Occupy Free Skool Collective

We are happy to announce class proposal submission has begun! We want to thank those who have jumped on board right away and we are looking forward to seeing your class in action. Don’t forget, we have a meeting on December 29th at the Black Sheep Pub and Restaurant in Ashland from 3:30 to 5 PM. Come help us open our first “season”. Check out our Classes tab to see how to propose a class, see upcoming classes in the Event Calendar tab, or drop of your class wishlist back in the Classes tab or in an email to us!

Solidarity Forever!

–OFSC


"Community" and "Property"

There is a lot more that could, and ultimately should, be said about the relationship between Proudhon's The Celebration of Sunday and his later works, but a detailed treatment will have to wait until I can complete and post the ongoing translation. There are lots of interesting issues raised in that early work that seem to resonate with those that came later—and in some cases much later. And the temptation to wander off on one of half a dozen fascinating tangents is something I've been fighting off with only partial success. For the moment, however, there are probably enough questions raised by the "energetic" interpretation of the commandment against theft, which raises the possibility that theft is a precondition for property, rather than the other way around, and puts Proudhon's infamous phrase in a rather different light.

I want to tackle a number of the immediate consequences of this alternate reading is some fairly short posts.

In the fifth chapter of What is Property? Proudhon proposed a "dialectical" reading of the development of "sociability," according to which society developed from "community" (communauté, unfortunately rendered as "communism" in Tucker's translation) to "property" and then, by a sort of "synthesis" of the two previous forms, to "liberty." We know that Proudhon gradually shifted his method from the application of a more-or-less Hegelian, and fairly mechanical dialectic, through an attempt to adapt Fourier's serial method, to a preoccupation with antinomies, which, ultimately, did not resolve themselves. We also know that his concerns remained relatively constant, but we have certainly complicated the project of determining just how consistent by our translation of communauté as "communism," and, at least potentially, by not taking "property" in its most "energetic" sense.

When we look at Proudhon's account of "dialectical" development, with the terms understood as we have generally understood them, the first two terms are obviously opposed approaches, but it isn't at all clear that "community" (or "communism") and "property" have a thesis-antithesis relationship. As critical as the battle between rival schools of property theory has been, it's almost certainly a mistake to proceed as if there is really a dialectic at work. It has, in fact, been commonplace for even anarchists to agree with Marx that Proudhon was a bit of a bungler in his attempt to apply Hegel's approach. But we have to at least consider whether or not it is perhaps Proudhon's critics who have been a little clumsy. If "property is theft," "theft" is a matter of "holding, turning or putting aside," and "community" is, in its primitive form, not much more than the absence of property—a form of society in which there is not "holding, turning or putting aside"—then the thesis-antithesis relationship looks a lot more convincing.

An article rewrite: Hegel’s idea of "Mind" as it relates to logic

The original was posted a few weeks ago.

Mind: Hegel's logical category in plain English

The term Mind in Hegel's thought confused me until recently. Hegel saw logic, dialectical knowledge, and Mind as three phases or 'moments' of knowledge, as three aspects of knowledge that contain within them all potential meaning.

Logic refers to logic with no reference to the external world. Dialectical knowledge refers not to the dialectical method but to knowledge gained from empirical reality. Scientific knowledge is dialectical knowledge, as are practical rules of thumb, because it emerges from a dialogue or interaction with the world itself.
According to Hegel, the stage of knowledge labeled "Mind, Geist or "Spirit", is produced by applying logic to dialectical knowledge, and is a higher form of knowledge. But in what way, and what exactly does it have to do with "Mind"?

How is Mind different from dialectical knowledge? If you're looking at something scientifically there's logic involved, but if you take a pure empiricist perspective, rationalist analysis should play a small part. In pure empiricism, meaning is supposed to only come from what the facts themselves say. If you rationally reflect on the facts to find truth, you can commit grave errors because of the inherent bias that comes from personal experience, points of view, and preferences.

However, there are problems with only using empirical facts. Noam Chomsky argues that if scientists only used the inductive empirical method, where every hypothesis is based on strictly verified chains of facts all observed experimentally, we wouldn't have modern technology. Instead, we'd still be waiting to observe all the facts we needed. At a certain point, the chain of facts we have access to runs aground and we have to use other methods to find conclusions. If rationalism is biased because we're trapped in our own heads, and have cultural, historical, and personal conditioning that influences us, empirical deduction is flawed because it can be very indeterminate. The solution, or a solution to the problem of how to get valid knowledge without relying on minute empirical observation is that observed facts have an inner logic to them. If you've studied something intently enough, you have enough information to make speculations based on the apparent logic and meaning that the system of facts contains. The speculations can then be experimentally verified or disproven those. Facts can be manipulated over and over again without taking new observations. No one said that hypotheses have to be sourced to a 't' in order to be true. They just have to be experimentally proven.

