceed the replacement-value of the depleted item of purchase, the result of such excessive consumer credit expansion is an abrupt drop in total purchases to levels below those at the outset of the program.

The way through which to create a sustained growth in consumer "demand" is through high-technology, capital-intensive productive investment. This increases both total employment, average productivity of labor, and thus fosters higher per capita real wage rates, as well as enlarging total wages. Taking the matter in broader terms, economic growth coincides with a

growth of the ratio of capital goods to consumer goods in final product. "Demand" does not create "supply"; "supply," *properly directed*, creates consumption, by creating more abundant means of consumption at a lower average social cost of production.

The reason for the mistaken choice of emphasis by the Eisenhower administration is simple and directly relevant to the point immediately under consideration here.

There are two modes in which to effect economic growth.

The ultimate source of wealth, and hence of growth, is the transmission of basic advances in science into capital-intensive forms of increases in the productive powers of labor. For various reasons, the rate of realized scientific progress is presently far too low to permit autonomous prosperity in the industrialized capitalist nations. The problem is so important to overall policy considerations that we summarize the demographic phenomena of adequate technological progress here.

Over the past two centuries, the increase in the productivity of agriculture has correlated causally with the increase in the ratio of the urban to the rural labor force. As this is extended, progress in productivity correlates causally with an increase of the ratio of capital goods to consumer goods in the productive employment of the urban labor force. As this proceeds, it correlates causally with a required increase in the ratio of scientists, engineers, and related professionals per 10,000 productive workers.

In general, worldwide, the ratio of qualified scientists

and engineers employed is qualitatively insufficient, a condition that is aggravated by low rates of capital-intensive investment in productive capital.

For the immediate decades ahead, we have an alternate means for initiating rapidly increasing global output and productivity. In general, wherever qualified urban labor is available among developing nations, it is possible to increase productivity by approximately an order of magnitude over the medium-term for each person shifted from labor-intensive to capital-intensive productive employment. Substantial, equally important if less dramatic gains can be realized in ingenious application of modern technologies to even illiterate rural labor—the use of fertilizers, irrigation, and so forth—to increase per hectare and per capita yields.

Although long-term economic growth must be based on “vertical” advances in technology, for the next two decades, we can inaugurate a great expansion in total and per capita production of wealth globally beginning with the “horizontal” application of current plus emerging state-of-the-art high technologies exported from industrialized into developing nations. This “horizontally” based expansion must be used as the material basis for developing adequate potentials for “vertical” expansion.

That is the opportunity for today. That was the proper policy for the postwar period as a whole. That was the available—and avoided—alternative policy for the United States in 1954.

The series of monetary crises erupting during the second half of the 1960s are to be viewed as the onset of a process of general breakdown of the Bretton

Woods order. This signified that the capital-flows to the account of rentier-finance—through channels of debt service and rent—had become large relative to the capital-flows into reinvestment in modern productive capital. If patterns of combined obsolescence and true replacement costs of productive capital are used to form the data base for analysis, we are able to portray directly the acceleration of “rot” in the U.S. economy. If we also examine the percentile of the total labor force productively employed during 1946-1947 (55 to 60 percent), and compare that with the past two decades’ decline of the percentile to less than 38 percent today, the picture of decay of the U.S. productive forces is approximately completed.

The past decade and a half of the U.S. economy has been dominated by a combined cost and monetary inflation. The cost-inflation is chiefly the result of the effects of a declining productive percentile of the total labor force, combined with depletion of productive capital through insufficient rates of investment. The monetary inflation is a reflection of the rising ratio of debt service and rent obligations to the gross profit of combined production of tangible commodities.

The solution to such a combined problem is to emulate the credit and banking reforms of U.S. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton: to reorganize the debt and to reestablish banking, credit, and tax policies on a “mercantilist” basis.

The rejection of such a solution means either an “automatic” spiral into depression or monetary collapse, or a resort to the methods made notorious by Nazi Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht.

Schacht “solved” the problem of inflation as Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek propose, by the simple accountant’s trick of gouging from the internal economy an amount equivalent to the amount of inflation. This was aimed to keep rentier debt service and rent yields on the currency at “competitive” levels. It accomplished this by depleting the labor force and large portions of the accumulated industrial and agricultural capital of the internal economy.

The failure of Schacht’s “miracles” was “overcome” by the expedient of shifting a large part of the burden of further looting from the German economy to the populations and economies of occupied nations and territories—culminating in the slave labor/“useless eaters” program of “austerity.” (The late Jacques Rueff has written a valuable study of Schacht’s methods.)

Political fascism is represented by each and any of the forms of government selected as instruments to impose monetary-economic measures like those of Schacht’s. The *essence of fascism* is Schacht’s method of “austerity.” The political forms rightly called fascism, including contemporary “environmentalism,” are the implementation of fascist economics by political instruments.

It is correct, and indispensable, to compare the genocidal effects of IMF “conditionalities” and World Bank/Brandt Commission “appropriate technologies” with the Nazi programs applied to the occupied territories and their populations during, especially, the 1943 to 1945 period. IMF “conditionalities” and “appropriate technologies” are fascism pure and simple, and, as

measured by the magnitude of the social consequences, a vastly more murderous form of fascism than Hitler’s. Those associated with the Club of Rome’s doctrines who project reduction of the world’s population to as little as between 1 and 2 billion persons by about the year 2000 are using competent arithmetic. The combined effects of famine, epidemics, homicidal social chaos, and regional wars flowing directly from those policies can readily effect such degrees of global depopulation.

The present degree of decay of the relics of the Bretton Woods system obliges the Anglo-American monetarists either to choose the “mercantilist” alternative, to simply squat passively amid ongoing collapse, or to essay fascist alternatives on a global scale.

Although it might and should be emphasized that the “automatic” monetary decay has been monstrously and willfully aggravated by choice of leading Anglo-American circles since the 1967-1969 period of reorientation toward a “neo-Malthusian” policy, the degree of decay effected by such combined “automatic” and willful means is as much an accomplished state of affairs as if the entire collapse had occurred “automatically.”

Therefore, refusal to accept a “mercantilist” alternative encumbers those policy-makers with something like the IMF “conditionalities,” neo-Schachtian policy, in any case. The degree of advancement of this collapse during the period from October 1979 to April 1980 has left those policy-makers with no choices but the immediate three-fold spectrum of choices cited above: (1)

“mercantilist” reform; (2) squatting, mewing importantly in the collapse; (3) pushing for immediate consolidation of a fascist world order.

3. The “Neo-Malthusian” Policy

For reasons we shall summarize in the next chapter of this memorandum, the desire to bring into being a world order based on “zero technological growth” and depopulation programs has been a persistent, endemic thrust within the inner core of the British oligarchy over centuries.

The revival of Thomas Malthus’ writings, and their extensive application to British practice following the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, was one major outbreak of this impulse. The limited “mercantilist” recoveries in the United States, France, Germany, and Russia during the 1820s, and the qualitative advance of continental science over British science during the same period, impelled the British to shift significantly away from Malthus’ policies toward sporadic, contained promotion of science and industrial developments in Britain during the nineteenth century.

Malthusianism was revived in a concerted way during the 1920s, around three leading figures of British intelligence: H. G. Wells, Bertrand Russell, and Aleister Crowley. This combined effort toward establishing a world federalism converging upon Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World* intersected most emphatically the emergence of the Tavistock Clinic, and later Tavistock Institute (Sussex), as both the British Psychological Warfare Executive’s kernel and an increasingly domi-

nant element of British Secret Intelligence Services as a whole.

The institutionalization of neo-Malthusian projects in the United States and other countries was developed in kernel-form during the late 1940s and 1950s, and launched on a broad, post-pilot project scale in about 1963. The concerted development of the social democratic left-conducted “New Left,” the mass distribution of LSD-25, and the promotion of the Beatles typify the early 1960s deployment of neo-Malthusian, anarchoid (or, arachnoid) cultism as a “youth movement.”

From about 1967 to 1969, this project was made operational in respect to “adult” policy-making and intelligence institutions. The decision was made to scale down NASA, as part of a concerted effort to terminate the image and influence of scientific rationalism in the population generally. The King’s College-Jesuit “systems philosophy” campaign to subvert scientific and technological progress in both the industrialized capitalist nations and the Soviet Union was emphasized as a key strategic thrust. The decision to shape “SALT” negotiations as a manipulation of Soviet scientific and military technological development was consolidated. In 1969, the peaked “New Left” ferment of 1968 was reoriented into cultism and “environmentalism,” organizing these social formations from frustrated “New Left” mass ferment as “alternative radical movements,” using the news and entertainment media and deploying the intelligence community to organize these new “alternative radical movements” from the top down.

(The persons who imagine that these “radical” movements are “spontaneous sociological phenomena” are either liars or require a course in the ABCs of intelligence operations.)

From 1972 onward, psychological warfare techniques such as “meditation” and “encounter groups” were proliferated against targeted populations of influentials, from the members of the elite themselves, down to the lower ranks of Aldous Huxley’s Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon strata.

In consequence, adding the subversion of youth during the sixties and seventies to the intensive brainwashing of elites themselves during the 1970s, the ideology of neo-Malthusianism has become a powerful, institutionalized force of policy-making and decision-making response among the presently dominant strata of policy-making institutions, political parties, industrial corporations, important sections of the military and strategic policy command, as well as the anarchoids of the Omega strata.

In crucial aspects of industrial, agricultural, and military policy and capabilities, the conditioning of U.S. policy strata and institutions under the Carter administration of the “technetronic” Brzezinski and professed neo-Malthusian James R. Schlesinger has implicitly destroyed U.S. civilian economic potentials and the possibility for regeneration of military capabilities.

This state of affairs is comparable in a crucial respect to the post-1815 Malthusian period in Britain.

Then, imagining themselves to have crushed “mercantilism” forever with the consolidation of the Metter-

nichian order, the ruling British oligarchs assured themselves that they had established sufficient hegemony over the world’s affairs that they could dispense with industrial-technological progress, and establish a bucolically flavored world order of the sort more gratifying to their oligarchist sentiments.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, for reasons based on a mixture of scenarios afoot and wishful self-delusions, the modern Anglo-American oligarchs believed that they were on the verge of containing and crumbling the Soviet Union. This belief has centered around the assumption that Moscow would view thermonuclear war with such horror that it would retreat before displays of apparent nuclear madness from the White House, Moscow thus being defeated step by step through war-avoidance retreats from strategic confrontations and “limited wars.”

The Anglo-American circles were trapped between the inertia of the institutionalization of neo-Malthusian policies and their wishful delusions concerning the scenarios they projected for Soviet defeat. To imagine that the scenarios would not succeed would be to oblige themselves to disassemble the institutionalization of the neo-Malthusian policies. They would be obliged to turn to the perceived alternative of a “dirigist” development of scientifically advanced military capabilities.

Hence, all of the intersecting elements of basic policy, including the various wishful scenarios involving “bluff” and “flexible response,” became a single, obsessive commitment—a kind of self-feeding policy hysteria.

It is the confluence among the institutionalization of

monetarist geopolitical doctrine, the circumstances of adoption of neo-Schachtian global monetary-economic perspectives, and the institutionalization of neo-Malthusian ideologies that defines these present months as a "point of no return." It is either change the policies or go toward war. There are no other options.

3

THE BRITISH OLIGARCHY'S HISTORICAL CHARACTER

The key to the possibility for durable peaceful coexistence is located in the sharpened contradictions between the nation-states dominated by the oligarchical, supranational elites, and the supranational elite as an entity of distinct rentier self-interest.

As we have noted earlier, within the ranks of that elite itself there are important factional and protofactional elements whose loyalties are divided between sensitivity to the real interests of their respective nation-states, and also to the collective interest of the oligarchy as a supranational institution counterposing itself to nation-state interests.

These are the key elements on which to focus efforts to secure policies leading toward durable peace.

For related reasons, it is important to include here a summary of the historically determined character of the oligarchy itself, and to emphasize the proper practical significance of the term "British oligarchy."

The development of the modern nation-state is to be traced from three of the writings of Dante Alighieri: his

Commedia, which is still today the best scientific manual in politics; his *De Monarchia*, which precedes important fifteenth-century writings on the republican order, such as the *Concordantia Catholica* of Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa; and his treatise on the potential eloquence of the Italian language.

The central flaw in the earlier efforts, beginning with Alcuin and Charlemagne, to establish a republic of Christendom had failed essentially because the dependence upon Latin left the mass of people speaking a brutish sort of common language. It was necessary to elevate the people to the qualifications of citizens of a republic, concentrating on the transformation of brutish common languages into spoken and written languages capable of communicating what Shelley aptly identifies as “profound conceptions respecting man and nature.” Thus, these dominant, transformed common languages must be the basis for constituting self-government by the citizens.

This did not inaugurate the sort of egotistical heteronomy among peoples British oligarchs cite in their wretched maligning of the nation-state as an institution. Rather, it required that nation-states so constituted be united in a “community of principle,” a common dedication to developing a world order premised on scientific progress, and upon making the practical realization of man’s creative-mental potentialities, through technological progress, the practical basis for the relationship of man to man in society.

The forces opposing both those world-order policies generally, and subsequently the sovereign nation-state in particular, were the faction of oligarchs and allied

rentier-financier interests termed variously the “black Guelph,” the “black nobility,” or simply the “Genoese.”

The character and implications of the “black Guelph” oligarchs are typified by the semicollapse of European civilization into a “new dark age” over the period ranging from approximately 1286 into the aftermath of the bubonic pandemic. Through a pre-Malthus antiscience policy of the so-called Aristotelians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and through rentier-financier “tax farming” typified by the Bardi and Peruzzi banking families, an economic devolution of central Europe emerged that wiped out about half of the parishes of that region over the indicated period.

