Flight-to-quality is usually accompanied by an increase in demand for assets that are government-backed and a decline in demand for assets backed by private agents.
A phenomenon that occurs with flight-to-quality is flight-to-liquidity. A flight-to-liquidity refers to an abrupt shift in large capital flows towards more liquid assets. One reason why the two appear together is that in most cases risky assets are also less liquid. Assets that are subject to flight to quality pattern are also subject to Flight to liquidity. For example, U.S. Treasury bond is less risky and more liquid than a corporate bond. Thus, most of theoretical studies that attempt to explain underlying mechanism take both flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity into account.
Worsening of initial impact developed into a flight-to-quality pattern as the unusual and unexpected features of the events made market participants more risk and uncertainty averse, incurring more aggressive reactions compared to responses during other shocks. Liquidation of assets and withdrawals from financial market were much severe that it made a risky group of borrowers much harder to rollover their liabilities and finance new credits.
A recent development in theories explains various mechanisms that led an initial effects to a flight-to-quality pattern. These mechanisms follow from an observation that a flight-to-quality pattern involves a combination of market participant's weakening balance sheet and risk aversion of asset payoffs, extreme uncertainty aversion, and strategic or speculative behavior of liquid market participants.
A “balance sheet mechanism” focuses on institutional features of financial markets. It provides an explanation for feedback loop mechanism between the asset prices and balance sheet, and investor's preference for liquidity. The idea is that if investor's balance sheet depend on asset prices under delegated investment management, then a negative asset price shock tightens investor's balance sheet forcing them to liquidate asset, and make investor prefer more liquid and less risky assets. Forced liquidation and change in investor's preference further lower asset prices and deteriorate the balance sheet amplifying the initial shock. Vayanos models how a relationship between fund managers and clients can lead to effective risk aversion when illiquidity risk rises due to asset price volatility. He and Krishnamurthy introduces principal-agency problem to a model to show how specialists’ capital investment are pro-cyclical. Brunnermeier and Pedersen model margin requirement and show how volatility of asset prices tightens the requirement that lead to asset sales.
An “information amplification mechanism” focuses on a role of investor’s extreme uncertainty aversion. When an unusual and unexpected event incurs losses, investors find that they do not have a good understanding about the tail outcome that they are facing and treat the risk as Knightian uncertainty. An example is subprime mortgage crisis in 2008. Investors realized that they did not have good understanding about mortgage backed securities which were newly adopted. Newly adopted financial innovation meant that market participants had only a short time to formulate valuation, did not have enough history to refer to in their risk management, and hedging models. Under Knightian uncertainty, investors respond by disengaging from risky activities and hoarding liquidity while reevaluating their investment models. They only take conservative approaches, investing on only safe and uncontingent claims to protect themselves from worst case scenarios on the risk that they do not understand which further deteriorated asset prices and financial market.
A model of strategic or speculative behaviors of liquid investors provides another mechanism that explains flight-to-quality phenomenon. Acharya et al show that during financial turmoil liquid banks in interbank loan market do not led their liquidity to illiquid banks or hoard liquidity for precautionary reasons. But, rather hoard them to purchase assets at distress price. Brunnermeier and Pedersen study strategic behaviors of liquid traders when they know that the other traders need liquidate their positions. The study shows that the strategic behaviors would lead to predatory pricing which leads price of risky and illiquid assets to fall further than the price based on risk consideration alone.
Caballero and Krishnamurthy show that central bank acting as a lender of last resort would be effective when both balance sheet and information amplifier mechanisms are at work. For instance, a guarantee issuance by government or loans to distressed private sectors would sustain deteriorating asset prices, bring confidence back in financial market, and prevent fire sale of assets. Brock and Manski argue that government's guarantee on minimum returns on investment can restore investor's confidence when Knightian uncertainty is prevalent.
Acharya et al argue that the central bank’s role as a lender of last resort can also support smooth functioning of interbank markets. The loan from the central bank to distressed banks would improve their outside option in bargaining. Thus less efficient asset sales would not be necessary and liquid banks would not be able to behave monopolistically. Brunnermeier and Pedersen propose short selling restrictions and trading halts to eliminate predatory behaviors of liquid traders.
This text is licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA License. This text was originally published on Wikipedia and was developed by the Wikipedia community.
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