What sets speculation of this kind apart from rationalism is that the deductions and manipulations occur after the initial observations happen, not before, and so are contextualized within the space of the observations themselves, which puts obstacles in the way of direct interference from prejudice. Creative license can also be applied, but creative license anchored in experimentally confirmable observations.

Such speculation is an instance of Hegel's category of Mind, an application of logic to empirical or dialectical data. I believe that Hegel called this kind of logic "Mind" because it's what we do when we think critically about our experiences, our lives, and the issues we face. Through using logic to make sense of empirical data while not rationalistically prejudicing the content, by using the logical faculty of Mind, we can produce quicker associations that can spur faster human progress than if we just slogged through the prison of observed facts.

Property is theft, competition is theft too…

Kevin Carsion discusses why, not only property is theft, but competition is theft too.

Consider local zoning and “safety” laws that require a seller of baked goods to rent expensive commercial property instead of operating out of their home, and to use standard industrial-sized ovens and dishwashers instead of the spare capacity of their regular household appliances. The only way to amortize that cost is by operating on a scale that requires several employees, lots of hours of paperwork, extensive remodelling to meet local code and ADA requirements, and so forth.

From the consumer standpoint, a major part of the price of the baked goods you buy is the embedded cost of that expensive rent, the cost of servicing the loans, and other overhead. And from the producer standpoint, all possibilities of starting out small with minimal capital outlays and overhead, and expanding incrementally with minimal risk, are foreclosed.

In every case, the effect is to require more hours of labor, more capital expenditures, and more overhead to be serviced, than a given unit of output would require for purely technical reasons.

Merry Christmas everyone. See you next year, when I will begin a series attacking both pro-choice and anti-abortion positions, which should be of great interest.


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Proudhon, property and theft, in 1839

Over the last few years, I've spent a lot of time demonstrating how the very suggestive general observations in Proudhon's What is Property? only really emerge as a property theory when we bring them together with developments in his later writings—and how, even then, we are arguably left to pick up his positive project, imagining a property that would not be theft, ourselves. As it turns out, there are also so clarifications to be made by looking back at Proudhon's earlier work, from 1839, The Celebration of Sunday.

The Celebration of Sunday is a peculiar mix of things. It's mostly a celebration of the genius and foresight of Moses, whose legislation is presented as a canny mix of realpolitik and insights so deep that he could only present them in the form of a seed which might germinate and flower under other conditions. For those who know Proudhon as the guy with some harsh things to say about the Jews, his high praise for Israelites may come as a bit of a surprise—and/or his criticisms of the Talmudic tradition may come as a kind of confirmation. I think a bit of both reactions is probably appropriate, and that adding some content to our sense of Proudhon's position can only help. In relation to Proudhon's economic and social theory, we can also see a lot of his early attempts to come to terms with issues like equality, the role of the family, the nature of just authority and government, etc.—and in one passage on the Decalogue's injunction against theft, we get a very interesting first look at Proudhon attempting to relate theft and property. Here is the passage in French:
L'égalité des conditions est conforme à la raison et irréfragable en droit, elle est dans l'esprit du christianisme, elle est le but de la société ; la législation de Moïse prouve que ce but peut être atteint. Ce dogme sublime, si effrayant de nos jours, a sa racine dans les profondeurs les' plus intimes de la conscience, où il se confond avec la notion même du juste et du droit. Tu ne voleras pas, dit le Décalogue, c'est-à-dire, selon l'énergie du terme original lo thignob, tu ne détourneras rien, tu ne mettras rien de côté pour toi (1). L'expression est générique comme l'idée même : elle proscrit non-seulement le vol commis avec violence et par la ruse, l'escroquerie et le brigandage, mais encore toute espèce de gain obtenu sur les autres sans leur plein acquiescement. Elle implique, en un mot, que toute infraction à l'égalité de partage, toute prime arbitrairement demandée, et tyranniquement perçue, soit dans l'échange, soit sur le travail d'autrui, est une violation de la justice communicative, est une concussion.
And the accompanying footnote reads: "Le verbe ganab signifie littéralement mettre de côté, cacher, retenir, détourner." (The verb ganab literally means to put aside, to hide, to hold, to divert." Some of these terms also have more specific applications to commerce. Détourner can mean to swindle, but Proudhon seems to be arguing for a rather literal translation of the terms, one which respects the original "energy" of an injunction which he associates with a basic "equality of conditions and goods." So we might be inclined to translate the passage in this way:
Equality of conditions is in conformity to reason and an irrefutable right, it is in the spirit of Christianity, it is the aim of society; the legislation of demonstrates that it can be attained. That sublime dogma, so frightening in our time, has its roots in the most intimate depths of the conscience, where it is mixed up with the very notion of justice and right. Thou shalt not steal, says the Decalogue, which is to say, with the vigor of the original term, lo thignob, you will divert nothing, you will put nothing aside for yourself. The expression is generic like the idea itself: it forbids not only theft committed with violence and by ruse, fraud and brigandage, but also every sort of gain acquired from others without their full agreement. It implies, in short, that every violation of equality of division, every premium arbitrarily demanded, and tyrannically collected, either in exchange, or from the labor of others, is a violation of communicative justice, it is a misappropriation
There is a fair amount here that requires some clarification, some of which is undoubtedly somewhat different than the positions that Proudhon would adopt later. Approaching the passage on the treacherous ground of probably authorial intent, I'm honestly torn between two readings. The first is comparatively cautious. We have, after all, a catalog of the varieties of robbery in What is Property?
We rob,—1. By murder on the highway; 2. Alone, or in a band; 3. By breaking into buildings, or scaling walls; 4. By abstraction; 5. By fraudulent bankruptcy; 6. By forgery of the handwriting of public officials or private individuals; 7. By manufacture of counterfeit money. ... 8. By cheating; 9. By swindling; 10. By abuse of trust; 11. By games and lotteries. ... 12. By usury. ... 13. By farm-rent, house-rent, and leases of all kinds. ... 14. By commerce, when the profit of the merchant exceeds his legitimate salary. ... 15. By making profit on our product, by accepting sinecures, and by exacting exorbitant wages.
And what these fifteen varieties of theft have in common is that they all seem to involve something which could be considered abuse—even, if we are careful about our terms, the abuse of property. If we choose to translate détourner as swindle, and proceed as if those other synonyms for theft also refer specifically to unjust forms of holding, turning or putting aside, then we seem to be in general agreement with the work of 1840, and if there are some awkward elements in that work—perhaps particularly the definition, in the introduction to the second edition, of "property" as "the abuse of property,"—we are at least no worse off than we were before.