Although the bubonic pandemic is credited with killing about one-third of that population, the pandemic was but the final phase of the process of devolution. Through the looting of populations and capital improvements, impelled by labor-intensity aimed at providing rents to pay spiraling debt service, the productivity of agriculture was sharply reduced, and large portions of the population were driven into vagabondage. These conditions, aggravated by feudal wars of looting by desperately debt-ridden potentates, destroyed civilization to a degree only approximated in overall effects by the seventeenth-century Thirty Years War in central Europe.

The focal point of development of the “black Guelph” was Rome, most emphatically the descendants of the ancient Roman senatorial families, who had been associated with the cult of Apollo’s rule of the Mediterranean during the historical period of the Roman republic and with the Ptolemaic cult of Isis under the Roman Empire.

This lineage is not merely biological, but is *consciously political* to the present date.

During the fifteenth century, these oligarchists consolidated their power against the insurgency of the Augustinian, Neoplatonic forces of Dante's political heirs, against the forces of the "Golden Renaissance."

The first, relatively decisive victory of the Rome Genoa oligarchs was their direction of the 1453 conquest of Paleologue Constantinople by "Muhammed the Conquerer." The "black nobility" forces within Rome collaborated with the rabidly Aristotelian Byzantine patriarch in alliance with the Turkish forces. The Romans supplied Muhammed with artillery, and the Genoese mercenaries, nominally employed in defense of Constantinople, opened the gates of the city to the Conqueror. This greatly weakened the flank of the Platonic faction in Italy.

The second major success of the Genoese was the takeover of Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella. Over the last half of the fifteenth century and subsequently concluding with the death of Cesare Borgia in the first decade of the sixteenth century, the republican forces in Italy were defeated in their own country.

However, the Platonic faction won in France, where Louis XI (d. 1482) established the first modern nation-state. The French development promoted the circumstances for the emergence of England as the second nation-state, under the Tudor Henry VII.

These developments established the alliance of French and English republican forces, which came to be identified as the "commonwealth" faction in both countries, also known as the *politiques* in France.

The standard glosses on the early sixteenth-century Reformation are chiefly either outright frauds or grossly simplistic distortions. The case of Germany is exemplary of the point, where we find the monstrously evil Luther nominally associated with Erasmus' breaks from a "black Guelph"-controlled state of the Papacy. The religious lines of division were not Protestants versus Catholics, but divisions among Neoplatonics, Aristotelians and nominalist irrationalists (such as Bernard of Clairvaux earlier), divisions that transcended distinctions of Protestant and Catholic, as well as what passed for borders of definable nationalist and protonationalist movements of the period.

(We interpolate the warning at this point: This is, as we shall demonstrate, not irrelevant or a merely tertiary matter respecting the principal topic at issue. We are exposing, historically, a very well-defined ideology, with a well-defined social basis for the perpetuation of that ideology.)

Hence, the Counter-Reformation is not to be understood *essentially* as a *revanchism* (revenge) of Catholicism against insurgent Protestantism. It was by no means an attempt to return to a fifteenth-century Catholic status quo ante; the chief adversary adopted by the forces directing the Counter-Reformation was fifteenth-century Neoplatonic Catholicism. The ultimate targets were typified by Dante, Cusa, Plethon, Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci, and the school of Raphael.

The first successful operation against English monarchical republicanism was accomplished in the context of Henry VIII's "English reformation." While attacking Henry VIII's England directly with their Scottish pup-

pets (who had been Genoese-Hospitaller “assets” since Robert Bruce), the “Genoese” gained control of key families raised to the peerage by purchase of titles and estates in the sale of the properties of the regular orders.

This group of newly created peerage families allied to the Genoese (and the Edinburgh aristocracy), arranged itself during the last half of the sixteenth century around the Jesuit-sponsored Cecils.

This Jesuit-centered group targeted Giordano Bruno’s collaborators in England (as well as in other countries) in an operation that coincided with the betrayal and capture of Bruno. (Jesuit agent Francis Bacon’s role in setting up and then denouncing Elizabeth’s designated heir, the Earl of Essex, is of particular significance to the historian’s sorting out of that period of English history.) Special focus was directed against the English Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), which was taken over by Cecil and his Jesuit-assassin allies in a nasty wave of bloodshed and kindred festivities. SIS has remained in the hands of the Anglo-Jesuits ever since.

Meanwhile, as the Hospitaller-Genoese intelligence arm, the Jesuits, was collaborating with Cecil, Francis Bacon et al. in the indicated unwholesomeness, the Genoese extended their axis of rentier-financier power through Burgundian Geneva, into Amsterdam, and into London. The two elements, the Scottish-English oligarchist aristocracy and the Genoese “tax farming” interest, took over London with the accession of James I to the throne of the United Kingdom in 1603.

The republican faction maintained its strategic position even after the assassination of Henri IV of France. Père Joseph du Tremblay, Cardinal Richelieu, the Ora-

torians, and Cardinal Mazarin led an effective counter-struggle against the Hospitaller-Jesuit forces, joining with their English commonwealth factional allies to administer a relatively devastating defeat to the Genoese-owned Hapsburgs in 1653.

The Hospitaller-Jesuit influences in France set back Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s efforts in France significantly by impelling Louis XIV into the wrong, protracted war, but, overall, the English-French commonwealth faction allies accomplished several things of decisive importance for the future during that century.

Both the English and French commonwealth faction forces implemented a project taken from the pages of Plato during the preceding century: the colonization of North America with the intent of developing new republics out of those colonies to become a decisive strategic margin for aiding the defeat of the oligarchist forces in Europe.

The other key institutional accomplishment of the seventeenth century centered around Colbert’s development of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz as his protégé. Around Leibniz, the republican networks deepened their organized penetration throughout Europe. If the implications of Leibniz’s attack on Descartes’ notion of momentum, and upon the more banal productions of Newton, are properly comprehended, it is clear that all modern science flows through the seminal work of Leibniz in continuing and advancing upon the fifteenth-century school of Padua and Florence—and Cusa’s crucial critical writings on Archimedes et al.—as mediated through the work of Kepler and of Francis Bacon’s scientific adversary, William Gilbert.

It was Leibniz who first rigorously defined political economy—in the time before malicious wretches conceived the fraud of separating economics from physics. It was Leibniz's correct perception of economics as the application of mastery of the lawful ordering of the universe to increasing the productive powers of labor that is key to the success of the American Revolution and to the creation of modern military science under the direction of France's Lazare Carnot.

The case of the collaboration between Colbert and his protégé Leibniz is key to modern British ideology. Since the founding of the professedly "Baconian" British Royal Society, the continuing British hatred of "continental science" is a perverse recognition of the impossibility of separating advanced physics from competent economics. Examining that point summarily now establishes the premises for comprehending what ensued from the period of William Pitt the Younger, and also provides essential background for the practical positive policy-measures we outline in the next chapter of this memorandum.

Economics Properly Viewed as Physics

Economics properly analyzes the processes by which societies successfully produce the material means of existence of populations. It is concerned with the manner by which mankind is able to overcome the relative finiteness of those aspects of nature which a fixed technology views as exploitable varieties of useful "natural resources." It studies the ways in which technological progress is developed to overcome such difficulties. It

studies further the ways in which such technological progress makes possible enlarged populations, and also how progress makes possible the manifest increase in the average power of the individual member of society over nature.

What we are measuring is the practical effect of the development of man's potential-creative powers *to discover and master for practice the lawful ordering of the universe*. The organization of productive practice and the organization of society in respect to the deployment and further development of that productive practice are the essential thing.

Thus, it is primarily through such progress by society that we prove, in the only empirical way possible to do so, that the notions man has developed concerning the lawful ordering of the universe conform in power of general social practice to such a lawful ordering. It is not in the isolated laboratory experiment, but in the empirics of general productive practice of societies, that we prove that a certain organization of ideas actually enables a practical increase in mankind's average power over nature.

Mere empirical study of such evidence goes over to becoming *science*, properly so named, as we examine *successive phases of progress* in man's productive powers. We are searching for something which is relatively *transfinite* and permanent with respect to mere ephemeral empirics. We are seeking to discover a pattern, an ordering principle which corresponds to increased power of conceptions of social practice. We are searching for the notion of *hypotheses* which can be used to

guide insight into imagining practicable new conceptions of greater power than previous conceptions.

We are defining knowledge not merely as a collection of empirical conceptions. We are defining knowledge as a *self-developing activity* of self-improving powers of hypothesis. That notion of knowledge, so defined, which coincides in its general applications with a corresponding degree of increased power over nature, is empirically proven to be scientific knowledge.

This increase of power in human productive and related practice corresponds, in first approximation, to the notion of reducing-power in secondary-school chemistry instruction. It is more abundant energy at higher flux densities that approximately defines productive power.

Yet, it is not simply greater flux density that we require, or we might imagine ourselves increasing our productive power by cooking our persons. It is higher flux densities in appropriately organized forms of "free energy."

This notion erupts in formal economic analysis in a provocative, important form.

If we restrict the notion of "productive" to the productive output of *tangible useful product* by production, including the transportation "conveyor-belt" of production as whole, we reduce "productive" to operatives employed in agriculture, manufacturing, energy production, mining, construction, and transportation (as broad categories). Then, we can define all other necessary administrative and service functions as part of the "overhead costs" of the production of the society taken as a whole.

We have then the social ratios involving S , C , V , and d (d = all nonproductive costs).^{*} These are:

(1) $S/(C+V)$: productivity

(2) $(S-d)/(C+V)$: rate of profit

(3) C/V : capital-intensity.

For these, we require that the energy-equivalent of C increases, that C/V increases, that per capita V increases absolutely relative to preceding epochs of production, and that $(S-d)/(C+V)$ increases as a function of increases in the ratio C/V . These, with emphasis on rising values for C , must rise at rates that offset the tendency for rises in marginal costs of "natural resources" exploited.

Substituting the simplified expression, $S'/(C+V)$, for $(S-d)/(C+V)$, we generate a four-dimensional phase-space involving energy flux density and indicated social ratios as the primary metric of the economic process. The significance of the ratio $S'/(C+V)$ is then situated with respect to Helmholtz's notion of "free energy." Since the characteristics of input-output matrices for economic processes are transformed through the qual-

^{*} C defines the allocation of capital and plant and equipment for the productive process of the economy as a whole; V is that amount required to maintain the households of that section of the total population engaged in productive labor as defined above; S is the gross profit of an economic cycle; d is that amount of nonproductive overhead costs, which subtracted from S yields S' , or net reinvestible surplus.

itative changes in structure and flow-patterns resulting from either devolution or technological progress in an economy, our primary phenomena for the indicated approach to analysis of economic processes are phase-space* changes: *No linear set of simultaneous equations can determine the efficient consequences of causal action from one phase-space to another.* This requires the viewpoint of Riemannian physics, as implicit in Riemann's 1854 habilitation dissertation.

This standpoint redefines the fundamental metric of a developing economic-process manifold as *negentropy* correlated with functions for rising energy flux density (for example, with the free-energy notion associated with the energy flux density representation of the relationship $S'/(C+V)$.)

The connection between Riemann's 1854 dissertation and the work of Lazare Carnot and Gaspard Monge is of course explicit, as the instance of the Legendre connection illustrates. Just as Riemann's notions are coherent with Cantor's notion of transfinite orderings, so the Carnot reformulation of Leibniz's point against both Descartes and Newton, respecting the multideterminacy ("indeterminacy") of "infinitesimals," is directly the historical basis for the subsequent development of the entire physics of a multiply-connected manifold.

It is implicit in the foregoing that the functional correlation of negentropy with rising energy flux density adducible in the course of such analyses of economic processes corresponds to specific target-areas of basic

* Phase-space is defined as the parameters defining the dimensionality of a given process.

research in physics. If we pose the economic-process issues correctly, each statement of a *required* increase in negentropy for a hydrothermodynamically interpreted economic process points toward the kind of physics applications or research breakthroughs that will satisfy that requirement.

Economics is scientific (and, subsumed technological) progress in its organized social form of expression for practice.

The British Objection to Science

The exemplification of the British ideological hostility toward science is the ignorant form of hostility by Francis Bacon, who made no contributions to scientific knowledge, directed against the great William Gilbert, whose *De Magnete* intersected Johannes Kepler's efforts to give birth to rigorous modern physics.

The point is not to be viewed as a special criticism of a mere aspect of the British ideology. It is directly exemplary of everything to be understood in accounting for two world wars during this century, and the present threat of a third.

Although British empiricism is most emphatically an extension of the sort of radical nominalism early associated with Bernard of Clairvaux and William of Ockham, it is an elementary, if commonplace error to imagine that there is any essential distinction between "Aristotelianism" and nominalism generally.

The essential feature of John Locke's, Newton's, and Boyle's attacks against the scientific method of hypothesis is the modeling of the "Baconian" method of the British Royal Society on the "delphic" method that

Philip of Macedon's spy Aristotle employed in the effort to neutralize the scientific work of the Platonic Academy at Athens.

We should rid popular misbeliefs of the myths which purport to make physics morally neutral with respect to such "social sciences" as political economy. We must situate physics as we locate it with respect to economics. On that basis, it should begin to be clear to students that proscience outlooks are the direct adversary in social practice of all oligarchs since Hesiod.

This is emphasized once we recognize the direct, causal correlation between fundamental progress in physics and corresponding problems of progress in economy. It is to be stated simply that physics is not worthy of the name unless it is a body of *progressive mastery of the lawful ordering of the universe. That sort of physics, the only physics worth the name, is a concentrated form of expression of rising productive powers of labor in a growing economy.*

On this point, both Newton and Pol Pot ultimately agree in their hatred against science. The difference between Newton and Pol Pot is not any essential moral difference, but a difference in the way their practice defines the specific form of the practical problem before them.

Peking satrap Pol Pot simply endeavored to destroy all semblance of a culture capable of assimilating science.

Newton served a British oligarchy which was obliged to seek parity and even hegemony over its adversaries in scientific and economic capabilities. He did his work just as that wretched spawn of the Delphi cult, Aristotle,

had faced a similar task against the Academy at Athens in his time.

It is Aristotle who reveals most efficiently the secret of Newton's and Boyle's pretensions at physics.

The central feature of the method represented by Plato, and by the current of modern science running through Kepler, Leibniz, Monge, Carnot, and Riemann to the present day, is the principle of *hypothesis*. Plato's universe can be shown to be in fact a multiply-connected manifold. In this universe causality acts efficiently across causally-connected phase-spaces of mutually distinct characteristic principles of internal action. Moreover, the notion of *causality* is defined in these terms, as it is more explicitly in Riemannian physics. *Efficient cause* in the universe and the notion of the *hypothesis of the higher hypothesis* are equivalent in Riemann's physics.

Aristotle undertakes to destroy the notions of both hypothesis and causality. He accomplishes both by reducing knowledge to the nominalist form of *description*, and by reducing "causality" to the logical significance of the middle term in the syllogism.

That is the kernel of British empiricism. Newton's "hypothesis is not necessary" and Bertrand Russell's later lunatic rantings against Riemann's habilitation dissertation and against Cantor's notion of the transfinite are the same matter. So is the hoaxster-plagiarist J. Clerk Maxwell's refusal to acknowledge his parodies of Riemann's work, this hater of "continental science" arguing that his British tastes forbade him to "take into account any geometries but our own."

Look at the same matter momentarily from another

facet of the seventeenth-century problems confronting the British oligarchists. The 1603 accession of James I, the 1660 Restoration, and the 1688 “Glorious Revolution” were immediately feudalist-rentier counter-revolutions against the changes in English society effected by sixteenth-century developments and the powerful impact of the short-lived Commonwealth. This domestic problem facing the “Genoese” counter-revolutionaries was accentuated by a potent external enemy—the Oratorian-centered *politiques* of France and the extensions of this force through agencies such as Leibniz’s networks.

The British oligarchy was compelled to make a *conditional* retreat from Malthusian policies during the middle nineteenth century, and now faces the strategically potentially disastrous effects of neo-Malthusianism today. So, the ability of the oligarchical faction to survive has depended substantially on its ability to adapt to technological developments, despite its deep hostility toward technological progress.

Whenever it perceives it has the power to do so without weakening itself to the point of defeat, it will express its innermost hatred of science by destroying every manifestation of scientific method, pushing society into genocidal technological devolutions of the sort converging on the work of the murderous Pol Pot excrescence. Nonetheless, whenever narrow expediency prescribes that it must not *yet* unleash its hatred of science to such an extent, it adapts, stealing as much science as it can manage, while also working to poison the wellsprings of scientific progress at the same sources from which it steals.

Excepting the eighteenth-century Joseph Priestley, the nineteenth-century Clifford, and like exceptions, British “science” is not science in any proper meaning of the term. What passes for British “science” is a kind of Jesuit’s encyclopedia of plausible explanations concerning what Cambridge et al. have stolen from actual, chiefly foreign scientists. British “science” is a recipe book: how to cook up this sort of portion, how that . . . an instruction manual outlining the efficient use of stolen artifacts.

The British magazine *Isis* warns us: there is one further element worked into such cookbook parodies of science.

In the explanations offered for each stolen conception, the British “Jesuit” concocts an Aristotelian, “delphic” account of the origins of discovery to the purpose of eliminating the element of hypothesis and causality. Newton’s “action at a distance” is exemplary.

As we focus on Leibniz’s attack on the fallacies of Descartes’ notion of momentum, we note immediately that the notion of physical relativity is already grasped fully, methodologically by Leibniz. To what kind of a physical space does Leibniz’s relativistic physics belong? It belongs to physical space studied from the vantage point of Kepler and Gilbert.

Looking at the banality of Newton’s physical space, we must recognize that Newton’s work was a qualitative step backwards from the previously established, and contemporary French level of scientific method. One should compare the characteristic features of Newton’s fraud with the frauds of Aristotle respecting Plato. This fraud is coherent in method with the wretched devolu-

tions in conceptions of geometry and astronomy represented by the delphic methods of Euclid and Ptolemy. From such studies, the rigorous epistemologist recognizes what Newton's work actually represents.

The American Revolution

The next major blow to which the British were obliged to adapt "Fabianly" was the American Revolution.

Once Britain had defeated France in 1763, manifestly the British oligarchy was confident that it no longer required the strategic logistical support it had employed during the pre-1763 period. In this circumstance, it acted to strip the English colonies of the privileges of urban-centered technological development. As Adam Smith was to defend this policy in his *Wealth of Nations*, beginning 1763 the British proposed to drive the English colonies into a state of bucolic idiocy, and to also begin imposing upon those colonies an "export" of the British debt obligations through tax farming measures.

It was British determination to prevent the colonies from developing manufactures and from developing a "federal economic infrastructure" that resolved the leading conspirators allied with Benjamin Franklin to break with Britain. This decision Franklin reached in 1766 in London.

Franklin naturally turned to the Commonwealth Party's continuing allies on the continent, as represented by the networks of the *politiques* and Leibniz. The American Revolution was systematically prepared through a transatlantic conspiracy of the same factional forces that had allied to defeat the Spanish Hapsburgs in 1653.

Not only did the continental, Oratorian-centered *politiques'* networks deploy, as what would be presently described as an intelligence force, to deliver crucial strategic support for the American victory. This mobilization around the American project consolidated and strengthened the networks most significantly.

In response to this defeat, the British oligarchy reorganized itself. It resolved to reconquer the United States—a policy it did not abandon until it did so abruptly, in face of threats from the Czar in 1863. The immediate response was institutional. As Lord Alfred Milner was to do approximately a century later, Lord Shelburne did in the 1780s, on the heels of the British American defeat.

As we indicated earlier, the British oligarchy is a blend of feudal-reeking aristocrats and equally feudalist rentier-finance. The Genoese element of finance embedded in London under Stuart tax-farming arrangements developed as the British East India Company. This institution, in addition to being the world's principal illegal trafficker in narcotics, was the principal institution of British financial power during the eighteenth century, as well as being integrated with SIS.

This Company and its associated investment banking house, Barings, was the immediate power behind Shelburne, as well as the instrument for buying up the requisite eighteenth-century portion of the world's most corrupt collection, the British parliamentarians. Bringing George III into his pocket, Shelburne bought the prime ministership for his protégé, William Pitt the Younger—the "Pizzaro" of Beethoven's *Fidelio*. Shelburne also created one of the nastiest collections of

immoral beasts assembled in modern history around the father of "British philosophical radicalism," Jeremy Bentham.

In concert with the Hospitallers and the Jesuits, of which force the British oligarchy is a part, Shelburne's crew essayed to destroy France before the impact of the American Revolution could grow strong enough to challenge the European oligarchical forces with overwhelming force.

Out of the semiwreckage of 1793-1794 France, a group led by Lazare Carnot and Gaspard Monge created the first modern instrument of warfare and also inaugurated a fresh scientific revival, a revival whose echoes into Leibnizian Göttingen and its orbit produced the essential core of everything we need not be ashamed to term "modern science" today.

Carnot's policy—in opposition to Napoleon's—was correct, and was the policy Gabriel Hanotaux and Sergei Witte nearly succeeded in reviving at the close of the nineteenth century. It was the policy-heritage that influenced de Gaulle—and the policy-heritage on which we must draw to establish durable peace today.

The British overthrew Carnot's government by a series of British-Jesuit-Hospitaller, or "Orléanist," operations culminating in the Barras affair. This coup led into the ambiguous emergence of Napoleonic government, an anti-British combination of republican and Hospitaller-coordinated forces. The Hospitaller element is exemplified by the circles of Jacques Necker and his notorious daughter, the Madame de Staël—the Necker who was patron of Robespierre and the Robespierre circles of which pre-Thermidor young Napoleon Bonaparte had been a protégé.

French patriots point to the great institutional accomplishments attributed to Napoleonic France. There were great accomplishments in France under Napoleon's rule. More accurately, there were continuations of the accomplishments launched under the leadership of Lazare Carnot from 1793 onward. The development of these institutions was continued, with reduced support and at a slower pace, under Napoleonic rule.

The romantic mind is awed by Napoleon's battles. In this way, that mind loses sight of the important facts—that Napoleon was essentially, merely the commanding field marshal of the French officer corps and the French national military instrument.

It is a great consolation for a nation which has suffered the humiliations France has endured since 1815 to focus one's imagination on a time when the mere name of Napoleon was used by British parents to terrify their own children. Effective field marshals are more or less indispensable. It is also an elementary truth that the only purpose for entering a war is to win that war, and that sooner or later, winning a battle or two is necessary to prove to one's adversary that one has won the war.

The issue of Napoleon, in a nutshell, is that Napoleonic France won many impressive battles, but that Carnot would have won the war.

That is not a matter of admiring one personality more than another. The preference of Napoleon over Carnot as a French national hero reflects and embodies a source of fundamental error in almost every important issue of statecraft, from military policy as such down to the more fundamental matter of conceptualizing

what policies represent an appropriately active response to essential national interests.

It was Carnot's circle that created the French army as the first modern military force, around the creation of new iron and steel industries to manufacture the overwhelming superiority of masses of mobile artillery. The changes in the character of movement and deployment of the infantry arm, improved approaches to the use of cavalry, and such important matters, were all constructed around the key role of massed mobile artillery.

The principles involved were not first discovered by Carnot's group, of course.

The Carnot approach to warfare was broadly the republican doctrine formally traced, with considerable justice, to the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli. The Tudors' dirigist logistical approaches to military science, the shaping of the Commonwealth's New Model Army, Leibniz's and other French innovations of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, were also enrichments of the republican military view, in which the relationship of science, logistics, and the subsumed adaptations of militia-based force-capabilities in depth was the central theme.

In principle, France of the 1790s was potentially a superior strategic force on the European continent, as long as the economic and military policies of France's oligarchical adversaries persisted. The French conception of republican warfare made France implicitly superior to the combined forces of adversary nations still dedicated to "cabinet warfare" doctrines. The latter doctrine was exemplified by the Prussian Line and the

Waterloo slaughter of Wellington's monstrously unscientific "meat wall."

The practical question faced by Carnot, from 1793 onward, was how to realize the superiority of a French republican military force in practice for the immediate battles and wars ahead. The critical task was to force an immediate breakthrough on the basis of the known potentials for developing relatively lightweight, mobile field artillery. This changed the geometry of warfare, away from the "set piece" arrangements in which opposing military forces had been, so to speak, "per-fected." The ability to neutralize undesirable geometries of the field of battle with mobile, massed field-artillery fire produced new dimensions for coordinated deployment of infantry and cavalry forces in battles whose geometry was defined by this artillery's field of fire.

To realize this, it was essential to produce such artillery, and to create almost instantly the new industries to manufacture such artillery in mass.

Concentrated and mobile artillery fire—or the equivalent—has been a principle of modern state policies of noncretinous government since the combined impact of Carnot's development of the French Army and the emulation of Carnot's achievements under the Prussian general Scharnhorst. In the present period, the first act of warfare of a principal power—which has not lost its wits—is massed ABC (Atomic, Biological, Chemical) bombardment against both the adversary's force concentrations and the adversary's in-depth logistical capabilities. The conduct of modern general warfare continues in a worldwide battlefield shaped by such initiating concentrated and mobile forms of the modern

equivalent of artillery fire. Continuing naval and land warfare emphasizes the same principles—mobile concentrations of bombardment capabilities to shape the battlefields for the deployment of modern forms of infantry at critical points of insertion.

Hence, the imbecility of “flexible response” doctrines respecting both military-actions policies and the development of war-fighting capabilities.

The successor to nuclear weapons is already in sight. Modern Riemannian approaches to the hydrothermodynamics of plasma physics research defines a spectrum of military capabilities, as is currently typified by the notion of the potential for deploying particle beam weapons in space. Such weapons could not only destroy missiles in mid-flight, but imply broader forms of military applications—as the successors to current forms of mobile concentrated artillery fire.

Yet, the impressiveness of the creation of the productive forces to produce mobile-concentrated field-artillery fire also tends to cloud our vision. Just as the romantic’s excessive, narrow focus on Napoleon’s battles obscures Carnot’s role in creating the instrument at the disposal of field marshal Napoleon, in a like manner, the impressiveness of the changes built around mobile field artillery may so dominate our attention that we might end our exploration of the matter mistakenly at that point.

The creation of a new kind of military force around the development of mobile field artillery is but one manifestation of the subsumed results of a more general principle.

Military force is an administrative element of an economy, just as competent political-economic analysis situates the costs of military capabilities. To the statesman who has the wisdom to select the proper wars to be fought, warfare is a continuation not of mere politics, but political economy “by other means.” It is both a forceful instrument of political-economic policy of states and is a concentration of the power for winning warfare developed in the form of the political economy of that state.

Clausewitz committed a grave, fundamental error, an error motivated by the character of the Prussian state, in substituting “state interest” for the correct determination of potential allies, adversaries, and issues of warfare and state interest. All of these are properly assessed according to the kind of political-economic criteria employed by Carnot.

The mere soldier, admittedly, fights for “state interest,” because wars are selected for him by those political institutions that command state military force at that time. However, “state interest,” as defined by a particular government of a nation, and national interest are by no means necessarily equivalent. The Wehrmacht oath to Adolf Hitler is a modern classic illustration of the point: a military overthrow of Hitler before the 1938 Munich agreement was contrary to existing “state interest,” but also in the fundamental national interest of the existing German nation.