The more "energetic" approach is to treat the prohibitions against holding, turning or putting aside much more literally. Instead of assuming that the target of the commandment is abuse, and thus that Proudhon's reading of 1839 is in agreement with his catalog of the forms of robbery in 1840, we can see that holding, turning or putting aside are the very means by which any sort of property, beyond the most transient sort of use or consumption, might be established—and property is theft, in a much more literal and consistent sense than any we find in What is Property?

About Ron Paul’s newsletters from the ’90s…well, what did you expect?

Libertarianism always had this fringe element, in one form or another.

Occupy Atlanta Helps Save Iraq War Veteran’s Home From Foreclosure

By Jason Cherkis of the Huffington Post: WASHINGTON — In a tangible victory by the Occupy movement, Occupy Atlanta has successfully helped save an Iraq War veteran from foreclosure. Activists began occupying Brigitte Walker’s home on Dec. 6. By the end of that first week, JPMorgan Chase, which owns her mortgage, began discussing with the [...]

A couple of historical gems

Roderick Long has posted a translation of a chapter from Gustave de Molinari's 1893 work on "Labor-Exchanges." I doubt anyone not already interested in Molinari's work will be won over, but it's a very interesting bit of that particular puzzle—and it's good to see more of Molinari's work in translation. Our understanding of all the players in anarchist/libertarian circles is enhanced by making more works available to more readers.

Readers of French may be interested in P.-J. Proudhon's review of the "Essai sur l'analyse physique des langues, ou Alphabet méthodique," by Paul Ackermann, which Woodcock cites as Proudhon's first published article.

A come to Jesus moment not required to live a great life, although we want it to be.

Our society is strange. We tolerate the worst behavior by men, and when they want to change , to live life with real meaning, values, and responsibility, we naturally present Christianity as the Way. Capitalism pushes consumption and attitudes that fuel misbehavior and excess, and an empty, unhealthy MTV, football, and Jersey Shore environment, and the fundamentalist Churches offer to fill the void through being born again and following God. If you do, you'll be put in touch with the virtuous higher life.

One extreme follows the other, and often born again Christians pursue a separatist agenda, cutting themselves off from secular society, creating an alternate universe where good values prevail. The churches take advantage of people who want to change, convincing them that they need an intimate relationship with Christ, and a total Biblical worldview for change to happen. The seekers give them an inch of their inner thoughts and conflicts and they take a yard of their independence, pressuring them to absorb the fundamentalist cult mentality, when all they wanted was to lead a decent life.

You don't need to accept Christ, believe in God or the Bible to lift yourself up or lead a good existence. The principles involved are purely philosophical. There's nothing sacred about them, but our ethical tradition, influenced by unreligious pagans like Aristotle and Seneca, has been so Christianized that it's hard to disassociate the higher life from the Christian life.

Instead, society should incorporate adult responsibility and virtue into itself as something natural, no Jesus, God or Bible involved. It's not productive to either mindlessly involve yourself in "the world" or cut yourself off from it, and it's a mark against the U.S. that we don't have a good secular way to discuss how to live a good life.

Sunny Sheu Killed after reporting death threat from Judge Joseph Golia.


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