This kind of discrepancy between “state” and “national” interest is the source of the greatest danger to the nation-state. The formal remedy for this actual or

potential menace is to embed an efficient stipulation of the actual national interest in the constitution of a true republic.

The Constitution of the United States, as originally adopted, contains such a provision—at least, for all who have the developed intelligence to recognize this implication. Just so, the present, massive subversion of U.S. national interest by the sort of “state interest” associated with the Carter administration shows that a merely formal constitutional provision is not adequate.

That constitutional provision must be kept efficient through institutions that expel from government every subversive effort to introduce a contrary definition of “state interest.”

The decisive point of general breakdown in U.S. constitutional law, from this standpoint, was Justice Holmes’ treasonous substitution of the “force doctrine” for the more rigorous judicial principle of adducing national interest according to a process of constitutional law.

It is generally in the active institutions of government that adequate constitutional principles of national interest are made efficient.

These institutions are not simply entities that act in the form of “checks and balances” against one another. These institutions, if they are properly designed and continue their proper functioning, are shaped according to a proper consciousness of their function, together with a proper consciousness of the methods for adducing in a more general way the current expression of national interests.

The name for the proper unifying consciousness is

“science” as Leibniz and Carnot’s circles understood the proper scope and unifying principles of what was then named “natural philosophy,” or the mastery of “natural law” in Leibniz’s Augustinian, Neoplatonic conception of *anti-Roman* natural law.

To approach this from the standpoint of practical problems exposing the differences between Carnot’s and Napoleon’s political methods, consider Napoleon’s rejection of the proposals for the submarine and torpedo, which Fulton had developed in collaboration with Carnot’s circles. The hereditary influence of Carnot’s earlier work on the military use of the dirigible should be immediately visible to any thoughtful engineering student. The Carnot approach to the development of the French naval arm was congruent with his approach to the development of the land arms. In germ, it was the approach of the early Tudors to the Hapsburg-Spanish naval preponderance.

There was no excuse for France’s permitting British access to mast-usable trees and so forth to enable Britain to dominate the seas. Science provided means to introduce new dimensions to navel warfare, as the Tudors had approached the problems of defeating Spanish Hapsburg maritime power. The issue was not properly defined as that of attempting to match the existing form of British naval power. The proper policy was one of using French superiority in scientific-industrial development to render the British naval arm obsolete.

The nation-state is essentially a political economy. The task of the state is to effect rapid and continuing advances in the productive power of labor.

This is accomplished, first of all, by promoting the highest possible rate of scientific progress. This scientific progress must be rapidly and efficiently introduced to the practice of the nation through education and other institutions for transmitting culture, *together with enhancement of the self-image of the nation as a nation of scientific progress*. This education and advancement of culture and self-image of the general population must be realized through increasing the capital-intensity of the productive process, through priority on incorporating scientific advances into design of productive processes, and through always emphasizing higher rates of both gross energy throughput and higher energy flux densities.

Miseducated persons object: "But there are other considerations, apart from political economy, which serve as criteria for the state." Not so, unless political economy is wrongly perceived.

The moral object of the modern nation-state republic is to establish the relationship of man to man in social practice on the basis of the contributions effected through the perfection of *the creative-mental potentialities of the individual*.

In a society under conditions tending toward those of "zero technological growth," man is degraded into the image of a beast. By acting, predominantly, on the basis of the technologies of preceding generations, his individual nature is comparable in social practice to that of mere cattle—which also manifest the same qualities and modes of "productive behavior" from generation to generation.

Only in a society in which the fruits of the develop-

ment of individual creative-mental powers are the measure of the value of the individual's contributions to society, does man efficiently set himself morally above cattle-likeness in the practical social relationship of man to man.

"Freedom" is not what the bestial mind of any degraded anarchist imagines it to be. This precious quality of "freedom" is freedom from what Karl Marx aptly described as "the idiocy of rural life," freedom from all practical approximations of a "zero technological growth" condition of bestialization of society.

There is not "science" on the one side and "morality" on the other. Granted, the British tradition of empiricism, as evolved along the track defined by Newton and Maxwell, degrades the idea of "science" to a merely descriptive discipline, whose specific incapacity is that it cannot represent cause *directly* in its formulations. That usage of the term "science" is the object of our hostility, and is an immoral thing precisely *because it separates science from morality*.

Actual science, non-British—*anti-British*—science, is "natural philosophy" in the sense to be associated with Leibniz. It is the process of discovering ever more profoundly the lawful notion of higher hypothesis, which entirely encompasses mankind's practice in the universe.

In the work of Carnot and his associates, the points of reference defined by the production of mobile field artillery, the proposals for technological revolutions in naval warfare, the development of French industry on a high-technology basis under direct coordination of an organized scientific community, and so forth, describe

science as understood by Carnot's Leibnizian circles as the basis for the conscious direction of the state in all aspects, including the subsumed aspect of developing adequate warfare capabilities. It is not simply isolable productions of science, but the continuing process of *directed* scientific discovery, which is the proper conscious expression of the essential interest of the nation-state republic.

It is indisputable that qualified field marshals are necessary for the conduct and selection of battles. However, the wellspring of the capabilities for winning wars is the development of the institutions which stand behind the tasks of the field marshal in case of war. It is not the field marshals which must choose which wars to fight, but those higher authorities that correspond to the creative power behind the creation of the appropriate institutions.

It follows from the foregoing line of discussion, that, in a very real sense, it was not the British, but Napoleon Bonaparte who defeated France. France was shifted away from the policies of Carnot to policies which led to France's defeat. It is a consoling error of French patriots, if they imagine that Napoleon's conspicuous mistakes, such as his Russian campaign, are exceptions to Napoleon's predominant manifestation of victories. The errors were the inevitable consequence of a fatal flaw from which attention is distracted by other military victories.

The task of France from the 1790s onward was not to conquer Europe for France, but to create sovereign industrialized states, through mobilizing the American networks of Europe around scientific and industrial-

development efforts. The task was to continue the work of Leibniz. The key to the military situation was to destroy British maritime power, through applying high-technology approaches to rendering existing British naval power technologically obsolete.

Carnot's circle's work is to be compared with the institutions initiated by U.S. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, and the two viewed properly as various expressions of what Hamilton first named the American System. We are compelled by that sort of evidence to the conclusion that the successive defeat of Carnot by the Barras conspiracy, and by Napoleon's drift toward "empire" balanced upon antagonistic forces within France, prevented a successful spread of the American System throughout Europe. Probably, as Lafayette imagined during the 1790s, this could have been done through republican forms introduced under monarchical rule.

The British success leading into the 1815 Treaty of Vienna was, as the victors proclaimed at that time, a victory of the oligarchical forces of the Hospitaliers, Jesuits, and rentier-financial interest over the Neoplatonic forces associated with the impulses of the American System.

In addition to defeating France, Britain almost succeeded, with aid of such various British agents-of-influence as Thomas Jefferson and the British East India Company's agents, the New England Secessionists, in crushing the United States as well.

It was in this context, a world ruled by compact between London and the Holy Alliance, that the British oligarchy ventured to impose the Malthus policies upon

Britain itself. Otherwise, the lessons accumulated by Shelburne and Pitt's ultimately successful operations against France defined the additional features of the British oligarchy's principal policy-institutions until 1863.

The Hanotaux Development

The British victory of 1815 was not that complete victory that is implied by the introduction of the policies of Malthus to Britain at that time.

Under Presidents Monroe and John Quincy Adams, the United States successfully revived for a decade the credit, banking, and manufactures policies associated with Hamilton. Lafayette's wide-scale organizing efforts of the 1820s had qualitative impact, despite Lafayette's defeat in specific 1830 ventures. The development of the transplanted center of Leibniz's tradition in Germany, Göttingen University, flourished as a leading edge of the forces for the economic development of Germany.

These and related developments were viewed as a calamity in British eyes. As Babbage et al. warned during this period, Britain had only one of its nationals capable even of following the mathematics common to leading circles of the United States and European continent. So, the British went back to the seventeenth-century Royal Society's practice of stealing science from the European continent, and the Malthus policies gave way, although most grudgingly, to eruptions of industrial development within Britain.

The greatest blow to Britain came in 1863: Lincoln's emerging defeat of the British puppet-entity, the slaveholder, the Confederacy, combined with the U.S.-

Russian alliance. As the two hoodlums, Palmerston and Russell, received the news of the Czar's warning against attacks on the United States by European powers, Bertrand Russell's grandfather reportedly fell, like Nebuchadnezzar, into a rug-chewing fit. Eighty years of British dedication to military reconquest of a subverted United States had flown out the window in less than three years of Lincoln's forced Hamiltonian industrial development of the Union.

Russia, already condemned to dismantling by the British—as the Crimean War illustrated—had emerged from that war to strengthen itself with aid of American technology. Czar Alexander's 1860s freeing of the serfs correlated with the onset of accelerated efforts at the industrial development of Russia; the accomplished industrial progress from then until the Russia-Japan War and fall of Witte was most impressive.

Meanwhile, the American System spread to Japan. The long-simmering preparations for Japan's industrial development were unleashed by the political stroke of the Meiji Restoration—an "economic miracle" rallied behind the banner-names of Alexander Hamilton, Henry C. Carey, and Friedrich List.

Unfortunately, even most statesmen and other relevant persons of today participate in the miseducated view that the last quarter of the nineteenth century was characterized by the "rise of imperialism." In that, we have another instance of typically British creation of lying mythologies.

Those features of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British colonial practice which some professed Marxists were duped into defining as hallmarks of an

emergent "imperialism" are nothing but the domination and suppression of industrial development by feudalist rentier-financial practices . . . *the latter an institution older than the cult of Apollo's practice of international usury throughout the Mediterranean littoral*, and the hallmark of the British System since the tax farmers' takeover of the government of the United Kingdom with the 1603 accession of James I.

What did emerge in the aftermath of Lincoln's Civil War victory over Britain was an insurgence of industrial capitalism in the United States, Germany, Japan, and Russia, which began to challenge the preexisting British "imperialist" order globally. This challenge was complicated by the fact that in each of the insurgent industrial-capitalist nations there was also implanted a British-allied, anti-industrialist element of rentier-financial interest, like the Mitsui of Japan and the Morgans, Seligmans, and Rothschilds of the United States.

The typification of the conflict of that period was the German alliance with the republican Oom Paul Kruger against both the Boers and the British in southern Africa. *It was the withdrawal of German support from Kruger which began the avalanche of the preconditions for World War I.*

What this case exemplifies, when properly examined, is the success of the British influence within Japan, within France, within Germany, within Russia, in using the rentier-financier and anti-industrial oligarchical factions of those nations against the industrial-capitalist impulses of those nations.

It was the fight between the forces of Carnot and Orléans all over again. Gabriel Hanotaux of France

and Count Sergei Witte of Russia approximated the Carnot policy for the Eurasia of the 1890s. The defeat of Carnot and Witte flowed from (1) German withdrawal from support of Kruger; (2) the British exploitation of anti-industrial-capitalist forces in both Russia and Japan to transform the Witte-Meiji cooperation around the "New China" project into the Korean conflicts leading into the 1905 Russia-Japan War; (3) this, coupled with the Rothschilds' orchestration of the two-phase Dreyfus affair in France, broke up the Hanotaux-Witte thrust; (4) bringing the rentier-oligarchist political forces to the fore in France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and so forth.

In that sense, the "imperialist" phase of modern European history began approximately in 1905, leading rapidly into World War I.

Geopolitics

The post-1863 phase of British political developments leading into the Milner-centered developments of the turn of the century is centered ideologically around John Stuart Mill, John Ruskin, the frauds of Benjamin Jowett, such outgrowths of this as the Cecil Rhodes' will, and that special instrument of evil known as the Fabian Society. The influential parvenu, H. G. Wells—chief of British foreign intelligence during the First World War, and the grandson of Lord John Russell (the rug-chewer of 1863), Bertrand Russell, are the odious distillate of this development.

Russell is the prototype of the oligarch adopting what Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* identifies as the function of "controller." This was the function

Russell-accomplice Huxley himself adopted, in bringing mass drug-addiction of youth into the United States over a period of three decades: from his promotion of marijuana in the United States during the 1930s, through the experimental MK-Ultra project of the "Palo Alto Mafia" in the LSD-25 mass distribution of MK-Ultra's operational phase during the 1960s.

It should not be imagined that the evil proliferated by Russell, the Huxleys, and so forth was in any strict sense original to them. The Phrygian cult of Dionysus is among the more ancient of oligarchists' dirty tricks against republics. Search for the beginnings of Bertrand Russell's and the Huxleys' work takes us to ancient Sodom and Gomorrah, and to what the Apostle Saint John identifies as the most-ancient "Whore of Babylon" (currently reputed to be alive and well in Peking).

Russell is worth study as a symptom of the evolution of British policy over the span of his lifetime. The essence of Bertrand Russell is defined by his activities over the period from the 1890s, as a young Cambridge Apostle under Alfred North Whitehead's immediate sergeantcy, through the outlining of his projects in the latter half of the 1920s. Russell, together with H. G. Wells and Aleister Crowley, exemplifies what some might wish to term a "vector" within Lord Alfred Milner's broader combination of geopoliticians.

H. G. Wells's autobiographical version of Russell's petulant 1902 storming out of Milner's Coefficients aids in mentally situating Russell—and Wells as well. Milner's overall combination brought together what might be termed "British Empire nationalists" together with the fruitier, "one-worldish" excrescences typified by Wells and Russell.

Those, excluding Russell, who remained in Milner's combination were bound together by the perceived threat to the world-hegemony of the British Empire. British power was threatened, and that threat must be crushed by all means, preferably the foulest methods that might be concocted for that enterprise. The simple-soldier sort within the collection, the flag-nationalist, was evil, but in a merely relative sense, sane in a violently neurotic sort of way. The "one-worlders" were (and, are) fanatical, lunatic utopians, whose impulses converged on what Aldous Huxley was later to portray in *Brave New World*.

The kooks of the collection, centered around the Cecils, Astors, and Waldorfs, have subsequently emerged as a dominant policy-influence of the Anglo-American cabals, the rabid neo-Malthusians who spawned the Club of Rome out of the bowels of NATO intelligence. Wells's ideology is luridly presented in his *The Time Machine*, and his influence among the rabid kooks by his *Open Conspiracy*. He hated the industrial capitalists as "morlocks," as did arch-oligarchist Bertrand Russell. The ideology of both is exemplified by the central role in their work of Aleister Crowley's obscene cult, the Isis-Urania Temple of Students of the Hermetic Mysteries of the Golden Dawn, and by the emergence of the kook-factory, the Tavistock Institute, as the dominant force within the Anglo-American intelligence community today.

A documentation of Bertrand Russell's crimes would occupy a dozen equivalents of a Nuremberg proceeding. Two points of his career suffice for our immediate purposes.

The two points are these. In the early part of his

career within British intelligence, the Whitehead-sponsored Russell concentrated on destroying the well-springs of science. After his policy declaration of the late 1920s, Russell broke off his tenuous connection to everything resembling science, and exhausted the residue of his greatly excessive number of years of life as a social controller.

It is sufficient to emphasize, concerning science, that Russell's public career as a British intelligence anti-science operative was initiated with concentrated attacks against Georg Cantor and Bernhard Riemann. Russell's principal endeavor in this connection was his work under Whitehead in writing out the monstrous fraud known as the *Principia Mathematica*. In this, Russell's specific role was as a parodizer of the muddlehead Gottlob Frege. Russell carried out a "delphic" effort to construct a logical set theory to be used as inoculation against both the "ontologically transfinite" universe of Riemann and Cantor, and the "methodologically transfinite" universe of Hilbert et al.

Special attention is to be given to Russell's first published writings, his lectures on geometry. Emphasis should be on his violent babblings against the mere existence of Riemann's 1854 habilitation dissertation.

The issue here is not simply the assessment of the influential beast Russell. Russell's early British intelligence assignments against science are to be rigorously examined in the light of points we have summarized earlier in this memorandum. The fatal flaw in the Einstein-Weyl program for physics aids us in appreciating the practical, and practical political significance of this crucial policy aspect of the geopolitical world-outlook.

We do not propose to drag Albert Einstein down to the level of the shallow but clever hoaxster Russell. Nonetheless, the degradation of the physical universe to a mosaic of Pythagorean "tiles" in the Einstein-Weyl program is a direct, exemplary, axiomatic repudiation of the fundamental principle of all modern scientific progress.

We refer, for brevity, to the treatment of the "infinitesimal" by Leibniz, Carnot, and Monge—the conceptual issue expressed for physics by Leibniz's defense of the Keplerian universe, against the linearized banalities of Descartes and of the more degraded Newton.

The essence of physical discovery, those hypotheses defining successful "crucial experiments," is located empirically in the extremes of any defined particular "ply" of the universe understood as a whole to be a multiply-connected manifold.

As we extend a domain of physical action of any assumed characteristic to its greatest extent (for example, "infinity") or examine the critical phases of transformation from one phase-space to another in terms of the smallest definable intervals of action for any given "ply" (for example, the "infinitesimal"), the sort of physics which has appeared to be adequate for in-between scales of action breaks down.

The ordinary person, encountering such difficulties in the "very small," shrieks "uncertainty," as Russell's ally Niels Bohr dictated.

The discoverer views this interesting development more optimistically. He views the problem from a standpoint in the tradition of Bacon's adversary, Gilbert, of Kepler, of Leibniz, of Monge, Carnot, Riemann, Weierstrass, and Cantor. The connection be-

tween, first, Leibniz's relativistic attack on the fallacy of Descartes' notion of momentum, and, second, Leibniz's and Carnot's conception of the "infinitesimal" is decisive.

The very small intervals of action are "indeterminate" not in the sense of ontological "uncertainty." They are indeterminate in the sense of *discontinuities* of the *efficiency of functions* associated with a single characteristic principle of action adduced for a single "ply" of a multiply-connected manifold. When the combined effect of the work of Weierstrass, Riemann, and Cantor is employed to view the work of Carnot, Monge, and Leibniz in retrospect, the essence of progress in fundamentals in modern physics is brought directly into consciousness for the scientific worker.

Conversely, when this rich domain of "discontinuities" of the "very small" is linearized, as by Newtonian vulgar reductionism or Weyl's misguided persuasion in connection with Pythagorean tiling, the experimental and conceptual basis for all fundamental scientific discovery is brainwashed out of existence for the mind so victimized.

This linearization of geometry is equivalent in its effects to attempting to reduce algebra to a purely logical form.

As we noted, Aristotelian logic degrades the account of scientific knowledge to mere nominalist forms of description. When the mere description is so substituted for the reality described, then the formal organization of the mere description is made the subject of what is then falsely termed "science." The use of grammatical reductionism, in place of science, produces forms equiv-

alent to the syllogism. As we noted, in such constructions the reality of cause is replaced by the copulational function of the syllogism's "middle term." The mind so drilled is "screwed up," as we say in United States' vernacular.

A more respectable example of the same sort of "delphic" mind-destruction than Bertrand Russell's banal crudities is the work of J. Clerk Maxwell. Maxwell represents an attempt to parody the results that Riemann et al. had previously achieved from a "Leibnizian" standpoint, through Maxwell's mere stretching and rotation of the geometry of the Newtonian concoction. Unable to comprehend the field in terms of Leibniz's sort of notion of relativistic "least action," Maxwell generates a mystification that has crippled the powers of insight of generations of students ever since.

During the last half of the 1920s, Russell advanced the three-point program that governed the activities of his life thereafter. All three points are a direct extension of the hideous insanity and wicked purpose of his first published work and the *Principia*.

(1) He insisted that all fundamental discoveries in science had come to an end. This was not an observation, but a statement of determination to halt all scientific progress, as the hooligan row at the Solvay conference properly attests British intelligence's policy.

(2) He proposed the development of an expanded repertoire of mind-dulling drugs as instruments for cheaper forms of mass social control.

(3) He proposed to destroy the cognitive connotations of cultivated language, also as a method of cheaper forms of mass social control. This last point he himself undertook to accomplish through his collaboration with his old World War I period crony, Karl Korsch, and others, in launching the brainwashing ideology known today as “linguistics.”

The odors of Sodom and Gomorrah spewing from John Ruskin’s “pre-Raphaelite” wickedness, the anti-science activities of Russell et al., H. G. Wells’s “open conspiracy” against the hated “morlocks,” and Aldous Huxley’s, Julian Huxley’s, and George Orwell’s lifelong activities as agents of Aleister Crowley’s Isis-Urania cult, define the “vector” of rampant and rabid “neo-Malthusianism” running through the Coefficients and Round Table geopolitics at the beginning of this present century.

Reeling from the defeat administered by Abraham Lincoln and Czar Alexander in 1863, the British oligarchs resolved to accomplish at last what the Treaty of Vienna had failed to achieve: the utter destruction of civilization—or, more narrowly, the destruction of the nation-state, and of that state’s correlative in scientific and urban-centered technological development.

“Communism” does not actually frighten the geopolitical doctrinaire. On condition that “communism” can be freed of Marx and Lenin’s commitment to industrial-technological progress, kept as an anarchist form of communism, like contemporary Maoism or that of the proterrorist, “environmentalist” left-coun-

terculture, it fulfills precisely the need for the sort of Russellite “left” ideology of the lowest classes in a Huxleyite “Brave New World.” The “left” of Bertrand Russell is, after all, entirely a top-down creation of the highest-ranking oligarchical strata of Anglo-American and NATO intelligence.

What terrifies the geopolitician oligarchists is the prospect that it will be impossible to crush the “neo-mercantilist” impulses of continental Europe, Japan, and much of the developing nations’ sector, as long as a powerful, industrialized Russia continues to develop along the lines Milner et al. feared in the strategic implications of continued Russian development at the beginning of this century.

We today have before us three historical alternatives:

(1) Defeat the neo-Malthusian faction now, together with its geopolitics, its monetarist sort of feudalist rentier system, its irrational cult of “environmentalism”; (2) Destroy civilization in general war; (3) See the Soviet Union take the leadership of as much civilization as survives the moral suicide of an oligarchism-ruled “West.”

We of the West must realize at last that the enemy of humanity, of our civilization, lies within, among the ruling institutions of our sector. The real danger is not that the Soviets will subvert or otherwise conquer us, but that we shall defeat ourselves by permitting ourselves to become morally unfit to survive. As we die so, if we do not mend our ways, a moving finger will write upon the wall: “*Mene, Tekel . . .*” In that message, we shall learn why we are being obliterated.

THE RUDIMENTS OF WORKABLE 'PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE'

Our leading practical problem is that war-avoidance must proceed by way of negotiations conducted in a world dominated by institutionalized, and often conflicting, mythologies. Relatively few among leading circles see the whole matter clearly. The more numerous, various institutions and large groups of populations of the various nations see life only from moment to moment, and view such episodic intervals under the governance of the illusions correlated with mythologies.

Since developments have induced a state of miseducation, as well as inadequate knowledge among most of the populations of nations, today, as during the period Friedrich Schiller wrote such lines, each great moment must reckon with the fact that it has found a "little people."

For a few among us, the conceptualization of a durable peace is relatively easy. We few of Western civilization act with consciences informed by the millennia of Christendom, and by knowledge reaching back to the Academy of Athens, and yet earlier. We locate personal identity of our brief span of mortal life as instruments of

that higher purpose which those in our tradition before us have served. Those faces of our predecessors live, so to speak, in our consciences: counseling us, while we view the moment of present action in terms of consequences for a century before us.

The rest are the "little people," to whom the matter is seen differently. In Plato's *Timaeus*, there is the account of the Egyptian speaking to Solon: "Oh, Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, and there is not one Greek who is an old man." Most of the "little people" are "little" because they have "poor memories"; in that Egyptian's sense, they have not spanned the millennia, to thus locate their individual lives in that great sweep. Thus wanting a conscious past, they have not yet developed the power to comprehend the sensuous reality of the future.

For the "little people," life begins with birth, and proceeds merely from moment to moment until the end of all such moments, death, surprises them. In successive moments, their judgment of events is governed by this or that petty goal of "Earthly Paradise." The governing connections among actions and consequences in a larger sense of things are degraded by imagination into the mixture of half-truths and superstitions that constitute prevailing mythologies. Whatever reality contradicts those mythologies frightens these little people, bestirs hostility within them. Only as we are able to present a demonstration of reality, within the limited span of the capabilities for rational judgments concerning relatively momentary occurrences of life, can they be induced to move willingly in directions contrary to institutionalized mythologies.

Such are the constraints of political practice, including diplomacy.

Not all moments in the experience of the peoples of nations are of the same weight. Mankind survives chiefly through crises—or not at all. The essential feature of a true crisis in human affairs, like that crisis appalling us presently, is that it has the quality of demonstrating even to “little politicians” the utter incompetence of entire chunks of prevailing mythologies. A people awakened to a sensuous comprehension of what the imminent destruction of warfare or continued monetary collapse represents for the whole of their mortal existence, develops a correspondingly increased capacity for communicating what Shelley aptly identifies as “profound conceptions respecting man and nature.”

Just for that reason, moments of the most appalling sorts of impending destruction are potentially the great moments of historical opportunity.

In such moments, as this present crisis, the principal source of difficulty is not the people generally, but incumbent political and other leaders. Incumbency in leading positions over extended periods habituates such leadership to a petty scope of perception of the possible. Acquired reflexes developed through career-progress under ordinary conditions have effects in times of crisis similar to those shown by the goldfish that continues to swim in narrow circles after being freed from a small bowl into a large pond.

In a moment of crisis, the “little people” acquire the potential to grow morally and intellectually, provided they are afforded the leadership needed to bring them together for effective concerted action. It is careerist

leaders who lack the courage to conceptualize this, who underestimate these enlarged potentialities of the people, and who block the qualities of initiative required to set the people into appropriate forms of motion.

From the standpoint of the career-politician whose mind is excessively habituated to accustomed rules of political practice, war-avoidance has now become impossible. This is because whatever forms of political initiative are acceptable to such practical politicians are inadequate actions, which will fail to deter the onrush of war. Such are the “goldfish politicians.”

We can have peace only on condition that some political leaders discover the courage to do what most career-politicians would violently oppose as “unthinkable,” “impracticable.”

Although the scope of politically feasible initiatives is greatly enlarged, it is a new kind of ranges of feasible action which has been developed to supersede the former. The essential problem of mythology-ridden “little people” persists in an altered form. The rules of effective political action have been changed, radically; but *the new rules of political action* are fully as rigorous in the new circumstances as the superseded sorts of rules were for the old circumstances.

Consequently, *we must move institutions and populations toward durable new institutions of peace by successive steps of accelerating motion toward that end.*

First, we must take adequate and credible actions which institutionalize short-term war-avoidance.

Second, we must use the forward political motion in popular consciousness established by the credible performance in the first instance, to proceed immediately to

the next phase, war-avoidance over the remaining decades of this century.

Third, we must use the accelerated motion derived from partial success on the second count, to proceed then to the third and concluding phase.

In this process, some key policy-designers must be governed by a clear perception of the end-result toward which we are working. We must view the developing proceedings from the broadest historical standpoint. We proceed in this way not "behind the backs" of the people of the nations, but as good pedagogues proceed, patiently directing experience in such a way that the conceptions presented are accepted by people generally as ideas which they have adopted as suited for practice.

We must proceed with the lovingness Friedrich Schiller extended to the German people through that poetry and drama he employed as the medium of communicating a sense of the essential truths of universal history. We must assemble from among those of us privileged by opportunity to possess the knowledge and instruments of action of a leading elite, those who lead nations with that same quality of loving devotion that Schiller so expressed: *If you love me, care for my sheep!*

We outline the three indicated phases, and then conclude with an outline of the overall policy-doctrine which must be institutionalized in the course of this phased development.

A. Short-Term War-Avoidance

Short-term war-avoidance means, categorically, but negatively the immediate termination of the IMF "conditionalities" and "neo-Malthusian" policies.

Rejecting these war-causing policies does not yet elim-

inate the third, underlying cause for the overall, more general war danger, the geopolitical assumptions. By itself, it merely postpones the general war danger to a future time, in the order of a decade or so hence.

Nonetheless, the first step must be taken. *If it is not taken, general war during the near future is unavoidable.*

However, taken by itself, repudiation of the two policies, IMF "conditionalities" and "neo-Malthusian" doctrines, creates a vacuum in the dimensions previously occupied by those policies. *A positive replacement for those policies is an integral part of the first measures to be taken.*

A new world monetary system to replace the International Monetary Fund must be established immediately. *Whoever opposes that has chosen general war during the immediate future.* No other action, or inaction, will forestall such war.

The establishment of the new monetary system is to occur through the equivalent of the following exemplary steps.

(1) The representatives of the European Monetary System and the President of the United States must agree on a new price for monetary gold. This price must be based on the quantities produced required to sustain the new, gold-based world monetary system. That determines average cost of production for monetary gold replacement stocks. *The price of gold must be an average rate of profit added to that cost.*

(2) The United States' President must agree to make the gold reserves of the United States available to support the imbalances on current account against the

dollar through the rediscount facility of a new, gold-based monetary system. That system should be based on the cornerstone of the European Monetary System's cooperation with concurring petrodollar-holder nations.

(3) The first measure of establishment of the new gold-based monetary system is the issuance and sale of large-denomination, medium- and long-term, rediscountable bonds of a new central rediscount facility. These bonds should be denominated in ECUs at the agreed price of monetary gold, and should bear an interest rate of between 2 and 3 percent. Those bonds should be sold to central banks, commercial banks engaged in financing world trade, and other suitable institutions. The principal marketing objective of the initial issue of such rediscountable bonds is the absorption of several hundred billions of dollar holdings into the central rediscount facility.

(4) The credit of the central facility is available at prime rates of between 4 and 6 percent for approved categories of lending.

The end-result of lending must be high-technology increase in the productive powers of labor of what are called currently developing nations. This is measured in terms of tangible product usefully consumed as productive capital or as household-consumption goods, with administration and services not included as output, but as overhead cost of output.

These credit-issuances should take the form of credit for agreed projects of development of agriculture, man-

ufacturing, construction, mining, transportation, and energy production projects, adopted by treaty-partner capital-goods-exporting and developing nations. Long-term credit for these projects is extended to the designated financial institutions of importing nations, as the equivalent of "construction loans" and "permanent mortgages." Credit also is issued "upstream" to firms within capital-goods-exporting nations for operating capital, for necessary investment in productive capacities, and export-credit with respect to contracts subsumed by the development projects.

Bonds issued to authorized institutions by the central discount facility may be pledged as security for credit to be issued for these designated purposes.

(5) The indebtedness of developing nations must be reorganized under the new system. Such nations joining the new system shall have their held-over indebtedness to public international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank "frozen" pending reorganization of those institutions. Debts to public institutions of sovereign nations are to be settled through direct relations among sovereign nations. The immediate focus of reorganization measures is upon indebtedness to private commercial banks.

Appropriate financial institutions of developing nations, which may be termed "development banks," shall issue gold-ECU-denominated medium- and long-term deferred-payment bonds at nominal interest rates. These bonds shall be discountable in the same manner as regular bonds of the central facility; these bonds shall be used either to purchase held-over debts to private

commercial banks, or as new commercial debts. This re-establishes the "credit-worthiness" of the developing nations participating in such agreements, and also revitalizes the credit-issuing powers of the relevant commercial banking institutions.

(6) The participating nations must adopt a code of standards for recommended reforms in internal taxation and credit policies of both industrialized and capital-importing nations. The object is to lessen the relative burden of taxation on productive varieties of capital improvements, and to provide preferential terms and conditions of credit for productive capital-formation and for those related scientific, educational, and medical programs contributing to the development and maintenance of the productive powers of the populations.

(7) The new monetary system shall also be defined as a sponsor for multinational partnerships among public and private institutions of nations participating in fulfilling a development project for a customer-nation—as temporary multinational "trading companies."

This shift from the devolutionary combined policies of austerity and "appropriate technologies" respecting the developing-nations sector will remove the principal cause for instabilities and repressive regimes among developing nations.

This effect should be reinforced by an adopted policy of hostility toward stagnation and devolutionary policies among developing nations, a policy which might

be aptly identified as an "anti-Pol Pot" supplement of clarification to the Nuremberg code.

The amplification of the code of international law should be co-sponsored by the United States of America, the member-nations of the European Monetary System, the Soviet Union, Japan, Mexico, and India, plus such other nations as indicate their wish to immediately co-sponsor such a resolution. *This should not be conditional upon proceedings of the United Nations Organization.* This agreement must be viewed as establishing a "community of principle" among a sufficient portion of the nations of the world as to constitute a treaty-alliance backed by an overwhelming political force. Those nations whose governments choose to exert their sovereign prerogatives of being adversaries to such a doctrine need but go to "stand on the other side of the room," so to speak.

The most vital national interests of a preponderance of nations demand the authority of international law for such a policy. Opposing nations are adversaries to such fundamental principles of human right, and the world will begin to become better when the position of governments on this moral issue is clearly demarcated.

Such a policy has been a continuous aspiration of most of the developing nations, and is also in the most narrowly defined self-interest of industrialized exporting nations. The support of a contrary policy by the Carter administration is not only a contributing cause of the present war danger, but is directly contrary to the most vital of the national interests of the United States, as is illustrated by the Carter administration's obscene policy to date toward its neighbor Mexico.

Agreement among the cited principal nations of the Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact to this principle, combined with the establishment of the new monetary order, eliminates the obstacles to war-avoidance otherwise erupting from conditions within the developing sector.

The special case to be resolved is the Arab-Israel conflict. Subject to secondary adjustments, the state of Israel must be assured peace, guaranteed by the principal alliances, within the so-called 1967 borders, on condition of its disengagement from Lebanon and its sponsorship of a prompt plebiscite among the present and former inhabitants of the so-called West Bank and Gaza Strip respecting the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state for those territories.

The moral and related issues of this matter are so clear-cut, and have been so well-defined over preceding years, that opposition to such a step from any source must be overruled summarily as intolerable lunacy. The only matters subject to substantive negotiations are those pertaining to the establishment of a viable political economy for the new Palestinian state, reconstruction of Lebanon, and aid to Israel respecting its debt, and related matters—expressing substantial manifestation of good will and related commitments by those powers which demand that Israel's government abandon lunacy and come to its senses in this issue of Israel's cruel and arrogant offense against the most elementary precepts of humanity.

We wish an Israel which is secure and prosperous among the community of nations, but we will no longer tolerate gross inhumanities by Israel, nor a continuation

of the monstrous strategic blackmail of the sort to which the world's peace has been subject during the past decade.

This first phase will be adequate to secure peace between the principals for the immediate period, on condition that it is understood that whatever nation violates the peace so ordered will be abandoned to the mercies of whatever nation, and its allies, is injured by such breach of the peace.

B. Medium-Term War-Avoidance

Medium-term war-avoidance is established through Com-econ cooperation with the new monetary system.

Ultimately, the Gaullist conception of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" can be realized through those forms of East-West, North-South economic cooperation that combine efforts in development of the developing sector—in other words, through a modern application of the principle of the "Grand Design" of Henri IV and Leibniz.

On the basis of past experience, we must anticipate two lines of objection to this from within the ranks of the Comecon leaderships. The general objection to such a policy-approach has been, "Socialist countries are not in the business of prolonging the vitality of the capitalist system." The narrower objection is of the form: "After we have achieved large-scale disarmament, then we shall consider using some of the productive capacity freed from arms production to aid developing nations' development."

Let us stand above both the capitalist and socialist forms of industrial development for a moment. From

that vantage point, the first sort of objection—and its “Western” correlative—is dissolved into a larger perspective on the matter.

Generally, we evoke the previously cited statement of the Egyptian to Solon from the *Timaeus*. Among the majority of the leading statesmen on both sides, we are lacking in “old men” of the qualities exhibited by the late Pope Paul VI. The present writer, speaking as a living spokesman for that historic current he serves, observes: “We created the sovereign nation-state, as a matter of policy, during the course of the fifteenth century, and capitalism grew directly from the implementation of our policy-conception.” We “old men” must intervene to inform the minds of those behaving as if the human species had been born only a generation or so ago. It is we “old men” who know, far better than either most capitalist or socialist statesmen present themselves to be, what is and what is not in the fundamental interest of capitalist and socialist states.

We “old men” say to such modern statesmen: “Children, your hysterical mythologies mean certainty of general war sooner or later during this century. It is time that you grew up, shedding such dangerous mythologies.”

Among the most pathetic of the sheep, we hear such prattlings as, “We need not give up our mythologies, because Providence will intervene with a miracle, if necessary, to give us triumphant victory in that war.” According to Apostolic Christian doctrine, God has already given you the miracle of Jesus Christ, and instructed you that all further miracles must come through the action of the Holy Spirit on the mind of

mankind. That is what is termed in Greek the Logos, or, more exactly what is associated with Plato’s description of the notion of the “hypothesis of the higher hypothesis.” Do not blame Christianity for whatever charismatic, pagan attributes of Fortuna you foolish gamblers have the arrogance to attempt to impose upon God. The only miracle available to you is the transfiguration of yourselves from the degradation of being the sort of foolish sheep who blasphemously impose on the word “Christian” such pagan superstitions as your own.

The issue of good versus evil in the ordering of the affairs of mankind is embodied in the millennia-old conflict between oligarchical doctrines, akin to Malthusianism, against the republican effort to create forms of societies in which the divine quality of humanity—man’s perfectible powers of creative intelligence—is made the basis for the practical relationship of man to man in social practice. In modern terms, the practice of good is represented by “mercantilist” republicanism, and the practice of evil is represented by monetarist oligarchism.

Insofar as the relations among states are ordered according to “mercantilist” republican principles respecting the prevailing order of the world’s affairs, the basis for durable peace is established. Insofar as relations among states are ordered predominantly according to monetarist oligarchical principles, the bestialization of mankind inherent in that order leads inexorably to the ultimate bestialities advocated by the Club of Rome’s neo-Malthusianism, and to war between those who support and those who resist such evil.

We “old men” are obliged by our policy of sovereign

nation-state republics to give our loyalties to those nation-states of which we are citizens, to live and die as the people of those nations of which we are citizens. Each nation must have its complement of dedicated servants from among the ranks of those who have become such "old men" as we. Yet, we are also part of a world community of "old men." In that aspect of our natures our wisdom is situated. It is from the resources of that aspect of our natures that we are enabled to design policies among nations.

In this aspect of our natures, whether another nation is socialist or capitalist in the form of its industrial institutions is of secondary importance to relations among states. These matters we view from the same standpoint we employed to design the establishment of the sovereign nation-state five centuries earlier.

Our principles, and the adopted principles of those among you wise enough to become "old men," are simply summarized:

(1) The development of mankind must be ordered to the effect that the creative potentialities of the individual are made, with increasing efficiency, the basis in form of social practice for relationship of man to man.

(2) What constitutes a realization of creative potentialities is proven uniquely as man's manifest mastery of natural law, discovery and self-government of human social practice of the lawful ordering of the universe. The increase of the power of the average individual over nature through the fruits of such discovery is the

proof of what is or is not creative mastery of natural law, and is also the ordering of society consistent with natural law. The increase in the number and average power over nature of the human population is the test of truth in practice, and the ordering of human affairs consistent with that truth.

(3) This, we have discovered centuries ago, requires a form of society based on the development of the power of language to communicate the most profound conceptions respecting man and nature according to those stated criteria of truth for practice. Hence, the development of the spoken language as the vehicle adequate, and increasingly so, for comprehending such conceptions is the proper basis for the constitution of social practice. For that reason, we have established the principle that mankind must be organized into forms of self-government constitutionally dedicated to these principles, a form of self-government based on the imposition of an educated form of spoken and written language as the common form of communication among the citizens of that institution of self-government. This form of institution is termed the sovereign nation-state republic.

That is the essence of proper international law; conformity with that law is the only justification for warfare, and is otherwise the only basis for durable peace.

In practice, if the Soviet Union and the majority of the present Atlantic Alliance adopt that form of international law in an appropriate form of cooperative

practice, that combination of nations, together with developing nations that aspire to such an order, constitutes the overwhelming preponderance of political, economic, and military power in the world. Let the adversaries of such cooperation under international law gnash their evil teeth in frustration; that is the order we must bring into being by appropriate phases of establishing new treaty-institutions.

Any other course is the folly of people and states which have lost the quality of moral fitness to survive. Neither socialism nor capitalism are ends in themselves. Those who would make those distinctions the issues of war or peace are at best infantile fools. The only real issue is the issues we have summarized here; the only worthy law governing such issues is the international law we have just summarized.

Accept that international law, or accept the destruction each alternative to the law now imminently prescribes. That has been the truth over centuries to date. The practical distinction of this moment of history is that the consequences of past follies have brought us to the point at which the consequences have become visible even to many of the children. Truth has so been brought forward from the status of the fearful knowledge of a relatively few "old men" to become the visible empirical reality perceived now even by those of lesser vision. Truth has now been brought by crisis into the condition of the possible practice of nations—at least, a number of nations.

Unless we rescue the peoples of the developing-nations sector from the heritage of colonialist degradation and the imminent genocide proposed by the Club of

Rome, civilization pronounces itself morally unfit to survive—and will not survive. All other issues are at best secondary, and otherwise false issues.

This task before us all cannot be accomplished by "redistribution" of the wealth of the world. To drag down the industrial economies of the industrialized nations, for a "more equal distribution" of existing wealth, would mean to destroy the capacity of the industrialized nations to deliver to the developing nations the indispensable technology, without which the world's population potential will be reduced to a few hundred million of persons at most. The proposal for "more equitable redistribution" of existing wealth among industrialized and developing nations is another form of the same crime as the British neo-Malthusians' proposal to depopulate the developing-nations regions for later recolonization of that depopulated territory by Cecil Rhodes' anglo-saxon race. The end-result of such satanic evils will be the same, like the identical results accomplished by the evil Peking puppet Pol Pot regime and in progress on the initiatives of the Muslim Brotherhood. Such evil institutions and doctrines must be outlawed as Nazi practices were pronounced outlawable.

If you do not wish to do this, you have thereby pronounced yourselves in today's crisis morally unfit to survive—and, as you should have begun to perceive from most-recent developments, in that case, if your views prevail, you will not survive.

Those portions of the Comecon leadership that object to "revitalizing the capitalist system" might see themselves as the mythology-ridden fools the consequences

of their foolish doctrines imminently declare them to be. Presume that the Soviet Union could win general war under the conditions defined by present trend-lines. At what price? At what risk to the very survival of even all but lower forms of life on this planet? Is a mere mythological conceit worth that?

As for the demand that "disarmament" must be the first step, the fact that "SALT" was abruptly junked the moment the on-going crisis reached a certain maturity ought to have taught the more sensible fellows a lesson.

First, there must be durable peace—and only then can there be disarmament. You of the Warsaw Pact who might successfully refuse to accept and act upon that lesson will thereby create within the Western Alliance the conditions under which a spectacular economic recovery is accomplished, all for the purpose of effecting a crushing advantage in military power. Do not imagine that such a mobilization is not feasible. It is not feasible under conditions of IMF "conditionalities" or continued toleration of "environmentalism" and the rock-drug-youth counterculture—that is true. But if those two disabling doctrines are crushed, the medium-term military potentials of the Western Alliance are greater than those of the Warsaw Pact. If you think not, you console yourselves with your own ignorance of the ABCs of actual political economic science.

Disarmament comes after peace, and only then.

Whoever makes "socialism versus capitalism" the underlying issue of present relations between the Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact is ensuring general war during some time within this century.

If that adversary relationship is made fundamental,

then the side that makes the industrial, high-technology development of the developing-nations sector its cause will be the side that commands the balance of strategic power for general war.

That is the issue posed immediately by the accomplishment of the first phase of monetary and related reorganization outlined above. Once the first phase is completed, the conditions for immediate general war between the Warsaw Pact and Atlantic Alliance are eliminated—assuming the containment of the Peking regime. However, unless this first phase proceeds to the second phase, the first phase defines the range of geopolitical options for deferred general war during this century.

If the Western Alliance mobilizes itself, as the United States mobilized during World War II, for the rapid industrial development of the developing-nations sector, within the second half of the first decade of such development, the growth of combined economic power represented by the new monetary system will be beyond the imagination of previous generations. The substitution of military development by such economic expansion of the base will be of a corresponding potential magnitude and quality.

If this were to occur under persistence of hard relations between the two military alliances, a new quality of adversary condition would emerge toward the end of the present decade.

The only point at which the adversary course of development could be forestalled is during the present period of perceived grave crisis. If the present resources of the Soviet Union are focused appropriately to aid in bringing the world out of the present economic crisis, that

cooperation will shape the institutional relations of the coming decade. If the Soviet Union placed itself or is kept in a hostile position respecting the recovery from that economic crisis, then the new geometry of deferred general war will be the institutionalized characteristic of the coming decade.

The necessity of that set of options ought to be clear enough from the summary of the historical record of the British oligarchy's evolution.

The capitalist-socialist conflict has acted as a surrogate cathexis for all of the rage flowing from the consequences of the monetarist-mercantilist conflict. The British astutely exploited that fact at the close of World War II, using their management of escalated hostilities between the United States and Soviet Union to consolidate the grip of the Anglo-American arrangement on the institutions and population of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Correspondingly, as the case of Cuba's course since 1959 exemplifies, the conflicts between British monetarist, for example "neo-colonialist," policies and the developmental aspirations of former colonial nations, tended to fall into the "socialist" orbit.

If this pattern is repeated in the course of the Atlantic Alliance's recovery from the present economic crisis, we shall be faced with a future repetition of the Malthusian eruptions of the post-1815 and present postwar period at whatever point the Anglo-American elite perceives itself strong enough to contemplate imminent victory over the last remaining obstacle to its global hegemony.

Whereas, if Soviet cooperation is integral to the process of recovery from all principal aspects of the

present crisis, the principles of international law we have outlined can be effectively institutionalized to the effect of steering the world away from the continuing influence of oligarchical monetarism. The long-standing British-Genoise problem can be extirpated, a process aided by the credits issued for the economic reconstruction of Great Britain as a modern industrial republic participating in the development of the southern hemisphere.

The advantages to the Soviet Union complement the advantages to the nations of the Western alliance.

Forget large-scale disarmament for the moment.

I speak now as a prospective President of the United States. Obviously, from the standpoint of the world, as well as the United States itself, I am the best President of the United States that might be desired by any people of any good nation, including the people of the United States. It follows that what I would be obliged to do in the national interests of the United States in military affairs is the minimal any merely competent President would be obliged to do. Those who imagine otherwise are foolish children, who have not learned to think clearly.

As President of the United States, I would be obliged by constitutional principles to restore a republican policy of adequate military capabilities: to develop an in-depth war-fighting capability of all qualified persons mobilized as a militia, and the training and equipping of those militia-based forces with war-fighting technological capabilities selected according to my adherence to the same historical current as Leibniz and Carnot.

No disarmament negotiations as such would dissuade

me from implementing such a policy, or could succeed in negotiating from me a single item of capability I deemed integral to the realization of such a policy. If some Soviet negotiating partner were to approach me with disarmament proposals such as "SALT," I would prove my sincere good faith to such a Soviet representative, for example, by providing that person with much-needed guidance in the ABCs of competent strategic doctrines.

I would insist, "Cooperate to remove the political-economic and related impulses of adversary status, and we shall both, then, be competently situated to adjust the scale of our military preparations accordingly." If the representatives of the prospective treaty partner argued, "But we cannot wait for that; we must first reduce the burden of armaments," I would be obliged to respond: "Then, if those costs are so troublesome, all the more reason to quickly resolve the political-economic and related causes for adversary status."

To wish, even very strongly, for disarmament, is like wishing to become a millionaire. The wish has no authority to upset the lawful ordering of the universe, except in the delusions of such unfortunate wretches as the Imams of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Back now to the economic advantages.

Let us consider first the Soviet advantages.

From my position as prospective President of the United States, I "selfishly" see the Soviet economy in the following terms. "Your agriculture is an ulcerated mess, not simply a mass of blunders, but worse; you have institutionalized blundering policies among a most-substantial portion of your total population and

portions of your ruling political institutions. Otherwise, you have another problem which altogether fascinates me.

"On the one side, you have developed an excellent scientific cadre and related categories of professionals. Your labor force is rising greatly in technological quality, while that of the Western Alliance nations has been systematically destroyed through lunatic educational and related so-called reforms. However, because of the constrictions imposed upon your economy by combined effects of your so-called foolish agricultural policies, by Western embargoes and threats of additional embargoes, and also by your military burdens, you cannot realize the full benefit of your technological progress. Indeed, the inefficiency of your capital, caused by the circumstances I have cited, shows you to be the world's potential scientific-superpower, whose growing scientific potential is like a giant blob which cannot be passed through your constricted capital-structures at a rate of flow even approximating the growth of the blob itself.

"You know that my farmers and agronomists are the best in the world—I see that my remarks on that topic interest you very much, and rightly so. However, let us pass that by for the moment; it is another part of your overall economic picture I wish to address first.

"Let us look at the matter from the vantage point of President Leonid Brezhnev's May 1978 address to a television audience of the Federal Republic of Germany. Let us go a step beyond your President's remarks on that occasion. Let us think in terms of bringing the Soviet economy into a rationalized position within the

world's generalized division of labor in the capital-goods sector.

“For example, let us put on the table the nuclear technology capabilities of the United States, France, West Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, Japan, and—very important in this picture—India. Let us now carve up a rational division of labor in the total world production of capital goods for nuclear-energy applications. Let us see what sort of forward contracts we might make giving the world certain quantities of Soviet exports of capital goods.

“Let us be concrete. If Mrs. Gandhi agrees, I propose that France, West Germany, and the Soviet Union work to give India, for one thing, the world's leading position in exports to the world market for the thorium-cycle side of nuclear applications. Let us presume for the moment that France takes the master contract for that bit of the international effort in cooperation with India. Let us presume that France will coordinate with West Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union to provide the capital goods and selected aspects of added technology India does not already command. If we sit down to work out with Mrs. Gandhi's government the categorical commitments for such an effort, what can the Soviet Union propose to deliver?

“The point is, we can treat Soviet deliveries of capital goods of that sort as payments against the credits for Soviet imports of capital goods from Atlantic Alliance nations. So, let us review adjustments you propose to consider for the Soviet planning budget in the light of such patterns of cooperation. Obviously, to develop your nation's capital-goods specialties for the export

market, you will require certain ingredients from us. You will also wish to use the indicated forward export earnings of the Soviet economy to compensate for capital imports of the sort President Brezhnev indicated categorically in that television address of May 1978.

“Let us review the implications of what we have just discussed. What is the effect of such forms of cooperation on the capital efficiency of the Soviet economy? Is it not the case that the blob of scientific accomplishments is now able to move through the pipe with greater freedom?

“True, you will be exporting Soviet science in the form of capital goods that increase the productive powers of the nations whose interests I represent. Yet, you are being compensated for that by our cooperation to enable you to enhance your capital efficiencies. Is that not a fair arrangement?”

To this, we must add one clinching point. “By the way, the feasibility of this depends upon our new, gold-based monetary system. We don't ask you to integrate in our capitalists' monetary system, but we propose that we establish a set of common rules and practices in credit matters consistent with the mechanisms of that new monetary system.”

At that point, our Soviet discussion-partner restates the question: “What about disarmament?”

To which we reply, “Fine. For the moment, let us begin with those items which it is to our mutual advantage to consider obsolete. There is no sense in either of our alliances continuing to waste efforts producing what is properly obsolete in military technology.”

The Soviet representative nods, but adds: "Can't we cut a little more substantially?"

We respond: "That depends upon how rapidly the benefits of our economic cooperation in Third World development become institutionalized as a growing element of assured durable peace. Let us work to ensure that that point is realized quickly."

C. The Distinction Between "War-Avoidance" and "Peace"

It ought to be clear enough that the two initial phases of negotiations we have outlined thus far do not establish *peace*, but merely institutionalize effective *war-avoidance*. They are, for reasons we have indicated, *the minimal actions without which there is no war-avoidance*.

These two steps of war-avoidance are to be viewed as generating the sort of momentum that can lead to a further development: the establishment of durable peace on a positive basis.

Let us now review the two steps from that vantage point: let us focus, in this reprise, on the phenomenon of *momentum*.

The turning point, the only measure that can stop an accelerating short-term plunge into general war, is action by a significant number of the governments among Atlantic Alliance nations to sabotage the policies of the IMF, including "appropriate technologies." If that step cannot be taken more or less immediately, the governments of the Atlantic Alliance will have established the moral unfitness of their nations to survive the short-term period. The finger will, in one fashion or another, write "*Mene, Takel . . .*" and either

the human species, or at least "Western civilization," will come to an abrupt termination during the short term ahead.

There is little practical difficulty in the way of wrecking the IMF and other neo-Malthusian institutions. A few key Western Alliance nations are sufficient means to accomplish that much. The practical question to be considered, in light of that fact, is whether it is also feasible politically to establish the new, gold-based monetary system.

In general, in terms of the overwhelming majority of the citizens of the United States, as well as Western continental Europe and Japan, those citizens are pro-nuclear energy, and hate the kind of economic depression Carter administration and British policies are now bringing upon the world. A turn toward nuclear-energized prosperity will have little difficulty in securing overwhelming majorities as constituencies in those nations. The problem is merely one of boldly resolute leadership, not of popular sentiments. The essential difficulty to be overcome is entirely within the leadership of these nations. The argument that "popular opinion" will not permit bold ventures on the economic and related monetary issues, is found, in most cases, to be a matter of political weaklings' substituting the opinion of leading news media's editors and publishers for that of the not-consulted people.

In any case, there is no alternative but war to the failure to execute the outlined initiative. *The government which does not choose the new monetary system has by that mere fact chosen war.*

It is not only to be admitted, but stressed, that the

first steps of monetary reform require no action from the Soviet leadership. They are a unilateral action among leading nations of the Atlantic Alliance, which becomes effective through acceptance of the change in policy by governments representing a majority of the non-Peking peoples of the developing-nations sector.

It is a "burst of artillery fire," which changes the geometry of the world strategic situation to the overwhelming benefit of both developing and Western nations, requiring no *explicit* commitments from the War-saw Pact alliance. It eliminates the determining cause of destabilizations of the developing-nations regions, and thus eliminates the driving forces impelling the Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Union toward general war.

The monetary reforms included in this first phase require only an assured Soviet perception of this as a war-avoidance measure. That perception, put into practice with the establishment of the new Palestinian state, with Soviet participation in the relevant Middle East agreements, makes the monetary reform a changed medium-term relationship between the two principal alliances.

The receding threat of general war brings the monetary-economic problems of the world to the foreground. A new monetary system is coming into being; urgency is now attributed to the process of bringing into being the economic growth this monetary reform portends. The political institutions of both the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance are thus energized with demands that the war-avoidance status be transformed into tangible economic benefits. Leaders must articulate that fact, and by articulating it bring it forward as a consciously focused impulse. That consciously focused

impulse makes feasible the large-scale economic and monetary-credit agreements among the Atlantic Alliance, Comecon, and key developing-sector nations.

It is the effects of the indicated kinds of expansion in foreign trade upon exporting and importing nations, and with it new hope for progress for economic and related problems which earlier seemed increasingly unremediable, that maintain and accelerate the momentum.

What next?

The concluding phase of the process leading toward peace (as distinct from war-avoidance) is the institutionalization of a fifty-year global policy embracing three interconnected elements of economic development.

The foundation of the three-aspect global policy is the setting of a goal of two generations of development—approximately the year 2030—as the fulfillment of a process of high-technology transformation of the developing-nations sector which brings those nations into a state of approximate parity in conditions of material standard of living and productive powers with the conditions to be reached in the presently industrialized sector by that time. About two generations of development of the productive powers of labor in the developing nations will be required, with concentrated efforts, to achieve that.

Second, during that period we must bring to an end all foreseeable shortages of "natural resources." This can be accomplished in only one way: the development of controlled thermonuclear fusion processes to sufficiently high energy flux densities. We must bring "first

generation" fusion-energy production "commercially" on line by the early 1990s, and must reach energy flux densities adequate to overcoming all foreseeable "natural resources" problems economically by the interval between 2020 and 2030.

Third, mankind must get its head out of the mud of this planet earth, and begin to dedicate itself to take over the management of the physical processes of our solar system.

To almost any scientist, the reason for that commitment is more or less clear. Such scientists might differ in choice of specific arguments for such an orientation, but the general direction of thought would be shared in common. For others, some clarification is warranted.

The initial objective of intrasolar operations is not to move "surplus populations" into artificial earth-like environments produced on Mars. The initial objectives are scientific. The discoveries made possible through exploration of nearby regions of our galaxy will be an integral part of qualitative advances in mastering the lawful ordering of our universe. Laboratories, explorations, and large-scale observational capabilities in nearby solar space, including the Moon and Mars, are the obvious means for fostering this progress.

The layman can be provided some sense of this in the following way.

It used to be the custom—before 1969—to speak of the rapidity of technological progress. For example, my grandparents were all born before the existence of the automobile, and my parents before powered heavier-than-air craft—and so on. The same kinds of observations can be made for the past four decades, or for the

span of the past four centuries, as one may choose. From this standpoint, the picture is stunning at first thought on such matters.

The effect is far more stunning if one also takes into account the amount of political sabotage of technological progress that has occurred over the past four centuries. Consider the period of time which lapsed before the majority of the immediately practical inventions of Leonardo da Vinci were realized for practice. For example, how many centuries passed between his invention of the conventional techniques of weaving and their use for cotton manufactures in England and the United States?

The case of the steam engine illustrates the point very well.

The modern development of heat-conversion engines of the category of the steam engine was undertaken seriously by a sixteenth-century group in England associated with Bacon's adversary, the great scientist Gilbert. Bacon and his associates, coming into power through the 1590s coup and the 1603 accession of James I, put a stop to scientific and technological progress of that vigorous sort, including their suppression of the efforts of Gilbert et al. to develop coal as a basic fuel to replace the diminishing supply of wood.

The development of the steam engine was resumed again under Colbert in France, but was stymied from further development by the British and their accomplices at about the beginning of the eighteenth century. Its development was finally set into motion through the initiatives of Carnot and such Carnot collaborators as Fulton at the close of the eighteenth century.

More recently, various degrees of political sabotage, beginning with that led by Bernard Baruch in the United States of the late 1940s, set the United States about twenty years behind where it should have been today had the obvious policy been conducted from the conclusion of the last war onward.

When we compare such hindering of rates of feasible technological progress with the kinds of ostensible raw materials problems, as well as social effects such hindering produces, we can begin to assemble the combined varieties of observations we have just indicated, to arrive at a rough conception of the rate of technological progress required to meet the needs defined by a world population of about 6 billion by the close of this century, and so on.

We also note that the “fall of Skylab” was entirely a consequence of Carter administration pinch-penny lunacy in related matters of research and development allocations. Moreover, had NASA not been gutted increasingly over the post-1966 period, leaving just about enough to complete the initially scheduled moon shots and a few other tentative operations, we should probably already have manned a station on the Moon, and might also have manned a station on Mars, which we might have named “Little America,” in echo of Admiral Richard Byrd’s appealing heroism in Antarctica. What we learned from the limited amount of exploration actually accomplished leaves no doubt of the actuality of the massive discoveries probably not to be achieved in any other way.

Beyond the scientific phase of such explorations, mankind is going into solar space—and further—within

a generation or two, provided he does not exterminate himself earlier. By fifty years from now, people should be moving into space in substantial numbers, and we will be creating suitable “artificial environments” on the Moon (or, beneath its surface), on Mars, and in “space stations.” No doubt, beyond that, there will be Earth “settlements” beyond Earth. This will occur not to escape overcrowded conditions on Earth, but because the work to be done there requires their presence.

Apart from the fact that conquest of space is indispensable to progress of life on Earth, as a matter of fostering scientific progress, we shall go there because we are human. We need not speculate on “other intelligent beings” analogous to ourselves in this universe—except for the creative intelligence embodied in the universe as a whole, of whose existence we may be already scientifically certain. We shall go into space for the same reason we have accepted our duty to exert dominion over the Earth. It is our business to master each next challenge placed within our reach. It is the development of our creative potentials, our divine qualities, which we further by grasping each new, more challenging task set before us. Just as the forebears of my faction created the nation-state during the fifteenth century in service of that purpose, we must now go out to master solar space, and later what is available to us beyond.

With that perspective, we at last pull our heads out of the mud.

The symbolic, or psychological (if you must have such terms) feature of this resolution is to be emphasized.

Earth is, in the final analysis, our home, our starting place, the place where we make ourselves fit to undertake the tasks the solar system, galaxy, and universe hold waiting for our species. Life must one day cease to be petty, if bloody, squabbling on the surface of this planet of ours. The time has come to end hunger and similar sorts of deprivation as the preoccupations dominating the minds of most of our species. We must bring our world's affairs into order, to bring such distractions to an end. We must get to the work of transforming the children of our posterity into an elite oriented to tasks of space—all of those children.

Physically, that transformation of our circumstances is within our reach now, in terms of two or three generations. The science we have and the breakthroughs in science now emerging from the frontiers of Riemannian hydrodynamics in plasma physics place such physical power at the disposal of these emerging two new generations. It is not sufficient, however, merely to do that work. The work must be directed by a conscious purpose, a purpose which is not a myth, not a wishful illusion.

The three-aspect, fifty-year perspective we have identified here is the comprehensible expression of that purpose for the present generation. The interconnection among the transformation of the developing sector, the end to raw materials predicaments for our species, and the scientific mastery of nearby space are all feasible and essentially comprehensible tasks. They are tasks that express purpose, not only for each nation, but for each individual within those nations.

Purpose, principle, and true law are but facets of the same conception. To bring nations into a condition of durable purpose, under the influence of a common body of true law, under a community of principle, those nations must share a common purpose, larger than any one of them. De Gaulle's perception of France, not as a collection of individual Frenchmen, but as a nation that must discover and realize its special purpose in the ordering of civilization, is of that form.

Ironically, but not accidentally, the categories of new weapons of warfare, emerging from the frontiers of plasma physics, are implicitly the tools of our immediate next period of work in space. We need not worry too much about developing such weapons, on condition that those weapons are gradually transformed into ploughshares, in fact, by the kinds of tasks our emerging sense of purpose assigns for their alternate employment.

In general, that growing "blob" of bottled-up Soviet scientific progress, to which I referred earlier here, will be part of the Soviet contribution to both the high energy flux density systems we require to master the raw materials challenge on Earth, and a substantial contribution to our exploration of space. It will also be part of the front from which spring the new productive technologies that must succeed one another in waves of five-to-ten-year frequency in each field over the fifty years ahead.

I write this, substantially aware that what I am writing here was considered with alarm by elements of the British Psychological Warfare Executive during the

second half of the 1960s. I am aware that they were alarmed by the manifest moral effects on the U.S. population of the NASA effort to outpace the Soviet Union in space (and implicitly, weapons technology of the sort correlated with space technologies). I am aware that they proposed not only to slash NASA efforts for that reason, but promoted the "SALT" process chiefly in the effort to induce the Soviets to relieve the United States of the prosciende pressure of Soviet high-technology progress in such dimensions.

One of those alarmed by this was the Rapoport with whom I had some correspondence on a related difference between us back during the early 1950s. The proponents of the neo-Malthusian antiscience view, such as that one-time correspondent of mine, have had the same epistemological differences over decades. I propose the space orientation for the same reason of fact they oppose it. Those who proposed the cutting down of NASA were wrong, were part of the effort leading to the present war danger. For related reasons, reversing their policy, as I have indicated here, is part of the pathway toward peace.

There are those who will deprecate the approach I have outlined here as "idealistic"—among the spectrum of unkind epithets they will accord it. Such critics will, on the evidence of past performance, present themselves as "more practical" than I. I despise their "practicality," which has in fact led us into the present crisis. Step by step, each decision informed by the perceived "most practical" choice, the "little politicians," the hoary-headed careerists, has guided nations and associated institutions of policy-making down each step of the

way through economic stagnation and devolution, straight to the gates of radioactive Hell. Assuredly, these are to be admired as most "practical" men, whose smug esteem for "practicality" it would be insolent to consider as anything less than the best available sort of political wisdom.

They managed quite well. They brought us successfully each step of the road. There was but one flaw in all this; they ignored the fact that they were leading us, and themselves, quite successfully to Hell.

Such wretchedly "little people"—no doubt centering their judgments around such universal, world-historical values of concern for their careers, re-election prospects and pensions, have one usual argument of last resort. "You can't change human nature," they decree with an air of finality about such an utterance. What "human nature"? That of the people in general, who are lied to, perpetually misled, their minds doped up with pornography and other popular forms of mind-deadening "entertainments"? Or, is it perhaps the "human nature" of the "little politicians" themselves—the sort who would march the world straight into Hell behind "Rasputin" Brzezinski and the mentally unbalanced President Jimmy Carter, to enjoy thereby the continuing protection of the "unity of the alliance."

Am I "idealistic"? Or, are these sorts of critics perhaps mythology-ridden bunglers of the sort which have brought the world step by step to the brink of Hell?

They are mere "little politicians," whose memories extend no further than to what prevailing mythologies misinform them respecting a mere generation or two.

Where is their expertise in such matters as these before us? There is not an experienced "old man" within their number.

I speak for the "old men." I tell you from the experience of that factional current for which I speak, that this is a time of crisis in which the manifest failure of the habitual ways of judging matters is precisely what is being viewed, increasingly, as bankrupt by the peoples of the world. It is during such periods, in the past, that "old men" before our time have rescued humanity from the hellish consequences of what seemed to be the overwhelming hegemony of the Mesopotamian "magicians," the cult of Apollo, and the modern, "Genoese" continuation of that same evil.

It will not occur if one waits for many to agree in advance to considering such remedies. It will occur because a relatively tiny minority among those in leading positions act with the determination and wisdom of "old men," to generate momentum behind the steps which must be taken. This is a revolutionary moment in history; either a few seize the opportunity so represented, or "Western civilization" will not survive this time.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. was born in Rochester, New Hampshire and spent the first ten years of his life in what was then a shoe manufacturing and farming center.

After completing military service in the China-Burma-India theater, he left university studies to begin a management consulting career in 1947. After an interval exploring other forms of employment, he resumed consulting in 1952, and continued this throughout the 1950s and 1960s. More recently, he has headed up an international political intelligence news service, a service which, among other qualifications, has gained respect and influence for its competence in combatting international terrorism.

Since 1974, LaRouche has gained recognition in the highest political and financial circles throughout the world through his influence in sponsoring a new, gold-based monetary system to replace the decaying International Monetary Fund. Among many of his leading friends and adversaries alike, he is often described as the "intellectual author" of the new monetary system emerging around the European Monetary Fund.

As a result of LaRouche's breakthrough in economic science, he has become a leading figure in promoting a revival of the "American System" of political economy, the political economy earlier associated with Alexander Hamilton, Henry C. Carey, and Friedrich List. This breakthrough was achieved through bringing in Riemannian physics to provide solutions for previously unsolved problems of "mathematical economics." Successful applications of Riemannian physics to economics have become the connecting link in his collaboration with numbers of leading plasma physicists in promoting solutions to present-day energy problems.

LaRouche's campaign will show that a nonliberal majority can be assembled for a moral **presidency**, uniting Democrats, Republicans and independents behind a January 1981 return to that American System which provided the foundation for our nation's former greatness.

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